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Thank you Mr Chairman.
New Zealand would like to thank the Director General for his comprehensive and professional report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We also thank acting DDG Hermann Nackaerts and the safeguards team for the technical briefing on the report last week.
New Zealand is once again deeply concerned by the Director General’s report. In it we see a clear message that, while the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, it remains unable to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is used for peaceful activities or to provide confidence to the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is disappointed that, contrary to resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran has continued with its enrichment activities. These include Iran’s ongoing stockpile of low enriched uranium, which now stands at just over 2800 kg, and the optimisation of 20% enrichment at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. We note with concern too that Iran has yet to provide the Agency with the necessary access to the Heavy Water Production Plant, the Uranium Conversion Facility and any other location where projects related to heavy water are being carried out so that the Agency can verify the suspension of heavy water related activities as mandated by the UN Security Council.
New Zealand notes that the report again confirms that the Modified Code 3.1, as agreed by Iran in 2003, remains in force in Iran. In this context, for both Darkhovin and the new facility at Qom, Iran failed to notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorise construction of the facility. The report also calls on Iran to fulfil its obligations with respect to the provision of design information relating to its announced construction of additional centres at a number of undisclosed locations and the development of “third generation” centrifuges. New Zealand urges Iran to fully implement its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Modified Code 3.1 and the Additional Protocol.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is deeply concerned that there remain a number of outstanding issues which still need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. We note that the Director General’s report highlights the seriousness of these issues, which have led to increased concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
We are disappointed and concerned by the complete absence of progress on all of these issues, and we note the Director General’s statement that it is essential that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and document, and be allowed to interview all relevant persons, without further delay, and that the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of some relevant information increase the urgency of this matter. We call on Iran to cooperate with the Agency immediately, to provide the information and access necessary to resolve these issues.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand is particularly concerned by Iran’s decision to object to the designation of two inspectors because it disapproves of language used in the Director General’s report in June 2010, and by its threat to withdraw the designation of inspectors should confidential information be conveyed to the media in the future. Such actions and threats may be seen to intimidate the Safeguards Department and its inspectors, and do not appear to be consistent with the CSA requirement that a State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement.
New Zealand notes in this regard the Director General’s conclusion in the present report that the repeated objection by Iran to the designation of inspectors with experience in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and facilities hampers the inspection process and thereby detracts from the Agency’s capabilities to implement effective and efficient safeguards in Iran. We call on Iran to respond positively to the Agency’s request for the withdrawal of its objection to the designation of inspectors with experience in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and facilities.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand notes the inclusion in the report of a number of incidents involving the breaking of seals by the operator at FEP, some variance in the enrichment levels of U-235 in samples taken in the FEP cascade area, and developments in the nuclear material accountancy system of that facility. We thank the clarification provided by the Safeguards Department on these issues at the briefing last week and look forward to the Agency’s final evaluation following the next PIV scheduled for October 2010.
New Zealand strongly believes that it is in all our interests for the IAEA to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Agency has again made clear in its current report that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
New Zealand has consistently called on Iran to engage in confidence-building activities, including transparency measures and ratification of the Additional Protocol, and we continue to encourage Iran down this path. We emphasise, however, that such activities must complement, and not replace, Iran’s compliance with mandatory requirements including Security Council resolutions on the suspension of enrichment activities and work on heavy water related projects, and compliance with Modified Code 3.1.
We, like all members of the Board of Governors and the broader international community, continue to expect Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to the extent necessary for the Agency’s fulfilment of its verification mandate. We remain disappointed and frustrated that Iran has not yet done so.
Thank you Mr Chairman.
