STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF POLICE WORK FUNDED UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND AID PROGRAMME 2005-2011

Police work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

Report by The Law & Development Partnership

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Abstract

This programme level strategic evaluation covers police work undertaken in fragile and conflict affected contexts funded through the New Zealand Aid Programme by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and implemented by the New Zealand Police during the period 2005-2011. The evaluation's purpose was to assess the overall achievements of the programme and make recommendations as to how it could be more effective, sustainable, relevant and efficient in the future. These issues were tested against a conceptual framework which addressed police technical capacity development as well as the broader institutional and governance context for policing. The evaluation was undertaken by way of a document review, stakeholder interviews and field observations in Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville), Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. There are two main findings in relation to police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts. First, New Zealand Police have contributed efficiently and effectively to building the technical capacity of national police services in highly challenging situations. However, the intended outcomes of interventions which relate to systemic change in police effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability have proved elusive. The second finding relates to the sustainability and relevance of interventions. In all the fragile and conflict-affected situations in which New Zealand Police operate, the boundaries of legitimate state action, and thus of the police as the public face of the state is contested. While the New Zealand's international police programme is highly relevant in terms of its peace-keeping role and developing capacity to address 'individual crimes', interventions have not been sufficiently contextualised within broader and more serious policing issues related to the underlying causes of fragility including inter-communal and state-community tensions. As a result, the long term robustness of achievements remains uncertain.

Glossary of acronyms

ABG	Autonomous Government of Bougainville
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
AusAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BCPP	Bougainville Community Policing Project
BPS	Bougainville Police Service
CAP	Community Auxiliary Police
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EAS	Evaluation analysis sheet
EUPOL	European Union Police
FCAS	Fragile and conflict affected state
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoPNG	Government of Papua New Guinea
IDG	International Development Group (MFAT)
ISG	New Zealand Police's International Service Group
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZP	New Zealand Police
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OH	Operation Highland
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNTL	National Police of Timor-Leste
PPF	Participating Police Force
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PTCCC	Pacific Transnational Crime Coordinating Centre
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RSIPF	The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
RTC	Regional Training College
TLCPP	Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

Executive Summary

Background and Context

Police work is an important part of New Zealand's international development assistance. Effective policing is vital for *building safe and secure communities* - now one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFAT) four priority themes for its aid programme, supporting the core focus of *sustainable economic development*.

This strategic evaluation covers police work funded by MFAT and implemented by the New Zealand Police during the period 2005- 2011, costing over NZ$ 75 million, approximately one and a half per cent of the total aid programme. This report considers New Zealand's police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts, with a focus on interventions in Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville), Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste. Field work for the evaluation was undertaken during March-July 2012 by a small multi-disciplinary team.

A partner report considers New Zealand's police work in the Pacific region including the Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands interventions.

Conceptual framework for police work and evaluation methodology

New Zealand's portfolio of police work has developed and evolved over time, rather than being conceived as a single programme with an explicit conceptual framework. The work – which was often initiated in response to an emergency - is described in a complex and partial set of documentation relating to individual interventions which are less than clear as to intended goals and results, and as to the analysis underlying their design. In the absence of formal outcome-orientated monitoring and evaluation systems and baselines, this evaluation has (a) constructed a conceptual framework and results diagram at the programmatic level (based results diagrams constructed at the intervention level); and (b) evaluated against the constructed results diagram using available evidence.

The constructed conceptual framework views police work as encompassing (a) the capacity of the police as an organisation; and (b) the relationships between the police and a number of other institutions: (i) polity/society as a whole; (ii) communities; (iii) the formal criminal justice system; and (iv) non-state dispute resolution systems. It is *policing* in this broad sense which is the subject matter for this evaluation. The evaluation gives particular consideration to community policing, which has been the focus of much of MFAT funded police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts.

Effectiveness and sustainability

New Zealand Police have contributed to restoring stability in conflict affected situations. Demonstration of community based approaches to policing have borne results in highly challenging and often unstable and changing environments, often in complex multi-donor environments. Clear strengths of the New Zealand approach is that assistance has been provided by one police service to another, that New Zealand is prepared to engage for the long haul, and has deployed high quality and very professional officers. Key operational lessons include the importance of: individual officers establishing close professional relations with partner country police forces; adopting flexible and pragmatic approaches to problems on the ground; pro-actively demonstrating how to engage with communities (for example through youth / sports clubs, women's groups); adopting culturally sensitive approaches; and demonstrating an out-going 'user friendly' style to local police forces more attuned to paramilitary policing approaches.

At the operational level, the benefits of New Zealand police work are being constrained in some cases by short-term deployments, imperfect skills matches, a tendency to substitute for local staff without a clear exit strategy to enable improvements to be sustainable, and differences in rank between New Zealand advisers and partner country police.

Despite the good work being done, interventions in fragile and conflict affected contexts have either not achieved, or only partially achieved their intended outcomes, which broadly relate to the effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability of partner country police forces. Deep-rooted systemic issues which will take a long time to resolve have inhibited the achievement of sustainable results. Operating under a joint command (such as RAMSI or UNPOL) has constrained New Zealand Police's approach, and in particular limited their ability to mainstream community policing. But limited achievement of intended results is mainly attributable to a technically-led approach, which focuses on New Zealand Police supporting *police* individual skills and organisational development, with limited attention by given MFAT to the broader *policing* context, especially the mandate and legitimacy of the police and the political ownership of the reform process. A technically-led approach is not sufficient to deliver on a sustainable basis the programme goal of safe and secure communities in conflict affected situations.

Relevance

New Zealand's police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts is well-aligned and relevant to New Zealand's developmental, foreign policy and security objectives.

New Zealand Police have demonstrated that community policing works, even in highly fragile and conflict affected environments. They have made relevant contributions to the critical transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach, although there have been some delays and missed opportunities.

The broader relevance of the work has been constrained by limited analysis of the broader context for policing including political economy analysis, particularly important in fragile and conflict affected country contexts where: (i) the legitimacy of the state and the police as the public face of the state should not be assumed; (ii) the police may be operating within a dysfunctional criminal justice system; and (iii) it may be informal, non-state systems of policing that are considered by communities to have more legitimacy than the formal police force. MFAT has a key role in engaging with these broader issues, which fall outside New Zealand Police's police technical support mandate.

Efficiency

New Zealand's international policing programme has been properly resourced. There is limited scope to improve further value for money through cost savings. There are however opportunities for improved efficiency through stronger engagement between MFAT / NZ Police and AusAid and the Australian Federal Police on security and justice issues.

Key recommendations

The overarching recommendation is that MFAT should continue to fund New Zealand Police's international police work in fragile and conflict contexts. New Zealand Police have delivered strong technical inputs, at modest cost. Recommendations are made as to how this work could be further improved – particularly in relation to its sustainability and relevance.

 The key recommendation is to develop the currently technically-led approach into a more strategic, politically informed, and context-specific one. This will require a different allocation of resources for police work, with much greater investment in diagnostic work including context and political economy analysis; on intervention design; and on more robust monitoring and evaluation, particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where lessons about what works in policing and its contribution to statebuilding and peacebuilding are emerging internationally. This implies much stronger engagement from MFAT - by IDG and at the broader policy and diplomatic levels.

1. Develop a clear conceptual framework / theory of change for police work and identify resources to operationalise it.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change in their developing partnership agreement, and identify and define the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT in contributing to the desired change: i.e. MFAT (IDG and more broadly) focusing on political influencing and broader institutional / governance analysis and engagement; and NZP on technical capacity building with partner country police forces.

- Develop explicit community policing principles for international work, emphasising the need to adopt context specific approaches particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where the legitimacy of the state (and so of the police) may be contested; where the underlying causes of conflict (e.g. inter-communal tensions) may impact on the relevance of community policing; and where non-state actors may be considered to be more legitimate providers of security than the police.

2. Strengthen engagement on policing at the political level and strategic level.
- As a first step, MFAT and New Zealand Police should on the basis of county-specific context (including political economy) analysis identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement in interventions, entry points and strategies for engagement (including through multi-national bodies such as RAMSI and the UN and through forming alliances with like-minded donors). There is need for enhance engagement on policing issues at the diplomatic level at post.

- New Zealand Police should strengthen strategic engagement with the Australian Federal Police, including possibly through a secondment to Canberra. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AFP.

- New Zealand Police ability to engage with policing at the strategic level could be strengthened by the formation of a strategic unit within the International Service Group with multi-disciplinary skills.

3. Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.

Always, but particularly in fragile and conflict affected environments, interventions should be underpinned by explicit and documented context-specific problem identification; context analysis (including political economy analysis); and risk assessment. Where initial engagement is in response to a crisis, diagnostic work should be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter. In line with the New Deal for Fragile States where possible such diagnostic work should be country-led.

- As a first step to strengthening diagnostic work, MFAT (IDG) should develop and support the introduction of a simple six point diagnostic tool to enable light touch assessments of (i) the nature of the problem to be addressed i.e. the underlying causes of conflict (e.g. inter-communal issues and / or disputes over resources); (ii) the legality and legitimacy of the state, and of the police as the public face of the state; (iii) the political drivers of change and incentives of different players to undertake reform; (iv) the role and legitimacy of the police in relation to non-state dispute resolution systems; and (v) the relationship between the police and different communities; and (vi) the strength of the criminal justice system as a whole.

- The New Zealand Aid Programme should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led fragility assessment (most appropriately in the Pacific region for example in Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States.

- MFAT (IDG) should explore the potential for tighter engagement with other partners including AusAid and the Australian Federal Police to promote joint understandings of security and justice issues, common context analysis, problem identification and harmonised approaches, including joint monitoring and evaluation.

4. Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should in their developing partnership agreement specify a design processes leading to a clear planning framework (context analysis; problem identification; theory of change; goal development leading to outcomes which determine outputs and activities; and identification of assumptions underlying the proposed intervention).

5. Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.

New Zealand Police's highly-rated work could be improved including by:
- ensuring police advisers are of the appropriate rank and have appropriate experience when counter-parted with an officer from a partner country;
- involving the partner police force in the selection of advisers especially long term ones;
- reconsidering the policy of short term six-month deployments, including considering contracting out some work to experienced former senior officers; and
- making more use of appropriate external specialist skills for example change management, gender (such skills may be available locally).

● As a first step New Zealand Police should review its approach to police organisational development and individual skills development in the light of the points made above, and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement (e.g. deployment length, explicit exit strategies for deployed staff).

6. Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.

MFAT (IDG) should strengthen its approach by providing gender and human rights guidance and training; linking to partner country national gender and human rights processes; and ensuring that design always involves listening to women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.

