



NEW ZEALAND  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE  
MANATŪ AORERE

# Briefing for incoming Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth

JULY 2019

This document has been proactively released.  
Redactions made to the document have been  
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**Cover photos (top to bottom):**

- A view of Scott Base, Antarctica, from an incoming helicopter. *Photo: R. Eisert/University of Canterbury*
- Children participating in Just Play, a New Zealand funded sports development programme, Cook Islands. *Photo: Sunpix*
- The aftermath of Cyclone Winston, Fiji, 2016. *Photo: NZDF*
- MFAT staff member Alice Revell representing New Zealand at United Nations negotiations on a new high seas marine biodiversity treaty. *Photo: IISD/Mike Muzurakis ([enb.iisd.org/oceans/bbnj/prepcom2/31aug.html](http://enb.iisd.org/oceans/bbnj/prepcom2/31aug.html))*
- Shipping containers being transported. *Photo: iStock*
- 'Global Haka' performing with MFAT staff member John Riley at the opening ceremony for the Weta Workshop Exhibition, Seoul, 2014.

# Briefing for incoming Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth

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# Contents

<b>Part one Associate Trade and Export Growth portfolio.....</b>	<b>1</b>
Portfolio overview .....	3
<b>Part two Key trade policy issues .....</b>	<b>7</b>
World Trade Organisation .....	9
Our free trade agreement negotiating agenda .....	12
Negotiations on new trade issues.....	16
Brexit.....	17
The Trade for All agenda .....	18
Treaty of Waitangi and trade.....	19
APEC 2021.....	20
Economic diplomacy.....	21
<b>Part three Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.....</b>	<b>23</b>
Ministry overview .....	25
Our New Zealand connections .....	31
Our operating environment.....	33
Our strategic direction.....	36
<b>Annexes.....</b>	<b>39</b>
Annex 1: New Zealand Trade Policy in 2019: the end of the Golden Weather .....	41
Annex 2: Trade For All — Public Voice .....	51
Annex 3: MFAT organisational chart.....	87
Annex 4: New Zealand Inc offshore footprint .....	89
Annex 5: Māori Engagement Strategy .....	91

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Part one  
Associate Trade and Export Growth portfolio

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## Portfolio overview

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As Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth, you help to grow New Zealanders' incomes, job opportunities and living standards: international economic connections make a vital contribution to economic development and productivity growth. You do this through collaborating with the Minister for Trade and Export Growth (MTEG) and the Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth (MSTEG) in your collective mahi to develop and implement New Zealand's trade policy, and to promote New Zealand goods and services internationally. You are supported in this work by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Te Manatū Aorere) and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (Te Taurapa Tūhono).

We understand that your Associate Minister for Export Growth and Trade responsibilities will have a particular focus on ensuring that the Government's trade policy and trade promotion work is helping Māori to succeed on the world stage (including through advancing indigenous-to-indigenous connections with other iwi taketake puta noa i te ao).

Your appointment is particularly timely as the Government develops its approach in six key areas of particular importance to Māori:

- **indigenous-to-indigenous trade missions;**
- **Trade for All;**
- s9(2)(j) the **Inclusive Trade Action Group (ITAG)** together with Chile and Canada;
- Māori success in **APEC 2021;**
- the establishment of a dedicated **Māori-MFAT Taumata-engagement mechanism** focusing on priority trade policy issues; and
- development of an **Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Protocol** (to apply in the event of an ISDS case where the Treaty of Waitangi exception is likely to be relied on).

Background on these six areas most relevant to your role is provided on the following pages. Briefing on the broader trade policy agenda is set out in Part Two. **Annex 1** contains a more detailed strategic trade policy outlook that Deputy Secretary Vangelis Vitalis prepared for the Minister for Trade and Export Growth in January 2019.

## Indigenous-to-indigenous trade missions

We are increasingly seeing the benefits of New Zealand's unique identity when it comes to forming lasting links with international partners. Planned upcoming visits that will provide further opportunities to build relationships and progress trade opportunities include: the World Indigenous Business Forum in Vancouver (October); s9(2)(f)(iv)

## Trade for All

In August 2018, Prime Minister Ardern launched consultations to create a Trade for All agenda. The agenda will help ensure that our trade policy delivers for all New Zealanders and contributes to addressing global and regional issues of concern. Public consultation on Trade for All was completed in October 2018. The face-to-face outreach involved 15 public events and 11 hui focused on a Māori audience. A summary of feedback from the consultation is attached as **Annex 2**.

Development of recommendations for Trade for All is now in the hands of the 23-person Trade for All Board tasked with producing a report by the end of the year. The intention is for the Government to draw on the Board's report to develop and announce Trade for All by early 2020.

While it is up to the Board to put forward its own recommendations, specific initiatives of interest to Māori could involve, for example, support for indigenous-to-indigenous business connections; support for protection of taonga species, taonga works and mātauranga Māori internationally; further advancement of initiatives to help the internationalisation of Māori businesses; improved practices around trade policy engagement and lifting of mātauranga Māori among government officials involved in trade policy and trade promotion.

## Inclusive Trade Action Group

The International Trade Action Group (ITAG) was established by New Zealand, Canada and Chile and operationalises commitments made in the **Joint Declaration on Fostering Progressive and Inclusive Trade**, which was signed between the three countries in March 2018 at the same time as the **Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**. ITAG Ministers met for the first time in November 2018. Among other things, ITAG members committed to working together to deliver on their expectations that trade can contribute to the achievement of sustainable development and solutions for global issues of concern, including with regard to Indigenous Peoples; affirmed the objectives of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the United Nations on 13 September 2007; and decided to examine ways to address the range of barriers that limit opportunities for indigenous peoples in international trade as well as the effectiveness of the CPTPP with respect to indigenous peoples.

At their most recent meeting in May 2019, Ministers instructed officials to develop activities to share their policies and programmes with regards to indigenous peoples and inclusive trade to determine best practices to facilitate their participation into international trade. s6(a), s9(2)(j)

## Māori success in APEC 2021

From December 2020 to November 2021, New Zealand will host APEC 2021 in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. It will be one of the largest events that New Zealand has ever undertaken. Hosting an APEC 2021 that we can be proud of is a priority in the Coalition Government's long-term plan for New Zealand.

The goal of Māori success in APEC is to enable a meaningful, authentic and impactful contribution by Māori to Aotearoa's hosting of APEC 2021. Involvement in APEC 2021 will ideally result in new economic value for Māori, an enhanced Māori contribution in the Asia-Pacific and increased awareness of Aotearoa's reputation as an inclusive society and leader in indigenous development.

Engagement is occurring with a wide range of Māori stakeholders with an initial focus on mana whenua in Tamaki Makaurau, Whanganui A Tara and Otautahi, Māori entities and peak bodies with economic interests, e.g. Whariki, FOMA, Poutama Trust, MWDI, Iwi Chairs, Local Councils in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and Government agencies responsible for Māori economic and cultural matters, e.g. Te Puni Kokiri, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Treasury, Ministry of Primary Industries, Te Arawhiti, Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Creative New Zealand, Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of Education, the State Services Commission and Ministry for Women.

The focus of engagement has been on creating awareness and understanding of APEC, outlining the potential opportunities and seeking feedback on a package of Maori initiatives. The proposals will include Operations and Hosting: providing an authentic and moving cultural experience for APEC delegates; Leveraging: showcasing the best of te ao Māori; and Policy: leading an indigenous conversation that demonstrates New Zealand's leadership in indigenous development. A paper will go to Cabinet on 22 October 2019, as part of a broader paper on getting the most from our APEC host year.

Māori have been overwhelmingly positive about APEC and the potential opportunities it could provide with the following key themes emerging:

- Kaupapa Māori principles need to underpin the Māori opportunities that are promulgated throughout APEC, such as manaakitanga, whanaungatanga, rangatiratanga, whakapapa;
- Māori want to be portrayed across many domains from culture to commerce and in both a contemporary and traditional context and not in the margins of activities;

- showcase the Treaty as a partnership, the good and the bad and how it has evolved over time; and
- real progress for Aotearoa will be getting Indigenous Peoples on to the agenda within APEC.

## Māori-MFAT Taumata engagement mechanism

A dedicated mechanism (Taumata) through which the Ministry and Māori can deepen their engagement on trade policy and related issues is expected to stand up before the end of July and be operational for a two year term. The Taumata is expected to comprise nine representatives drawn from Māori business, Iwi leadership, FOMA, Trade for All Board, WAI 262 and 2522/23 claimants, Māori landowners, academia, Māori forests and Māori fish interests.

This initiative will provide an opportunity to deepen and regularise discussions on strategic trade policy issues of mutual interest and pave the way for potential collaborations. It will also complement the engagement that MFAT routinely conducts on trade policy with both Aotearoa whānui and Māori. The initial focus will be on trade policy but other related issues, e.g. climate change and the Māori-Pacific relationship, are also expected to feature in ongoing deliberations.

There is a high level of interest within Te Ao Māori in the Taumata engagement model. This was apparent during consultations conducted around the country in the last quarter of 2018 and at dedicated hui in the first quarter of this year, which culminated in a decision to set up an interim Taumata working group to progress stand-up arrangements as quickly as possible. The need for haste is being driven by a growing concern by many Māori around the increasing volatility and uncertainty for agricultural traders in the global market place; the fast moving nature and pace of change; and the number of negotiations currently under way that are of interest to Māori. Recent engagement in Whakatane (with Te Awanuiarangi), Rotorua (with landowners and exporters) and Hamilton (Tainui) upheld the call to move with haste. There was also no demur on the Terms of Reference, which includes a process to firm up the relationship foundation on which the successor to the Taumata will operate. A further 3-4 engagement hui are planned for July with the first Taumata-MFAT dialogue meeting expected to take place in July-August.

## Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) protocol

The Government is developing an ISDS protocol. This would apply if an ISDS case were ever brought against New Zealand in which the Treaty of Waitangi exception in New Zealand's FTAs was likely to be relied upon. Initial consultations were conducted in the final quarter of 2018, and are informing the development of an initial draft that will be subject to further consultation in 2019.

Part two  
Key trade policy issues

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## World Trade Organisation

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As a small export-dependent economy, New Zealand gains huge value from there being a set of common and enforceable global trade rules. Having a single forum where economies can get together to discuss and resolve issues in world trade has resulted in increased stability and security, and commercial certainty, and has helped to deliver increased global prosperity.

### Pressures on the system and the reform agenda

The WTO is currently facing unprecedented systemic challenges. To highlight a few examples, it has not been possible to agree on the appointment of new members to the WTO Appellate Body (AB), with the result being that the AB now has only the minimum three (of seven) Members needed to hear appeals; the multilateral negotiations are in a state of inertia and rules need to be updated in some areas; Members are not fully implementing their existing transparency obligations; and there are tensions regarding who should be able to access “developing country status” and the flexibilities this entails. These issues are symptomatic of broader underlying tensions among the membership. New Zealand is committed to working with other likeminded WTO members to defend, improve and strengthen the multilateral trading system to help address these challenges.

The Minister for Trade and Export Growth continues to participate in the “Ottawa Group”, a small group Ministerial process on WTO reform led by Canada. Following its inaugural meeting in October 2018 in Ottawa, the Group has subsequently met in Davos in January 2019 and Paris in May 2019. New Zealand is one of only 13 WTO members invited to participate.<sup>1</sup> So far in 2019, the group’s focus has been to consider ways to improve the WTO’s deliberative function (i.e. regular Committee work), including through consideration of best practice that can be shared across Committees. The Group also continues to underscore the priority placed on resolving the AB impasse and concluding fisheries subsidies negotiations in 2019.

The WTO has delivered only a handful of new rules and agreements since its establishment in 1995. New Zealand acknowledges that WTO rules need updating, or are incomplete, in some areas and need to be strengthened to better deal with 21<sup>st</sup> Century economic challenges, including sustainable economic development. In particular, New Zealand is a leading advocate for new disciplines on fisheries and agriculture subsidies, and we are actively engaged in plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce. New Zealand is interested in exploring new ways of working. We are particularly interested in how to build momentum in WTO negotiations by using flexible and open negotiating approaches that lay pathways towards multilateral outcomes. This might mean initially working in smaller groups, for example, provided that participation is ultimately open to other Members who meet the required standard, that the negotiations

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<sup>1</sup> Other participants are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland.

are transparent and support WTO rules and institutions, and have a pathway towards multilateralism.

The question of development status (and associated “special and differential treatment” under the WTO Agreements, or SDT) has gained prominence in WTO reform discussions over recent months. The US has now twice tabled a paper at the General Council proposing criteria to entitle development status (in effect the proposal would restrict over 30 current self-declared “developing” Members from continuing to enjoy SDT). China, India, Kenya, Pakistan and South Africa tabled a paper in response, arguing for the continued relevance of SDT. Despite some disagreement, many members have recognised the need for genuine dialogue on SDT. Norway has since submitted a General Council paper on the issue aimed at generating a constructive dialogue (co-sponsored by New Zealand, Iceland, Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, and Hong Kong). Finding a way to respond to US concerns that is also acceptable to major developing countries will be an essential part of ongoing WTO reform discussions, including in the lead up to the 12<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference in Kazakhstan in June 2020 (MC12).

New Zealand is also working with other Members on how to encourage better compliance with notification obligations. These require Members to provide information about their trade-related policies and regulations, and are fundamental for transparency and understanding how Members are meeting existing WTO obligations.

## Key negotiating objectives for 2019 and beyond

### Multilateral negotiations

New Zealand has long sought elimination of harmful fisheries subsidies for environmental, economic and systemic reasons. Throughout 2019 New Zealand is involved in an intensive series of negotiations to conclude disciplines on fisheries subsidies, pursuant to the **Ministerial Decision on Fisheries Subsidies**. This decision from the 2018 WTO Ministerial Conference commits the Membership to continue negotiations to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies for conclusion in 2019 (i.e. before the SDG 14.6 deadline of 2020) and re-commits to existing transparency obligations. Making progress towards this goal has been a key focus of New Zealand’s efforts in 2019. This is the only active multilateral WTO negotiation.

### Plurilateral negotiations

The absence of broader multilateral outcomes from MC11, including in key “new areas” such as e-commerce, resulted in intensified efforts to advance them through plurilateral processes launched under Joint Ministerial Statements. New Zealand joined initiatives launching the following:

- exploratory work toward future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of **e-commerce** (agreed among 70+ WTO Members);
- advancing text-based negotiations to deliver a multilateral outcome on **services domestic regulation** (agreed among 60+ Members);

- an informal work programme on measures to assist **micro, small and medium sized enterprises** (MSMEs) (agreed among 80+ WTO Members);
- collaboration on making national **trade and development policies more gender-responsive**, including by removing barriers to and fostering women's economic empowerment (agreed among 110+ WTO Members and Observers);
- structured discussions with the aim of developing a multilateral framework for facilitating **foreign direct investments**, explicitly excluding market access, investment protection and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (agreed among 60+ Members); and
- ongoing discussion at the WTO aimed at achieving ambitious and effective disciplines on inefficient **fossil fuel subsidies** that encourage wasteful consumption (led by New Zealand, and agreed among 12 Members).

Good progress has been made under these various initiatives. New Zealand has joined a Ministerial Statement issued in the margins of the Informal Gathering of WTO Ministers in Paris in May 2019 calling for outcomes on services domestic regulation to be harvested in time for the next Ministerial Conference to be held in 2020 in Kazakhstan.

Electronic commerce is another area where progress is positive, with negotiating meetings underway. New Zealand has also participated in a range of seminars and workshops at the WTO to share experience on advancing women's economic empowerment; and participated in activities in Geneva aimed at raising awareness about the benefits of fossil fuel subsidy reform.

