

**Review of NZAID funded New
Zealand Police activities in
Bamyan, Afghanistan**

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Executive Summary

Introduction

This report reviews the development work that New Zealand Police (NZP) are conducting in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan to strengthen the capacity of Afghan National Police (ANP) in the areas of training, management and leadership. The NZP mission is called Operation Highland and began in March 2005 following a request for assistance from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) (CAB Min (05) 40/1). Operation Highland is a small part of an extremely large international effort to progress police reform in Afghanistan and as such NZP works closely with international partners and are now hatted under EUPOL-A.

The key tasks and responsibilities of Operation Highland are:

1. Supporting the Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC) to deliver training to the Afghan National Police.
2. Mentoring of the Bamyan Provincial Police Chief (PCoP) and other senior managers within Bamyan Province as required.

Operation Highland contingents are made up of three NZP personnel who rotate on a six monthly basis. They are co-located with the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The NZP Contingent Commander mentors the Provincial Chief of Police and senior ANP managers at the Provincial Police Headquarters (PPHQ). The other two NZP personnel are assigned to support the RTC to deliver training.

Review aims

The review examines NZP activities in Afghanistan from March 2005 to May 2008 focusing on three main areas:

- Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to manage the Centre
- Building capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to train and up-skill ANP
- Enhancing the leadership capacity of the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police and other senior managers

The review team conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan in May 2008. Data sources included: NZAID and NZP project files; literature review; interviews; consultation meetings; and observations at the RTC and PPHQ. There were limitations to what information could be collected in terms of the diversity of people interviewed and the records available.

NZP Operation Highland objectives

The main areas of focus and objectives identified in the Plan of Action (project plans) for Highland 2 to 7 are grouped under the two key tasks or applicable to both key tasks:

1. Supporting the RTC to deliver training:
 - to mentor RTC management and instructors to advise on all aspects of course delivery and administration
 - to maintain basic training at the RTC and explore the introduction of new courses to progress ANP development
 - to develop the investigative skills of the ANP
2. Mentoring the PCoP and senior managers
3. Applicable to both key tasks:
 - establishing and maintaining relationships with key stakeholders
 - enhancing female recruitment and employment in the ANP

- development of the Provincial Training Programme (PTP) to provide in-service training to ANP in Bamyan Province
- to progress a number of specific short and long term projects for the benefit of the ANP
- to exploit and develop opportunities for capacity building with the ANP.

The overall focus of Operation Highland has been on assisting with the development of a functioning police force through mentoring leaders and senior management at the PPHQ and RTC and supporting training new recruits and up-skilling serving ANP. There has generally been continuity between contingents planned activities. Variations in objectives reflect the stage of development of the RTC and PPHQ; the current priorities and projects of police reform as required by the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the international community, and also the identification of development opportunities by NZP.

NZP Operation Highland activities

Capacity building activities with Bamyan RTC staff

The NZP activities to strengthen RTC management included both mentoring individuals and establishing a number of management and administrative systems with the ANP, and endeavouring to build ANP capacity to maintain these systems. Examples of management and administration processes NZP mentors have developed with ANP senior staff includes:

- establishing regular staff meetings to debrief the previous week and plan for the following week
- regular evaluations of instructors
- establishment of instructional workshops for instructors where senior ANP staff deliver training sessions to enhance junior instructors
- annual plan of training schedules
- planning student recruitment process
- staff rosters and holidays
- whiteboard schedule with currently running courses, times and allocated instructors.

All students at the RTC are taught by Afghan ANP instructors and the role of NZP is to build the instructors' capacity through mentoring activities which provides the best opportunity for sustainable training of the ANP. The following activities have been conducted by NZP to strengthen the capacity of the RTC instructors:

- provision of additional training to instructors
- instigating instructional workshops where RTC ANP staff supervisors participate in training RTC instructors
- provision of training on teaching techniques such as active learning techniques involving role play and interactive learning which is particularly important for delivering training to non-literate students
- supporting RTC instructors to further professional development such as courses at the RTC and attending courses at the CTC in Kabul
- assessment and appraisal of instructors skills through:
 - regular observation of teaching and providing briefings and feedback after class
 - formal evaluations of instructors teaching skills and class room management
 - mentoring senior management at RTC to supervise and assess instructors.

Female ANP identified barriers to recruitment for women were perceptions by the community based on their culture and tradition. The RTC Commander said with the assistance of the NZP mentors they had been able to recruit and maintain women in the police which was a great achievement, particularly considering that Bamyan could be a very religious and traditional province. The RTC Commander had also been responsible for recruitment of some women from his District.

Successive NZP Contingent Commanders have worked with the PCoP to negotiate with the Provincial Council, Shura and other interested parties to successfully gain support for women joining ANP. However, some interviewees said there is still some reticence in the community and from some of the mullah.

To facilitate the training of women NZP mentors have carried out a number of activities including:

- mentoring male ANP senior staff and instructors to support training of women
- making a business case recommending DynCorp fund the building of a separate day room at the RTC for women and their children which has also been used as onsite accommodation for women students, their children and minders.
- hiring nannies for women students with children to look after babies and children onsite at the RTC
- encouraging women recruits to do further training and to become instructors at the RTC resulting in two female instructors at the RTC.
- facilitate women training with men including both theory and practical exercises. For example conducting fire arms training together and having a female firearms instructor available for female students due to the hands on demonstrations.

Ideally potential women recruits should be presented with choices about training i.e. at the provincial level at the RTC for mid-rank opportunities or going to the Kabul Police Academy (KPA) for higher rank officer opportunities.

Follow-up training of ANP was identified by NZP as extremely important to ensure ANP are implementing what they have been taught and continue to develop their policing skills appropriate for their rank. District training in Bamyan has taken place as part of the RTC Provincial Training Programme (PTP) course designed by DynCorp and delivered at the RTC by ANP instructors. District trainers have attended the PTP at the RTC to up-skill so they can provide refresher training in their Districts. A summary of NZP activities to support ANP District training from 2005 to 2008 include:

- periodic assessment of training needs in the Districts which is ongoing
- development of District Trainers: ANP staff are identified by their DCoP to undertake instructors' courses to become District Trainers
- creation of Mobile Training Teams (MTT): includes RTC instructors, NZP mentors and recently a DynCorp mentor, escorted by NZDF PRT personnel. The purpose is to provide additional training in the Districts and be able to assess how the District Trainers are performing.
- building the capacity of RTC instructors to work in Districts by mentoring and advising them about assessment of District Trainers and delivering PTP at the RTC
- development of a second PTP course by Highland 7 to be delivered in-District as a refresher course which was undergoing approval by INL at the time of writing this report.

The Bamyan RTC's facilities have increased capacity to teach from 30 to 90 students NZP have facilitated the improvements to the Bamyan RTC's facilities by making business cases to DynCorp, INL and CSTC-A for their approval and resourcing. Accommodation facilities, including a small facility for women, has meant men and women from outside Bamyan township can more easily attend the RTC.

Capacity building activities with Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police and senior managers

NZP Contingent Commanders have focused on building the capacity of the PCoP and senior management and establishing and enhancing managerial, administration and operational systems. The main areas of focus have been:

- Leadership
- Strategy and planning
- Management (personnel and resources)
- Administration (Logistics, Finance and Human Resources)
- Operations

NZP mentors identified the key attributes of mentoring the PCoP and his team are based on relationship building and developing trust and respect and using a problem solving approach to develop capacity to identify issues and solutions. It is also important that those mentored have ownership of the solutions and outcomes.

NZP promote a community policing approach which is different to the paramilitary mindset the ANP are used to from their Russian training. NZP mentors have encouraged the PCoP to meet with the community representatives such as Shura, city councils, District sub-governors and mayors to develop community relations. NZP have also encouraged community radio broadcasts by the ANP to try and develop a better perception of the police in the community. Another community policing initiative has the Police patrolling the bazaar and the setting up of small Police Post in a container at the bazaar in order to be more accessible to the community.

Successive NZP rotations have enhanced the PPHQ facilities and the ANP's operational capability by securing funding to develop the following areas:

- communications ability
- fuel and vehicle management
- PPHQ compound security
- building repair and additions

Progress of Operation Highland to achieve objectives

Supporting the RTC to deliver training to the ANP

NZP have done a lot of mentoring work with the RTC Commander and his management staff by dedicating a mentor to enhance their capacity to manage and administer the RTC. Senior ANP staff at the RTC all gave very positive feedback about the mentoring on management and administration that they had received from NZP mentors.

In terms of providing education the RTC was regarded as sustainable as the quality of the instructors was thought to be good.

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To
some degree constant staff changes can be mitigated by succession planning and robust management and administrative systems.

The qualitative evidence from the ANP and DynCorp shows that NZP have enhanced the ability of instructors to provide training to ANP. Feedback from all the RTC instructors interviewed was very positive and they said they really appreciated the assistance they had received from NZP mentors which they had found very useful. INL and CSTC-A commented on the quality of the teaching at Bamyan, however there was limited evidence in regards to instructors' performance assessments. An indication of their teaching capability is that over 90 percent of students passed the Basic 8 and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) courses from 2004 to mid 2008.

NZP aimed to continue the emphasis on basic training and to facilitate the introduction of new courses. This has been achieved during the review period as the predominant courses have been the Basic courses to train new recruits (891) and TIP1 and TIP3A courses (523) to up-skill existing ANP NCOs and Officers. The RTC expanded the selection of courses offered from the Basic and TIP courses in 2006 to include a variety of other courses offering opportunities for Bamyan ANP and neighbouring provinces to develop their policing skills, e.g. NZP facilitated the introduction of the CID course in 2007.

There was one female police officer in Bamyan Province before the RTC started operations and in May 2008 there were fifteen. The Bamyan RTC trained their first female recruit in 2005 and since that time they have trained sixteen female recruits in the introductory course (Basic 8) and the majority of them have gone on to do advanced courses. Ten of these women have graduated from intermediate training in the TIP3A for officers and NCOs and four have passed the specialist CID training. Many of this group of women have also gone on to do instructors courses with nine doing the IDC course and eight doing the Firearms instructor course. Eight of these women have had refresher training in the PTP course. At the time of the review eleven of these women were doing an abridged NCO course at the RTC. Of the sixteen women who have received training at the RTC fourteen were from Bamyan Province and two from Parwan Province.

NZP identified through visits to Districts in Bamyan Province that many of the ANP NCOs and officers had a lack of basic investigative skills such as securing crime scenes, collecting and recording evidence. To build the investigative capabilities of ANP officers and NCOs the NZP mentors used to advise sending suitable candidates to the CTC in Kabul to do the CID course. A significant achievement by the NZP mentors in Highland 6 was their facilitation of introducing the CID course to the Bamyan RTC curriculum. Instructors and CID students interviewed for this review thought that the CID curriculum was appropriate for the ANP and within their knowledge; however there was a shortage of resources in the field to implement some of the techniques taught. A more basic CID course has been proposed by Highland 7 that is more appropriate for the environment the ANP work in.

Mentoring the Provincial Chief of Police and senior managers

The review identified some significant changes had been made at PPHQ in terms of infrastructure development and the development of management and administrative systems (e.g. PCoP holds regular management meetings with senior management and District Police Chiefs, improved payroll system, staff rosters, daily occurrence book). The PCoP had an annual plan for 2008 and indications at the time of the review were that he was starting to implement objectives.

It is unknown how effective community initiatives such as patrolling the bazaar have been as members of the public were not canvassed for this review. Future reviews may want to consider a survey of public perceptions as community perception/satisfaction surveys are an important way of monitoring changes to police practice. This is particularly important in regards to human rights abuses.

NZP have encouraged the PCoP to give female ANP core policing roles and to negotiate with community leaders to encourage them and their families to allow women to join the ANP. Female officers work in CID, personnel and the Family Response Unit (FRU). The FRU is an important new area of work at the PPHQ as it is beginning to address family violence issues and provide Afghan women with more surety their case will be taken seriously. There was no refuge safe house and this issue has been discussed by community organisations. It is also important to provide ongoing support to women and children in family violence situations and community outreach by an NGO could be looked at to support the work of the FRU.

NZP have endeavoured to address human rights issues through their work at the PPHQ and RTC by promoting professionalism, integrity and reinforcing the importance of human rights when they see abuses occur. RTC training includes components on human rights in basic training, NCO training and District training.

NZP mentors have assisted in building up the RTC and PPHQ facilities over the last three years through promoting these facilities to donors and developing business cases to fund development of buildings and provision of equipment. NZP do not have their own funding and work closely with key partners such as NZAID, DynCorp/INL/CSTC-A, and NZPRT to develop facilities. Observations of the RTC and PPHQ facilities show there have been many improvements, particularly at the RTC, compared to photographs and descriptions of how they used to be.

NZP identified establishing and maintaining key relationships as an important objective to progress their work with the ANP and feedback from those interviewed was they had developed very good relationships with key partner agencies.

Key strengths

The major strengths of NZP involvement at the RTC and PPHQ were identified as:

- NZP ISG send experienced serving police who have current knowledge about police management and operations and many of whom had experience providing training
- ability to engage and build strong relationships with ANP, Afghan and international key stakeholders
- strong work ethic and motivation to take opportunities to develop ANP and RTC/PPHQ
- promotion of women in policing
- promotion of professionalism and integrity in policing
- promotion of community policing approach

Barriers

The main barriers to implementation have been:

- changes to ANP national allocation of staff (tashkil)

- shortage of resources
- poor recording systems including a lack of reliable crime statistics to monitor performance
- cultural perceptions of women's roles

Given that resourcing is such an issue care should be taken with any programme expansion over and above key tasks that will provide the most enduring results for ANP. Resourcing is a major issue at the PPHQ which is dependent on the funding capacity of Mol. Given the lack of government income this is likely to be a concern for some time.

NZP have endeavoured to address corruption issues through mentoring and role modelling professionalism and integrity and focusing on improving management and administration systems where there are opportunities for corruption.

Suggestions for improvement

A limitation for NZP has been usually only one NZP member of the contingent works at the PPHQ.

the PPHQ still requires a lot of ongoing mentoring work to enhance the ANP's management and administrative capabilities. Additional mentors with expertise in the areas of finance, logistics and personnel would be really beneficial in regards to improving the capacity of the ANP to administer these systems

To address the requirement for the ANP to take more responsibility for administrative tasks and forward planning it is suggested mentoring continue in the RTC and further professional development of RTC staff through attending management, administration and computer courses at the Programme for Professional Development (PPD). The PPD is provided by the Aga Khan Foundation, funded by NZIAD and would therefore incur no additional cost.

The review process found some gaps in maintaining records over time at the RTC e.g. instructor performance assessments and in NZP records e.g. training needs analysis. There was also variation in the way NZP contingents assessed their activities which made it difficult to get consistent data to examine the effectiveness of Operation Highland. A monitoring and evaluation framework is recommended to provide a more consistent way of reporting across contingents.

Part of ensuring continuity and thoroughly informing new contingents about activities, contacts and issues is good handover procedures. The review endorses the continuation of the good practices identified for handover by Operation Highland contingent members including: the command recognisance by the Contingent Commander and NZDF undertaken 3 months prior to deployment; comprehensive handover notes; updated desk-file; and the few days orientation provided by the outgoing rotation to the incoming rotation.

A constraint has been the lack of a national strategic plan for the ANP with which to align programme direction. This was being progressed by the International Police Co-ordination Board (IPCB) with senior police at the Ministry of Interior (Moi). With the development of an overall vision for the ANP, and NZP now hatted under EUPOL-A, it is suggested that it is timely to develop a strategic overview for Operation Highland that acknowledges the alignment of this operation with key partners. This would clarify strategic direction for future contingents and facilitate the continuity of strategic objectives. It would also signal to key partners (e.g. ANP, EUPOL-A, INL, CSTC-A and DynCorp) that NZP are aligned and committed to national directions for policing.

Recommendation 1: Development of a Strategic Overview

To enhance continuity between NZP rotations and align with the police reform goals of the ANP and EUPOL-A it is recommended a Strategic Overview for Operation Highland is developed to provide more guidance by defining strategic direction, operating principles, objectives and general performance indicators. It is suggested the Strategic Overview is developed by a working party made up of NZP representatives, especially those who have been on previous rotations and NZAID for their expertise in development activities and knowledge of the local context in Bamyar.

Recommendation 2: Suggestions for staff recruitment

Whenever possible it would be very beneficial to include a woman in the NZP contingent to work with female ANP and potentially mentor at the FRU. This is to maximise the opportunity to continue working with female ANP to enhance their capacity. It is also suggested that it would be very beneficial to complement the mentoring activities provided by the NZP Contingent Commander to the PCoP and his leadership team at the PPHQ with other NZP staff with expertise in the areas of logistics, finance, administration, communications and human resources. This could include non-sworn NZP staff with appropriate expertise.

Recommendation 3: Monitoring and evaluation

It is recommended that a more systematic monitoring and evaluation system be incorporated into NZP reporting to provide more consistency of reporting across missions, using predominantly the same outcomes and performance indicators. A suggested monitoring and evaluation framework is included in this review.

Acronyms

ANA – Afghanistan National Army
ANDS – Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP – Afghanistan National Police
Bamyan PPHQ - Bamyan Provincial Police Head Quarters
CPHD - Center for Policy and Human Development, Kabul University
CSTC-A – Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan
CTC – Central Training Centre
EUPOL-A – European Union Police – Afghanistan
FRU - Family Response Unit
GoIRA - Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPPO – German Police Project Office
HQ JFNZ – Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
INL – Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
ISAF – International Security and Assistance Force
IPCB – International Police Coordination Board
IPT – Integrated Project Teams
JCMB – Joint Coordination Monitoring Board
LOTFA – Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan
MoI – GoIRA Ministry of Interior
NATO – Northern Alliance Treaty Organisation
NCO – non-commissioned officer
NZAID – New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
NZDF – New Zealand Defence Force
NZP – New Zealand Police
PMT – Provincial Mentoring Teams
PRR – Pay and Rank Reform
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
RTC – Regional Training Centre
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This report reviews the development work that New Zealand Police (NZP) are conducting in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan, to strengthen the capacity of Afghan National Police (ANP) in the areas of training, management and leadership. The NZP mission is called Operation Highland and began in March 2005 following a request for assistance from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) (CAB Min (05) 40/1). Operation Highland is a small part of an extremely large international effort to progress police reform in Afghanistan and as such NZP works closely with international partners. NZP deployment members are now hatted under EUPOL-A. The review period is March 2005 to May 2008.

The NZP deployment is part of New Zealand's contribution to peace and security in Afghanistan and is funded through NZAID. NZAID's policy on *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* (2005:4) recognises the importance of legal systems to protect human rights and the role of police,

Legal systems (including traditional systems and adherence to international law) that protect the rights of women, men and children, and are upheld by a functioning police force and an independent, objective and capable judiciary, are also essential.

NZAID funding for NZP in Bamyan is part of a three year \$15 million programme agreed by Ministers and begun late 2005/06. The programme is focused on agricultural livelihoods, health, education, capacity development and human rights. Gender is a cross-cutting issue for all NZAID programming and is a key factor in all Bamyan activities. As such, implementing partners are expected to consider the impact of programme activities on women and women's access to and participation in activities. An additional \$1 million per annum was made available from the 2007/08 financial year. NZP personnel were funded from NZAID's Afghanistan programme at a projected cost of \$800,000 in 2007/08.

The key tasks and responsibilities of Operation Highland in the current memorandum of understanding between NZP and NZAID are:

1. Supporting the Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC) to deliver training to the ANP.
2. Mentoring of the Bamyan Provincial Police Chief and other senior managers within Bamyan Province as required.

NZP are co-located with the NZ Defence Force at the Bamyan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and NZP and NZDF personnel rotate six monthly at the same time. From March 2005 to May 2008 there have been seven NZP rotations deployed to Operation Highland and at the time of the review Highland 7 was in the field. The resourcing for NZP Operation Highland has not changed significantly over that time as NZAID has funded three personnel from Highland 2 onwards. At the request of NZP, NZAID has added a discretionary fund of NZ\$5000 for the deployment members to use on approved projects.

Operation Highland does not have an overall project plan and has been developed on an incremental basis as each contingent is required to update the Operation Highland Plan of Action and submit to NZP and NZAID six weeks into their mission

putting their objectives for their six month rotation. The project monitoring mechanisms are a mid-rotation report and end of mission report that assess progress against a project plan. NZP also submit weekly reports to NZP, NZMD, NZDF and international partners in Afghanistan.

1.2 Purpose of Review

The Terms of Reference (TOR) specified the purpose for this review was:

... to provide important conclusions and recommendations for enhancing the design and implementation of the project to ensure that best results for policing reform and training in Bamyan are being achieved. This will include considering the support role of NZP, providing increased understanding of effective performance for the continuous improvement of this project and wider issue of delivering effective police reform in conflict and post-conflict settings. The Review will also provide detailed recommendations for the future monitoring for project results. This is expected to include the development of an appropriate monitoring and evaluation framework

The Review conclusions and recommendation will be particularly relevant for NZP's functioning under EUPOL-Afghanistan and the expectations that training and mentoring will conform to EUPOL standards. Recommendations should inform decisions about the alignment of training and mentoring to these standards.

The TOR specified three main areas to examine NZP capacity building activities:

- Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to manage the Centre
- Building capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to train and up-skill recruits
- Enhancing leadership capacity of the Provincial Chief of Police

The TOR states that the review will not be limited to these specified areas and also include activities that were added through amending the project design or as a requirement of project implementation. The full TOR is included in Appendix 1.

1.3 Report outline

Chapter 2 outlines the methodology used for the review including: the review approach; how information was analysed; and the limitations of the review in terms of the type of data that could be collected.

Chapter 3 provides a brief historical overview of police reform in Afghanistan to provide contextual information about progress and challenges and how NZP 'fits' into the international reform effort.

Chapter 4 describes the Bamyan RTC and Provincial Police Headquarters (PPHQ) organizational structure, staffing allocation (tashkil) and facilities in order to provide context to the capacity building activities NZP has undertaken at these locations.

Chapter 5 examines the development of NZP Operation Highland programme objectives over the review period and continuity between contingents. Identifying the programme objectives over this time provides a reference for discussing programme activities and outcomes in the following chapters. This chapter briefly describes the NZP pre-deployment training and handover between contingencies for Operation Highland as this is an important factor for programme continuity.

Chapter 6 describes what the NZP Operation Highland activities have been and the ANP and international community's feedback about NZP's input. Statistical evidence such as RTC training outputs were limited but are included to give an indication of how the RTC is performing.

Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the findings of the review to assess to what extent Operation Highland activities have met the programme intentions. The strengths, issues and barriers to Operation Highland are identified along with suggestions for improvement.

Chapter 8 concludes with an examination of the NZP programme in terms of the DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability) and recommendations for the future development of the programme. A monitoring and evaluation framework for future monitoring of the programme is provided for NZP and NZAID consideration.