● As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing[1] so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work, and provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights. The advice should include a focus on fragile and conflict affected situations including where the police are accused of human rights abuses arising out of conflict, and operationalising UN resolution 1325 (on the role of women in peacebuilding) in the context of police work.

7. Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.
Each intervention should have locally developed and owned indicators which where possible are aligned with partner police force's own monitoring and evaluation and management information systems.

● As a first step MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop strong procedures for monitoring and evaluation to feed into lesson learning about what works and why. Recommended procedures include: establishment of clear planning framework (see recommendation 4); establishment of outcome level baselines; regular outcome-

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[1] Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

focused monitoring and reporting by NZP and MFAT; periodic NZP/ MFAT meetings in country formally to review intervention assumptions and theory of change, with specialist assistance (e.g. political economy analysis) where required; and regular independent evaluation. (See also recommendation 8 on lesson-learning across interventions).

8. Consolidate and disseminate MFAT's on-going learning about statebuilding and peacebuilding.

Internationally, knowledge about what works in fragile and conflict affected situations is limited but developing including through the formation of the g7+ group of fragile states, the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility, and the joint donor/fragile states International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. MFAT should ensure that learning from New Zealand's own police programmes in fragile and conflict affected contests, and from elsewhere is effectively consolidated and disseminated, and applied to inform the design and implementation of future police work.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should allocate this on-going area of work to a specified member of staff (or contract it out), and form a working group to identify the existing knowledge base within MFAT (and across Government) as well as internationally.

- MFAT (IDG) should identify mechanisms to ensure that learning started through the working group is on-going, disseminated and used effectively (such as briefing papers, round-table learning meetings, and involvement of the staff member in police work design and on-going monitoring and evaluation).

Chapter 1: Background and methodology

1.1 Introduction

This strategic evaluation considers New Zealand's international police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts[2] funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) through the international aid programme. The evaluation provides a strategic overview of the effectiveness, sustainability, relevance and efficiency of this work over the period 2005-2011. The evaluation is specifically intended to: (i) inform the strategic direction of police work; (ii) strengthen the design and implementation of the programme and individual interventions; and (iii) strengthen the range of Wellington-based and in-country partnership arrangements. Terms of reference for the evaluation are in annex B.

The evaluation considers interventions in Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea (including Bougainville), Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste, and to a limited extent in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua.[3] A partner report considers New Zealand's police work in the Pacific region including the Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands interventions (the 'Pacific Report').

1.2 New Zealand Police and international work

During the evaluation period New Zealand's aid programme invested over NZ$ 75 million in police work[4] in partner countries, approximately one and a half percent of the total aid programme. New Zealand's police work in fragile and conflict affected states has developed in the context of the growing awareness of the international community that security[5] and justice are essential foundations for a well-functioning state and for sustainable economic development.[6]   Security and justice are recognised as core functions of the state, particularly important for statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict affected situations, with weak rule of law associated with low confidence in the state, a precipitator of organised violence.[7] The 2011 World Development Report identified security and justice as key priorities to break cycles of violence and enable development.[8] The international

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[2] The terms of reference for the evaluation (annex B) refer to *post-conflict and / or fragile states.* The term *conflict affected contexts* is used in this report, reflecting the fact that moving from conflict to stability is not a straight line, and that states frequently move in and out of conflict as set-backs and relapses occur, even after political settlement. In some instances New Zealand's work has focused on particular areas of conflict within a state: thus the use of the term *context* rather than *state.*

[3] In relation to the evaluation criteria of relevance only. All countries (with the exception of Indonesia) are members of the g7+ group of fragile states. http://www.g7plus.org/

[4] I.e. developmental interventions to support policing

[5] In this paper security encompasses state security and human security

[6] See for example UK Department for International Development's White Paper 2009. 'Eliminating world poverty: Building our common future' which identified security and justice as a basic service, on a par with health and education. Also Danida 'How To Note' on Justice Sector Reform http://www.danidadevforum.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/780EF121-1242-4541-88B7-36765867F04D/0/JusticeSectorReformfinalprint.pdf

[7] See for example 'Building Peaceful States and Societies.' A DFID Practice Paper. UK Department for International Development. 2010

[8] World Bank 2011. World Development Report: Conflict Security and Development. 2011, Chapter 3 p103

community (including New Zealand) recently endorsed security and justice as core *statebuilding and peacebuilding goals* in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.[9]

New Zealand Police were MFAT's main implementing partner for police work during the evaluation period.[10] The Pacific Report provides background on the establishment and development of New Zealand Police's International Service Group (ISG) and the evolution of New Zealand Police's international work, including the extent to which it is reportable as official development assistance.[11]

1.3 Methodology

This section provides a brief overview of the evaluation's methodology with fuller details, including an overview of ethical issues and quality assurance procedures, in annex E, and in the Evaluation and Research Plan.[12] Key evaluation methods were: (i) literature and document review; (ii) stakeholder consultations, both on a one-to-one basis and through focus groups in both cases using semi-structured interview sheets[13]; and (iii) field visit observations. Annex D details data sources.

Stakeholder consultations were based on stakeholder analysis - see Evaluation and Research Plan. Consultations included focus groups with representatives of users of policing services (including community leaders and NGOs.) In line with the semi-structured interview sheet, the emphasis was to interrogate what had changed as a result of New Zealand Police interventions.

Evaluation methods were agreed with MFAT at the Evaluation and Research Plan stage. As explained in the Plan (section 5), consideration was given to preparing a questionnaire to be sent in advance of our field visits, but was rejected as it was considered that this might pre-empt discussion of the relevance of the programme, and compatible survey and sample arrangements could not be arranged across the whole programme.

Key evaluation processes were: (i) construction and validation of results diagrams; (ii) context analysis; and (iii) development of structured evaluation findings through the completion of evaluation analysis sheets[14] into which were entered consolidated data from all sources including from one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions.

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[9] Endorsed on 30th November 2011 at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness the New Deal advocated by the g7+ and developed through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/

[10] Over the last 10 years NZ Police have undertaken 33 MFAT funded projects valued at $NZ66.4m. Source: MFAT

[11] For summary see 'Is it ODA?' OECD/DAC factsheet November 2008. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf accessed on 30 May 2011

[12] 24 April 2012. See http://www.aid.govt.nz/

[13] See Evaluation and Research Plan paragraph 5.1 and annex G.

[14] See pro forma in Annex J of the Evaluation and Research Plan. This was subsequently adapted and simplified.

Construction of results diagrams

New Zealand's policing programme is described in a complex and partial set of documentation relating to individual interventions[15] (see list of intervention documents in annex D). This fragmentation has arisen because many of the individual interventions were initiated in response to an emergency or crisis, and because some were implemented in partnership with other agencies (such as the Australia Federal Police (AFP) or the UN) with New Zealand contributing to particular elements of a wider programme.

Only the most recent interventions have a clearly expressed intervention logic, which current MFAT practice is to present in the form of results diagrams. MFAT required the evaluation to be undertaken at the programme level, and by reference to a constructed results diagram. A summary of key intended programme results from the constructed results diagram is in table 1.1 below.

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[15] In this report, 'interventions' refer to individual projects or programmes. 'Programme' refers to the policing work overall.

Table 1.1 Overarching (programme-level) intended results

Overarching Goal: SAFE AND SECURE COMMUNITIES (urban and rural; men and women, young and old. maintained on a sustainable basis)					
Aspect of conceptual framework	*Police relations with polity/ society as a whole*	*Police*	*Police relations with communities*	*Police relations with formal criminal justice system*	*Police relations with non-state dispute resolution mechanisms*
Long Term Outcomes	Governance arrangements for policing in place – Including inclusive and representative political voice and oversight together with a legal mandate	A capable and effective community-focused national police service is established	Structures facilitating two-way communication between citizens and police are in place and functioning effectively	Police are fully embedded in and contributing to the functioning of the criminal justice system	Complementary and synergic linkages between police and non-state dispute resolution systems in place
Medium Term Outcomes	Governance structures, at national and / or local government level, representing the broad spectrum of communities and stakeholders, women and men, are piloted	Management systems for approaches standards, HR, planning and budgeting under development and testing	Institutional arrangements and systems for communication between citizens and police are developed, piloted and rolled out across the country	Police approaches, priorities and operations adjusted to maximise overall performance of criminal justice system	Police programmes, priorities and operations adjusted to maximise the overall functioning of state and non-state systems.

The results diagram reflects the evaluation's conceptual framework / theory of change[16] for police work which focuses not only on the *police* as an organisation, but the broader governance and institutional arrangements for *policing* including the political context. The results diagram therefore examines the relationships between the police and a number of other institutions: (i) polity / society as a whole; (ii) communities; (iii) the formal criminal justice system; and (iv) non-state dispute resolution mechanisms.   It reflects the insufficiency of capable police forces alone to achieve safe and secure communities: oppressive, corrupt and regime-serving police can also be technically advanced and efficient. Police work cannot be properly understood (or evaluated) without an appreciation that policing is essentially a political activity, going to the heart of the relationship between the communities, society and the state. Annex C provides further detail on the conceptual framework underlying the results framework, including the assumptions behind it.

New Zealand's interventions have focused on police technical capacity development. But the conceptual framework recognises the need for such inputs not to take place in a vacuum. New Zealand's aid programme is unlikely to fund inputs across the whole *policing* spectrum, but the evaluation argues that New Zealand's contribution is more likely to be relevant and sustainable it is informed by and makes linkages with this broader context – for example through harmonised approaches with other donors.

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[16] A theory of change sets out the results as well as the assumptions which underlie the results. It amounts, therefore to an explanation and rationale for the intervention.

Context analysis

Initial context analysis considered countries' geography, history, economy, governance, security, justice, human rights and gender issues on the basis of a wide-ranging literature review.[17] The conceptual framework for the evaluation subsequently prompted (i) brief institutional assessments of partner county's police forces and (ii) analysis of the broader governance and institutional context within which the police operate (see annex B). Sources for the context analysis were a literature review, supplemented by information provided by key informants (see annex D).

1.4 Evaluation limitations

Key limitations faced by the evaluation were:

- The lack of explicit programme or intervention-level outcomes to evaluate against. This was dealt with by the development of programme and intervention-level results diagrams, validated by MFAT and by New Zealand Police.

- The limited time period in each country during the fieldwork – a maximum of four days in most cases. The team planned for this by ensuring time in country was used to full effect, with meetings set up in advance (with excellent support from MFAT post and New Zealand Police), and also by the team splitting up so that several meetings were undertaken simultaneously.

- While the evaluation team was free to meet whom they wanted, in practice the team was to a considerable degree dependant on post and New Zealand Police for guidance on which stakeholders to consult – as there were no local consultants on the evaluation team. The team identified stakeholder categories, and post and New Zealand Police assisted with identification of precise interviewees. The team dealt with this once in country by setting up independent interviews through independent contacts.