In addition to advancing these plurilateral work streams, New Zealand has an ongoing interest in ensuring that the WTO remains focussed on establishing an overall limit on trade-distorting agriculture subsidies. New Zealand also continues to closely monitor and question trade distorting policies, s6(a), s9(2)(j) through WTO committees. Meanwhile, some Members have signalled an interest in introducing new negotiations to the WTO agenda, for example, industrial subsidies, forced technology transfer and state owned enterprises, although no work has yet formally begun in these areas in Geneva.

## Our free trade agreement negotiating agenda

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### Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership

The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force on 30 December 2018 ushering in preferential access into Japan, Canada and Mexico for the first time, as well as covering Australia, Singapore and Viet Nam<sup>2</sup> where we had existing agreements. Other signatories — Chile, Peru, Brunei and Malaysia — are working towards completing their domestic processes to ratify CPTPP. They will come on board 60 days after they notify New Zealand as Depository of the Agreement that they have done so.

CPTPP has already provided New Zealand exporters with two rounds of tariff cuts in these markets — one on entry into force and a second one on 1 January 2019 for all except Japan (a second cut for Japan came into effect on 1 April 2019). It is early days, but we are already seeing signs of positive tangible results from CPTPP. In the first quarter of this year, the value of New Zealand's meat exports to Japan increased 25 percent, with beef exports rising by 40 percent; while exports to Canada increased 8.4 percent overall and those to Mexico lifted 5.9 percent for the quarter. Some of these initial figures may have been influenced by companies delaying the delivery of product until CPTPP came into effect, but they nevertheless point to a significant degree of increased interest in these new FTA markets.

The Agreement has the potential to deliver an estimated \$222 million of tariff savings annually once fully in force, with \$104 million of those savings in the first 12 months from exports to the six countries that have already ratified.

At the first CPTPP Commission meeting held in Tokyo in January 2019, Trade Ministers agreed accession procedures to enable other economies to join the Agreement now that it is in force. Multiple economies have publicly expressed an interest in CPTPP — s6(a) — but none have yet formally sought to join the Agreement.

New Zealand will host a second Commission meeting along with associated committee meetings s6(a) These meetings will be important for ensuring CPTPP is implemented effectively and contributes to inclusive and sustainable economic development for its members.

### EU-NZ FTA

The EU-NZ FTA is a major negotiation for New Zealand. The EU is our third-largest trading partner with two-way trade reaching around \$25 billion dollars in 2018 (\$20 billion excluding the UK). Four rounds of negotiations have been held since the launch in

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<sup>2</sup> Viet Nam agreed to implement a double round of tariff cuts as soon as the Agreement entered into force for it on 14 January 2019 to keep in sync with the second round of tariff cuts that had come into effect for other members from 1 January 2019.

June 2018. New Zealand is seeking comprehensive and commercially meaningful market access outcomes from the EU in this agreement, in addition to strong provisions on trade and sustainable development, including climate change. Initial market access offers have been exchanged for goods, services, investment, and government procurement, s6(a), s9(2)(f-v), s9(2)(g)

In addition, New Zealand has begun work to assess the EU's proposed list of geographical indications (GIs) to be protected under the agreement. s6(a), s9(2)(j)

like GIs. Further rounds are scheduled for July and October 2019.

## Pacific Alliance

Negotiations towards a free trade agreement with the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) are ongoing, with Chief Negotiators meeting in Mexico City in early June 2019. Seven rounds of FTA negotiations with the Pacific Alliance have taken place since October 2017. Agreement has been reached in a number of areas, including across the rules of the agreement and elements of the Government's Trade for All Agenda. We are working to conclude negotiations as soon as possible, but this will depend on securing commitments from Chile, Mexico, and Peru that build on existing agreements (including the CPTPP), and a high quality and comprehensive first free trade agreement with Colombia.

## Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations cover the 10 ASEAN member countries, and Japan, Korea, China, India, Australia and New Zealand. These markets take over 56 percent of New Zealand's total goods and services exports. New Zealand's participation is of critical importance to help embed us in the region at a time of rising turbulence in global trade, and particularly as a path to conclude a free trade relationship with India. At the 2<sup>nd</sup> RCEP Leaders' Summit in November 2018, Leaders announced that negotiations had made "substantial progress" in 2018 and that they were determined to conclude in 2019. Negotiations will continue to intensify this year on a number of outstanding issues, including finalising market access.

## China FTA upgrade

Seven rounds of negotiations on the China FTA upgrade have been held since 2017, most recently in Wellington over 6-8 May 2019. The next meeting is likely to take place in early August in Beijing. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang shared ambition to conclude negotiations as soon as possible when they met in Beijing in April 2019. s9(2)(j)

Our focus is on modernising the agreement and addressing barriers that continue to impact exporters, with removing barriers affecting wood and paper products trade being a key focus. We are also focused on

tackling non-tariff barriers affecting goods trade and aim to achieve high quality, services market access.

## New Zealand/Singapore Closer Economic Partnership

On May 17 2019, the Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth signed the upgraded Closer Economic Partnership (CEP), as part of the launch of the New Zealand Singapore Enhanced Partnership. The upgraded CEP will come into force following the completion of respective domestic legal procedures by both parties. For New Zealand, this will include undertaking Parliamentary treaty examination and the passage of regulations to meet our updated obligations with respect to customs duties and procedures. New Zealand was not able to amend commitments regarding purchases of residential land in New Zealand by overseas buyers. Therefore, New Zealand has exempted Singapore from screening of residential land as sensitive land under the recently passed Overseas Investment Amendment Act 2018.

## ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area

Work is under way to upgrade the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA). The negotiations are expected to take 2-3 years. The upgrade will address both long-standing areas of the FTA's built-in agenda (services, investment and rules of origin) as well as enabling the parties to agree more novel areas (including new provisions in e-commerce and government procurement) and cooperation in Trade and Sustainable Development. Commitments on goods market access and intellectual property are outside the agreed scope of these upgrade negotiations. The Ministry is currently receiving public submissions on the upgrade negotiations until 31 July 2019.

## Upgrade of other FTAs

Work is also under way to upgrade some of our other existing FTAs, including the Second General Review of our free trade agreement with **Hong Kong**.

Our current **PACER Plus** priority is to encourage Pacific signatories to ratify the Agreement. [s6\(a\)](#) and Samoa are the most likely countries to achieve this before the August Pacific Islands Forum. Officials took forward Ministerial direction on re-engagement with Fiji during a visit to Suva on 10 May 2019 for a PACER Plus signatories meeting, which included a side meeting with Fiji trade officials (in conjunction with Australia).

A resumption of formal dialogue between the countries of the Southern Common Market (**MERCOSUR**)<sup>3</sup> and New Zealand is a welcome development in our ambitions to develop closer economic relations with this bloc. New Zealand attended the second Exploratory Dialogue with MERCOSUR in November 2018. The meeting provided an opportunity to continue exchanging views on respective trade agendas, to discuss the role of agriculture

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<sup>3</sup> The current full members of MERCOSUR are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

in our trade profiles, and to again test MERCOSUR's willingness and readiness to advance to free trade negotiations with New Zealand. Parties will meet again for further discussion in 2019.

While we have in recent years received positive signals about the readiness of the **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**, including Saudi Arabia, to resume the process towards finalisation of the NZ/GCC Free Trade Agreement, there are still several steps the GCC needs to undertake before that can happen. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Negotiations for an **FTA with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan** were launched in November 2010. Negotiations were suspended in early 2014 following Russian intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Since that date, the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union has become the Eurasian Economic Union, also comprising Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Following the events in Salisbury and Syria, New Zealand has stated that we are not currently taking forward an FTA with Russia and its Customs Union partners.

New Zealand wants to increase its cooperation with **India**, including through the conclusion of a formal economic partnership through RCEP and, once India is in a position to do so, a high quality bilateral FTA.

## Negotiations on new trade issues

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Negotiations with Singapore and Chile towards a **Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)** were launched in May 2019. New Zealand's goal for DEPA is to help co-create and shape global norms for digital trade and to lead on important issues in the wider digital economy. The envisaged scope is wider than e-commerce chapters in FTAs and the WTO e-commerce negotiations and, at the same time, will safeguard our ability to regulate to address legitimate public policy interests.

s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(j)

## Brexit

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We are monitoring the **Brexit** process closely. We continue to encourage both the EU and United Kingdom (UK) to use the extension period (to 31 October 2019) to work constructively with us to resolve remaining issues, including preservation of our goods market access into the EU and UK. New Zealand has resolved continuity arrangements regarding the NZ-UK Veterinary Agreement, a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on Conformity Assessment and recognition of equivalency for our exports of organic products, conformity checks for the inspection of apples, pears and kiwifruit prior to export, fisheries catch certification and "data adequacy" for the transfer of personal information from the UK. This will come into effect in a "no deal Brexit" situation or at the end of any transition period under which the UK remains subject to EU regulation.

s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(j), s6(a)

Meanwhile, public submissions on a **NZ-UK FTA** closed in mid-February. New Zealand stakeholders understand that the launch of negotiations is now mostly contingent on developments in the UK and EU, which are beyond our control.

## The Trade for All agenda

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On 6 August 2018, Prime Minister Ardern launched public consultation on Trade for All. The Agenda will help to ensure that our trade policy delivers for all New Zealanders and contributes to addressing global and regional issues of concern.

Key principles that informed the consultation process include:

- Creating a genuine and enduring conversation with the public and key stakeholders, and a separate ongoing consultation with Māori, consistent with their role as a Treaty partner.
- Supporting trade policy that contributes to possible solutions on global issues of concern, such as environmental issues, labour rights, gender equality, indigenous rights, inclusive domestic regional development and promoting SMEs' participation in trade.
- Continued active support for the international rules-based system, multilateral negotiations at the WTO, and enhancing our economic integration with international partners, including through FTAs and broader regional economic integration with a view to sustaining and creating new opportunities for New Zealanders internationally.

Public consultation was completed in October 2018. The face-to-face outreach involved 15 public events and 11 hui focused on a Māori audience. In addition to face-to-face consultation, we also received written comments and formal submissions.

The feedback from the public consultation has been collated into a report (see **Annex 2**) and has been available on the Ministry website since December 2018 (<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Trade-for-All-Summary-of-Feedback.pdf>).

The feedback is now being considered by the Trade for All Advisory Board. The Board has been established to bring together New Zealanders with a wide range of views, knowledge and experience to identify and discuss key issues in depth. The Board is independent of government and will report directly to the Minister for Trade and Export Growth on its deliberations and recommendations by the end of October 2019. These will inform the development of Trade for All.

The intention is for the Government to develop and announce Trade for All by early 2020.

## Treaty of Waitangi and trade

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### Treaty of Waitangi exception clause

The Treaty of Waitangi General Exception (“Treaty of Waitangi exception”) has been incorporated into New Zealand’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) since the Singapore Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) in 2001. The Treaty of Waitangi exception allows New Zealand to provide more favourable treatment to Māori subject to the requirement that laws or policies adopted under the Treaty of Waitangi exception are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against persons of other countries. The exception also clarifies that the Treaty of Waitangi itself cannot be interpreted by international dispute settlement tribunals. The Treaty of Waitangi exception is just one of a number of exceptions and reservations that ensure that our Government retains its right to regulate in the public interest.

The Treaty of Waitangi exception was considered as part the Waitangi Tribunal’s WAI 2522 inquiry. The Tribunal determined that the Treaty clause offers a reasonable degree of protection to Māori interests.

### WAI 262

A key concern expressed by many Māori during MFAT’s trade policy engagement work is that the New Zealand Government has never provided a formal consolidated response to the findings and recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal’s WAI 262 report — Ko Aotearoa Tēnei. MFAT strongly supports recent TPK-led efforts to advance the Government’s work on Wai 262. We are working closely with TPK, Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment (MBIE), Te Arawhiti, Ministry for the Environment and other agencies on this, and has a key role in the work of kete 3 (kawenata aorere/kaupapa aorere) as well as the international aspects of kete 1 and kete 2, i.e. Government efforts to protect taonga species, taonga works and mātauranga Māori internationally.

### WAI 2522

MFAT is leading the Crown’s response to three of the four issues remaining to be heard by the WAI 2522 Tribunal (the TPP/CPTPP claim). In its stage one report, the Tribunal found that the Treaty exception (explained above) provided a reasonable degree of protection to Māori interests affected by the Trans Pacific Partnership (as it then was). However, it was critical of the Crown’s consultation with Māori during negotiations. The Tribunal has confirmed that the remaining issues are: further consideration of the Crown’s consultation with Māori in relation to the TPP/CPTPP; whether the Crown’s approach to confidentiality in the negotiations was a breach of te Tiriti; and whether the e-commerce provisions of the CPTPP are inconsistent with the Crown’s obligations under te Tiriti. MBIE is leading the final issue, which relates to plant variety rights. The parties are currently working through various procedural issues and the matter is set down for hearing in December 2019.

## APEC 2021

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New Zealand's hosting of APEC in 2021 (from December 2020 to November 2021) will showcase our regional leadership, reinforce our commitment to the Asia-Pacific and advance New Zealand interests. It is also an opportunity to host leaders from most of our largest trade partners (including China, the US and Japan) at the same time. 18,000-22,000 people will visit, approximately half during Leaders' Week (8-14 November 2021 in Auckland).

Meetings will be held in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. APEC meetings are attended by Leaders; Ministers (responsible for issues including Foreign Affairs, Trade, Finance, and Small to Medium-sized Enterprises); chief executives of businesses from across the Asia-Pacific; international media; youth and delegates.

We are leading a process to shape possible policy priority areas and leverage events that will maximise opportunities from the hosting, including ensuring success for Māori (refer to Portfolio overview — **Māori success in APEC 2021** in Part One for more information).

A wide-ranging engagement process is under way to shape priority areas for policy outcomes and leveraging activities. A set of recommendations will be submitted to Cabinet for consideration in the second half of 2019.

The \$84.58 million allocated in Budget '19 to host APEC in 2021 brings the total Government funding provided to \$184.14 million.

## Economic diplomacy

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The Economic Diplomacy Programme is a new initiative designed to enhance returns to the New Zealand economy, by using our diplomatic network to help New Zealand exporters succeed in overseas markets and assist the New Zealand Government to access key international policy insights. The Programme contributes to the Government's strategy to build a productive, inclusive and sustainable economy. The Programme was officially launched in December 2018 following a 12-month Pilot Programme.

The Economic Diplomacy Programme also responds to feedback received from New Zealand exporters that some valued MFAT's services, while others were unaware of how MFAT can assist them. The creative/tech sector, SMEs, Māori and regional business-people are under-represented as users of MFAT exporter services. Therefore, the Programme is designed to make MFAT's services and its international insights more available to a wider range of New Zealand exporters and businesses. This includes an emphasis on contributing to the Ministry's Māori Engagement Strategy to strengthen partnerships with Māori in the export sector.

