Global IssuesDisarmamentEnvironmentHuman RightsInternational SecurityInternational OrganisationsAfricaAntarcticaAsiaAustraliaEuropeLatin AmericaMiddle EastNorth AmericaPacific
New Zealand statement
Thank you Mr Chairman
New Zealand would like to thank the Director General for his report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We also thank DDG Heinonen and the safeguards team for the technical briefing on the report they provided last week.
New Zealand is deeply concerned by the Director General’s report. In it we see a clear message that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is used for peaceful activities or to provide confidence to the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Contrary to United Nations Security Council resolutions and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, including the Board’s latest resolution in November last year, Iran has continued with enrichment activities. Iran has begun construction on a new facility and announced ten more. It has taken actions with the aim of enriching uranium up to 20% at Natanz and has provided insufficient time for the Agency to adjust existing safeguards procedures.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is deeply disappointed by Iran’s decision to pursue enrichment to 20% at the PFEP at Natanz, an action that is contrary to Iran’s obligations under Security Council resolutions. We note the conclusion in the Director General’s report that, with respect to the increased maximum enrichment levels at the PFEP, Iran’s failure to provide the Agency with design information sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted is inconsistent with its safeguards obligations under Article 45 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We also regret Iran’s decision to begin feeding material into the PFEP cascade without advising the Agency of the date it would do so, and without giving inspectors the opportunity to be present.
New Zealand notes that Iran has sought to publicly justify its decision to enrich to 20% by claiming it needs to produce fuel for the TRR domestically. We understand from the technical briefing provided last week by the Safeguards Department, however, that the Agency has no information about Iran’s plans to convert this enriched uranium into the fuel needed by the TRR. This raises questions about the intention behind Iran’s decision to enrich to 20% and reduces confidence in the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We look forward to a solution on the provision of fuel to the TRR that will resolve these concerns.
We note with disappointment that Iran has not responded to any of the Agency’s further requests for access to relevant design information documents and companies involved in the design of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom. We understand that such access is essential to allow the Agency to clarify outstanding questions with regard to this facility and its construction and we call on Iran to cooperate fully.
Iran has also refused to grant the Agency requested access to the Heavy Water Production Plant at Esfahan. It has neither clarified the origin of the large number of drums observed at the facility in October 2009 nor allowed the Agency to take samples of the water, and has declined to provide any further information on these drums. The Director General’s report points out that UNSCR1737 (2006) requires Iran to provide the access and cooperation needed by the IAEA to verify the suspension of all heavy-water related projects, and makes it clear that the Agency needs direct access to the drums at Esfahan to fulfil its UNSC mandate.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is also deeply concerned that there remain a number of outstanding issues which still need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. We note that the Director General’s report highlights the seriousness of these issues, including activities related to nuclear explosives and the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems, which the report notes seem to have continued beyond 2004. These activities have led to increased concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
We are disappointed by the complete absence of progress on all of these issues and we call on Iran to cooperate with the Agency without further delay, to provide the information and access necessary to resolve them.
Mr Chairman
We also note that the report makes it clear that the Modified Code 3.1, as agreed by Iran in 2003, remains in force in Iran. In this context, for both Darkhovin and the new facility at Qom, Iran failed to notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorise construction of the facility. The report concludes that Iran’s actions in this regard are inconsistent with its obligations under the subsidiary arrangements to its safeguards agreement and raises concerns about the completeness of its declarations.
New Zealand is deeply concerned at Iran’s ongoing refusal to accept the Additional Protocol or application of modified Code 3.1, the impact it is already having on the Agency’s safeguards activities, and the potential implications it might have in the future. We support the Director General’s call for Iran to fully implement its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Modified code 3.1 and the Additional Protocol.
Mr Chairman
It is in all our interests for the IAEA to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Agency has made clear in its current report that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
New Zealand has consistently called on Iran to engage in confidence-building activities, including transparency measures and ratification of the Additional Protocol, and we continue to encourage Iran down this path. We emphasise, however, that such activities must complement, and not replace, Iran’s compliance with mandatory requirements including Security Council resolutions on the suspension of enrichment activities and work on heavy water related projects, and compliance with Modified Code 3.1.
We, like all members of the board of Governors and the broader international community, continue to expect Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to the extent necessary for the Agency’s fulfilment of its verification mandate. We are disappointed and frustrated that Iran has not yet done so.
Thank you Mr Chairman
