

# STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF POLICE WORK FUNDED UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND AID PROGRAMME 2005-2011

Report by The Law & Development Partnership

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*Pacific regional  
report*

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## Abstract

This programme level strategic evaluation covers police work in the Pacific region funded through the New Zealand Aid Programme by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and implemented by the New Zealand Police during the period 2005-2011. The evaluation's purpose was to assess the overall achievements of the programme and make recommendations as to how it could be more effective, sustainable, relevant and efficient in the future. These issues were tested against a conceptual framework which addressed police technical capacity development as well as the broader institutional and governance context for policing.

The evaluation was undertaken by way of a document review, stakeholder interviews and field observations. There are two main findings. First, New Zealand Police have contributed effectively and efficiently in developmental contexts, to building the technical capacity of national police services. The second finding relates to the sustainability and relevance of these achievements. In some countries covered by the programme, the boundaries of legitimate state action, and thus of the police as the public face of the state, is contested. While New Zealand's international police programme is highly relevant in terms of its peace-keeping role and developing capacity to address 'individual crimes', interventions have not been sufficiently contextualised within some of the more serious policing issues in the region, related to inter-communal and state-community tensions. As a result, the long term robustness of achievements remains uncertain.

# Executive Summary

## Background and Context

Police work is an important part of New Zealand's aid portfolio. Effective policing is vital for *building safe and secure communities* - now one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFAT) four priority themes for its aid programme, supporting the core focus of *sustainable economic development*.

This strategic evaluation covers police work funded by MFAT and implemented by the New Zealand Police during the period 2005- 2011, costing over NZ\$ 75 million, approximately one and a half per cent of the total aid programme. The evaluation was undertaken during March-June 2012 by a small multi-disciplinary team. Fieldwork covered the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville), the Solomon Islands, and Tonga.

## Conceptual framework for police work and evaluation methodology

New Zealand's portfolio of police work has developed and evolved over time, rather than being conceived as a single programme with an explicit conceptual framework. The work is described in a complex and partial set of documentation relating to individual interventions which are less than clear as to intended goals and results, and as to the analysis underlying their design. Reviews and reporting tend to focus on implementation and activities. Much evidence for the evaluation is anecdotal, as formal outcome-orientated monitoring and evaluation systems were not put in place.

A conceptual framework for police work was constructed for the purposes of the evaluation, as well as results diagrams. The conceptual framework and constructed diagrams provide the basis for the evaluation against which evidence of results has been compared. The framework views police work as encompassing both the nature, approach and capacity of the police as an organisation; and the relationships between the police and a number of other institutions: (i) polity/society as a whole; (ii) communities; (iii) the formal criminal justice system; and (iv) non-state dispute resolution systems. It is *policing* in this broad sense which is the subject matter for this evaluation. The evaluation gives particular consideration to community policing, which has been the focus of much of MFAT funded police work.

## Effectiveness and sustainability

Overall New Zealand's police work has effected positive changes to the technical capacity of Pacific island police forces. The majority of interventions in developmental contexts have delivered, or are on track to delivering their intended results. The quality and professionalism of deployed New Zealand Police officers is highly regarded and their contribution valued by all partner police forces. Officers appear to have worked sensitively within different cultural settings. Gender and human rights have generally been mainstreamed within interventions. A clear strength is that assistance has been provided by one police service to another, and also that New Zealand has been prepared to engage for the long haul. New Zealand Police have been more successful at mainstreaming a community policing approach in bi-lateral or tri-lateral interventions, than when operating under a joint command (e.g. RAMSI).

However, the benefits of New Zealand police work are being constrained in some cases by short-term deployments, imperfect skills matches, a tendency to substitute for local staff without a clear exit strategy to enable improvements to be sustainable, and differences in rank between New Zealand advisers and partner country police. In addition, New Zealand has taken a technically-led approach which focuses on *police* individual skills and organisational development, with limited attention to the broader *policing* context, especially the mandate and legitimacy of the police and the ownership of the reform process.

A technically-led approach is not sufficient to deliver on a sustainable basis the programme goal of safe and secure communities, especially in conflict affected situations. Achievement of intended results in conflict-affected situations has therefore proved challenging: community policing has tended to be carved out as a *niche* function rather than mainstreamed; and delays in moving from operational policing to capacity development (and from an aid-dependency to focusing on sustainability) fail to build the legitimacy of the state, and may even undermine it.

## Relevance

New Zealand's police work in the Pacific appears overall well-aligned and broadly relevant to New Zealand's developmental, foreign policy and security objectives; although the lack of an explicit conceptual framework makes relevance harder to confirm. It is noted that interventions have generally not been designed to have a direct impact on trans-border crime, but there is potential to address this issue through the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordinating Centre.

Within the boundaries of its engagement – primarily around technical capacity building - New Zealand support has been relevant to context, and has responded to the needs of particular situations including for community policing interventions. But there is scope for

deeper and more considered context analysis (including political economy analysis) during programme design and implementation. Key aspects of developing country contexts which need to be taken on board in relation to police work are: (i) that the legitimacy of the state and the police as the public face of the state should not be assumed; (ii) that the police may be operating within a dysfunctional criminal justice system; and (iii) that it may be informal, non-state systems of policing that are considered by communities to have more legitimacy than the formal police force.

In conflict-affected situations, New Zealand has made relevant contributions to the critical transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach - for example in the Solomon Islands. However, New Zealand has not taken full advantage of its potential entry points to shape and focus the transition (including the mainstreaming of community policing) particularly at the strategic and political levels.

## Efficiency

New Zealand's international police work has generally been properly resourced to reflect specific intervention designs. There is limited scope to improve further value for money through cost savings. The main scope for value for money gains is by allocating more resources to the wider policing context, which would require deeper analytical working and additional skills, potentially from outside New Zealand Police.

There are also opportunities for improved efficiency through stronger engagement between MFAT / NZ Police and AusAid and the Australian Federal Police on security and justice issues in the Pacific, exploiting MFAT decentralisation from Wellington to post.

## **Key recommendations**

The key message of the evaluation is the need to improve the relevance and sustainability of New Zealand's police work by moving away from a technically-led approach, to a much more strategic and context-specific engagement. MFAT and New Zealand Police need to reach a broader understanding of what 'police work' is – moving beyond technical fixes, to an engagement that recognises the inherently political nature of policing and embeds policing within the broader security and justice context. The operational implication of this message is for a different allocation of resources provided for police work, with much greater investment in diagnostic work including context and political economy analysis; on intervention design; and on significantly more robust monitoring and evaluation particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where lessons about what works in policing and its contribution to statebuilding and peacebuilding are emerging internationally. This in turn implies much stronger engagement from MFAT in police work (by International Development Group (IDG) and through broader policy and diplomatic engagement) in partnership with NZ Police's more technically-focused inputs.

Specific recommendations are listed below:

### ***Develop a clear conceptual framework / theory of change for police work and identify resources to operationalise it.***

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change for policing in their developing partnership agreement.
- The partnership agreement should also identify the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT in contributing to the desired change (broadly the technical role of the Police in capacity building, and the role of MFAT in broader governance and political issues around policing, which is likely to require enhanced input from IDG as well as at the broader policy and diplomatic level).

### ***Strengthen engagement on policing at the political level and strategic level.***

*Policing is always and everywhere a political process and there is scope for enhanced MFAT engagement with partner countries on policing issues.*

- As a first step, MFAT and New Zealand Police should on the basis of county-specific context analysis identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement, and identify entry points and strategies for taking such engagement forward (for example through RAMSI). This is likely to require engagement from IDG and at the diplomatic level at post.



- New Zealand Police should enhance strategic engagement with the Australian Federal Police, including possibly through a secondment to Canberra.
- New Zealand Police ability to engage with policing at the strategic level should be enhanced by the formation of a strategic unit within the International Service Group with multi-disciplinary skills.

***Rationalise the structure of police work in the Pacific under an umbrella programme bringing together regional and country-led interventions.***

Such rationalisation would reduce management costs; enable activities under regional interventions to be integrated with country-based interventions thus reducing overlap and enhancing effective engagement; and facilitate cross-regional working (for example training) and lesson-learning.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should consider this recommendation within the context of their developing partnership arrangement.

***Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.***

Particularly in fragile and conflict affected environments, interventions should be underpinned by explicit and documented context-specific problem identification; context analysis (including political economy analysis); and risk assessment. In line with the New Deal for Fragile States where possible such diagnostic work should be country-led.

- As a first step to strengthening diagnostic work, the New Zealand Aid Programme should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led fragility assessment in the region (for example in the Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States.
- MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should determine where responsibility for enhanced diagnostic work lies – to what extent with MFAT and to what extent with New Zealand Police, and what additional resourcing (including technical competencies) are needed to enable it to take place.
- MFAT (IDG) should explore the potential for tighter engagement with other partners including AusAid and the Australian Federal Police to promote joint understandings of security and justice issues in the region, and at the intervention level common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches.

***Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.***

- As a first step MFAT (IDG) should develop clear guidance on how to design policing interventions, including the development of context-specific goals, based on diagnostic work.

***Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.***

- New Zealand Police's highly-rated work could be improved including by:
  - ensuring police advisers are of the appropriate rank and have appropriate experience when counter-parted with an officer from a partner country;
  - involving the partner police force in the selection of advisers especially long term ones;
  - reconsidering the policy of short term six-month deployments when operating in a developmental context, including considering contracting out some work to experienced former senior officers; and
  - making more use of appropriate external specialist skills for example change management, gender (such skills may be available locally).
- As a first step New Zealand Police should review its approach to police organisational development and individual skills development and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement.

***Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.***

MFAT (IDG) should strengthen its approach by providing gender and human rights guidance and training; linking to partner country national gender and human rights processes; and ensuring that design always involves listening to women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing<sup>1</sup> so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work and provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights.

***Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.***

Each intervention should have locally developed and owned indicators which where possible are aligned with partner police force's own monitoring and evaluation and management information systems.

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<sup>1</sup> Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

- As a first step MFAT (IDG) should work with NZ Police to develop clear guidance on development of indicators for police work.
- MFAT (IDG) should work with NZ Police to develop strong procedures for monitoring and evaluation to feed into lesson learning about what works and why, including on-going testing of assumptions on which an intervention is based.

# Chapter 1: Background and context

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## 1.1 Introduction

This strategic evaluation considers international police work funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) through the international aid programme, and implemented by the New Zealand Police during the period 2005- 2011. During this period New Zealand's aid programme invested over NZ\$ 75 million in police work<sup>2</sup> in a range of partner countries, approximately one and a half percent of the total aid programme. This report focuses on police work in the Pacific region, much of which has been undertaken in fragile and conflict affected states. A partner report focuses solely on police work in fragile and conflict affected states, and includes interventions outside the Pacific region.

This chapter sets out the background to New Zealand Police's international work, and provides the overall context for it. The chapter then shows how MFAT funded police work evolved over time, and provides an overview of interventions,<sup>3</sup> highlighting the different security and political contexts within which they have taken place. The chapter ends with an explanation of the purpose of the evaluation and an overview of the evaluation report.

## 1.2 New Zealand Police and international work

New Zealand Police were MFAT's main implementing partner for police work during the evaluation period.<sup>4</sup> New Zealand Police's International Service Group (ISG) was established in 2005 to lead on international work, and the new Policing Act 2008<sup>5</sup> specifically embraces *participation in policing activities outside New Zealand* as a core function of the New Zealand Police.<sup>6</sup> ISG now has five constabulary police members led by a superintendent and thirteen other staff. Currently about 70 New Zealand Police personnel are deployed overseas,<sup>7</sup> the vast majority being sworn officers.<sup>8</sup>

New Zealand Police's international work can be divided into three broad categories: (i) peacekeeping missions and capacity development projects; (ii) furthering New Zealand's law enforcement interests; and (iii) contributing to emergency and disaster response and security liaison (see table 1.1 below).

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<sup>2</sup> I.e. developmental interventions to support policing

<sup>3</sup> In this report, 'interventions' refer to individual projects or programmes. 'Programme' refers to the policing work overall.

<sup>4</sup> Over the last 10 years NZ Police have undertaken 33 MFAT funded projects valued at \$NZ66.4m. Source: MFAT

<sup>5</sup> which replaced the outmoded 1958 Police Act

<sup>6</sup> Section 9 of the Policing Act 2008

<sup>7</sup> Before the recent draw down of officers in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste, the number was nearer 100.

<sup>8</sup> See ISG website <https://www.police.govt.nz/service/overseas> accessed on 1 June 2012

Most MFAT funded police work is reportable as official development assistance (ODA).<sup>9</sup> In summary, ODA must be administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective. OECD/DAC has provided additional guidance on when peacekeeping and police work may be reported as ODA (see box 1.1 below). Most NZ police work even when delivered in a peacekeeping context (e.g. Solomon Islands) is reportable as ODA, with the role of the New Zealand Police confined to capacity development (mentoring and advising, as well as provision of some equipment, infrastructure, and logistical support). In some cases the role has transitioned. In the Solomon Islands for example, funding was until recently, a mix of capacity development (80%) and operational peacekeeping (20%), but is now 100% capacity development. The issue of transition from peacebuilding to capacity development work is discussed in section 4.4 in chapter four below.

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<sup>9</sup> For summary see 'Is it ODA?' OECD/DAC factsheet November 2008. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2011

**Table 1.1 Overview of New Zealand Police's international police work**

Type of work	Brief description	Funding source	% of total expenditure <sup>10</sup>
Peacekeeping missions and capacity development projects	UN and regional peacekeeping missions (e.g. Solomon Islands) and capacity development projects in the Pacific and beyond involving assisting partner country police with organisational and individual skills development including through mentoring, advisory support and training	MFAT including through the Pacific Security Fund and the Asia Security Fund	81%
Furthering New Zealand's law enforcement interests	This role is undertaken primarily through Police Liaison Officers serving in New Zealand High Commissions and Embassies worldwide. It includes activities such as support to criminal investigations, information sharing, and relationship building etc. In some Posts there is now also a level of support to capacity development activities.	Police	19%
Contributing to emergency and disaster response and security liaison	Examples of emergency response are support to the Samoa tsunami, the Indonesia earthquake, and Victoria bushfires.  Security liaison includes NZ Police presence offshore at major events such as the Olympic Games and annual Gallipoli commemorations		

<sup>10</sup> Source: ISG

Box 1.1 Is it ODA? OECD/DAC guidance on civil police work and peacekeeping<sup>11</sup>

**Civil police work** - Expenditure on police training is reportable as ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as counter-insurgency work or intelligence gathering on terrorism. The supply of the donor's police services to control civil disobedience is not reportable [as ODA].

**Peacekeeping** - The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilisation of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal. ...Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code. Activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, are not reportable as ODA.

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<sup>11</sup> 'Is it ODA?' OECD/DAC factsheet November 2008. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf> accessed on 30 May 2011

### 1.3 Overall context for international police work

The overall context for the evaluation and for New Zealand's international police work funded under the aid programme is the growing awareness of the international community that security<sup>12</sup> and justice are essential foundations for a well-functioning state and for sustainable economic development.<sup>13</sup> Recent research based on global comparative data demonstrates strong quantitative associations between weak rule of law and weak government effectiveness, high perceptions of corruption, strong tendencies towards state failure, low human development and low GDP per capita.<sup>14</sup> Security and justice are recognised as core functions of the state, particularly important for statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict affected situations, with weak rule of law associated with low confidence in the state, a precipitator of organised violence.<sup>15</sup> The 2011 World Development Report identified security and justice as key priorities to break cycles of violence and enable development.<sup>16</sup> The international community recently endorsed security and justice as core *statebuilding and peacebuilding goals* in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.<sup>17</sup>

### 1.4 Evolution of international police work

New Zealand's aid programme funded police work has grown organically, as MFAT responded flexibly to events in the Pacific region and internationally, and to requests for assistance. MFAT's investment in police work has recently undergone significant increase, with nearly 80% of total spend over the last ten years occurring in the last three.<sup>18</sup> Figure 1.1 below shows the growth of the work over time. Annex A provides details of each of the interventions shown in figure 1.1, together with evaluation findings.

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<sup>12</sup> In this paper security encompasses state security and human security

<sup>13</sup> See for example UK Department for International Development's White Paper 2009. 'Eliminating world poverty: Building our common future' which identified security and justice as a basic service, on a par with health and education. Also Danida 'How To Note' on Justice Sector Reform <http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/780EF121-1242-4541-88B7-36765867F04D/0/JusticeSectorReformfinalprint.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Murney, T., Crawford, S. and Hider, A., 2011, "Transnational Policing and International Human Development – A Rule of Law Perspective", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15, pp. 39-71

<sup>15</sup> See for example 'Building Peaceful States and Societies.' A DFID Practice Paper. UK Department for International Development. 2010

<sup>16</sup> World Bank 2011. World Development Report: Conflict Security and Development. 2011, Chapter 3 p103


<sup>17</sup> Endorsed on 30th November 2011 at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness the New Deal advocated by the g7+ and developed through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>

<sup>18</sup> Source: MFAT



The expansion of New Zealand’s international police work can be seen in the light of increased focus on conflict and insecurity internationally, including in the Pacific region, with associated security concerns for New Zealand. Significant international police engagement began in Bougainville in 2000, and was followed in 2003 with New Zealand’s participation in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) as a member the Pacific Island Forum and a key ally of Australia. In 2006 New Zealand Police supported the United Nations missions to Afghanistan and Timor Leste. Interventions have generally arisen from specific requests – for example to participate in UN / regional interventions, or to respond to a police review (in the case of the Cook Islands). In some cases New Zealand took the opportunity to offer its assistance – for example to the Kingdom of Tonga following the crisis of November 2006, when riots erupted in the capital, Nuku'alofa.

Figure 1.1 Evolution of MFAT funded police work



MFAT is funding three interventions which support police work on a regional basis across the Pacific: Pacific Island Chiefs of Police (PICP); Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP); and the new Partnership for Pacific Policing (3P). Each was developed on the back of previous successful interventions. Further details are provided in annex A sections 5 (PICP); 6 (PPDVP) and 7 (3P).

