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New Zealand statement
Thank you Mr Chairman
New Zealand thanks the Director General for his report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We also thank DDG Heinonen and the safeguards team for the technical briefing on the report last week.
New Zealand is deeply concerned by the Director General’s report. We are troubled by what is in it but also by what is missing, namely a credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Members of the Board of Governors, and the broader international community, continue to expect Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to the extent necessary for the Agency’s fulfilment of its verification mandate. We are disappointed and frustrated that Iran has not yet done so.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand supports the resolution before the board on the implementation of the NPT safeguard agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The resolution highlights the ongoing and important work of the IAEA in seeking to resolve the issues outlined in the Director General’s report, and reaffirms the commitment of the Board of Governors to achieving a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The resolution makes clear, however, that further steps are needed in light of Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its international obligations in this area.
The credibility of the IAEA demands some consequence for breaching Security Council requirements, acting inconsistently with Agency safeguards obligations, and refusing to cooperate on even the most basic confidence-building measures. From New Zealand’s perspective this resolution exercises the authority of the Board of Governors under Article XII C of the Agency’s statute to report the non-compliance of any Member State to the Security Council of the United Nations. We encourage all members of the Board to support the resolution and urge Iran to comply without delay.
Mr Chairman
Returning to the Director General’s report, New Zealand notes that the Agency carried out design information verification at the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom on 26 and 27 October. We also note the Agency’s confirmation that the plant corresponds with the design information provided by Iran, and that the facility will henceforth be subject to regular DIV by the Agency in accordance with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. We welcome the advice of Mr Nackaerts at last week’s technical briefing that Iran was very cooperative in allowing the IAEA team full access to the facility during the inspection.
New Zealand regrets the late notice given of the Fordow site by Iran. We recall the finding of the IAEA that Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorise construction of the facility is taken. In this regard, we note the Director General’s conclusion in his latest report that Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is deeply concerned at Iran’s ongoing refusal to accept the application of modified Code 3.1, the impact it is already having on the Agency’s safeguards activities, and the potential implications it might have in the future. In this regard we note that the Director General’s present report also classifies Iran’s failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin facility until September of this year as inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
New Zealand shares the view of the Agency that Iran’s declaration of the new facility near Qom reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction, and gives rise to questions about whether there are any other nuclear facilities in Iran which have not been declared to the Agency. In light of this confidence deficit, Iran’s statement that it does not have any other undeclared nuclear facilities currently under construction or in operation is insufficient. We note that the Agency has sought further clarification of whether Iran has taken a decision to construct, or authorise construction of, any undeclared nuclear facility, and call on Iran to respond to the IAEA in a fully transparent and timely manner.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is deeply concerned that there remain a number of outstanding issues which still need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. We are disappointed by the complete absence of progress on all of these issues and we call on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and provide the information and access necessary to resolve them.
Mr Chairman
It is in all our interests for the IAEA to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Agency has made clear in its current report that it cannot do this unless Iran implements the Additional Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the Agency. New Zealand has consistently called on Iran to engage in confidence-building activities, including transparency measures and ratification of the Additional Protocol, and we continue to encourage Iran down this path. We emphasise, however, that such activities must complement, and not replace, Iran’s compliance with mandatory requirements including Security Council resolutions on the suspension of enrichment activities and work on heavy water related projects, and compliance with Modified Code 3.1.
Finally, Mr Chairman, New Zealand has followed with interest the efforts of the IAEA, Iran, the United States, France and Russia to agree a nuclear fuel deal for the Tehran Research Reactor. Such a deal would constitute a much-needed confidence building measure and we encourage all parties to continue their constructive engagement with a view to reaching a positive outcome.
Thank you Mr Chairman