- The potential perception that the independence of the evaluation team was compromised by the inclusion in it of a serving member of the New Zealand Police. This was dealt with by providing a clear explanation to stakeholders of the independence of all team members. In addition, the New Zealand Police expert was not involved in interviews or discussion groups where his presence could, or could be perceived as, compromising the willingness of interviewees to speak openly.

- The structured nature of detailed evaluation questions specified in the terms of reference, and required in the Evaluation and Research Plan did not sit easily with the need to develop a conceptual framework, and lack of explicit programme outcomes. This was addressed by adapting the evaluation analysis sheets during the fieldwork as the conceptual framework developed, and also at report-writing stage by re-ordering and grouping some of the questions.

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[17] See annex D in the Evaluation and Research Plan

1.5 Report overview

Evaluation findings against the OECD/DAC criteria are presented in chapters two (effectiveness and sustainability); three (relevance), and four (efficiency). Chapter five provides recommendations to inform the future direction of MFAT's partnership with New Zealand Police and of future police work.

1.5 Report overview

Chapter 2: Effectiveness and sustainability - findings and lessons

Key findings

- **Goal: Safe and secure communities:** New Zealand Police have contributed to restoring stability in challenging and unstable situations, usually in the context of complex, multi-donor interventions. Sustainability of gains is unclear due in large degree to factors outside New Zealand's control.

- **Police mandate:** In both bilateral and multi-lateral interventions, there has been very limited engagement at the strategic / political level.

- **Police technical capacity development:**
  - The quality of deployed New Zealand Police officers is highly regarded and their contribution valued by all partner police forces. New Zealand Police appear to have worked sensitively within different cultural settings. A clear strength is that assistance has been provided by one police service to another, and also that New Zealand has been prepared to engage for the long haul.
  - However, short-term deployments, imperfect skills matches, a tendency to substitute for local staff (rather than develop skills), and differences between the rank of New Zealand advisers and partner country police counterparts may be constraining benefits.
  - All partner police forces have deep-rooted systemic problems including financial and human resource constraints which will take a long time to resolve and need to be addressed by more effective and sustained high-level political engagement, and a stronger focus on police strategy, structures and systems.
  - New Zealand Police's demonstration of community policing appears to have borne results in some very challenging contexts, including Afghanistan. However, with community policing carved out as a *niche* function, there has been limited success in mainstreaming the approach within partner country police forces. The New Zealand approach has been constrained when operating under a joint command (e.g. RAMSI and the UN).

- **Police interface with communities:** Interventions appear to be appreciated by communities, but there is no hard evidence of impact.

- **Police interface with the criminal justice system:** Linkages with interventions to support partner police forces' engagement with the broader justice system are weak

- **Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems:** New Zealand police officers have engaged pragmatically with non-state systems, but few background or design documents explore this issue.

- **Gender and human rights** have generally been mainstreamed within interventions.

- **Intervention level results:** Achievement of intended results in fragile and conflict affected situations has proved challenging: interventions have not achieved most of their intended outcomes.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the extent to which New Zealand's police work has *effected positive changes that will be sustained once New Zealand's support is withdrawn.* In line with the strategic nature of the evaluation these issues are considered against the programme-level goal and outcomes (see table 1.1 above), with section 2.5 and table 2.3 at the end of the chapter providing a brief overview of achievements at the intervention level.

2.2 Programme-level goal

> **Goal: safe and secure communities** (urban and rural, men and women, young and old maintained on a sustainable basis)

Context for achieving safe and secure communities

The entry point for each New Zealand intervention was a fragile security context, with peacekeeping and stabilisation work involving New Zealand Defence Force deployment transitioning into organisational and individual skills development work with the local police. Deployment was under a variety of mechanisms and mandates: UN mandate (Timor-Leste); regional mandate (Solomon Islands); bilateral assistance (latterly in Timor-Leste); and through joint donor mechanisms (deployment to EUPOL in Afghanistan).

In fragile and conflict affected contexts, the key policing issue is not 'individual crime' levels, which are typically low, although with significant under-reporting especially in relation to family and sexual violence.[18] The key issue is rather the underlying security threat – both internally within the partner country itself, and externally. The nature and severity of the insecurity varies from time to time and from intervention to intervention: from inter-communal and political tensions which flare up during tension points such as elections (e.g. Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste) to on-going insurgency (Afghanistan). The underlying causes of instability are also varied and complex and include cycles of poverty (e.g. Afghanistan and Timor-Leste); fragile institutions (e.g. Timor-Leste); legacy of former occupation (e.g. Afghanistan and Timor-Leste); limited legitimacy of the central state or of the reach of the central state's powers (e.g. Afghanistan and Solomon Islands); conflicts over political autonomy (e.g. Bougainville and Papua and West Papua provinces in Indonesia); and inter-communal tensions related to land rights and extractive industries (e.g. Bougainville).

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[18] See for example Timor-Leste Strategy Development – Background Issues Paper: community policing (undated)

Findings in relation to programme goal - safe and secure communities

- New Zealand Police have contributed to restoring stability in complex and unstable situations (Afghanistan (Bamiyan), Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste).

Box 2.1 New Zealand's contribution to restoring stability in Afghanistan

Afghanistan: New Zealand Police have contributed to stability in Bamiyan Province, including supporting the development of the best-regarded police Regional Training Centre in the country.

- Evidence of changes in rates of individual crime, or of community perception of safety is very limited. Where it is available, evidence of results is mixed and uncertain (see box 2.2 below).

Box 2.2 Limited evidence for changes in safety and security of communities

Crime figures were not available, and in any event they are difficult to interpret (a rise in reported crime may reflect increased confidence in the police, rather than an actual increase in crime).

Perception surveys: The regular People's Survey in **Solomon Islands** reveals that while communities feel safer and more secure, levels of trust in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) have declined over the evaluation period, and that people have a higher degree of trust in the regional police force (the Participating Police Force) than in the RSIPF.

Similarly in **Bougainville**, high degrees of public dissatisfaction with the BPS can be contrasted with confidence in the CAP, coupled with near universal clarity that CAP would not survive without on-going support (and leadership) from New Zealand.

Surveys in **Afghanistan** reveal contrasting messages: quantitative surveys[19] suggest that about 80% of the population have some level of confidence / a favourable view of the Afghan National Police, while qualitative reports[20] paint a much less optimistic picture. The differences may be due to (i) respondents in quantitative surveys preferring not to criticise government institutions in the surveys; and (ii) unsatisfactory sampling e.g. The Asia Foundation's 2012 survey had to replace 16% of sampling locations because they were not safe and, many areas could not be reached.

In **Timor-Leste**, concerns over safety and the performance and capability of the PNTL remain high. However the vast majority of respondents in a survey of four sub-districts believed the relationship between the PNTL and citizens is 'good' and that the security situation has improved or stayed the same (Baseline survey of community policing perceptions 2009)

(See intervention overviews in annex B)

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[19] See for example the 2010 UNDP survey (http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=3292 or http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/2011/Police%20Perception%20Survey%20Book%202010%20FINAL%20(6th%20Jan%202011).pdf), and The Asia Foundation's in 2012 (http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2012-poll.php) (both , accessed on 3 December 2012)
[20] For example ICGs reports on the police (2007-8) and the Feinstein Cops or Robbers report, 2007.

- Sustainability of achievements is unclear, relying to a large degree on factors outside New Zealand's control including the strength of the political settlement and the on-going political process. It may take a generation for a country to recover from conflict and move out of fragility,[21] a time scale that often does not fit with (relatively) short-term international donor funding horizons and mandates, and which again may be outside New Zealand's control. (See box 2.3 below).

Box 2.3 Afghanistan: example of limits to sustainability

Afghanistan: Sustainability is threatened by a political environment in which policing is suborned to the interests of central politicians or local power-brokers. This means that personnel newly-trained by the New Zealand supported Regional Training College often return to districts unable to practice new skills or to develop a public ethos. Sustainability is also threatened by an international political timetable determining the closure of the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the consequent withdrawal of the New Zealand contingent. New Zealand has notionally earmarked NZ$2 million per annum for follow-up police support work as part of the transition process.

Lessons in relation to programme goal: safe and secure communities

- **New Zealand Police have played a role in restoring stability in complex and conflict affected situations,** including in complex multi-donor environments.
  [See over-riding recommendation in the introduction to chapter five.]

- **Better evidence is needed on the impact of policing interventions.** Solomon Islands People's survey may provide a useful model.
  [See recommendation 7 in chapter five.]

2.3 Programme-level outcomes and outputs

This section presents an overview of achievements against programme-level outcomes and outputs (see table 1.1 in chapter 1 above).

2.3.1 Police mandate

Long term outcome: Governance arrangements for policing in place – including inclusive and representative political voice and oversight together with legal mandate

Police mandate: context

Establishing the mandate for policing involves sensitive issues such as the degree of political control over the police; police accountability; and independent oversight mechanisms. Engagement at the political level (possibly at the highest level) may be required. In addition, the government ministry / department responsible for police and the domestic police force

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[21] See, for example, World Bank (2011) World Development Report on *Conflict, Security and Development*. This report measures how long it has taken various developing countries to evolve 'legitimate', effective institutions and concludes that under relatively optimal circumstances periods of 25-30 years should be regarded as standard.

may require specialist technical assistance to develop this framework for policing. The police mandate in a fragile and conflict affected contexts involves (explicitly or implicitly) fundamental political and often contested issues such as the legitimacy of the state; the relationship between the state and society; and relationships between the centre and the periphery.

The countries considered in this report have a range of political contexts with varying degrees of legitimacy of the central state. These include an autonomous region within a larger state, where the relationship between the centre and the region is highly complex and evolving (Bougainville); a Melanesian state with weak state-society relations, due to the structure and political culture of small-scale and acephalous[22] societies (Solomon Islands); a newly independent state with weak institutions and regional tensions (Timor-Leste); and Afghanistan with its history of invasion and occupation, with strong and complex tribal and religious allegiances. More detail is provided in box 2.4 below.

Box 2.4 Police mandate: context

Afghanistan: Police reform is uniquely difficult: during the Soviet occupation and civil war period the Afghan National Police was essentially destroyed, leaving behind predatory armed militias. Building a community-sensitive state institution is the work of a generation or more, and has been compressed into a decade. At the same time, the police has also been fitted out to serve as the first point of kinetic interaction with the Taliban, a role that has diverted attention from its role as an upholder of the rule of law.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Bougainville): Highly complex situation related to the political settlement between the Government of PNG and the autonomous region of Bougainville. Bougainville Police Service (BPS) operates under the auspices of the Royal PNG Constabulary but with intention to draw down powers to the BPS. The draw down process has currently stalled due to political impasse in PNG.

