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Thank you Mr Chairman
New Zealand would like to thank the Director General for his comprehensive and professional report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We also thank DDG Heinonen and the safeguards team for the technical briefing on the report they provided last week.
New Zealand is deeply concerned by the Director General’s report. In it we see a clear message that, while the Agency continues to verify the non diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, it remains unable to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is used for peaceful activities or to provide confidence to the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is disappointed that, contrary to resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran has continued with its enrichment activities. These include Iran’s ongoing stockpile of low enriched uranium, which now stands at almost 2500 kg, and the introduction of a second cascade to enrich uranium to 20% at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. We note the Director General’s characterisation of this second cascade as a new and significant development in both its design and operation. New Zealand also remains concerned about Iran’s construction of the enrichment facility at Qom, and its refusal to provide the Agency with detailed information on the purpose, design and construction of that facility. Of similar concern is Iran’s refusal to provide the Agency information relating to its announced construction of additional centres at a number of undisclosed locations and the development of “third generation” centrifuges.
New Zealand notes that the Agency and Iran have now agreed on strengthened safeguards measures at the PFEP, and that Iran has cooperated with the Agency request to not feed the second cascade at the facility or connect it to the first cascade until the revised safeguards approach had been implemented. We regret, however, that Iran did not provide sufficient time for the Agency to implement these measures before it began enriching to 20 percent. We recall that Iran’s failure to do so was inconsistent with its safeguards obligations under Article 45 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand recalls that Iran has said its decision to enrich to 20% was to produce the fuel it needs for the Tehran Research Reactor domestically. We understand, however, that the Agency still has no information about Iran’s plans to convert this enriched uranium into the fuel needed by the TRR. We appreciate the efforts of Brazil and Turkey to assist Iran in this humanitarian endeavour. We will follow developments on this cooperation closely, including the consultations with interested states as discussions continue, the proposal is further clarified and current concerns are addressed. We note, however, that Iran has asserted it will continue to enrich to 20% regardless of whether a deal is reached on the provision of fuel for the TRR. This raises questions about Iran’s decision to enrich to 20% and reduces confidence in the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We look forward to a solution on the provision of fuel to the TRR that will resolve these concerns.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is also deeply concerned that there remain a number of outstanding issues which still need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. We note that the Director General’s report highlights the seriousness of these issues, which have led to increased concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
We are disappointed and concerned by the complete absence of progress on all of these issues, and we note the Director General’s statement that “with the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is essential that Iran engage with the Agency and provide the required access and information without delay”. We call on Iran to cooperate with the Agency immediately, to provide the information and access necessary to resolve these issues.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand notes that the report again confirms that the Modified Code 3.1, as agreed by Iran in 2003, remains in force in Iran. In this context, for both Darkhovin and the new facility at Qom, Iran failed to notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorise construction of the facility. The report repeats earlier conclusions that Iran’s actions in this regard are inconsistent with its obligations under the subsidiary arrangements to its safeguards agreement and raises concerns about the completeness of its declarations.
New Zealand is deeply concerned at Iran’s ongoing refusal to accept the Additional Protocol or application of modified Code 3.1, the impact it is already having on the Agency’s safeguards activities, and the potential implications it might have in the future. We support the Director General’s call for Iran to fully implement its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Modified code 3.1 and the Additional Protocol.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand calls on Iran to provide the Agency with the necessary access to the Heavy Water Production Plant, the Uranium Conversion Facility and any other location where projects related to heavy water are being carried out so that the Agency can verify the suspension of heavy water related activities as mandated by the UN Security Council.
We note too that questions remain to be answered concerning the precise nature of the Research and Development activities conducted at the JHL. The operators told inspectors in January that these activities were pyroprocessing activities, to produce uranium metal. However, we note in the report that Iran has since stated that the Research and Development was instead related to a research project aimed at studying the electrochemical behaviour of uranyl nitrate in ionic liquid. We urge Iran to work with the Agency to clarify the nature of its R&D activities as soon as possible.
Mr Chairman
It is in all our interests for the IAEA to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Agency has made clear in its current report that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
New Zealand has consistently called on Iran to engage in confidence-building activities, including transparency measures and ratification of the Additional Protocol, and we continue to encourage Iran down this path. We emphasise, however, that such activities must complement, and not replace, Iran’s compliance with mandatory requirements including Security Council resolutions on the suspension of enrichment activities and work on heavy water related projects, and compliance with Modified Code 3.1.
We, like all members of the board of Governors and the broader international community, continue to expect Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to the extent necessary for the Agency’s fulfilment of its verification mandate. We remain disappointed and frustrated that Iran has not yet done so.
Thank you Mr Chairman.