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2 Review methodology

2.1 Review approach and methods

The Terms of Reference specified the review objectives and methodology. A mixed methods approach is utilized collecting and analysing both qualitative and quantitative data. The advantage of using mixed methods is that it provides a more comprehensive picture of what is occurring. It is important to have different sources of data so that they may be cross-referenced (triangulation), to ensure that the most rigorous results are obtained. The review examines NZP activities in Afghanistan from March 2005 to May 2008.

Two weeks fieldwork was conducted in Afghanistan during May 2008 which included three days in Kabul and nine days in Bamyan to interview, observe, and consult with key stakeholders. The review consultant was accompanied by an NZAID staff member and staff from the NZP International Services Group (ISG) to provide advice and guidance during the review.

The review included the following activities:

Desk file review

- Three day review of project files held in Wellington by NZAID and NZP. NZP provided copies of the following Operation Highland reports: six weekly Project plans; 3 month mid-rotation reports; and six month end of rotation reports. Weekly reports from Highland 4 to 6 were also provided.
- Review of Operation Highland documents related to RTC operations, monitoring and training in the Bamyan RTC in Afghanistan.

Literature review

- Literature review of recent reports and journal articles on police reform in Afghanistan
- Review of documents on international best practice to monitor and evaluate police operations in conflict/post-conflict zones.

Consultation meetings

- Kabul: The review team meet with key stakeholders in Kabul to inform the team about the context and progress of police reform and obtain feedback about NZP contribution.
- Bamyan: The review team meet with the Bamyan Governor to inform her about the review and discuss policing in Bamyan Province. The team also meet with the UNAMA Human Rights and Governance Unit Director to discuss their activities in Bamyan.

A list of key stakeholders consulted for this review are included in Appendix 2.

Interviews

- Semi-structured individual interviews were conducted with a total of 36 stakeholders from the following organisations:
 - Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC): 14 ANP managers and instructors (including 1 female ANP instructor), and one interpreter
 - Bamyan Police Provincial Headquarters (PPHQ): 3 ANP managers and 2 female ANP who operate the Family Violence Response Unit (FRU) were interviewed together
 - Shibar District Police: District Chief of Police

- Operation Highland 1 to 7: 10 NZP staff, with at least one staff member from each rotation (face-to-face and telephone interviews)
- ISG: 2 personnel responsible for recruitment and deployment
- DynCorp at Bamyan RTC: 2 staff
- New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Senior National Officer (SNO)

The ANP are the recipients of NZP capacity building activities and it was important to gain their views on the efficacy of these activities at the RTC and PPHQ. Individual interviews were conducted with fourteen of the nineteen RTC managers and instructors and five members of the PPHQ and a District Chief of Police. Due to the ANP being very rank conscious it was important to conduct the interviews individually to encourage frank feedback, otherwise junior police may not have felt as free to express their views. The Provincial Chief of Police was not in Bamyan during the time of fieldwork and therefore not able to be interviewed.

Cross validation was obtained from interviews with NZP members from every rotation and two members of DynCorp, one who had worked at the RTC for a year. NZDF work alongside NZP and interview with the current SNO was conducted to obtain their views on NZP activities.

Focus groups

- 1 focus group with 7 female ANP on an NCO course at the RTC
- 2 focus groups with 15 male ANP students attending a CID course at the RTC

Observation

1. Integrated Project Team meeting in Kabul of international representatives involved in police reform
- Tour of RTC facilities and Bamyan Provincial Headquarters and observation of PPHQ morning briefing meeting with senior ANP.

Statistical analysis

2. Descriptive statistical analysis of RTC training records of the numbers of students graduating from each course from 2004 to June 2008.

2.2 Review analysis

A brief literature review was conducted to provide historical and contextual information about police reform in Afghanistan and the environment NZP Operation Highland are working in.

Interviews were coded to identify common themes or conflicting views about NZP capacity building activities at the Bamyan Regional Training Centre and the Provincial Police Headquarters. Quotes have been used from interviews to illustrate a commonly held view or a point of difference.

Information from the different data sources were triangulated as much as possible to analyse efficacy of NZP staff capacity building activities. The analysis process included identifying what NZP objectives were for Operation Highland as this initiative does not have an overarching programme plan with objectives and specified outcomes. The objectives of the programme were identified through a review of each contingent's Plan of Action. An analysis was then conducted of what activities NZP had conducted and how effective those activities had been to strengthen the capacity of the ANP to manage the RTC; train ANP students; and enhance leadership and management at the PPHQ.

When looking for evidence of NZP staff ability to enhance the capacity of the ANP it was important to consider what is and what is outside the scope of NZP staff influence. By examining what NZP staff activities were, the review aimed to identify tangible areas where NZP staff have the ability to educate, advise and mentor ANP staff at the RTC and PPHQ.

To assess the volume of training undertaken at the RTC and get an indication about the quality of instruction the training outputs of the RTC were examined.

2.3 Limitations

The review has the following limitations:

1. There was a limit on the diversity of views obtained for the review and it was difficult to find people from outside of police work or the police reform processes who were familiar with NZP activities to interview.
2. Several key stakeholders were not in Bamyan at the time of the review and were therefore unable to be interviewed, most importantly the Provincial Chief of Police.
3. There were limitations on the records that could be reviewed either because data was not collected or they no longer existed.
3. There were cultural factors that posed a risk to the review methodology namely that the contracted consultant who conducted the interviews with Afghan nationals was a female from New Zealand and the interviews required a translator. There were no observed barriers due to gender and the translator was very experienced and reliable. The consultant has also previously worked with translators in cross-cultural contexts, for example with Iraqi and Turkish participants. The majority of ANP interviewed were very positive about NZP personnel and this could be partly due to their desire to have continued assistance from NZP. It was difficult to get the ANP to identify any issues with the NZP mission or suggest any improvements apart from additional resources which most appreciated were not within the NZP's scope to obtain.
4. Assessing the efficacy of NZP capacity building activities with ANP to develop their personal capabilities required examining the personal development of ANP staff through qualitative information from interviews; NZP mission reports; and evidence of ANP staff performance. The barriers to verifying personal development from multiple sources of information was many of the ANP staff had been relocated over the duration of Operation Highland so could not be interviewed. There were also no staff performance assessment reports from the RTC available for the review.

The evidence for the review therefore relied on current ANP staff; NZP reports and interviews; observation of the RTC and PPHQ; and outcomes of activities such as the implementation of systems e.g. Pay and Rank Reform. Interviews with other key stakeholders involved in police reform such as DynCorp, EUPOL-A, CSTC-A and INL contributed to the analysis.

3 Overview of police reform in Afghanistan

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of police reform in Afghanistan since the Bonn Agreement in 2001 to provide the context in which NZP are working and the role of Operation Highland. The first section provides a brief history of policing in Afghanistan and the challenges facing police reform. The next section examines police reform between 2002 and 2008 and the achievements and current issues still needing to be addressed. The final section outlines how NZP Operation Highland fits into the police reform efforts of the international community in Bamyan Province. This chapter is based on a review of published reports, consultation meetings and interviews with key stakeholders in Afghanistan.

3.2 Overview of policing in Afghanistan

3.2.1 A brief history of policing in Afghanistan

In the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan had a national civilian police force based on the European policing model and with contributions to training by Germany. The police force included a trained officer corps and a largely untrained force of police conscripts required to do two years of duty (Wilder 2007:3).

During the Soviet invasion (December 1979 – 1989) the police became militarized to the extent that the Ministry of the Interior (Moi), which is responsible for police policy and operations, had its own light infantry force. During this period there was also an emphasis on secret police and intelligence agencies with the State Information Services (*Khidamat-e-Atlaat-e-Dawlati* or KhAD) being created to counter the Moi during a power struggle within the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Murray 2007:109). Intelligence agencies began to take over criminal investigations and civilian police procedure and there are still overlaps today with the current intelligence agency, the National Security Directorate (NDS), taking part in criminal investigations (ISG No. 138 2007:3).

The post-Soviet period saw the reopening of the national police training institute, the Kabul Police Academy (KPA), in 1989 with assistance from Germany in an attempt to re-establish a civilian police force. However, the ensuing civil war meant establishing a civilian police force was unsuccessful as the mujahedeen carved up the country into their own 'fiefdoms' (ISG No. 138 2007:3). The KPA closed down again in 1992 (Wilder 2007:3).

The civil war ended with the Taliban taking over Afghanistan and their police force consisted of the 'Vice and Virtue Police' under the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. The International Crisis Group (2007 No.138:3) describes the practices of the Vice and Virtue Police as '*violently enforced adherence to a rigid interpretation of ultra-orthodox Islamic/Pashtun tribal norms*'.

When the Taliban were overthrown in 2001 Afghanistan had been without a civilian police force for over twenty years. Murray (2007:109) summarises the situation of police at the beginning of reconstruction in 2002,

There were 50-70,000 police, consisting of some professional police trained before the civil war and a vast number of untrained and largely illiterate mujahedeen and

conscripted soldiers. They lacked discipline, formal polices and procedures, facilities, equipment, uniforms and public trust. There was also an ethnic imbalance since most of the senior police posts were held by Tajik Afghans. Provincial and local police commanders owed allegiances to local military commanders, and central control was virtually non-existent. Moreover, there was no clear chain of command to the Ministry of Interior.

A review of the international literature shows there are still many serious issues facing police reform in Afghanistan including:

- control and command issues with some local police owing allegiances to local commanders (Center for Policy and Human Development 2007:82; Murray 2007:109) which has continued through the reform process in some areas as previous mujahedeen leaders and other 'strong men' have been integrated into the police force in positions of authority (ICG No. 138 2007:12-13)
- endemic corruption and continuation of systems of patronage and nepotism (UNAMA 2008)
- human rights abuses
- imbalanced composition in terms of ethnicity and gender which limits fair representation (Center for Policy and Human Development 2007:83; Murray 2007:115))
- increasing insurgency and targeting of police – in 2007 over 1000 police killed (UNAMA 2008)
- increasing cultivation of illegal opium poppies – it is estimated that Afghanistan supplies over 90 percent of the worlds opium (Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 2008:64).

3.2.2 Current Police structure and governance

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is under the command of the MoI. There is no separation between the political/policy and operational powers directing police which allows for political interference in appointments of police and in operational matters. The International Crisis Group recommend in their report on police reform in Afghanistan,

Clear lines of authority and a precise delineation between executive policy-making and police operation duties unimpeded by political considerations are essential and should be set forth in the law (ICG No.138 2007:4).

The geographical divisions of command and chain of command currently are:

- 5 Regions: North, West, East, South and Central commanded by Regional Commanders who report to MoI in Kabul
- 34 Provinces – the regions are divided into a number of provinces commanded by a Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) who reports to their Regional Commander.
- Districts – each province is divided into districts commanded by a District Chief of Police (DCoP) who reports to their Provincial Chief of Police
- Stations and check points report to their District Chief of Police.

The projected number of police in 2008 is 82,000 and table 1 shows the allocated and actually assigned numbers of ANP to each division as of April 2008.

Table 1: Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces as of April 2008

	Number Authorized	Number Assigned	Percent Assigned
MOI Headquarters	6,015	5,237	87
Uniformed Police	44,319	42,969	97
Border Police	17,970	12,213	68
Auxiliary Police(ANAP)*	0	9,318	NA*
Civil Order Police (ANCOP)	5,365	1,523	28
Criminal Investigative Division	4,148	2,815	68
Counter Narcotics Police	3,777	2,265	60
Customs Police*	0	623	NA*
Counter Terrorism Police	406	411	101
Standby/Highway Police*	0	2,536	NA*
Total	82,000	78,910	97

Source: GAO analysis of Ministry of Interior data (in Afghanistan Conflict Monitor www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/securityforces.html)

*The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police and highway police are no longer authorized.

The Afghan Constitution (January 2004) specifies the discovery of crimes is the duty of police and investigation and prosecution are conducted by the Attorney General's Office which is based on an inquisitorial system. The Government of Afghanistan has a number of strategic documents that set out the police role and reform processes including:

- Police Law 2005 which governs police and lists duties and obligations
- Tashkil reform which sets out ANP staff allocation
- National Internal Security Strategy (2006)
- Pay and Rank Reform (PRR) which sets out the restructuring of ANP's command and rank structure and pay scale (see section 3.3.3)

ANP salaries are paid by multilateral funding through the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) which has been administered by the UNDP since 2002 (Murray 2007:110).

3.3 Progress towards police reform

Recent literature on Afghanistan police reform and many of those interviewed for this review thought that reform of the Afghanistan National Police will take many years. While there have been some major achievements in terms of police structure, pay reform, training outputs, training facilities and infrastructure development the status of police reform has not progressed as much as hoped for (Murray 2007:116, Wilder 2007:2). The reasons for this have been well documented in the international literature and are outlined in the following sections.

3.3.1 Framework for security sector reform

Police reform should be seen within the context of efforts towards security sector reform (SSR) generally. The Bonn Agreement (2001) sets out the 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions' and provides the terms of agreement for international assistance in Afghanistan. The goals towards a democratically elected government set out in the Bonn Agreement have been achieved including: the adoption of a new constitution in January 2004; the holding of presidential elections in October 2004; and National Assembly and Provincial Council elections in September 2005 (Afghan Compact 2006). The Bonn Agreement (2001: Annex 1) recognised that the 'responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves' and 'the participants requested the

assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces'. Police were not specifically mentioned in this agreement.

The Bonn Agreement (2001) has been superseded by the Afghan Compact (2006) which is the agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community. The Compact identifies three critical and interdependent pillars of activity for 2006 – 2010:

- Security;
- Governance, rule of law and human rights; and
- Economic and social development (Afghanistan Compact 2006)

The specific policing goal for Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) is,

By end of 2010 a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable. (Afghanistan Compact 2006: Annex I (Security)).

The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) sets out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the Afghanistan Compact's three pillars. The expected number of personnel for the ANP and ABP has increased since the Afghanistan Compact was agreed and the new goal by 2010 is to have 82,000 personnel (ANDS 2008:192). Key expected outcomes to take place between 2008 and 2013 for ANP and ABP are:

- ANP operationally capable of performing those missions and tasks assigned and crime rates reduced
- Operational border posts able to protect national sovereignty, levy and collect custom duties and process those collections to the central government
- ANP and ABP expenditures are fiscally sustainable
- Eventual eradication of poppy production and crack down on drug trafficking. (ANDS 2008:192-193)

3.3.2 International assistance

Security sector reform was divided into five 'pillars' each with a lead nation at the Geneva Conference in 2002. Germany was given the lead for police reform given its history of police training with the Kabul Policing Academy. The US was responsible for reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA); Japan was in charge of disarmament; UK counter-narcotics; and Italy the justice sector. This approach has reportedly not benefited police reform, the ICG (No. 138 2007:6) state,

Rather than being treated as a whole, SSR became a series of discrete programs which moved at very different paces, with little coordination between them, including on matters where there was important substantive overlap.

To progress police reform Germany operated the German Police Project Office (GPPO) with the following responsibilities:

- Advising the Afghan Security authorities to instil professionalism into the police and turn the focus to combating drug cultivation, drug processing and drug trafficking;
- Assisting in the training of police recruits;

- Establishing the Kabul Police Academy;
- Implementing bilateral police funding assistance; and
- Coordinating the international support for the rebuilding of the Afghan Police. (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID 2005, Schedule One)

Germany led the Afghan Police Training Project (AFTP) which coordinated the international communities training assistance. Germany focused their police training primarily on the higher ranks with the philosophy it was best to start with senior staff and focus on developing leadership and management. They reopened the Kabul Police Academy to train officers during a three year course and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with a nine month course. They also established a mentoring programme, focusing on mentoring key ANP officials at the Mol in Kabul and some affiliated mentors to mentor ANP at a provincial level. NZP were affiliated with the GPPO mentoring programme and worked with the Provincial Chief of Police in Bamyan Province. International Police Officers do not have any operational mandate in Afghanistan and therefore work under their own national mandates as mentors/advisors to Afghan National Police.

In July 2003 the Minister of Interior, Ali Ahmad Jalali, announced the plan for Mol reform which included replacing conscripted soldiers (low ranked police) with volunteers to create a police force of 50,000 members (Murray 2007:111). The reform plan also included establishing a number of divisions and specialist units including: highway police (2,600), quick reaction force, border police (12,000); and counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, human rights units (Murray 2007:111).

As part of this reform plan the US provided equipment and training to the ANP establishing this as a project under the AFTP (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID 2005, Schedule One). The US established the Central Training Centre (CTC) in Kabul in 2003 and built seven Regional Training Centres (RTCs) to train high numbers of low ranked recruits and provide in-service training to established police in low and mid-ranks. Only a temporary RTC could be built in Bamyan due to building restrictions imposed when Bamyan was declared a World Heritage Site.

The US Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) was responsible for managing the US police equipment and training programme and contracted DynCorp International to construct and staff the CTC and RTCs with mentor/trainers (US Department of State and US Department of Defense 2006:7). In 2005 the US government shifted the responsibility for managing parts of the US funded police equipment and training programme from INL to the US Department of Defense, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Policy guidance remained with the US Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and CSTC-A provided overall direction of the programmes at the CTC and RTCs including curriculum development (US Department of State and US Department of Defense 2006). INL continued to contract manage DynCorp and has final approval on the curriculum. In 2008, an INL representative reported that the US is contributing \$2.5 billion towards police reform.

An interviewee working on curriculum development at CSTC-A said the long term vision is for a civilian police model but the current environment was meaning a military focus dominates over a police one due to insurgent activity.

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A review of the literature highlights tensions between the different approaches taken by Germany and the US. Germany's vision of creating a civilian police focused predominantly on Kabul, providing more comprehensive and long term training to the higher ranks. The pace of reform was too slow for the US, who wanted numbers on the ground to tackle the rising insurgency and the narcotics trade (Wilder 2007:27). Murray states that evidently, two different approaches to police-building were developing.

One cautious and rational, building on what already existed and extending outwards, and the other bold and sweeping, attempting to tackle a number of pressing problems all at the same time. Both approaches had their merits and their flaws, but were philosophically conflicting and introduced a wedge into what was in any case a rather fragile partnership. (Murray 2007:113)

A major critique of the international communities' police reform efforts has been the lack of a shared vision about which police model to use and the role of police in regards to counter-insurgency (Murray 2007:120; Wilder 2007:43). International best practice in policing highlights the importance of differentiating the police from the military and other security sector roles in Security Sector Reform (SSR). Murray (2007) provides an example of the blurring between roles in Afghanistan,

A significant example of the blurred distinction between the two roles in Afghanistan was the assumption by the US Defence Department of the management of the US police reform effort in 2005. The military personnel of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) thus started working with German police representatives on the reconstruction of the Afghan National Police. While this infused considerable drive into what appeared to be a languishing initiative, there has been little demonstration that military leaders have understood the separate nature of policing. (Murray 2007:118)

The different programmes in police reform have also led to a lack of coordination in regards to mentoring and technical assistance (ICG No. 138 2007, Murray 2007, Wilder 2007). At the time of the review there were still overlaps in mentoring programmes, particularly at the national level with senior police officials at the MoI sometimes being assigned more than two mentors from different countries (ICG 2007 No. 138:8, Murray 2007, 2008; EUPOL-A staff interview). Reforming the MoI is essential to police reform nationally and the sometimes conflicting advice from different mentors and lack of a common approach has reportedly been detrimental to progress.

In June 2007 EUPOL-A mission was established under a European Security and Defence Policy. EUPOL-A officially took over the "key partner" role in police reform from Germany and aimed to draw an umbrella over all non-US actors and coordinate their commitments better (ICG 2007:8). Representatives from EUPOL-A and CSTC-A told the review team they are progressing working together and have regular scheduled meetings to discuss reform processes.

An important initiative that EUPOL-A is supporting is the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). The IPCB function is to ensure the 'coherence of approach among the international community and alignment of international activities with Afghans strategies in the field of police reform' (IPCB pamphlet). The permanent members of the IPCB are MOI, EUPOL-A, CSTC-A/U.S. Embassy INL, UNAMA and ISAF.

The IPCB is supported by a permanent secretariat and the board provides strategic guidance to the IPCB Secretariat to facilitate communication among all members of

the international police community to ensure their coordination with MOI (IPCB Pamphlet). A mechanism for communicating and coordinating international efforts are the Integrated Project Teams (IPTs). These are working groups made up of international representatives based around different areas of Policing. The IPTs are chaired by the IPCB secretariat and CJ5 (Operational Planning OSTC-A).

Members of the international community identified the lack of Afghan input and ownership of police reform. This is essential for Afghan buy-in to the process and the success of reform measures (Wilder 2007:43). Afghan ownership is part of the IPCB mission statement and the IPCB secretariat have been working closely with high ranking Afghan generals from across the spectrum of MoI to draft an ANP vision, mission statement and values.

3.3.3 Major reform initiatives

A major initiative of the reform process has been the Pay and Rank Reform (PRR) which was developed by the MoI with assistance from German and American representatives in 2005. The PRR is premised on using a merit principle to select personnel in order to purge the incompetent and corrupt police and improve the quality of the ANP (Murray 2007:114). Key changes the PRR has or will implement are described by Murray (2007:113):

- clustering of provincial police commands under five higher regional commands
- reduction of field grade and general officers from 15,000 to 6000 through a process of reviewing qualifications, personal history and character and sitting written exam and board interview.
- Increase in NCOs and lower ranked police
- pay increases which began with lowest rank members.

Apart from PRR the international community has predominantly focused on training and reinforcing this training with mentoring programmes (Wilder 2007:viii). From 2003 to mid 2008 there have reportedly been more than 149,000 trainees who have gone through the basic, intermediate, advanced and specialised training at the CTC and RTCs (Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan June 2008). By May 2007 the KPA had graduated 868 officers and 2,626 NCOs, including 69 women (ICG 2007 No.138:11).

German, American and other international police mentors have been mentoring key senior Afghan police to develop their leadership competencies (Murray 2007:114). International mentors have been in the MoI since 2003 and mentors at many of the Provincial Police Headquarters have been in place since September 2005. There was no information available on the national success of the mentoring programmes and Wilder (2007:ix) identifies the importance of effective assessment systems to find out whether mentoring programmes have enough positive impact to justify their expense.

A challenge is finding international police mentors/trainers who are experienced and knowledgeable about the areas they are expected to work in. For example, it is important to have police with knowledge of effective training methods such as group discussions, scenarios; role playing and analysis of case histories which promote participation, learning and retention of information (Murray 2007:119).

It is also important to match mentors with comparable experience to the command positions they are mentoring (Murray 2007:119; Wilder 2007). Non-sworn personnel are not often recruited for Afghanistan yet they can be very knowledgeable and experienced in certain aspects of policing (Murray 2007:120).

Operational knowledge and experience are essential for transferring policing techniques but on their own are not sufficient to achieve reform. Management and administrative knowledge, skills and experience are needed. There are few international advisers in the Afghanistan police sector with knowledge and experience of strategic and corporate planning, management of organization change, human resource management, development of police policies and procedures or monitoring and evaluation of police performance. (Murray 2007:119)

Priorities at the time of the review team's consultation meetings in May 2008 were the Focused District Development (FDD) being conducted in high risk areas of Afghanistan. This was part of a US funded 'training surge' to develop ANP at the District level. Bamyan is a relatively secure province and therefore will not likely be a recipient of FDD as it is only being implemented in highly insecure areas.