## 1.5 Overview of interventions

MFAT funded police work in the Pacific region during the evaluation period covered nine countries spanning Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia (see table 1.2 below). All are middle income.<sup>19</sup> Support was also provided to the police in a further ten countries in the region<sup>20</sup> through the PICP Secretariat, based in Wellington.

**Table 1.2 Overview of key MFAT funded police work implemented by New Zealand Police**

Country	Country level intervention	Regional intervention	
		PPDVP <sup>21</sup>	3P <sup>22</sup>
<b>MELANESIA</b>			
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Community Policing Project		
Solomon Islands	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands		
Vanuatu		x	x*
<b>POLYNESIA</b>			
Cook Islands	Cook Islands Police Programme	x	
Niue			x
Samoa		x	x
Tokelau			x*
Tonga	Tonga Police Development Programme	x	
Tuvalu			x
<b>MICRONESIA</b>			
Kiribati		x	x

\* Included in programme but activities currently not designed or undertaken.

The evaluation reviewed interventions in four focus countries in the Pacific: the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea (autonomous region of Bougainville), the Solomon Islands, and Tonga. In addition it considered the three regional programmes: PICP, PPDVP, and 3P. Together these comprise all MFAT funded Pacific policing interventions, with the exception of small and/or stand-alone contracts.

<sup>19</sup> All are lower middle income (i.e. with a per capita income of US\$1,006-3,975), apart from Niue which is upper middle income. [http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#East\\_Asia\\_and\\_Pacific](http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#East_Asia_and_Pacific). Accessed on 1 June 2012.

<sup>20</sup> American Samoa, Federated States of Micronesia, French Polynesia, Guam, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau. Fiji's membership of PICP is currently suspended. Australia is also a member and co-funds the Secretariat with New Zealand.

<sup>21</sup> Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme

<sup>22</sup> Partnership for Pacific Policing

New Zealand's assistance has been provided to a range of **sizes of police forces**<sup>23</sup> across the Pacific, from the relatively large and complex in the Solomon Islands to the very small in Niue (see table 1.3 below). It is notable that most of these countries combine low crime rates, with high ratios of police per head of population (the UN standard is 1:450; New Zealand is 1:383).

The evaluation covers police interventions in a range of **security contexts**, from conflict affected (Solomon Islands and Bougainville) to the stable and developmental (the Cook Islands and Samoa). In Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, the entry point for police work was peacekeeping and stabilisation, which transitioned into organisational and individual skills development work with the local police. The transition process is discussed in section 4.4 in chapter four below.

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<sup>23</sup> In line with the terminology used by most of the countries considered in this report, the term police 'force' is adopted. However, democratic policing regards to focus of the police as being to uphold the law (a service), rather than defending the state (a force).

**Table 1.3 Size of police forces and police: population ratios**

	Approximate population	Area (land mass)	Police force	Size of Police force	Police: population ratio
Bougainville	234,280	10,050 km <sup>2</sup>	Bougainville Police Service	173 523 with CAP*	1:1012 1:335
Cook Islands	21,750	15 islands spread over 2.2 m km <sup>2</sup>	Cook Islands Police Service	120	1:181
Kiribati <sup>24</sup>	110,000	33 atolls, about 5 million km <sup>2</sup>	Kiribati Police Service	510	1:215
Solomon Islands	550,000	28,400 km <sup>2</sup>	Royal Solomon Islands Police Force	1,052	1:553
Niue	1,500	295 km <sup>2</sup>	Niue Police	16	1:90
Samoa	217,000 <sup>25</sup>	2,820 sq km	Samoa Ministry of Police & Prisons	457	1:475
Tokelau	1,400	12 km <sup>2</sup>	Tokelau Police Force	10	1:140
Tonga	119,000	176 islands spread over 700,000 km <sup>2</sup>	Tongan Police Force	375	1:317
Tuvalu	12,000	27 km <sup>2</sup>	Tuvalu Police	63	1:193
Vanuatu	215,500	12,274 km <sup>2</sup>	Vanuatu Police Force and Mobile Force (paramilitary)	547	1:393

\*Community Auxiliary Police (350) are part time constables in villages who are paid a small allowance

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Kiribati.php> Accessed 7 June 2012

<sup>25</sup> Population and police numbers derived from Boswell, Bronwin – The evolution of international policing in the Pacific, University of Victoria, Wellington, 2010  
<http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/1520/thesis.pdf?sequence=2> Accessed 7 June 2012

Associated with the range of security contexts is the range of ***political and societal contexts***. These include an autonomous region within a larger state, where the relationship between the centre and the region is highly complex and evolving (Bougainville); a constitutional monarchy (Tonga); and Melanesian states with weak state-society relations, due to the structure and political culture of small-scale and acephalous<sup>26</sup> societies.

It is a central tenet of this evaluation that police work cannot be properly understood (or evaluated) without an appreciation that policing is essentially a political activity, going to the heart of the relationship between the communities, society and the state. The police are at the front line of the engagement between the state and society, at the heart of civic stability. They have been described as embodying *the most fundamental relationship between citizens and the state*.<sup>27</sup>

Involvement in policing is therefore inherently political. It means engaging (explicitly or implicitly) with fundamental political issues such as the legitimacy of the state; the relationship between the state and society; and relationships between the centre and the periphery. These issues tend to be particularly acute and often contested, in fragile or conflict affected situations, where security (including policing) is a key aspect of the (possibly emerging) political settlement, and of on-going statebuilding and peacebuilding. Police work cannot be properly considered and evaluated merely as a technical intervention narrowly focused on organisation or individual skills development. In order properly to understand its relevance and impact, it must be considered within the broader political context.

It is also necessary to consider policing within the broader societal and cultural context. The evaluation considers engagement in three key areas in this respect: (i) police mandate which is associated with the legitimacy of the state especially in Melanesian societies (section 3.3.1); (ii) police relationship with communities (section 3.3.3) and (iii) police relations with non-state dispute resolution systems (section 3.3.5).

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<sup>26</sup> i.e. a society without political leaders or hierarchies: decisions are made by small scale groups (bands or tribes) by consensus.

<sup>27</sup> Mitchell B Reiss, Director, Policy Planning Staff during Testimony to the US Helsinki Commission, Washington DC, March 16, 2004

## 1.6 Purpose of the evaluation

Police work is set to remain an important part of New Zealand's aid portfolio. Effective policing is vital for *building safe and secure communities* - now one of MFAT's four priority themes for its aid programme, supporting the core focus of *sustainable economic development*.<sup>28</sup>

Recognising the growing importance of this work to MFAT, and the significance of MFAT's partnership with New Zealand Police, the evaluation provides a strategic overview of the achievements of the aid programme funded work implemented by New Zealand Police so far, and makes recommendations on how the work could be more effective and efficient. The evaluation is specifically intended to: (i) inform the strategic direction of police work; (ii) strengthen the design and implementation of the programme individual interventions; and (iii) strengthen the range of Wellington-based and in-country partnership arrangements. Evaluation questions and terms of reference for the evaluation are in annex B.

## 1.7 Report overview

Chapter two sets out the conceptual framework (or theory of change) for New Zealand's MFAT funded international police work, acknowledging that the framework was implicit during the evaluation period. The chapter briefly sets out the methodology for the evaluation. Evaluation findings against the OECD/DAC criteria are presented in chapters three (effectiveness and sustainability); four (relevance), and five (efficiency). The report ends (chapter six) with recommendations to inform the future direction of MFAT's partnership with New Zealand Police and of future police work.

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<sup>28</sup> New Zealand Aid Programme. (2011). International Development Policy Statement: Supporting Sustainable Development. The New Zealand Government's overarching policy on international development assistance. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) March 2011. The other three priority themes are: investing in economic development; promoting human development; and improving resilience and responding to disaster

## Chapter 2: Conceptual framework for police work and evaluation methodology

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief explanation of the conceptual framework (or *theory of change*<sup>29</sup>) constructed by the evaluation team, for the purpose of this evaluation. The framework has been developed on the basis of the interventions reviewed and the implicit thinking behind them. Further details on the conceptual framework can be found in annex C.

The chapter ends with a brief description of the evaluation methodology, including an outline of the processes and the method used to implement the evaluation, and a consideration of the evaluation's limitations. A fuller description of these aspects of the evaluation methodology can be found in the Evaluation and Research Plan for the assignment<sup>30</sup> on MFAT's website.

### 2.2 Conceptual framework for 'police work'

New Zealand's overall policing programme is described in a complex and partial set of documentation relating to individual interventions (see list of intervention documents in annex D). This fragmentation has arisen because many of the individual interventions were initiated in response to an emergency or crisis, and because some were implemented in partnership with other agencies (such as the Australia Federal Police) with New Zealand contributing to particular elements of a wider programme.

The conceptual framework for 'police work' (or *policing*) developed for this evaluation is centred on the role and capacity of the police. But capable police forces are necessary but not sufficient to achieve safe and secure communities: oppressive, corrupt and regime-serving police can also be technically advanced and efficient. As noted in section 1.5 of chapter one, policing is always and everywhere a political process, mediating the space between the governing and the governed.

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<sup>29</sup> The theory of change sets out the results as well as the assumptions which underlie the results. It amounts, therefore, to an explanation and rationale for the intervention.

<sup>30</sup> 24 April 2010

The evaluation, therefore, takes a wider perspective and considers the **broader governance and institutional context** within which the police operate. Although this wider perspective shows the police at the centre of the analysis, it critically examines the relationships between the police and a number of other institutions:

- polity / society as a whole;
- communities;
- the formal criminal justice system; and
- non-state dispute resolution systems.

The legitimacy of policing does not just depend on the capacity of the police themselves and their way of working, but on the overall capacity and functioning of all elements in this broader governance and institutional context. It is *policing* in this broad sense which is the subject matter for this evaluation.

The conceptual framework shows how policing is intimately connected to a society's political arrangements, community norms and state-society relations. This suggests that police work should be undertaken in cognisance of the relationships between the police and the other institutions even where it is not necessarily appropriate for New Zealand's Aid Programme to fund interventions within these other institutions. It also suggests that there is no single appropriate form of policing that can be applied in all contexts, and that the type of support provided by New Zealand should reflect a deep understanding of this context.

Annex C provides a more detailed explanation of the conceptual framework / theory of change, including a discussion on the key issue of the **legitimacy** of the police- the extent to which the state and its legal instruments are recognised as legitimate by communities and citizens.

### 2.3 Community policing

Community policing is the key philosophy which underpins New Zealand's approach to policing both at home and in its international work, and is therefore an integral part of the conceptual framework for policing. Community policing, properly understood is a *whole of policing* approach, mainstreamed throughout the organisation, rather than a *niche* activity. Mainstreaming community policing implies that it must be embedded within the police's philosophy, legislative framework, organisational structure, concept of operations, management policy, and operational strategy.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> SEESAC, UNDP Stability Pact, Saferworld, 2006, Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing (3rd edition), South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade



New Zealand's community policing principles are aligned with general principles of democratic policing adopted by mature democracies worldwide. The broad principles of community policing are also applicable to developing countries (including fragile and conflict affected situations) but the implicit assumptions underlying community policing in New Zealand do not necessarily apply in international work: the context within which policing takes place is likely to be significantly different to that pertaining in a developed democracy. In particular:

- the legitimacy of the state, and therefore of the police as the public face of the state should not be assumed; especially where the state is seen as either 'external' to a particular community or captured by specific communal groups or economic interests;
- the reality that the police may be operating within a dysfunctional criminal justice system must be recognised; and
- the fact that informal, non-state systems of policing may be considered by communities to have more legitimacy than the formal police must be accommodated.

Community policing is discussed further in annex C.

## Methodology

### 2.4 Theory based evaluation

The evaluation team constructed an overarching results diagram for New Zealand police work on the basis of the conceptual framework described above. Key intended programme results are summarised in table 2.1 below.

**Table 2.1 Overarching (programme-level) intended results**

<b>Overarching Goal: SAFE AND SECURE COMMUNITIES</b> (urban and rural, man and women, young and old maintained on a sustainable basis)					
<i>Aspect of conceptual framework</i>	<i>Police relations with polity/ society as a whole</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Police relations with communities</i>	<i>Police relations with formal criminal justice system</i>	<i>Police relations with non-state dispute resolution mechanisms</i>
<b>Long Term Outcomes</b>	Governance arrangements for policing in place – Including inclusive and representative political voice and oversight together with a legal mandate	A capable and effective community-focused national police service is established	Structures facilitating two-way communication between citizens and police are in place and functioning effectively	Police are fully embedded in and contributing to the functioning of the criminal justice system	Complementary and synergic linkages between police and non-state dispute resolution systems in place
<b>Medium Term Outcomes</b>	Governance structures, at national and / or local government level, representing the broad spectrum of communities and stakeholders, women and men, are piloted	Management systems for approaches standards, HR, planning and budgeting under development and testing	Institutional arrangements and systems for communication between citizens and police are developed, piloted and rolled out across the country	Police approaches, priorities and operations adjusted to maximise overall performance of criminal justice system	Police programmes, priorities and operations adjusted to maximise the overall functioning of state and non-state systems.

None of the individual interventions that together make up the programme had a results diagram as part of its original design. The evaluation team therefore constructed an *evaluation results diagram* for each intervention. These represent each intervention's intended results at the time it was designed and funds were allocated to it – and against which it is therefore appropriate to evaluate achievements.

## 2.5 Processes and methods for implementing the evaluation

The key processes for implementing the evaluation were: (i) construction and validation of results diagrams; (ii) context analysis; and (iii) development of structured evaluation findings through the completion of evaluation analysis sheets. The key methods for implementing the evaluation were: (i) literature and document review; (ii) stakeholder consultations; and (iii) field visit observations. Annex D sets out the data sources used by the evaluation. Further detail on evaluation processes and methods is provided in annex E, together with an overview of ethical issues and quality assurance procedures.

## 2.6 Limitations

Key limitations faced by the evaluation were:

- The lack of explicit programme or intervention-level outcomes to evaluate against. This was mitigated by the development and validation of programme and intervention-level results diagrams. However the lack of a formal outcome-orientated M&E system for the programme and individual interventions resulted in heavy reliance on anecdotal evidence.
- As discussed in section 2.2 above, documentation relating to the police work was focused at the intervention level, and on activities, with limited discussion of context or background (for example political economy) analysis.
- The limited time period in each country during the fieldwork – a maximum of four days. This was mitigated by the four person team splitting up so that more than one interview could be held simultaneously, and by excellent support in setting up interviews in advance of the team's arrival from MFAT post and New Zealand Police in country.
- While the evaluation team was free to meet whom they wanted, in practice the team was to a considerable degree dependant on post and New Zealand Police for guidance on which stakeholders to consult. The team identified stakeholder categories, but was reliant on post and New Zealand Police to identify precise interviewees. This could be seen to undermine to some extent the independence of the evaluation. This issue was mitigated by the team setting up interviews independently in country where possible through independent contacts.

- The potential perception that the independence of the evaluation team was compromised by the inclusion in it of a serving member of the New Zealand Police. This was mitigated by a clear explanation to stakeholders of the independence of all team members. In addition, the New Zealand Police expert was not involved in interviews or discussion groups where his presence could, or could be perceived as, compromising the willingness of interviewees to speak openly.
- The structured nature of detailed evaluation questions specified in the terms of reference, and required in the Evaluation and Research Plan did not sit easily with the need to develop a conceptual framework, and lack of explicit programme outcomes. This was mitigated by adapting the evaluation analysis sheets during the fieldwork as the conceptual framework developed, and also at report-writing stage by re-ordering and grouping some of the questions.

## Chapter 3: Effectiveness and sustainability

### Key findings

- The majority of interventions in developmental contexts have delivered, or are on track to delivering their intended results. Achievement of sustainable reform in conflict affected situations proved more challenging: in both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, the performance and community perceptions of partner police forces has not improved (and may have declined) over the evaluation period.
- The quality of deployed New Zealand Police officers is highly regarded and their contribution valued by all partner police forces. New Zealand Police appear to have worked sensitively within different cultural settings.
- A clear strength is that assistance has been provided by one police service to another, and also that New Zealand has been prepared to engage for the long haul.
- Short-term deployments, imperfect skills matches, a tendency to substitute for local staff (rather than develop skills), and differences between the rank of New Zealand advisers and partner country police counterparts may be constraining benefits.
- New Zealand has taken a technically-led approach which focuses on *police* individual skills and organisational development, with limited attention to the broader *policing* context, especially the mandate and legitimacy of the police and the ownership of the reform process. This approach is not sufficient to deliver the goal of *safe and secure communities*, especially in fragile and conflict affected situations.
- All partner police forces have deep-rooted systemic problems of financial and human resources that will require more effective and sustained high-level political engagement to resolve.
- New Zealand Police have been more successful at mainstreaming a community policing approach in bi-lateral or tri-lateral interventions, than when operating under a joint command (e.g. RAMSI). In conflict-affected situations, community policing has been carved out as a *niche* function rather than mainstreamed.
- In fragile and conflict-affected situations delays in moving from operational policing to capacity development (and from aid-dependency to focusing on sustainability) fail to build the legitimacy of the state, and may even undermine it.
- Gender and human rights have generally been mainstreamed within interventions.
- The approach to intervention design driven by outputs rather than by a clearly articulated and context-specific goal, risks a supply-driven and overly simplified approach that is not sustainable.

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the evaluation's findings on the effectiveness and sustainability of New Zealand's police work in the Pacific. This means considering the extent to which New Zealand's police work has *effected positive changes that will be sustained once New Zealand's support is withdrawn*. In line with the strategic nature of the evaluation these issues are considered against the programme-level goal and outcomes (see table 2.1 above), and the chapter also provides a brief overview of achievements at the intervention level. The chapter ends with a summary of key findings from which lessons are drawn out. A summary of key findings mapped against evaluation questions can be found in annex F.