Solomon Islands: Fundamental questions remain about the boundaries of legitimate state action, and the fragility of the political settlement. An independent evaluation of Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), February 2009, stated that the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force must settle its policing model through establishing its core functions and how they are to be carried out and the objectives to be achieved.[23]

Timor-Leste: New organic law setting out the powers and accountability of the Timor-Leste national police (PNTL) – but lack of clear concept of operations including role of community approach to policing. Subsidiary legislation under the organic law has yet to be developed. Complex political accountability structures with PNTL under political control of the Secretary of State for Security under the Ministry of Defence.

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[22] I.e. a society without political leaders or hierarchies: decisions are made by small scale groups (bands or tribes) by consensus.

[23] PPF Capacity Building: An Independent Review. February 2009.

Police mandate: findings

- New Zealand policing interventions had very limited engagement at the strategic / political level with the development of the police mandate. This was the case even where New Zealand has a bilateral relationship with the partner country (Bougainville and Timor-Leste). See box 2.5 below.

Box 2.5 NZ engagement with police mandate

Afghanistan: New Zealand has had very little engagement with the overall strategic development of the police or on the politics of policing, instead focusing in one province on inculcating excellence into the training of new recruits at the Regional Training Centre, and on mentoring senior provincial police officers.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Bougainville): New Zealand focus has been on development of community auxiliary police (CAP). New Zealand has lobbied unsuccessfully for appointment of a superintendant to the BPS to supervise the CAP.

Solomon Islands: A fundamental review of the Police Act is currently under review by the Ministry of Police, funded and supported by the Australian Federal Police. This is a key entry point at the political and strategic level to provide expertise and insights into the mainstreaming within the RSIPF of a community based approach to policing. MFAT and New Zealand Police have not engaged with this process to date.

Timor-Leste: New Zealand focus has been on the promotion of community policing through the Police training school, and also through 'bottom up' piloting. New Zealand now has a bilateral engagement with the Government through its new Community Policing Project, providing an opportunity for New Zealand (MFAT and New Zealand Police) to engage directly with the government of Timor-Leste at the political and policy level on the shape of police reform. But the intervention design takes the political situation as a given, and does not review entry points for engagement with these issues.

- Engagement at a strategic / political level was constrained where New Zealand support was in the context of an international or regional operation. But in Solomon Islands, as a significant contributor to RAMSI, New Zealand had a variety of potential entry points for political / strategic engagement (see box 2.6 below).

Box 2.6 Opportunities for strategic / political engagement

In **Timor-Leste**, New Zealand is one of 42 nations, with a variety of policing philosophies participating in UNPOL, and is similarly a minor player in EUPOL in **Afghanistan**. However New Zealand has a stronger political voice in **Solomon Islands**, contributing 16% of RAMSI's costs and providing its Deputy Co-ordinator. New Zealand had a number of entry points for contributing to, and assisting to shape the transition and the focus of police work in Solomon Islands, including promoting a community based approach to policing: (i) at the political level through diplomatic and ministerial sub-group meetings; (ii) at the strategic level through the RAMSI coordination office, and New Zealand Police adviser deployments to RAMSI (currently three long term advisers); and (iii) at the operational level through New Zealand Police deployments to the PPF.

Police mandate: lessons

- **Sustainable police reform requires political and policy-level engagement.** Partner countries' police mandates lie outside the control of external funding and implementing agencies such as MFAT and New Zealand Police. However, international experience suggests that donors can play a key role in engaging at this level in fragile and conflict affected contexts where (i) challenges relating to police mandate and the role of the police as the public face of the state tend to be particularly acute; and (ii) administrations may have limited experience of or capacity in policy making, or may have limited political mandate/ legitimacy for their policing decisions. Such engagement needs to be based on sound context (including political economy) analysis.
  [See recommendation 2 in chapter five.]

- **New Zealand, even as a relatively small player, had opportunities to influence partner country policing mandates and legal frameworks.** This includes by forming alliances with like-minded donors, many of whom have similar views to New Zealand on developing police legitimacy based on a community policing approach.
  [See recommendation 2 in chapter five.]

2.3.2 Police technical capacity development

Long term outcome: a capable and effective community-focused national police service is in place

Police technical capacity development: context

The police forces in each country considered by this evaluation have extremely low capacity with rooted systemic problems. Police recurrent budgets (wage and non-wage) and human resource issues present challenges in each country, for example: lack of petrol for police vehicles inhibiting ability to patrol or respond to incidents (e.g. Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste); lack of systems to deal with operational issues (e.g. Solomon Islands where the police fax machine for maintenance requests was broken for over a year); low wages (all countries considered by the evaluation); the geographical distribution of the police (e.g. Solomon Islands); and weak performance management systems (all countries considered by the evaluation). All the countries considered by this report have reasonable ratios of police per head of population (ranging from 1:224 in Afghanistan to 1:553 in Solomon Islands, compared to the UN standard of 1:450 and New Zealand at 1:383).

Security priorities in fragile and conflict affected situations tend to militate toward a paramilitary approach to policing, rather than community based approach advocated and demonstrated by New Zealand Police (see box 2.7 below). In Afghanistan for example, the essential orientation of the Afghan National Police is towards kinetic operations, and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) is essentially organised on paramilitary lines.

Box 2.7 New Zealand community policing approach

Community policing is the key philosophy which underpins New Zealand's approach to policing both at home and in its international work. Community policing, properly understood is a *whole of policing* approach, mainstreamed throughout the organisation, rather than a *niche* activity. Mainstreaming community policing implies that it must be embedded within the police's philosophy, legislative framework, organisational structure, concept of operations, management policy, and operational strategy.[24] New Zealand's community policing principles are aligned with general principles of democratic policing adopted by mature democracies worldwide. International experience suggests that the broad principles of community policing can also be applicable to fragile and conflict affected situations,[25] and community based policing approaches are increasingly being applied in situations where conflict has recently ceased, and are becoming recognised as a fundamental element of conflict management.[26] Early visible results at the local level are critical to inspiring confidence that the state is able to improve can improve quality of life. The flexibility and risk based approach[27] inherent in community policing makes it a good choice in unpredictable and volatile conflict affected environments.

A capable and effective national police service is one that has mainstreamed a community based approach to policing within its philosophy, legislative framework, concept of operations, organisational structure, management policy, and operations.

The implicit assumptions underlying approaches to policing in New Zealand are unlikely to apply in a fragile and conflict affected situation. In particular: (i) the legitimacy of the state, and therefore of the police as the public face of the state should not be assumed, especially where the state is seen as either 'external' to a particular community, or captured by specific communal groups or economic interests; (ii) the police may be operating within a dysfunctional criminal justice system; and (iii) informal, non-state systems of policing may be considered by communities to have more legitimacy than the formal police.

In addition, the police may be implicated in human rights abuses. In Timor-Leste, the PNTL still has to finalise the issue of officers within its ranks accused of human rights abuses arising from the conflict (which may be as many as one in every 2.5 officers).[28] The cultural context may also be different to that in New Zealand. For example recognition and self-worth may come from how a police officer has helped his community and family, or fulfilled his obligations to another community – rather than from professional performance management criteria. For example, in Solomon Islands a police officer who makes an arrest may then face demands to pay compensation to the arrestee's family.

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[24] SEESAC, UNDP Stability Pact, Saferworld, 2006, Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing (3rd edition), South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade

[25] See for example Groenewald, H. and Peake, G., 2004, Police Reform Through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation, International Peace Academy/Saferworld, New York. Also Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations December 2003 Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping

[26] Groenewald, H. and Peake, G., 2004, Police Reform Through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation, International Peace Academy/Saferworld, New York

[27] I.e. identifying the risks faced by communities and using them to set priorities

[28] Timor-Leste: A need for accountability not forces. Gordon Peake (police reform adviser). 11 April 2011. The Timor-Leste Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice (human rights commission) suggests that the figure is considerably lower than this.

Police technical capacity development: findings

Deployment of New Zealand police officers

- The vast majority of deployments of New Zealand Police personnel that the evaluation team considered were well-received and perceived to have made a positive contribution. The approach adopted has focused strongly on skills transfer through mentoring and training, provided through a mix of long and short term advisers. For example in Bougainville a long term adviser responsible for developing the CAP system is supplemented by officers on six month deployments.

- Characteristics of New Zealand's approach to policing, are highly relevant to international work, in particular the cultural sensitivity that officers bring to overseas deployments (see table 2.1). The police officers on assignment or recently returned interviewed by the evaluation[29] were clearly enthusiastic, well-motivated and keen to make a difference. Many had waited several years for the chance to go overseas and were keen to make the most of the opportunity.

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[29] Over 20 such officers were interviewed.

Table 2.1 Characteristics of New Zealand approach to policing[30]

Nature of New Zealand policing style	Associated competences for New Zealand Police officers
Policy principles	
Unarmed community police service with a professional tactical response capability	Focus on verbal skills in conflict resolution (minimum and proportionate use of coercive powers)
Culturally sensitive to Treaty of Waitangi as partners with Iwi Maori (Treaty serves as a 'touchstone')	Respect for principles of biculturalism with Iwi Maori
National organisation (isolated geographically but well-connected internationally)	Outward facing world view (in common with Pacific nations)
Limited funding with well-defined outcomes, outputs and fiscal accountabilities	Innovative, agile thinking, able to operate with minimal resources and adapt to local context
Responsive to community feedback (as measured by satisfaction surveys)	Professional pride, positive, transparent and open with people
Operational approach	
Community policing is the dominant philosophy (not a discreet or isolated activity) led by 'prevention first' and 'policing excellence' strategies	Ability to form and maintain effective community relationships (including civil society and NGOs); open, friendly, engaging and genuine
Intelligence-led policing with tasking, coordination as core elements of deployment	Ability to scan, analyse and deploy to address causes of crime, not just symptoms
Well connected to communities (e.g. rural and neighbourhood support, community patrols, 'Blue Light' [youth], victim support, road safety)	Ability to play an active part in and with communities
Inclusive of multicultural ethnic groups	Tolerant, accepting and respectful - able to integrate into local culture and treat people as equals
Active in promotion of crime prevention, alternatives to prosecution and restorative justice	Ability to understand and relate to traditional systems of mediation and reconciliation
Focus on team spirit, sport and fitness	'Can do' attitude

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[30] Source: Compiled from personal experience and knowledge of New Zealand Police since 1975 by Superintendent John van der Heyden. Supplemented by interviews in the field and observations.

