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Mr Chairman
Let me first congratulate the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on reaching its 50th anniversary. The Agency has, since its inception 50 years ago, worked professionally to further the goals we all share – to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way.
At the helm of the Agency’s work in recent years has been the Director General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei. He has distinguished himself during his terms in Office by his independence and professionalism. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr ElBaradei and the staff of the Agency in 2005 is truly a fitting tribute to his work, and to the staff of the Agency. They have worked diligently over the years to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
New Zealand strongly supports the work of the Agency and recognises the vital contribution that it makes in verifying that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty fulfil their non-proliferation commitments as enshrined in Article III of the NPT.
New Zealand attaches great importance to the Agency having all of the tools necessary to provide robust assurances to the international community that nuclear activities undertaken by States are purely for peaceful purposes.
We would note Mr Chairman that since the 2005 Review Conference, nine further Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements pursuant to the NPT have been brought into force. It is, however, of deep concern that thirty States have yet to fulfil their respective obligations under the Treaty. We urge those states remaining outside the safeguards system to remedy this situation as a matter of priority. In addition, we call on all States to submit all nuclear material and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards.
Current proliferation challenges today, however, mean the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on its own is no longer adequate in giving the Agency the necessary authority to fully carry out its verification mandate under the Treaty. In the absence of an Additional Protocol only a limited level of assurance can be provided regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The Additional Protocol is the key tool in this regard and forms the contemporary verification standard. Mr Chairman it is this verification standard that should always feature as a condition in new supply arrangements developed with non-nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand strongly urges all States Party which have not yet done so – particularly those with significant nuclear activities – to conclude and to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.
In the verification context, outstanding issues remaining with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme are yet to be adequately addressed. New Zealand shares the international community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and the major challenge this represents to the non-proliferation regime. It remains New Zealand’s strong preference that a peaceful, negotiated solution to this matter is found but Iran must do its part. We continue to urge Iran to comply with UN Security Council and Agency’s resolutions regarding its nuclear programme, in particular through suspending its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and co-operating in a full and transparent manner with the IAEA.
New Zealand joined many others last year in universally condemning the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK on 9 October 2006. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme remains a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. In this context, we call upon the DPRK to dismantle fully implement their denuclearisation commitments in a prompt, verifiable and irreversible way.
New Zealand welcomes the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 following the Six Party Talks in Beijing, in which the DPRK committed to initial actions towards the implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement. New Zealand has long-supported efforts to bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula, and believes the Six Party Talks are the key process in this regard. We have strongly encouraged the DPRK to return to active membership of the NPT, to meet its Treaty obligations, and to resume its co-operation with the Agency.
New Zealand notes the important role of export controls in preventing the possible misuse of nuclear-related exports for developing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. State Parties’ implementation of effective export controls form an integral part of the non-proliferation regime as recognised in UN Security Council resolution 1540 - later reiterated in UN Security Council Resolution 1673 - which specifically calls on States to implement effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including by establishing and maintaining effective national export controls over nuclear weapon related items
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 also underlines the paramount importance of States establishing effective physical protection measures over nuclear material and nuclear facilities. Mr Chairman New Zealand has placed particular emphasis on the implementation of the measures mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in our region. New Zealand is currently engaged in providing ongoing bilateral assistance to Pacific Island countries to assist them meet their reporting obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Similarly, New Zealand notes the important role that the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction plays in enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material in the former Soviet Union. New Zealand continues to be a contributor to the G8 Global Partnership and is currently working with donors to assist with projects established under the G8 Global Partnership. We would encourage other states parties to also consider making contributions to the G8 Global Partnership.
New Zealand also calls on those states that have yet to do so to make a political commitment to the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. We would note that the IAEA General Conference has encouraged States to harmonise their practices in line with the Guidance and we would encourage States Party to act accordingly.
