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The Seriously Asia conference held in Wellington in November 2003 placed a renewed focus on New Zealand’s relations with Asia. In the wake of that conference a number of initiatives were taken to enhance New Zealand’s profile in Asia. The first prime ministerial visit to India since 1985 took place in October 2004, and the first Summit meeting with ASEAN leaders since 1977 took place in November 2004. The fostering of new science and technology linkages, and the initiation of cultural diplomacy projects, have both had a strong Asian focus. There is funding allocated for specific Seriously Asia projects (prime ministerial fellowships, academic and media exchange programmes) in 2005/6 under the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF).
North Asia’s overall significance to New Zealand has grown steadily in recent decades - the region’s importance is now in many respects, on a par with that of our more traditional partners (Australia, Europe, and North America). Over the past few years, North Asia has emerged as a primary engine of global economic growth, with China increasingly playing the role of regional economic hub. Intra-regional trade has grown to account for more than 50 percent of the region’s total trade – primarily as a result of increased investment into China by South Korea and Japan.
In stark contrast to these deepening economic ties, however, historical and political issues continue to divide the region, often in a complex and overlapping fashion. The six-party talks over the North Korean nuclear issue offer some hope that longstanding tensions on and around the Korean peninsula can be peacefully resolved, but agreement so far has been elusive and would in any case likely take several years to fully implement. Meanwhile, recent visits by Taiwan opposition leaders to China have helped lower immediate tensions across the Taiwan Strait, but fundamental issues remain unresolved. Recent heightened tensions between China and Japan raise the prospect of long-term competition for regional and global influence between two of New Zealand’s more important bilateral partners.
North Asia is important to New Zealand for four broad reasons:
Our goal is to promote New Zealand’s core economic and political interests in the region and expand bilateral ties through balanced and productive relationships in North Asia. Relations with China, Japan and South Korea have received a high profile through visits by the Prime Minister. Coming the other way has been a steady flow of high-level visitors, particularly from China.
New Zealand has Embassies in Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo, and Consulates-General in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei is headed by a seconded MFAT officer. We are represented by Honorary Consuls in Fukuoka, Nagoya, Osaka and Sendai (Japan) and are accredited to Macau, Mongolia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
China: New Zealand has completed four rounds of FTA negotiations with China. After four rounds, China has a clear understanding of the type of agreement New Zealand is seeking, although has indicated a range of issues represent new approaches or present challenges to its current systems. The fifth round is scheduled for 17-20 October and will provide an opportunity to gauge further the nature of China’s positions (see separate brief below). Meanwhile, we are working separately with Beijing to facilitate individual trade access issues, in particular concerning New Zealand’s meat trade with China. The political relationship with China is a central driver of our focus of engagement, including trade. It is kept in good heart by frequent bilateral exchanges. We are keeping a watching brief over judicial developments regarding the filing of a civil suit against former Chinese president Jiang Zemin by a small group of Falun Gong practitioners in New Zealand.
Japan: We are currently working towards implementing the June agreement between the New Zealand and Japanese Prime Ministers to take a fresh look at the bilateral trade and economic relationship. We are also examining ways to promote bilateral dialogue, including between academics and researchers, on appropriate political and security issues. These efforts will help underpin the two leaders’ commitment to strengthening high-level exchanges, including those between the Prime Ministers and the Ministers. Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (under the G4 proposal) is currently in some doubt as the G4 has not been able to garner enough support from UN Member States. The issue may still resonate in the future. New Zealand recently lodged a formal request with Japan to negotiate improved access for our apples, and bilateral discussions are ongoing on a range of other phytosanitary and regulatory issues.
Korean Peninsula: We continue to play close attention to developments in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. There is potential for New Zealand to again be asked to help provide energy assistance to the North as part of any new agreement. Meanwhile, New Zealand is seeking, through a series of bilateral meetings at senior officials’ level, to resolve a number of outstanding market access issues with South Korea, including for sliced deer velvet, potatoes, and fish heads.
Whales and fisheries: Japan is seeking a return to commercial whaling through the replacement of the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) moratorium with a Revised Management Scheme. Lack of progress towards that goal has seen Japan increase the number of whales (and species of whales) it intends to catch for ‘scientific’ purposes. We currently enjoy an open and constructive relationship with Japan on fisheries issues. Japan recently acceded to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission despite an earlier disagreement over its scope. It is commencing access negotiations with members of the Forum Fisheries Agency, suggesting it will be an active and engaged member of the Commission. Japan has also indicated it is considering possible accession to the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, a move that would be welcomed by New Zealand.