### 3.2 Programme-level goal

**Goal: safe and secure communities (urban and rural, man and women, young and old maintained on a sustainable basis)**

New Zealand Police's key achievement has been to contribute to restoring stability to some highly complex and unstable situations in the region – in particular Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The extent to which this stability is sustainable lies largely outside a policing programme, and depends on the strength of the political settlement, and the on-going political process.

In terms of individual crimes, the evaluation team found limited hard evidence to assess the extent to which New Zealand's international police work had led to sustainable change and to safer and more secure communities on the ground. Crime figures were not reviewed because in many cases (particularly post conflict situations) they were not available, and in any event they are difficult to interpret (a rise in reported crime may reflect increased confidence in the police, rather than an actual increase in crime). With the exception of the People's Survey in the Solomon Islands, baseline and follow up perception surveys are rare. For example even in the developmental context of the Cook Islands, while there was anecdotal evidence that people felt safer and more secure since New Zealand's strong support to the Cook Islands Police Service, a formal follow up perception survey has not yet been undertaken.

### 3.3 Programme-level outcomes and outputs

This section provides an overview of programme-level outcomes and outputs. More detailed findings in relation to each intervention can be found in the intervention overviews in annex A.

#### 3.3.1 Police mandate

*Long term outcome: Governance arrangements for policing in place – including inclusive and representative political voice and oversight together with legal mandate*

This section considers the engagement of New Zealand police work with the interface between the police and their political mandate / the political system. The ability to achieve outputs and outcomes in this area lies outside the control of external funding and implementing agencies (such as MFAT and New Zealand Police). However, as a funding partner and stakeholder, New Zealand has a role in engaging with partner countries on the legality, mandate and legitimacy of the police force it is supporting. This role may need to be exercised at the political level, and should be based on sound analysis. In some cases, New Zealand is providing support under the auspices of an international or regional body (such as RAMSI), and New Zealand Police are operating under a joint command. As a participating member (New Zealand contributes 16% of RAMSI's costs and provides the Deputy Co-ordinator) the key entry point for New Zealand's engagement is through that joint body. Engagement in these circumstances is clearly more complex than when New Zealand has a direct, bi-lateral relationship with the partner country. But such partnership engagement is particularly important in fragile and conflict affected situations where (a) challenges relating to police mandate and the role of the police as the public face of the state tend to be particularly acute; and (b) administrations responsible for these issues may have limited experience of or capacity in policy making, or may have limited political mandate/ legitimacy for their policing decisions.

The legitimacy of the police and their legal mandate were live issues in each of the evaluation focus countries during the evaluation period, particularly so in conflict-affected Bougainville, and Solomon Islands, but also in the Cook Islands and Tonga. As figure 5.1 in chapter five highlights, there are opportunities for close engagement between MFAT and New Zealand Police on such issues, both in Wellington, and in the field. Table 3.1 below summarises the key issues in each focus country, New Zealand's engagement with them, and outputs and outcomes achieved.

**Table 3.1 Police mandate: outputs/ outcomes achieved in the evaluation focus countries**

Key issues	Findings: outputs/ outcomes achieved
<b>Cook Islands (CI)</b>	
<p>Politicisation of the appointment of the Commissioner of Police (provided for under the Police Act 1981) was a key issue that led to a loss of public confidence in the CI Police, and the commissioning of the 2006 Robinson Review into the Police.</p>	<p>Draft proposals for reform of the Police Act, including to de-politicise the appointment of the Commissioner have been developed by New Zealand Police, and are under review by the CI Crown Law Office, but appear to have made little progress.</p>
<b>Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Bougainville)</b>	
<p>Highly complex situation related to the political settlement between the Government of PNG and the autonomous region of Bougainville. Bougainville Police Service (BPS) operates under the auspices of the Royal PNG Constabulary but with intention to draw down powers to the BPS. Draw down process has currently stalled due to political impasse in PNG.</p>	<p>New Zealand focus has been on development of community auxiliary police (CAP). New Zealand has lobbied unsuccessfully for appointment of a superintendant to the BPS to supervise the CAP.</p>
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	
<p>Fundamental questions remain about the boundaries of legitimate state action, and the fragility of the political settlement. An independent evaluation of Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), February 2009, stated that the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force must settle its policing model through establishing its core functions and how they are to be carried out and the objectives to be achieved.<sup>32</sup></p>	<p>A fundamental review of the Police Act is currently under review by the Ministry of Police, funded and supported by the Australian Federal Police. MFAT and New Zealand Police have not engaged with this process to date.</p>

<sup>32</sup> PPF Capacity Building: An Independent Review. February 2009.



<b>Tonga</b>	
<p>The role and responsibilities of the Minister of Police and the Police Commissioner were unclear. A new Police Act was introduced in 2010 which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- clearly separated the powers of the Commissioner and Minister and reduced the authority of the Minister. A judicial body was established to appoint the Commissioner and senior officers, leaving the Minister accountable to Parliament for a police force over which the Minister has little control;</li><li>- changed the investigation and disciplinary process for alleged misconduct by members of the police; and</li><li>- introduced promotion on merit</li></ul>	<p>The legal mandate of the police and the respective roles of the Minister of Police and the Commissioner of Police are delineated in the new Act. The Act transfers power and patronage from the elected Minister and Parliament to an appointed judicial board, a concern to those advocating for increased democracy. The outcome of the promotion by merit policy should be more rapid promotion for young officers without connections to the elite.</p> <p>The new Act has proved very controversial, and its implementation is being restricted by elements of the police force, although younger officers, including females are more pro reform (see annex A (5)).</p>

Table 3.1 leads to the overall findings that:

- There has generally been strongest engagement with the police mandate/ political issues around the police where New Zealand has a bilateral (or in the case of Tonga, trilateral<sup>33</sup>) relationship with the partner country. However, the broader reform process has been slow, and has lagged behind inputs to improve police technical capacity. The approach has tended to be technically-led – for example in the case of the Cook Islands, by a New Zealand Police legal expert.
- In Bougainville, New Zealand’s ability to engage effectively at the political level has been constrained by a complex political environment, coupled with a strong operational focus on Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) development.
- Engagement at a strategic / political level on police issues has similarly been constrained in situations where New Zealand has provided support as part of an international or regional operation (RAMSI in the Solomon Islands). As will be discussed further in chapter 5 below, in the Solomon Islands, the transition of the PPF from an operational policing modality to a capacity building one has taken time, and the local police force has not yet developed a concept of operations, or reformed accountability mechanisms.

The limits to MFAT’s achievements at the political and policy level in relation to policing may be linked to the absence of an explicit conceptual framework for policing, which would facilitate the identification of strategic/ political issues and entry points for engagement at the intervention level.

### *3.3.2 Police technical capacity development*

***Long term outcome: A capable and effective community-focused national police service is in place***

#### ***Overall approach: community policing***

A capable and effective national police service is one that has mainstreamed a community based approach to policing within its philosophy, legislative framework, concept of operations, organisational structure, management policy, and operations (see section 2.3 in chapter two and annex C). When community policing is mainstreamed in this way, the approach is very likely to be sustained after New Zealand Police input has finished. New Zealand’s effectiveness in supporting mainstreaming reflects the entry points and level of engagement with partner police forces, as described below.

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<sup>33</sup> With the Australian Federal Police

Gains have been made where support has been provided either bi-laterally (e.g. Cook Islands) or tri-laterally (Tonga) for an agreed programme of organisational development in a developmental (rather than conflict affected) environment. For example, the Cook Islands Police Service's Strategic Plan 2010-2015 (which New Zealand Police supported Cook Islands Police to develop) clearly mainstreams community policing, and interviews with Cook Island police officers at all levels suggested that there was a real a commitment to it.

In conflict affected situations, it has proved harder to mainstream a community policing approach. In Bougainville, community policing is clearly adopted by the CAP. But there is very strong evidence that the CAP are currently a long way from being integrated within the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), and are not sustainable without on-going New Zealand support<sup>34</sup> (a key stakeholder even suggested that New Zealand support for the CAP would be required 'indefinitely.')

Box 3.1 below provides more details (see also annex A(1)).

### **Box 3.1 Community Auxiliary Police in Bougainville**

The Peace Agreement gave a strong mandate for community policing in Bougainville, which New Zealand responded to through the development of the CAP system. It appears that certainly from 2007 (see results diagram A(1)), and possibly before then, the intention was for the CAP to be developed in a sustainable manner under the auspices of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), including through the BPS Community Policing Strategy 2011-2015 (developed with New Zealand Police assistance). The CAP appear to be providing a useful service at community level (see table 3.1 above). But the low capacity of the BPS and the limited ability of the Autonomous Bougainville Government to address this, with key police powers remaining in Port Moresby, mean that it is difficult to see how the CAP service can be sustained in the absence of strong on-going New Zealand support. Low BPS capacity also limits the effectiveness of the CAP who are dependent on the BPS to respond to offences which cannot be dealt with at community level.

New Zealand has lobbied unsuccessfully for appointment of a superintendant to the BPS to supervise the CAP. The extent to which the Government of PNG is committed to the CAP concept is unclear. While CAP allowances are now paid by the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, the BPS has not been provided with sufficient human or other resources to manage the CAP or to integrate them into the regular police service. AusAid's long-running and far-reaching PNG Law and Justice Programme which operates at both the central level and in Bougainville provides a potential additional entry point for New Zealand engagement with the Government of PNG on these issues (see section 5.3 below).

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<sup>34</sup> Evidence includes from wide ranging interviews with stakeholders, direct observations of BPS, progress reports.

The approach taken in Bougainville has effectively been to carve out a 'niche' community policing function. This tendency is evident in other interventions. For example in Vanuatu under 3P, background documents relating to the intervention suggest that the approach is to 'complement' the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) organisational development work,<sup>35</sup> by undertaking a community policing project. From the documents<sup>36</sup> this does not appear to involve engagement with issues necessary to mainstream community policing such as police concept of operations, organisational structure, and management policy (handled by the AFP).

The same approach is evident where New Zealand's engagement is as part of a multi-national (regional) intervention. Here, New Zealand Police's approach and ability to influence the shape of organisational development and capacity building of the local police must be understood in the context of operating under a joint command (in the case of the Solomon Islands – RAMSI). Promotion of a community policing approach has been undertaken through *bottom up* demonstration and mentoring efforts by individual officers in the Participating Police Force (PPF). Bottom up projects to demonstrate or test a community policing approach are appropriate as pilots, but without strategic engagement to secure mainstreaming, they will be unsustainable.

In both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, while New Zealand Police have supported community policing approaches, the performance and community perceptions of partner police forces has not improved (and may have declined) over the evaluation period (see intervention overviews in Annex A).

### ***Developing the capacity of the police to deliver community policing***

New Zealand Police capacity development interventions have focused on (i) organisational development, and (ii) the development of individual skills. To be effective and sustainable, capacity development should follow a clear and logical process that is understood by stakeholders and that delivers measurable, beneficial results. Table 3.2 below sets out key characteristics of such a process, drawn from the World Bank Institute's 2011 *Practice Guide for Results-Focused Capacity Development*, together with an assessment of the New Zealand approach.

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<sup>35</sup> At that stage the AFP had a large policing programme in Vanuatu, funding 40% of the operating budgets, 8 long-term in-country advisers and an infrastructure programme. The design document states that AFP did 'not focus on community policing.'

<sup>36</sup> Fieldwork was not undertaken in Vanuatu

**Table 3.2 Process for capacity development**

Key characteristic of effective process	Applicability of characteristic to New Zealand process for capacity development
Clarify and articulate development goals	Medium – generally well articulated at the output level, but less so in terms of higher level strategic goals and policing priorities
Identify problems through institutional diagnostic with stakeholders	Strong – close engagement with stakeholders when planning capacity development interventions
Formulate change strategy and change process including critical changes and sequencing	Strong in developmental states Weak in fragile and conflict affected states
Develop a time bound, costed action plan with clear responsibilities and deliverables	Strong where in bilateral/trilateral role Weak in joint command
Construct a results framework and M&E arrangements appropriate to the levels of effort and investment involved	Medium – results at the activity level well measured and reported but very limited higher level M&E of capacity development

The New Zealand process matches many of the characteristics necessary for effective and sustainable capacity development. But how do the resulting interventions compare with international experience? The operational menu contained in the Background Paper for this evaluation, sets out a range of different capacity development interventions that have been successfully applied in different developing police contexts around the world, covering many different organisational dimensions. There is no expectation that New Zealand support should select any particular subset of these interventions; evidence is clear that locally developed *best fit* approaches are most effective. However, it is instructive to compare the intended results of these wide-ranging interventions, against the intended results of the New Zealand work. This provides an indication of whether the New Zealand technical capacity development interventions are on the right track to deliver effective and sustainable change. Table 3.3 below provides this comparison, using the *McKinsey 7S Model* to provide a framework for organisational dimensions.

**Table 3.3 Comparison of intended results for capacity development interventions**

<b>Organisational dimension</b>	<b>'Optimal' result from operational menu interventions</b>	<b>Applicability to intended results of New Zealand capacity development interventions</b>
<b>Strategy</b>	Community, government and sector engagement to consolidate mandate	Low
<b>Structure</b>	Decentralised, aligned to community structures, embedded in a clear plan that defines roles and responsibilities	Medium
<b>Systems</b>	Legislation, policy and concept of operations clearly outline the role of police in criminal justice system	Medium
<b>Style</b>	Emphasis on integrity, ethical conduct and personal responsibility	Strong
<b>Shared values</b>	Police as part of the community, not apart from it, driven by community policing principles	Strong
<b>Skills</b>	Situational awareness and leadership based on engagement, role models, relationships and moral authority	Strong
<b>Staffing</b>	Composition of police matches ethnicity, gender mix with abilities to work in and with the community at all levels	Strong

Further discussion of how effective and sustainable these interventions have been in practice is provided below, firstly for organisational development and then for individual skills.

### **Organisational development of police**

Overall, reform has been much harder to achieve in conflict affected situations (Bougainville and Solomon Islands) than in developmental situations (such as the Cook Islands). (See intervention overviews in annex A and summary of intervention-level results in annex G).

A clear strength of New Zealand's police work has been that it is provided by one police service to another. Interviews with partner country police forces revealed that they clearly appreciated the professional relationships developed, and strengthening of ties with New Zealand Police. Moreover, New Zealand has understood that, like most institutional reform initiatives, police reform takes time. New Zealand has been prepared to engage for the long

haul: for example in Bougainville since 2000; in RAMSI since 2003; and in the Cook Islands since 2006. In some cases the length and depth of engagement reflects a special relationship between New Zealand and the partner country: the Cook Island's free association with New Zealand (where following the Robinson Review a programme of assistance was set up with a ten year time frame and estimated budget of NZ\$ 1million);<sup>37</sup> and the relationship with Bougainville developed during New Zealand's involvement with the brokering of the peace agreement in 1998/1999.

There has been a strong focus on the role of leadership in the New Zealand Police's approach to institutional reform. For example, in the Cook Islands, following the Robinson Review in 2006 which recommended fundamental reforms to the Cook Islands Police Service (CIPS), the appointment of a New Zealand Police commissioner was seen as critical to achieve reform by both the Cook Islands and New Zealand governments. The institution of a leadership programme within the CIPS was a key element of the subsequent reform process. Similarly in Bougainville, the strategy for development of the CAP was to provide a long term CAP adviser, responsible for supporting the CAP, who in turn developed a cohort of non-commissioned officers to whom the CAP report. Strong leadership to drive forward reform is important in institutional reform processes, and probably particularly so in a uniformed and disciplined organisation such as the police. However, the approach has its limitations in terms of sustainability. The risk is that once the leader/ reform champion leaves, the pace of reform will slow, or even slip backwards. This phenomenon was noted by almost all police advisers interviewed for the evaluation – in their view while they were in post, things moved forward, but once they left, change lost pace, or stopped altogether until their return.

There are deep rooted systemic issues in each of the police forces New Zealand is engaging with. At their root are two policy issues: police recurrent budgets (wage and non-wage) and human resources. The evaluation team was made aware of manifestations of such systemic issues in each country in which field work was undertaken, for example: lack of petrol for police vehicles inhibiting ability to patrol or respond to incidents (e.g. Solomon Islands); lack of systems to deal with operational issues (e.g. Solomon Islands where the police fax machine for maintenance requests was broken for over a year); low wages (e.g. Cook Islands); the geographical distribution of the police (e.g. Solomon Islands); weak performance management systems (e.g. Tonga where Cabinet approval is required to dismiss a police officer, and Cook Islands where there is currently a ban on redundancies, and an inability to recruit in the absence of them); and the political nature of top appointments (e.g. Cook Islands, Tonga).

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<sup>37</sup> NZ Aid MOU 2008

A sustainable approach to mainstreaming community policing requires not only technical assistance and skills transfer, but also engagement with root and branch police organisational development, with a particular focus on making policing affordable from national resources. The 2006 Robinson Review of the Cook Islands Police Service provides a useful precedent for this approach, but there is scope to take this much further and to engage with partner countries on fundamental organisational issues such as: the size, structure and pay of police (the pros and cons of a small well-paid force versus a large poorly paid one); the enhanced use of auxiliary police (paid a small allowance), rather than regular police; the potential to merge with other civil uniformed organisations (such as the fire service, customs and civil defence) to reap economies of scale and enhance career opportunities; and geographical distribution of police.

Cultural issues also have a critical part to play. In small, close-knit communities, with strong family or community ties, recognition and self-worth may come from how a police officer has helped his or her community and family, or fulfilled his/ her obligations to another community. For example, in the Solomon Islands a police officer who makes an arrest may then face demands to pay compensation to the arrestee's family.

Engagement with these issues requires a strong political and cultural sensitivity, and is likely to be long-term. In practice the response of the New Zealand Police has been frequently pragmatic and helpful. Fuel and transport and other operational essentials are provided; training and mentoring is undertaken. But overall the evaluation's assessment is that there is need for stronger engagement at the policy level and with key systemic issues to ensure sustainable reform and to move away from dependency on New Zealand support.