The MFAT-NZTE partnership is central to ensuring the Programme's activities are well coordinated and focused. The Programme is being delivered via five work streams:

- **Exporter Services (offshore):** Many MFAT Posts are already delivering support to exporters offshore in conjunction with NZTE and other agencies. Economic Diplomacy promotes a more structured approach to the way Posts support exporters in realising opportunities offshore and helping them resolve non-tariff barriers affecting their business.
- **Exporter Services (onshore exporter tools):** Improving and increasing awareness of MFAT's New Zealand-based exporter services. Based on industry feedback, these services are being promoted as a suite of tools and include: the interagency <https://tradebarriers.govt.nz>, MFAT's Exporter Helpdesk ([exports@mfat.net](mailto:exports@mfat.net)) and upgrade of the Tariff Finder service ([www.tariff-finder.govt.nz](http://www.tariff-finder.govt.nz)) that includes tariffs for 136 markets in addition to the 20 markets with which we have FTAs.
- **Onshore communication and business engagement:** Developing a framework to ensure MFAT is engaging with the export sector in a more strategic, inclusive and systematic way. This includes activities such identifying and disseminating relevant Post economic reporting to a wider audience; and facilitating contact between business and New Zealand diplomatic representatives following the completion of their term overseas. The Ministry is using more innovative tools and social media to engage with a more diverse range of businesses. This two-way exchange also serves to influence New Zealand's trade policy, particularly in relation to insights gained from a more diverse range of exporters. For example, the Auckland Office's network of women-led businesses and the emerging tech/digital sector.
- **Policy Insights:** Domestic policy agencies are able to request targeted reporting from MFAT Posts on current policy issues that could benefit from international insights.

- **Strategic bilateral projects:** The final work stream seeks to increase New Zealand's strategic engagement with key bilateral partners by leveraging Economic Diplomacy activities to grow that relationship. Economic Diplomacy projects also contribute to other major cross-cutting initiatives, such as APEC 2021.

MFAT's Economic Division reports internally every 6 months on the progress of work streams. Performance measurement includes reporting on trade successes achieved by Posts and resolution of non-tariff barriers. MFAT will also conduct regular surveys of business and other stakeholders to measure satisfaction with the programme and apply a continuous improvement focus to its further development.

Part three  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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## Ministry overview

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### Our purpose

**The Ministry acts in the world to make New Zealanders safer and more prosperous.**

**E mahi ana te Manatū i te Ao kia whai haumarū me te whai rawa mo Aotearoa.**

New Zealand's security and prosperity depend on the conditions in, and our connections with, the wider world. This means we must engage with — and seek to influence — other countries to our advantage, in line with New Zealand's values and our interests in:

- Security environments that keep New Zealand people and activities safe;
- Collective solutions to global challenges that impact on New Zealand;
- International conditions and connections that enable New Zealanders to prosper; and
- International influence on issues that matter to New Zealand.

Protecting and advancing these interests is the purpose of New Zealand's diplomacy.

### Our contribution to New Zealanders' wellbeing

In line with our purpose, the Ministry exists to deliver value to New Zealanders and contribute to their wellbeing. As a result of our work:

- Generations of New Zealanders benefit from sustainable solutions to global and regional challenges (**Kaitiakitanga**).
- New Zealanders are able to live, do business, travel and communicate more safely at home and offshore (**Security**).
- New Zealanders have better job opportunities and incomes from trade, investment and other international connections (**Prosperity**).
- New Zealanders have confidence their country can influence others on issues that matter to them, now and in the future (**Influence**).

The contribution we make to New Zealanders' wellbeing in these four areas at the heart of our Strategic Framework is illustrated in the following pages, and linked to the four capitals in the Government's Living Standards Framework (LSF).

The Ministry's principal contribution to wellbeing as defined in the LSF is through the four capitals (natural, human, social and financial/physical) — the "foundations of wellbeing that together generate wellbeing now and in the future." This reflects New Zealand's interdependence with other countries and our global environment when it comes to building capital stocks and managing risks related to them. For our wellbeing, New Zealand relies on global public goods, such as the atmosphere, economic stability and global institutions, rules and agreements. We both invest in and benefit from these international assets.




# MFAT's contribution to New Zealanders' wellbeing and what we do to deliver this



## Kaitiakitanga

Generations of New Zealanders benefit from sustainable solutions to global and regional challenges



New Zealanders' long-term wellbeing depends heavily on the international community working together to safeguard the global commons, promote global norms and achieve sustainable development. MFAT leads New Zealand's contribution to these efforts, ensuring New Zealand has a say on decisions that affect both us and people around the world now and into the future. Specifically, we:


- ▶ support the international and regional institutions that resolve problems which cross borders and impact on global wellbeing.
- ▶ work with other countries to address environmental and natural resource challenges by negotiating agreements on issues such as climate change and over-fishing.
- ▶ contribute to global efforts to achieve sustainable development.
- ▶ deliver New Zealand's development assistance, with a focus on the Pacific region, and lead responses to humanitarian crises and natural disasters.
- ▶ promote global rules and legal frameworks on human rights and other issues, and support the international justice system.
- ▶ protect Antarctica.



Ross Sea Iceberg. Credit: Dr Regina Isert.

## Influence

New Zealanders have confidence their country can influence others on issues that matter for them now and in the future



The international dimension of New Zealanders' wellbeing depends on New Zealand's ability to influence decisions by other countries and organisations. MFAT works to ensure that, despite being a small country, New Zealand has the levers to achieve what matters to us. Specifically, we:

- ▶ sustain through the way we work New Zealand's reputation for being a principled, fair and constructive participant in global and regional affairs – a country others want to work with and do business with.
- ▶ work to strengthen institutions and rules that give small states influence and protect their interests.
- ▶ build trust and long-term capital in our relationships with other countries so that when we need their support, we can secure it.
- ▶ build worldwide coalitions to support initiatives on issues that are important to New Zealand and where we have expertise.



Credit: Pete Souza.

## Security

New Zealanders are able to live, do business, travel and communicate more safely at home and offshore



Credit: Westend61, Getty Images.

New Zealanders' ability to operate in safe environments, whether in New Zealand, offshore or online, can be threatened by international factors ranging from conflict to cyber-attacks. MFAT is New Zealand's voice in the forums that address security issues affecting New Zealand, our region and the world. We also provide the consular services that help keep New Zealanders safe and informed when they live or travel overseas.

Specifically, we:

- ▶ lead New Zealand's contribution to global and regional efforts to promote peace and security, working through the United Nations and Asia-Pacific forums, as well as directly with other countries.
- ▶ work with international partners on rules and capacity-building to reduce threats from cyber and terrorist attacks, illegal migration, transnational crime and other threats.
- ▶ help advance global disarmament and rules against the proliferation of weapons.
- ▶ provide safe travel information, help New Zealanders affected by crises and other problems overseas and ensure their rights are protected.

## Prosperity

New Zealanders have better job opportunities and incomes from trade, investment and other international connections



Credit: Tryaging.

International trade and investment are essential for New Zealanders' prosperity and standard of living. MFAT negotiates and defends access to overseas markets and helps exporters succeed. This supports jobs for over 630,000 New Zealanders. Specifically, we:

- ▶ help build global and regional trade rules and frameworks through the World Trade Organisation and Asia-Pacific forums. These make it easier for New Zealanders to conduct international business.
- ▶ open up and protect diverse exporting and investment opportunities through negotiating free trade agreements and tackling non-tariff barriers.
- ▶ defend New Zealand's access rights including through taking dispute settlement action when other countries don't keep their commitments.
- ▶ help New Zealanders through our network of overseas posts to succeed in international markets and support international connections in areas such as research.
- ▶ promote the New Zealand brand and protect it when it's put at risk.

## Our functions


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is the Government’s principal agent for pursuing the country’s interests and representing New Zealand internationally. We also help the Government understand what is happening in the world and the implications of that for New Zealand.

We lead the New Zealand Government’s diplomatic network, a unique national asset, safeguarded by international law, able to speak with an authoritative voice, and with heads of mission and post formally charged with representing the state.


We are the Government’s specialist foreign, trade and development policy adviser, international legal adviser and negotiator. We are responsible for delivering New Zealand’s official development assistance and for providing consular services for New Zealanders overseas.

The full range of functions that the Ministry undertakes, both in New Zealand and internationally, is set out in the diagram below.

### What MFAT does in New Zealand and around the world to deliver value to New Zealanders



## Ministry at a glance



## Where we operate and how we organise ourselves

The Ministry is organised around geographic regions, policy functions and corporate functions. The Trade and Economic Group is made up of the Trade Negotiations Division, the Economic Division and the Māori Policy Unit. An organisational chart is in **Annex 3**.

The Ministry's global network comprises 60 posts in 53 countries. In addition, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise Trade Commissioners lead a further nine Consulates-General. The entire NZ Inc network with agency representation is illustrated in **Annex 4**.

In addition to our Wellington head office, we have offices in Auckland and Christchurch. Our Auckland office is focused on business engagement, and outreach to the Auckland Pacific community. The office can serve as a base for your Auckland engagement. It is co-located with New Zealand Trade and Enterprise.

## Our organisational values

The Ministry's values guide how we interact with each other and people outside the Ministry. We want our values, which were refreshed in 2018, to make a real difference to how we work and the results we deliver for New Zealand.



## Diversity and inclusion

The Ministry's 10-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy is designed to grow the diversity of our workforce and the inclusiveness of our workplace. The Ministry aspires to be a workplace that values and utilises diverse and inclusive thinking, people and behaviours. We want our staff to reflect the diversity of New Zealand and the countries we work in. At the core of our ambition is a focus on leadership, talent, training and development, and flexible work options. We want to demonstrate to our global partners and to New Zealanders that the Ministry represents the aspirations of the country we represent: a tolerant, diverse, inclusive and welcoming society.

We have set ourselves a goal that by 2028 the percentage of Māori, Pasifika, Asian and other ethnic minority staff employed in New Zealand is within +/- 3 percent of national percentages. By applying a diversity and inclusion lens to our recruitment and progression we are giving ourselves permission to question and challenge our own unconscious bias about what good looks like, what experience is relevant and what will bring us greater diversity of thought.

The Ministry has set ambitious diversity targets for the 2019 graduate recruitment that will support us in working towards achieving our agreed goal. We use internships and scholarships as a tool to attract and build our pipeline of diverse talent into the Ministry. The Ministry receives interns through various interagency initiatives, including the Government Health and Safety Internship Programme, the Government Legal Network Summer Clerk Programme and the Tupu Tai Pasifika Public Sector Internship Programme.

We also run our own in-house Aorere Internships Programme for Māori talent and other ad hoc New Zealand-based and international internships. Reconfigured Aorere Scholarships for Māori talent are in the design phase for launch in 2019/20.

## Our New Zealand connections

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### New Zealand partnerships

The Ministry's performance as a New Zealand public sector agency and our success in pursuing New Zealand's interests internationally rely on strong connections at home.

The Ministry is committed to a systematic, collaborative and transparent approach to working with New Zealand partners and engaging with Māori, other stakeholders and the New Zealand public.

Our partnership with other government agencies with external interests ("NZ Inc") is critical to delivery of results for New Zealanders. The Ministry leads and supports an integrated NZ Inc approach, both onshore and offshore, to maximise collective impact in pursuing the Government's objectives internationally. With domestic and international policy increasingly linked, we contribute to cross-agency coordination and policy-making on Pacific policy, economic policy, the national security system and climate change/natural resources.

The Ministry has extensive engagement with New Zealand stakeholders across business, non-government organisations (NGOs), local government, Pasifika, and academia with the aim of fostering mutually beneficial partnerships.

### Māori/Crown relationship

Te Tiriti o Waitangi is New Zealand's founding document that established and governs the relationship between Māori and the Crown. The Ministry recognises its importance by applying the principles of the Te Tiriti — including partnership, good faith, and active protection — to our core work. As the national and global landscape changes, we appreciate that how we interpret and apply those principles will need to adapt, but the relevance and importance of Te Tiriti will remain.

### Māori Engagement Strategy

The Ministry's Māori Engagement Strategy (see **Annex 5**), which was adopted in 2017, sets out our enduring commitment to and aspirations for our relationship with Māori. In implementing the strategy, we aim to improve the way we engage, partner and consult with Māori in order to ensure Māori are able to influence the development and implementation of MFAT-led issues and activities which affect them.

The strategy is being implemented through the following work streams, which are forecast for completion in 2020-21:

- "Our People" aims to lift mātauranga Māori capability and capacity across the organisation.
- "Our Stories" will bring a stronger Māori dimension to the stories we tell as a people and as a nation and propose a shared value proposition for the future.

- “Our taonga” is about according greater meaning, value and care to the Ministry’s Taonga Māori in their role as ambassadors for the Māori people. This work stream will also connect with other Taonga Māori which Māori have installed offshore as cultural and relationship portals.
- “Treaty of Waitangi” is about lifting the visibility of the Treaty in MFAT and strengthening staff capability to apply the principles of the Treaty in their day to day work.
- “Our relationships and partnerships” is about enabling and supporting Māori business success and building an engagement interface that has integrity and value for both sides.

### **Mātauranga Māori**

Mātauranga Māori is one of three organisational priorities for the Ministry this year. This project will reinforce the work under way across the organisation to implement the Māori Engagement Strategy. It will also align with the Crown’s intention to strengthen the Crown Māori relationship and build Māori capability and capacity as part of the recently announced reforms to the State Sector Act 1988.

The project will establish greater clarity in the Ministry’s Mātauranga Māori capability requirements over the next five years and deliver an expanded and tailored professional development programme that is aligned with the Ministry’s business needs and its people, both on and offshore, the Ministry’s Capability Framework and State Sector expectations of New Zealand’s public servants. It will also provide support for initiatives such as internships that open career pathways into the Ministry, and promote Mātauranga Māori exchanges and connections.

### **Trade policy engagement**

Engaging with New Zealanders on trade policy is a priority for the Government, and an integral part of negotiating trade agreements. It is important that New Zealanders have access to accurate information and that we take their views into account when seeking a mandate from the Government.

Some of the tools we use include:

- publicising trade negotiations through the media and social media (including at Prime Ministerial and Ministerial level);
- providing information online;
- calling for public submissions;
- targeted emails to interested groups; and
- face-to-face consultation sessions.

## Our operating environment

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### The global environment

New Zealand's external operating environment remains challenging, with pressures continuing to build in systems and parts of the world that matter deeply to our country. Most pressingly, there is a sense of impending transition in the international order — but what we are transitioning to and the extent of the transformation are not yet clear. Earlier expectations of a multipolar world order or one characterised by the US and China cooperating have not eventuated. Instead, we face a situation where powers are unwilling or unable to provide global leadership at a time when we are also seeing a weakening of the United Nations and related institutions that have been the bulwark of the post-World War II rules-based international system.

New Zealand relies heavily on that system — multilateralism, international law and international norms work to distribute power more evenly between larger nations and smaller ones. The system has been under strain for some time as institutions have expanded in scope and membership, states have jockeyed for position, non-state actors have exerted greater influence and emerging economies use the system to pursue a broader set of priorities. There is no imminent risk that this system will collapse, although the perilous state of the WTO Appellate Body and the withdrawal of a range of states from various international agreements and institutions are concerning developments.

More broadly, very visible economic and security issues over the last decade have resulted in widespread populist sentiment and further buffeting of the international system and its institutions. Elected leaders, appealing to their political bases, are pursuing nativist and protectionist policies and rejecting globalisation and the institutions that support and enforce it. Civil unrest and political paralysis are troubling some of the largest and most entrenched democracies around the world. These trends will have negative implications for multilateralism, for adherence to values New Zealand supports, for democracy and for solutions to global problems.

On the economic front, risks to global growth tilt to the downside. Further escalation of trade tensions between the US and China remains a key risk to the outlook. A range of other issues taken together could also affect growth, especially given the high levels of public and private debt. These potential triggers include a "no-deal" withdrawal of the UK from the EU and a greater-than-envisaged slowdown in China. With policy space limited in many countries due to lingering effects of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, risks to the global financial system are mounting.