Nature of New Zealand policing style	Associated competences for New Zealand Police officers
(as an important dynamic of culture)	Ability to develop links to sports enjoyed by Pacific peoples
Human resource policies	
Police reflect ethnic and gender mix of general population	
Requires wide variety of operational roles (generalist policing skills, with high levels of expertise, based in specialist groups in a decentralised model)	Acceptance of high levels of mobility between work groups and across the organisation
Competency based (merit) promotion system	Accept roles that demonstrably match skills; embrace culture of 'playing to strengths' and developing others
International	
Located in the Pacific with strong community linkages to Pacific Islands' people in New Zealand and the Pacific	Familiar with and able to relate to Pacific peoples, sense of shared heritage
Responsive to obligations as a leading nation in the Pacific (fragile, post conflict, disaster relief). There 'for the long haul'	Resilient, tactically adept and willing to share skills
NZ police seen as neighbours and reliable partners in the development of policing in the Pacific region.	Ability to support formal and informal networks within the Pacific
Links with government	
Whole of government approach	Adapt readily to working with other government agencies, beyond criminal justice sector
Highly accountable (courts, external conduct authority, parliamentary scrutiny, open media and official information transparency)	High levels of integrity (Inherent rejection of corrupt practice, breaches of human rights and any threat to the rule of law)
Explicit separation of executive powers in legislation in a 'Westminster system'	Clear understanding that government influence/control is limited to administrative but not operational matters

- A clear strength of New Zealand's police work has been that it was provided by one police service to another. Interviews with partner country police forces revealed that they clearly appreciated the professional relationships developed, and strengthening of ties with New Zealand Police. In Solomon Islands trust has been enhanced by some New Zealand officer advisers being sworn into the RSIPF.

- New Zealand has understood that, like most institutional reform initiatives, police reform takes time. New Zealand has been prepared to engage for the long haul: for example in Bougainville since 2000; in RAMSI since 2003; and in Timor-Leste since 2006. In some cases the length and depth of engagement reflects a special relationship between New Zealand and the partner country: for example the relationship with Bougainville developed during New Zealand's involvement with brokering the peace agreement in 1998/1999.

- Within the context of the excellent work carried out by New Zealand officers, several concerns about the current deployment model were repeatedly expressed, both by New Zealand Police and partner country police officers:

  - Skills match: there were concerns that personnel deployed, particularly on short term assignments did not always have the appropriate skills for the assignment. One example seen by the evaluation team was a community policing adviser with no community policing experience, and in Timor-Leste an independent review noted that some New Zealand officers lacked appropriate skills.[31]

  - Preparedness: serving and recently returned officers gave the evaluation team mixed reports on the scope and quality of pre-deployment training. There was appreciation that training now includes guidance on MFAT's monitoring and evaluation requirements, and on language and cultural issues.

  - The 'six month churn': while long term deployments can result in mission fatigue and a loss of enthusiasm, the vast majority of current and past short term deployed officers interviewed expressed doubt about the sustainability of the work they had undertaken (see box 2.8 below).

Box 2.8 The 'six month churn'

Officers on six month deployments felt that in practice it takes several weeks to 'find their feet', then, following a break, there is a feeling that they are on the 'countdown to departure.' It was noted that in most contexts to which they are deployed a high premium is put on relationships, and it can take months or even years to be gain the trust of local people. Complex environment take time to adapt to. Examples were provided to the evaluation team of fragmented initiatives of individual officers that had lapsed once the officer had left. For logistical reasons, hand-overs were sometimes perfunctory.

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[31] Timor-Leste Community Policing Project independent review report, 2010

- The evaluation team noted other issues with the current deployment model:

  - Generally the partner police force is not involved in the selection of advisers, even long term ones. This is in contrast to RAMSI's support to Solomon Islands Corrections Service where it is reported that a key factor in the success of the technical support provided was the involvement of local partners in the adviser selection process.

  - Fieldwork revealed on several occasions significant differences between the rank of the New Zealand Police adviser, and the partner country police counterpart. The team considers that counter-parting a more junior New Zealand officer with a more senior officer from the country police is inappropriate, both in terms of the effectiveness of the mentoring, and in terms of the peer to peer relationship between the New Zealand Police and the host country police. It is in contrast to the approach adopted by RAMSI in relation to the reform of Solomon Islands Corrections Service, where advisers were of the same rank as the officers being mentored.

  - A tendency on the part of New Zealand Police officers to *substitute* for local staff, rather than develop skills (see box 2.9 below). While substitution can be part of successful capacity development strategy, to be so it must have clear exit strategy to enable improvements to be sustainable. Interviews with serving and returned deployed staff, and New Zealand Police reports following assignments suggest that improvements from substitution tend to be transient. A capacity development (rather than a substitutional approach) requires working through local people and systems and needs long term personal engagement, particularly in societies where much depends on relationships. It also requires engagement with fundamental organisational development issues focused on affordability.

Box 2.9 Substitution rather than capacity development

It was clear to the evaluation team that New Zealand Police officers deployed overseas are in general highly pragmatic, resourceful, dedicated and determined to make a difference. This means that when local systems do not work, or local staff have low capacity, New Zealand officers tend to step in and fill the gap (examples seen during the evaluation include writing police procedures, providing transport, and organising the selling of brake fluid to fund the purchase of fuel).

<u>Organisational development of partner police forces</u>

- New Zealand Police's approach to capacity building matches many key characteristics for effective and sustainable capacity development set out in the World Bank Institute's 2011 Practice Guide for Results-Focused Capacity Development (see Pacific Report chapter 3 table 3.2 for details).

- However, achieving improvements in the capacity of partner police forces in fragile and conflict affected contexts has proved very challenging. Perception surveys reveal the

performance and community perceptions of some partner police forces has not improved, and even declined over the evaluation period.

- There is a strong focus on the role of leadership in the New Zealand Police's approach to institutional reform. For example, in Bougainville, the strategy for development of the CAP was to provide a long term CAP adviser, responsible for supporting the CAP, who in turn developed a cohort of non-commissioned officers to whom the CAP report. Strong leadership to drive forward reform is important in institutional reform processes, and probably particularly so in a uniformed and disciplined organisation such as the police. However, the approach has its limitations in terms of sustainability. The risk is that once the leader/ reform champion leaves, the pace of reform will slow, or even slip backwards. This phenomenon was noted by almost all police advisers interviewed for the evaluation – in their view while they were in post, things moved forward, but once they left, change lost pace, or stopped altogether until their return.

- Deep-rooted systemic issues which will take a long time to resolve have inhibited the achievement of sustainable results. In some cases resolution may be outside the control of external agencies, or of New Zealand (see example from Afghanistan in box 2.3 above). In other cases, New Zealand Police have adopted a short term fix (see box 2.9 above) rather than engaging with the root of the systemic issue.

New Zealand's community policing approach

- New Zealand Police applied community based policing approaches in all the fragile and conflict affected countries considered by this evaluation (see box 2.7 above). The approach adopted was a technically-led, 'bottom up' one, focused on training and mentoring, with the aim of bringing about changed policing philosophy through a demonstration effect and 'lowering the temperature' on the ground.32 The 'demonstration' model appears to have borne results is very challenging contexts (see box 2.10 below).

Box 2.10   Effectiveness of demonstration effect in Bamiyan, Afghanistan

While New Zealand Police did not have access to significant financial resources, the daily modelling of professional behaviour, scrutiny of ANP actions, and enthusiasm for the development of ANP in Bamiyan appears to have borne results. In other provinces where cash, rather than professional mentoring and training assistance, has been used as the key lever for change, outcomes have been much less favourable. Although it is impossible to say with certainty how far these changes can be attributed to New Zealand Police, it is reasonable to assume that their role has been significant.

- Demonstration of community policing was undertaken by establishing close professional relations with partner country police forces. Individual officers establishing close working relations with local counterparts (including in Solomon Islands officers being

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[32] For example MFAT recent background and design documents relating to community policing projects in Papua and West Papua and Timor-Leste.

sworn into the local force); presented strong role models; adopted flexible and pragmatic approaches to problems on the ground, pro-actively demonstrating how to engage with communities (for example through youth / sports clubs, women's groups); were culturally sensitive, and demonstrated an out-going 'user friendly' style often in the context of local police forces more attuned to paramilitary policing approaches.

- Community policing approaches were in some cases undertaken at the initiative of individual officers operating within joint command situations. Within multi-lateral / joint command engagements - in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands – very limited progress has been made in mainstreaming a community policing approach within partner country police forces. In some cases this is because of limited progress in addressing police mandate issues (see box 2.11 below and box 2.4 above).

Box 2.11 Community policing in Timor-Leste

Timor Leste: The PNTL Organic Law of 2009 requires the PNTL to have *the characteristics of a community policing approach* but also embraces a military approach to the PNTL's organisation, discipline and training. Subsidiary legislation to 'flesh out' the Organic Law has yet to be developed. The PNTL's organisational structure does not promote community policing as a mainstream activity, with the under-resourced community policing unit headed by a relatively junior office. The PNTL does not have an operational strategic plan (the current plan has little internal ownership or awareness) and the degree of ownership of the community policing strategy is unclear. Operationally, the PNTL continues to adopt a largely paramilitary style of policing, favoured by some senior officers.

The evaluation team visited two police stations where New Zealand police under UNPOL command had piloted community policing. Community policing approaches had been embraced by the commander in one; in the other the approach was abandoned once the New Zealand pilot ended. In another police station, an individual New Zealand police officer was demonstrating a community policing approach, but there was little evidence that it had been embraced by PNTL, for example the storing of riot shields at the entrance to the station did not present a 'user friendly' face.

In bilateral engagements New Zealand tended effectively to 'carve out' community policing as a 'niche' function. In the lengthy Bougainville bilateral intervention, community policing has not been mainstreamed within local police operations, and the sustainability of the New Zealand Police supported Community Auxiliary Police is doubtful. A similar 'niche' approach has been adopted in the new Timor-Leste bilateral intervention (see box 2.1.2 below).

Box 2.12   Bilateral community policing initiatives: Bougainville and Timor-Leste

Bougainville: The Peace Agreement gave a strong mandate for community policing in Bougainville, which New Zealand responded to through the development of the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) system. It appears that certainly from 2007 and possibly before then, the intention was for the CAP to be developed in a sustainable manner under the auspices of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), including through the BPS Community Policing Strategy 2011-2015 (developed with New Zealand Police assistance). The CAP appear to be providing a useful service at community level. But the low capacity of the BPS and the limited ability of the Autonomous Bougainville Government to address this, with key police powers remaining in Port Moresby, mean that it is difficult to see how the CAP service can be sustained in the absence of strong on-going New Zealand support. Low BPS capacity also limits the effectiveness of the CAP who are dependent on the BPS to respond to offences which cannot be dealt with at community level.