In addition to the focus on training, mentoring and organizational structure the ANP have also been provided with new police stations, uniforms, weapons and equipment. There have been issues regarding the standard and the suitability of equipment in terms of maintenance and ongoing sustainability. More ANP than Afghanistan National Army (ANA) personnel have been killed, and some commentators attribute the high death rate to the ANP being ill-equipped and being used inappropriately as a fighting force (ICG 2007 No.138:15, Wilder 2007:46).

3.4 New Zealand Police role in Afghanistan police reform

3.4.1 Establishment of NZP Operation Highland

In 2004 New Zealand was informally invited by the Afghan Police Training Project (AFTP) to assist with police training at the RTC to be established in Bamyan. As stated, the AFTP was led by Germany and the RTCs were funded by the US as part of their contribution toward police reform. This request for assistance with police training at Bamyan was made by the US Head of the AFTP and made in light of the existing commitment of the NZDF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based at Bamyan.

In March 2004, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) prepared a report to Ministers to seek advice on the informal request for assistance from the AFTP (SPD/BSR/6/6) and subsequently Ministers agreed that NZP and NZAID should give further consideration to the possibility of providing assistance at the Bamyan RTC. (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID April 2005, Schedule One)

A reconnaissance mission to Bamyan Province was conducted in 2004 by NZP in conjunction with NZDF to 'assess the potential role of NZ Police staff, local conditions and risk management measures' (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID April 2005, Schedule One). The NZP report to Cabinet (CAB(05)4) noted the following points:

- New Zealand Police is able to make a meaningful contribution to the training of Afghan Police by providing two staff with training skills to the Regional Police Training Centre in Bamyan Province, a view supported by NZAID, MFAT and NZDF;
- NZAID would fund the 2004/2005 costs of the deployment of two NZP officers, including salary and allowances, from within its NZ\$7 million total allocation for Afghanistan;

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On the 18th January 2005, Cabinet (CAB (05) 4) noted they agreed to NZP deploying two staff to the Bamyan RTC from March 2005 until the end of 2005 subject to an extension of NZAID funding over the next financial year. The first deployment of NZP (Highland 1) was 'to deliver classroom training, manage, and mentor Afghan Police trainers' and to 'review the project scope and feasibility, after consulting with DynCorp' (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID April 2005, Schedule One).

Results from the first deployment of NZP were reported as positive due to approximately 500 ANP receiving training. Consequently, New Zealand was asked to continue assistance and take the lead role in the regional training project in Bamyan (Memorandum of Understanding between NZP and NZAID January 2006, Schedule One). Additionally, New Zealand was invited to take part in the Police Mentoring Project led by the GPPO which sought to raise the skills levels and professionalism in senior police within the ANP. In December 2005 the New Zealand Cabinet (CAB Min (05) 40/1) approved the continuation of the NZP contribution to the RTC and to expand the mission with a third Police Officer to work in the Police Mentoring Project in Bamyan. Throughout the rest of the review period from January 2006 to May 2008 (Highland 2 - 7) three NZP Police officers have been deployed on six monthly rotations. The key tasks and responsibilities of Operation Highland in the current memorandum of understanding between NZP and NZAID are:

1. Supporting the Bamyan Regional Training Centre to deliver training to the ANP.
2. Mentoring of the Bamyan Provincial Police Chief and other senior managers within Bamyan Province as required.

3.4.2 NZP key relationships with the international community

NZP have an informal arrangement with INL to work in the Bamyan RTC as mentors. They have established relationships with INL's Police Program Manager and Advisors and with CSTC-A Police Training Advisor.

NZP worked closely with DynCorp mentors who implement police training for INL. Until recently one DynCorp mentor has been posted to Bamyan RTC and their primary role has been site management while NZP led the capacity building activities with the RTC instructors and management. In 2007 a second DynCorp mentor was employed to assist with site management and any additional police mentoring work that may be required. At the time of the review there were three DynCorp mentors, two at the RTC and one female mentor at the Family Response Unit (FRU) at the PPHQ. All three DynCorp staff were co-located with the NZPRT.

NZP members on mission in Afghanistan are hatted under EUPOL-A with the signing of a Terms of Agreement between EUPOL-A and the New Zealand Government. However, the technical agreement that outlined the details of the arrangement had yet to be signed at the time of this review, therefore NZP were not working under EUPOL at that time.

The training and mentoring work that NZP undertake were to come under the EUPOL-A Operational Plan (April 2008). The work of the NZP mentors falls under Strategic Objective 2: Development of a National Strategy for Criminal Investigation and Strategic Objective 4: Development and Implementation of a National Training Strategy. The job titles were chosen by NZP to align as far as possible with the work that Operation Highland had been undertaking at the Bamyan RTC and Bamyan PPHQ. The EUPOL-A job titles that have been allocated to NZP deployed in Bamyan are:

- training adviser at field level (post number 159)
- mentors at field level (post number 157)
- criminal investigation department adviser (post number 158) (EUPOL-A Advertisement for EU Seconded and/or Contracted Staff members, n.d.)

William Morrell, the EUPOL-A Head of Mentors at the time of the review, said the EUPOL-A action plan was still evolving and had to be adjusted to the needs of different areas of Afghanistan. He said it was important to focus on coordination between the international community and the ANP first, which EUPOL-A was participating in through the IPCB and secretariat. Morrell recognised the work that NZP had been doing with DynCorp and the RTC and wanted NZP to continue this work when they began working under EUPOL-A.

The NZP Operation Highland contingents are stationed at the NZPRT

Interviewees with past and current NZP mentors and the Crib 12 Senior National Officer (SNO) of the NZPRT consistently said the relationships between NZP and NZDF rotations have been very good. The NZPRT has provided support to Operation Highland by providing security to NZP when they visit ANP in the Bamyan Province outside of Bamyan township. Other examples of NZPRT support to Operation Highland include: technical advice and support on some of the building development and maintenance at the RTC and PPHQ, and providing NZP with information about the status of ANP in the Districts. NZPRT have also provided support to the ANP through NZ ODA funding by constructing police stations, and providing essential equipment.

4 Bamyán RTC and PPHQ facilities and organizational structure

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the Bamyán RTC and PPHQ ANP organizational structure, staffing allocation (tashkil) and facilities in order to provide context to the capacity building activities NZP has undertaken at these locations.

Bamyán province is one of the most secure in Afghanistan and this is attributed to the population being predominantly Hazara. This ethnic group was persecuted by the Taliban and therefore have no allegiance to the Taliban and interviewees said they welcomed the NZ presence to help maintain security. The Afghan National Army does not operate in Bamyán Province. A secure environment allows NZP to move around relatively freely, for example the Contingent Commander can conduct their daily mentoring activities at the Bamyán Provincial Police Head Quarters in Bamyán township.

The NZPRT do not have any agreement to operate in provinces outside of Bamyán, therefore NZP mentors are unable to travel to the other provinces to provide training/mentoring support to the ANP in the region the Bamyán RTC serves.

The chapter begins by outlining the relationship between the RTC and PPHQ and the geographical boundaries of their operations.

4.2 The ANP in Bamyán Province

The Bamyán RTC management is led by the RTC Commander who has been at this RTC since 2004. The Bamyán RTC Commander reports directly to the CTC Commander in Kabul who oversees all the ANP in the RTCs. The national staff in the CTC and RTCs comes under the head of the Training Department at the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Bamyán RTC Commander does not report to the Bamyán Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) but maintains a close relationship with him and meets regularly to liaise over recruitment and training in the Bamyán Province. The Bamyán RTC provides training to ANP from five provinces: Bamyán; Daikundi; Kapisa; Panjshir; and Parwan.

The PCoP is based at the PPHQ and is responsible for ANP operations in Bamyán Province. This province is made up of seven Districts: Bamyán¹; Yakawlang; Kahnard; Sayghan; Shibar; Panjab; and Waras. Each district has a District Chief of Police (DCoP) who reports to the PCoP.

¹ Bamyán District includes Bamyán township where the Bamyán Provincial Police Headquarters, NZPRT and RTC are situated.

4.3 Bamyán RTC

4.3.1 Establishment of Bamyán RTC

As stated above, the Bamyán RTC was established as part of the US funded project to support training of new ANP recruits and provide in-service training for mid to low rank ANP. The aim of the US project was to increase the number of trained recruits on the ground and up-skill existing ANP staff.

The training curriculum was primarily based on training material developed for police reform in Kosovo. The CTC and RTCs curriculum originally included basic training for literate (nine weeks) and illiterate recruits (five weeks) which has been superseded by the Basic 8 course which includes both literate and illiterate recruits. There is in-service training for existing ANP NCOs and Officers such as the Transition Integration Programme (TIP) which runs from three to five weeks and aims to improve their basic knowledge of human rights, democratic policing and operational policing skills. Other courses include firearms training, tactical training, and some specialist courses such as the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) course (US Department of State and US Department of Defense 2006:63-67). A description of the courses that have been conducted at the Bamyán RTC, the stated goal of the course and duration are included in Appendix 3.

The RTC started out as temporary tents situated in the compound of the PPHQ. There were attempts by several US Department of State (DoS) representatives to build a permanent structure but planning restrictions were imposed as a result of Bamyán being declared a World Heritage Site. The current temporary facility was built next to the NZPRT, which by its very nature is also a temporary facility.

Successive NZP contingents have promoted developing the infrastructure of the RTC and worked with INL and DynCorp to facilitate this. Since 2005 the Bamyán RTC has grown from one classroom to three and the ability to accommodate 30 students to the current capacity of 90 students. Improved facilities include two additional classrooms, expanded residential facilities including sleeping quarters for staff and students, new bathrooms, women's quarters, dining hall and kitchen, secure firearms storage, and a mosque. Projects at the time of the review included a gymnasium for training in winter.

4.3.2 Organizational structure and tashkil

The RTCs and CTC ANP staff operate under an ANP management structure with DynCorp Police mentors and other international Police mentors providing site management and assistance. In 2005 the Bamyán RTC had eight staff, three of whom were in managerial positions. Three of the original staff remains and there is now nineteen ANP staff with an additional twenty support staff. Information regarding the numbers of staff at the RTC in 2006 and 2007 were not available. The staff list of the Bamyán RTC managers and instructors as at 8 May 2008 included the following positions:

1. RTC Commander,
2. Deputy Commander
3. Chief Administration Officer
4. Provincial Education and Training Officer
5. Basic Education Training Officer
6. Operational Officer*
7. Director Ops Training*
8. Assistant Director of Ops Training*

9. Financial Director*
10. TIP3A Course Officer*
11. Dining Officer and Quarter Master*
12. Secretary to Commandant and Computer Officer
13. Communication Officer*
14. Assistant Instructor
15. Uniform Administrator*
16. Technical Officer*
17. Logistics Accountant*
18. Logistics Accountant*
19. Commander of Police Quick Reaction Force (PQRF) provides security to RTC

*not instructor position but assists with instructing
Source: Bamyan RTC 2008

The staff list shows that the Bamyan RTC has only one staff member (underlined) officially allocated to an assistant instructor position. Previously the Bamyan RTC had six staff allocated as instructors; however in late 2007 five instructors were relocated to other RTCs in areas where the FDD initiative required additional instructors. Further analysis of the ratio of courses offered to staff availability/capacity would be required to assess what the optimum number of instructors would be for the Bamyan RTC.

To compensate for the lack of officially allocated instructors eleven of the staff (indicated with an asterisk) assisted with instructing either part time or on a full time basis. Some of the staff allocated to administrative positions had been instructing even prior to the five instructors leaving and there appears to have been some flexibility in staff roles versus their official position. The flexibility in roles seems to have arisen either because of a requirement for instructors in certain areas; or the official position did not always require a full time staff member due to the small size of the RTC which has allowed them to pursue instructing roles in the RTC.

Underlying this somewhat confusing picture is the MOI tashkil allocation which has caused a number of issues. For example in 2007 one hundred and sixty three managerial and administrative positions were allocated by the tashkil to the Bamyan RTC, the same number allocated to other larger RTCs despite Bamyan's small size. Other issues have been: on occasion disparity between ANP staff's experience and skill set with position; and as stated the reallocation of a number of experienced staff at the same time. Highland 6 assisted with these issues by conducting an analysis of the tashkil in Bamyan Province and working with the PCoP and RTC Commander to advise on the reallocation of some of the excess positions at the RTC and allocate the most appropriate staff members for positions within the RTC. Highland 6 submitted the tashkil analysis to the PCoP that included a recommendation for him to consider:

Seeking authority from the MOI to reallocate the remaining 83 positions from the RTC to positions within the Bamyan Province. There may be difficulties placing some of these positions in the Bamyan Province as many are specialist positions relating to RTCs. Those not able to be placed within Bamyan would be referred back to the MOI. (Highland 6 Tashkil analysis of Bamyan Province Tashkil 2007)

ANP officers noted the important role of training provided by the RTC was to contribute to developing the ANP and install a sense of a national police force that is professional, ethical and works within the rule of law. Many ANP interviewed said that previously the Afghan police were allied with their commander usually along

ethnic lines rather than aligned to a national force. This correlates with information from a report on the Afghanistan justice system by the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD) (2007:82) who state there was 'initially an ethnic imbalance within the police, as most senior posts were held by Tajiks. Provincial and local police commanders owed their allegiance to local military commanders, and central control was virtually non-existent'.

the ANP was now composed of mixed ethnicity and this was one of the most important changes to the ANP and has been 'a great contribution to the development of a professional police force'. They thought the mixing of ethnicities allowed police to start to move away from tribal allegiances with their commanders towards the idea of a national force. One ANP officer said *but now it was improving and multi-ethnicity was the best achievement since I have been working with the police in the last 30 years.* Five years ago most senior commanders in the ANP were Tajik, they now comprise slightly less than 50 percent (CPHD 2007:82). However the ethnic composition of police still does not reflect the ethnic composition of the general population (CPHD 2007:83).

4.3.3 Recruitment of female ANP

To provide context about how many women are in the ANP and their rank the table 2 compares the number of women in 2005 with 2007. There has been a small increase, particularly at the mid-rank NCO level.

Table 2: Numbers of women in the Afghanistan police May 2005 – February 2007

Category	2005	2007	Difference
Officers	80	93	13
Sergeants	84	118	34
Patrol	0	22	22
Total	164	233	69

Source: Personnel Department, Afghan Ministry of Interior, Kabul, 2007 in CPHD 2007:83)

There was one female police officer in Bamyan before the RTC started operations, there are now fifteen. The Bamyan RTC trained their first female recruit in 2005 and since that time they have trained sixteen female recruits in the introductory course (Basic 8), many of whom have gone on to do advanced courses. Fourteen of the new recruits were from Bamyan Province and two from Parwan Province.

A focus group with Afghan police women participating in the NCO course at the Bamyan RTC identified the main reasons why they wanted to join the police:

- Serve their country and their people especially women
- Address lack of policewomen especially in Bamyan
- Economic support for their families

Policewomen said barriers to recruitment were perceptions by the community based on their culture and tradition that joining the police was not a suitable role for women. Therefore families were reluctant to let their daughters/wives join the police. Murray (2007:115) notes that policing is considered a low-status occupation and not respectable for women which is another barrier to recruitment. It was notable that many of these recruits were recruited by the RTC Commander from his home district.

4.4 Bamyan PPHQ

4.4.1 Organizational structure and tashkil

The Bamyan Centre and Provincial Head Quarters are in combined accommodation. Table 3 lists the departments designated in the 2006 and 2007 tashkil.

Table 3: Bamyan Centre and Provincial Head Quarters departments designated in the 2006 and 2007 tashkil

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bamyan Centre • Sub Check Points • Jail • Police Station • Administration • Logistics • Finance. • Personnel (HR) • Medical* • Criminal (CID) • Security • Signals • Technical • Traffic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education • Operations • Fire • Human Rights* • Computer • Public Opinion • Anti-Terrorism • Narcotics • Passport • Mechanics* • Lubricants and Fuel* • Kitchen* • Intelligence
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Source: NZP tashkil analysis Highland 6

The departments that were not actually staffed in 2006 are shown with an asterisk, and while this information was not recorded for 2007 it is known a Human Rights Officer was appointed to that position in 2007. An analysis of the Bamyan Province tashkil for 2007 was conducted by Highland 6².

As stated there were issues with the over allocation of personnel to the Bamyan RTC and NZP state that the 'RTC is non-operational so inclusion of these figures misrepresents the PCoP's operational capability.' Table 4 presents the tashkil allocation of staff and actual staff numbers for 2007 for the Bamyan Province excluding the RTC/ANP staff.

Table 4: tashkil allocation of staff and actual staff numbers for 2007 for the Bamyan Province

	Officers	Satanman ¹	Patrolmen	Civ Supp	Total
Tashkil 07	78	222	307	20	627
Actual 07	65	79	416	20	580
Reduction			-109		
Increase	13	143			47

Source: NZP tashkil analysis Highland 6

¹ Satanman are Non-commissioned Police officers (NCOs)

NZP observed that the PCoP is 'required to increase his total numbers by 47 members: by increasing Officers by 13 and Satanman by 143; and reducing Patrolmen by 109'.

Bamyan Centre and HQ

The Tashkil allocation and actual numbers of ANP are presented for Bamyan Centre and PPHQ. Table 5 compares the tashkil 2007 with the actual Bamyan Centre and

² The Tashkil 2007 staff numbers were to be complied with by 20 March 2008.

HQ numbers indicates Officers should increase by 8, Satanman (NCOs) increase by 52; and Patrolmen reduce by 40. This shows the PCoP is slightly under the total required tashkil level but the distribution of staff is not as per the tashkil 2007 model.

Table 5: tashkil allocation of staff and actual staff numbers for 2007 for the Bamyan Centre and PPHQ

	Officers	Satanman ¹	Patrolmen	Civ Supp	Total
Tashkil 07	47	99	96	20	262
Actual 07	39	47	136	20	242
Reduction			-40		
Increase	8	52		0	20

Source: NZP tashkil analysis Highland 6

While the tashkil allocation calls for a reduction in patrolmen, there is still a need to upskill existing patrolmen. A training needs analysis of ANP in Bamyan Province conducted by Highland 7 in mid 2008 found the 'urgent need to conduct refresher training of basic policing skills, in particular the subjects of Firearms, Human Rights, Vehicle Searches, Person Searches, Checkpoints, Use of Force and Police Station Security'.

4.4.2 PPHQ Facilities

The PPHQ is situated in Bamyan township and includes an old building; a number of 'Connex' storage containers converted to office space; a garage for vehicle maintenance, and storage tent. The facilities are rudimentary by modern policing standards.

A new Provincial Police Headquarters is in the process of being built funded by the US. The new building will not have any furnishings or equipment provided and this is an area of concern as the current PPHQ has limited furnishings and equipment to transfer. There will need to be an analysis of the requirements to fit out the new PPHQ taking into consideration the numbers of staff and feasibility of resourcing this station.

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5 NZP programme objectives March 2005 – May 2008

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the development of NZP Operation Highland programme objectives over the review period and continuity between contingents. Identifying the programme objectives over this time provides a reference for discussing programme activities and outcomes in the following chapters. The chapter begins by briefly examining the NZP pre-deployment training and handover between contingencies for Operation Highland.

5.2 NZP pre-deployment training and contingency handover

NZP staff apply to go on overseas deployments to the International Service Group (ISG) at NZP. ISG select applicants based on their suitability for particular deployments and on condition that their District Commanders are able to release them from their duties in New Zealand. ISG have found it more difficult to engage enough female Police Officers for overseas deployments due to the length of the commitment.

NZP provides NZP staff deployed on Operation Highland with operational orders and pre-deployment training undertaken jointly with NZDF. A recent review by NZDF (HQ JFNZ August 2008) of NZP Operation Highland pre-deployment training with NZDF concludes the following:

- The OP HIGHLAND syllabus has been an evolving process. The general consensus from the J3 Ops and J7 Trg Branches, HQ JFNZ is that the training is well balanced
- A key observation from J3 Branch, is that some contingents (both NZDF and NZPOL) have said that this training is too much, and some have stated that they would like to see further training added. The current syllabus is currently located in the centre ground.

Interviewees from NZP said the pre-deployment training was good, and the only criticism was that there was limited focus on the actual activities to be undertaken with the ANP. This has been addressed to some degree with the development of a better handover process between contingents. The handover between Highland 1 and 2 took place in Dubai which did not allow for orientation and introductions with the ANP and key stakeholders from the international community. An interviewee from Highland 2 said it took them about a month to find out 'where they were going'. Highland 2 were also the first contingent to mentor at the PPHQ and were actually the first to be mentoring the ANP at a provincial level³. There was limited information and no material support from the GPPO who led the mentoring programme and the Highland 2 Contingent Commander developed his own processes. Highland 2 organized a two to three day handover with Highland 3 in Bamyan to facilitate their

³ International mentors stationed in other provinces were not actually able to conduct mentoring activities with the ANP as they were not able to regularly leave their PRT compounds due to the security situation in those provinces.

orientation and introductions with the ANP and assist continuity between contingents. This has become common practice between Highland contingents.

The handover has been enhanced further with NZP commanders from Highland 6 onwards joining the NZDF command recognisance trip to Afghanistan three months before deployment. Highland 6 and 7 Contingent Commanders said this provided them with a lot of useful information to prepare their teams. An orientation in Kabul is also conducted to introduce the Contingent Commander to the key partners both in the ANP and international community which is very important as NZP are reliant on working closely with national and international partners.

A comprehensive desk file was kept by NZP mentors at the RTC to inform future rotations about operations at the RTC and also provide a list of key contacts. This is an important document to maintain and update for each incoming rotation. There has been variability of practice in regards to 'handover notes' between contingents which provide details not recorded in NZP reports such as key contacts, their roles and contact information and an outline of daily activities. Feedback from some NZP is that comprehensive handover notes are useful, particularly due to the number of local and international key stakeholders NZP have to work with. Other reports such as weekly reports and mid-term report also provide information for successive contingents. The major mechanism for continuity of strategic direction and activities is the Plan of Action for each contingent which is examined in the next section.

5.3 Development of Operation Highland objectives

The key tasks and responsibilities of Operation Highland outlined in the memoranda of understanding between NZAID and NZP specify two areas of operation:

1. Supporting the Bamyan Regional Training Centre to deliver training to the ANP.
2. Mentoring of the Bamyan Provincial Police Chief and other senior managers within Bamyan Province as required.

The memoranda of understanding between NZP and NZAID (January 2006; December 2006; and October 2007) state that an updated Plan of Action expanding on the delivery of the key tasks is to be submitted by each contingent six weeks into their operation. Each Plan of Action submitted by Highland 2 to 7 was examined to see how the programme objectives have developed and changed (see Appendix 5 for a summary of objectives and timeframes for each contingent).

