BlogsEventsFeaturesImage galleriesMediaMFAT speeches2006200720082009201020112012Media contact informationMedia updateMinisters releasesPublications
Mr Chairman,
Allow me at the outset to assure you of my delegation’s full support for your endeavours at the helm of this Preparatory Committee meeting. We look forward to a full engagement on key substantive and procedural issues under the agenda and timetable that you have formulated to guide our work. We thank you for the comprehensive and inclusive way in which you have carried out the complex groundwork required for this meeting.
On the key issue of nuclear disarmament, New Zealand stands firmly behind the views of the New Agenda Coalition, as expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Ireland. It is clear that creating a world safe from nuclear weapons must remain one of the international community’s most pressing priorities.
Mr Chairman,
The beginning of a new NPT review cycle gives us all an opportunity to move forward in constructive engagement on ways to strengthen the Treaty’s regime against the many challenges of today’s security environment. We look forward to participating positively in that process.
In doing so, we should honour the commitments and obligations agreed in the past to enable us to move the NPT regime forward. We should remember that NPT negotiations have always involved a balance of interests. It is the NPT’s status as the cornerstone of our global security regime that makes the preservation of this balance all the more vital.
Everyone must be able to recognise and act on their part of the bargain to ensure that the threat of nuclear war does not encroach on future generations. Obligations jointly entered into over the course of our shared NPT history provide the benchmarks against which to assess how best to move forward together and how well we have done to date. The long-term success of the Treaty is dependent on the delivery of all of its objectives.
One of the dichotomies we continue to face is the inherent contradiction between some states arguing a unique security benefit from the possession of nuclear weapons while insisting that no more states should be allowed to acquire them. Indeed, in recent times, this argument has even been extended to encompass the reasoning that it would be irresponsible for some states to relinquish nuclear weapons in the current geo-political environment. We need to find ways to regain the opportunity that was taken up in other WMD treaties where biological and chemical weapons were ideologically rejected by all states because of their abhorrent and indiscriminate effects. Are we not safer in a world where nuclear deterrence is universally outlawed as a security doctrine for all states, as has happened with the other weapons of mass destruction?
Mr Chairman,
Just as the nuclear weapon states made an unequivocal commitment under the NPT to eliminate their nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon states undertook a parallel obligation never to acquire or facilitate the proliferation of such weapons. New Zealand takes this obligation very solemnly, and continues to be active on a number of fronts to guard against nuclear proliferation. Through the G8 Global Partnership, New Zealand has contributed a project to shut down Russia’s last plutonium producing nuclear reactor and we have recently announced we will contribute to a project in the Ukraine to combat the smuggling of nuclear materials. Through the Proliferation Security Initiative, we are working with a network of states to combat the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. We are also implementing changes to our domestic export control legislation to incorporate the facility for catch-all controls. These examples illustrate some of the practical ways in which New Zealand is implementing its non-proliferation commitments.
Mr Chairman
New Zealand shares the international community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear programme. It remains New Zealand’s strong preference that a peaceful, negotiated solution to this matter is found but Iran must do its part. We urge Iran to comply with UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions regarding its nuclear programme, in particular through suspending its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and co-operating in a full and transparent manner with the IAEA.
New Zealand was extremely disappointed at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s decision late last year to conduct a nuclear test. New Zealand has urged the DPRK to implement its commitments under the Six Party Talks 13 February Initial Actions Agreement and the 2005 Joint Statement. As a long-time supporter of efforts to bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula, New Zealand encourages the DPRK to return to active membership of the Treaty, meet its NPT obligations and resume co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Mr Chairman,
New Zealand is in full agreement that all NPT states parties in compliance with their safeguards obligations have the right to access to peaceful nuclear technology. It is fitting that in this year which celebrates the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 50th anniversary this meeting should be held in the Agency’s home of Vienna. Over the course of its history, the Agency has provided vital support to the Treaty in its provision of compliance verification and peaceful use nuclear technology to all NPT states. In order to ensure that the safeguards regime remains current in a constantly evolving global environment, we have long advocated that the Additional Protocol, which represents the contemporary verification standard, should be a condition of nuclear supply.
We are not starting from a zero-base on consideration of substantive issues during this review cycle. Significant work was done on many topics during the 2005 Review Conference, which was only hindered in its progress towards pragmatic conclusions through inability to agree an overall result for the Conference. We believe that there is considerable merit in revisiting some of that work to see whether there is potential for it to be updated and incorporated into our deliberations at this PrepCom. We will be contributing further comments on individual topics during the specific time you have made available for substantive issues within the timetable.
In conclusion Mr Chairman,
We need to move forward collectively, but this process will require due recognition and implementation of the commitments we have negotiated together in the past. As we work on formulating what can be achieved within the framework of the current review cycle, we need to remain mindful of complementary opportunities to progress NPT-relevant work. For example; the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, or the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would both constitute concrete gains for the NPT regime. Constructive engagement on measurable and practical objectives would provide a useful confidence building dynamic on which to develop the next review cycle of our Treaty. New Zealand is committed to playing its part in this process.