Within our region, the balance of risk and opportunity remains. The overall prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is real, growing and of great benefit to New Zealand. But regional peace and stability and continuation of preferred norms cannot be taken for granted. This is a region where strategic trust is tenuous, habits of dialogue are not well-developed among all players, the security architecture is nascent and sources of tension are many. ASEAN has been successful in supporting peace in South East Asia, but its centrality may

come under strain as pressures rise for greater shared leadership among the full range of countries involved. As well, US-China competition has the potential to spill over into other areas of tension in the Asia-Pacific, such as in the South China Sea and China-Taiwan relations. The Korean peninsula is calmer as parties continue to seek to bring the two Koreas closer, though denuclearisation of North Korea remains a very challenging and long-term goal.

Intensifying challenges are buffeting the Pacific. The combined effects of climate change, mixed governance records, transnational crime, narrowly-based economies and enduring lack of scale and isolation create social, economic and security problems that are becoming more acute. Strategic competition in the Pacific region is increasing the donor base but also exposing Pacific countries to a broader set of risks that affect New Zealand interests as well.

Further afield, instability in the Middle East has global implications. Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Sunni-Shia divide are enduring problems in their own right and they also underpin the regional strategic competition between Iran and its neighbours. Continuing conflict in Syria and Yemen are having major humanitarian consequences, driving large-scale migration and providing a source of inspiration for violent extremism in the region and around the world. Nevertheless, there is some room for optimism as the Da'esh threat diminishes.

Finally, trans-border security threats also pose risks to New Zealand and place further pressure on the international system. These threats include malicious cyber activities, foreign espionage and interference, transnational crime, irregular migration and terrorism. In addition, today's cyberspace creates new vulnerabilities for data, privacy, intellectual property and "truth."

Action on climate change is one area where international cooperation remains most evident. Steps toward the transformation to a low-carbon economy are being taken. Nevertheless, the current level of ambition in climate change pledges falls short of what is necessary to stay below a 1.5°C temperature increase.

Climate change and a range of other significant environmental issues (e.g. ocean acidification, plastic pollution, ecosystem decline, species loss), are showing how much development is pushing up against critical planetary boundaries. Significant changes in world production and consumption patterns will put further pressure on limited global strategic resources already under pressure from climate change effects (water, food, land, energy, minerals) and bring forward the tipping point for conflict.

The stressors are building and we are poised for further significant movement in the tectonic plates that underpin the international order. Ultimately, we will see a quite different international landscape emerge as a result of these movements. Most likely, those movements will continue over the next four years to be slow and gradual, punctuated by small blips and contained crises, though there is also the potential for more significant, sharper jolts along the way.

## The domestic environment

The Ministry is attuned to developments in the New Zealand public sector, economic, security and social environments, and to the growing link between domestic and international policy. For example:

- expectations of deeper and more transparent engagement to earn the confidence of New Zealanders;
- the growth of the Māori economy;
- increasing significance of services trade and digital commerce relative to goods exports;
- the confluence of domestic and international dimensions of security concerns, such as violent extremism, cyber threats and foreign interference;
- the interplay between domestic and international policy on climate change, environment, health, education, science, poverty eradication, indigenous, and disability issues;
- recognition of connections between Pacific and New Zealand wellbeing; and
- expectations of government agencies to focus on intergenerational wellbeing, and better demonstrate and evaluate the impact of their work.

## Our strategic direction


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The Ministry's Strategic Framework sets out the impact we are seeking to achieve over a ten year horizon. It includes the shorter term deliverables we are prioritising; articulates the Ministry's contribution to New Zealanders' wellbeing; and provides a basis for measuring and evaluating our performance and linking our priorities and our resources.

The Framework comes together in the diagram on page 38, which illustrates the interdependencies between the Ministry's contribution to New Zealanders' wellbeing, the seven strategic goals which express the impact the Ministry aims to achieve over the next 10 years and the four organisational capability goals that set out the critical capability we need to achieve our strategic goals.

The Ministry contributes to the Government's priorities, and in particular the Priority Outcomes in the diagram on the following page, through action under our Strategic Framework.

**MFAT Strategic Framework contribution to Government priorities**





# Strategic Framework

## OUR PURPOSE

The Ministry acts in the world to make New Zealanders safer and more prosperous



# Annexes

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## Annex 1: New Zealand Trade Policy in 2019: the end of the Golden Weather<sup>4</sup>

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The period 1995-2018 has been the “Golden Weather” for New Zealand trade policy. To state the obvious, the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the legal enforceability of trade disciplines from 1995;<sup>5</sup> and a reduction of global protectionism over this period — facilitated in part by a burgeoning network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) — has delivered significant benefits for our economy.

Unfortunately, 2019 is likely to mark the end of this Golden Weather, not least because the two basic assumptions that have underpinned our trade policy since 1995 may no longer apply. Global protectionism is no longer declining. The past two years have seen the sharpest increase in trade restrictive measures (of varying impact) since the establishment of the WTO. Our assumption that enforceable WTO rules would widen and deepen is also in trouble. Enforceability hinges on a functioning WTO Appellate Body (AB). Assuming the s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i) by December 2019, this body will no longer have a quorum, thereby threatening the s9(2)(g)(i) wider system.<sup>6</sup>

### WTO reform and modernisation is existential, but at risk...

There is no doubt that the WTO and its rules are in need of modernisation to reflect the dramatic changes in the way trade now occurs. The risk, however, is that members will (again) fail to agree a reform pathway this year, leading to the gradual erosion of existing rules and the WTO itself. That will signal the beginning of the end of the current world trading order — with the foundation blocks for a new one only coming into view more slowly.

s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Networks of regional and bilateral trade agreements will also proliferate.

The issue for international trade policy has always been whether such preferential agreements will be “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” to progress at the WTO. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

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<sup>4</sup> This document is a summary of the outlook for New Zealand’s trade policy in 2019, written for MTEG by Deputy Secretary of Trade, Vangelis Vitalis, in January 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Including agriculture for the first time.

<sup>6</sup> The situation is in fact even worse. If a case goes to appeal before the end of December and involves a WTO member of the same nationality as one of the remaining Appellate Body judges, that judge will have to recuse him or herself from the case. The chance of this are relatively high given that the three remaining judges are from India, China and the US – all from WTO members extensively involved in ongoing disputes.

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

In some ways of course, 'twas ever thus. s9(2)(g)(i)

But this year really is an existential moment for the WTO. The threat to the enforceability of the international trading system, s6(a) has a s9(2)(g)(i) decision-point: end-December 2019.

### ...and the global economic outlook is not helping

The backdrop for international trade policy in 2019 is darkening. A slowing global economy s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

This will encourage further inward looking and protectionist policies which will, in turn, further undermine the process of internationalisation that underpins much of the rules-based trading system.

More broadly, s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(j)

In sum, the hopes of many for a global trading system that delivers a Kantian "perpetual peace" are fading fast. The Golden Weather is ending but it is rather less clear how inclement the new weather will be. The return to a Hobbesian "might makes right" world order s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

The Melian Dialogue-type<sup>7</sup> implications are troubling.

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<sup>7</sup> The Melian Dialogue refers to an exchange reported by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian Wars* between the major power of the era (Athens) and the small city state of Melos during which the Athenians chillingly declared "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Following the "dialogue" the state of Melos was extinguished.

## What does this mean for New Zealand?

Within this challenging context, work is well underway to manage the changing weather conditions. With CPTPP in force, nearly 65 percent of our existing trade flows are “covered” by legally enforceable FTAs. In fact, the global network of preferential trade agreements may well become the foundation blocks for an emerging (albeit second-best) trade order, though these will continue to impose well-known complexities (*inter alia* varying rules of origin) and challenges (differential rules on e-commerce etc). [s9\(2\)\(j\), s9\(2\)\(g\)\(i\)](#)

And, this may be yet another year where protectionism behind the border becomes ever more challenging for us than traditional tariff restrictions at the border. [s6\(a\), s9\(2\)\(g\)\(i\)](#)

The implications and negative spill overs of all of the above extend far beyond trade to other areas of international cooperation. This includes trans-boundary issues like climate change, the ability to tax multinational “digital” and other firms, privacy protections and settings, etc. These all depend on international cooperation and, above all, agreement on both rules and norms. In this way, the challenges that will come to a head this year in trade policy can be expected to have serious negative implications for other areas. Therefore, there is a risk that not only will we be unable to extend the internationalisation of — and benefits to — the New Zealand economy, but we’ll actively go backwards as a small country at risk of not being able to enforce rules against both states and indeed multinationals in some areas.

To help us address the kinds of challenges noted above [s9\(2\)\(g\)\(i\)](#)

New Zealand’s organising concept of open plurilateralism may go some way towards mitigating the risk of (closing) “trade blocs.” Importantly, too, there is still time to work with others to shore up enough of the existing system to provide a sufficient foundation for what is to come.

All of this requires a high degree of active engagement by us since any “new order” — or even “new disorder” for trade policy — will not materialise out of nowhere. It will be made. And New Zealand needs to help shape this. To do so we need to be active both in form and substance in the key discussions, but we cannot do this by ourselves, nor do we need to. Managing the interface between strategic political and economic dynamics is best done working with others. We are already coordinating some efforts ourselves (see below [s9\(2\)\(j\)](#) ) and others are busily doing the same.<sup>8</sup> We should explore how such instruments might mutually reinforce one another to support an emerging trade order that takes our views into account.

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<sup>8</sup> The new Hanseatic League (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands) is a recent EU example emerging from the risks arising out of Brexit.

## Points of emphasis for 2019

Against this background, we have two overarching functional objectives for 2019. These are to: 1) ensure that New Zealand secures/retains its “seat in the room”; and 2) where that is not possible (e.g. G20), ensure we can project a “voice into the room.” In this regard, the existing framework for trade policy agreed with the Government in mid-2018 will have the following points of emphasis for 2019:

### Defence of the WTO and the rules-based system

This remains **the** priority. It will require a redoubling of our current efforts with a particular emphasis on the Canada-chaired reform process — currently involving 13 other WTO members — as our focal point. Ministerial engagement, [s6\(a\)](#) will be crucial. New Zealand Ambassador Walker’s appointment to chair the Dispute Settlement Body process in 2019 [s9\(2\)\(j\)](#) further shores up our claim to a “seat in the room.”

In the meantime, we must deliver on the WTO Ministerial Conference 11 (MC11) mandate on **fisheries subsidies**, which is helpfully reinforced by a very specific Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) (14.6). This issue is also at the interface of the relationship between trade, development and the environment. The WTO’s credibility will be enhanced if a meaningful outcome can be achieved — demonstrating how trade disciplines can be used to respond in real and practical ways to a global issue of concern. Our track record and history of leadership here positions us well to have influence. We will prioritise this work in 2019.

**Steel and aluminium tariffs** imposed by the US on New Zealand will also need to be addressed. We will want any outcome to be WTO-consistent, both to support the system and to mitigate any precedent-related risks for our other exports to the US.

### Embed New Zealand in the emerging regional economic architecture

There are two inter-related aspects to this for 2019: 1) ensure we remain well embedded ourselves; and 2) mitigate as far as possible any tendency towards “closing regionalism.” Against that background:

- **Australia** remains the key relationship for New Zealand in terms of our [s6\(a\), s9\(2\)\(g\)\(i\)](#) shared values on trade policy. [s6\(a\), s9\(2\)\(g\)\(i\)](#)

To this end, CER needs to be seen in 2019 more than ever as being more than a bilateral trade and economic integration process.<sup>9</sup> Its future is to connect both economies more directly into the Asia-Pacific region and, in this way, to drive and reinforce our (shared) regional trade and economic integration aspirations. [s9\(2\)\(j\)](#)

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[s9\(2\)\(j\)](#)

s9(2)(j)

- Implementation of **CPTPP** provides us with a vehicle through which to play an active role (not least as depository) in a key part of the emerging regional economic architecture. Therefore, this needs to be understood not only in terms of this FTA's commercial value, but as a way to support "open plurilateralism."

s9(2)(j)

- Concluding **RCEP** has value in commercial terms, s9(2)(j)
- Progressing the **EU FTA** will ensure Brussels' engagement with our region, s6(a), s9(2)(j)
- **Brexit** is about balancing opportunity and risk (not least to our Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs)) s6(a), s9(2)(j)
- The geostrategic value of bringing the **Pacific Alliance** more directly into the Asia-Pacific architecture remains important, s6(a), s9(2)(j)

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s9(2)(j)

- Concluding our FTA modernisation processes with **China** s6(a)
- Sub-regional instruments like **AANZFTA** — for which the upgrade process formally commences this year — should be seen in commercial terms, s9(2)(j)
- **MERCOSUR** remains of interest, s6(a), s9(2)(j)
- Our current **PACER Plus** priority is to encourage Pacific signatories to ratify the Agreement. s9(2)(j)
- We will want to be opportunistic as well on **emerging options** s9(2)(j)
- Encouraging the **diversification of our trade relationships** remains a priority without confusing dependence with interdependence. s9(2)(j), s9(2)(g)(i)

## Supporting regional and global public goods

New Zealand support for organisations like APEC, ASEAN, the OECD and the Commonwealth (among others) helps them continue to sustain, institutionalise and support trade policy cooperation. 2018 was not a good year on this front — we only narrowly avoided the Kindleberger Trap.<sup>15</sup> OECD members, for instance, struggled to find a way forward on a seemingly trivial budget question, which almost brought the

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s9(2)(j)

<sup>15</sup> This is the situation described by Charles Kindleberger, one of the architects of the Marshall Plan, who argued that the disastrous decade of the 1930s was enabled by the failure of the US and others to support, sustain and help provide key global public goods following the decline of Britain as the leading global power.

institution to a standstill. For its part, APEC failed for the first time to secure an agreed Leaders' Statement and ASEAN continues to have mixed success s6(a)

Perversely, Brexit may give the Commonwealth a new lease on life. If so, New Zealand can expect to be "in the room" on trade-related matters in this organisation, not least through the signal sent by the Government's appointment of a Special Envoy for Commonwealth Trade Integration. More generally, New Zealand needs to be active and seen to be so in supporting these "public goods" by:

- Supporting Chile and Malaysia (**APEC** hosts this year and 2020, respectively) in practical ways on their specific agendas and by a Ministerial presence at the MRT (and other APEC meetings where possible);
- Engaging in the **OECD MCM** and associated **WTO mini-Ministerial** provides both insights and scope for coalition building and reinforcement of commitment on the value of multilateralisation of trade policy;
- Exerting ourselves more actively in support of ASEAN's role in trade policy cooperation across the region, including through intensified engagement by us and Australia on the **ASEAN-CER IPF process**;
- Using the **Small Advanced Economies Initiative** more specifically in support of an enforceable rules-based international trading system; and
- Developing **Finance and Trade dialogues** with Australia (in the context of CER and Canberra's G20 membership) and to see whether trade policy could also be incorporated into the existing finance-focused Canada-UK-Australia-NZ dialogue. Securing direct insights (and being able to provide input) into G7 and G20 trade-related processes will have more value than usual this year.

### **Open-plurilateralism (aka Flexible and Open Negotiating Approaches FONA)**

Modelling this concept through our behaviour will be important. Consequently, the digital trade partnership with Singapore and Chile must be consistent with our FONA principles<sup>16</sup> as will our participation in the e-commerce negotiations. Advancing the substance of our thinking on how to use trade disciplines to encourage fossil fuel subsidy reform (with obvious climate change-related implications) will be a work in progress this year, including as we plan for MC12.