The main areas of focus and objectives identified in the Plans of Action for Highland 2 to 7 can be grouped under the two key tasks assigned to NZP or are applicable to both key tasks.

1. Supporting the RTC to deliver training:
 - to mentor RTC management and instructors to advise on all aspects of course delivery and administration
 - to maintain basic training at the RTC and explore the introduction of new courses to progress ANP development
 - to develop the investigative skills of the ANP
2. Mentoring the PCoP and senior managers
3. Applicable to both key tasks:

- establishing and maintaining relationships with key stakeholders
- enhancing female recruitment and employment in the ANP
- development of the Provincial Training Programme (PTP) to provide in-service training to ANP in Bamyan Province
- to progress a number of specific short and long term projects for the benefit of the ANP
- to exploit and develop opportunities for capacity building with the ANP

Interestingly a community policing approach is not specified in the Plan of Action until Highland 7 who included NZP strategic imperatives. This is probably because previous contingents' Plans of Action focus more on activity areas and do not provide over arching strategic direction.

Supporting the RTC to deliver training to the ANP has been interpreted by NZP as: mentoring and advising to support the management and administration of the RTC; ensuring the delivery of basic training courses and facilitating the introduction of new courses; and mentoring RTC instructors to build their capacity to deliver training. It has also been interpreted as supporting the development of facilities at the RTC. Performance indicators were only specified by Highland 2 and have not been provided by other contingents in their Plan of Actions which means there has been variability about the way any progress in activities has been reported. While much of the evidence is qualitative, some consistency in the areas to report would give more indication of how effective mentoring activities have been. A monitoring and evaluation framework for contingents to include in reporting is recommended and outlined in this report to enhance consistency and quality of information reported.

An example of performance indicators for the RTC from Highland 2 for the development of 'senior staff in the planning, management and leadership of a Police educational institution':

5.2 Performance Indicators

- 5.2.1 Evidence of effective planning, management and leadership demonstrated by the Commandant and Deputy Commandant.
- 5.2.2 Evidence of effective and ethical Human Resource management.
- 5.2.3 Evidence of the effective resource management.
- 5.2.4 Evidence of regular structured evaluations of Instructors class management and lesson delivery.
- 5.2.5 Provision of constructive feedback to instructional staff.
(Highland 2 Plan of Action)

Since the second rotation the NZP Contingent Commander has been assigned to mentoring the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP). This was at the request of the GRPO as part of their provincial mentoring programme that had the following objectives:

1. Proper application of nationally promulgated policies, procedures and systems.
2. Facilitate the delivery of community-based Police services that are effective, efficient, impartial and universally accessible to the public.
3. Promote ethical behaviour within the ANP,

The original focus was on mentoring the PCoP and Highland 2 found that due to the organizational structure and 'compartmentalization' of operations at PPHQ that it would be more effective to also mentor the senior officers in charge of the various departments. Spreading mentoring across head of departments would help manage

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the risk of staff turnover as during the review period there have been three PCoP, at least two Deputy Chief of Police, as well as changes to other senior ANP positions at the PPHQ. The risk to NZP is that with only one member assigned to mentor the PPHQ their capacity is spread thinly and ideally they would have more staff to assist with capacity building there.

Highland 2 identified there would be opportunities to mentoring senior management in human resources, finance and logistics. This aligned with the emphasis of GPPO and CSTC-A⁴ in 2006 to extend the mentoring role to mentoring around activities and building sustainable systems to withstand the changes to senior ANP personnel due to the police PRR processes (Highland 3 end of mission report). Mentors at provincial headquarters were to also focus on the areas of Finance, Personnel, Logistics, Education, and Operations.

All the NZP contingents have recognised the importance of developing and maintaining key relationships to progress their work with the ANP. This objective has changed from establishing and developing strategic partnerships to progressing existing relationships with 'key partner agencies'. It would be expected that over three years relationships would be established and the task of successive contingents is to maintain and cultivate those relationships. A challenge to maintaining relationships is staff turnover and the rotational basis many international staff are employed on including NZP.

Highland 3 and 4 specified their objective to recruit and train more female ANP and facilitate their employment opportunities. This was not specified in the high level objectives of future rotations despite work continuing in this area. Below is an example of objectives in relation to female ANP for Highland 4,

Further opportunity exists to increase the number of women recruits into the ANP. Although the facilities do not yet exist to be able to run a women only course, effort will be made to have at least two on every Basic and Officer's course.

Coupled with this it is incumbent on the international adviser to ensure that the women officers are appropriately employed in meaningful roles, and are correctly supported and mentored. It is noted that the current 4 are assisting the CID in investigations, and one has enquired about being employed as an instructor at the RTC. (Highland 4 Plan of Action)

NZP identified through conducting assessments of the capabilities of ANP in Bamyan Province that many of the ANP NCOs and officers had a lack of basic investigative skills such as securing crime scenes; collecting evidence and recording evidence. Highland 2 specified an objective for the PPHQ was to 'improve investigative capability in Bamyan Province'. Highland 3 also specified criminal investigations training for ANP in Bamyan and the importance of back capture of unqualified police investigators that were operational. The CID was newly introduced to the CTC in Kabul at that stage and Highland 3 promoted sending CID NCOs for training there. They also aimed to encourage the PCoP to better resource the CID and Narcotics sections (Highland 3 Project Plan).

Highland 4 stated one of their aims was to introduce nationally approved courses to the Bamyan RTC. They noted that the emphasis so far had been on the Basic course and Firearms Course which was important to ensure that the ANP have the basic skills to do their job. Highland 4 saw the benefit in training ANP to be instructors (through CTC and RTC Instructors courses) so that they were then able to

⁴ Around the same time (September 2005) the US State Department deployed international mentors to 26 of the 35 provinces to mentor the provincial police chiefs.

teach these courses at the Bamyan RTC. This NZP contingent started to seek clarity from INL and DynCorp about what courses the CTC would allow to be introduced at other RTCs. This culminated in Highland 6 seeking approval from the CTC and INL to introduce their CID course to the Bamyan RTC in 2007.

Follow-up training of ANP in the Province was identified by NZP as extremely important to ensure the ANP are implementing what they have been taught and continue to develop their policing skills appropriate for their rank. Undertaking the Provincial Training Programme (PTP), an INL approved programme, has been an objective since Highland 2 and specified in every contingent's Plan of Action. The introduction of in-District Training as part of the PTP was an objective for Highland 4. This has then become part of the objective for the PTP.

An assessment of provincial training needs was identified as an objective from Highland 2 and has then come under objectives to update the Provincial Logistical spreadsheet which provides information on training needs. In later contingents assessment of provincial training needs has come under the PTP.

NZP contingents have identified a number of specific short and long term initiatives they can contribute to, to build the capacity of the ANP in their objectives. For example:

- Provincial Coordination Centre (PCC). Part of a national network of centres designed to assist with the coordination of emergency management (natural disasters and terrorist or aggressive acts). A building has been installed at the Bamyan ANP HQ compound but is not functional due to lack of power, staff and resources.
- Police Quick Reaction Force (PQRF). With no Afghan National Army (ANA) in the Bamyan Province a PQRF of 24 police members has received additional training from NZDF staff to bring them to a high level of operational efficiency. There is now a need to have the course formalised so that it becomes a nationally recognised qualification.
- Emergency Management Committee (EMC). A Disaster Management Plan was drafted in October 2005. With limited 'buy in' to this plan to date there are a number of areas needing urgent attention in order to better prepare for any disasters or emergencies in the districts.
- Police Pay Reform (PPR). This is a nationally driven project which requires regular input and feed back from provinces to ensure ANP pay issues are refined.
- Family Response Unit (FRU). Family violence is an issue which is in the process of being addressed by the introduction of FRU's to all provinces. Coordination of its integration to the existing ANP structure and training of staff are some of the issues that will need attention.
- Continuation of literacy course being run by NZP after hours at the RTC. (Highland 5 Plan of Action)

Highland 4 included a catch-all objective 'to discover and exploit any opportunities for Rotation 4 members to improve on the overall capacity and professionalism of the ANP'. This has been taken up by successive contingents in their action plans. This objective has allowed NZP flexibility to respond to opportunities to improve the capacity of the ANP that may arise during their time in Bamyan.

5.4 Development of strategic overview

A review of the Plans of Action for Highland 2 to 7 shows general continuity of activities to be undertaken and variations reflect the stage of development of the RTC and PPHQ in terms of the status of the facilities; the current priorities and projects of police reform as required by Mol and the international community; and also the identification of developmental opportunities by NZP.

Highland 5 developed a future directions discussion paper which set out strategic objectives that have been utilised by successive rotations. Highland 7 has incorporated these objectives into their project plan and used NZP strategic goals to provide strategic direction.

There are no overall programme outcomes or consistent indicators identified to measure progress. There are constraints for NZP on a number of levels as they work in partnership with multiple stakeholders.

NZP therefore do not have control of the overall direction of the RTC. At the PPHQ they have more autonomy with their mentoring activities but limited resourcing and are reliant on making business cases to the international community to progress development of the facilities. Another constraint has been the lack of a national strategic plan for the ANP with which to align programme direction. This was being progressed by the IPCB with senior Mol ANP.

As outlined in Chapter 3 there have been difficulties in defining the role for the ANP in Afghanistan given the continued insurgency. The overall vision developed with the ANP is extremely important as changes to practices nationally should be led by Mol. Given the vision of the ANP is being developed in consultation with the ICPB which includes EUPOL-A and the US (CSTC-A, INL) there should be synergies between all partners in terms of an overall goal for the direction of ANP policing. With the development of an overall vision for the ANP, and NZP now hatted under EUPOL-A it is suggested that it is timely to develop a strategic overview for Operation Highland that acknowledges the alignment of this operation with key partners. This would clarify strategic direction for future contingents and facilitate the continuity of strategic objectives. It would also signal to key partners (e.g. ANP, EUPOL-A, INL, CSTC-A and DynCorp) that NZP are aligned and committed to national directions for policing.

6 NZP programme activities at the Bamyán RTC and PPHQ

6.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the capacity building activities NZP have undertaken at the RTC and PPHQ. Feedback about those activities from the ANP and international community interviewees provided along with documented evidence of outcomes where available to provide an indication of effectiveness.

6.2 NZP capacity building activities with the RTC management

The NZP mentors' activities to strengthen management include both mentoring focused on individuals and establishing a number of management and administrative systems with the ANP and building their capacity to maintain these systems.

The NZP Contingent Commander assigns one NZP mentor to the RTC Commander and this can also include mentoring senior RTC ANP such as the Deputy Commander and Chief Administration Officer. The other NZP mentor works with the instructors. All the NZP mentors work with interpreters who play an extremely important role translating between the parties. Mentoring included daily one on one mentoring with the Commander and working with him to problem solve issues as they arise and develop management and administration systems (see examples below). The NZP mentor assigned to the Commander has a desk in the Commanders office which facilitates working closely with him.

The senior officers at the RTC have many years of experience and some trained at the Kabul Police Academy prior to the Soviet invasion or trained with the Soviets. They had varying levels of experience working in training and managing a training institution. The five ANP officers who had arrived at the RTC in the six months prior to the review had experience working in other RTCs. They were officially allocated to management or administration positions at Bamyán RTC although most were also assisting with instructing due to their prior experience.

The RTC Commander said his leadership had been greatly assisted by the mentoring he had received by successive NZP contingents. He said NZP staff had been very keen to help and he appreciated the talent, capability and behaviour of all the NZP contingents. His suggestion for NZP was that they fund him to come to New Zealand to learn more about policing and he would also like to see Bamyán RTC expanded. An NZP mentor who had been on the first and sixth rotations said there has been a marked improvement in his leadership and management capabilities. The mentor observed the RTC Commander now explored every opportunity to develop the RTC and thought of new initiatives.

An important element of managing the RTC is forward planning. This has been identified as an issue by NZP mentors who found generally the ANP managers did not tend to plan further than a few weeks ahead. Based on interviews and NZP reports, the mentors have worked closely with the RTC Commander and other RTC managers to enhance their forward planning but this has met with varying degrees of success. A NZP mentor described always talking strategically with the RTC

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managers but in the end having to put together the RTC programme for the following year themselves. Long term planning is therefore in place primarily due to NZP assistance and needs to be developed further with the ANP if they are to operate the RTC independently. Medium term and short term planning is also an issue as some of the NZP interviewees talked about occasions where they would be given short notice about issues and events that would have benefited from prior planning. For example leaving sending out invites to graduations of ANP students until the day before the graduation.

The lack of forward planning by senior ANP officers could possibly be a result of different cultural perspectives and the result of years of war where the future was uncertain.

Examples of planning and administration systems NZP mentors have assisted ANP senior staff to develop (or done themselves) include:

- annual plan of training schedules
- planning student recruitment process
- staff rosters and holidays
- whiteboard schedule with currently running courses, times and allocated instructors.
- upgrade of the manual filing system and assistance with electronic records
- assist with proposals and requests to Mol

Senior ANP staff at the RTC all gave very positive feedback about the mentoring on management and administration that they had received from NZP mentors. They described sitting down with NZP mentors to discuss issues relevant to their positions, for example logistics to recruit and transport students to courses or management advice on scheduling class and allocating instructors. These officers talked about problem solving with NZP mentors and said they had received good advice and suggestions from them. One ANP officer said that one of the mentors could have provided more guidance on what he was supposed to do but he was now happy with NZP contribution 'now they have good consultation, coordination and solving problems'.

A senior ANP officer at the RTC provided an example of NZP assistance with planning and coordinating the CID course when it was first introduced:

The officer sat with NZP mentor to plan how many students can attend the course from Bamyan and other provinces. We produce a list and NZP send the list via email to the different provinces with dates the course is available and numbers of student places available. This officer was impressed with the proper planning to undertake the course including transporting students, having course materials available and the use of modern technology (email) to communicate with ANP in provinces to recruit students. (interview notes May 2008)

There is no internet available at the Bamyan RTC and NZP would use email at the PRT. There was an internet shop in Bamyan township that had also been used in the past. This highlights the lack of resources at the RTC and sustainability issues in regards to the ANP being able to carry on this form of communication.

A DynCorp interviewee said they are building the administrative capacity of RTC ANP and Mol by transitioning the responsibility of ordering resources to them so the RTC ANP are making requests directly to Mol. Currently the RTC can order different equipment via two channels either through the Mol or DynCorp (NZP Desk file). NZP mentors report that despite encouraging RTC ANP to make logistic requests to Mol

for supplies they have been reluctant and there was a sense that DynCorp should be supplying everything.

Examples of management processes NZP mentors have developed with ANP senior staff include:

- establishing regular staff meetings to debrief previous week and plan for following week
- regular evaluations of instructors (no results available)
- establishment of instructional workshops for instructors where senior ANP staff deliver training sessions to enhance junior instructors

Assessment of the ANP instructors by their supervisor, the RTC Education Deputy, has recently been made easier by the introduction of the student and instructor evaluation system developed by CSTCA and the CTC. This is an assessment process for the introductory course (Basic 8) and instructors and supervisors assessment (CTC Student Evaluation Programme). This process was piloted at the CTC for eighteen weeks and then introduced at the RTCs. Bamyan RTC started this assessment process in July 2008. The Student Evaluation Programme is being administered by the RTC ANP staff and they were taught the process by the DynCorp mentor with assistance from NZP mentors (NZP Weekly Report 21-27 July 2008).

This new system ensures that every Basic 8 student is assessed as the course progresses by their instructors. New instructors are assessed bi-weekly by the Education Deputy and more experienced instructors are assessed quarterly. The Education Deputy is in turn assessed by the RTC Commander. NZP mentors may assist with assessments and provide feedback. This system systematically collects data on the progress of instructors and their senior supervisor and should provide valuable monitoring data to assess the progress and areas requiring improvement of these ANP personnel. As the system has only recently been introduced to the Bamyan RTC it is too soon to analyse the assessments. Prior to this new system NZP interviewees said they have assessed instructors using an assessment form. The frequency of assessment varied from weekly to monthly; however there were no records available from the RTC to analyse for this review.

Mentors reported spending a lot of time mentoring senior staff on how to manage and supervise instructors. For example, an NZP mentor said they teach them about constructive feedback and giving praise in public and criticisms in private.

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The key attributes these ANP officers valued about the NZP mentors contribution to managing the RTC were:

- knowledge and experience of NZP mentors to provide guidance
- availability of NZP mentors to discuss issues
- NZP mentors listened to officers and instructors and worked with them to solve problems
- attitude of NZP mentors with many officers saying they 'behaved well', were friendly, non-discriminatory, and NZP observed Afghan customs
- helpfulness – they noted NZP mentors tried to get resources for courses even though it was not their responsibility. Several also mentioned the support of the PRT
- many of them were impressed that NZP staff had given up their rest time to provide them with English lessons

An ANP officer said that NZP mentors provided intellectual quality which they considered more important than the quantity of material things. Another ANP officer stated they appreciated the 'talent, capability and behaviour' of the NZP mentors and during their three years at the RTC they noted the NZP mentors had always been really keen to help and were interested. Some ANP interviewees said an example of their contribution is their work to introduce the CID course. The ANP at the RTC seemed to be very aware of NZP's role and their limited capacity to provide additional resources and they understood that the resourcing of the RTC was the responsibility of DynCorp. They suggested that DynCorp provide more resources in terms of accommodation, stationery, and transport.

6.3 NZP capacity building activities with the RTC Afghan instructors

All the students at the RTC are taught by Afghan ANP instructors and the role of NZP mentors is to build their capacity through mentoring which provides the best opportunity for sustainable training of the ANP. ANP instructors undergo training provided by DynCorp at the CTC or the Bamyar RTC (Firearms Instructors course and Instructors Development Course (IDC)). NZP mentors have assisted with the Bamyar RTC instructors courses and provided additional training such as demonstrations of new equipment and techniques, and discussions about the theories and processes that are in the DynCorp curriculum.

A review of NZP Highland end of mission reports and interviews with NZP mentors' and ANP RTC staff identified the following activities by NZP to strengthen the capacity of the RTC instructors include:

- provision of additional training to instructors
- instigating instructional workshops where RTC ANP staff supervisors participate in training RTC instructors
- provision of training on teaching techniques such as active learning techniques involving role play and interactive learning. This is particularly important for delivering training to illiterate students.
- supporting RTC instructors to attend professional development such as courses at the RTC including IDC and Firearms instructors course and attending specialist courses at the CTC in Kabul. There was no record of how many went to the CTC over the review period.
- assessment and appraisal of instructors skills through:
 - regular observation of teaching and providing briefings and feedback after class
 - formal evaluations of instructors teaching skills and class room management
 - mentor senior management at RTC to supervise and assess instructors.

NZP mentors have enhanced the learning environment in classrooms including getting proper desks built, installing shelving, providing an overhead projector and sourcing educational posters. There has been difficulty sourcing resources such as stationery which was supposed to be supplied by MoI. Additional funding from the US Military has been used to buy pens and other stationery.

NZP report ensuring course material is current and that instructors had the correct material for the class they were teaching. NZP mentors found that giving instructors' responsibility for their own instructor's manuals and resources made them accountable for looking after these resources. A NZP interviewee said that the

instructors' manuals and lesson overheads were in a collective pile in the instructors' room and not stored properly so things would get lost. Allocating the instructors their own resources with folders meant they had ownership over them and stored them properly.

The tashkil can reallocate RTC instructors and the loss of experienced instructors presented a risk to the operation of specialist courses such as the CID course. In 2007 Highland 6 advised the RTC Commander to send six RTC instructors to the CTC for training to provide an additional capacity of three instructors. Since that time five instructors have been reallocated to other RTCs. The strategy of always having back-up trainers might not always be sustainable for the Bamyan RTC, however, encouraging and building the capacity of new trainers will assist the ANP nationally to increase their training capacity.

There is qualitative evidence that NZP mentors have encouraged promising young recruits to become instructors for example one of the female firearms instructor, who was the first female firearms instructor in Afghanistan. Three of the young instructors interviewed spoke about the encouragement and assistance they had received from NZP mentors to become instructors.

6.4 NZP activities to monitor and enhance District training (Provincial Training Programme)

District training in Bamyan has taken place as part of the RTC programme funded by DynCorp. The components of District training from 2005 to May 2008 included:

- Provincial Training Programme (PTR) course designed by DynCorp and delivered at the RTC by ANP instructors. District trainers have attended the PTR at the RTC to up-skill so they can provide refresher training in their Districts.
- District visits by Mobile Training Teams (MTT) which has included RTC instructors, NZP mentors and DynCorp mentor, escorted by NZDF PRT personnel. The purpose is for RTC instructors to provide additional training in the Districts from DynCorp curriculum and be able to assess how the District trainers are performing.
- Facilitation of further training for ANP graduates of the RTC in Bamyan Province either at the RTC or the CTC.

Several ANP interviewees emphasised the importance of transferring knowledge from the RTC to the Districts and to do that via the RTC instructors, District trainers and up-skilling NCOs and Officers through courses like the CID. Many interviewees said it was very important for the RTC to check and audit the Districts due to lack of knowledge about professional police practices. The RTC ANP managers and instructors are part of the training division of Mol and have a role in identifying training needs in the Districts; supporting and assessing District trainers; and to reinforce the knowledge and skills ANP were taught at the RTC. This role helps to ensure policing practice in the Districts is up to the standards taught through the RTC curriculum. (b)(a)

The RTC Commander and members of the RTC staff liaise with DCoP and PCoP to organise ANP training at the RTC (or CTC) and arrange visits to the Districts. District training is supported through the mentoring work of the NZP Contingent Commander with the PCoP and District Commanders to promote the importance of developing the ANP and supporting new ANP graduates with their work in the Districts.

A review of NZP reports identified that NZP have undertaken District visits to assess the training needs of ANP.⁵ While Training Needs Analysis (TNA) is reported as being conducted in NZP monitoring reports no copies of the TNA reports were available for this review.

Highland 2 began with a TNA in the seven districts of Bamyan Province to provide information on the prioritization of training needs and priorities for Bamyan. The paper *Afghanistan New Zealand Police Training Project* by (9)(2)(9)

The GPPO remains the coordinating nation in policing reform and as such is in a unique position to advise the international community on the prioritisation of donor funding. To this end the current police advisors are undertaking a Provincial Inventory in tandem with a Training Needs Analysis to raise the profile of the province and to better inform a variety of agencies including the GPPO of the policing needs and priorities in Bamyan.

Since Highland 2 NZP rotations have continued to assess the training and logistical needs required in the Bamyan Province to varying degrees. Highland 2 completed briefing papers to disseminate to GPPO, NZAID, DynCorp, Bamyan Provincial Government and NZPRT and a record of the TNA was included in the Provincial Logistical spreadsheet. Highlands 3 and 4 continued the Provincial Logistics spreadsheet including information on training. Information regarding training needs is not obvious in Highland 5 and 6 reports but it is uncertain whether they were contributing to reporting requirements such as the Interim Readiness Report (IRR) required by the MoI and ISAF that contained information on personnel and training.

