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1. I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, members of the New Agenda Coalition.
2. As we embark on a new Review Cycle, it is imperative to build on the achievements of past Review Conferences. The New Agenda Coalition regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, upon which we have all helped to construct the consensus that today underpins and sustains that regime. In trying to build further, we should not undermine our achievements by seeking to resile from previous commitments. Otherwise, we risk undermining the Treaty itself.
Mr Chairman,
3. In 1995, the States Parties extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The Review Process of the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were adopted. The Resolution on the Middle East was adopted as an integral part of the 1995 package.
4. In 1996, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and under strict and effective international control.”
5. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference represents a positive step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In particular, nuclear weapon-States made the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed on practical steps to be taken by them that would lead to nuclear disarmament. To this end, additional steps were necessary to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty.
6. The fact that the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to agree on a substantive outcome document containing any measures to strengthen the Treaty, cannot, and does not, affect the validity of commitments made at these two previous Review Conferences. We believe that such commitments, freely made in consensus outcome documents, have a particular legitimacy.
7. The New Agenda Coalition acknowledges that the agreements reached in 1995 and in 2000 provide for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved through systematic and progressive efforts. The task for all States Parties over the course of this Review Cycle will be to identify and address particular aspects on which incremental progress is necessary, and should be made, with a view to advancing towards the objective of a nuclear weapon-free world.
Mr Chairman,
8. The fact that the Treaty has not achieved universality despite its entry into force 37 years ago remains a source of concern to the New Agenda Coalition. Considering that universality is highlighted in Decision II of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as an essential element in achieving international peace and security and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that concrete steps are taken towards achieving this pivotal goal in order to fully realise both the declared objectives of the Treaty and the commitments made by the States Parties to the Treaty as part of the consensus package of Decisions and Resolutions achieved at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. We call upon all States Parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, and, in that regard, we urge India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet Parties to the Treaty, to accede to it as non nuclear weapon states promptly and without any conditions.
9. The New Agenda Coalition is concerned at the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasising the importance of nuclear weapons not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. Plans to modernise nuclear forces have reinforced these doctrines. Moreover, certain policies have broadened the scope of potential use of nuclear weapons, for example as a preventive measure or in retaliation against the use of other Weapons of Mass Destruction. We believe that if the nuclear-weapon States continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is a real danger that other States will start pondering whether they should do the same.
10. The continuation of the Cold War-era high alert status surely makes little sense in today’s security environment and only serves to exacerbate the danger posed by the existence of these weapons. It is essential that the nuclear-weapon States remove the launch-on-warning option from their security doctrines by agreeing reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. In addition, States should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions, or undertake the replacement or modernisation of their nuclear-weapon systems, which runs counter to the agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference on a diminishing role of nuclear weapons and on the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate these weapons.
11. The emergence of new nuclear doctrines which envision a role for nuclear weapons in offensive capabilities of States lends a new urgency to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear weapon-States against such use. The New Agenda Coalition calls upon the nuclear weapon-States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapon-States Parties which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT or as a protocol to the Treaty.
12. We believe that attempts to secure advances on non-proliferation, while at the same time disregarding the significance of nuclear disarmament, are counterproductive; disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Genuine implementation of irreversible, verifiable and transparent nuclear weapon reductions, leading to their total elimination, serves to diminish the perceived utility of these weapons, and thus their desirability.
13. The New Agenda Coalition calls upon the United States and the Russian Federation to show leadership in the nuclear disarmament process by extending START, upgrading SORT to include verification and negotiating further reductions including destruction of warheads and to include tactical nuclear weapons in future negotiations.
Mr Chairman,
14. The 2000 Review Conference agreed on the necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Review Conference called for immediate negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
15. While disappointed that this timetable has not been met, the New Agenda Coalition is encouraged by the recent constructive discussions on this matter in Geneva and welcomes the efforts currently being exerted in the CD, including the P6 proposal to enable negotiations to get underway. For such a treaty to be meaningful it should include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. Negotiation and conclusion of a fissile material treaty will limit the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals, and, therefore, can be understood as a significant step in a phased programme towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mr Chairman,
16. The New Agenda Coalition remains totally opposed to nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. We have repeatedly underlined the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay and without conditions. Further progress in this direction will strengthen the norm against all nuclear weapons tests established by the treaty.
17. Pending entry into force of the CTBT, the New Agenda Coalition calls upon all States to uphold and maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. The strict observance of the CTBT’s purpose, obligations and provisions is imperative on the path to a world free of nuclear weapons. In this connection, we welcome the progress made in the installation of the International Monitoring System as an integral part of the CTBT’s verification regime.
Mr Chairman,
18. We have presented a working document further outlining our views and principles on all these issues. This document is being circulated by the Secretariat as an official document of this meeting under the reference number NPT/CONF.2010/PC.1/WP.15 and I commend it to delegations’ attention.