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<sup>16</sup> These principles are that open plurilateral initiatives should: respond to business needs or global priorities, such as sustainable development; be open, transparent and inclusive in their working methods and keep the full WTO Membership updated as a matter of course; support WTO institutions and involve the WTO Secretariat as much as possible; be high quality agreements, with rules or commitments that go beyond the existing WTO Agreements, and where possible go beyond existing WTO offers; have open accession clauses that allow any Member that meets the required standard to join the agreement; and establish a clear and meaningful pathway towards multilateralism over time, using WTO rules and institutions to do so.

## Trade for All

With the public consultation completed, the Trade for All Advisory Board has commenced its work on developing recommendations and delivering these to Ministers before the end of 2019. Meanwhile, we will be doing our own thinking including on a range of potential policy responses to the Board's eventual recommendations. And domestically, the Trade for All Agenda is already being implemented to ensure greater transparency and engagement with stakeholders, including to develop (if agreed) a specific mechanism/structure for Māori input that can also expand our Mātauranga Māori in trade policy. Delivering improved coherence between international trade and domestic economic policy is also a priority — closer inter-agency work domestically is needed to ensure the economic benefits of trade are realised more effectively. Finally, the internationalisation of the Trade for All Agenda launched in 2018 through the inaugural meeting of the Ministerial-level Inclusive Trade Action Group<sup>17</sup> at last year's APEC MRT will expand in 2019 beyond CPTPP to caucus at the WTO and (again) in APEC. In the meantime, the review in three years' time of CPTPP against the Trade for All principles is a priority analytical commitment.

## Economic Diplomacy

Work is in hand to better deploy our Embassy network to deliver insights and advice to policymakers in support of the domestic economic agenda. In addition, practical tools are being updated/expanded so that exporters can make well-informed decisions and ensure maximum uptake of new and existing agreements (e.g. the NTB portal; expanded tariff finder, introduction of a services finder tool — the latter a world-first).

## Conclusion

The year ahead is shaping up to be an intensive and busy one. This is in part driven by the now existential threats that confront the existing trade policy order, but also the usual challenges we face as a trade-dependent small (and distant) economy. In purely process terms and unlike many others (e.g. EU and ASEAN member states or members of the Pacific Alliance or Mercosur), we do not have regular and close points of trade policy engagement with key counterparts internationally beyond the usual forums like the WTO, APEC and the OECD. Combined with our expectation that we should be "in the room" to shape outcomes on issues that touch on our national interests, this all means we have to work particularly hard **and** be particularly present simply to keep up with developments. Therefore, even greater effort than usual will be needed to ensure that we are contributing not just on process but also in substance, i.e. to be creative, constructive, interesting and interested as well.

All of this imposes significant pressure on resources and, above all, on Ministerial time and attention. That said, while the scope of the above is necessarily expansive, not all of these elements will be priorities at the same time. As a consequence, it should be possible at various times during the year and in each particular case to actively calibrate

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<sup>17</sup> Including Chile and Canada.

and target resource where needed, both in Ministerial/personnel and intellectual energy terms. In fact, this will be required, indeed crucial, to our overall ability to effectively manage the challenges **and** take the opportunities that lie ahead. It will also be worth considering how best to work across agencies and with Ministerial colleagues on the priorities set out here (e.g. on the linkages between the global trade and financial architecture).

And, finally, as we navigate the end of the Golden Weather for trade policy and prepare for more turbulent times, it is worth bearing in mind the distinction Aristotle made between three types of knowledge “*episteme*” (theoretical knowledge); “*techne*” (technical knowledge) and “*phronesis*” (practical wisdom). For Aristotle, these three forms of knowledge were at the heart of *eudaimonia* — the state of ethical and political wellbeing where, above all, one does what is worth doing and what is right. We have traditionally been able to deploy all three of these forms of knowledge in support of our trade policy, but in 2019, perhaps more than in most years, it will be our application of *phronesis* in particular that will best help us manage the inclement weather ahead.

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## Annex 2: Trade For All — Public Voice

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
HAVE  
YOUR  
SAY  
KŌRERO  
MAI  
ON TRADE



## SUMMARY OF FEEDBACK

Prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs and Trade | Manatū Aorere

DECEMBER 2018



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# Contents

<u>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>SUMMARY OF PUBLIC MEETINGS</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>SUMMARY OF MĀORI HUI</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>SUMMARY OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS</u>	<u>22</u>
<u>ONLINE POLL RESULTS</u>	<u>31</u>

# Executive summary

## Introduction

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has consulted New Zealanders on the Government's proposal to create a Trade for All policy aimed at ensuring all New Zealanders benefit from trade. The goal is a trade policy that works alongside other Government policies to support sustainable and inclusive economic development.

MFAT commissioned PublicVoice, an independent research organisation, to analyse and report on all feedback received from the Trade for All consultation.

This document summarises the feedback that MFAT received from the Trade for All consultation and will be provided to the Trade for All Advisory Board and to Ministers. Feedback from New Zealanders, along with the Trade for All Advisory Board's recommendations, will inform the development of Trade for All policy by mid-2019.

## What did people say?

The major themes from the public meetings / hui and written submissions to Trade for All included:

- Using trade to deliver sustainable development was a significant theme that emerged from the consultation process. Areas to focus on included ensuring environmental standards were included in trade agreements, economic sustainability, protecting New Zealand's water, mitigating climate change by managing emissions, and enhancing biodiversity.
- Using trade as a tool to enhance social wellbeing was considered an important factor for trade agreements. Key focus areas were income inequality, human health, labour standards and human rights. Many believed trade agreements could have the potential to enhance the social wellbeing of citizens.
- There was general concern about market access and the impact of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on New Zealand trade.
- Many submitters talked about the benefits that trade provided to both the New Zealand and global economy. Trade was viewed as an essential factor in driving economic growth. The benefits of economic growth were distributed to the New Zealand regions, business, workers, citizens and consumers.
- A key concern that many respondents had was a possible loss of sovereignty that trade agreements might lead to. Respondents were particularly concerned about the impact of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and the negative impact that trade might have on New Zealand laws.
- Feedback from Māori through face-to-face hui focused on the Government providing more support to Māori to help grow the Māori economy. There was a belief that there is a unique contribution that Māori can provide to the economy, which is being underutilised.

- There was a belief that more could be done to enhance women’s economic empowerment using trade agreements. Trade agreements could focus more on reducing barriers to women’s participation in the global economy.
- The biggest trade challenges for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were non-tariff barriers and foreign protectionism. There was a belief that SMEs could benefit from more government support.

## The consultation process

The Ministry consulted on Trade for All between 6 August and 14 October 2018. Public meetings / hui were held at various New Zealand centres. A ‘Have Your Say’ website was developed (<https://www.haveyoursay.mfat.govt.nz/>), which contained discussion papers, an online submission form and five online polls. Feedback and questions from the public meetings / hui and written submissions form the initial part of the consultation process and are summarised in this report.

The final part of the consultation process will involve deliberations by a Trade for All Advisory Board.

### Public meetings / hui

Fifteen public meetings were held in the following centres:

- Auckland\*
- Christchurch\*
- Dunedin\*
- Gisborne
- Hamilton\*
- Invercargill
- Napier / Hastings\*
- Nelson\*
- New Plymouth\*
- Palmerston North\*
- Rotorua
- Tauranga\*
- Timaru
- Wellington
- Whangārei\*

Eleven hui were held in the following centres:

- Auckland\*
- Christchurch\*
- Gisborne
- Hamilton
- Napier / Hastings\*
- Nelson\*
- Rotorua
- Tauranga
- Wellington
- Whakatāne
- Whangārei



\*These meetings / hui were joint European Union-New Zealand free trade agreement (EU-NZ FTA) and Trade for All events.

## Questions for written submissions

The Have Your Say website contained seven discussion documents with various questions aimed at stimulating engagement on trade policy. The discussion topics and questions on the MFAT Have Your Say website were intended to prompt discussion and feedback. However, submitters were not restricted to these topics and were free to respond with their views as they saw fit.

The questions posed in the discussion documents were as follows:

### 1. New Zealand and free trade agreements (FTAs)

- How could we improve consultation?
- What issues do you want to be consulted on?
- Are you happy with the information available on trade negotiations?

### 2. Trade and sustainable development

- How might New Zealand use FTAs to enable and support a just transition to a sustainable, inclusive, low-emissions economic future?
- What role do you think trade agreements should play in helping us to achieve/progress sustainable development?
- Which of the SDGs do you think can be supported through trade agreements?

### 3. New Zealand and international trade rules

- How could New Zealand respond to an uncertain trade environment?
- What do you think about New Zealand's approach to trade rules?

### 4. Te ōhanga Māori - the Māori economy

- What areas of opportunity do you see for Māori businesses?
- Are there specific initiatives relating to the Māori economy you would like to see reflected in New Zealand's trade policy?
- What do you think are areas of focus for connections between Māori and other indigenous groups?

### 5. Trade and regional economic development

- What opportunities or challenges do you see for regional communities and businesses looking to participate in trade?
- To what degree do you think New Zealand's regions currently benefit from trade?
- What else do you think would help regions to capture greater benefits of trade?
- To what extent do you want to see a regional perspective reflected in trade agreements?

### 6. Trade and small and medium enterprises

- Are there any other tools or information that you would benefit from receiving?
- To what extent do you want to see experiences of SMEs reflected in trade agreements?
- What has your experience been using the Government's current internationalisation services?
- What do you think are the key challenges for SMEs who want to succeed in overseas markets?

### 7. Trade and women's economic empowerment

- What gender equity issues can and should be addressed through trade agreements?
- What further opportunities do you see for women to participate in trade?

## Online poll questions

The multi-choice questions in the online polls were designed to stimulate public discussion and engagement on trade policy and should not therefore be regarded as scientific or statistically representative. Nevertheless, the results from the online polls are included for interest and completeness and can be found on page 31 of this report.

The poll questions were as follows:

1. What is the best reason for trading products and services with other countries?
2. If you have concerns about trade, what are they?
3. Who do you think benefits most from New Zealand's trading relationships with other countries?
4. What should our trade agreements with other countries deliver?
5. What is it most important that New Zealand's trade agreements protect?

## Analysis methodology

Three separate types of data were collected from the consultation. They were:

1. Feedback received via public meetings / hui
2. Written submissions (received via the consultation website or emailed/sent directly to MFAT)
3. Online poll responses.

### Feedback received via public meetings / hui

Feedback and questions from public meetings and hui were recorded non-verbatim. Meeting/hui feedback has been coded/themed separately from the written submissions. The reason for this is that it is not always possible to ascertain an individual's position on a given topic by the nature of a question they have asked. Word clouds have been created that depict the most frequently used words.

### Written submissions

Written submissions were received via the consultation website or sent directly to MFAT. Written submission data was imported into MAXQDA, a specialised qualitative data analysis program where responses were coded and categorised into themes. Tables illustrating frequency of codes associated with each theme have been included to demonstrate the significance of each theme. It is important to note that in some cases a submission may be coded more than once with the same code as the coded element might have been mentioned multiple times in a single submission. Word clouds have been created that depict the most frequently used words.

### Online poll responses

The completed responses to the online polls have been reported using frequency analysis and reported as bar charts. Online poll results are not to be regarded as scientific or statistically representative.



Theme	Frequency Raised
Capability and capacity building	36
Sustainable development	31
Current trade negotiations	30
European Union - New Zealand free trade agreement (EU-NZ FTA)	25
Trade relations	24
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and trade	21
Market access	16
World Trade Organisation & rules-based system	13
Māori and trade	12
Regional development	10

### Capability and capacity building

A wide range of ideas/opportunities for capability and capacity building were presented at the meetings. This included how the New Zealand Government could provide advice and support to build New Zealand's trading capacity, marketing, and the challenges that New Zealand businesses face when trying to export their products and services.



“The lack of electricity and infrastructure supporting exports, further undermined by the lack of maintenance and repair.”

**Public meeting – Timaru**

“We have a small export market – trying to push into wine tourism. At this stage it feels very fragmented. NZ Wine and NZTE are doing something, and NZ Tourism is trying to do a similar thing but they aren't connected up or even aware of what the others are doing in that space. If we could bring them all together there would be so much more to gain – as they are all working on brand 'New Zealand'.”

**Public meeting – Rotorua**

“The lack of capacity and capability means that there is a link between immigration policy for example the RSE (Recognised Seasonal Employer) scheme in the horticulture sector and productivity.”

**Public meeting – Timaru**

## **Sustainable development**

Questions were asked about sustainable development, climate change, protecting New Zealand's water, and New Zealand's clean green image. A focus on why environmentally sustainable trade is not an objective was raised on several occasions.



“Why is making trade environmentally sustainable not an objective?”

**Public meeting – Wellington**

“Any sign in the negotiations you are involved with that countries are tackling issues of environmental sustainability more in their activities? Is that a good thing, should it be part of conditions of trade agreements? Knowledge of damage to environment, addressed through economic activities?”

**Public meeting – Dunedin**

“What is the government doing to protect public interests in water? Is MFAT involved?”

**Public meeting – Palmerston North**

## **Current trade negotiations**

A diverse range of questions were received about current trade negotiation processes.



“I think transparency is one important way to rebuild public trust. When we negotiate at the UN and WTO there is greater transparency, but suddenly in FTAs we don't have this transparency. For many people it goes to accountability. People do not think this is acceptable anymore. I would encourage you to think more broadly about this. EU discloses their text proposals during FTAs. It would be good for us to at least match the EU.”

**Public meeting – Auckland**

“What are the chances of the Trade for All strategy getting cross-party support in Parliament?”

**Public meeting – Nelson**

### **European Union free trade agreement (EU-NZ FTA)**

Questions were asked about the current EU-NZ FTA negotiations. They included how the agreement may impact travel and business, data security and issues of sovereignty.



"What are the EU's interests in an FTA with New Zealand, given that we do not have particularly high tariffs?"

**Public meeting – Christchurch**

"Will data security and sovereignty be part of the EU-NZ FTA negotiations?"

**Public meeting – Christchurch**

"We have discounted the EU market because of duties and taxes on our products. Are there any updates in terms of duties and taxes in terms of how we may access EU market, and not need to focus completely on US market?"

**Public meeting – Dunedin**

### **Trade relations**

Many questions focused on trade relations with a number of countries. Concerns were expressed about trading with China and the impact of Brexit.



"With the UK, and Brexit and things, is there a risk of things getting stuck at the border? Are we going to have issues of stuff having access issues because they are in disarray?"

**Public meeting – Dunedin**

"As a NZ company based in the UK, when Brexit comes into force do you see any issues with us being based there and us trading with Europe? We have two companies, one is distribution and one is manufacturing. If our goods went through the UK to Europe what would this mean?"

**Public meeting – Hamilton**

"What is going to happen with China and the things they are doing in the Pacific? Will this dynamic with China play out our Free Trade Agreements?"

**Public meeting – Hamilton**

### **Small and medium enterprises (SMES) and trade**

A variety of questions were received from and about SMEs. The key focus was on how Government can work to develop and grow the participation of SMEs in international trade.



“We want information to be fed back into the grassroots. The information sharing infrastructure needs to work both ways. There are too many government silos – our small businesses need to know what doors to knock on, how can we bring those doors to them?”

**Public meeting – Gisborne**

“It’s a huge expense to go to an export market and how are you going to find your distributor.”

**Public meeting – Invercargill**

“I think you could think more about how you reach out to business. In our manufacturing exporting sector, we have got 20–30 SMEs and when I talk to them, they don’t really know what an FTA is.”

**Public meeting – Auckland**

### **Market access**

Tariffs and the ability to negotiate better terms were a concern expressed at many meetings. Agriculture products like dairy, meat and forestry products were mentioned.



