
I take the floor on behalf of Canada, Australia and New Zealand to explain why we must vote against draft resolution A/C.5/60/L.37/Rev.1.
The resolution before us is not a product of consensus. It does not express our three countries’ strong support for reform. This resolution does not do ourselves, our leaders and the UN as a whole, justice. We cannot accept this.
We are sad and disappointed to have been put in a position where we have to vote “no” on a vote that need not have taken place. We wanted to avoid a vote. Since the financial crisis of the mid 1980s and the consequent adoption of resolution 41/213, the work of the UN on budgetary and administrative matters has been largely based on the idea of consensus. This system has served the membership and the organization well. The consensus approach has worked because it recognised that the essential interests of all groups need to be accommodated. It has worked because each group of countries has been prepared to take serious account of what the others can accept, and find agreements accordingly.
In this spirit, while we strongly disagreed with the assertion by the G77 and China that the Secretary General’s governance proposals should be rejected (indeed, we believe action in this area must --at minimum-- be on the table for discussion) CANZ was willing to consider setting proposals 20 and 21 aside temporarily in the interests of reaching a consensus on today’s resolution. We commend the EU for their effort in putting forward a deal that would have incorporated the main thrust of South Africa’s original amendment on this section, and regret that the G77 was unable to accept this compromise.
Mr. Chairman, the draft resolution we are left with represents an unnecessary departure from this system of mutual accommodation. It risks serious harm not only to this Committee, but also to our shared interests in management reform. It is unnecessary because there are no proposals on the table that require decisions now. The ideas in the Secretary-General’s paper, “Investing in the United Nations” (A/60/692) are to be elaborated and explained in more detailed proposals to come at later dates. It is at that point that decisions will need to be taken.
This extraordinary session was not the time to provide strategic guidance to the SG or make substantive policy decisions. Instead, the role of the Fifth Committee should have been to provide such comment as we were able to agree upon, as an input for consideration by the General Assembly of the SG’s report.
Mr Chairman,
The Summit Outcome document, a document adopted by consensus, requested, among other things, the SG to submit proposals on the conditions and measures he needs to manage effectively. Proposal 16 in report A/60/692 responds to this request. We fully expected the SG to elaborate on the ideas contained in proposal 16. However, L.37.Rev1 seeks to prohibit the SG from doing so. And why? Because the sponsors of the draft resolution contend that this particular set of proposals do not constitute the “limited discretion” referred to in the budget resolution adopted last December (resolution 60/246). Mr. Chairman, we cannot accept that a group of delegations can designate itself as the sole arbiter of what constitutes “limited discretion”. The refusal to allow the SG to elaborate on the proposals so that Fifth Committee can discuss them, unfortunately, speaks volumes about the character of the negotiations. We believe that the SG has a standing mandate to propose the conditions and measures he needs to manage – the Summit Outcome Document gives him this mandate. Irrespective of the outcome of this resolution, we urge the Secretary-General to fulfil his mandate.
Accordingly, Mr Chairman, we cannot accept this resolution, which we believe has the potential to damage UN reform not only now, but well into the future. We urge delegations to consider the message that adoption of this resolution would send.
Thank you.