### ***Individual skills development***

The approach adopted by New Zealand Police to individual skills development has focused strongly on skills transfer through mentoring and training. This has been provided through a mix of long and short term advisers. For example a two year adviser was provided to the Cook Islands during 2009 and 2010 supplemented by a series of short term advisers/trainers on particular specialist areas ranging from forensics to dog-handling. In Bougainville a long term adviser responsible for developing the CAP system is supplemented by officers on six month deployments. The vast majority of deployments of New Zealand Police personnel that the evaluation team considered were well-received and perceived to have made a positive contribution. However, the evaluation team noted two issues of concern:

- A tendency on the part of New Zealand Police officers to *substitute* for local staff, rather than develop skills. While substitution can be part of successful capacity development strategy, to do so it must have clear exit strategy to enable improvements to be sustainable. Interviews with serving and returned deployed staff and New Zealand Police reports following assignments suggest that improvements from substitution tend to be transient. This issue is discussed further in section 4.3.2 in chapter four below.



- Fieldwork work revealed on several occasions significant differences between the rank of the New Zealand Police adviser, and the partner country police counterpart. The team considers that counterparting a more junior New Zealand officer with a more senior officer from the partner country police is inappropriate, both in terms of the effectiveness of the mentoring, and in terms of the peer-peer relationship between the New Zealand Police and the host country police. It is in contrast to the approach adopted by RAMSI in relation to the reform of the Solomon Islands Corrections Service, where advisers were of the same rank as the officers being mentored.

Deployments of police from across the region (primarily RAMSI, but also in Bougainville where the New Zealand Deployment includes a ni-Vanuatu officer) have provided opportunities for mutually beneficial interaction between police from New Zealand Police and other Pacific island states.

### ***Effectiveness of deployments***

Table 3.4 below highlights characteristics of New Zealand's approach to policing, which are highly relevant to international work, in particular the cultural sensitivity that officers bring to overseas deployments.

**Table 3.4 Characteristics of New Zealand approach to policing<sup>38</sup>**

Nature of New Zealand policing style	Associated competences for New Zealand Police officers
<b>Policy principles</b>	
Unarmed community police service with a professional tactical response capability	Focus on verbal skills in conflict resolution (minimum and proportionate use of coercive powers)
Culturally sensitive to Treaty of Waitangi as partners with Iwi Maori (Treaty serves as a 'touchstone')	Respect for principles of biculturalism with Iwi Maori
National organisation (isolated geographically but well-connected internationally)	Outward facing world view (in common with Pacific nations)
Limited funding with well-defined outcomes, outputs and fiscal accountabilities	Innovative, agile thinking, able to operate with minimal resources and adapt to local context
Responsive to community feedback (as measured by satisfaction surveys)	Professional pride, positive, transparent and open with people
<b>Operational approach</b>	
Community policing is the dominant philosophy (not a discreet or isolated activity) led by 'prevention first' and 'policing excellence' strategies	Ability to form and maintain effective community relationships (including civil society and NGOs); open, friendly, engaging and genuine
Intelligence-led policing with tasking, coordination as core elements of deployment	Ability to scan, analyse and deploy to address causes of crime, not just symptoms
Well connected to communities (e.g. rural and neighbourhood support, community patrols, 'Blue Light' [youth], victim support, road safety)	Ability to play an active part in and with communities
Inclusive of multicultural ethnic groups	Tolerant, accepting and respectful - able to integrate into local culture and treat people as equals
Active in promotion of crime prevention, alternatives to prosecution and restorative	Ability to understand and relate to traditional systems of mediation

<sup>38</sup> Source: Compiled from personal experience and knowledge of New Zealand Police since 1975 by Superintendent John van der Heyden. Supplemented by interviews in the field and observations

Nature of New Zealand policing style	Associated competences for New Zealand Police officers
justice	and reconciliation
Focus on team spirit, sport and fitness (as an important dynamic of culture)	'Can do' attitude Ability to develop links to sports enjoyed by Pacific peoples
<b>Human resource policies</b>	
Police reflect ethnic and gender mix of general population	
Requires wide variety of operational roles (generalist policing skills, with high levels of expertise, based in specialist groups in a decentralised model)	Acceptance of high levels of mobility between work groups and across the organisation
Competency based (merit) promotion system	Accept roles that demonstrably match skills; embrace culture of 'playing to strengths' and developing others
<b>International</b>	
Located in the Pacific with strong community linkages to Pacific Island peoples in New Zealand and the Pacific	Familiar with and able to relate to Pacific peoples, sense of shared heritage
Responsive to obligations as a leading nation in the Pacific (fragile, post conflict, disaster relief). There 'for the long haul'	Resilient, tactically adept and willing to share skills
NZ police seen as neighbours and reliable partners in the development of policing in the Pacific region.	Ability to support formal and informal networks within the Pacific
<b>Links with government</b>	
<i>Whole of government</i> approach	Adapt readily to working with other government agencies, beyond criminal justice sector
Highly accountable (courts, external conduct authority, parliamentary scrutiny, open media and official information transparency)	High levels of integrity (Inherent rejection of corrupt practice, breaches of human rights and any threat to the rule of law)
Explicit separation of executive powers in legislation in a 'Westminster system'	Clear understanding that government influence/control is limited to administrative but not operational matters

The police officers on assignment, or recently returned interviewed by the evaluation<sup>39</sup> were clearly enthusiastic, well-motivated and keen to make a difference. Many had waited several years for the chance to go overseas and were keen to make the most of the opportunity. However, several concerns were repeatedly expressed, both by New Zealand Police and partner country police officers:

- Skills match – There were concerns that personnel deployed, particularly on short term assignments did not always have the appropriate skills for the assignment (one example seen by the evaluation team was a community policing adviser with no community policing experience). In the Solomon Islands it has been noted that the capacity development of the RSIPF requires a change in personnel away from rank and file advisors in day to day policing to capacity development specialists targeting skills and systems for enhanced leadership, management and supervision of policing within the domestic force.<sup>40</sup> There may be scope for drawing on some skills from outside the New Zealand Police to provide this type of input (for example in relation to change management), including from within the partner country.
- The ‘six month churn’ – While long term deployments can result in mission fatigue and a loss of enthusiasm, the vast majority of current and past short term deployed officers interviewed expressed doubt about the sustainability of the work they had undertaken. Officers on six month deployments felt that in practice it takes several weeks to ‘find their feet’, then, following a break, there is a feeling that they are on the ‘countdown to departure.’ It was noted that in the Pacific countries to which they are deployed a high premium is put on relationships, and it can take months or even years to be gain the trust of local people. Examples were provided to the evaluation team of fragmented initiatives of individual officers that had lapsed once the officer had left. For logistical reasons, hand-overs were sometimes perfunctory.
- Preparedness – Serving and recently returned officers gave the evaluation team mixed reports on the scope and quality of pre-deployment training. There was appreciation that training now includes guidance on MFAT’s monitoring and evaluation requirements, and on language and cultural issues (such as the differences between Polynesian and Melanesian culture).

It was noted by the evaluation team that generally the partner police force is not involved in the selection of advisers, even long term advisers. This is in contrast to RAMSI’s support to the Solomon Islands Corrections Service where it is reported that a key factor in the success of the technical support provided was the involvement of local partners in the adviser selection process.

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<sup>39</sup> Over 20 such officers were interviewed

<sup>40</sup> See Partnership framework between Solomon Islands Government and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, April 2009

### 3.3.3 Police interface with communities

**Long term outcome: Structures facilitating two-way communication between citizens and police are in place and functioning effectively**

This section considers the extent to which New Zealand police work has assisted with the development of effective and sustainable structures to facilitate communications between citizens and the police. The interventions considered by this evaluation reveal two approaches:

- A 'facilitated' community based approach, where civil society organisations work with communities to assist them to develop committees through which to engage with the police. This approach tended to be in conflict affected situations - for example in the Solomon Islands through RAMSI's support to Save the Children Fund to develop community police committees.
- A 'direct' approach, seen in developmental contexts, where the police take the initiative to develop structures for interaction with communities. Examples include Blue Light youth clubs in the Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands; and PICP's Village Support Pacifica Project's promotion of Neighbourhood Watch schemes across the Pacific (including in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa where the approach taken is to work closely with traditional leaders and to ensure that schemes are in line with cultural norms and taboos).

Both approaches appear to be appreciated by communities<sup>41</sup> and seen by the police as worthwhile.<sup>42</sup> But the evaluation was not provided with hard evidence of their impact – for example on crime or perceptions of community safety. Further work is merited on the relative benefits of the two approaches, and on whether a transition from (a possibly unsustainable) civil society supported modality to a police supported modality should be undertaken as part of the transition from a post conflict to a developmental context (see discussion in section 4.4 in chapter four).<sup>43</sup>

New Zealand police's sensitivity to cultural issues was noted in relation to their support to police interaction with communities, perhaps best reflected in the evidence the evaluation team found in changes to attitudes and behaviour concerning domestic violence through engagement under PPDVP with churches, NGOs and particularly with women's rights groups and male advocates.

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<sup>41</sup> Evidence from stakeholder interviews

<sup>42</sup> Interview evidence

<sup>43</sup> By way of contrast, in post conflict Sierra Leone it was decided from the outset that the police should be closely involved with the community, so a 'direct' approach was taken from the word go, through the development of Police Partnership Boards as part of Local Needs Policing.

### 3.3.4 Police interface with the criminal justice system

**Long term outcome: Police are fully embedded in and contributing to the functioning of the criminal justice system**

New Zealand Police are providing capacity development support, particularly individual skills development, in police forces across the Pacific to strengthen the role of the police in the criminal justice chain. Support for improved investigation and prosecution skills, for example in the Cook Islands and in Tonga, is particularly relevant in this respect. But as the intervention-level results tables in annex A show, interventions have generally not been designed with linkages across the criminal justice system in mind. Table 3.5 below summarises the position.

**Table 3.5 Police engagement with broader criminal justice system**

Country	National criminal justice reform programme?	NZ support to police engagement
Cook Islands	No formal programme	The intervention includes supporting the review of the outdated Criminal Procedure Code, but there was no evidence of progress.
PNG (Bougainville)	Government of PNG Law and Justice Sector (supported by AusAid and executed by Cardno). Includes Royal PNG Constabulary in a 'sector wide' approach to justice reform. The programme has an office in Bougainville and is supporting reform across the criminal justice sector, for example through training Bougainville Police Service prosecutors and the restructuring of the BPS.	The complex political situation in Bougainville with the BPS operating under the auspices of the Royal PNG Constabulary means that entry points for NZ Police engagement are unclear
Solomon Islands	RAMSI's Law and Justice Programme	Entry point is through RAMSI / PPF. The linkages between the PPF and broader reforms to the criminal justice system undertaken by through the Law and Justice Programme appear weak
Tonga	No formal programme	The Police work closely with the criminal justice system

### 3.3.5 Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems

**Long term outcome: Complementary and synergetic linkages between police and non-state dispute resolution systems in place**

The form of the relationship between state and non-state systems may depend on the nature and preferences of communities and also on the resources available for formal police work. In some situations it may be appropriate for policing to be undertaken in partnership with non-state bodies. In other situations, non-state systems may be less relevant and more formal legal systems may be required - for example in urban areas or in situations of conflict related to extraction of natural resources or minerals. Particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations, the legitimacy of the state and security providers may be contested and, in these cases, the legitimacy of the state may be associated with how the formal and informal systems start to come together to meet the concerns and needs of communities.

In each of the focus countries considered in this evaluation there is a complex set of non-state dispute recognition mechanisms, including traditional, community and religious leaders. Different cultural groups in the region have their own distinctive methods of dispute resolution, often focused on restorative justice. An example in Polynesian culture is in Pukapuka (one of the outer Cook Islands) where petty offenders are dealt with through 'social shunning' and being treated as juveniles. Restorative justice traditions are found among the Maori people of New Zealand, and are increasingly used within the formal justice system.<sup>44</sup>

Police and formal justice providers in partner countries interviewed during the evaluation all regarded non-state systems as appropriate fora for dealing with petty crimes and minor infringements. They were viewed as the bottom rung on the ladder of a hierarchy of conflict and dispute resolution processes. This arrangement can arise as a matter of practice, including through the exercise of police discretion, or because of the limited reach of the formal system (for example in the Solomon Islands 60% of people will never see a police officer).<sup>45</sup> Sometimes the role of non-state providers is explicitly recognised in legislation.

But as well as being in a hierarchical relationship, there is clearly potential for conflict between the state and non-state systems. This may arise because it may be the non-state system, rather than the police who are viewed as legitimate providers of security and justice, or because of different norms and cultural understandings operating within the two systems, which serving police officers embedded in local communities and culture may have to mediate. Examples provided by stakeholders during the evaluation included:

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<sup>44</sup> Attitudes to Crime and Punishment: A New Zealand Study undertaken by Judy Paulin, Wendy Searle, Trish Knaggs. NZ Ministry of Justice, December 2003, p14

<sup>45</sup> Estimate by RAMSI adviser

- Customary loyalties to clan or family may conflict with the formal system. For example in the Solomon Islands police officers may be required by their wantok to pay compensation to another wantok for arresting an offender;
- Alternative systems may be regarded as having legitimacy to the exclusion of state-provided justice. For example in some eastern islands in the Solomon Islands (Tikopia and Anuta) chiefs have refused to allow the police to land;
- Alternative systems may operate with different norms to the formal system – for example attitudes to violence as a form of dispute resolution;<sup>46</sup> to domestic violence; and to sorcery (for example in Bougainville where the evaluation team was informed of instances of the BPS and CAPS being unable to intervene in cases of communities killing adults and juveniles accused of sorcery.)

To what extent has New Zealand police work been effective in working within these complex settings, and supporting the development of effective and sustainable linkages between formal and informal dispute resolution systems? New Zealand police work has not addressed this issue directly, and few background or design documents seen by the evaluation team provided context analysis in relation to plural legal systems. However, New Zealand officers appear to have worked sensitively within these different cultural settings. In the Solomon Islands for example, New Zealand officers said they had become involved in time-consuming negotiations between *wantoks* about compensation payments. The starting point for deeper engagement with this issue is clearly context analysis, including engagement with national governments and partner police forces to determine their approach to addressing these issues. Approaches could include: working with traditional systems to resolve different approaches; training for traditional leaders in human rights issues; and working with the partner police to develop strategies to confront human rights abuses stemming from traditional values.

In Bougainville, New Zealand has taken a much more proactive approach, through supporting the establishment of CAP, community members trained as ‘auxiliaries’ who operate at community level as a ‘bridge’ between the formal and informal system. Most cases involving the CAP are dealt with by chiefs at the village court level. A similar approach is being considered in the Solomon Islands, through the revival of community officers (originally introduced by the colonial regime), following a pilot undertaken with assistance from the PPF and RAMSI.<sup>47</sup>

As discussed in section 3.3.2 above, it was clear to the evaluation that communities appreciate the role that CAP play in Bougainville. One aspect of this was the provision by the CAP of the visible face of the state at community level. However, less clear was the

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<sup>46</sup> Hughes, B. 2012. Peace Operations and the Political: A Pacific Reminder of What Really Matters. *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 16 (2012) 99–118

<sup>47</sup> Dinnen S and Haley N. Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in the Solomon Islands. World Bank Justice for the Poor Research Report. May 2012



extent to which the CAP are adding value to existing conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms, which take place through traditional mediation systems, peace officers and village courts. Piloting/ rigorous impact evaluation has not been undertaken to enable the value added by the CAP to be assessed. Key findings of the recent evaluation of the community officer pilot in the Solomon Islands<sup>48</sup> chime with anecdotal evidence provided to the evaluation team in Bougainville:

- The community officers / CAP were popular with communities;
- Communities have improved perceptions of safety and security, but there is no hard evidence about crime rates;
- Expectations raised by the community officers / CAP about improved formal police responsiveness to communities have been disappointed, because of the low capacity of the formal police; and
- To be sustainable community officers / CAP need to be embedded within government systems.

### 3.4 Gender and human rights

This section considers the extent to which New Zealand police work has resulted in effective and sustainable outcomes in relation to gender and to human rights. Two approaches have been adopted:

- To mainstream gender and human rights within interventions; and
- In the case of gender, to undertake targeted interventions, primarily through the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP).

All the focus countries in the Pacific considered by this evaluation face gender and human rights challenges specifically in relation to their police forces and more generally. Key issues include:

- high rates of violence against women;
- accusations of human rights abuses perpetrated by the police during periods of conflict (for example in the Solomon Islands during the 2003 civil unrest);
- ensuring gender equality within police forces; and
- ensuring that police officers act in accordance with human rights norms (for example in relation to the use of force, the exercise of discretion, pre-trial detention, and charging procedures).

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<sup>48</sup> Dinnen S and Haley N. Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in the Solomon Islands. World Bank Justice for the Poor Research Report. May 2012

All the countries considered by the evaluation are parties to key international gender and human rights obligations (although Tonga is not a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), and have put in place or are putting in place national gender and human rights policies and processes. One of the most recent is the Cook Islands National Policy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment and Strategic Plan of Action (2011-2019) under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which addresses key gender issues including violence against women, and sets up a cross-government implementation structure (which includes the Cook Islands Police Service) and national monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

Because interventions have tended not to undergo a formal design process, neither gender nor human rights were 'designed in' to country-level interventions. Very few of the 'design' documents (MOUs, letters of variation etc) mention either issue. In practice, the New Zealand approach to mainstreaming gender and human rights issues in police work has been to promote sustainability by:

- **Supporting national processes** such as that described in the Cook Islands above, and in the Solomon Islands the on-going peace and reconciliation process.
- **Mainstreaming human rights and gender within key organisational processes** when supporting police organisational development. For example New Zealand police advisers have worked with the Cook Islands Police Service on developing gender sensitive recruitment and human resource policies and processes; training programmes that mainstream gender and human rights; data gathering (for example sex disaggregated data). CAP recruitment policies instituted by New Zealand Police are directly responsible for an impressive 20% of female CAP. Recent MFAT guidance on mainstreaming gender within the Partnership for Pacific Policing<sup>49</sup> promotes these approaches.
- **Using national resources** -for example in Bougainville, human rights and gender training is delivered to the CAP by local NGOs, rather than by New Zealand Police.