GIF: Seriously Asia, Cultural Diplomacy International Programme: A number of North Asia initiatives have been approved for funding this financial year under the Seriously Asia work programme, including media and academic exchanges. The North Asia focus for Years Two and Three of the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme includes planning for a major interactive exhibition by Te Papa to North Asian capitals and a series of documentaries about New Zealand for the Chinese market, focusing on New Zealand as an innovative and creative country with a distinctive and unique identity.
Science and technology: Science and technology links with North Asia continue to expand, following interest stimulated by the New Zealand science mission to North Asia in August 2004, led by the Minister for Research, Science and Technology. Close cooperation with MoRST and other partner agencies has led to increased visits in both directions by scientists and policy makers and collaborative partnerships such as that recently concluded with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
Education, tourism and migration: Numbers of North Asians travelling to New Zealand for study, leisure and migration reasons remain high. International education (drawing 80,000 North Asian students annually) and other ‘people-to-people’ sectors need to be managed carefully if they are to grow in a sustainable manner, as recent experience with China in particular has shown. China, South Korea and Japan (in that order) are far and away New Zealand’s largest education markets.
Forestry: China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are important markets for our forestry products. MFAT is the lead government agency for the Forestry Trade Access Group (TAG), which is a component of the Forest Industry Development Agenda (FIDA). The TAG is responsible for identifying and addressing market access issues affecting New Zealand forestry exports, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Further investment from North Asia is also sought for our forestry processing industry.
The tsunami disaster of late 2004 caused a great deal of damage to the coastlines of India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with New Zealand’s bilateral aid programme in Sri Lanka having significantly increased as a result. NZAID also has programmes in Nepal and the Maldives.
India’s role in regional and global affairs continues to grow in importance. The decision by ASEAN to extend to India an invitation to attend the inaugural East Asia Summit reflects India’s increasing engagement in the South/Southeast Asian region and shows that ASEAN recognises India’s importance. India is pursuing FTAs with its ASEAN neighbours at the moment. New Zealand has been actively seeking to deepen bilateral links with India in recent years, recognising India’s democratic tradition, strategic significance, and the various people-to-people links.
New Zealand’s trade relations with India have been growing, with a focus on services (information technology and education) and eliminating irritants in the bilateral trade relationship such as sanitary and phytosanitary issues and other non-tariff barriers. Aviation services negotiations are scheduled to continue in the near future. The Indian tourism market has been identified by Tourism New Zealand as a target market.
Sri Lanka was a recipient of New Zealand overseas development assistance prior to the tsunami disaster but levels of assistance have since increased. The Sri Lankan community in New Zealand was very active in fundraising for the tsunami relief effort and maintain an active interest in aid distribution and the political situation in Sri Lanka.
New Zealand is concerned over internal security in Nepal. There have been cases of Nepalese coming into New Zealand and then claiming refugee status. New Zealand has introduced transit visas as a result. Nepal continues to receive development assistance from NZAID.
New Zealand has a limited relationship with Bangladesh. The international community has expressed concern that Bangladesh is becoming a haven for terrorists. The 463 bomb blasts that occurred on 17 August and the ferry bombing of 28 August have confirmed fears that the security situation is deteriorating.
The visit in June by Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, raised the profile of the bilateral relationship. It highlighted areas such as education, information and communication technologies (ICT), agriculture and dairy with potential for both government and business to build closer links. New Zealand concerns on democratic reforms, human rights and freedom of expression were registered during President Musharraf’s visit and Pakistan was encouraged to continue down the path of democratic reform.
New Zealand has a High Commission in India and is accredited to Pakistan (through the Embassy in Tehran), Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
Southeast Asia is of central importance to New Zealand in economic, political and security terms. In recent times our relationship with the region has been characterised by growing trade ties and an increasing tempo of high-level political engagement.
In the year to June 2005, two-way trade with Southeast Asian nations topped NZ$6.6 billion. Countries where we have over NZ$1 billon trading relationships include Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Our biggest export market in the region is the Philippines, at over NZ$540 million. The terms of trade are weighted heavily in the region’s favour, with high value petroleum products (Singapore and Brunei) and manufactured goods (Thailand and Malaysia) ensuring we import around NZ$1.1 billion more than we export to Southeast Asia (our exports are dominated by primary products). Our economic integration with the region is being strengthened by trade agreements including the Thai CEP, the Trans-Pacific SEP, and ongoing negotiations with Malaysia and with ASEAN/Australia (see separate briefs on the trade agreements).