“In a world with increasing awareness of health, will we face increased tariffs on sugar, alcohol and fats?”

**Public meeting – New Plymouth**

“We import a lot of goods from Hong Kong and China, but there’s a big difference in duties and tariffs between them, depending on the shipping route to New Zealand – is there any move to unify these?”

**Public meeting – Napier**

“... the issue however is that while horticulture may not be sensitive product, dairy or meat is difficult to get zero tariffs. How do we process and manage this within the NZ context?”

**Public meeting – Tauranga**

### **World Trade Organisation & rules-based system**

Concerns regarding how we can move beyond the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were expressed along with issues that arose with investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and dispute settlement.



“Do our bilateral FTAs stand up independently of the WTO system or are they reliant on it?”

**Public meeting – Auckland**

“How effective are trade agreements if the WTO isn’t working?”

**Public meeting – Palmerston North**

“What can New Zealand industry do to support the government in this space, and how can New Zealand support the rules-based system in a time of threats?”

**Public meeting – Wellington**

### **Māori and trade**

Questions regarding Māori focused on protecting Māori interests through trade, taking a Māori approach to trade and ensuring obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi are observed.



“Māori culture is how we differentiate ourselves on the global stage. Māori have always been traders, are good at building relationships and have a holistic view that trade needs to be balanced – to look after people, Papatūānuku and our atua. We need to use Māori frameworks and overseas connections (i.e. expat communities) that we have, as well as having more Māori in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to take our values with them to negotiations.”

**Public meeting – Gisborne**

“How will Māori capacity be built so that they can benefit from trade agreements? How will Māori make sure their voice and perspectives are understood in future trade agreements? How does MFAT get in touch with Māori communities?”

**Public meeting – Palmerston North**

## **Regional development**

There was a range of questions that focused on trade and regional development. Several questions focused on the Provincial Growth Fund (PGF).



“I recognise the point made around regional development. I’m not a Northlander, and I work in a big business. What I heard prior to moving to Northland, is that there is lack of investment in Northland. Now that I’m here, I can see it. The government should make sure that all regions have opportunity for regional development.”

**Public meeting – Whangarei**

“Are this trade initiative and the PGF working together?”

**Public meeting – Nelson**

“What role should/could a region play (via a regional plan) in its own development from a trade point of view?”

**Public meeting – Nelson**



Theme	Frequency Raised
Growing the Māori economy (ME)	50
Capability and capacity building	41
Barriers to trade and participation	28
Māori international trade opportunities	24
Māori rights and obligations	23
Indigenous intellectual property and taonga protection	22
Global indigenous economy (GIE)	21
Agriculture and farming	17
Greater involvement of Māori in trade negotiations	12
Wai 262 reflection in trade	10

### Growing the Māori economy (ME)

There were calls for the Government to help grow the Māori trade economy. Areas of focus were research and development and utilising the unique cultural aspects that Māori can provide.



"The Māori economy is like a developing economy. It has an explosive agenda with a lot of catch-up to do. Conversations are transforming at every hui into much more complex issues."

**Hui – Nelson**

"How do we incentivise Māori business to operate in an international context?"

**Hui – Christchurch**

"Hate that the government uses our culture all the time. But in saying that we have the All Blacks playing in Japan next year – we should have a Māori expo at every All Black meet. Should be controlled by a Māori tourism group, but a lot of that doesn't happen."

**Hui – Rotorua**

### Capability and capacity building

Lack of capital was cited as a key constraint for Māori. It was mentioned that communication needed to be improved beyond advisory boards and to engage Māori fully into trade discussions.



"We want commitment from the government that they are investing in people in their agencies to move beyond the traditional populist approach. We don't just want more advisory boards, which can require Māori business people to do a lot of the work."

**Hui – Nelson**

"There are significant opportunities for Government/Crown to really show it values Māori culture and heritage."

**Hui – Nelson**

"What can we do to better enable Māori businesses to trade? Resourcing and capability building could be better tailored to the needs of these businesses."

**Hui – Wellington**

### Barriers to trade and participation

There was a feeling that Māori have not benefited from trade as much as other New Zealand groups. A removal of barriers is required so Māori have an equal opportunity to participate in trade. This included a strong focus on reducing both domestic and international barriers to trade.



"I notice your comment on 'levelling the playing field', and how the NZ government is trying to level the playing field internationally. We have a lot of levelling the playing field internally to do. From Māori position we are below those levels of the mainstream market, and businesses. Levelling of the playing field is required to get us to the table amongst our own, let alone globally. How is the government going to empower those gaps?"

**Hui – Rotorua**

"Māori cannot allow others to appropriate the work they do, but there are huge barriers for Māori around engaging in international markets."

**Hui – Whakatane**

"A lot of the locals here are suppliers, Fonterra have a monopoly on the market and it is very hard to get into the international market."

**Hui – Whakatane**

### Māori international trade opportunities

There was strong interest in cultivating Māori trade opportunities overseas and expressions of interest for the Government to support negotiations.



"Currently negotiating a forestry deal with China. Would have preferred that an agreement could have been reached with NZ Government to ensure profits remained in NZ."

**Hui – Whangarei**

"I am part of a group developing a relationship with the US Ambassador to talk about how investments can be brought into Rotorua/Te Arawa. Does the government approve /appreciate when iwi is working with other countries to see what benefits we can get? Is there a possibility we could have people from MFAT as part of the group /process?"

**Hui – Rotorua**

"Emphasise the opportunities that exist in the space of indigenous cooperation in Taiwan and how this can allow barriers to be cut down."

**Hui – Hastings**

### Māori rights and obligations

A desire for stronger recognition of Māori as Crown Treaty partner was expressed. This included support for amendments to the Treaty of Waitangi to reflect settlements, modern free trade agreements and Tikanga.



"We are not against trade, we have always been traders. But the Treaty and its obligations came into play. Constitutional reform is required to recognise the Treaty partnership between Māori and the Crown."

**Hui – Rotorua**

"Are the Article 2 Treaty of Waitangi rights protected through our trade agreements? In particular - looking at intellectual property and the treatment of Mānuka honey."

**Hui – Gisborne**

"Treaty of Waitangi clause needs to be updated, it is too old. It needs to reflect the fact of the Treaty Settlements and the potential that is being realised by those processes. Set up a group to look at the Treaty clause, get decent analysts in to get rid of it or change it."

**Hui – Rotorua**

### **Indigenous intellectual property and taonga protection**

A strong support for Indigenous IP was expressed so that Māori can protect, preserve and benefit from taonga species e.g. mānuka honey, kawakawa.



"In emerging industries Māori are focused on taonga species and biocultural IP. Need recognition for Māori to protect, preserve and benefit from taonga species, but lack of domestic policy settings is creating barriers. It is difficult for small companies using native species for ingredients in cosmetics and food production to grow without these protections."

**Hui – Nelson**

"We want to try and ensure that our rights under the Treaty are maintained – our flora and fauna, our IP rights, some of that is compromised by FTAs and we have to fight against that."

**Hui – Rotorua**

"A big challenge is how to protect Māori IP rights – for example, taonga and resources as protected under the Treaty. Internationally we see plagiarism of our mana through names, words – for example, mānuka."

**Hui – Nelson**

### **Global indigenous economy (GIE)**

Opportunities exist for the greater development of networks between Māori and other indigenous people around the globe. The GIE presents a substantial opportunity for New Zealand and Māori.



"Develop not only the Māori economy, but also the global indigenous economy, with the goal of raising capital, but more importantly, of helping first nations communities globally."

**Hui – Tauranga**

"Need to activate indigenous to indigenous trade, there is an opportunity there. How the government manages that space and gives empowerment to that space is important. I think we go straight to the capital gains and miss the beat when it comes to the relationships."

**Hui – Rotorua**

"We need pūtea (funding) to build the trade and economic connections with other indigenous peoples."

**Hui – Wellington**

## Agriculture and farming

A range of questions and comments regarding agriculture were received. This covered impact of forestry, water rights, and using agriculture to provide jobs for Māori.



"You shouldn't be negotiating our water rights. We own the lakes and the water here. Our water is now being subject to international agreements and that is a no from me. You cannot utilise our water for commercial use without our consent. It is the biggest thing concerning all of us – who owns the water? How are FTAs dealing with it? And why haven't Māori been involved?"

**Hui – Rotorua**

"Benefits have to be able to cascade down to employment, education. If we are getting into forestry, we have to own the trees, we have to own the supply and get the added value and then we can engage more effectively in trade, off our own lands and give jobs to our people."

**Hui – Rotorua**

"Māori kiwifruit growers want more autonomy to do it their way with their own brand. Capability is growing but regulatory ceilings don't allow us to do our own thing. This needs to change."

**Hui – Wellington**

## Greater involvement of Māori in trade negotiations

A desire for greater involvement in trade negotiations was expressed for Māori. This included having Māori directly involved in the negotiation process.



"There needs to be Māori voices in trade negotiations. There is a huge absence of Māori voice. The Māori way of thinking and tikanga framework can only really come from Māori people. Not until you get this to permeate the trade faculty that the capacity and ability for Māori to be far more engaged is realised."

**Hui – Whangarei**

"Negotiators should have Māori seated with them, not just as advisers but as decision-makers."

**Hui – Rotorua**

"No FTA should be confirmed until a representative Māori group have ticked it off. Needs to be a hui, I am prepared to trust people. But I want to be the person who chooses those people not MFAT."

**Hui – Rotorua**

### **Wai 262 reflection in trade**

There was interest in how Wai 262 is reflected in trade and that agreements need to comply with the recommendations presented by the Waitangi Tribunal.



“There are significant opportunities for Government/Crown to really show it values Māori culture and heritage. It is important that Trade for All is consistent with the recommendations from the Wai 262 Claim.”

**Hui – Nelson**

“There has been an inadequate response from the Government on Wai 262 and what protections are available to hapū / iwi. It appears that the tools to protect taonga are no longer fit for purpose.”

**Hui – Gisborne**

“How are Wai 262 claims/recommendations represented in the Treaty of Waitangi Clause? And how are they reflected in the way that the FTA is implemented?”

**Hui – Rotorua**

## Summary of written submissions

A total of 209 written submissions were received. A breakdown of submissions is detailed below.

Submission/Submitter Type	Count
Received via the Trade for All website <sup>3</sup>	165
Business / industry	26
Non-governmental organisation (NGO)	8
Individual	6
Iwi / Māori	2
Training organisation	1
Member of parliament	1



<sup>3</sup> Written submissions received via the Trade for All website did not collect any profile data.

Main Theme	Main Frequency Raised	Sub Theme	Sub Frequency Raised
<b>Sustainable development</b>	266	Environment	197
		Economic sustainability	69
<b>Social wellbeing</b>	263	Inequality	93
		Human health	59
		Human rights	56
		Labour standards	55
<b>Market access</b>	162	Elimination of tariffs	60
		More market access	42
		Elimination of non-tariff barriers	40
		Foreign protectionism	20
<b>Women's economic empowerment</b>	156	Trade should support women's economic empowerment	80
		Capacity building	32
		Develop measurement, analysis and evaluation tools for women	19
		Incorporate a trade and gender chapter	17
		Gender equality in negotiating teams	8
<b>Benefits of trade</b>	138	Economy	65
		All citizens	32
		Business	24
		Consumers	17
<b>Loss of sovereignty</b>	116	ISDS and loss of sovereignty	60
		Ability to protect NZ interests and values	35
		Protect intellectual property	21
<b>Opportunities for New Zealand</b>	112	Initiatives to improve New Zealand's economic performance	63
		Develop international trade relations	35
		Protecting New Zealand brand	14
<b>Growing the Māori economy</b>	100	Māori rights and obligations	39
		Capability and capacity building	19
		Protect Māori property, taonga, customs	15
		Māori consultation	11
		Māori involved in negotiation process	10
		Global indigenous economy (GIE)	6
<b>Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and trade</b>	85	Challenges	53
		More help and encouragement from government	20
		Useful tools / information	12
<b>Support for the rules-based system and WTO</b>	72	Support for the rules-based approach	72
<b>General trade concerns</b>	66	Impact of digitised economy	30
		Multi national corporations	19
		Oppose CPTPP	9
		Marketisation	8
<b>Increase the transparency of negotiations</b>	33	Improve transparency	33

The key themes emerging from the Trade for All written submissions were:

- Sustainable development
- Social wellbeing
- Market access
- Women's economic empowerment
- Benefits of trade
- Loss of sovereignty
- Opportunities for New Zealand
- Growing the Māori economy
- Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and trade
- Support for the rules-based system and WTO
- General trade concerns
- Increase the transparency of negotiations

### **Sustainable development**

A focus on using trade to deliver a sustainable economy was a major theme that emerged from the written submissions. Areas to focus on included ensuring environmental standards were included in trade agreements, protecting New Zealand's water, mitigating climate change by managing emissions and enhancing biodiversity.



“We need to move away from growth-focused trade and instead focus on trade for the purposes of social and environmental advancement specifically, not vaguely.”

**Have Your Say website**

“New Zealand assets should be developed and protected in a way that is sustainable and provides benefit for current and future generations.”

**Have Your Say website**

“There is no first principles examination of what the proper relationship is between trade agreements and the environment or even MEAs (multilateral environmental agreements). Neither is there meaningful identification of objectives related to the environment. The overall Trade for All principles does not go beyond a statement of the most basic rule of thumb ‘maximising the opportunities and minimising the risks’ for the environment and other matters, and ‘creating more sustainable economic opportunities’.”

**NGO**



## Social wellbeing

Using trade as a tool to enhance social wellbeing was considered an important factor for trade agreements. Key focus areas were income inequality, human health, labour standards and human rights. It was seen as important that trade agreements enhance the social wellbeing of citizens.



"Our trade agreements should deliver interesting well-paid jobs that provide dignity and a stable living for families and individuals."

**Have Your Say website**

"Trade must progress equity within and between countries"

**NGO**

"Trade should be a vehicle to increase human wellbeing, it should be fair and encourage only sustainable activity. We know that inequality is a major contributor to social unrest in the world today and that resources are not fairly distributed. Fair trade does not take advantage of less powerful trading partners, exploit workers or deplete natural resources. It allows the free flow of knowledge and encourages co-operative activity."

**Individual**

## Market access

There was general concern about market access and the impact of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on New Zealand trade.



"We are vulnerable to offshore markets losing interest in our exports (tariffs, sanctions, etc), or to the development of a desirable substitute (cultured meat?)"

**Have Your Say website**

"...recognises that the case for trade and the case for reducing trade barriers must continue to be advocated and be renewed."

**Business / industry**

"the continuing negotiation of high quality, ambitious, and comprehensive agreements, which not only address tariffs and other market access issues at the border, but also focus on behind-the- border issues such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), regulatory coherence and alignment, strong science-based sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) disciplines."

**Business / industry**

## Women’s economic empowerment

Submitters expressed a need for reducing barriers to women’s participation in trade and that trade agreements should focus on equal opportunities for all women. It was suggested that trade agreements should be assessed and monitored in their ability to deliver on gender equity goals.



“Enabling greater success for women in trade is a central element of sustainable economic development. Should build capacity for and reduce barriers to women’s participation in trade, grounded in robust gender-disaggregated data analysis. NZ has the opportunity to lead global policy development in this area. Should also foster gender equality in negotiating teams, business delegations and leadership roles in trade.”

**Business / industry**

“Trade and all aspects of the economy, should support women’s economic empowerment.”

**Business / industry**

“It is vital that governments negotiating agreements consider the ways in which gender equality can be advanced through agreements.”