Rather than deploying specialist human rights and gender experts, MFAT has sought to build capacity of New Zealand Police and its own programme staff to integrate gender and human rights into intervention design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. MFAT's gender guidance for 3P is a good example of this approach. The evaluation team noted the demonstration of human rights and gender sensitivity in the general approach of New Zealand Police. For example there has been a good gender balance of New Zealand Police advisers deployed, creating positive role models. Interviews with individual officers revealed that gender and human rights issues were high on their list of priorities and interests.

As well as the mainstreaming approach described above, New Zealand has taken a more targeted approach to addressing gender issues in the Pacific through (i) the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP); and (ii) the PICP Women's Advisory

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<sup>49</sup> Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

Network (WAN). The express purpose of PPDVP was to take a more holistic (while still police centred) approach to addressing domestic violence, working with local police forces to develop partnerships with NGOs and community leaders to address the issue. PPDVP has begun to deliver results, although these tend to relate to process, rather than to domestic violence outcomes (see intervention overview in annex A (6)).

### 3.5 Intervention-level outcomes and outputs

Results at the intervention level are considered in the intervention overviews in annex A, and a summary of overall results achieved by interventions is provided in annex G. Overall, the majority of interventions in developmental contexts have delivered, or are on track to delivering their intended results. Achievement of intended results in conflict affected situations proved more challenging.

These findings have been generated against intervention-level evaluation results diagrams constructed by the evaluation team (see section 2.3 in chapter two). Specific comments on the design of interventions can be found in the intervention overviews in annex A. In summary, intervention design can be seen to be: (i) generally narrowly focused on *police* individual skills and organisational development, with limited attention to the broader *policing* context presented in the programme theory of change (ii) essentially output (activity) driven rather than being driven by goals and high level results; and (iii) in many cases, unrealistic in terms of measurability, since the results are dependent on undocumented assumptions. Recommendations to address these issues can be found in chapter six.

### 3.6 Conclusions and lessons

The overall approach to police work has focused strongly on ***police technical capacity development***. In this area, support provided by New Zealand Police has generally been highly regarded and appreciated, and is overall in line with good development practice. However, there have been challenges in relation to mainstreaming a community policing approach, particularly in conflict affected situations. MFAT and New Zealand Police have engaged to some extent with the broader governance and institutional context within which the police operate (including through MFAT's senior institutional strengthening adviser from 2006-2011) but strong NZ Police ownership and shaping of interventions has meant that in practice the work has been technically led and focused on police capacity development. In relation to the ***police mandate***, engagement at the political level has had limited success, with the reform process generally being slow and lagging behind technical inputs. New Zealand Police's support to partner police's ***interface with communities*** is clearly appreciated by communities, although evidence of impact is hard to find. Interventions have generally not been designed with the ***police interface with the criminal justice system*** in

mind, although New Zealand Police have undertaken capacity development work in relation to investigation and prosecution skills. Finally, although New Zealand Police officers have during their deployments engaged with ***non-state dispute resolution mechanisms***, police work has as not directly addressed the interface and potential conflicts between the formal and informal systems. ***Gender*** and ***human rights*** have generally been mainstreamed using approaches that are likely to be sustainable.

At the intervention level, the majority of interventions in developmental contexts have delivered or are on track to deliver on their intended results. But achievement of results in fragile and conflict affected situations has proved more challenging.

### **Lessons:**

- New Zealand Police are strong operational and technical implementing partners for MFAT. However there is scope to improve the operational effectiveness of deployments. [See recommendation 6 in chapter six.]
- Increased engagement with the broader governance and institutional arrangements of policing is necessary if MFAT is to secure its investment in policing and its ultimate goal of sustainable economic development in the Pacific, especially in fragile and conflict affected contexts. Complementary skills from outside the New Zealand Police would be required to support a broader approach to policing. [See recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 5 in chapter six.]
- Sustainable police reform, including the sustainable embedding of community policing as a whole of policing approach requires political and policy-level engagement. [See recommendation 2 in chapter six.]
- There is limited evidence on outcomes, but New Zealand's blend of mainstreaming gender and human rights, combined with a targeted approach to addressing violence against women appears appropriate. However, there is scope to strengthen the approach to mainstreaming. [See recommendation 7 in chapter six.]

## Chapter 4: Relevance

### Key findings

- New Zealand's police work in the Pacific appears overall well-aligned and broadly relevant to New Zealand's developmental, foreign policy and security objectives; although the lack of an explicit conceptual framework makes relevance harder to confirm. Interventions are not designed to have a direct impact on trans-border crime or regional security, but support has the potential to address these issues through the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordinating Centre.
- New Zealand Police's approach to technical capacity building support has been relevant to context, and has responded to the needs of particular situations including for community policing interventions.
- But overall relevance is less clear in relation to the particular country contexts, for example where the legitimacy of the police is contested, or where a key problem is inter-communal violence.
- Support has been relevant to the needs of small Pacific states to some extent, in that technical policing weaknesses have been directly addressed. There is scope and opportunity to engage in more fundamental police organisational and resourcing issues that would lay the foundations for sustainability. The approach currently taken may encourage substitution and not be sustainable, unless an open-ended commitment is made to provide key personnel.
- New Zealand has made relevant contributions to the critical transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach in the Solomon Islands. However, New Zealand has not taken full advantage of its potential entry points to shape and focus the transition (including the mainstreaming of a community policing approach) particularly at the strategic and political levels.
- Regional police interventions have been relevant especially in tackling violence against women; promoting police-community dialogue; and have created opportunities for lesson sharing, networking and peer accountability. However there is scope for greater coherence between regional and country-level interventions.

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief review of the relevance of MFAT funded police work to the developmental and strategic interests of New Zealand. The remainder of the chapter focuses on relevance to partner countries in the Pacific. A particular focus is given to police work in small Pacific island states, where sustainability is a key issue. The chapter moves on to consider two specific issues: (i) the experience of transitioning police work from peacekeeping/ stabilisation to supporting the development of a sustainable domestic police force responsible for public order and maintaining the rule of law; and (ii) the relevance of a regional approach to police reform. The chapter ends with a summary of key findings from which lessons are drawn out. A summary of key findings mapped against evaluation questions can be found in annex F.

## 4.2 Developmental and strategic relevance of MFAT funded police work for New Zealand

As discussed in section 1.4 of chapter one, New Zealand's portfolio of aid funded police work has developed considerably since 2000. This appears to have had three main drivers:

- **Development drivers:** Increased understanding in the international development community about the role of security and justice in development – particularly in fragile states. In 2008 the UN suggested that the rule of law was the *missing millennium development goal* – *not only a goal in itself, it is also a means of achieving all eight MDGs.*<sup>50</sup> The New Deal for Fragile States agreed in Busan in 2011 recognised security and justice as two of the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.
- **Foreign policy drivers:** New Zealand's desire to be a good global and regional citizen and work in solidarity with Australia and other regional players to respond to instability in the region (for example in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands). More generally police work appears to have expanded in line with New Zealand's wish to be a good and responsive neighbour to Pacific island states, assisting where New Zealand has clear and relevant expertise, and where there is demand for assistance. A significant amount of police work in the Pacific takes place in other Polynesian states, including where New Zealand has a special constitutional relationship – the Cook Islands,<sup>51</sup> Tokelau<sup>52</sup> and

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<sup>50</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2008. Rule of law: A 'missing' Millennium Development Goal. [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/rule-of-law-a\\_missing-millennium-development-goal.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/rule-of-law-a_missing-millennium-development-goal.html). Accessed on 15 June 2012

<sup>51</sup> The Cook Islands became a dependent territory of New Zealand in 1901 when it was annexed. In 1965 the Cook Islands adopted a Constitution enabling self-government in free association with New Zealand. Free association is a status distinct from that of full independence in that it allows the Cook Islands to maintain New Zealand citizenship, while administering its own affairs. (<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Cook-Islands.php>)

<sup>52</sup> Although it remains a territory of New Zealand, in recent years Tokelau has taken on increasing levels of responsibility for its own administration. In 2003 it began to take full responsibility for managing its national budget. In 2004 the Administrator formally delegated his administrative powers to the Council of the Ongoing Government of Tokelau. The

Niue.<sup>53</sup> Increased Chinese engagement in the region, including in the justice and security sector (for example supplying the Cook Islands with police headquarters and the central court house) provides an additional dimension to New Zealand's on-going engagement.

- **Security drivers:** Increased concern about New Zealand's security in the wake of 9/11, the Bali bombs etc and instability in the Pacific region. Key regional threats for New Zealand which could potentially be addressed through police interventions include: general spill-over of crime from the Pacific to New Zealand; trans-national organised crime; the threat of terrorists having easy transit through weak borders; drugs and people trafficking, and money laundering.

As far as security drivers are concerned, police work is obviously only a small part of New Zealand's wider international/ regional security agenda. However, it is the case, as discussed in section 1.2 in chapter one above, that the New Zealand Police mandate changed explicitly to address international work as conflict increased in the region. Two subsequent interventions in the Pacific – those in Bougainville and in the Solomon Islands were initially in response to crises, and immediate instability. The subsequent deployment of ODA funds for police capacity development work reflects the acknowledgement that moving from fragility to stability is a long term enterprise. The issue of transition of police work from peacekeeping to capacity development is discussed in section 4.4 below.

New Zealand MFAT funded police work has had a strong focus on community approaches to policing (for example the development of CAP in Bougainville, the focus on community policing in the Solomon Islands), and on domestic issues such as violence against women (including through PPDVP). Such interventions are not designed to have a direct impact on trans-border crime or regional security. And it should be recognised that regional security issues may not be high on the agenda of Pacific island countries who do not perceive themselves to be at particular risk. One Commissioner interviewed during the evaluation made it clear that his immediate priority in a resource constrained environment was domestic policing, rather than regional issues.

General police organisational development and assistance in particular areas, such as forensics, or dog handling (for example in the Cook Islands) has the potential to enable New Zealand Police to interact with capacitated police forces in other Pacific island states to

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Administrator remains responsible for oversight of assistance as well as political developments on or affecting the atolls. (<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Tokelau.php>)

<sup>53</sup> New Zealand and Niue have a special relationship founded on close historical ties, unique constitutional arrangements and a common citizenship and currency. Niue became a British protectorate in 1900 and was annexed by New Zealand in 1901. In 1974, following an act of self-determination under United Nations auspices, the people of Niue adopted a Constitution providing for full self-government in free association with New Zealand, a status distinct from that of full independence. (<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Niue.php>)



address regional and trans-border crime issues, including through the AFP funded Pacific Transnational Crime Coordinating Centre (PTCCC) which acts as a hub for distributed Transnational Crime Units across the Pacific. New Zealand Police has recently deployed a senior intelligence analyst to the PTCCC. This is in line with the Pacific Island Forum's Security Plan (2005) which recognises the need for regional cooperation in policing, enabling economies of scale and information sharing. It was not possible for the evaluation team to identify specific New Zealand trans-border crime issues which have been directly addressed through MFAT funded police work. However, the evaluation team did hear from a variety of sources that improvement in coordination between police, immigration and customs agencies was a necessary pre-cursor to regional security and economic sustainability. The Pacific Patrol Boat strategy aimed at fisheries maritime surveillance operations is an example of an AFP funded initiative supported by New Zealand Defence Force and MFAT through PICP. Recent success from the AFP funded cyber-safety awareness pilot in identifying risks to children and young people is another example of preventative initiatives aimed at public safety that is supported by MFAT through PICP.

The interests discussed above need to be balanced with New Zealand's domestic policing needs, particularly when deployments are to small Pacific islands states which do not have specific security issues associated with them. This issue is likely to become more acute if resources for domestic policing become more constrained.

### 4.3 Developmental relevance for partner countries

#### 4.3.1 Overall relevance

This section considers the overall relevance of New Zealand's police work for partner countries in the light of general principles of good development practice in the Paris Declaration,<sup>54</sup> and in relation to fragile and conflict affected states - the OECD/DAC principles for engagement in fragile states,<sup>55</sup> and the New Deal for Fragile States.<sup>56</sup> The

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<sup>54</sup> The Paris Declaration set out five core principles for aid effectiveness: ownership (through formation of national strategies); alignment (donor support to those strategies); harmonisation (streamlining of donor efforts); results (achievement of clear, monitored goals); and mutual accountability (joint responsibility of donor and partner country).

<sup>55</sup> The principles are:

- (i) Take context as the starting point
- (ii) Ensure all activities do no harm
- (iii) Focus on state building as the central objective
- (iv) Prioritise prevention
- (v) Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
- (vi) Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
- (vii) Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
- (viii) Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors
- (ix) Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
- (x) Avoid creating pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans')



section focuses on the need for *context analysis; ownership and alignment* with national strategies and priorities; and *donor harmonisation/ co-ordination*.

**Context analysis:** As well as being a principle for engagement in fragile and conflict affected states (*align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts*) and good development practice in general, international experience is clear that effective policing must be tailored to specific contexts. New Zealand Police have, in the main, adopted a localised approach in their international work. In situations where they are involved in working with local partners to develop or strengthen a community policing philosophy, there was generally a clear understanding of the need for local ownership, an appreciation that one size does not fit all, and a desire to work with local people to develop a model of community policing which is appropriate to the local context (see for example the BPS Community Policing Strategy developed with assistance from New Zealand Police, and the Cook Islands Youth Technical Assistance Project).

However, when considered in relation to the broader *policing* context, analysis has been limited. Context analysis identifies the particular problems to be addressed in a particular situation. The problems to be addressed should then inform the goal of the intervention. The priority problems in fragile and conflict affected states in the Pacific for example include (i) inter-communal violence; and (ii) disputes over land / resources where the state grants extraction rights which local communities do not regard as legitimate (both key issues in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands). Without careful analysis of the problem, there is a danger that interventions export a developed world presumption of policing priorities.

As recognised in the New Deal for Fragile States, the need for careful and on-going context analysis is particularly acute in fragile and conflict affected situations, where the situation is very different to that in mature democracies. In these situations context analysis should be on-going, informing implementation and on-going design decisions.

While New Zealand's policing support has been provided in response to particular situations, the evaluation team's view is that there is scope for deeper and more considered context analysis (including for example political economy analysis) during intervention design and on-going implementation. Design documents, progress reports and reviews considered by the evaluation team nearly all focused narrowly on the police as an organisation, and on activities and implementation, with very limited broader context analysis, or consideration of the wider policing context discussed in chapter two above.

**Ownership and alignment:** As discussed in sections 4.2 and 1.3 in chapter one above, security and justice are now recognised as vital to economic development, and to statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict affected states. Security is a clear

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<sup>56</sup> The New Deal was agreed in November 2011, therefore near the end of the evaluation period. However, the underlying principles and issues had been under discussion for the previous two years. It highlights the importance of starting with a country-led assessment of the underlying causes of fragility; of the need for a single country-led plan to which all donors align their support; and the increasing use of government systems.

priority for the governments of the two conflict affected situations where New Zealand has provided assistance – Bougainville and the Solomon Islands - recognised as such in overarching development plans (in the case of Bougainville in the Peace Agreement<sup>57</sup>), budgets, and during discussions with government officials and politicians. In some developmental contexts, the situation is slightly more nuanced. As discussed in section 1.4 above, New Zealand's support has usually been in response to a specific request for assistance, and yet it is less clear that in all cases security is a top priority on the national agenda (as evidenced for example in resource allocation decisions and national development plans).

In Bougainville, the Cook Islands, and Tonga, New Zealand is explicitly providing support in line with locally developed and owned police development strategies. However in Bougainville, the degree of traction of the BPS's Community Policing Strategy 2011-2015 is not clear, in view of the limited autonomy of the BPS over strategy and resources.

***Donor harmonisation / co-ordination:*** Fragmentation of aid is generally unhelpful, but particularly so in fragile and conflict affected situations, where there is weak capacity to deal with multiple donor initiatives. In the Solomon Islands co-ordination is assured through the RAMSI mechanism. In Tonga, New Zealand Police are providing programmatic support together with the AFP under a tri-partite agreement. Where New Zealand is working bilaterally, care has been taken to co-ordinate with other donors (usually the AFP) – but sometimes co-ordination seems to be conceived as a 'carving out' a community policing *niche* (as discussed in section 3.3.2 in chapter three above) rather than harmonising around a common, government-led reform programme.

#### *4.3.2 Relevance for small Pacific island states*

All partner police forces are located in small Pacific island states with the exception of Bougainville, which is an autonomous region, with similar characteristics to such a state. The police in small Pacific island states face a number of general challenges:

- Geographical: policing remote island communities often with inadequate transport and unreliable communications. For example in the Solomon Islands 80 per cent of the population live in villages and small towns spread over nearly 1,000 islands;
- Economic: limited financial resource base and therefore limited funds available for the police;
- Human resources: small states have a limited talent pool, especially for appointments to senior ranks;
- Societal: particularly in Melanesia highly diverse communities in terms of culture and language, with propensity for inter-communal conflict. Close clan / community / *wantok*

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<sup>57</sup> Bougainville Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001

ties tend to have stronger legitimacy than the state, and thus than the formal justice system enforced by the police;

- Political: in some cases the highly personal and clan / locality based nature of the political system resulting in a politicised police force; and
- Public sector: a strong emphasis on the public sector (including the police) as a key source of employment.

Despite these challenges, most Pacific island states enjoy relatively low reported crime rates – although under-reporting is likely especially for violence against women, and human insecurity is clearly a major problem in those states affected by conflict. Most of the states have relatively high police: population ratios (see table 1.3 in chapter one above) and Pacific island government interviewees regarded a police presence at community level (including for example through the CAP in Bougainville and through police posts on outer islands in the Cook Islands) as important in presenting the ‘public face’ of the state, and in some cases in providing early warning of potential conflict or insecurity.