Our growing political engagement with the region has seen an increasing level of contact between government ministers and leaders. In 2005 we have received visits from the President of Indonesia, and the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Viet Nam. Our Prime Minister visited Thailand, and the Governor-General has also visited Malaysia and will visit Viet Nam in November. These contacts reflect the growing importance accorded to our relations by both sides
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is at the centre of important structural changes in Asia as countries look toward greater regional integration to support national efforts towards political modernisation and continued economic progress. It is a fluid environment, driven in large part by China’s (and India’s) economic and political emergence and determination among ASEAN countries to strengthen their economies. ASEAN has sought to position itself at the hub of this emerging regional architecture, which will reach its most tangible expression in the holding of the inaugural East Asia Summit in December this year (see separate brief on the EAS).
New Zealand has worked hard to be seen as a natural partner in the evolution of these regional mechanisms and we are pleased to have been invited to the first meeting of the EAS. The Prime Minister’s attendance at the ASEAN/Australia/New Zealand Summit in Vientiane in November last year marked the 30th year of New Zealand’s Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN. New Zealand also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in July this year - an important symbol in our relationship with ASEAN.
On the security front, the countries of Southeast Asia are increasingly aware of non-traditional threats and have taken considerable steps to combat terrorism. New Zealand supports these efforts and we signed, in July this year, a declaration with ASEAN on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. There remain, however, pockets in some countries where terrorist groups are still of concern. Secessionist elements and other forms of political unrest in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines area also potentially destabilising influences in the region. The possibility of an Avian Influenza epidemic (and some analysts suggest it is a question of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’) is a significant threat to human security, in its broadest sense, both within the region and beyond.
The Boxing Day Tsunami struck a devastating blow with loss of life on a previously unimaginable scale. The disaster also proved not only to be a testament to the resilience and resolve of the people of the region, but also a yardstick of their governmental capabilities and public infrastructures. The Southeast Asian nations themselves were the foundations of the international response. New Zealand has committed over NZ$68millon to post-tsunami relief and reconstruction.
New Zealand has Embassies in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam, High Commissions in Malaysia and Singapore, and Consulates-General in Ho Chi Minh City (Viet Nam) and Timor-Leste (soon to be upgraded to an Embassy). We are represented by an Honorary Consul in Sarawak (Malaysia), and are accredited to Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
Our relationship with Indonesia is a complex one. President Yudhoyono’s visit in April highlighted his democratic credentials and the efforts by his government to fight corruption and to combat terrorism. It also suggested we could be doing more to broaden the base of our political and economic interaction. There is scope to develop our education, tourism and trade ties, including aviation services. A Joint Ministerial Commission to be held in Jakarta in November this year will be an opportunity to progress a number of issues. The recent peace deal in Aceh was a very positive development, but the implementation of special autonomy in Papua has been uneven and the prognosis there is still unclear. Formal military links with Indonesia remain suspended.
Together with Timor-Leste, Indonesia has placed a great deal of emphasis on the Joint Truth and Friendship Commission. But concern has been expressed internationally about the possibility of this body granting amnesties in relation to the 1999 crimes against humanity. New Zealand’s commitment to supporting Timor-Leste as a politically stable and economically viable new nation can be seen in our ODA programme, our assistance to the fledgling defence force, and our decision to upgrade the Consulate-General in Dili to full Embassy status.
Our very good relations with Malaysia, with deep roots in education and military ties, were shifted up a gear by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s visit to New Zealand in March. The FTA negotiations launched then should become a springboard for closer and stronger economic ties. A new Education Counsellor, with a region-wide mandate, will soon be established in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia’s decision to de-list 24 meat processing plants on halal grounds is an issue in an otherwise positive bilateral relationship - officials are working actively to resolve this matter.
Singapore remains a very close partner in Southeast Asia. Our economies are closely connected, with the New Zealand-Singapore CEP providing the basis for the recently concluded Trans-Pacific SEP (encompassing Singapore, Brunei and Chile). The depth of our military relationship with Singapore is second only to Australia, and Singapore has consistently supported the idea of an open and outward-looking approach to the EAS – including New Zealand involvement. Singapore is actively engaging with other littoral states to combat the threats of piracy and terrorism in the vital trade routes through the Malacca straits.
The conclusion this year of a Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) agreement with Thailand, marked by Prime Minister Clark’s visit to Bangkok in April, was a major step forward in our relationship (see separate brief). 2006 will also be a watershed year as we celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations. Political unrest in parts of southern Thailand has created a new challenge that the Thaksin government is grappling with. New Zealand Police will remain in Thailand through to the end of 2005 to assist with post-tsunami forensic victim identification work.