ANP from the Districts have been trained as District trainers firstly in firearms training in response to both the security situation and the number of unqualified police staff with arms which was considered a critical risk by NZP. In 2007 District trainers were brought to the RTC for further training under the PTP to learn about community policing, vehicle searching and people searching. NZP reported the training went really well and participants thrived on knowledge and education.

In 2008 Highland 7 conducted visits to Districts in Bamyan to assess their training needs. They assessed that many of the District Trainers 'have insufficient training to provide quality training to their staff. Where training is being provided that training is limited to firearms and marching which is intended to instil discipline.' It is unknown whether any of these District Trainers had attended training the previous year at the PTP. Highland 7 also found that there were a 107 ANP who had not received Basic 8 training. This impacted on the RTC instructors PTP training in the Districts as they had to provide additional tuition to those ANP who had not received Basic 8 training. 69

As a result of their TNA Highland 7 developed a basic PTP course for delivery to the Districts by RTC instructors. This PTP plan was being assessed by INL for approval in August 2008 as a possible second PTP course to deliver at RTCs as a refresher course. The original PTP course is going to be updated by the Green Cell (CSTC-A curriculum development based at CTC) and there would be two PTP courses offered. The following extract from an email from the Green Cell adviser to INL adviser dated 17.8.08 verifies this process,

⁵ Visits to Districts are dependent on the weather as some Districts in Bamyan are inaccessible during the winter therefore NZP rotations have undertaken District visits to varying degrees.

I support this PTP in that it is a second PTP course that can be used, once approved, as well as the current (but outdated) course. The NZPOL Advisors did an excellent assessment of their AOR and developed the PTP using already approved INL courses that are packaged into a PTP.(email communication from Highland 7 24.8.08).

The target group for the new PTP course are those ANP in Bamyan Province who have already received Basic 8 or TIP training. Highland 7 state it is not suitable for those who have not attended Basic 8, as teaching untrained ANP significantly increases the time required for delivery because material has to be covered in full rather than as a refresher.

Highland 7 recommended that the RTC run a refresher course for District Trainers at the RTC which took place from the 26 to 30 July 2008. They propose that District training will be conducted in-District by RTC trainers until District Trainers are competent; RTC directs and monitors refresher training in Districts; and training is observed in-District where possible by DynCorp, NZP, PRT patrols until such a time that RTC officers can provide an observation role. The role of international staff (DynCorp, NZP, NZPRT) is to observe, guide and advise.

Highland 7 proposed that equipment and resources required are supplied as follows:

- firearm range consumables including targets and ammunition provided by RTC
- Weapons provided by district
- 4x4 Ranger truck provided by RTC for transporting RTC instructors to district
- Fuel provided by DynCorp
- Messing and accommodation provided by host district

To coordinate District training a senior Officer at the RTC has been assigned this task. At the conclusion of each round of training there is a debrief and review conducted so lessons learned can be applied to the next round. The RTC instructor is to also prepare a report that is presented to the Bamyan PCoP. NZP Contingent Commander Highland 7 reported that the RTC instructors after a recent visit to the Districts to conduct training recommended that the PTP firearms training be reduced from three to two days which could be seen as an example of some ANP shifting away from the military mindset towards law and order training.

The need to provide training to ANP who have not received Basic 8 meant the rescheduling of planned CID courses so more Basic 8 courses could be run in 2008.

A summary of NZP activities to support ANP District training include:

- Periodic assessment of training needs in the Districts which is ongoing.
- Development of District Trainers: ANP staff are identified by their DCoP to undertake instructors courses to become District Trainers.
- Creation of Mobile Training Teams (MTT): includes RTC instructors, NZP mentors and recently a DynCorp mentor, escorted by NZDF PRT personnel. Purpose is to provide additional training in the Districts and be able to assess how the District trainers are performing.
- Building the capacity of RTC instructors to work in Districts by mentoring and advising them about assessment of District trainers in the field and delivering PTP at the RTC.
- Development of a second PTP course by Highland 7 to be delivered in-District as a refresher course. This was undergoing approval by INL at the time of writing this report.

6.5 Developing criminal investigative skills

To build the investigative capabilities of ANP officers and NCOs the NZP mentors advised the ANP in Bamyan Province to send suitable candidates to the CTC in Kabul to do the CID course. As stated, Highland 6 facilitated the introduction of the CID course to the Bamyan RTC curriculum by making a case to DynCorp and to INL that the Bamyan RTC could deliver this course.

To deliver the course Bamyan RTC instructors received CID training at the CTC in Kabul. NZP mentors from Highland 6 reported spending considerable time enhancing this training and mentoring RTC instructors to deliver the CID course and provided in-class monitoring of instructors. The training and mentoring work provided by NZP adhered to the CTC CID curriculum. One of the NZP mentors from Highland 6 also attended part of the CID course in Kabul so they would be familiar with the way the course was taught.

RTC Instructors interviewed for this review thought that the CID curriculum was appropriate for the ANP and within their knowledge; however there was a shortage of fingerprint powder and other resources in the field to implement some of the techniques taught⁶. NZP mentors suggested to DynCorp at the CTC that some of the crime scene photographs used in the CID course be removed as they considered them inappropriate for the Afghan culture as they would be regarded as obscene.

The feedback from approximately thirty ANP students from focus groups with two CID classes at Bamyan RTC was that the course was effective and they are learning good methods that they had not known before. They concurred with NZP assessment of the need to provide CID training to ANP. Collecting and documenting evidence are basic policing skills and are an essential part of any justice system to identify suspected offenders and bring them to prosecution. The CID students reported that the course was also teaching them to produce credible reports for the Prosecutors. While they described techniques and processes they could utilise when they got back to their Districts they identified barriers such as having the proper technical equipment to collect evidence e.g. DNA laboratory, fingerprint powder. Another resource issue was the lack of transport to attend crime scenes.

This is supported by the report on the justice system by the Centre for Policy and Human Development at Kabul University which examines the issues for the whole justice sector (formal and traditional) including corruption,

The judiciary is perceived as the most corrupt institution within Afghanistan.⁷ Alleged corruption within the judiciary may stem in part from the low salaries received by judges, as their salaries are insufficient for caring for their families. (Centre for Police and Human Development 2007:72)

⁶ DynCorp resource the course and there was a resourcing issue over the supply of fingerprint kits which DynCorp found difficult to source. The high quality finger print powder is reportedly difficult to obtain and NZP mentors requested fingerprint kits from ISG to send from NZ. Highland 7 have stopped this as they recognise this is not sustainable for the ANP.

⁷ Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). 2006. *Afghanistan Government more Corrupt the Taliban*, A survey report released on March 19th, 2007, Kabul.

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The lack of security from Illegal Armed Groups (IAGs) was also identified as a major barrier to the ANP conducting their work. There were also traditional barriers, for example they said they could not investigate a dead body. Their suggestion for improvement to the CID course was a longer course so they could learn more techniques and processes. They also identified other issues they would like to be addressed in courses at the RTC which illustrate the realities they face in their work:

- How to stop corruption or bribes
- How to dispose of mines
- How to stop suicide bombers
- How to deal with kidnapping.

The CID course at Bamyan is offered to ANP from other provinces in Afghanistan in order to assist the CTC in training the backlog of Officers and NCOs waiting to go on this course. While the actual number of police that remains to back-capture for this type of training was not available, considering the lack of basic investigative skills noted by NZP there would likely be substantial number of ANP who would benefit from the CID course. Table 1 noted that in April 2008 only 68% of the allocated tashkil to the CID was in place and a further 1,833 ANP were required to work in this area.

6.6 Analysis of training outputs at Bamyan RTC

This section provides an analysis of the number of graduates from each RTC course from 2004 to July 2008. As ANP students may complete more than one course it is not known how many ANP staff have graduated from the Bamyan RTC as records were not kept on individuals during that period. Graduation from a course means that the student has passed the course. Due to the large number of ANP who are illiterate some courses such as the introductory Basic 8 course do not have written examinations. More specialised courses such as the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) course have a written exam as well as a practical assessment.

CTC said the introduction of the Student Evaluation Programme to assess students on the Basic 8 course *was instituted to address some of the challenges of training a police force containing literate and illiterate police officers* (CTC Student Evaluation Programme). The evaluation methods include visual evaluation of practical exercises and verbal or written evaluation of topics to systematically assess both literate and non-literate students. This assessment process will provide much more information on the progress of students and will also contribute to future evaluation of the instructors and development of their capacity to train students.

Table 6 presents the number of ANP who graduated from each course at the Bamyan RTC from 2004 to July 2008.⁸ There are limitations to this data as already noted a student may attend more than one course so this does not show the total number of ANP trained by the RTC. Nor is there any information available about how the numbers trained match the training needs of the ANP at the provincial or district levels.

⁸ The training numbers are recorded by the Persian Calendar which starts on the 20th March. At the time of the review in 2008 the year in Afghanistan is 1387.

Table 6: Total number of ANP graduating from each course at the Bamyan RTC from March 2004 – July 2008

	2004	2005	2006	2007	July 2008	TOTAL
Basic (1,2,8)	27	282	258	192	132	891
TIP1 and TIP3A	76	99	204	144	-	523
CID	-	-	-	41	124	165
Firearms Rifle	-	-	497	-	-	497
Firearms Pistol	-	-	164	21	-	185
PTP	84	-	15	14	-	113
TTP	-	-	36	37	-	73
IDC	-	-	16	12	-	28
Firearms instructor	-	-	17	12	-	29
TOTAL	187	381	1,207	473	256	2,504

Source: Bamyan RTC training records

The following analysis is based on the RTC records which breakdown student numbers by province; gender; and rank. NZP provided additional information on the number of ANP that enrolled in the Basic 8 and CID courses and did not complete these courses to provide an indication of the number of students passing.

Basic 8

The Basic 8 course is recorded in the RTC files as starting in 2006 at Bamyan RTC. Preceding the Basic 8 is the Basic 1 and Basic 2 courses which provided separate courses for literate and non-literate new recruits from 2004 to 2006 at Bamyan RTC. For the purposes of analysing entry level courses the number of graduates from Basic 1, 2 and 8 courses have been added together and show 891 new recruits graduated from the Bamyan RTC from 2004 to July 2008. The RTC records show that 29 did not graduate for various reasons including absenteeism and behaviour issues which means 96.8 percent of new recruits graduated from the Basic courses.

All the students bar one were of Soldier rank (low ranked police). The number of recruits rises from 27 in 2004 to 282 in 2005, the year NZP started at the RTC and DynCorp started to fund expansion of the facilities. The numbers of ANP who attended the Basic courses reduces over subsequent years.

An analysis of the five provinces the Bamyan RTC provides training for shows the majority (511) are from Bamyan and the next highest is Daikundi Province (173). Parwan province had 143 recruits graduate; Kapisa (28) and Panjshir (31) had similar small number of Basic course graduates.

Furthermore the provincial analysis shows that the training of new recruits from the four provinces outside of Bamyan started in 2006 with the exception of 27 recruits from Daikundi province who were trained in 2005. This correlates with the increased capacity of the RTC to accommodate students and suggests an increased ability of the RTC management to liaise with other provinces about their training requirements.

Transition Integration Programme (TIP1 and TIP3A)

The Transition Integration Programme is an intermediate level course for ANP commissioned and non-commissioned Officers. The TIP1 was conducted from 2004 to 2006 when it was replaced by the TIP3A. The total number of ANP graduating from the TIP1 and TIP3A from 2004 to July 2008 was 523.

NCOs made up 48.5 percent (n254) of TIP1 and TIP3A graduates and 51.5 percent (n269) were Officers. Analysis by province shows that the majority of graduates

came from Bamyan province (n196, 37.4 percent) closely followed by Parwan province (n171, 32.6 percent). The remainder of TIP1 and TIP3A graduates came from Daikundi (n54), Panjshir (n481) and Kapisa (n54) provinces.

Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

The CID course started at the Bamyan RTC in November 2007 and eight courses had been conducted to July 2008 with a total of 165 graduates. The current NZP mentors report that a further eleven ANP student enrolled but did not complete the CID course for various reasons including failing the exam; health reasons; and discipline matters. Therefore of the 176 ANP students who enrolled in the CID course 165 ANP or 93.4 percent graduated.

Firearms (Rifle)

The Bamyan RTC records show the Firearms (Rifle) course was only delivered as a separate course in 2006 to 497 ANP soldiers in Bamyan Province. Firearms training became part of the Basic 8 course that replaced the Basic 1 and 2 courses. There are still external firearms courses being conducted.

Firearms (Pistol)

The Firearms (Pistol) course was delivered in 2006 to 104 ANP soldiers and 2007 to 21 ANP (11 NCOs and 10 soldiers). All the ANP receiving this course were from Bamyan province. A total of 185 ANP have received this training to date.

Provincial Training Programme (PTR)

The total number of ANP who have completed the PTR from 2004 to 2007 was 113.

In 2004 84 ANP soldiers graduated from the PTR which was prior to Operation Highland. In 2006 15 Officers, NCOs and Soldiers (2) completed the PTR course. In 2007 14 Officers and NCOs attended the PTR course. No PTR course has been held at the Bamyan RTC in 2008 to July.

Tactical Training Programme (TTP)

The Bamyan RTC records show this course was delivered in 2006 and 2007 to 73 ANP from Bamyan province. In 2006 36 ANP graduated (two NCOs and 34 soldiers) and in 2007 37 ANP graduated (three NCOs and 34 soldiers).

Instructors' courses at the RTC

The Instructors Development Course (IDC) and Firearms instructor are aimed at developing ANP instructors. The IDC has had 28 graduates (9 female) and the Firearms instructor has had 29 graduates (8 female) all from Bamyan province.

Some instructors received training in courses at the CTC so they could then deliver those courses at the Bamyan RTC. Examples are:

- six RTC instructors were sent to the CTC to do the CID course and returned to deliver the CID courses at Bamyan RTC (Highland 6) Two of the instructors came top of their class which indicates their comprehension of the course material.
- two RTC instructors were sent to the CTC to do the TTP course and returned to deliver courses at the Bamyan RTC (Highland 4 report).

6.7 NZP activities to facilitate recruitment and capacity building of female police

6.7.1 Recruitment and training of female police

NZP mentors have been very active during each rotation to encourage the ANP to recruit and train female police and the number of women has increased from one to fifteen during the review period. The RTC Commander said with the assistance of the NZP mentors they had been able to recruit and maintain women in the police which was a great achievement considering that Bamyan could be a very religious and traditional province. NZP had worked with senior ANP at the RTC and at Provincial Police Head Quarters to encourage the recruitment of women by advising them to talk to respected members of the community such as Shuras, Provincial councils and mullahs about the police being a respectable job for women.

To facilitate the training of women NZP mentors have carried out a number of activities including:

- mentoring male ANP senior staff and instructors to support training of women
- making a business case recommending DynCorp fund the building of a separate day room at the RTC for women and their children which has also been used as onsite accommodation for women students, their children and minders.
- hiring nannies for women students with children to look after babies and children onsite at the RTC
- encouraging women recruits to do further training and to become instructors at the RTC. There are now two female instructors at the RTC.
- facilitate women training with men doing both theory and practical exercises with men. For example conducting fire arms training together and having a female firearms instructor available for female students due to the hands on demonstrations.

Highland 4 (mid tour report January 2007) reported,

Already four women have graduated from the Bamyan RTC, and one other local [female] has been recommended and referred to the Police Academy in Kabul, for the 3 year Officer course.

The NZP female officer during Highland 6 saw an opportunity to develop working with female ANP as a group. A meeting was organised for the fifteen female Police officers who worked in the Bamyan Province in late 2007 to find out where they worked, what their jobs were and any professional issues they encountered. From this meeting the female NZP mentor was able to work with the women to address issues; educate on professional policing; and create a network to maintain contact via letters and phone. This work was supported by mentoring work of the NZP Contingent Commander with the PCoP to encourage him to put female police officers into proper policing positions. For example, working in the Family Violence Response Unit (FRU) at the PPHQ and in the CID.

6.7.2 Training outputs with female police

Table 7 outlines the courses undertaken by female ANP.

Table 7: Female ANP training at Bamyan RTC 2005 – 2008 (first quarter)

	Basic 1 or 8 ¹	TIP3A ²	IDC ³	Firearms Instructor ⁴	PTP ⁵	CID ⁶	NCO ⁷
2005	1						
2006	3	3	1	1			
2007	9	7	8	7	8	4	
2008	3 (2 Parwan)						11
Total	16	10	9	8	8	4	11

1. Basic 8 – Entry level course for all ANP providing basic training (in 2004-5 was Basic 1)
2. TIP3A – Transition Integration Programme: Provides basic knowledge on Human rights issues, democratic policing and operational police skills. Practice orientated focusing on human rights issues in connection with daily activities of police.
3. IDC
4. Firearms Instructor – course for instructors to teach firearms
5. PTP – Refresh ANP Officers knowledge in skills learned at RTC and introduce new material since their training.
6. CID – Criminal Investigation Detail: Enable investigator to better perform in role of Criminal Investigator.
7. NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer Course: Abridged NCO course from Kabul Police Academy

There was one female police officer in Bamyan Province before the RTC started operations and there are now fifteen. The Bamyan RTC trained their first female recruit in 2005 and since that time they have trained sixteen female recruits in the introductory course (Basic 8) and the majority of them have gone on to do advanced courses. Ten of these women have graduated from intermediate training in the TIP3A for officers and NCOs and four have passed the specialist CID training. Many of this group of women have also gone on to do instructors courses with nine of doing the IDC course and eight doing the Firearms instructor course. Eight of these women have had refresher training in the PTP course. Of the sixteen women who have received training at the RTC fourteen were from Bamyan Province and two from Parwan Province.

The NZP mentors facilitated the NCO course that eleven female police officers undertook in the first quarter of 2008. In order for the MoI to confer their NCO rank the female officers had to pass the appropriate courses. They had done all the courses available at the Bamyan RTC and it was reportedly very difficult for them to travel to Kabul to do the Officers courses because of cultural perspectives that women should not travel on their own. The NCO course at Bamyan was based on an abridged version (4.5 months) of the Kabul Police Academy NCO course in light of the other courses these women had already attended.

A focus group with the policewomen completing the NCO course identified the following ways their training would assist them when they went back to work:

- They were not previously aware of the principles underpinning the police, but have now learned more about law and the constitution.
- They are now familiar with the jobs (roles) in police so will now conduct themselves properly.
- They did not know how to deal with suspects and criminals, but now more able to defend themselves.

They identified the following barriers to carrying out their police duties:

- Family problems - balancing looking after the family/children and working.
- Culture and tradition of the community. Other women feel they are having affairs with their men. Mullahs against them being in police. One woman stated they have gone so far as to say they would be killed.

- Women not getting jobs or tasks assigned to them as the men were always given them.

6.8 Quality of instruction at the RTC

To examine whether the capacity development activities by NZP are leading to enhanced and sustainable quality instruction information was obtained from interviews, RTC records and NZP Operation Highland reports. While NZP reports and interviews specify that assessment forms were used to assess instructors there were no records of these assessment forms. As stated, the new student and instructor evaluation process introduced to the Bamyan RTC in August 2008 by CSTC-A and the CTC should provide information for future monitoring and evaluation.

Information on the percentage of students who pass the Basic 8 and CID courses showed:

- Of the 920 students who have attended Basic 8 courses 96.8 percent have graduated
- Of the 176 students who have attended CID courses 93.4 percent have graduated

Fourteen ANP staff were interviewed at the RTC and nine of the interviewees provided instruction to classes either on a full or part time basis dependent on their other assigned duties. Of the nine interviewees providing instruction, six had been instructing at the Bamyan RTC for a minimum of six months and up to four years so had considerable experience of NZP contingents. A further five instructors who had been at the Bamyan RTC had recently been transferred to another RTC so there was not an opportunity to interview them about the mentoring they had received from NZP mentors.

Feedback from all the ANP RTC staff that provided instruction was very positive and they said they really appreciated the assistance they had received from NZP mentors which they had found very useful. Some of the examples provided by ANP instructors were:

- Instructors described the NZP assisting them when they had questions about subjects they were teaching.
- An ANP instructor described how NZP had done regular performance appraisals with the instructors and they found this process very useful to improve their teaching.
- About half of the instructors provided examples of how NZP had assisted them through practical demonstrations of using equipment such as handcuffs, batons and fire arms.
- An ANP instructor said that one of the NZP mentors had provided them with very good instruction about operational and tactical techniques and that no where else would they have been taught that.
- Another instructor discussed how a NZP mentor had taught them how to deal with aggressive criminals.

The ANP instructors appreciated the additional time that some of the NZP mentors had given to provide them with further training. ANP instructors said,

Generally their assistance and help was great and whatever they could do they did.

NZ Police gave young instructors good training and due to their advice and efforts we have had good achievements with the graduates.

An instructor said when they conduct performance appraisals of their students they feel proud when the students are doing the right thing, 'Gives you hope what we are doing is right.' Another young instructor said that while they were enthusiastic to take classes they required further assistance to improve their skills; this highlights the need for further training and mentoring.

NZP mentors also work with instructors and their supervisors to ensure the ethical management of the students and address any issues they observe. A senior ANP officer said that the NZP mentors had been good at providing guidance to instructors about how to teach the students including not threatening or intimidating them and 'not to beat them but to tell them'.

A task of this review was to examine the cross cutting theme of human rights. Teaching human rights was part of the curriculum and included in the Basic 8 course and the TIP3A⁹ and has also been included in the PTP. A common theme when talking to ANP staff at the RTC was the emphasis they put on teaching the students human rights. This was unprompted in the interviews and the instructors said they took teaching students about human rights very seriously, particularly as they were aware of issues to do with corruption and human right abuses. A young instructor said,

Police they have to be servants of the community. They can not be cruel and abuse people. So some tactical training is good but in my point of view it is important to give training on being ethical and about human rights. Because when they go back into the field this has to be implemented.

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6.9 NZP capacity building activities at Bamyan Provincial Police Headquarters

6.9.1 Capacity building with the PCoP and senior managers

NZP Contingent Commanders have focused on building the capacity of the PCoP and senior management and establishing and enhancing managerial, administration and operational systems. The main areas of focus have been to build the capacity of the PCoP and his senior managers in regards to:

- Leadership
- Strategy and planning
- Management (personnel and resources)
- Administration (Logistics, Finance and Human Resources)
- Operations

Mentoring activities have typically involved spending the day at PPHQ starting with the PCoP morning briefing to managers and then spending one on one time with the PCoP and each of the senior managers. The PCoP sits on a number of Provincial security committees and the NZP mentor plays a support role to the PCoP and attends the meetings with him.

⁹ The review did not include a comprehensive examination of course content, for example in regards to the extent of time spent on subjects, as this was outside the terms of reference. One way of verifying if there have been changes to the ANP attitudes and practices in the way they treat the public would be a community satisfaction survey on any changes they have noted.