**NGO**

## Benefits of trade

Many submitters talked about the benefits that trade provided to both the New Zealand and global economy. Trade was often viewed as an essential factor in driving economic growth. The benefits of economic growth were distributed to businesses, workers, citizens and consumers.



“Trade has supported individuals, communities, and nations to grow their prosperity over a long period of time.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Trade is a way for people around the world to share and benefit from resources that would not otherwise be available. I believe we need to move forward from a parochial desire to benefit ourselves at the expense of others and look instead towards fair and sustainable trade for everyone.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Despite the numerous benefits of trade, we recognise that the social license and public acceptance of trade policy that we have taken for granted needs to be refreshed.”

**Business / industry**

## Loss of sovereignty

A key concern that many respondents had was a possible loss of sovereignty that trade agreements might lead to. Respondents were particularly concerned about the impact of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and the negative impact that trade might have on New Zealand laws.



“ISDS will deem our Government useless if disputes arise over trade. We will not be masters of our own destiny.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Investors must come under NZ law and courts. No non-NZ organisation, business or political, should be given a right to limit the expressed will of the NZ people.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Our democracy – trade should never undermine the ability of New Zealanders to determine the direction of their country through integral democratic processes with strong checks and balances on power.”

**Member of parliament**



## Opportunities for New Zealand

A wide array of initiatives on how New Zealand could improve its economic performance were received. Ideas included focusing on moving up the value chain and protecting New Zealand’s brand/reputation.



“NZ has a very good reputation overseas, including Europe and Mid. East, created by our saying NO to nuclear testing and nuclear-powered ships coming here, saying no to genetic engineering in our food, plus we look clean and green. We have been trading on this image for years. Reputation takes a while to change! However we seem to be hell bent on destroying this by polluting our rivers (and paying \$8 million for the pleasure!) Why do we not learn from overseas experiences?”

**Have Your Say website**

“Free trade is good, but only when all parties are playing by the same rules. What we have with our relationship with China is that they want our raw materials but not our value add goods. The impact of this has been to undermine growth of real wages and regional economic development in NZ. If we look at the imports of every other pine producing country into China we see lumber well out numbers Log as an imported item, Russia, Chile, Brazil, Finland are all exporters who understand that only stupid countries export their raw materials!”

**Have Your Say website**



## Growing the Māori economy

Ensuring that trade agreements honour the Treaty of Waitangi was seen as important by many submitters. Some mentioned that Māori representatives should be directly involved in trade negotiations. Importance was placed on ensuring that any trade agreements have protections for Māori customs, taonga and language in place.



“MFAT needs more staff who are knowledgeable in Māori language and culture, so they are better equipped to engage with Māori and represent our interests.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Crucial that trade policy protects the integrity of Māori indigenous rights, interests and IP, including our culture and language. Important that NZ’s domestic-policy to protect these interests is properly addressed, and carefully co-ordinated with our trade-policy.”

**Iwi / Māori**

“Trade agreements must protect the government’s obligations under Te Tiriti. Working in true partnership with Maori, as is required by Te Tiriti, is still being worked towards and there should not be any obstructions to that whatsoever.”

**Have Your Say website**

## Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and trade

Comments on SMEs were varied and focused on the challenges that SMEs face including non-tariff barriers and foreign protectionism. There was a perception that SMEs could receive more government support. A single portal for all trade related information was suggested as a useful tool to help SMEs.



“Big business and foreign owned big business are not good for the country, it is only good for the profit makers who do not operate a trickle-down system and never will. Small export businesses need support to enter overseas markets.”

**Have Your Say website**

“The smaller businesses who manage to export seem to have to do it out of their own sheer will and determination. It would be good if they got more support.”

**Have Your Say website**

“SMEs would benefit significantly from improved access to critical information about market access opportunities and constraints. At present, this information is spread across multiple websites of different Government service producers.”

**Business / industry**

### **Support for the rules-based system and World Trade Organisation**

There was widespread support of the rules-based approach and utilising the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to handle dispute settlement.



“We strongly support NZ’s commitment to a rules-based international trading system and the WTO. Without a strong WTO we, as a small trading nation, could be ‘caught in the cross fire’ of trade-related antagonism between our major trading partners.”

**Business / industry**

“Supporting the international rules-based system and maintaining a free and open trading environment that benefits citizens of NZ and our trading partners remains paramount.”

**Business / industry**

“World Trade Organisation or WTO-compliant trade agreements is crucial for ensuring small countries like New Zealand are able to be treated fairly in trade negotiations”

**Business / industry**

### **General trade concerns**

There was a wide range of concerns raised about trade. They included the threat of trade war, the protection of intellectual property, the power and influence that multinational corporations had, and opposition to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement.



“We need to protect our resources and not sell them off through big business over a short period of time. Our capital resources should be preserved for generations to come.”

**Have your say website**

“My major concerns are that trade agreements are not about trade but about control by large corporations and foreign governments.”

**Have your say website**

“...in the 21st century, the value to New Zealand of trade in IP and copyright needs to be better understood by government and the agencies representing New Zealand’s trade interests.”

**Business / industry**

### **Increase the transparency of negotiations**

Perceived secrecy around trade negotiations was a concern for some. It was thought important that trade negotiations should be transparent.



“Trade agreements shouldn't prevent the Government protecting the interests of the country. However, this needs to be done in transparent fashion.”

**Have Your Say website**

“Trade deals have been one of the most insidious contributors to the blinkers on our view of the world. They are written in secret and then imposed upon us as though they are the rules of the game – simply the way things have to be.”

**Have Your Say website**

“An end to secrecy: open negotiations and regular release of draft texts.”

**NGO**


## Online poll results

The multi-choice questions in the online polls were designed to stimulate public discussion and engagement on trade policy and should not therefore be regarded as scientific. Nevertheless, the results from the online polls are included for interest and completeness.


### Online poll questions

1. What is the best reason for trading products and services with other countries?
2. If you have concerns about trade, what are they?
3. Who do you think benefits most from New Zealand's trading relationships with other countries?
4. What should our trade agreements with other countries deliver?
5. What is it most important that New Zealand's trade agreements protect?


### What is the best reason for trading products and services with other countries?




## If you have concerns about trade, what are they?




## Who do you think benefits most from New Zealand's trading relationships with other countries?



## What should our trade agreements with other countries deliver?



## What is it most important that New Zealand's trade agreements protect?



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
Lower Hutt, 5040

Ph: (04) 909 7463

Email: [info@publicvoice.co.nz](mailto:info@publicvoice.co.nz)

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# Annex 3: MFAT organisational chart



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## Annex 4: New Zealand Inc offshore footprint

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# NZ Inc Offshore Network

As at 31 March 2019



Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)		New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE)	Tourism New Zealand (TNZ)	New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)	The Department of Internal Affairs (DIA)	Education New Zealand (ENZ)	New Zealand Police (NZP)	New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS)	Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI)	The Treasury (TSY)												
	Immigration New Zealand (INZ)	Science and Innovation (S&I)																					
<b>908.1</b>	<b>416.5</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>283.1</b>	<b>76.5</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>2</b>												
SEC 234	LES 674.1	SEC 24	LES 392.50	SEC 3	LES 2.5	SEC 39	LES 244.1	SEC 0	LES 76.5	SEC 34	LES 35.7	SEC 0	LES 33	SEC 2	LES 27.2	SEC 9	LES 8	SEC 9	LES 4	SEC 17	LES 12	SEC 2	LES 0

**Note:** Total numbers **1882.7** seconded (SEC) and locally employed staff (LES)

- **New Zealand Posts** managed by MFAT
- **New Zealand Consulates-General** and other **offices** managed by NZTE

UNCLASSIFIED

## Annex 5: Māori Engagement Strategy

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# Māori Engagement Strategy

November 2017



NEW ZEALAND  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE

# Nga Whakamarama - Meanings

**Ararua:** two pathways.

**Kanohi- ki -Te-kanohi:** face to face. Within Māoridom there is a strong belief that relationships need regular face to face interactions in order to flourish and have authenticity.

**Kawa:** Māori protocol or etiquette determining attitudes, behaviours and practises in a Māori cultural setting.

**Mahi:** to work at or accomplish something.

**Mana:** collective strength, influence and prestige.

**Matauranga:** knowledge and understanding of things Māori e.g. culture, custom, language, and history.

**Pou:** pillars.

**Tikanga:** Māori lore, custom, ethic and protocol. Derived from the Māori word 'tika' meaning right or correct.

**Whakapapa:** genealogical connection. A fundamental principle in Māori culture.

**Whanaungatanga:** a sense of belonging and identity. Derived from the word 'whanau' or family.



# Introduction

This Māori engagement strategy provides an opportunity for the Ministry to break through and redefine its value proposition for Māori in the domestic and international contexts by building networks and relationships which have value and integrity and promoting our identity and culture thoughtfully and authentically. We do this not just because we should but because we want to and because there is genuine organisational desire and commitment for the kind of change which this strategy will deliver.

In July 2017 an SSC-led PIF (Performance Improvement Framework) review of MFAT cautioned that “the Ministry needs to shift its paradigm in relation to its responsibility as a Treaty partner and determine not only how it engages with authenticity and integrity but also develop a shared understanding of its value proposition for and with Māori”.

The need for the Ministry to improve on the way in which it engages and consults with Māori was also highlighted by the Waitangi Tribunal (WAI 262 and 2522), in a number of MFAT internal reviews including a 2013 Māori Policy stocktake report by STR and MPU, and a 2016 scoping document for a Māori engagement framework.

In August 2017 the Deputy Secretary (Trade & Economic Group) established a Working Group to formulate a Māori Engagement Strategy. The initial Working Group mandate was to refresh and where necessary revise the existing 2016 scoping document and to report to MFAT’s Coordination and Performance Committee (CPC) on its interim assessment of the draft strategy. Assuming CPC approval, it was anticipated that implementation work would be undertaken in early 2018 by a Steering Group.

## Our Strategy

Te Tiriti o Waitangi as New Zealand’s founding document established a continuing partnership between the Crown and Māori. This strategy paper sets out the Ministry’s enduring commitment to and aspirations for that partnership.

*“Māori have confidence in their partnerships with the Ministry”*

*(Ka hikitia te whanaungatanga a te Manatu Aorere me te Iwi Māori).*





## Our aspirations

The Ministry's aspirations concerning the Māori dimension are housed in Te Whare Aorere – Te Ara Whakamua (the way forward). This is illustrated in the conceptual diagram on page 4.

Our overarching aspiration, which sits at the top of Te Whare Aorere, is that “Māori have confidence in their partnerships with the Ministry” (Ka hikitia te whanaungatanga a te Manatu Aorere me te Iwi Māori).

This is supported by two pou: Te Pou Waho, comprising an aspiration for our outwards facing work focused on engagement with Māori, whether independently or in concert with other agencies; and Te Pou Roto, comprising an inward facing aspiration focused not only on building Māori engagement capability but also in shifting the organisational paradigm so that it both enables and reinforces the level of change foreshadowed through this strategy.

Strong leadership from the top is also important, particularly with regard to achieving the attitude, behaviour and structural changes required to achieve the Ministry's overarching aspiration, and supporting the outward and inward facing focus of the two pou:

- Engagement: Engaging with authenticity and integrity with Māori is a vital part of the Ministry's wider reorientation towards a more inclusive domestic approach. Lasting and meaningful relationships with Māori enhance the Ministry's ability to effectively present New Zealand to the world and achieve our strategic objectives.
- Capability: Our people are the Ministry's greatest assets. Building the ability of our people to incorporate matauranga Māori in our work is critical to enabling the Ministry's Māori dimension to flourish.

Subject areas of priority interest to Māori underpin the two pou, reflecting the link between what Māori want and what we are doing to meet those needs, with regard to relationships, capability and capacity, and giving the Treaty more visibility and mana in the organisation.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi, as our founding document, is the foundation of Te Whare Aorere. The constitutional significance of the Treaty of Waitangi to New Zealand, and its fundamental importance to the relationship between the Crown and Māori, should be upheld in all that the Ministry does.

For each of the engagement and capability aspirations, this Strategy sets out how we will achieve our aspirations. It addresses our current state, what we are aiming to achieve, our particular goals and what we will do to achieve this. Recom-

recommendations are included under each of the engagement and capability aspirations - these are also collated in Annex A in a suggested timeline format in accordance with priority.

This Strategy has a four year horizon, but it is recommended that its implementation be prioritised in the Ministry's strategic planning for the next two years. There are also a number of recommendations or quick wins which could be implemented within six months. As the Ministry's journey progresses, our aspirations and initial focus areas can be supplemented and expanded, initially through a review after 18 months.

Guidance on subject areas of priority can be drawn from MFAT's 2013 Māori Policy Stocktake Report which highlighted that trade, economic development, and investment issues were priority areas of interest for Māori and could form the basis of future policy priorities.

Trade and economic work should continue to be accorded clear priority. Other areas of the Ministry's work of ongoing interest to Māori include the impact of international treaties on Māori interests including natural resources and the environment, indigenous and human rights, representation of Māori cultural identity and values on and offshore, and issues for the Māori diaspora.

Māori have a whakapapa to the Pacific and to Asia. Their links to these regions will continue to have relevance for them, as will new economic markets. These links, and Māori experience in driving economic and social development, also offer potential for New Zealand's development cooperation work in the Pacific. Many Māori businesses are also diversifying their interests into new markets including the Middle East, North America and Europe and some will be looking to the Ministry and to other agencies for advice and guidance in this regard.

As well as strengthening our mahi in particular policy areas important to Māori, this strategy will support authenticity in the Ministry's approach to our international representation and profile, for example in our offshore office design and our 'soft power' diplomacy, and enable the development of conditions to support the kind of paradigm shift called for in the 2017 PIF review.



## Over-Arching Aspiration

Ka hikitia te whanaungatanga a te Manatu Aorere me te Iwi Māori  
*Māori have confidence in their partnerships with the Ministry*

### TE POU WAHO

Outward Facing Aspiration

#### Engagement:

Our engagement with Māori has integrity, is delivering value for both partners, and enhancing our relationships with external agencies

### LEADERSHIP

### TE POU ROTO

Inward Facing Aspiration

#### Capability:

Our people have the capability and confidence to use matauranga Māori in their mahi in a way that brings mana to our Ministry and represents Māori interests with authenticity.

### The Ministry's mahi and Māori issues

Our engagement and our capability support our mahi on issues affecting Māori interests, in particular:

- ☉ Māori trade and economic interests
- ☉ Impact of International Treaties on Māori interests
- ☉ Application of tikanga Māori to Consular services
- ☉ International environment issues
- ☉ Indigenous and human rights
- ☉ The Māori diaspora in Australia
- ☉ Representation of Māori cultural identity and values on and offshore
- ☉ Asia and Pacific connections

### Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi

The Ministry acts consistently with the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the Treaty of Waitangi has visibility and mana in our mahi

### TE WHARE AORERE – TE ARA WHAKAMUA

Te Whare Aorere sits at the spiritual heart of this Ministry, connecting our people with each other and fostering a sense of whanaungatanga. The Ministry's overarching aspiration sits at the top of the Whare and connects Te Pou Waho, the outward facing pillar, and Te Pou Roto, the inward facing pillar. The way forward, Te Ara Whakamua, is set out in the aspirations and recommendations contained within the two pillars. At the bedrock of the Whare is Te Tiriti o Waitangi, our founding document.



# TE POU WAHO

## Outwards facing aspirations: Engagement

### Current State

Māori are more than stakeholders, they are also treaty partners and their treaty rights and interests must be protected. This can best be achieved through a systematic programme of deliberate, regular and coherent engagement including through the use of a tikanga Māori framework.