The focus of New Zealand’s police work in the Pacific has been on providing technical assistance, focused mainly on training and skills transfer. Observations gathered over the evaluation period lead the evaluation team to question whether this approach will lead to sustainable change in the small island state context. New Zealand Police officers consistently report that their efforts have slipped, or slowed down when they were not in-country to supervise or oversee the work. This is the case even in relatively well-resourced and well-functioning forces, such as that in the Cook Islands, and even in the case of long-term deployments. In Bougainville, after 12 years of assistance, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the CAP system is unsustainable without on-going New Zealand support.

In practice, a considerable amount of the technical assistance deployed to small island Pacific states has been *substitutional* at a variety of levels – ranging from supplying senior personnel (including commissioners), to New Zealand Police filling in with recurrent budget items (seen at first hand by the evaluation team in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands). In some cases New Zealand Police are explicitly substituting for local staff (for example providing commissioners of police). In other cases substitution occurs by default. It was clear to the evaluation team that New Zealand Police officers deployed overseas are in general highly pragmatic, resourceful, dedicated and determined to make a difference. This means that when local systems do not work, or local staff have low capacity, New Zealand officers tend to step in and fill the gap (examples seen during the evaluation include writing police procedures, providing fuel and transport, organising the selling of brake fluid to fund the purchase of fuel). This tendency is exacerbated when the deployment is short term only, and there is pressure to ‘achieve something’. A capacity development (rather than a substitutional approach) requires working through local people and systems and needs long term personal engagement, particularly in societies where much depends on relationships.

It also requires engagement with fundamental organisational development issues focused on affordability (discussed in section 3.3.2 in chapter three), and a clear exit strategy.

It may be that it is necessary to accept that New Zealand police work in small Pacific island states will inevitably involve some degree of substitution– including providing key personnel to address the problem of the limited talent pool, and to provide independent leadership removed from political/*wantok* allegiances.

#### 4.4 Transition from peacekeeping to development approach

This section considers how New Zealand's peace-keeping work in conflict affected states transitioned to a development approach. In the Pacific region this transition occurred during the evaluation period only in the Solomon Islands, in the context of New Zealand Police's participation in the PPF under the auspices of RAMSI.

Figure 4.1 on the following page illustrates the typical three overlapping phases of the transition from peacekeeping to a developmental approach. This transition is the exit strategy for the deployment. Immediate stabilisation predominantly by a military force (in the case of the Solomon Islands, a regional force), is followed by a gradual draw down of the military (*green shirts*) who are replaced by civilian police (*blue shirts*). Local civilian police are supported by an international / regional police force (the PPF in the Solomon Islands) who may undertake both operational policing, and increasingly, institutional strengthening and capacity development of the domestic police. Whilst this transition is represented in figure 4.1 as a forwards trajectory, it is important to recognise that in fragile and conflict affected situations, the process is rarely linear, with setbacks and lapses into conflict that may occur during the transition from conflict to stability.<sup>58</sup>

The PPF's deployment in the Solomon Islands exhibited the following characteristics: a period of tension, conflict and destabilisation before the deployment, followed by short, sharp military and 'public order' policing with formed tactical police units engaged to suppress violence and arrest offenders, followed by a transition into stabilisation. Once the situation had calmed down (although with setbacks for example the 2006 riots in Chinatown), there followed a withdrawal of military units and a period of joint command with local police in which the focus shifted to restoring the capacity of local police to take the sovereignty of policing their country. The handover to local command was followed by a period during which New Zealand and other nations' police worked alongside local police. During this time, opportunities were taken, often at the initiative of individual officers, to provide technical assistance, advice, mentoring and capacity development. These activities required quite different skills to the tactical skills required when police operate in formed groups to suppress public violence and disorder.

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<sup>58</sup> World Development Report .See work of Louis Kriesberg; Dean Pruitt, Jeffrey Rubin and Sung Hee Kim, and William Zartman

**Figure 4.1 Exit strategy: transition from peacekeeping to development approach**

	Phase 1: peacekeeping	Phase 2: transition	Phase 3: development
	Instability External legitimacy for police		Stability Internal legitimacy for police
Key functions:	Stabilisation: military peacekeepers create the space for civilian policing		
		Military peacekeepers maintain surge capability	
	International / regional police may (a) support local police operationally and / or (b) undertake monitoring, observing and reporting	International / regional police increasingly focus on reinforcing or re-establishing the domestic police force through institutional strengthening and capacity development	Domestic police force supported by through institutional strengthening and capacity development takes increased responsibility for policing  Development of early warning systems for conflict prevention
Policing approaches (domestic and international / regional police):	Strong focus on security and restoring and maintaining law and order	Increasing focus on community based approaches to policing	

For police work, the key shift occurs during phase 2 in the diagram above, with a re-focusing from operational policing (provided directly by the external force and/or by supporting the domestic force to undertake operational policing) to long term institutional strengthening and capacity development. For example in the Solomon Islands in 2009<sup>59</sup> it was recognised that the PPF should change its focus from providing a high visibility police presence in Honiara and other provinces and technical and logistical assistance to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), towards intensive organisational support and capacity development for the RSIPF. Approaches to capacity development (including mainstreaming a community based approach to policing) are discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.3.2). They imply a number of changes to the nature and scope of police work for successful transition:

- a more strategic, long term focus based on a clear view of what success would look like through an agreed policing philosophy, strategic direction and concept of operations for the domestic police force. This is essentially a political discussion, and is likely to involve sensitive issues such as the degree of political control over the police; police mandate and accountability; and independent oversight mechanisms for police. Engagement at the political level (possibly at the highest level) may be required. In addition, the government ministry / department responsible for police and the domestic police force may require specialist technical assistance to develop this framework for policing. In the Solomon Islands the AFP are currently supporting this process, through providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Police for a fundamental review of the Police Act, involving extensive participatory process.
- a change in personnel away from rank and file advisors in day to day policing to capacity development specialists targeting skills and systems for enhanced leadership, management and supervision of policing within the domestic force.<sup>60</sup> In the Solomon Islands trust has been enhanced by some New Zealand officer advisers being sworn into the RSIPF.

In the Solomon Islands, since moving to the transitional phase in 2009, progress has been slow, and it is clear that the RSIPF remains a long way from being able to stand alone without PPF support. Survey evidence suggests that people in the Solomon Islands have a stronger degree of trust in the PPF than in the RSIPF (see annex A (3)). Similarly in Bougainville, high degrees of public dissatisfaction with the BPS can be contrasted with confidence in the CAP, coupled with near universal clarity that CAP would not survive without on-going support (and leadership) from New Zealand. This suggests that in fragile and conflict-affected situations, delays in moving from operational policing to capacity

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<sup>59</sup> Partnership framework between Solomon Islands Government and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, April 2009

<sup>60</sup> See Partnership framework between Solomon Islands Government and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, April 2009

development (and from an aid-dependency to focusing on sustainability) fail to build the legitimacy of the state, and may even undermine it.

A key issue in the Solomon Islands is the very slow progress towards the establishment of RSIPF's policing philosophy, strategic direction and therefore concept of operations. As mentioned above, these strategic issues are now being tackled by a fundamental review of the Police Act, through a consultative process, supported by the AFP. New Zealand had a number of entry points for contributing to, and assisting to shape the transition and the focus of police work in the Solomon Islands, including promoting a community based approach to policing:

- at the political level through diplomatic and ministerial sub-group meetings;
- at the strategic level through the RAMSI coordination office, and New Zealand Police adviser deployments to RAMSI (currently three long term advisers); and
- at the operational level through New Zealand Police deployments to the PPF.

There is scope for New Zealand to strengthen its engagement within RAMSI during the transition process to ensure that New Zealand's expertise in community based approaches to policing are fully realised. For example, neither New Zealand Police nor MFAT appeared to be engaged in the Police Act reform process – a key entry point at the political and strategic level to provide expertise and insights into the mainstreaming within the RSIPF of a community based approach to policing.

#### 4.5 Relevance of the regional approach

The New Zealand Aid Programme has funded three initiatives that take a regional approach to police work: Pacific Islands Chief of Police (PICP); Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP); and Partnership for Pacific Policing (3P). The PICP Secretariat, which is based in Wellington, is co-funded by AFP. Design documents reveal four key motivations for a regional approach:

- to strengthen police networks, promote experience sharing and learning (especially PICP). This is in line with the AFP's approach through the Pacific Policing Development Programme and the Australian Institute of Police Management leadership development programme;
- to develop complementary interventions and common approaches across the Pacific, while recognising the cultural and context specific nature of interventions (especially PPDVP and 3P – for example it has been suggested that a mentoring tool kit for deployed officers could be developed under 3P);
- to develop accountability between police forces for taking forward initiatives (e.g. PPDVP); and



- to reduce MFAT and New Zealand Police transaction costs and enable nimble responses to requests for assistance (especially 3P).

Overall, these motivations appear to have borne fruit in practice – see key evaluation findings in table 4.1 below (also intervention overviews in annexes A (5), (6) and (7)).

**Table 4.1 Regional interventions: key evaluation findings**

<b>Intervention</b>	<b>Key findings</b>
PICP	The annual meeting of the Chiefs of Police is perceived to be useful, but more needs to be done to improve the level of engagement, leadership and participation of chiefs of police. There is a willingness to support projects that make a difference to community safety (cyber-safety awareness funded by AFP). (Evidence from stocktake report and evaluation interviews with Chiefs). Interviews with commissioners during the evaluation identified a number of challenges with the current workings of PICP including: the perception that it is driven by Wellington, and the need for a more decentralised approach for example through identifying project officers in country; and limited follow up after annual meetings.
PPDVP	The intervention was developed in response to strong sector-wide support to challenge and change attitudes (most recently evidenced in USA/Australia/New Zealand policy dialogue on women) and to activism for improved responses to violence against women. PPDVP was explicitly developed in response to this demand, following a PICP declaration. The intervention has resulted in increased improved response/support for victims of violence (See Annex A(6))
3P	Emerging results are tentative but there is a degree of demand from within the Pacific for a coordinated New Zealand and Australian programme to improve policing service to match community expectations.

Challenges associated with a regional approach are (i) the dangers of a ‘one size fits’ all approach to interventions in different countries with different cultural contexts. Concerns were expressed on this front by some stakeholders in relation to PPDV in the Cook Islands and Tonga; and (ii) it may promote a technically-led approach, and militate against a more context specific political and strategic engagement.

All the focus countries considered by the evaluation had both country specific and regional programmes during the evaluation period. In some cases regional programmes appear to have been rather disjointed from the country-level engagement. For example in the Cook Islands PPDVP was considered by in-country organisations to have insufficient local engagement. Similarly, as noted in table 4.1 above, PICP needs to have stronger country-level engagement with police chiefs, whose leadership is clearly vital for taking forward

reform. Within PICP it has been recognised through the recent formation of a PICP Pacific Policing Training Advisory Group, led by a Pacific Commissioner (Cook Islands), that while there is need for interventions to be context specific and to address national issues, there is also scope for general training and the production of training material to be streamlined across the region. This is in line with the approach taken by the Australian Institute of Police Management in the development of a regional police leadership programme.

These points suggest that there may be scope for a more coherent approach, which would enable strong integration of regional programmes (PDVP and PICP) with country-level interventions and national processes, as well as a vehicle for cross-regional working and lesson-learning. An expanded 3P with a new remit, bringing together all interventions in the Pacific under a single umbrella programme may provide a ready-made route for such an approach. This is discussed further in chapter six.

Finally, it is noted that the Pacific Forum has taken a strong lead in responding to crisis (e.g. RAMSI) and in coordinating regional security. There may therefore be potential for stronger integration into the Pacific Forum process to drive forward reform, accepting that the Forum does not represent all Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and recognising the sovereignty of each PIC in determining its own affairs.

## 4.6 Conclusions and lessons

Within the boundaries of its engagement – primarily around technical capacity building - New Zealand support has been relevant to context, and has responded to the needs of particular situations, including in relation to community policing interventions, and the transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach. A stronger focus on exit strategies may be required, although it is acknowledged that police work in small Pacific island states may inevitably involve some degree of long term substitution.

However, overall, limited context analysis means that broader relevance to country context is harder to see, particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where key policing issues may include for example inter-communal violence and disputes over land/ resources.

### **Lessons**

- **Strong context analysis is necessary before technical engagement in police reform. The New Deal for Fragile States emphasises the need for a country-led and owned approach to diagnosing the causes and effects of fragility.**  
[See recommendation 4 in chapter six.]
- **Context analysis should lead to interventions being driven by context-specific goals, articulated in results diagrams.** For example in fragile and conflict affected situations, a strong focus on statebuilding may be relevant, with clarity about the ‘problem’ to be addressed articulated in the goal statement of the intervention.  
[See recommendations 5 and 8 in chapter six.]
- **There is scope for a more coherent approach to police work in the Pacific by integrating activities currently carried out under regional thematic interventions with country-level interventions.**  
[See recommendation 3 in chapter six.]

## Chapter 5: Efficiency

### Key findings

- The programme has generally been properly resourced to reflect specific intervention designs. The broader institutional and governance issues associated with policing have not been included in intervention designs or resources.
- The relationship between New Zealand Police and MFAT is moving from one which is currently highly transactional, to a strategic partnership approach which should exploit the complementary skills and approaches of both organisations i.e. each organisation should focus on those activities at which it is most efficient.
- There is limited scope to improve value for money through cost savings. One route may be to consolidate police work in the Pacific under a single umbrella programme, incorporating funds for deeper analytical working and additional skills, potentially from outside New Zealand Police.

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the overall efficiency of police work in the Pacific funded through New Zealand's Aid Programme. It first considers efficiency in terms of how well human resources and institutional relationships were used to deliver results. It then considers whether the same results could have been achieved with fewer resources or at lower cost, and so makes an assessment of value for money. The chapter ends with a summary of key findings from which lessons are drawn out. A summary of key findings mapped against evaluation questions can be found in annex F.

### 5.2 Use of human resources and MFAT/New Zealand Police arrangements

#### 5.2.1 Human resource deployment

The vast majority of police work has been undertaken by sworn New Zealand Police officers. Non-sworn staff have also been deployed where appropriate (for example for communications work in the Solomon Islands), and outside expertise has been brought in to assist with particular aspects of the work (for example for programme design e.g. 3P). The use of serving New Zealand Police officers overseas has both external and internal advantages. Externally, developing international working relationships can serve as a foundation for close operational relationships and for tackling issues upstream before they

affect New Zealand. Internally, giving New Zealand Police officers the opportunity to develop skills in an international setting has the potential to improve the quality of New Zealand policing, particularly in relation to communities from other Pacific islands living in New Zealand.


As discussed in section 3.3.2 in chapter three above, the evaluation team was impressed with the enthusiasm and commitment of New Zealand Police personnel deployed. Section 3.3.2 also discusses the scope for enhancing the effectiveness and relevance of deployments.

MFAT funded police work developed organically, often in a highly responsive and flexible manner, and deploying a largely technical, skills transfer approach. The analysis in chapters three and four suggests that there is an opportunity for New Zealand to engage at a more strategic level in sustainable police reform in the Pacific. This implies the need for stronger analysis to inform a deeper political engagement, including developing understanding of the political economy of police reform, and country specific drivers of change.

### 5.2.2 MFAT / New Zealand police relations

As figure 5.1 illustrates, MFAT and New Zealand police interact regularly both in Wellington and in the field. The strength and degree of MFAT involvement varied between interventions, and in some cases changed over time, for example in relation to Bougainville where there has been increased engagement by MFAT post in the light of the need to develop an exit strategy.

**Figure 5.1: MFAT / New Zealand Police institutional arrangements**



Memoranda of understanding (MoUs) for the interventions considered by the evaluation team highlight the transactional (funder and recipient) nature of the relationship between MFAT and New Zealand Police during the evaluation period under which MFAT 'contracted out' the design, implementation and reporting on police work in the Pacific to New Zealand Police. MoUs read very similarly to contracts with private sector contractors. This is now changing. The intention is for MFAT and New Zealand Police to move to an engagement based on a strategic partnership. This is intended to put the relationship between the two organisations onto a stronger peer to peer basis, facilitating the blending of MFAT's developmental expertise with New Zealand Police's operational expertise.

Interviews with staff from both organisations highlighted their different and complementary skills and approaches. MFAT aid programme staff have expertise in international development: New Zealand Police have strong technical policing skills and a highly operational approach. The new partnership arrangement has the potential to exploit these different approaches, and to ensure productive cross-fertilisation between them. The current transactional nature of the relationship means that there can be frustrations and misunderstandings, revealed most clearly in MFAT's requirements for outcome orientated reporting, compared to the more operational and activity based approach familiar to the Police.

The increasing decentralisation of responsibility from Wellington to post has facilitated MFAT's engagement in project implementation, and a move towards a more partnership orientated relationship. In Papua New Guinea for example, constructive discussions were taking place at the time of the evaluation team's visit between MFAT and New Zealand Police on issues of CAP sustainability in Bougainville and the development of an exit strategy. This was clearly facilitated by the presence of an MFAT aid manager on the ground.

As is suggested in section 5.2.1 above, the evaluation team considers that there is scope for considerably stronger input from MFAT on analytical and police policy issues, and for tighter engagement between MFAT and New Zealand Police both in terms of the overall strategic direction of police work in Wellington, and on the political aspects of police work at post.

### 5.3 Relations with other donors

This section focuses on relations with Australia, New Zealand's key donor partner in the Pacific with strong engagement in police and broader security and justice reform in the region. Australia's implementation modalities are rather different to New Zealand's, with the AFP's International Deployment Group having their own budget for international development work. In addition, AusAid undertakes broader security and justice interventions through private sector contractors. A prime example is the Law and Justice Programme in Papua New Guinea implemented by Cardno, which is currently supplying an adviser to the Bougainville Police Service to support the re-structuring of the Service,


including integration of CAP. The Australian model for its international police work implies a number of potential entry points for MFAT and New Zealand Police to engage with Australia on police issues in the Pacific (see figure 5.2 on the following page).