NZP interviewees identified the key attributes of mentoring the PCoP and his team are based on relationship building and developing trust and respect. NZP mentors generally talked about using a problem solving approach to develop capacity to identify issues and solutions. It is also important that those mentored have ownership of the solutions and outcomes such as annual plans and systems. An NZP mentor emphasised the importance of not taking credit for initiatives yourself and letting those you mentored take the kudos.

They call the shots – you influence where you can. If they do not accept your advice you don't get upset and remember it so if it all goes wrong then you can use it as a learning exercise and ask 'what would you have done differently?'

In 2007 the PCoP developed an annual plan with Highland 6 which involved asking the PCoP what he wanted to see for the Province. The NZP Contingent Commander at that time had to prompt him about different areas such as what did he want to see in the areas of training, discipline and community policing. The PCoP wrote a ten page document by himself which the NZP Commander said he did not suggest many amendments in order to let the PCoP take ownership of it. The PCoP showed the annual plan to the Governor and UNAMA which reportedly helped with relationship building as the PCoP was relatively new at that time. At the time of the review the PCoP had met some of the objectives such as meeting all the DCoP and meetings with community representatives such as Shuras and provincial councils.

There have been major staff changes to many of the senior management staff at the PPHQ. While good mentoring relationships have been achieved with some senior managers, others have been more difficult to engage

The areas of finance, logistics and personnel have in the past been very challenging

The current PCoP specifically appointed the current Finance and Personnel Officers because of their experience and honesty.

6.9.2 Developing sustainable systems

The review identified some significant changes had been made at PPHQ in terms of infrastructure development and the development of management and administrative systems (e.g. regular management meetings with senior management and DCoP, improved payroll system, staff rosters, daily occurrence book).

A recent example is NZP have assisted in establishing the nationally developed new payroll system that provides the ANP with EftPos cards the facility to directly access their pay. This was recently installed in Bamyan and Shiba Districts. This has reportedly worked well in Bamyan but there have been difficulties in Shiba as non-literate ANP staff do not remember the mark they used for their specimen signature so it does not match with the one held electronically with the bank. The current PCoP was taking a keen interest in wages and complaints from ANP about not getting their wages has ceased despite the issues in Shiba.

However, the administrative systems would still benefit from mentoring support, quality assurance and resourcing. For example there are two computers at PPHQ run by a small generator. The computers are often unable to be used due to a lack of fuel.

6.9.3 Community policing activities

NZP promote a community policing approach which is quite different to the paramilitary mindset the ANP are used to from their Russian training. NZP mentors have encouraged the PCoP to meet with the community representatives such as Shura, city councils, District sub-governors and mayors to develop community relations. NZP have also encouraged community radio broadcasts by the Police to try and develop a better perception of the police in the community.

Another community policing initiative was getting the Police to patrol the bazaar and set up a small Police Post in a container at the bazaar in order to be more accessible to the community.

6.9.4 Addressing human rights and gender issues at PPHQ

Human rights and gender issues are priorities of the ANDS. NZP mentors said they reinforced human rights issues every time they see something at the PPHQ. The PCoP has appointed a Human Rights Officer however they are of junior rank and therefore would not have much influence regarding any alleged corruption of senior ranking ANP. While there are incidences of corrupt staff being dismissed by the PCoP,

Successive NZP Contingent Commanders have supported the recruitment and professional development of women to the ANP through their mentoring work with the various PCoPs. They have encouraged the PCoP to give women core policing roles and there are now female police working at the PPHQ in CID, FRU and personnel. In earlier rotations the NZP Contingent Commanders have worked with the PCoP to negotiate with the Provincial Council, Shura and other interested parties to successfully gain support for women joining ANP. Although some interviewees said there is still some reticence in the community and from some of the mullah.

NZP mentors supported the introduction of the Family Violence Response Unit (FRU) at the PPHQ which is a US funded initiative facilitated by DynCorp. The FRU facility at PPHQ is operated by two female ANP officers and they receive advisory support from a female DynCorp mentor. The female ANP officer who is in charge of the FRU has experience working in the CID. While the FRU had only been in operation formally since the beginning of 2008 there has been increased public awareness about the FRU through radio and newspaper publicity and they were getting cases either via CID or sometimes they come directly to the FRU. Interviewees who worked at the FRU identified the main strengths of this initiative was providing women with an avenue for reporting family violence and someone to listen to them. Another emerging advantage of the FRU for victims of family violence was that they highlighted to the Prosecutors the penal codes related to family violence in the Afghan constitution which strengthened cases for the Prosecutors to lay charges and take through to prosecution. It was also noted that while some women report cases to the FRU the case may also be dealt with by traditional Islamic law and it would be beneficial to investigate how these two systems can support each other in cases of family violence.

An NZP mentor worked with the Head of FRU and head of PPHQ CID to facilitate the collection of evidence from the hospital in cases of violence or sexual attacks. This involved a meeting with 30 medical staff at Bamyan hospital, Head of FRU and Head of CID, PRT doctor and the NZP mentor to discuss Afghan legislation in this regard. To inform medical staff about the responsibilities they had to collect evidence and provide it to the police so they can pass the information on to prosecution to convict the perpetrator. The main issues were disclosure of medical reports and a suitable

time for police to obtain them. A formal process was agreed upon between the hospital and police for requesting and providing information. This was apparently also beneficial to the hospital staff as previously the ANP could demand information sometimes at inappropriate times.

6.9.5 Activities to develop facilities and infrastructure

Successive NZP rotations have enhanced the PPHQ facilities and the ANP's operational capability by securing funding to develop the following areas:

- communications ability
- fuel and vehicle management
- PPHQ compound security
- building repair and additions

In regards to District capacity and infrastructure NZP have conducted a Provincial logistics inventory (Highlands 2/3/4) to assist in providing a more informed approach for donor contributions to policing in the Bamyan Province. The inventory included a structured evaluation of each District to assess the logistical situation. For example number of actual staff, level of training, audit of equipment, vehicles and weapons.¹⁰ A number of projects were identified to improve the conditions and capability of ANP in the Districts such as the building of five new police stations in the Districts undertaken by the NZPRT with NZ ODA funding. NZP were involved in administering some of those projects providing a police perspective.

Highland 7 Contingent Commander advised that the five new police stations were now operational with the ANP stationed in them. Other projects included the provision of a Toyota Hilux to the ANP PPHQ and one to each of the Bamyan Districts. The vehicles were to be maintained by the NZPRT for two years, which ended at the beginning of 2008. Five of the vehicles are still used by the Districts. The PCoP swapped the PPHQ Toyota Hilux with the Central Zone commander for a Ranger donated by the Japanese. It is uncertain the reason for the swap

(source: email from NZP Contingent Commander to NZAID Programme Manager 3.7.08).

Radios for communication had also been donated to the ANP with ODA funding. In April 2008 Highland 7 discovered a container of radios that were not being used. The radios were motorollas and of excellent quality, however the ANP were not using them. It is uncertain if the ANP received training on how to use the radios as the radios have a lot of different features and once the user's communication channel is lost it can be difficult to retrieve without training. In August 2008 fifty of the radios were with the PRT being reprogrammed so they can be used for the Provincial Coordination Centre (PCC). As part of the PCC Highland 7 are redeveloping radio communications including providing basic training on the use of equipment. They hope to have the PCC operational by the time Highland 8 arrives.

¹⁰ This inventory has been updated by Highland 3 and 4. It then appears to be replaced by the monthly ANP Interim Readiness Report (IRR) submitted to ISAF in order to inform decision making and provide a check for the ANP own IRR report submitted to Mol.

7 Analysis

7.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the findings of the review to assess to what extent Operation Highland activities have met the programme intentions. The strengths, issues and barriers to Operation Highland are identified along with suggestions for improvement.

There are limitations to this review in regards to what information could be collected in terms of the diversity of people interviewed and the records available. There are also limitations on assessing the effectiveness of Operation Highland as there is a lack of specified programme outcomes and indicators of effectiveness.

It is not surprising NZP do not have a clearly defined vision of the ANP with associated outcome measures as this is something the ANP and international community were still working on at the time of the review. Realistic expectations of what can be achieved by NZP with a small contingent and limited resources in a conflict zone should also be taken into consideration.

The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 highlights the different 'visions' among members of the international community. NZP work with US agencies at the RTC and were under the GPPO and now EUPOL-A mentoring programme at PPHQ. The first NZP contingent to work on both initiatives did find it confusing working with different international partners and working at two sites (RTC and PPHQ). They established relationships with key partners and successive contingents have focused on maintaining good relations as they are very dependent on these agencies to conduct their work. Information from the documentation and interviews show that INL/CSTC-A/DynCorp, GPPO and now EUPOL-A have accommodated NZP working across initiatives and that on the ground the NZP interviewees have not found the different 'visions' to be an issue in relation to the work they do at the RTC and PPHQ. There have been connections between their work at the two sites particularly through assessment and facilitation of provincial training needs.

The main areas of focus and objectives identified in the Plans of Action for Highland 2 to 7 can either be grouped under the two key tasks assigned to NZP or are applicable to both key tasks:

1. Supporting the RTC to deliver training:
 - to mentor RTC management and instructors to advise on all aspects of course delivery and administration
 - to maintain basic training at the RTC and explore the introduction of new courses to progress ANP development
 - to develop the investigative skills of the ANP
2. Mentoring the PCoP and senior managers
3. Applicable to both key tasks:
 - establishing and maintaining relationships with key stakeholders
 - enhancing female recruitment and employment in the ANP
 - development of the Provincial Training Programme (PTP) to provide in-service training to ANP in Bamyan Province

- o to progress a number of specific short and long term projects for the benefit of the ANP
- o to exploit and develop opportunities for capacity building with the ANP.

The overall focus has been on assisting with the development of a functioning police force through mentoring leaders and senior management at the RPHQ and RTC and supporting training new recruits and up-skilling serving ANP. There has generally been continuity between contingents planned activities and the following sections discuss to what extent objectives have been achieved from the information available.

7.2 Supporting the RTC to deliver training

The NZP mentors have made a contribution towards the efficient management of the RTC and have done a lot of mentoring work with the RTC Commander and his management staff dedicating a mentor to enhance their capacity to manage and administer the RTC. However, it appears that the RTC management are still not taking full responsibility for planning and this area requires further capacity building and motivation by mentors.

The qualitative evidence from the ANP and DynCorp shows that NZP have enhanced the ability of instructors to provide training to ANP. Interviews and reports show the capacity building activities with ANP instructors have been focused on enhancing their knowledge and teaching abilities to teach the RTC curriculum. INL and CSTC-A commented on the quality of the teaching at Bamyan, however there was limited evidence in regards to instructors' performance assessments. The information available from the Basic 8 Course and CID course show over 90 percent of students enrolled passed these courses.

NZP aimed to continue the emphasis on basic training and to facilitate the introduction of new courses. This has been achieved as the predominant courses have been the Basic (1,2,8) courses (891) to train new recruits and TIP1 and TIP3A courses (523) to up-skill existing ANP NCOs and Officers. The RTC expanded the selection of courses offered from the Basic and TIP courses in 2006 to include a variety of other courses offering opportunities for Bamyan ANP and neighbouring provinces to develop their policing skills e.g. NZP facilitated the introduction of the CID course in 2007.

There was a large increase in numbers trained in 2006 primarily due to the 661 trained in firearms. NZP identified a lack of skills in the safe use of firearms and also used firearms training as an introduction to in-District training during this period. In 2006 there was also an increase in the numbers training in TIP courses and a small number trained in specialist courses (i.e. IDC, Firearms instructor, TTP and PTP).

The training numbers for 2007 show the largest number were trained as new recruits Basic 8 (192) and up-skill training TIP3A (144). A variety of courses were conducted in 2007 and the CID course was introduced to the Bamyan RTC in late 2007. EUPOL-A have recognised that the Bamyan RTC could be a centre for excellence of CID training outside of Kabul. Several international interviewees thought that the Bamyan RTC could develop into a specialist RTC offering niche courses.

The Bamyan RTC's facilities have increased capacity to teach from 30 to 90 students. This RTC is small compared to the others in Afghanistan and interviewees thought the size was appropriate for the training needs of the region. However, further analysis would have to be done to assess this. NZP have facilitated the improvements to the Bamyan RTC's facilities by making business cases for new or

expanded initiatives to DynCorp, INL and CSTC-A for their approval and resourcing. Accommodation facilities, including a small facility for women, has meant men and women from outside Bamyan township can more easily attend the RTC.

The number of female police in Bamyan Province has increased from one to fifteen in during the review period and NZP have been active in encouraging the ANP to recruit, train and employ women. An important consideration is the career prospects of female ANP and whether or not only training provided through the RTC, as opposed to the Kabul Police Academy (KPA) limits their eligibility for promotion. The abridged NCO course held at Bamyan was designed to give the 11 Bamyan female NCOs the qualifications and recognition by Mol. At least one Bamyan female was recommended to attend the KPA but it is uncertain if she in fact did and how many others from Bamyan have attended the KPA. Concerns about women travelling alone can be overcome by funding a *maharam*, a male family member to go and stay with the women and there are women only courses with women only facilities at the KPA.

Women make up one-third of one percent of police personnel (CHDP 2007:83) and therefore any increase in their numbers would be important for better representation within police. Particularly as Islamic practices inhibit policemen managing female complainants, victims or suspects (Murray 2007:116). Ideally potential women recruits should be presented with choices about training i.e. at the provincial level at the RTC for mid-rank opportunities or going to the KPA for higher rank officer opportunities.

Feedback from international agencies working with NZP at the RTC was very positive. CSTC-A and INL thought NZP were working well and they liked their approach in terms of "how can we work with you" rather than going off and doing their own thing. This indicates that NZP mentors were working with these US agencies within the curriculum they set for the RTCs. DynCorp representatives interviewed thought NZP were excellent at mentoring and training and they all work well as a team. From a DynCorp perspective the only tension at times was that they work to very specific guidelines as they are contracted by INL, whereas NZP are freer to develop their programme and organise their members' activities with each contingent.

7.3 Training to meet needs of ANP in Bamyan Province

NZP have encouraged ANP management at the District level to identify suitable candidates for CID training, either at KPA or from late 2007 at the RTC to progress the development of investigative skills. There are challenges to carrying out investigative work in this environment including the availability of resources and alleged corruption. Highland 7 proposed a basic CID course that would be more appropriate for the environment ANP work in. This highlights issues of 'cookie cutting' courses from other countries and not taking into consideration factors such as availability of facilities and resources and the cultural context.

NZP have identified the importance of monitoring ANP standards in the Districts and promoting the PTP to develop in-service training in line with the curriculum and funding from INL. Identifying training needs and facilitating in-service training requires co-ordination between the RTC, PPHQ and the Districts. NZP contingents have endeavoured to enhance the capacity of the ANP to coordinate this through their mentoring positions at the RTC and PPHQ and visiting Districts (e.g. MTT initiative and training needs analysis.)

NZP's assessment of the training needs on a regular basis could be justified by the mobility of ANP through tashkil allocations and the dynamic situation in Afghanistan.

However, a running record of the TNA's done by NZP would have been useful and ensure an overall picture is built up of the progress and needs in the Districts in Bamyán Province. It is suggested NZP's TNA analysis is regularly recorded against the training outputs of the RTC for Bamyán Province to give an indication of the training required. This would assist with planning for the RTC. It is appreciated that there are challenges such as rapid staff changes with the tashkil allocation and the ability to conduct TNA during winter months.

7.4 Capacity building at the PPHQ

The ANP are very conscious of police rank and seniority and it is appropriate the most senior member of the NZP contingent is assigned to the PCoP. All the NZP Contingent Commanders assigned to mentoring at the PPHQ have held management positions in the NZP and so have the experience to mentor the PCoP and senior management team.

The review identified some significant changes had been made at PPHQ in terms of infrastructure development and the development of management and administrative systems (e.g. regular management meetings with senior management and DCoP, improved payroll system, staff rosters, daily occurrence book). The PCoP had an annual plan for 2008 and indications at the time of the review were that he was starting to implement objectives. Further monitoring by NZP would indicate to what extent the objectives have been achieved for that year.

A limitation for NZP has been that usually only one NZP member of the contingent works at the PPHQ.

It was suggested by several NZP interviewees that additional mentors with expertise in the areas of finance, logistics and personnel would be really beneficial.

It is unknown how effective community initiatives such as patrolling the bazaar have been as members of the public were not canvassed for this review. Future reviews may want to consider a survey of public perceptions as community perception/satisfaction surveys are an important way of establishing baseline information and monitoring changes to police practice (Groenewald & Peake 2004:12; Harris 2005:39). This would be particularly important to monitor human rights abuses.

NZP have endeavoured to address human rights issues through their work at the PPHQ and RTC by promoting professionalism, integrity and reinforcing the importance of human rights when they see abuses occur. RTC training includes components on human rights in basic training, NCO training and District training. An ANP interviewee said the role of the RTC was to teach ANP the 'legal framework, good conduct with local community as many police don't know their own rights or civilian rights!'

NZP have encouraged the PCoP to give female ANP core policing roles and to negotiate with community leaders to encourage them and their families to allow women to join the ANP. Female officers work in CID, personnel and the Family Response Unit (FRU). The FRU is an important new area of work at the PPHQ as it is beginning to address family violence issues and provide Afghan women with more surety their case will be taken seriously. There was no refuge safe house and this

issue has been discussed by community organisations. It is important to provide ongoing support to women and children in family violence situations and community outreach by an NGO could be looked at to support the work of the FRB.

The PPHQ facilities and operational capability has been enhanced through NZP securing funding to develop communications ability; building repairs, compound security; and fuel and vehicle management. The facilities were still rudimentary and a new Provincial Police Headquarters was being built with funding from the US. The concerns were that no funding had been provided for furnishings or equipment and the old PPHQ had limited fittings to transfer.

The issues with the subsequent use or misuse of equipment e.g. vehicles and radios, suggest closer donor monitoring is required (see 6.7.5). The lessons to learn from the provision of radios include: providing appropriate equipment, training on the use of equipment; and monitor if the training is successful and if there are any issues with the maintenance of equipment.

7.5 Key strengths of NZP programme in Bamyan

The key strengths of NZP capacity building activities identified by the review are:

- NZP ISG send experienced serving police who have current knowledge about police management and operations and many of whom had experience providing training.
- ability to engage and build strong relationships with ANP, Afghan and international key stakeholders
- strong work ethic and motivation to take opportunities to develop ANP and RTC/ PPHQ
- promotion of women in policing
- promotion of professionalism and integrity in policing
- promotion of community policing approach

A major strength contributing to the acceptance of the NZPRT and NZP presence was their attitude and ability to engage with the local community. Many interviewees commented on the New Zealanders attitude as being respectful, friendly and responsive to local customs. For example, an ANP interviewee noted the NZP contingents knew about Afghan culture and correct greetings and said 'they [NZP] do not have any political, national discrimination against us'. They noted that the NZP members were 'interested to find out about Afghanistan people which shows they are here to help'.

7.6 Barriers to implementation of NZP programme in Bamyan

7.6.1 Resources

Resources are a major barrier to the sustainability of the RTC and would depend on the future funding capacity of MoI.

Resourcing issues identified were in regards to transport, diesel, accommodation and some course materials. NZP had spent quite a bit of time securing additional funding and finding some resources for courses. Given that resourcing is such an issue care should be taken with any

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programme expansion over and above key tasks that will provide the most enduring results for ANP. Resourcing is a major issue at the PPHQ which is dependent on the funding capacity of MoI. Given the lack of government income this is likely to be a concern for some time.

7.6.2 Planning and administration

Administration systems have been established at the RTC, however NZP mentors have had to motivate, encourage, and provide quality assurance to maintain these systems. While some ANP need little motivation others required a lot of work to involve them in these processes.

They had seen different governments come and go and there were also issues between different ethnic groups. The risk for NZP mentors is that they end up doing a lot of the administration. Highland 7's team motto 'Let them do it!' is a good reminder not too.

There were difficulties in getting some of the senior officer to plan ahead. Training schedules, staff rosters, recruitment planning and events planning (e.g. graduation dates so guests could be invited) contributed to the efficient management of the RTC. However, it could take considerable encouragement to get some of these officers to participate in planning.

Barriers in regards to planning and administration at the PPHQ have been:

- poor recording systems including a lack of crime statistics to monitor performance
-

NZP have also focused on building the ANP capacity to administer nationally developed systems that can mitigate corruption such as finance systems (e.g. efpas system so ANP can receive pay electronically). The Finance Officer at the RTC reports there are no issues now with ANP getting their pay on time which he attributes to the current Provincial Chief of Police.

7.6.4 Tashkil issues

The allocation of ANP by the tashkil can be very challenging for the RTC and PPHQ in terms of skill match with position and the loss of very capable staff. ANP senior staff changes have been an issue for NZP mentors at the Bamyan PPHQ as there has been three ANP staff in the position of Provincial Chief of Police and major personnel changes to the management team and to the District Chief of Police positions. To some degree constant staff changes can be mitigated by organizations promoting succession planning and robust management and administrative systems. However, systems are only as reliable as the personnel implementing them and it is extremely important to work at the individual level with current staff as well as the systems level.

7.7 Suggestions for improvement and additional capacity development activities

7.7.1 NZP processes

Interviewees suggested that NZP increase the number of personnel they send to provide more capacity to conduct mentoring, particularly at the PPHQ.

The review process found some gaps in maintaining records at the RTC e.g. instructor performance assessments and in NZP records e.g. training-needs-analysis. There was also variation in the way NZP contingents assessed their activities which made it difficult to get consistent data to examine the effectiveness of Operation Highland. A monitoring and evaluation framework is outlined in Chapter 8 to provide a more consistent way of reporting across contingents using predominantly the same outcomes and performance indicators.

NZP contingents have built on the work of previous contingents and their objectives have been reasonably consistent. However, to ensure and enhance continuity a strategic overview is recommended for future contingents. It is suggested that the strategic overview align with ANP national objectives (when they are confirmed) and EUPOL-A strategic direction. A strategic overview should not go to the level of specifying activities as there should be flexibility to respond to the dynamic environment in Afghanistan.

Part of ensuring continuity and thoroughly informing new contingents about activities, contacts and issues is good handover procedures. Continuation of the good practices identified for handover by Operation Highland contingent members including: the command recognisance by the Contingent Commander introduced at

the time of Highland 6; comprehensive handover notes; updated desk-file; and the few days orientation provided by the outgoing rotation to the incoming rotation.

7.7.2 Improving RTC capacity building

Several ANP officers noted that it was important that DynCorp, ANP and NZP coordinated their activities to ensure the smooth running of the RTC. There had been some coordination issues in 2007 with a new ANP senior officer, saying there was confusion over what their input should be regarding course coordination and they thought the NZP mentor coordinated with DynCorp and this did not happen. This officer reports that coordination and communication between NZP, DynCorp and ANP processes had improved and there were no issues at the time of the review. This highlights the importance of stakeholders having clearly defined roles and tensions from time to time between DynCorp and NZP staff have generally been around this issue. As noted DynCorp have very specific contractual obligations to INL while NZP have been freer to interpret their role.