New Zealand has lobbied unsuccessfully for appointment of a superintendant to the BPS to supervise the CAP.   The extent to which the Government of PNG is committed to the CAP concept is unclear. While CAP allowances are now paid by the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, the BPS has not been provided with sufficient human or other resources to manage the CAP or to integrate them into the regular police service. AusAid's long-running and far-reaching PNG Law and Justice Programme which operates at both the central level and in Bougainville provides a potential additional entry point for New Zealand engagement with the Government of PNG on these issues.

There is very strong evidence that the CAP are currently a long way from being integrated within the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), and are not sustainable without on-going New Zealand support[33] (a key stakeholder even suggested that New Zealand support for the CAP would be required 'indefinitely').

Timor Leste: New Zealand's new Community Policing Project in Timor-Leste also takes a technically-led approach, despite the opportunities offered by the strategic decision to enter into a bilateral relationship with the Timor-Leste government. While design documents reveal a concern to mainstream and ensure sustainability, the approach taken to achieving this is essentially a technical one – through the practical application of community policing principles including through training, advisory work and mentoring.

With the Timor-Leste national police (PNTL) lacking a developed legislative framework, operational strategic plan, or concept of operations, and the leadership giving mixed messages about its commitment to a community policing approach there are clearly opportunities for New Zealand to use its new bilateral arrangement to strategic effect and engage with the government of Timor-Leste at the policy and political level on the future philosophy and shape of its police force, as well as with the PNTL on its concept of operations, organisational structure, and management policy. It is encouraging that under the new Community Policing Project NZ police officers are engaging with organisational structure issues and are seeking to work with the PNTL to reposition its community policing department within Commissioner General's office, in order to show the Commissioner General's commitment to community policing being upgraded to a mainstream policing activity. Opportunities for a more strategic engagement may also exist through co-ordination with the AusAid/ Australian Federal Police Timor-Leste Police Development Programme, which focuses on PNTL institutional reform and organisational development.

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[33] Evidence includes from wide ranging interviews with stakeholders, direct observations of BPS, progress reports.

- Results that international experience suggests could be achieved through capacity building for community policing (including in fragile and conflict affected situations) have been limited – see box 2.13 below. As the box shows, there has been little engagement with local police strategy, structure and systems. While New Zealand has limited resources and cannot engage across the board, opportunities have been missed to co-ordinate on these issues with other donors, especially AFP and AusAid (see box 2.12 above).

Box 2.13 Intended results for police capacity building interventions

The operational menu contained in the Background Paper for this evaluation, sets out a range of different capacity development interventions that have been successfully applied in different developing police contexts around the world, including many in fragile and conflict affected contexts, covering many different organisational dimensions.[34]   There is no expectation that New Zealand support should select any particular subset of these interventions; evidence is clear that locally developed *best fit* approaches are most effective. However, is instructive to compare the intended results of these wide-ranging interventions, against the intended results of the New Zealand work.   This provides an indication of whether the New Zealand technical capacity development interventions are on the right track to deliver effective and sustainable change. The table below provides this comparison, using the *McKinsey 7S Model* to provide a framework for organisational dimensions.

Organisational dimension	'Optimal' result from operational menu interventions	Applicability to intended results of New Zealand capacity development interventions in fragile and conflict affected situations
Strategy	Community, government and sector engagement to consolidate mandate	Low
Structure	Decentralised, aligned to community structures, embedded in a clear plan that defines roles and responsibilities	Low
Systems	Legislation, policy and concept of operations clearly outline the role of police in criminal justice system	Low
Style	Emphasis on integrity, ethical conduct and personal responsibility	Medium (evident at the local level where NZ Police have engaged)
Shared values	Police as part of the community, not apart from it, driven by community policing principles	Medium (evident at the local level where NZ Police have engaged)
Skills	Situational awareness and leadership based on engagement, role models, relationships and moral authority	Medium (evident at the local level where NZ Police have engaged)
Staffing	Composition of police matches ethnicity, gender mix with abilities to work in and with the community at all levels	Medium (evidence is mixed)

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[34] The key sources for the menu were: (1) SEESAC, UNDP Stability Pact, Saferworld, 2007, 'Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing (3rd edition)', South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Belgrade; and (2) Groenewald, H. and Peake, G., 2004, Police Reform Through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation, International Peace Academy/Saferworld, New York.

Police technical capacity development: lessons

- **New Zealand Police are strong operational and technical implementing partners for MFAT.** Key operational lessons include the importance of: individual officers establishing close professional relations with partner country police forces (including potentially being sworn into local police forces); adopting flexible and pragmatic approaches to problems on the ground; pro-actively demonstrating how to engage with communities (for example through youth / sports clubs, women's groups); adopting culturally sensitive approaches; and demonstrating an out-going 'user friendly' style to local police forces more attuned to paramilitary policing approaches. As well as strong personal commitment from individual officers, deployments exhibit strong corporate commitment, with New Zealand being prepared to engage for the long haul. While there is some scope to improve the operational effectiveness of deployments, New Zealand Police have positive lessons to share with the international community.
  [See recommendations 5 and 8 in chapter five.]

- **Sustainable police reform, including the sustainable embedding of community policing as a *whole of policing* approach requires political and policy-level engagement.** Bottom up projects to demonstrate or test a community policing approach are appropriate as pilots, but without strategic engagement to secure mainstreaming, they will be unsustainable. A sustainable approach to mainstreaming community policing requires engagement with root and branch police organisational development, and issues of affordability from national resources. This requires a strong political and cultural sensitivity, and is likely to be a long-term enterprise.
  [See recommendations 1 and 2 in chapter five.]

- **There is scope for much stronger linkage with other donor initiatives that address systemic policing issues, to enhance the strategic impact of New Zealand Police's technical inputs.** Where New Zealand is a relatively minor actor in a broader enterprise, while recognising that influence may be limited, opportunities should be sought for partnership, alliances and where appropriate harmonised approaches with like-minded larger players.
  [See recommendation 2 in chapter five.]

2.3.3 Police interface with communities

> **Long term outcome: Structures facilitating two-way communication between citizens and police are in place and functioning effectively**

Police interface with communities: context

This section considers the extent to which New Zealand police work has assisted with the development of effective and sustainable structures to facilitate communications between citizens and the police. In fragile and conflict affected situations, paramilitary forms of policing, accusations of human rights abuses by the police, weak state and police legitimacy, and low police capacity all militate against strong police / community relations. At the same time, the police have a key role to play in statebuilding: creating loyalty to the state will depend significantly on the extent to which the police are able to protect, and willing to respect local communities.

Police interface with communities: findings

- The approach taken in fragile and conflict affected situations has been a 'facilitated' community engagement approach, where civil society organisations work with communities to assist them to develop structures / committees through which to engage with the police (see box 2.14 below for examples). This can be contrasted with a 'direct' approach, where it is the local police who take the initiative to develop structures for interaction with communities (for example the Police Partnership Boards developed in Sierra Leone immediately after the conflict).[35]

Box 2.14 'Facilitated' community engagement approach

Solomon Islands: RAMSI is supporting Save the Children Fund to work with communities to develop community police committees.

Timor-Leste: New Zealand is supporting the Asia Foundation to work with communities to develop police / community councils at the district level.

- These interventions appear to be appreciated by communities[36] and seen by the police as worthwhile.[37] But there did not appear to be hard evidence of their impact – for example on crime or perceptions of community safety.

Police interface with communities: lessons

- **There is scope for further work on the relative benefits and impact of different models to enhance police interaction with communities,** and on whether a transition from (a possibly unsustainable) civil society supported modality to a police supported modality

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[35] In post conflict Sierra Leone it was decided from the outset that the police should be closely involved with the community, so a 'direct' approach was taken from the word go, through the development of Police Partnership Boards as part of Local Needs Policing.

[36] Evidence from stakeholder interviews

[37] Interview evidence

should be undertaken as part of the transition from a post conflict to a developmental context.

[See recommendations 7 and 8 in chapter five.]

2.3.4   Police interface with the criminal justice system

> **Long term outcome: Police are fully embedded in and contributing to the functioning of the criminal justice system**

Police interface with the criminal justice system: context

The police are the entry point to the formal criminal justice system. For the goal of safe and secure communities to be realised, the police need to be understood as part of the criminal justice chain. The criminal justice system in each of the countries considered by this report is weak, and in some cases almost dysfunctional. For example in Afghanistan prosecutors are poorly-paid and subject to influence and bribery, allegedly resulting in cases being dropped for lack of evidence, and against police advice. In Timor Leste, poor communications between the police and prosecutor make investigation problematic, and the slow processing of cases, together with the use of Portuguese as the official language of the court make for a dysfunctional criminal justice system.

These issues do not imply that New Zealand should necessarily engage with the whole spectrum of criminal justice reform,[38] but it does suggest that police work will have limited impact if the rest of the criminal justice system remains dysfunctional. New Zealand police work should therefore be undertaken in the context of the partner country police's role in the criminal justice system, including by making linkages with criminal justice reform processes being undertaken in the partner country (which may be supported by other donors).

Police interface with communities: findings

- New Zealand Police are providing capacity development support, particularly individual skills development, in police forces to strengthen the role of the police in the criminal justice chain. For example in Afghanistan New Zealand Police are supporting investigation skills, but the impact has been reduced by highly politicized and corrupt Afghan prosecution and judiciary systems.

- Interventions have generally not been designed with linkages across the criminal justice system in mind (Afghanistan is a notable exception). Table 2.2 below summarises the position.

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[38] Such as AusAid's Law and Justice Programme in Papua New Guinea, which involved the provision at one stage of over 60 advisers throughout PNG's criminal justice institutions

Table 2.2 Police engagement with broader criminal justice system

National criminal justice reform programme?	NZ support to police engagement with broader criminal justice system
Afghanistan (Bamiyan): Reforms to the criminal justice system have been mandated under successive national strategies, and supported from 2001 by Italy and other bi-laterals and from 2007 by EUPOL.	NZP support for police engagement with justice reform has focused on criminal investigation training and mentoring, with some technical progress made. The aim of the EUPOL Rule of Law Programme is to support an integrated police, justice and corrections system, and during Highland 12 EUPOL added civilian advisers on human rights and rule of law to the mission.
PNG (Bougainville): Government of PNG Law and Justice Sector Programme (supported by AusAid and executed by Cardno). Includes Royal PNG Constabulary in a 'sector wide' approach to justice reform. The programme has an office in Bougainville and is supporting reform across the criminal justice sector, for example through training Bougainville Police Service prosecutors and the re-structuring of the BPS.	The complex political situation in Bougainville with the BPS operating under the auspices of the Royal PNG Constabulary means that entry points for NZ Police engagement are unclear. Linkages have not been made with the AusAid Law and Justice Sector Programme
Solomon Islands: RAMSI's Law and Justice Programme	Entry point is through RAMSI / PPF. The linkages between the PPF and broader reforms to the criminal justice system undertaken by through the Law and Justice Programme are weak
Timor-Leste: Justice sector strategic plan under the Ministry of Justice	No linkage with NZ Police engagement

Police interface with the criminal justice system: lessons

- **While New Zealand Police cannot address the problems across the justice system, there are opportunities for MFAT to link policing interventions with other donor initiatives which do address these issues.**
  [See recommendations 1, 3 and 4 in chapter five.]