The discussion below compares the contrasting approaches that have been taken by New Zealand to co-ordination with Australia in Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and in Tonga. In the Solomon Islands, relations are conducted within the context of RAMSI (discussed in section 4.4 in chapter 4 above).

AFP are not operating in Bougainville, but AusAid is providing significant inputs into Bougainville's criminal justice system including the BPS, through the Law and Justice Programme implemented by its contractor, Cardno. This provides a significant opportunity for New Zealand and AusAid to co-ordinate on an holistic approach to improving Bougainville's criminal justice system at the operational and strategic levels – both on the ground in Bougainville, and Port Moresby where key decision-making power in relation to the BPS lies. There is scope for stronger engagement with Cardno and AusAid. Encouragingly MFAT and AusAid have now begun to have regular coordination meetings in Port Moresby, but the evaluation team was told that their focus is on operational coordination, rather than on policy and strategic issues such as the future of policing in Bougainville.

By way of contrast in Tonga, New Zealand Police and AFP are working jointly on a jointly agreed plan to support the Government of Tonga on the implementation of its business plan for the Tonga Police (see annex A(4)).

**Figure 5.2 Potential entry points for engagement with Australia on police issues in the Pacific**



## 5.4 Value for money

To assess whether New Zealand police work in the Pacific represents value for money, this section considers whether the same results could have been achieved with fewer resources and/or at lower cost. In other words, it considers whether the 'unit cost' of delivery has been as low as it could have been.

The methodology is first to identify as far as possible what the total costs of delivering the results has been, including an assessment of cost drivers and opportunity costs. Then the potential for reducing these costs is discussed, and areas identified where cost reductions could feasibly have been made without negative impact on results.

### 5.4.1 Costs of delivering results

The costs of delivering results include both directly budgeted programme costs which are visibly attributable to the programme, and opportunity costs that are not.

#### **Budgeted or 'visible' costs**

The total cost of the international police services is approximately NZ\$ 19 million per annum, out of a total police budget of \$1.5 billion. Out of this total, non-ODA liaison officers cost about NZ\$ 4 million. The administrative overheads of the ISG amount to around NZ\$1.7 million per annum and the remainder, approximately NZ\$ 13 million, relates to ODA. The drivers of these costs include the type and number of people deployed, the cost per person, the way they are deployed, and the ISG overhead rate:

- **Type of people deployed** - given the costs of selection, training and deployment, the seniority of the officer is unlikely to have a significant bearing on the total cost of deployment. There could therefore be cost-benefits from deploying people at relatively senior levels, where capacity development efforts translate to benefits throughout the organisation. However, a judicious mix of skills and seniority is required and, as noted in section 3.3.2 in chapter three above, there is a need to match advisors/mentors to the seniority of their counterparts. As programmes move from operational peacekeeping to more developmental work, interventions need to adjust the set of skills provided (see section 4.4 in chapter four).
- **Number of people deployed** – clearly there is a direct relationship between the number of people deployed and the total costs. However, as the deployed officer is the central element in most intervention design and planning, he or she is the 'scaling unit' so – unless a fundamentally different delivery mechanism were to be used (for example, private sector contractors as discussed below) changing the number deployed – all other factors unchanged - would not have a significant value for money impact
- **Cost per person** - the deployment costs consist of normal salary, superannuation and uniform costs, together with additional allowances and expenditure associated with



working overseas. Additional costs, which would not otherwise be required, include transportation and freight as well as medical expenses and insurance (see intervention expenditure summaries in annex A). The average cost per person is difficult to determine from the expenditure data provided to the evaluation team, as the range of durations for which officers are deployed overseas varies over time and by intervention. In general, it would appear that allowances have fallen over time relative to basic salary packages.

- **Way people are deployed** - substituting for national police – as opposed to undertaking a developmental role - has both direct cost and value for money implications and, if continued for too long, may also delay the development of national ownership.
- **ISG overhead rate** – the ISG overhead of NZ\$1.7million represents less than 10% of direct deployment costs. This compares favourably with a typical private sector margin (profit + overheads) on deployed long term experts of 30-40% and 11-17% for UN agencies and International NGOs.<sup>61</sup>

#### **Opportunity or 'invisible' costs**

Opportunity costs are the benefits foregone as a result of an action: in this case the deployment of a New Zealand Police officer away from his or her post in New Zealand. These costs are 'invisible' in that they are not identifiable to the programme in financial reports, but they are a real cost to New Zealand nevertheless. Salaries associated with short overseas assignments are met by the officer's home unit, with colleagues 'filling in' while the officer is away. While this arrangement appears to be feasible for short one-off deployments, it represents an additional and sometimes unrecognised cost to the policing exercise.

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<sup>61</sup> MFAT and post costs not included.

### **5.4.2 Potential for reducing costs**

#### ***Reducing direct costs to the New Zealand Police***

The scope for reducing New Zealand Police costs is not immediately apparent. The basic salary package for police officers is fixed. Additional allowances for overseas deployment appear to vary considerably from intervention to intervention, although they seem to be falling over time.

It has been suggested (in section 3.3.2 in chapter three) that longer deployments could be more effective and therefore better value for money than short-term assignments. However, care would be needed to ensure that longer-term deployments remain focused on capacity development. Where deployed officers substitute for national officers, there must be a clear exit strategy to ensure that skills are transferred, improvements in performance are sustainable, and ownership remains with national institutions. The model for skills transfer practiced for example in the Cook Islands, of short-term assignments accompanied by on-going remote support (by e-mail and telephone) appears to combine the benefits of both approaches. The rate of absorption of capacity development activities should determine inputs.

The scope for using police from other countries in the region with a similar approach to policing was also raised during the evaluation. In Bougainville for example an officer from Vanuatu Police Force is part of the New Zealand contingent. Although there are costs to engaging and deploying third country police, these may be lower than for New Zealanders and there may be additional benefits in terms of regional networks. Third country police also do not incur any opportunity cost in New Zealand (though there would presumably be an 'exported' opportunity cost to their home station in the third country).

#### ***Alternative providers: private sector contractors***

The New Zealand Police, the main implementing agency for the programme, is a public sector agency subject to well-established procedures and remuneration packages. The potential for using alternative models for delivering police work, including using private contracts is discussed in chapter 8. Private providers can sometimes reduce costs by employing staff on a more flexible basis and retaining them for specific periods only. Although the cost per day/month may appear to be more expensive, the total cost of the input may be cheaper especially when opportunity costs are factored in. One area in which private sector providers can almost certainly reduce costs is the provision of local, as opposed to New Zealand-sourced, consultancy inputs. However the availability of suitable local consultancy services in most of the relevant intervention areas is likely to be limited.

#### ***Scope to reduce overheads***

New Zealand's international policing programme in the Pacific consists of a wide range of interventions with a broad geographic spread, some with relatively small, periodic activities. This increases overhead costs for relatively few benefits. Engagement that is deeper (in the

sense of more strategic and political) and broader (in the sense of broader policing issues) may imply a re-shaping of engagements across the Pacific, with a focus on stronger engagements with fewer states. Associated with this is the potential to rationalise engagement by moving to more integrated, regional 'expanded 3P' model, discussed in section 4.5 in chapter 4 above. The expanded 3P approach proposed, as well as enhancing the effectiveness of regional approaches through stronger integration with deeper country-level engagements, could be beneficial in terms of value for money, reducing transaction costs, and enabling rationalisation of activities. One example is the potential to reduce costs and increase value for money through a regional approach to training under PICP (see section 4.5 in chapter four).

### *5.4.3 Overall assessment*

The overall assessment is that there is limited scope to improve value for money through cost savings. However, the evaluation suggests that the main source of value for money gains is through securing progress in developing the capacity of partner country police forces, by allocating more resources to the wider institutional and governance arrangements for policing. This would require different sorts of skills and resources, working more analytically and perhaps more politically and, therefore, to some extent at least, based outside the police, perhaps in posts. Additional resources for deeper and wider analysis would improve the design and steering of interventions. The unit costs of such resources will be similar to those of police deployments. In addition, the need for stronger strategic engagement with the broad policing agenda could be addressed cost-effectively by the inclusion within an expanded 3P (see sections 4.5 in chapter 4 and 5.3.2 above) of a New Zealand Police strategic unit, responsible for taking forward strategic thinking about the nature of policing in the region.

## *5.5 Reporting*

New Zealand Police's financial reporting to MFAT on international police work is on an operational 'line by line' basis. Current procedures do not facilitate reporting against outcomes identified in intervention results diagrams. Moving to outcome based reporting would require New Zealand Police to develop new reporting procedures. More fundamentally, meaningful outcome-based reporting would require improved results diagrams, associated results measurements tables, and monitoring and evaluation processes. As discussed in section 3.4 in chapter 3 above, it is currently very difficult to measure results against outcomes, as they are dependent on undocumented assumptions, and tend to be output driven. During the evaluation period, none of the interventions had formal monitoring and evaluation systems. MFAT is now working with New Zealand Police to strengthen activity design documents.

## 5.6 Conclusions and lessons

Overall New Zealand police work has been undertaken efficiently. Scope to enhance the efficiency of the work at the operational level further lies with: strengthening the partnership relationship between MFAT and New Zealand Police; enhancing engagement with other donors, particularly AusAid and the AFP; and supplementing the work of New Zealand Police with the use of private contractors. More fundamentally, there is scope to re-shape engagements across the Pacific, with stronger engagements in fewer states. Associated with this is the potential to rationalise engagement through an 'expanded 3P' programme which brings together all interventions in the Pacific under a single umbrella.

### Lessons

- **There is scope for tighter analytical engagement between MFAT and New Zealand Police.** The developing partnership agreement between MFAT and New Zealand Police provides an opportunity to move the approach to police work to a more strategic level within a consistent conceptual framework.  
[See recommendations 1, 2 and 4 in chapter six.]
- **There is scope to rationalise and streamline police work, and enable deeper analytical working on a cost effective basis by bringing existing Pacific interventions together under one umbrella programme.**  
[See recommendation 3 in chapter six.]
- **Outcome-based financial reporting requires strengthened results diagrams and results measurement tables.**  
[See recommendations 4 and 8 in chapter six.]

## **Chapter 6: Recommendations**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter makes recommendations to improve the effectiveness, sustainability, relevance and efficiency of New Zealand's Aid Programme funded police work, and gender and human rights outcomes. The key message of the evaluation is the need to improve the relevance and sustainability of New Zealand's police work by moving away from a technically-led approach, to a much more strategic and context-specific engagement. MFAT and New Zealand Police need to reach a broader understanding of what 'police work' is – moving beyond technical fixes, to an engagement that recognises the inherently political nature of policing and embeds policing within the broader security and justice context. The operational implication of this message is for a different allocation of resources for police work, with much greater investment in diagnostic work including context and political economy analysis; on intervention design; and on significantly more robust monitoring and evaluation particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where lessons about what works in policing and its contribution to statebuilding and peacebuilding are emerging internationally. This in turn implies much stronger engagement from MFAT in international police work (by International Development Group and at the broader policy and diplomatic levels), in partnership with New Zealand Police's more technically-focused inputs.

The recommendations set out below should be considered within the context of the available resource envelope for policing work within New Zealand's aid programme (for which non-programme allocations are estimated to remain constant over the next 3 years), and prioritised accordingly. It is noted that many of the recommendations are already acknowledged and in the process of being taken forward by MFAT and New Zealand Police, and the developing partnership agreement between them provides an excellent opportunity to consolidate this process. The chapter ends with a summary of recommendations highlighting their impact and priority.

### **6.2 Recommendations**

#### ***6.2.2 Conceptual framework / theory of change for police work***

Police work has contributed to building technically competent police forces, but sustainable reform requires broader engagement and contextualisation, especially in conflict affected situations. In both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, while New Zealand Police have supported community policing approaches, the performance and community perceptions of partner police forces has not improved (and may have declined) over the evaluation period. There is need for a more context specific, strategic and holistic approach, which engages in issues beyond technical support to police capacity development.

This evaluation comes at a time when MFAT and the New Zealand Police are looking to move their approach to police work to a more strategic level through a better defined partnership approach, enabling a streamlining of their operational engagement within a consistent conceptual framework. The key to forging effective partnership agreements involves more than establishing relationships between like-minded partners who share the same values. In particular, there is the need to undertake and maintain a common understanding of the underlying problem being addressed, out of which a joint programme emerges. Discussions with MFAT and with New Zealand Police in Wellington and in the field undertaken during this evaluation suggest that the conceptual framework for police work presented in chapter two and in annex C could form the basis of a shared understanding of police work. The framework could not be implemented by New Zealand Police alone, but if it were to be included in the developing partnership agreement with MFAT, could form the starting point for a more holistic implementation model, involving MFAT in active engagement with *policing* issues across the broad context of governance and institutional arrangements for policing, complementing New Zealand Police's more focused engagement with partner country police.

As part of the conceptual framework, there is need for greater clarity on how New Zealand Police's principles for community policing relate to international contexts. There is a need to recognise explicitly the need to adopt context specific approaches particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where (unlike New Zealand) the legitimacy of the state and therefore of the police as the public face of the state cannot be assumed; where the police are operating within a dysfunctional criminal justice system; and where it is informal, non-state dispute resolution providers that are considered by communities to have more legitimacy than the formal police: issues which are all taken for granted in established democracies such as New Zealand. This is important to ensure that community policing remains valid in a region where the overriding security problems relate to state-community conflicts over land and extractive industries and inter-communal tensions.

**Recommendation 1: Develop a clear conceptual framework / theory of change for police work and identify resources to operationalise it.**

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should explicitly set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change in their developing partnership agreement, and identify and define the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT (IDG and broader policy and diplomatic engagement) in contributing to the desired change.
- New Zealand Police should develop explicit *community policing principles for international work*, emphasising the need to adopt context specific approaches particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where the legitimacy of the state (and so of the police) may be contested.

### 6.2.3 Political and strategic engagement

Operationalising the broader approach to policing proposed in the conceptual framework does not mean that the New Zealand Aid Programme should necessarily support interventions in every aspect of the governance and institutional arrangements for policing, but it does mean that there is scope for stronger analysis and engagement in the political and strategic issues around policing.

Policing is always and everywhere a political process. In the Cook Islands, the long term sustainability of New Zealand Police inputs is challenged by the slow pace of Police Act reform needed to tackle the politicisation of the police. In Tonga Police Act reform is threatened by limited ownership of the reform process from some elements within the police. Sustainable reform to support affordable police forces also requires tackling deep seated systemic issues relating to recurrent budgets and human resources – also requiring engagement at the political/ policy level.

MFAT should strengthen its engagement with police work at the political level in country by identifying specific entry points for complementary political and strategic engagement in policing in partner countries, particularly in fragile and conflict affected ones, where such engagement will often take place through a regional or multi-national body (such as RAMSI in the Solomon Islands). In addition, at the regional level, there may be potential for stronger integration into the Pacific Forum process to drive forward reform, recognising that the Forum does not represent all PICs and the sovereignty of each PIC in determining its own affairs.

At the strategic level, there is scope to leverage New Zealand Police's expertise in community policing approaches through tighter engagement with AFP, whose focus in the region tends to be on core police organisational development. While New Zealand Police view community policing as a *whole of policing* approach, this has in some cases proved challenging to operationalise, particularly in conflict affected situations. As described in paragraph 3.3.2 in chapter three above, in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu community policing has in practice been addressed mainly as a *niche* New Zealand-supported activity within police operations, and this has militated against it being mainstreamed within the partner country police force. For example, while the CAP in Bougainville provide a strong model of community policing, their effectiveness and sustainability is constrained by limited strategic engagement with the BPS and more particularly with the Royal PNG Constabulary and policy-makers in Port Moresby. Securing New Zealand investments in the operational aspects of community policing requires strong engagement with core organisational development and engaging with the legitimacy of policing through institutional support and development of all aspects of the policing system. While at an operational level, it is possible during the design and preparation stages to partition areas of work (sub-projects) between AFP and New Zealand Police, this is less feasible as the issues become more strategic affecting either the partner police force as an

organisation or the political and social context. The Tonga Police Development Programme provides a good example of a nationally owned, jointly prepared and locally managed support programme. To take this approach forward, New Zealand Police should consider having a presence in AFP in Canberra to leverage the expertise, skills, experience of both New Zealand Police and AFP in a manner that meets each agency's needs, particularly in strategic approaches to ensure Australian and New Zealand security interests are better understood and met in deployments.

In order to enhance its ability to engage strategically with police reform in the region, consideration should be given to setting up within ISG a strategic unit with multi-disciplinary skills responsible for steering the police work throughout the Pacific region, taking forward strategic thinking about the nature of policing in the region, and the development of context-specific policing interventions. The unit would have funds for strategic studies and be responsible for maintaining strategic relationships including with AFP.

Finally, there may be scope for MFAT and New Zealand Police to work closely with the NZ Defence Force at the strategic level. Regional issues are important to New Zealand interests, from both a defence and policing perspective. NZ Defence Force is engaged to undertake analysis of significant issues that have an impact on the Government's defence policy and international defence relations including developments in the international security environment, especially in the South Pacific and Asia; changes in the defence and security policies of key partners such as Australia and the United States; and developments in regional security relations.<sup>62</sup> This analysis could add significantly to decisions on deployment of New Zealand Police resources.

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<sup>62</sup> <http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/annual-report-2011/part3-policy-advice.html> Accessed on 15 June 2012



**Recommendation 2: Strengthen engagement on policing at the political and strategic level.**

- MFAT (IDG post) and New Zealand should through context analysis at the partner country level identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement, and identify entry points and strategies for engagement (including through multi-national bodies such as RAMSI). This is likely to require engagement at the diplomatic level at post.
- MFAT (led by IDG) should consider engagement with the Pacific Forum on police reform as a mechanism to drive reform forward.
- New Zealand Police should enhance strategic engagement with the AFP, including possibly through a secondment to Canberra. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AFP.
- New Zealand Police's ability to engage with policing at the strategic level should be enhanced by the formation of a strategic unit in ISG with multi-disciplinary skills.
- New Zealand Police and MFAT (led by IDG) should work at the analytical / strategic level with New Zealand Defence Force to leverage the skills of each agency.