To address the requirement for the ANP to take more responsibility for some of the administrative tasks (e.g. logistical requests to MoN) and forward planning NZP were looking at further professional development of ANP RTC staff through attending management, administration and computer courses at the Programme for Professional Development (PPD). The PPD is provided by the Aga Khan Foundation, funded by NZIAD and would therefore incur no additional cost to the RTC.

Since the review visit in May 2008, NZP reported in weekly report no. 18 (4-10 August 2008) that the RTC Commander, Deputy Commander and Chief Administration Officer have completed a week long Communication Management Course at the PDD. The aim of the course is to increase the capacity of individuals and organisation to manage communication and development initiatives and the topics covered included:

- understanding the basic concepts and principles of communication
- intra and inter-personal communication
- group and mass communication
- project communication

Another suggestion was that the RTC Commander may benefit from a development plan for the RTC which NZP mentors could assist with development and implementation.

7.7.3 Improving capacity building at the PPHQ

The suggestions for improving capacity building at the PPHQ were:

- More mentoring capacity to enhance administration systems in the areas of logistics, finance and personnel and communications.

- The PCoP and members of senior management team may benefit from professional development courses such as those provided by the PPD.

Most interviewees thought it would take a long time to change the police and many thought significant changes for the ANP would only be achieved when a new generation of young officers and NCOs took over the leadership. An Afghan interviewee said,

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A lot of younger people are very adaptable and pick up things quickly; they should be encouraged, given responsibility and become more involved

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The NZP contingents of three personnel are extremely efficient for their small number and have spread themselves between the PPHQ and RTC and some contingents have endeavoured to place the third member in a role to facilitate the training in Districts. Follow-up training of ANP in the Districts was identified by NZP as extremely important to ensure the ANP are implementing what they have been taught and continue to develop their policing skills appropriate for their rank. The risk to NZP is that they spread themselves too thinly and require more capacity, particularly with mentoring at the PPHQ.

The project has been more effective at the RTC where more personnel have been focused. All of those interviewed thought the RTC had progressed significantly in the last three years in terms of growth and ability to provide courses.

In terms of providing education the RTC was regarded as sustainable as the quality of the instructors was thought to be good. This could vary as the ANP instructors changed at the Bamyan RTC due to frequent moving of staff under the tashkil/staff allocation by MoI. As a temporary facility it has an uncertain future and further investigation into national plans for ANP training and training needs would have to be verified. Whether the Bamyan RTC continues or not the NZP capacity building of ANP managers and instructors does contribute nationally to the pool of capable ANP to train this police force.

There have been some gains at the PPHQ in terms of enhancing operational capability through mentoring the RCoP and senior managers, upgrading facilities and provision of equipment. There are many areas where further capacity building and resourcing is required. The consensus from interviewees and the literature was that changes to the ANP would take a long time.

8.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Development of a Strategic Overview

To enhance continuity between NZP rotations and align with the police reform goals of the ANP and EUPOL-A it is recommended a Strategic Overview for Operation Highland is developed to provide more guidance by defining strategic direction, operating principles, objectives and general performance indicators.

The Plans of Action and reports of NZP Operation Highland provide a good basis on which to develop a Strategic Overview. It is **NOT** recommended detailed activities be defined in the Strategic Overview as it is important NZP personnel are responsive to this dynamic environment and maintain flexibility while working towards achieving the objectives. NZP personnel could specify activities to achieve the objectives in their project plan submitted six weeks into their rotation.

A suggested structure for the Strategic Overview is:

- Statement of strategic direction (align with ANP/EUPOL/NZP)
- Values (or operating principles)
- Strategic objectives
- Performance indicators related to objectives

It is suggested the Strategic Overview is developed by a working party made up of NZP representatives, especially those who have been on previous rotations and NZAID for their expertise in development activities and knowledge of the local context in Bamyan.

8 Conclusion and recommendations

8.1 Conclusion

Using the DAC¹¹ evaluation criteria as a guide, the following concluding comments can be made about Operation Highland.

The activities of NZP Operation Highland are highly relevant to the ANP reform effort in Afghanistan and align with the Afghanistan's government and international communities' objectives to build training, management and operational capacity of the ANP at the Provincial and District levels. Operation Highland is aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the Bamyan RTC and PPHQ personnel who are the direct beneficiaries of this project. These institutions are key for police reform in Bamyan Province as the RTC provides training for new recruits and in-service training and the PCoP and senior managers lead policing in the Province. The development of a professional civilian police force that is proficient, observes human rights and gender equality, and upholds rule of law would benefit the whole community.

It has been difficult to assess overall effectiveness because the specific outcomes of Operation Highland require clarification and there have not been consistent performance indicators between contingents. The programme objectives have been developed on an incremental basis by each contingent, although there have been attempts by several contingents to develop cohesive direction by writing papers on strategic direction (e.g. Highland 2, Highland 5). There appears to be several reasons for this evolving process, namely NZP work closely with international partners who define many of the parameters of the activities and resources. For example at the RTC they facilitate the implementation of the INL approved training curriculum. At the PPHQ, NZP have had more autonomy but are constrained by lack of resources. NZP have therefore had to be responsive to multiple stakeholders in a complex and dynamic environment. Until recently there has been a lack of strategic national direction for the ANP and a lack of co-ordination between members of the international community working with the ANP on police reform. Initiatives implemented by the IPCB will hopefully lead to alignment of ANP and the international community's direction for policing in Afghanistan.

With the development of an overall vision for the ANP, and NZP now under EUPOL-A it is suggested that it is timely to develop a strategic overview for Operation Highland that acknowledges the alignment of this operation with key partners. This would clarify strategic direction for future contingents and facilitate the continuity of strategic objectives. It would also signal to key partners (e.g. ANP, EUPOL-A, INL, CSTG-A and DynCorp) that NZP are aligned and committed to national directions for policing. A monitoring and evaluation framework has also been suggested to provide more consistent reporting of achievements against outcome measures.

On the evidence available NZP have progressed many of their objectives and tasks outlined in the Plans of Action for Highland 2 – 7. However, there are still major areas to address that require ongoing capacity building at both the individual and system levels.

¹¹ DAC is OECD Development Assistance Committee. The DAC criteria used are: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; and sustainability.

Recommendation 2: Suggestions for staff recruitment

Whenever possible it would be very beneficial to include a woman in the NZP contingent to work with female ANP at the RTC and PPHQ and potentially mentor at the FRU. This is to maximise the opportunity to continue working with female ANP to enhance their capacity.

It is also suggested that it would be very beneficial to complement the mentoring activities provided by the NZP Contingent Commander to the PCoP and his leadership team at the PPHQ with other NZP staff with expertise in the areas of logistics, finance, administration, communications and human resources. This could include non-sworn NZP staff with appropriate expertise.

Recommendation 3: Monitoring and evaluation

It is recommended that a more systematic monitoring and evaluation system be incorporated into NZP reporting to provide more consistency of reporting across missions, using predominantly the same outcomes and performance indicators. A suggested monitoring and evaluation framework is provided below.

8.3 Monitoring and Evaluation framework

The framework outlined in tables 1 to 5 are a guide only and a final template would need to be agreed in consultation with NZP and NZAID. This type of framework is based on a programme logic approach and it is good practice to develop these in consultation with the key stakeholders delivering the programme so that the most useful information is obtained for the future development of the programme.

As a guide to evaluation design in post-conflict police reform it is useful to look at UNPOL's Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation (PRIME) system. PRIME was developed by Princeton University based on reform efforts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Lest in 2005. PRIME aims to provide a systematic qualitative evaluation tool that focuses on the development of four main outcome areas that are fundamental in police reform:

- Performance Effectiveness
- Management and Oversight
- Community Relations
- Sustainability

The four main outcome areas have 16 core indicators (see Appendix 4) which relate to police reform as a whole. It is suggested some of these indicators could be used to systematically collect data to monitor Operation Highland's effectiveness, particularly the work done at the PPHQ. PRIME could also provide NZP mentors with an overall framework to identify where their mentoring activities fit in progressing police reform in Bamyan. It is extremely important to be mindful of the scope and capacity of NZP's work in Bamyan and not expect that they are responsible for all of police reform in this Province. NZP mentors are limited in what they can achieve as they are a very small contingent and police reform is reliant on structural changes nationally through reform of the MoI and input from the wider international community. Therefore performance indicators should be realistic and relate to the work NZP mentors are doing. The indicators would relate to the desired outcomes of the objectives in the Strategic Overview.

Ylber Bajraktari and the other authors of PRIME state the main limitation of this tool is that it is not a statistical assessment tool and consider that given the real world constraints in post-conflict situations it cannot be.

The difficult conditions in which post-conflict reconstruction efforts take place render it impossible to collect statistical data sources that are comprehensive and stable enough from year to year. PRIME, therefore, focuses on available and practical data sources that help capture a snapshot of police performance at a given moment in time. (Bajraktari et al 2006:13)

The limitations on collecting quantitative data for this review highlighted the difficulties of collecting statistical data and it is recommended that quantitative targets are not realistic in regards to the mentoring work NZP do to build capacity of ANP staff. The authors of the PRIME system note that measurements based on simple inputs and outputs do not reflect the quality or sustainability of the police service (Bajraktari et al 2006).

To measure progress on outcomes the PRIME system requires a baseline evaluation of police reform efforts so that future assessments can be compared to the initial findings (Bajraktari et al 2006:14). It is suggested that findings from this review provide a benchmark on which to measure future progress against outcomes for Operation Highland.

Reporting framework

NZP contingents have an extensive reporting framework with weekly reporting; project plan; mid rotation progress report, and final report. Based on the current NZP reporting structure it is suggested a standardized section reporting on progress against objectives using performance indicators be included in reports:

- **Project plan:** the 6 week plan at the beginning of each rotation should be confirming Operation Highland objectives already in place from the Strategic Overview and identifying continuation of activity areas from the previous rotation along with identification of new activity areas where opportunities arise. It is important that the plan provides continuity as well as options for flexibility to respond to the changing environment. It is noted many rotations have in fact done this and this would be formalising practices largely already in place.
- **weekly reports:** suggest NZP very briefly document any key achievements against performance indicators that took place that week. The suggested format is bullet points at the end of the report after their narrative report of activities over the week.
- **mid-mission report (3 months) and end of mission report (6 months):** suggest these reports include a standardised evaluative section that summarises achievements against objectives of the Strategic Overview and progress on activities identified in the Project Plan.

The following tables provide examples of possible performance indicators based on the objectives in Highland 7 project plan.

Suggested Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

NZP Activities are based on current Highland 7 activities in their project plan. The activities should reflect the strategic overview when it is developed therefore some of these activities may change. Each contingent should confirm their activities in their six week project plan as there may be some changes or additional activities required to reflect changes at the RTC and PPHQ.

Desired outcomes should align with strategic overview and project plan of each mission. It is more usual to start with the outcomes but NZP have organised their plan around activities so the desired outcomes are an assumption of the outcomes NZP is hoping to achieve. In the absence of a strategic overview with specified outcomes these templates provide an example of outcomes and performance indicators based on the current Highland 7 proposed activities.

Performance Indicators are based on PRIME indicators and analysis undertaken for this review of NZP reports, and interviews with stakeholders.

Evidence column provides examples of evidence NZP can provide to measure progress against outcomes and this could be included in mid-tour (3 month) and end of mission (6 month) reports.

Evaluation summary provides a space for NZP to summarise key achievements with the ANP and areas where the ANP still have scope for improvement. It also provides space for NZP personnel to reflect on any key learnings about good practice i.e. what they thought worked really well with the capacity building activities with the ANP, what did not work so well, what were the barriers, and how they could improve practice or mitigate barriers. These learnings could provide valuable information for future NZP contingents.

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Table 1: Building the capacity of the RTC ANP staff to manage the RTC

N/ZP Activities	Desired Outcomes	Performance Indicators	Evidence
<p>Monitoring & professional development of the Bamyan RTC Commander</p> <p>Establishing strategic and forward planning for the Bamyan RTC</p> <p>Encouraging forward thinking and future training requirement planning</p> <p>Develop existing administrative processes, logistical capability and infrastructure within the Bamyan RTC and encourage management compliance</p>	<p>RTC Commander is effectively leading and managing the RTC</p> <p>RTC Commander and senior management staff have ownership of strategic and operational plans and are implementing them to achieve planned goals</p> <p>RTC ANP management staff are able to develop and implement administrative processes</p> <p>RTC ANP management staff effectively managing staff and resources (where possible)</p>	<p>Evidence of ANP effective and ethical management of RTC</p> <p>Evidence of ANP forward planning resulting in improved performance of RTC</p> <p>Evidence of ANP effective resource management</p> <p>Evidence of ANP maintaining accurate records</p> <p>Evidence of ANP senior officers supervision of instructors including regular structured evaluations of instructors and provision of constructive feedback to instructors</p>	<p>Examples: Examples of RTC Commander implementing professional skills developed</p> <p>Examples: ANP participation in development and implementation of annual plan for RTC ANP participation in development and implementation of training schedule and staff rosters</p> <p>Examples: ANP participation in development and implementation of administrative systems e.g. finance, training records ANP using the internal system to order supplies from Mol. ANP accuracy in ordering equipment and supplies for RTC (where possible)</p>
<p>Additional activities undertaken</p>			
<p>Additional activities undertaken</p>			
<p>Evaluation summary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key achievements of capacity building with ANP against desired outcomes: • Areas where ANP management of RTC still requires improvement: • Learnings from N/ZP involvement i.e. what worked well and what could N/ZP improve on? 			

Table 2: Capacity building of RTC instructors to train recruits and up-skill ANP

N/ZP Activities	Desired outcome	Performance Indicators	Evidence
Mentoring and professional development of the Barmyan RTC instructors	ANP Instructors are improving their standard of instruction	Evidence of instructors improving their standards	Examples: Progress in instructors performance assessment Pass rate of students
Monitoring and quality assurance in delivery of the: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic 8 (recruit) Course • TIP3A (officers) Course • External Firearms Course • External Pistol Course • CID Course • Women's NCO Course • Provincial Training Programme 	ANP Instructors are delivering courses using appropriate lesson plan and teaching techniques	Evidence of instructors effectiveness in delivering courses	Examples: Progress in instructors performance assessment
Identify training opportunities for all RTC staff	RTC staff are appropriately trained and have access to professional development	Evidence of training undertaken by RTC staff	Examples: RTC staff undertaking training opportunities that are appropriate for their professional development
Additional activities undertaken			
Evaluation summary:	Key achievements of capacity building with ANP against desired outcomes:		
Areas where RTC training still requires improvement:			
Learnings from N/ZP involvement i.e. what worked well and what could N/ZP improve on?			

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* Denotes evidence that is outside of NZP control and therefore not necessary to include. However, where possible the provision of information about these areas would provide context about the environment ANP work in and how NZP capacity building activities can assist the PCoP and senior management team to manage police in Bamyayn Province. The other evidence examples may be within NZP scope to build the capacity of the PCoP and senior managers to implement.

Table 3: Capacity building of Bamyayn Provincial Chief of Police and other senior Afghan National Police officers

NZP Activities	Desired outcomes	Performance Indicators	Evidence
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mentor the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) Mentor Bamyayn Province senior management team including but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deputy Police Chief District Police Chiefs Office in Charge of Narcotics Officer in charge of CID Officer in charge of Anti-Terrorist Office Officer in charge of Logistics Officer in charge of Personnel Officer in charge of Finance 	<p>Mentoring of the Bamyayn PCoP and senior management team will ultimately enhance ANP service delivery and align them with internationally recognised best practice</p>	<p>Performance Effectiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Crime statistics Coordination with justice sector 	<p>Performance Effectiveness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity <p>Evidence of adequate physical capacity to solve crime and enforce public order.⁺</p> <p>Presence of strategies to deal with capacity problems e.g. budgeting process, donor support etc</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crime statistics <p>Presence of detailed crime statistics⁺</p> <p>Analysis of available statistics to achieve crime-fighting and crime prevention goals</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination with justice sector <p>Regular collaboration with prosecutors, judicial and penal sectors on arrests, investigations, imprisonment as appropriate for Afghan legal system</p>
		<p>Management and Oversight</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission and Procedures Strategic planning and monitoring Oversight and accountability Personnel 	<p>Management and Oversight</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission and Procedures <p>Evidence of clear mission and procedures e.g. mission statements, job descriptions, organization chart, code of conduct etc⁺</p> <p>Systematic procedures for how to process criminal investigation, control risks etc⁺</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic planning and monitoring <p>Annual plan developed</p> <p>Use of realistic and clearly defined strategic plan</p> <p>Existence of system that monitors police performance and is tied to consequences and incentives⁺</p>
			<p>Management and Oversight</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission and Procedures <p>Evidence of clear mission and procedures e.g. mission statements, job descriptions, organization chart, code of conduct etc⁺</p> <p>Systematic procedures for how to process criminal investigation, control risks etc⁺</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic planning and monitoring <p>Annual plan developed</p> <p>Use of realistic and clearly defined strategic plan</p> <p>Existence of system that monitors police performance and is tied to consequences and incentives⁺</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oversight and accountability Internal oversight mechanism that enforces discipline & investigates complaints of misconduct Existence & effectiveness of external mechanism for police oversight e.g. Ombudsperson⁺ Description/statistics of filed complaints and results of disciplinary measures⁺ • Personnel Recruitment process with reasonable & transparent standards for vetting recruits⁺ Merit based promotion system⁺ Low turnover & high retention rates⁺ 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community relations • Human Rights Code of conduct⁺ Oversight mechanism Public perception of police⁺ • Cooperation Development of community relations e.g. meeting Shuras, local council Development of community initiatives with community Implementation of resulting initiatives Evidence of community policing efforts • Corruption Public perceptions and how change over time⁺ Police salaries sufficient to support an average size family⁺ Presence & use of disciplinary mechanisms to publicly punish corrupt officers • Public acceptance Positive public perceptions of police and role in community⁺ Public differentiation between police and other security actors both formal and informal⁺ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community relations • Human Rights • Cooperation • Corruption • Public Acceptance 	

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<p>Additional activities undertaken</p> <p>Evaluation summary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key achievements of capacity building with ANP against desired outcomes • Areas where PPHQ still requires improvement: • Learnings from NZP involvement i.e. what worked well and what could NZP improve on? 	<p>Sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget/Finance planning and systems • Training and equipment 	<p>Sustainability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget/Finance planning and systems • Presence and use of annual budget plan that is realistically aligned with goals of police strategic plan • Training and equipment • See above tables on RTC training of recruits and PTP
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Table 4: Continue to develop the Provincial Training Programme

NZA Activities	Desired outcome	Performance Indicators	Evidence
<p>Completing initial visits to all District stations and conducting a needs analysis for training requirements</p> <p>Developing RTC capability to assess and identify training requirements for all Districts</p>	<p>RTC is responding appropriately to training needs in Districts in order that ANP can receive the most necessary training as quickly as possible</p>	<p>RTC courses provided match TNA assessment</p>	<p>EXAMPLES Provision of appropriate courses to meet training needs of Districts</p>
<p>Monitor PTP courses at RTC</p> <p>Monitoring and quality assurance in delivery of the PTP by RTC instructors</p>	<p>RTC instructors are delivering courses at RTC and in the Districts using appropriate lesson plan and teaching techniques</p>	<p>Ability of RTC instructors to conduct district training</p>	<p>Assessment of RTC instructors ability to deliver District training</p>
<p>Develop the PTP District trainers</p>	<p>District trainers are motivated and able to deliver training using appropriate lesson plan and teaching techniques</p>	<p>Number and capability of District trainers</p>	<p>Number of District trainers and assessment of their ability to deliver training they have been taught</p>
<p>Increase visibility of RTC instructors and NZPOL mentors in all Districts</p>	<p>Provide support to District trainers and ANP generally to enhance their policing skills</p>	<p>Visits to Districts undertaken by RTC instructors & NZPOL Visits support the development of District trainers and ANP refresher training</p>	<p>Number of visits Assessment of visit Lessons learned to improve district training</p>
<p>Additional activities undertaken</p>	<p>-</p>		
<p>Evaluation summary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key achievements of capacity building with ANP against desired outcomes: Areas where the PTP still requires improvement: Learnings from NZP involvement i.e. what worked well and what could NZP improve on? 			




Table 5: Progress existing relationships with key partner agencies

NZA Activities	Desired outcome	Performance Indicators	Evidence
Develop and maintain effective working relationships with key partner agencies to support the work of Operation Highland	Cooperation, support and partnerships with key partner agencies to support the capacity building activities of Operation Highland	Maintenance of key relationships Development of new relationships that support Operation Highland	Examples: Outcomes of meetings with agencies in Kabul and Bamyan
<p>Evaluation summary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key achievements of progressing existing relationships against desired outcomes: Areas for improving the development and maintenance of key partner relations: Learnings from NZA involvement i.e. what worked well and what could NZA improve on? 			

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NZP Operation Highland Mid-Term Reports Rotations 2-6

NZP Operation Highland End of Mission Reports Rotations 2 – 6 (missing Highland 4)

NZP Highland 6 Desk file including course description

RTC Record of training statistics

RTC ANP personnel as at 8th May 2008

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for Review of NZAID funded New Zealand Police activities in Bamyan, Afghanistan

Background

Project's History

New Zealand Police (NZP) began work in support of police training in Bamyan in March 2005 following a request for assistance from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) (CAB Min (05) 40/1). Assistance was sought for the Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC) in the first instance from the United States and later for mentoring of senior police staff. The NZP deployment is part of New Zealand's contribution to peace and security in Afghanistan alongside military and aid contributions.

In 2005 it was anticipated that a Bamyan Regional Training Centre (RTC) would be constructed in central Bamyan. Difficulties with land acquisition and town planning restrictions mean that this has not happened. Instead, the RTC is housed in temporary facilities alongside the NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)¹² compound in central Bamyan. This facility can accommodate and deliver training for up to 60 trainees at one time.

The United States State Department (US) through the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) contracts DynCorp, a private security company, to manage a Central Training Centre for Afghan National Police (ANP) in Kabul and five RTCs. The training courses delivered at the RTC are designed by DynCorp and delivered by Afghan staff trained at the CTC. Courses are generally short and literate and non-literate recruits are trained together. NZP initiated literacy training for recruits and this has now become a core part of the training delivered in the Bamyan RTC.

Germany, as the lead donor for police reform under the Bonn Accords, undertook to reconstruct the police academy in Kabul and train senior police. In order to speed up training of new recruits, the US funded the establishment of a central and five regional training centres. These are managed by DynCorp a private security company with which NZP work closely in Bamyan

The Afghan National Army (ANA) has received significantly more resources and attention than the Afghan National Police (ANP) and it is argued that while there is some way to go before the ANA no longer need international support significant progress is being made. Accordingly, the European Union's European Security Defence Policy established The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-Afghanistan). EUPOL-A aims to focus the necessary resources and attention on ANP and build a competent and independent civilian police force that upholds the rule of law. EUPOL-A is currently deploying staff across the country.