The Philippines is New Zealand’s current ASEAN Dialogue Partner and we have enjoyed a very positive relationship in that context. Our trade has continued to grow and the Philippines is now our largest export market in the region. We have a longstanding ODA programme and a modest defence Mutual Assistance Programme with the Philippines. President Arroyo has come under immense pressure in recent months in relation to corruption allegations, which have the potential to derail the shaky peace process in Mindanao and severely damage the economy.
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s visit to New Zealand in May signalled a maturing of our relationship with Viet Nam. A Joint Declaration signed at that time will be a useful planning tool for future cooperation. A Joint Trade and Economic Commission, at senior officials level, is due to meet in October this year and bilateral negotiations on the terms of Viet Nam’s accession to the WTO are ongoing. The NZAID programme in Viet Nam was recently increased to NZ$4.8 million per annum, recognising the developmental challenges faced particularly in rural areas. The Governor-General will visit Viet Nam in November this year.
The regime in Myanmar remains out of step with the rest of Southeast Asia and is seemingly impervious to criticism over the lack of democratic freedoms and widespread human rights abuses. Myanmar’s decision to decline the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 was welcome, but the government shows no signs of fundamental change. New Zealand maintains a ban on travel visas for members of the ruling regime. Myanmar is scheduled to be New Zealand’s dialogue partner in ASEAN from mid 2006.
The first East Asia Summit will be held in Kuala Lumpur on 12 December as part of a suite of ASEAN linked meetings, including ASEAN Ministerial and Leaders’ meetings, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN+Russia. New Zealand’s participation in the Summit (other invitees are the ten ASEANs, China, Japan, Korea, India and Australia) will enable New Zealand to help shape the pace and direction of Asian integration. It is expected that EAS Foreign (and possibly Economic) Ministers will hold their own meetings in the week preceding the Summit. There will also be a number of “associated activities” around the EAS including a trade fair and an economic roundtable to which the Prime Minister has been invited.
The structure and agenda for the Summit is still being worked through by ASEAN+3 in consultation with participating countries. At this stage it seems likely that the EAS will meet once every two years, and that substantive discussion will be in the form of a retreat. A number of countries are working hard to keep the structure of the summit open and free flowing, and devoid of the ritual that can restrict robust debate. New Zealand supports these efforts. The agenda for the Summit is also a work in progress, as is a possible EAS Leaders’ Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, we understand the agenda will most likely cover three areas – international issues, regional architecture and development assistance – and that these topics are broadly acceptable to participants.
The pre-eminent security mechanism in our region is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was set up in 1994 as the first arrangement of its kind for consultation and dialogue on security and political issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Its membership comprises the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), plus Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, Timor-Leste and the United States. Bangladesh will join the ARF at the beginning of the 2006/07 year, and Sri Lanka is expected to follow the year after.
The ARF is designed to evolve along a three-stage process, beginning with confidence-building amongst its members, then moving to “preventive diplomacy” (i.e. the prevention of conflicts in the region) and concluding with “elaboration of approaches to conflict” (a compromise reference to conflict resolution, reflecting the ambivalence of some ARF members about progress in this direction).
The ARF provides a useful framework in which ministers, senior officials, defence officers and operational practitioners meet to discuss issues of importance to regional security and hold activities aimed at building confidence between its members. In recent years, the range of issues considered by the ARF has expanded to include non-traditional security threats, such as natural disasters, terrorism, maritime piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national crime and disease epidemics. The ARF also allows New Zealand to engage with countries that we ordinarily have few opportunities for contact with, outside of the United Nations.
The ARF is currently moving into its second phase, preventive diplomacy. New Zealand supports greater involvement by the ARF in the management of regional conflicts, but we acknowledge that this needs to occur at a speed that other ARF members are comfortable with. As the ARF is the only regional forum which brings all the major players into a security dialogue, it is important that they all remain engaged. We also support greater engagement between the ARF and other bodies involved in security issues (e.g. APEC) to reduce duplication and reinforce key messages.
The ARF’s role will continue to develop and broaden, albeit at an evolutionary and sometimes uneven rate. Given the pace of change in regional architecture, it is not yet clear how the ARF’s role will mesh with that of emerging regional groupings such as the East Asian Summit.
Workshops and confidence-building measures are an increasingly important (and resource intensive) feature of the ARF. New Zealand hosted and co-chaired a number of ARF activities during the 1990s, but has been less active in recent years. Ministers may need to consider a New Zealand-led ARF workshop in the medium term.