2.3.5 Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems

> **Long term outcome: Complementary and synergetic linkages between police and non-state dispute resolution systems in place**

Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems: context

In all the countries considered in this report local disputes are more likely to be handled within communities than through the formal system. The form of the relationship between state and non-state systems may depend on the nature and preferences of communities and also on the resources available for formal police work. Particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations, the legitimacy of the state and of security providers may be contested and, in these cases, the legitimacy of the state may be associated with how the formal and informal start to come together to meet the concerns and needs of communities.

Police and formal justice providers in partner countries interviewed during the evaluation all regarded non-state systems as appropriate fora for dealing with petty crimes and minor infringements. They were viewed as the bottom rung on the ladder of a hierarchy of conflict and dispute resolution processes. This arrangement can arise as a matter of practice, including through the exercise of police discretion, or because of the limited reach of the formal system (for example in Solomon Islands 60% of people will never see a police officer).[39] Sometimes the role of non-state providers is explicitly recognised in legislation.

But as well as a hierarchical relationship, there is potential for conflict between the state and non-state systems. This may arise because it may be the non-state system, rather than the police who are viewed as legitimate providers of security and justice, or because of different norms and cultural understandings operating within the two systems which serving police officers embedded in local communities and culture may have to mediate. Examples provided by stakeholders during the evaluation included:

- Customary loyalties to clan or family may conflict with the formal system. For example in Solomon Islands police officers may be required by their *wantok* to pay compensation to another *wantok* for arresting an offender;

- Alternative systems may be regarded has having legitimacy to the exclusion of state-provided justice. For example in some eastern islands in Solomon Islands (Tikopia and Anuta) chiefs have refused to allow the police to land. In Afghanistan police practice in relation to political disputes or major outbreaks of violence are subject to local power-bargaining, as well as being strongly influenced by expectations based on cultural norms and kinship ties;

- Alternative systems may operate with different norms to the formal system – for example attitudes to violence as a form of dispute resolution;[40] to domestic violence;

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[39] Estimate by RAMSI adviser
[40] Hughes, B. 2012. Peace Operations and the Political: A Pacific Reminder of What Really Matters. Journal of International Peacekeeping 16 (2012) 99–118

and to sorcery (for example in Bougainville where the evaluation team was informed of instances of the BPS and CAPS being unable to intervene in cases of communities killing adults and juveniles accused of sorcery).

Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems: findings

- New Zealand officers have worked sensitively within different cultural settings, including with non-state mechanisms (see box 2.15 for examples).

Box 2.15 Interface with non-state dispute resolution systems in Solomon Islands and Bougainville

Solomon Islands: New Zealand officers have become involved in time-consuming negotiations between *wantoks* about compensation payments.

Bougainville: New Zealand has very proactively engaged with non-state systems, through supporting the establishment of CAP, community members trained as 'auxiliaries' who operate at community level as a 'bridge' between the formal and informal system. Most cases involving the CAP are dealt with by chiefs at the village court level.

- With the exception of Bougainville, New Zealand police work has not addressed the issue of engagement with non-state systems directly. Few background or design documents seen by the evaluation team provided context analysis in relation to plural legal systems.

- In Bougainville the CAP are clearly appreciated by communities (based on focus group and interview evidence). What was less clear was the extent to which the CAP are adding value to existing conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms, which take place through traditional mediation systems, peace officers and village courts. Key findings of the recent evaluation of the community officer pilot in Solomon Islands[41] chime with evidence provided to the evaluation team in Bougainville: (i) community officers / CAP were popular with communities; (ii) communities have improved perceptions of safety and security, but there is no hard evidence about crime rates; and (iii) expectations raised by the community officers / CAP about improved formal police responsiveness to communities have been disappointed, because of the low capacity of the formal police.

Police interface with non-state dispute resolution systems: lessons

- **Stronger context analysis and understanding of non-state systems is required in intervention design**. This should include engaging with national governments and partner police forces to determine their approach to non-state systems.
  [See recommendation 3 in chapter five.]

- **Interventions should have a stronger and more explicit focus on engagement with non-state mechanisms.** These could include: working with traditional systems to resolve different approaches; training for traditional leaders in human rights issues; and working

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[41] Dinnen S and Haley N. Evaluation of the Community Officer Project in Solomon Islands. World Bank Justice for the Poor Research Report. May 2012

with the partner police to develop strategies to confront human rights abuses stemming from traditional values.   *[See recommendation 1 in chapter five.]*

- **Improved lessons learning / monitoring and evaluation systems need to be put in place to enable MFAT to understand the impact of initiatives (such as the Bougainville CAP) that engage with non-state systems.** Overall there is limited international knowledge about what works in engagement with non-state mechanisms (see Background Paper).
  [See recommendations 7 and 8 in chapter five.]

2.4 Gender and human rights

Gender and human rights: context

All the fragile and conflict affected contexts considered by this evaluation face gender and human rights challenges specifically in relation to their police forces and more generally. Key issues include:

Human rights:

- accusations of human rights abuses perpetrated including by the police during periods of conflict (for example in Solomon Islands during the 2003 civil unrest and Timor-Leste during 2006);
- in conflict-affected situations involving paramilitary style policing, the suppression of civil unrest, and counterinsurgency activities - ensuring that police officers act in accordance with human rights norms (for example in relation to the use of force, the exercise of discretion, pre-trial detention, and charging procedures).

Gender:

- high rates of violence against women which may at least in part be associated with conflict;
- ensuring the participation of women in the peacebuilding process in line with UN resolution 1325;
- ensuring gender equality within police forces.

All the countries considered by the evaluation are parties to key international gender and human rights obligations, and have put in place or are putting in place national gender and human rights policies and processes. For example Afghanistan's National Development Strategy 2008-13 identifies gender equality as a cross-cutting issue and also addresses human rights.

Gender and human rights: findings

- Despite the importance of gender and human rights in fragile and conflict affected state contexts, because interventions have tended not to undergo a formal design process, in general neither gender nor human rights have 'designed in' to country-level interventions. Very few of the 'design' documents (MoUs, letters of variation etc)

mention either issue. The newly designed bilateral Timor-Leste Community Policing Project is an exception.

● Rather than deploying specialist human rights and gender experts, MFAT has sought to build capacity of New Zealand Police and its own programme staff to integrate gender and human rights into intervention design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. MFAT's gender guidance for Partnership for Pacific Policing[42] is a good example of this approach.

● In practice, New Zealand Police have taken a pragmatic approach to mainstreaming gender and human rights issues in police work – see box 2.16 below.

Box 2.16 New Zealand Police approach to mainstreaming gender and human rights

Supporting national processes such as in Solomon Islands the on-going peace and reconciliation process. In Timor-Leste New Zealand police are supporting PNTL officer to operationalise the human rights obligations in the National Community Policing Department Services annual plan, and the intention is to develop partnerships with other agencies working in the area of human rights, conflict prevention and peace-building including the National Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention and the *Provedoria* for Human Rights and Justice.

Using national resources - for example in Bougainville, human rights and gender training is delivered to the CAP by local NGOs, rather than by New Zealand Police.

Mainstreaming human rights and gender within key organisational processes when supporting police organisational development. Training and mentoring provide clear opportunities. These have been taken in Timor-Leste where New Zealand is supporting the development of PNTL trainings. In addition, the new Community Policing Project in Timor-Leste explicitly focuses on mentoring and skills development of female staff in the PNTL. In Bougainville CAP recruitment policies instituted by New Zealand Police are directly responsible for an impressive 20% of female CAP.

Providing dedicated support in the Pacific under the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (discussed in the partner Pacific regional evaluation report – in particular the need to integrate interventions under this regional approach more effectively with country-level interventions) and in Timor-Leste through the proposed provision of two short term New Zealand officers to work at national and district levels with relevant PNTL staff to support the strengthening of policy, systems, procedures and training to address domestic violence.

Demonstrating human rights and gender sensitivity - the evaluation team noted the demonstration of human rights and gender sensitivity in the general approach of New Zealand Police. For example there has been a good gender balance of New Zealand Police advisers deployed, creating positive role models. Interviews with individual officers revealed that gender and human rights issues were high on their list of priorities and interests.

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[42] Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

Gender and human rights: lessons

- **There is limited evidence on outcomes, but New Zealand's blend of mainstreaming gender and human rights, with a targeted approach to addressing violence against women appears appropriate.** The approach to mainstreaming should be strengthened in intervention design.
  [See recommendation 6 in chapter five]

2.5 Intervention-level outcomes and outputs

The discussion above centres on results at the programme level. This section reviews results at the level of individual interventions. Table 2.3 at end of the chapter summarises findings against intervention-level evaluation results diagrams, constructed by the evaluation team. Results at the intervention level feed directly into outcomes achieved at programme level: intervention designs (from which the programme level results diagram was constructed) focus strongly on *police* individual skills and organisational development, but there is some degree of engagement with the broader *policing* contexts identified in the programme-level results diagram.

Intervention-level outcomes and outputs: findings

- Achievement of intended results in conflict affected situations was challenging: most intended outcomes were not achieved, or only partially achieved.
- Planning and evaluation frameworks focused on activities. Assumptions were undocumented.

Box 2.17 Afghanistan – limited planning and M&E framework

Afghanistan: During the first two years of engagement in Afghanistan prior to EUPOL incorporation, although the essential training and mentoring mandate was clear, New Zealand Police operated without an operational strategy and evaluation benchmarks were never been developed.

Intervention-level outcomes and outputs: lessons

- **Insufficient planning and evaluation structures have constrained the achievement of results and lesson learning.** This has constrained the evaluation's ability to assess what was done best, and what might have been done better.
  [See recommendations 7 and 8 in chapter five]

2.6 Conclusion

The achievement of intended results in fragile and conflict affected situations has proved challenging. The overall approach to police work has focused strongly on ***police technical capacity development***. In this area, support provided by New Zealand Police has been highly regarded and appreciated, and is overall in line with good development practice. MFAT and New Zealand Police have engaged to some extent the ***broader governance and institutional context*** within which the police operate (including through MFAT's senior institutional strengthening adviser from 2006-2011) but strong New Zealand Police ownership and shaping of interventions has meant that in practice the work has been technically led.