Two NZP personnel were provided to the Bamyan RTC in 2005. This was quickly increased to three personnel in 2006. The role of the third NZP personnel was to mentor the Provincial Chief of Police in Bamyan. NZP are co-located with the NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan and rotate each 6 months as does

NZ PRT personnel. The three NZP personnel are funded from NZAID's Afghanistan programme at a projected cost of \$800,000 in 2007/08.

NZAID funding for NZP in Bamyan is part of a programmed of a 3-year \$15 million programme agreed by Ministers and begun late 2005/06. The programme is focused on agricultural livelihoods, health, education, capacity development and human rights. Gender is a cross-cutting issue for all NZAID programming and is a key factor in all Bamyan activities. As such, implementing partners are expected to consider the impact of programme activities on women and women's access to and participation in activities. An additional \$1 million per annum was made available from the 2007/08 financial year.

Prior to the establishment of EUPOL-A, New Zealand Police worked on an informal basis with Dyncorp in the RTC and with ANP in Bamyan. At this time Germany was lead donor for police reform and established the German Police Project Office (GPPO). In 2007, the GPPO transitioned to EUPOL-A and NZP became part of that mission. However, it was agreed with the European Union that NZP would continue with the same activities undertaken since 2005 in the US-funded Bamyan RTC and to mentor the Chief of Police of Bamyan Province.

Stakeholders include the Provincial Governor, the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police, staff in the United Nations Mission of Assistance in Afghanistan UNAMA, Regional Office in Bamyan, Dyncorp (Bamyan and Kabul), CSTC-A, NZ PRT senior staff (e.g. Commanding Officer), NZAID, and NZP.

Project's Purpose

The purpose of the NZP project is to build the capacity of the Afghan staff to lead and manage the RTC and to delivery effective training to recruits. The following examples

- Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to manage the Centre

The project is expected to build the management capacity of senior Afghan RTC staff. The activities undertaken by NZP are expected to culminate in stronger business processes and policies that are understood and followed by RTC staff. In particular, RTC decision-making processes should be strengthened ensuring that key decisions are document and completed, and RTC Afghan staff are involved in decision-making. All Afghan RTC staff should have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and appropriate activities should be undertaken to ensure that trained Afghan women from Bamyan are filling policing roles in the field.

- Building capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to train and up-skill recruits

The project is expected to build the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to produce trained police who are ready to fulfil community policing roles in the Bamyan Province. Project activities would be expected to build the capacity of Afghan RTC staff to enhance training practices, delivery monitoring, application of quality assurance processes, course content improvement, monitoring of the skill utilisation of trained recruits, and ensure that courses are appropriate for women recruits.

- Enhancing leadership capacity of the Provincial Chiefs of Police

The project is expected to build the capacity of the Provincial Chiefs of Police to provide effective leadership in developing community-supported community

policing in Bamyan. Activities would seek to improve strategic decision-making, professionalism, integrity and the operational ability of the Provincial Chiefs of Police. Mentoring is expected to enhance service delivery and align practices with internationally recognised good practice.

The Review

The Review aims to consider the extent to which all activities planned and undertaken contribute to the successful implementation of the project and are aligned to achieving the results sought for police reform and enhanced police training by NZP in Afghanistan. The Review will examine all activities planned or undertaken as part of the project and will consider their appropriateness with reference to the purpose and settings of the project.

The Review will provide critical information for strengthening the design, implementation and monitoring of the project to ensure that the best possible results for policing reform and training in Afghanistan is achieved.

The Review will also examine the way in which the different donor funded police projects interact on the ground in Bamyan in order to assess the likely impacts for NZP on future operations.

NZP, NZAID, Dyncorp, Bamyan RTC staff and the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police are the primary stakeholders in the Review. NZP and NZAID will use the findings to inform future programming decisions. Others with an interest in understanding New Zealand's contribution to building police training capacity and leadership capacity in Bamyan include the Provincial Governor, the NZ PRT Team and UNAMA staff as the findings may be used to inform other justice sector related programming and feed into general lessons learned documents.

Purpose of the Review

The Review will provide important conclusions and recommendations for enhancing the design and implementation of the project to ensure that best results are being achieved. This will include considering the support role of NZP, providing increased understanding of effective performance for the continuous improvement of this project and wider issue of delivering effective police reform in conflict and post-conflict settings. The Review will also provide detailed recommendations for the future monitoring for project results. This is expected to include the development of an appropriate monitoring and evaluation framework.

The Review conclusions and recommendation will be particularly relevant for NZP's functioning under EUPOL-Afghanistan and the expectations that training and mentoring will conform to EUPOL standards. Recommendations should inform decisions about the alignment of training and mentoring to these standards.

Scope of the Review

The Review will cover project activities (planned and / or undertaken) since implementation in late 2005 until early 2008. This will not be limited to activities associated with the three areas outlined in the purpose section of this review terms of reference but will also include activities that were added through amending the project design or as a requirement of project implementation.

The Review will focus on the contribution NZP activities are making toward the establishment of an effective and efficient Regional Training Centre and reform of Afghan National Police at the provincial level. As NZP activities are a contribution within a larger police reform programme it will be necessary to explore how NZP interface with other stakeholders, and the contribution NZP are able to make through participation in other donor funded and designed programmes.

Objectives of the Review

The Review will consider NZP activities in the following three areas by seeking to answer the following questions:

- **Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to manage the Centre**

What capacity development activities have been undertaken by NZP to strengthen the management of the RTC by Afghan staff?

How well do the capacity development activities align with enhancing Afghan staff abilities for their respective roles? Including for the effective and efficient management of the RTC?

What assistance was been provided by NZP to enhance forward planning of the Bamyan RTC?

What evidence is there that forward planning strengthening activities by NZP have culminated in improved performance of the RTC?

What evidence is there that the capacity development activities by NZP are leading to sustainability, good practice management of the RTC?

What are some of the constraints RTC Management have experienced in getting recruits for the RTC, in particular women, and how might these constraints be mitigated?

What activities have been undertaken by NZP to enhance the approach of Afghan RTC to recruit Bamyan women for policing roles?

What evidence is there that NZP activities in support of women have led to greater participation by women in day to day policing?

What additional capacity development activities by NZP might be considered to help enhance the ability of Afghan RTC staff to effectively and efficiently manage the RTC?

What are the strengths of NZP involvement and in what areas could involvement be improved?

- **Building capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to train and up-skill recruits**

What capacity development activities have the NZP undertaken to enhance the ability of RTC Afghan instructors to produce appropriately-trained recruits?

What evidence is there that the capacity development activities by NZP are leading to enhanced and sustainable quality instruction?

What capacity development activities have the NZP undertaken to enhance the monitoring and quality assurance of the courses?

What are the views of the RTC staff on the appropriateness of training programmes with regard to meeting the recruits training needs?

What evidence is there of course attendance and delivery, trainee progress during the course, regular and systematic assessment, and of recruits meeting learning outcomes?

What evidence is there of RTC recruits implementing good practice learned at the RTC?

How many Bamyan women have a) received training b) completed some form of training, and c) have been placed in policing roles after their training?

How could delivery of training be enhanced to improve the up-skilling of women?

What are the strengths of NZP involvement and in what areas could involvement be improved?

- **Enhancing leadership capacity of the Provincial Chief of Police**

What activities have been undertaken to mentor and enhance the strategic decision-making, professionalism, integrity, and operational ability of the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police?

How well do these activities align with developing the capacity of the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police?

What evidence is there that the activities undertaken with the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police have improved service delivery and the adoption of internationally recognised good practices?

What additional mentoring and professional development activities might be considered to help enhance the strategic decision-making, professionalism, integrity, and operational ability of the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police?

What are the strengths of NZP involvement and in what areas could involvement be improved?

There are three NZAID cross-cutting issues should be considered in relation to the policy focus, implementation and results of this project: gender, human rights, and conflict and peace building. Specific questions related to gender have been suggested at the beginning of this section. The Review should also consider the alignment of all aspects of the project with the policy settings for human rights, and conflict and peace building as they are described in NZAID's policy documents (see *NZAID: Human Rights Policy Statement* and *NZAID: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace*) noting that the latter policy was only confirmed by Ministers in early 2006.

Evaluation methodology

Review methodologies will include:

A review of published reports and articles on police reform in Afghanistan should be included in the report to illustrate the context in which NZP are working. Relevant published work includes the International Crisis Group report of August 2007 *Reforming Afghanistan's Police* and Andrew Wilder's July 2007 report *Cops or Robbers? The struggle to reform the Afghan National Police* published by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. The intention of this section is to illustrate a broad and general view of donor assisted progress with police reform since the Bonn Agreement in 2001 and how the factors identified may affect progress in Bamyan.

- Review of project files held in Wellington by NZAID and NZP. Information sources include project plans and weekly and end of rotation reports provided by NZP personnel.
- Review of project files and files related to RTC planning, operations, monitoring and training in the Bamyan RTC in Afghanistan.
- Focus group discussions/structured interviews with stakeholders including RTC staff, NZP, past and present, national staff with responsibility for management, national trainers and recruits; staff from provincial departments including provincial and District police; and staff from UNAMA Human Rights and Governance Units as well as Head of Office in Bamyan.

Review Process

The Review steps are likely to include:

- Briefing by NZAID and NZP staff in Wellington and review of relevant files held in Wellington.
- Meet with and interview key respondents in Kabul including Dyncorp, the International Police Coordination Board representatives, EUPOL-Afghanistan, CSTC-A, UNAMA.
- Meet with key senior staff at the Bamyan RTC (both NZP and Afghan) to explain the Review, and how the results will be used.
- Meet with and interview NZP, Provincial Chief of Police, the Provincial Governor and NZ PRT in Bamyan, Afghanistan.
- Meet with and interview key respondents in the Bamyan RTC and utilise focus groups discussions where appropriate. This may include recruits.
- Review NZP project related files in Bamyan RTC to gather information on NZP systems and processes, and evidence of results.
- Review files held in the RTC in order to understand policy, procedures and processes used in the RTC.
- Summaries of the key points from the interviews will be returned to the respondents for verification and comment.
- Conduct phone interviews with a select number of NZP who have filled roles in the project in Bamyan.

Data and information sources available for the Review include Planning documents (i.e. Highland 4, Highland 5, Highland 6), Weekly and end of deployment reports

The Review, including the fieldwork, should be conducted with regard to NZAID's values and cultural principles (see NZAID: Policy Statement).

Management of the review and team members

NZAID and NZP agreed to a joint Review to be led by an independent consultant. The consultant will be contracted to NZAID for the purposes of the review.

The review team will include a staff member from NZAID (Suzanne Loughlin, Humanitarian Programme Manager with responsibility for Afghanistan) and NZP (Jacquelyn Goodwin, Manager, International Strategy and Policy, International Service Group) who will advise and guide the consultant. Both NZAID and NZP representatives will undertake to ensure consensus and give expedient advice and direction to the consultant. NZAID evaluation staff will provide expert input and support with drafting terms of reference and comment on the draft report.

In addition, EUPOL-A have agreed to provide a third person to the review team to advise and guide the team with regard to current policy and practice on police reform and training in Afghanistan.

The consultant will provide the NZAID and NZP with a draft report, for comment and recommendations. After the report is finalised, it will be provided to NZP Commissioner Broad or his representative/s and to Peter Adams, ED, NZAID or his representative/s.

Timing

The review is planned for late April/ early May and will take up to 12 days in the field. An additional 4 days will be required in Wellington to review files and undertake a brief literature review. Ten days will be allowed for writing up.

Reporting requirements

The report will be presented to NZP and NZAID management and include recommendations for improvements. It will cover the following areas:

- Brief overview of police reform efforts to date and assessment of progress in Afghanistan based on published reports. The aim of this section is to illustrate the nature of the environment in which Afghan and international actors are working to progress police reform.
- Brief description of the activities implemented in 2005, changes made during implementation.
- Sections detailing the extent to which NZP activities are contributing to:
 - > Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to manage the Centre
 - > Building the capacity of Bamyan RTC staff to train and up-skill recruits
 - > Enhancing leadership capacity of the Provincial Chief of Police.
- Develop a plan of action and framework to assist with monitoring and evaluation of future NZP work in Bamyan. This will include performance indicators and targets and indicate methods for information collection.

The consultant will make oral presentations of the key findings/interpretations to small groups of key stakeholders as a means of feeding back and checking findings. Groups may include ANP personnel, RTC management, NZP personnel, other provincial officials, Dyncorp staff, NZ PRT senior personnel, other development/political advisors assigned to the NZ PRT and UN staff working on police reform as appropriate.

The main body of the report will be no longer than 30 pages. Annexes will include relevant literature assessments, summaries of discussions and interviews etc. The

consultant will be expected to work to NZAID good practice standards as set out in the NZAID Evaluation Policy Statement and the OECD Evaluation Quality Standards.

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Appendix 2: List of key stakeholders consulted by review team

Pat Cavanaugh	Vice President Operations Afghanistan DynCorp International
Jim Jones	Regional Training Supervisor at Central Training Centre (CTC) DynCorp
Risto Lammi	Head of International Police Coordination Board Secretariat
Shannon Leary	Police Program Advisor at INL
Stu Logan	Wing Commander, Royal Air Force Strategic Plans Team Leader Afghan National Police (CJ5), Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
Merry Miller	Police Program Manager at International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
William Morrell	Head of Mentors at European Union Police – Afghanistan (EUPOL-A)
Scott Munns	Police Training Advisor US Department of Justice/ICITAP International Police Program Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
Dr Habiba Sarabi	Governor of Bamyan Province
Herong Song	Bamyan Manager United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Appendix 3: Bamyan RTC Course description 2005 - 2008

The table below provides a description of the courses that have been conducted at the Bamyan RTC, the stated goal of the course and duration.

Table 2: Description of courses offered at the Bamyan RTC from March 2004 July 2008

	Course Description	Course Goal	Duration
Basic 8	Designed to give an entry level police recruit the necessary skills to stay alive and respond to the police needs of the society. It replaces the idea that different units of the ANP need different entry level training. All policemen will share the same training and after successful completion of it they will be eligible to take unit specific and additional advanced courses.	To provide a single, all inclusive basic training for ANP	8 weeks/ 251 hours
TIP1	Transition Integration Programme - No description available		15 days
TIP3A	Updated Transition Integration Programme (TIP3A) is aimed to improve the basic human rights knowledge, democratic policing knowledge and operational police skills of existing police trainers, NCO's and officers. There is an introduction of the function and role of the Field Training Officer. Practice orientated course that specifically focuses on human rights issues that are in connection with the every day activities of law enforcers, as well as on the topic of democratic policing and operational police skills.	To provide student with basic knowledge on Human Rights Issues, Democratic Policing and Operational Police Skills.	5 weeks
CID	Criminal Investigation Division course consists of courses specific to the CID Police Training Program which will enable the investigator to better perform in the role of a Criminal Investigator assigned to the CID, and to know the different tasks and responsibilities included with being an ANP Investigator.	The Criminal Investigation Program is designed to provide specific Criminal Investigation training.	6 weeks - 198 hours (142 class room hours/ 56 practical hours)
Fire-arms Rifle	The Firearms Training Course is a one week course designed to provide specific training in the safe and proficient use of the semi-automatic AMD-65 rifle issued to the ANP.	To provide the ANP with the necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to use the semi-automatic AMD-65 Rifle used by the ANP proficiently and safely.	1 week/ 34 hrs
Fire-arms Pistol	The Firearms Training Course is a one week course designed to provide specific training in the safe and proficient use of the semi-automatic pistol issued to the ANP.	To provide the ANP with the necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to use the pistol used by the ANP proficiently and	1 week- 34 hours

PTP	A review of basic and advanced police courses with an added component of military survival skills.	safely To provide advance tactical training skills to the ANP, specifically police in high risk areas, to reduce the number of deaths and injuries. Also to increase safety and security in the communities of Afghanistan with better trained police.	1 week – 40 hours
TTP	Tactical Training Programme – no description available		
IDC	Instructor Develop Course - Train the Trainers course – no description available		3 weeks
Fire-arms instructor	Firearms Instructor Course - no description available		

Source: NZP RTC Desk file from DynCorp material

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Appendix 4: PRIME performance indicators

Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation (PRIME) Indicators at a Glance

Acknowledgement: *The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform* (Bajraktari et al: 2006)

Performance Effectiveness

Considers the extent and quality of the police service's efforts to produce law and order and respond to all levels of crime

- **Capacity:** adequate manpower, training and equipment to currently be effective
- **Authority and Reach:** political/legal authority to enforce internal security throughout the territory
- **Crime:** collection and use of crime statistics to set and achieve crime-fighting and crime prevention goals
- **Coordination:** external coordination with criminal justice system e.g. prisons, courts

Management and Oversight

Assesses the police service's basic management structure for carrying out operations and being accountable to the community

- **Mission and procedures:** clearly defined and understood mission, code of conduct, operational procedures, and chain of command
- **Strategic planning and monitoring:** existence of goals and performance measures that regulate current and future professional conduct
- **Oversight and accountability:** presence and strength of external and internal oversight mechanisms that ensure accountability
- **Personnel:** transparent and merit-based recruitment and promotion systems and level of retention rates

Community Relations

Considers the police service's relations with the local community in securing the public's support and trust

- **Human Rights:** level of commitment to democratic policing standards, respect for all people, and readiness to protect minority rights
- **Cooperation:** evidence of public involvement in ensuring internal security and in solving crime investigations
- **Corruptibility:** degree of police corruption and public perceptions of police honesty
- **Public acceptance:** acceptance of the police as the main legitimate source of internal security

Sustainability

Evaluates the ability of the police service to sustain itself and its capabilities without international donor support and guidance

- **Budget:** long-term budget planning that secures sufficient funding for the development and maintenance of the police service
- **Training and Equipment:** Existence of local capacity to train officers and maintain necessary police equipment in the future
- **Political independence:** adequate insulation from political influence to maintain neutrality and protect all citizens
- **Compensation:** sufficiency of salaries and other benefits to encourage high retention and discourage corruption

Appendix 5: Summary of Highland 2-7 objectives

NZP contingent	Date	Objectives
Highland 1	March 2005 - December 2005	Scope and establish Operation Highland at Bamyan Regional Training Centre No information available on objectives
Highland 2	6th December 2005 – 6th March 2006 (winter rotation)	<p>At RTC</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Winterisation Project 2. Securing of logistical contracts to support the Bamyan Police Regional Training Centre 3. Official Opening of the improved Bamyan Police RTC 4. Training Plan for the Bamyan Police RTC Calendar Year 2006 5. Mentoring of Commandant and Deputy Commandant of the Bamyan Police RTC 6. In-Service Training for Instructors of the the Bamyan Police RTC 7. Professional development Instructors through attendance at CTC courses 8. continuation of Basic I Courses for illiterate Students 9. Introduction of Basic II Course 10. Introduction of Firearms Course 11. Curriculum and Student Evaluation Development 12. Provincial Training Programme 13. Field Training Officers 14. Provincial Training Needs analysis 15. Afghan Police Identification Cards 16. Enhancement of the Bamyan Police RTC Records 17. Provincial logistics Inventory <p>At PPHQ</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Information gathering and networking 2. Resource management 3. Improve information gathering in order to accurately assess crime and developing crime trends in Bamyan 4. Improve Public access to Police 5. Enforce new Arms legislation 6. Improve investigative capability Bamyan province 7. Develop a strategic and action plan for Bamyan Police
Highland 3	March – October 2006 (summer rotation)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Delivery of training especially emphasis on basic training for new officers 2. Back capture of untrained ANP 3. Arms training 4. Provincial training programme 5. Joint ANP/NZPRT patrolling 6. Criminal investigations training 7. Provincial logistic inventory 8. RTC training for catchments area 9. information sharing 10. expanded mentoring role 11. NZAID Police projects 12. Update provincial inventory 13. relationship building 14. RTC building programme 15. Operational Discretionary Fund 16. ANP policewomen project 17. Prosecutorial project

		18. Truck crime project
Highland 4	October 2006 – March 2007 (winter rotation)	<p>Basic Training - To maintain the current emphasis on the delivery of basic training for new and current police officers.</p> <p>Firearms Training - To maintain the current emphasis on the delivery of basic firearms training for new and current police officers.</p> <p>Officer's Course (TIP) To maintain the current emphasis on delivery of the Officers course for current and future Officers</p> <p>In District Training - To introduce In District Training to augment the training conducted at the RTC</p> <p>Capacity Building - To introduce other nationally approved courses to the RTC.</p> <p>Quick Response Force - To train a Quick Response Force for Bamyan province.</p> <p>Mentoring Program - To continue the implementation of the Afghan mentoring program.</p> <p>Provincial Coordination Centre - To ensure the smooth and efficient opening, manning and subsequent operating of the Bamyan PCC.</p> <p>NZAID Projects - The previous police advisory team took an active role in the administration of key NZAID projects, that enhanced the capacity and capability of local police. To assist this a NZPOL NZAID financed discretionary fund was created.</p> <p>Provincial Logistics Spreadsheet - To audit and validate the provincial logistics spreadsheet.</p> <p>Strategic Partnerships Extensive efforts have been made to establish and further enhance relationships with a variety of strategic partners. It is critical to the success of the Afghanistan New Zealand Police Training Project that these relationships continue to be developed and maintained.</p> <p>Women Recruiting and employment - To increase the number of women graduating from the RTC</p> <p>Other - To discover and exploit any opportunities for Rotation 4 members to improve on the overall capacity and professionalism of the ANP</p>
Highland 5	March – October 2007 (summer rotation)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development of a strategic business plan for the ongoing New Zealand Police commitment to the Bamyan Province. 2. Mentor all Regional Training Centre staff and advise on all aspects of course delivery and administration. 3. Mentor the Provincial Chief of Police and other senior Afghan National Police officers. 4. Continue the development of the Provincial Training Programme (PTP) and monitor its implementation and delivery in the seven provincial districts. 5. Progress existing relationships with key partner agencies. 6. Develop opportunities for capacity building within both the Afghan National Police and Regional Training Centre. 7. Exploit any opportunities that present themselves to develop, mentor or advise Afghan National Police on how to better the business of policing and service delivery within the province.
Highland 6	October 2007 – April 2008 (winter rotation)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mentor the Bamyan RTC Staff 2. Mentor the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police 3. Continue to develop the Provincial Training Programme 4. Progress existing relationships with key partner agencies

		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Develop opportunities for the Bamyan RTC and the ANP 6. Make use of all opportunities to develop, mentor or advise ANP on how to better their business of policing
Highland 7	April 2008 – October 2008 (summer rotation)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mentor the Bamyan Regional Training Centre staff 2. Mentor the Bamyan Provincial Chief of Police and other senior ANP officers 3. Continue to develop the Provincial Training Programme 4. Progress existing relationships with key partner agencies 5. Exploit and develop opportunities for capacity building within both the ANP and RTC

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