#### 6.2.4 Rationalisation of engagement

MFAT and New Zealand Police should consider the shape of police work in the Pacific in the light of recommendations (below) about the need for enhanced investment in diagnostic, design and monitoring and evaluation. The call for enhanced investment in each intervention (aimed at achieving improved value for money) together with New Zealand Police concern about abstractions may point to fewer more strategic interventions that engage more broadly and deeply with the governance and institutional arrangements for policing that this evaluation has argued are necessary to deliver *safe and secure communities*. Such a move would clearly need to be phased as current interventions draw to a close, and would initially impact on new requests for assistance.

In addition, there is scope for consolidation and rationalisation of New Zealand's police work in the Pacific through an umbrella programme potentially taken forward under an expanded and re-modelled 3P. Such rationalisation would reduce management costs; enable activities under regional interventions to be integrated with country-based interventions thus reducing overlap and enhancing effective engagement; facilitate cross-regional working (for example training) and lesson-learning and the integration of these inputs into country interventions; and in general promote a more coherent approach to engagement around an agreed conceptual framework for police work. Such an umbrella programme would bring together:

- country-level interventions comprising intensive support interventions (such as Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue); and limited support interventions (all other countries in Pacific Islands Forum);
- support to regional networks (such as PICP) ;
- regional support to country initiatives (such as PPDVP which would be treated as a thematic programme supporting country interventions, rather than providing 'standalone' activities);
- regional support to capacity development (including centralised regional training school, training materials); and
- a strategic unit within ISG (see recommendation 2 above).

**Recommendation 3: Rationalise the structure of police work in the Pacific under an umbrella programme bringing together regional and country-level interventions**

- Within the context of their developing partnership agreement, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should consider the scope and structure of engagement in the Pacific and review the potential for consolidation a under an expanded and remodelled 3P programme

### *6.2.5 Diagnostic work before engagement*

Particularly in fragile and conflict affected environments, each intervention should be underpinned by explicit and documented context-specific problem identification; context analysis (including political economy analysis); and risk assessment. In line with the programme conceptual framework presented in chapter two, key issues to be explored for each intervention in each context include: (i) the legality and legitimacy of the state, and of the police as the public face of the state; (ii) the political drivers of change and incentives of different players to undertake reform; (iii) the role and legitimacy of the police in relation to non-state dispute resolution systems; and (iv) the relationship between the police and different communities. Stronger context analysis should lead to more broadly designed interventions which link in with broader justice reform initiatives (for example Samoa's national cross-cutting justice reform process).

The police are the 'public face' of the state, and so poor performance and limited community trust in the police (as in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands) have important implications for broader issues of statebuilding, peacebuilding and stability. Police work therefore needs to be conceptualised, designed and implemented within a wider statebuilding context. This includes a clear definition of the problem to be addressed (relating to the causes and effects of fragility such as inter-communal issues and / or disputes over resources). The New Deal for Fragile States emphasises the need for a *country-led and owned* approach to diagnosing the causes and effects of fragility.

The assumptions underlying the programme (set out in annex C) need to be tested in each context. This type of analysis is particularly important in fragile and conflict affected situations, which by definition are unstable and fluid, and in which different approaches are required as peacekeeping work transitions into capacity development.

The scope of this diagnostic work will clearly vary from intervention to intervention: in very small states, a light-touch analysis is appropriate. At a minimum it should comprise a brief analytical paper setting out: the context-specific policing issue to be addressed; the assumptions underlying the proposed intervention; and an analysis of the issues (i) – (iv) set out in the first paragraph of this section 6.2.5.

New Zealand Police are currently not well-placed to undertake this type of analytical work, which should be distinguished from pre-deployment / operational scoping. This requires a wider range of competencies, including governance and political economy skills. It is recommended that MFAT should undertake responsibility for taking forward this work, drawing on analysis undertaken by academics, international development specialists, NGOs (or contracted out to them), as well as New Zealand Police. It should be the norm for diagnostic and analytical work to be undertaken by a tight multi-disciplinary team including as well as expertise in policing, political economy and social development competencies. Such expertise may be available in partner countries for example in universities or NGOs. In addition, undertaking interventions in partnership with other development agencies (such as AFP or AusAid) provides an opportunity for common context analysis and problem identification, as well as harmonised approaches.

While the diagnostic should be developed by technical experts, it will require broader policy inputs including from diplomatic staff at post. It should then inform MFAT's engagement with policing by IDG as well at the broader policy/diplomatic level (as well as New Zealand Police's more technical engagement). The initial diagnostic should be tested and up-dated as implementation progresses.

**Recommendation 4: Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.**

- As a first step to strengthening diagnostic work, the New Zealand Aid Programme should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led *fragility assessment* in the region (for example in the Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States in consultation with partners in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.
- MFAT (led by IDG) and New Zealand Police should determine where responsibility for enhanced diagnostic work lies – to what extent with MFAT and to what extent with New Zealand Police, and what additional resourcing (including technical competencies) are needed to enable it to take place.
- MFAT (IDG) should explore the potential for tighter engagement with AusAid to promote joint understandings of security and justice issues in the region, and at the intervention level common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AFP.

#### 6.2.6 Intervention design

Strong diagnostic work should lead to context-specific problem identification, which in turn should inform the context-specific intervention goal, and the results should cascade down from this. Such an approach militates against a ‘bottom up’ technically-led approach revealed by current intervention design documents.

On the basis of sound diagnostic work, a context (country) specific goal should be developed for each intervention (rather than a generic goal of ‘safe and secure communities’). It should be the goal which drives intervention design (rather being driven by outputs as at present). Results diagrams should be supplemented with a clear and context specific *theory of change* which articulates the assumptions on which each intervention is based. Clarity about goals is particularly important where initial engagement is through peacekeeping. Delays in moving from operational policing to capacity development (Solomon Islands) and from aid-dependency to a focus on sustainability (Bougainville) can threaten statebuilding and stability. When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality. Table 6.1 below provides an example of possible generic transition plan for police operations, which the evaluation team has developed on the basis of the McKinsey ‘7S’ model. In the context of a joint command (such as the PPF / RAMSI) responsibility for such a plan would lie with the joint command structure.

**Table 6.1 Generic transition plan from peacekeeping to development**

	<b>Phase 1: peacekeeping</b>	<b>Phase 2: transitional</b>	<b>Phase 3: development</b>
<b>Strategy</b>	Rapid response, 'shock and awe', restoration of order and apprehension of offenders	Concentration on getting the basics right in local policing, shared ownership	Community, government and sector engagement to consolidate mandate
<b>Structure</b>	Rigid, hierarchical, formed tactical groups with narrow span of control, centralised	Centralised, span of control built on identified roles, competency framework with mid management authority based on skills	Decentralised, aligned to community structures, embedded in a clear plan that defines roles and responsibilities
<b>Systems</b>	Rapid communication to enable effective interventions, highly mobilised	Clarity of roles, retaining public order groups but merging into capacity development, new selection systems	Legislative, policy and concept of operations clearly outline the role of police in criminal justice system
<b>Style</b>	Command, control, no discretion	Consolidate ability to transition using formal and informal approaches including mentoring	More ability to exercise discretion with emphasis on integrity, ethical conduct and personal responsibility
<b>Shared values</b>	Discipline, obedience, team cohesion, fit, proficient in use of force, defensive tactics and weapons	Shared understanding of 'how and why we do things around here' and what needs to change and who needs to go	Police as part of the community, not apart from it, driven by community policing principles
<b>Skills</b>	High technical competence with clear roles to suppress disorder and regain control	Technical expertise deployed at all levels and across constabulary, admin and support, holistic	Situational awareness and leadership based on engagement, role models, relationships and moral authority
<b>Staffing</b>	Specially selected, tested and deployed to be highly responsive and rapidly change tactics to adapt and overwhelm opposition	Job specific training or mix of police/capacity development teams, clear emphasis on building sustainability in local police	Composition of police matches ethnicity, gender mix with abilities to work in and with the community at all levels

Source: Based on the McKinsey 7S model

**Recommendation 5: Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.**

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should in their developing partnership agreement specify clear processes to enable close collaboration between them on intervention design.
- MFAT (IDG) should develop clear guidance on how to design policing interventions and develop results diagrams underpinned by a context specific theory of change which explicitly identifies assumptions on which the intervention is based.
- When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality.

### *6.2.7 New Zealand Police's deployment model*

There is scope for New Zealand Police to re-consider some aspects of their deployment model:

- Police advisers should have a stronger focus on capacity development /mentoring / advising, and should be actively discouraged from substituting for local staff, which could unintentionally undermine, rather than build up, local capacity - even at the risk of slower progress on implementation;
- Police advisers should be of the appropriate rank and have appropriate experience when counterparted with an officer from a partner country;
- Care should be taken to ensure that police skills are matched with requirements of the local police force. In some cases New Zealand Police may need to source specialist skills (e.g. in change management or coaching) from outside New Zealand Police. In some cases appropriate skills may be available locally (for example in relation to social development issues or gender). The partner police force should be involved in the selection of advisers (especially long term ones);
- The policy of short term (six-month deployments) should be reconsidered when operating in a developmental context. It may be that fewer, longer term deployments may be more effective, and so provide better value for money than more, shorter term deployments;
- Pre-deployment training should be reviewed in the light of feedback from staff returned from deployment.

In addition, MFAT and New Zealand Police should consider whether there would be advantages in complementing the police work undertaken by New Zealand Police, with some contracting out (see two alternative models in box 6.1 below). If the field were widened, and some international work put out to tender, it could reduce abstraction issues for New Zealand Police, and enable the deployment of senior, experienced former officers.

Greater use of local consultants and expertise should be considered in countries where this is available. Local consultants represent value for money as they provide local knowledge at lower cost. Consideration should also be given to entering into partnerships with other regional police services, perhaps by expanding on the current arrangements whereby officers from other Pacific islands join New Zealand Police teams.

**Box 6.1 Alternative models for developmental and capacity building international police work**

**Northern hemisphere donor nations:** Programmes tend to be wider than police development and reform and concentrate upon broader policing issues incorporating the development of formal and informal dispute resolution systems and civil society in the wider issues of police delivery and accountability. Programmes are designed by teams that are separate from the people assigned to deliver the projects and are routinely monitored and evaluated by independent groups. Delivery is almost always contracted out to services providers who recruit specialists to deliver the results. Most police experts are retired police officers with appropriate experience in either a specialist discipline, e.g. criminal investigation, or have been in the strategic command to enable mentoring at the appropriate level. The use of retired officers is appropriate because the need for totally up-to-date skills is not so great in most of the areas of operations as most require a back to basics approach.

**Australia:** Assistance is financed through direct activities of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) through its International Deployment Group. The International Deployment Group is a large standing group of police personnel and embedded civilian experts and is drawn from the AFP or from State police organisations within Australia. This methodology avoids extraction of valuable resources from routine police duties within the communities of Australia.

**Recommendation 6: Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.**

- As a first step, as part of the developing partnership agreement with MFAT, NZ Police should review its approach to police organisational development and individual skills development and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement (e.g. deployment length, explicit exit strategies for deployed staff)
- MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should consider alternative models of provision, including some contracting out to retired officers to increase the seniority of officers provided and reduce abstraction rates.

### **6.2.8 Gender and human rights**

There is scope for MFAT to strengthen its approach to incorporating gender and human rights issues in its policing work by providing gender and human rights guidance and training; linking to partner country national gender and human rights processes; and ensuring that design always involves listening to women and civil society on gender and human rights issues. Gender and human rights should be explicit in new country-level results diagrams (and associated results measurements tables).

These recommendations are important in their own right, but in addition there is a strategic case to be made for deeper and broader gender mainstreaming, including in relation to police human resource policies. For example in Tonga, it was the women police officers who tended to show a positive commitment to reform (see annex A (4)), and police women have a key role in operationalising effective community policing.

#### **Recommendation 7: Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.**

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing<sup>63</sup> so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work.
- MFAT (IDG) should provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights.
- In guidance on intervention design (see recommendation 5 above) MFAT (IDG) should include a requirement to link into partner country national gender and human rights processes into intervention design and monitoring and evaluation (including adopting national gender and human rights indicators where appropriate) to promote sustainable approaches.
- Where appropriate include gender and human rights expertise on the design team, and ensure that intervention design processes always involve listening to the voice of women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.

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<sup>63</sup> Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom



### **6.2.9 Monitoring and evaluation**

Work being undertaken by MFAT to strengthen activity design documents is a good starting point for strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of interventions. Each intervention should have locally developed and owned indicators which where possible are aligned with partner police force's own monitoring and evaluation and management information systems. As well as ensuring a focus on robust initial outcome indicators (as well as output reporting), it is important to build lesson-learning loops into intervention design, to ensure that the initial design is re-considered and adapted as implementation progresses. This is particularly important in unstable, fragile and conflict affected contexts, where the context of interventions may change over time.

**Recommendation 8: Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.**

- As a first step MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop clear guidance on development of indicators for police work based on the points below.
- Intervention-level results measurement tables should contain indicators that are context specific and 'actionable' i.e. indicators are linked to both the partner police's management information systems to inform national decision-making as well as meeting MFAT's requirements to demonstrate strategic progress. (The indicative programme-level results measurement table in annex H which has been developed by the evaluation team contains generic indicators which may assist with the development of intervention-level indicators).
- MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop strong procedures for monitoring and evaluation to feed into lesson learning about what works and why, including on-going testing of assumptions on which an intervention is based.
- There should be a strong focus on piloting new approaches before they are rolled out, accompanied by robust monitoring and evaluation.

**Table 6.2 Summary of recommendations**

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility <sup>64</sup>	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium- term/ long- term)
<b>1.</b>	<b>Develop a clear conceptual framework / theory of change for police work and identify resources to operationalise it.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explicitly set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change in their developing partnership agreement, and identify and define the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT in contributing to the desired change.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop explicit <i>community policing principles for international work</i>, emphasising the need to adopt context specific approaches particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where the legitimacy of the state (and so of the police) may be contested.</li> </ul>	NZP	High	Medium-term
<b>2.</b>	<b>Strengthen engagement on policing at the political and strategic level.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Through context analysis at the partner country level identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement, and identify entry points and strategies for engagement (including through regional bodies such as RAMSI)</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG post with broader policy and diplomatic input) / NZP	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider engagement with the Pacific Forum on police reform as a mechanism to drive reform forward.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG led with broader MFAT policy input)	Low	Long-term
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enhance strategic engagement with the AFP, including possibly through New Zealand Police secondment to Canberra. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) /NZP	Medium	Immediate

<sup>64</sup> Unless stated otherwise, responsibility lies with Wellington, rather than post

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility <sup>64</sup>	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium- term/ long- term)
	evaluation report with AFP.			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Form a strategic unit in ISG with multi-disciplinary skills.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Medium-term
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work at the analytical / strategic level with New Zealand Defence Force to leverage the skills of each agency.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG led with broader policy input) / NZP	Medium	Long-term
<b>3.</b>	<b>Rationalise the structure of police work in the Pacific under an umbrella programme bringing together regional and country-led interventions</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Within the context of their developing partnership agreement, consider the scope and structure of engagement in the Pacific and review the potential for consolidation under an expanded 3P programme</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)/ NZP	Medium	Immediate
<b>4.</b>	<b>Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The New Zealand Aid Programme should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led <i>fragility assessment</i> in the region (for example in the Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States in consultation with partners in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG/ NZ's representative at the International Dialogue)	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine where responsibility for enhanced diagnostic work lies – to what extent with MFAT and to what extent with New Zealand Police, and what additional resourcing (including technical competencies) are needed to enable it to take place.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explore the potential for tighter engagement with AusAid to promote joint understanding of security and justice issues in the region, and at the intervention level common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AusAid.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Immediate

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility <sup>64</sup>	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium- term/ long- term)
<b>5.</b>	<b>Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In MFAT and New Zealand Police's developing partnership agreement specify clear processes to enable their close collaboration on intervention design</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)/ NZP	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop clear guidance on how to design policing interventions and develop results diagrams underpinned by a context specific theory of change which explicitly identifies assumptions on which the intervention is based.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG post with broader policy and diplomatic input )/ NZP	High	Medium-term
<b>6.</b>	<b>Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As part of the developing partnership agreement with MFAT, New Zealand Police should review its approach to police organisational development and individual skills development and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement (e.g. deployment length, explicit exit strategies for deployed staff)</li> </ul>	NZP	Medium	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider alternative models of provision, including some contracting out to retired officers to increase the seniority of officers provided and reduce abstraction rates.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	Medium	Medium-term
<b>7.</b>	<b>Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing<sup>65</sup> so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term

<sup>65</sup> Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility <sup>64</sup>	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium- term/ long- term)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In guidance on intervention design (see recommendation 5 above) include a requirement to link partner country national gender and human rights processes into intervention design and monitoring and evaluation (including adopting national gender and human rights indicators where appropriate) to promote sustainable approaches.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Where appropriate include gender and human rights expertise on the design team, and ensure that intervention design processes always involve listening to the voice of women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG post, or Wellington if intervention is managed from there) / NZP	High	Medium-term
<b>8.</b>	<b>Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop clear guidance on development of indicators for police work based on the points below.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG)	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Intervention-level results measurement tables should contain indicators that are context specific and 'actionable' i.e. indicators are linked to both the partner police's management information systems to inform national decision-making and meet MFAT's requirements to demonstrate strategic progress.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There should be a strong focus on piloting new approaches before they are rolled out, accompanied by robust monitoring and evaluation.</li> </ul>	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Medium-term