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Background
1. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 1995, was accompanied by a resolution (on the Middle East) and by two decisions. The first decision was a commitment to strengthen the Treaty review process. The second was a decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The two decisions and the resolution on the Middle East were specifically linked to the decision on the extension of the Treaty.
2. In the second decision (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2), the States parties expressed their desire that “nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process”.
3. The decision on principles and objectives went on to state, as follows:
4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
- The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Development of a reporting requirement
4. In 2000, the notions of periodic evaluation and systematic and progressive efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, as highlighted in the decision on principles and objectives, were brought together through the provision of a specific reporting requirement.
5. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference included, among a list of agreed practical steps towards the implementation of the Treaty, the requirement to submit:
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”.
Rationale for reporting by all States parties
6. The security of all States parties is affected by the existence of nuclear weapons. The call for reports “within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty” suggests that States parties are expected to report regularly through the central forums of the strengthened review process, in other words, the cyclical meetings of the Preparatory Committee and Review Conference. Given that all parties share in the responsibility to implement the Treaty, the reporting requirement applies to all States parties.
Rationale for reporting by nuclear-weapon States parties
7. The readiness of the non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo nuclear weapons by becoming party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is testament to their belief that collective security is best served by the elimination of nuclear arsenals. The increased responsiveness by nuclear-weapon States to article VI reporting, following the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference outcomes, has been welcomed.
8. Reporting on systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States would further increase transparency and build international confidence, helping to create a climate conducive to further disarmament.
Recommendations
9. The Treaty envisages both in its preamble and article VI that nuclear disarmament will take place through “effective measures”. We recommend that the
Conference give further effect to this by including the following recommendation in its outcome document in respect of article VI:
1. Calls on the nuclear-weapon States to systematize their reporting along the following lines:
- Nuclear doctrine (including measures taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems and any security assurances);
- Fissile material (policy on production and control);
- Warhead and delivery vehicle numbers;
- Strategic and tactical reductions;
2. Calls on the nuclear-weapon States to provide these reports to five-yearly Review Conferences, with updates provided as appropriate at the Preparatory Committee meetings;
3. Calls on all States to continue to report on their efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament, including the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.