SSC PIF review: “The Ministry needs to shift its paradigm in relation to its responsibility as a Treaty partner and determine not only how it engages with authenticity and integrity but also develop a shared understanding of its value proposition for and with Māori...”

The Cabinet-approved 2001 Strategy for Engagement with Māori on International Treaties requires the Ministry to (1) identify whether proposed treaty actions for which we are the lead agency are of interest or relevance to Māori and to ensure that appropriate engagement with Māori occurs where this is the case and (2) provide a six monthly list of all international treaties being negotiated by the New Zealand Government to Māori.

The Waitangi Tribunal (WAI 262 and WAI 2522) has signalled a need for us to improve on the implementation of the 2001 Strategy.

Engagement with Māori is expected for the range of issues of interest to Māori. Other agencies with an interest in the policy or thematic issues underpinning the engagement should also be invited to participate. We now have some practical guidelines (Ararua) to assist staff with engagement on international trade treaties. Once Ararua has been promulgated it could be adapted for use in other areas of the Ministry’s work of interest to Māori.

### What are we aiming to achieve?

The Ministry’s engagement with Māori has integrity, is delivering value for both partners, and enhancing our relationships with external agencies.

#### In particular:

The Ministry’s capacity to engage on issues and activities of interest to Māori continues to grow in a systematised and sustainable way.

The Ministry’s engagement ensures Māori are able to influence the development and implementation of MFAT-led issues and activities which affect them.

The Ministry’s strategic objectives reflect a Māori dimension

SLT receives informed, quality, relevant advice and guidance on engagement with Māori

The Ministry articulates more clearly the value, support and services it can offer Māori.

# How will we do this?

## Relationships and Partnerships

- Clarify channels of communication and the Ministry's arrangements for engagement with Māori. MPU's role as the Ministry's priority Māori relationships manager helps to ensure our response is also calibrated on tikanga Māori lines. It also maintains relationship continuity, improves coordination and reduces 'consultation fatigue'.
- Review the case to establish a dedicated Māori Advisory Group, including options regarding internal or external membership.
- Deliver workshops for Māori on how to benefit from each Free Trade Agreement that enters into force.
- Examine existing funds within the Ministry to determine if they are fit for purpose to support targeted engagement with Māori, and give effect to an authentic partnership.
- Establish business processes and protocols to guide collaborations with other agencies and Māori travelling offshore.
- Produce and implement a public outreach plan to underpin and promote our value proposition for Māori. The plan should include a calendar of existing and new opportunities for kanohi-ki-te-kanohi engagement, utilise traditional and social media platforms (facebook, website, twitter etc) to disseminate our messaging and seek the views of Māori on what else we can do together.
- Support Maori international economic connectivity and produce a series of 'success stories', demonstrating the power of collaboration between Māori and MFAT (e.g. Taniwha-dragon Economic Summit).

## Diplomacy

- Ensure our physical presence on and offshore reflects our Māori culture and heritage through building design and cultural artefacts, and our people have the expertise, resources and support they need to represent and promote Māori culture and Māori values thoughtfully and authentically.



- Develop a menu of options to advance the economic interests and aspirations of Māori, to evolve based on feedback from Māori. As part of this identify partner countries with which Māori may wish to engage with further, based on market intelligence.
- Ensure that the Māori dimension of future work on the Ministry's approach to 'soft power diplomacy' is aligned with this strategy. This should include any MFAT funded initiative aiming to leverage an aspect or aspects of the Māori culture.
- Identify initiatives which promote targeted collaborations between Māori and developing and indigenous communities, and produce guidelines to support this.

## Tools

- Draw on Ararua in the production of guidelines to inform the Ministry's engagement planning with Māori on issues and activities of interest to Māori.
- Develop tools to map and measure the Ministry's relationships with Māori (stakeholder analysis, relationship maturity index, performance measurement framework).
- Ensure stakeholder surveys and other mechanisms provide informative feedback on engagement with Māori.





# TE POU ROTO

## Inwards facing aspirations: Capability & Capacity

### Current State

Māori are under-represented in our Ministry (comprising 10%) – we have proportionally fewer Māori than the public sector overall (16%). The percentage of staff with basic knowledge of Te Reo Maori has increased from 6% (in 2013) to around 18% (in 2016) as a result of the Te Reo Classes delivered under the Cultural Passport Programme. However, few of these staff continue to the next level and our cultural and language capability at the intermediate and advanced levels is likely to remain weak in the absence of an intervention. There are only 2 first language speakers and less than 5 exceeding a limited working proficiency when compared to other language capability and investment in the Ministry. Expectations of cultural competence are also relatively low.

Insufficient MFAT staff have the ability to move as comfortably as they should in the Māori world. The MFAT Capability Framework is a key building block that underpins a range of strategies that can be used to build Ministry capability. The current capability framework does not adequately describe the capabilities required to deliver on this proposed Māori Engagement strategy and the level of ambition in respect of our capabilities needs to lift over time.

### What are we aiming to achieve?

Our people have the capability and confidence to use matauranga Māori in their mahi in a way that brings mana to our Ministry and represents Māori interests with authenticity.

#### In particular:

We recruit, retain, develop and recognise talent to ensure we are able to deliver against our Treaty commitments.

Staff know how to apply the Ministry's Treaty of Waitangi commitments in their mahi.

MFAT has a better understanding of Māori groups and their views by engaging in a manner that appropriately incorporates mātauranga Māori.

Māori are more open and welcoming of MFAT's engagement.

MFAT's reputation is enhanced domestically and internationally, with stakeholders and with staff, in terms of our standing in the NZ government, our Treaty obligations, and the connections we foster with other countries.

The quality of the Ministry's representational work is enhanced.

The Ministry is better placed to fulfil its obligations as a good employer (including recognising the aims and aspirations and employment requirements of Māori as required under the State Sector Act 1988), including an improved ability to attract and retain Māori staff.



# How will we do this?

## Build Capability

- Review the Capability Framework to ensure that it adequately reflects the level of Maori capability the Ministry requires and lift our capability ambitions over time.
- Establish a comprehensive Māori cultural competence programme aligned to the Capability Framework, and addressing any gaps in our current offering, covering:
  - o increased Te Reo training
  - o a programme for all staff to develop capability in the application of Treaty of Waitangi to our mahi
  - o other elements of mātauranga Māori
  - o specific material for LES to promote understanding of Māori culture and the Ministry's partnership with Māori in a way that resonates for them culturally
  - o any additional preparation required for staff being posted
  - o any additional resources required to support staff at posts
- Strengthen the incentives for uptake of the Māori cultural competence programme and application to our mahi by:
  - o clarifying how the 'cultural passport' concept could be used as a development tool and as a 'gateway', e.g. for postings at all levels
  - o ensuring managers use PDP processes to set mātauranga Maori competence expectations and recognise this capability as a core and valued part of performance when this is demonstrated
  - o aligning promotion requirements and decision-making to the Capability Framework requirements for mātauranga Māori (and considering training in adopting broader views on cultural/policy competence for those involved in promotion recommendations and decision making)
  - o rewarding those who contribute as a specialist Ministry resource beyond the scope of their role by providing informal cultural advice or specific knowledge to inform policy dialogue
- Offer a basic Introductory Module (e.g. basic te reo, tikanga and kawa for engagement work) and support the development of MPU's Te Ao Māori app to build staff understanding and knowledge of things Māori.
- Draw on the ARARUA guidelines to produce tailored guidelines to inform the Ministry's engagement planning with Māori on issues and activities of interest to Māori and offer practical engagement workshops for staff.
- Contribute to work under way on the Ministry's engagement with alumni, including encouraging Māori Alumni to return to the organisation or to act as bridges into their current communities and professional fields.
- Encourage expatriate Māori to apply for LES positions at Post.



- Develop a Ministry-wide process for periodically measuring capability in matauranga Māori. This could include an anonymous survey asking staff to self-assess their confidence in areas such as proficiency in Te Reo Māori, tikanga Māori, Māori practices and protocols, Treaty of Waitangi, knowledge of major iwi Māori and their locations, the ability to organise and conduct a Māori welcome.

## Build Capacity

- Ensure that our approaches to recruiting and retaining talent with Māori capability are appropriate to our capability ambitions:
  - o The newly established Recruitment Working Group to assess and recommend the approaches to be used to attract applicants with Māori capability, the criteria to be used for selecting staff with Māori capability which is otherwise in short supply, and ensure staff are placed thoughtfully and supported on arrival in the Ministry.
  - o Establish the role of MPU and Te Pou Māori in our outreach to candidates with Māori capability.
  - o Ensure that our approach to rewards and recognition value staff with the required matauranga Māori capability.
  - o Create an inclusive culture where Tikanga Māori is respected and diversity of thought is encouraged and valued.

## Internal Compliance

- Promote within MFAT and the broader Government the 2001 Strategy for Engagement with Māori on International Treaties.
- Develop a framework for responsible divisions to report on compliance with the 2001 Strategy for Engagement with Māori on International Treaties and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including through the Control Self-Assessment Process.
- Review Ministry templates (such as divisional business plans and policy documents) to ensure consideration of Treaty of Waitangi and Māori interests is mandated as appropriate.
- Develop wording to reflect the Ministry's commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi and engagement with Māori, for inclusion in the Ministry's Strategic Intentions.

# Annex A: Summary of recommendations and implementation timeframes

This table sets out all of the recommendations contained in the Māori Engagement Strategy, grouped according to their pillar and suggested implementation timeframe.

Timeframe	Engagement	Capability and Capacity
<b>Short term</b> <i>(within 6 months)</i>	Clarify channels of communication and the Ministry's arrangements for engagement with Māori. MPU's role as the Ministry's priority Māori relationships manager helps to ensure our response is also calibrated on tikanga Māori lines. It also maintains relationship continuity, improves coordination and reduces 'consultation fatigue'.	Review the Capability Framework to ensure that it adequately reflects the level of Māori capability the Ministry requires and lift our capability ambitions over time.
	Identify initiatives which promote targeted collaborations between Māori and developing/indigenous communities, and produce guidelines to support this.	Offer a basic Introductory Module (e.g. basic te reo, tikanga and kawa for engagements) and support the development of MPU's Te Ao Māori ap to build staff understanding and knowledge of things Māori.
	Deliver workshops for Māori on how to benefit from each Free Trade Agreement that enters into force.	Draw on the ARARUA guidelines to produce tailored guidelines to inform the Ministry's engagement planning with Māori on issues and activities of interest to Māori and offer practical engagement workshops for staff.
	Develop a menu of options to advance the economic interests and aspirations of Māori, to evolve based on feedback from Māori. As part of this, identify partner countries with which Māori may wish to engage with further, based on market intelligence.	Strengthen the incentives for uptake of the Māori cultural competence programme and application to our mahi by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>aligning promotion requirements and decision-making to the Capability Framework requirements for mātauranga Māori (and considering training in adopting broader views on cultural/policy competence for those involved in promotion recommendations and decision making)</li> </ul>
	Ensure that the Māori dimension of future work on the Ministry's approach to 'soft power diplomacy' is aligned with this strategy. This should include any MFAT funded initiative aiming to leverage an aspect or aspects of the Māori culture.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>clarifying how the 'cultural passport' concept will be used as a development tool and as a 'gateway', e.g. for postings at all levels</li> </ul>
	Establish business processes and protocols to guide collaborations with other agencies and Māori travelling offshore.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ensuring managers use PDP processes to set mātauranga Māori competence expectations and recognise this capability as a core and valued part of performance when this is demonstrated</li> <li>rewarding those who contribute as a specialist Ministry resource beyond the scope of their role by providing informal cultural advice or specific knowledge to inform policy dialogue</li> </ul>
	Support Maori international economic connectivity and produce a series of 'success stories' demonstrating the power of collaboration between Māori and MFAT (e.g. Taniwha-dragon Economic Summit).	Promote within MFAT and the broader Government the 2001 Strategy for Engagement with Māori on International Treaties.
		Review Ministry templates (such as divisional business plans and policy documents) to ensure consideration of Treaty of Waitangi and Māori interests is mandated as appropriate.
		Develop wording to reflect the Ministry's commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi and engagement with Māori, for inclusion in the Ministry's Strategic Intentions.

Timeframe	Engagement	Capability and Capacity
<p><b>Intermediate (within 1-2 years)</b></p>	<p>Review the case to establish a dedicated Māori Advisory Group, including options regarding internal or external membership</p>	<p><b>Professional Development</b> Establish a comprehensive Māori cultural competence programme aligned to the Capability Framework, and addressing any gaps in our current offering, covering:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increased Te Reo training</li> <li>• a programme for all staff to develop capability in the application of Treaty of Waitangi to our mahi</li> <li>• other elements of mātauranga Māori</li> <li>• specific material for LES to promote understanding of Māori culture and the Ministry's partnership with Māori in a way that resonates for them culturally</li> <li>• any additional preparation required for staff being posted</li> <li>• any additional resources required to support staff at posts</li> </ul>
	<p>Ensure our physical presence on and offshore reflects our Māori culture and heritage through building design and cultural artefacts and our people have the expertise, resources and support they need to represent and promote Māori culture and Māori values thoughtfully and authentically.</p>	
	<p>Examine existing funds within the Ministry to determine if they are fit for purpose to support targeted engagement with Māori, and give effect to an authentic partnership.</p>	<p><b>Recruitment and retention</b> Ensure that our approaches to recruiting and retaining talent with Māori capability are appropriate to our capability ambitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The newly established Recruitment Working Group to assess and recommend the approaches to be used to attract applicants with Māori capability, the criteria to be used for selecting staff with Māori capability which is otherwise in short supply, and ensure staff are placed thoughtfully and supported on arrival in the Ministry.</li> <li>• Establish the role of MPU and Te Pou Māori in our outreach to candidates with Māori capability.</li> <li>• Ensure that our approach to rewards and recognition value staff with the required mātauranga Māori capability.</li> <li>• Create an inclusive culture where Tikanga Māori is respected and diversity of thought is encouraged and valued.</li> </ul>
	<p>Produce and implement a public outreach plan to underpin and promote our value proposition for Māori. The plan should include a calendar of existing and new opportunities for kanohi-ki-te-kanohi engagement, utilise traditional and social media platforms (facebook, website, twitter etc) to disseminate our messaging and seek the views of Māori on what else we can do together.</p>	<p>Contribute to work under way on the Ministry's engagement with alumni, including encouraging Māori Alumni to return to the organisation or to act as bridges into their current communities and professional fields.</p>
		<p>Develop a framework for responsible divisions to report on compliance with the 2001 Strategy for Engagement with Māori on International Treaties and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including through the Control Self-Assessment Process.</p>

Annex A continued

Timeframe	Engagement	Capability and Capacity
<b>Intermediate (within 1-2 years)</b>	Develop tools to map and measure the Ministry's relationships with Māori (stakeholder analysis, relationship maturity index, performance measurement framework).	Encourage expatriate Māori to apply for LES positions at Post.
	Ensure stakeholder surveys and other mechanisms provide informative feedback on engagement with Māori.	Develop a Ministry-wide process for periodically measuring capability in matauranga Māori. This could include an anonymous survey asking staff to self assess their confidence in areas such as proficiency in Te Reo Māori, tikanga Māori, Māori practices and protocols, Treaty of Waitangi, knowledge of major iwi Māori and their locations, the ability to organise and conduct a Māori welcome.
	Draw on Ararua in the production of guidelines to inform the Ministry's engagement planning with Māori on issues and activities of interest to Māori.	



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