As a relatively small player, New Zealand is unlikely to address all the broader governance and institutional issues around policing. But a siloed technical approach raises questions about sustainability. Stronger analysis of the broader policing context is required, and opportunities to link New Zealand Police's technical inputs with interventions (including by other donors) in this wider agenda should be taken. Engagement with this wider *policing* context will require enhanced input from MFAT to complement and enhance New Zealand Police's work on *police* capacity development.

Table 2.3 Summary of intervention level results

The table below provides a summary of intended results and actual achievements at the intervention level, highlighted using green, amber, and red shading. Green indicates achievement of intended results within the envisaged time-frame. Amber indicates (i) in the case of on-going interventions, those that have made progress towards achievement of intended results within the envisaged time-frame, or (ii) in the case of past interventions, those that have partially achieved their intended results. Red indicates failure to achieve intended results or that in intervention is off track to achieve them. Where there was insufficient evidence for the evaluation team to make an assessment, the relevant row in the matrix has been left un-shaded.

Intervention	Summary intended results	Intended final delivery date	Key evidence
Afghanistan (Operation Highland)	ANP in Bamiyan discharges its duties in an efficient, effective, just and transparent manner in accordance with Afghan law	Continuous (mandate renewed annually from 2005-14)	Some impact in terms of better procedural record-keeping, budgeting and personnel / equipment allocation. But sustainability is uncertain owing to political context. The nature of the reform challenge argues for a more extended deployment, but international 'transition' realities do not permit this • 2009 review (Cresswell) • Evaluation interviews and observations
	Improved ANP ethos, upgraded personnel and resource management at Bamiyan and in the districts		
	The quality and skills of ANP personnel in Bamiyan is sustained over time through its training system		Relevance, quality and efficiency of training at the RTC greatly improved as a consequence of NZP involvement. However the impact of training is diluted on the ground by the politicisation of policing in Afghanistan. • 2009 review (Cresswell) • Evaluation interviews and observations
	Creation of excellence in training and re-training of ANP at the Regional Training Centre, Bamiyan		
Bougainville Community	Effective policing services provided across all of Bougainville by BPS and CAPS	2010	CAP appear to be providing an effective service at village level, but their effectiveness is constrained by low BPS capacity • Mid Term Review BCCP July 2006
	CAP provide effective community police		
	CAP are effectively managed by BPS		

Intervention	Summary intended results	Intended final delivery date	Key evidence
	Active application of community policing philosophy by BPS regulars		
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	Civil order, rule of law and safe communities	2012	Law and order re-established, but limited progress made on developing RSIPF capacity • Draft Independent Review 2009 • RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2010 • People's Survey • Interviews evidence and observations gathered during evaluation fieldwork
	Royal Solomon Islands Police Forces is capable, effective, self reliant and self-sustaining		
	Community has confidence and trust in RSIPF		
	Political mandate for RSIPF secured		
	RSIPF is a capable, efficient, self-reliant and self-sustaining police forces with new services and approaches in use (including collaborative crime prevention, community safety and security initiatives)		
Timor-Leste: support to UNMIT/UNPOL (including Community Policing Pilot)	Enforcement of law and order supported	2010	New Zealand Police's contribution to supporting law and order within UNPOL/ UNMIT has been appropriate and effective • CPP independent review report 2010 • Evaluation interviews and observations
	PNTL is capable, sustainable and effective with strengthened governance and discipline		Concerns over safety and the performance and capability of the PNTL remain high. However the vast majority of respondents in a survey of four sub-districts believed the relationship between the PNTL and citizens is 'good' and that the security situation has improved or stayed the same. • Baseline survey of community policing perceptions 2009 Organic Law on Police recognises community policing approach (within a military-style structure) and establishes a Department of Community Policing • Timor-Leste Community Policing Pilot Review 2009
	Community confidence in PNTL enhanced		
	PNTL strengthened including on community policing methodologies		
	Sustainable community policing model and philosophy developed		

Intervention	Summary intended results	Intended final delivery date	Key evidence
			• CPPP independent review report 2010 Training in community policing has progressed well with the 2009 Review reporting PNTL staff trained in community policing based on the modules prepared in consultation with PNTL 50-75% of PNTL surveyed across four sub-districts say they are familiar with community policing concept. • Baseline survey of community policing perceptions 2009 • Evaluation fieldwork suggested that on the ground, the sustainability of community policing approaches promoted during the pilot was patchy.
Timor – Leste Bilateral Community Policing Project 2011-2015	Effective community policing programme at national/ district/sub-district/ *suco* levels Effective on-going partnerships at national/district/sub-district/ *suco* levels Effective training at all levels Effective PNTL community policing action plans, systems and procedures at national/district/sub-district/ *suco* levels	2015	Too early to assess No data available

Chapter 3: Relevance - findings and lessons

Key findings

- New Zealand's police work is well-aligned and relevant to New Zealand's developmental, foreign policy and security objectives, although the lack of an explicit conceptual framework makes relevance harder to confirm. Interventions are not designed to have a direct impact on trans-border crime or regional security.

- New Zealand Police's approach to technical capacity building support has been relevant to context, and has responded to the needs of particular situations including for community policing interventions.

- New Zealand has made relevant contributions to the critical transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach, although there have been some delays and missed opportunities.

- Overall relevance is less clear in relation to particular country contexts, for example where the legitimacy of the police is contested, or where a key problem is inter-communal violence. Interventions have in general been based on limited context analysis.

3.1   Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief review of the relevance of MFAT funded police work in fragile and conflict affected situations to the developmental and strategic interests of New Zealand. The remainder of the chapter focuses on relevance to partner countries, including the experience of transitioning police work from peacekeeping/ stabilisation to a developmental approach.

3.2   Developmental and strategic relevance of MFAT funded police work for New Zealand

Relevance for New Zealand: context

New Zealand's portfolio of aid funded police work has developed considerably since 2000. The context for this includes: (i) increased international development community understanding about the role of security and justice in development – particularly in fragile states; (ii) New Zealand's desire to be a good global and regional citizen and work in solidarity with Australia and in line with its commitment to the Pacific Forum (Solomon Islands), the UN (Timor-Leste), and the international community (Afghanistan); and (iii) increased concern about New Zealand's security in the wake of 9/11, the Bali bombs etc and instability in the Pacific region.

Relevance for New Zealand: findings

- Police work is clearly in line with international understanding of priority interventions in fragile and conflict affected states (as expressed in the New Deal for Fragile States). It is also in line with New Zealand's developmental objectives: effective policing is vital for *building safe and secure communities* - now one of MFAT's four priority themes for its aid programme, supporting the core focus of *sustainable economic development*.[43]

- Foreign policy and security considerations have been key drivers of New Zealand's increased involvement in international police work (see box 3.1 below). General police organisational development, strengthened relationships with partner police services, together with assistance in particular areas such as forensics, all have the potential to enable New Zealand Police to interact with capacitated police forces to address regional and trans-border crime issues.

- New Zealand MFAT funded police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts has a strong focus on community policing, and has mainly been undertaken through a 'bottom up' demonstration approach. This way of working is not designed to have a direct impact on trans-border crime or regional security.

Box 3.1 Foreign policy and security drivers of New Zealand's international police work

Afghanistan: New Zealand's involvement was motivated by a wish to support international efforts to counter terrorism which can threaten New Zealanders and New Zealand's interests; to support Afghanistan to become a responsible international citizen and to support the US and other close security partners. As a small player in a global collective, New Zealand's influence on security and development outcomes in Afghanistan was likely to be limited: but benefits of involvement are largely geopolitical in nature.

Timor-Leste: New Zealand's engagement was in response to an Australian led UN mission, but the more recent decision to strengthen bilateral engagement reflects a desire to strengthen an already close relationship with a possible future member of ASEAN.

Bougainville and **Solomon Islands**: Interventions were initially in response to crises and immediate instability. The subsequent deployment of ODA funds for police capacity development work reflects the acknowledgement that moving from fragility to stability is a long term enterprise.

Papua and West Papua: The intervention is in part driven by the desire to strengthen relationships with the Indonesian Police, with whom New Zealand has shared interests in trans-national issues such as people smuggling and counter-piracy.

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[43] New Zealand Aid Programme. (2011). International Development Policy Statement: Supporting Sustainable Development. The New Zealand Government's overarching policy on international development assistance. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) March 2011. The other three priority themes are: investing in economic development; promoting human development; and improving resilience and responding to disaster

Relevance for New Zealand: lessons

- **Long term and often difficult to measure foreign police and security benefits need to be balanced with New Zealand's domestic policing needs.** This issue is likely to become more acute if resources for domestic policing become more constrained.
  [See recommendation 5 in chapter five]

3.3 Developmental relevance for partner countries

The relevance of New Zealand's police work for partner countries is addressed in relation to (i) ownership and alignment with national strategies and priorities; (ii) context analysis; and (iii) donor harmonisation/co-ordination. These key issues are reflected in the Paris Declaration,[44] the OECD/DAC principles for engagement in fragile states,[45] and the New Deal for Fragile States.[46]

Relevance for partner countries: findings

Ownership and alignment with partner country priorities

- Security is a clear priority for the governments of the all the fragile and conflict affected situations where New Zealand has provided assistance (see box 3.2 below). It is recognised as such in over-arching development plans,[47] in national budgets, and by government officials and politicians.

- New Zealand Police have, in the main, adopted a localised approach in fragile and conflict affected contexts, although local priorities are not always easy to discern. In their approach to community policing, New Zealand Police demonstrated understanding of the need for local ownership, an appreciation that one size does not fit all, and of the need to develop a model appropriate to the local context (see box 3.2 below).

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[44] The Paris Declaration set out five core principles for aid effectiveness: ownership (through formation of national strategies); alignment (donor support to those strategies); harmonisation (streamlining of donor efforts); results (achievement of clear, monitored goals); and mutual accountability (joint responsibility of donor and partner country).

[45] The principles are: (i)Take context as the starting point; (ii) Ensure all activities do no harm; (iii) Focus on state building as the central objective; (iv) Prioritise prevention; (v) Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives; (vi) Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies; (vii) Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts: (viii) Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors; (ix) Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; (x) Avoid creating pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans')

[46] The New Deal was agreed in November 2011, therefore near the end of the evaluation period. However, the underlying principles and issues had been under discussion for the previous two years. It highlights the importance of starting with a country-led assessment of the underlying causes of fragility; of the need for a single country-led plan to which all donors align their support; and the increasing use of government systems.

[47] In the case of Bougainville in the Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001

Box 3.2 Examples of New Zealand Police's localised approach

Afghanistan: New Zealand Police's involvement in provincial-level training, mentoring and role-modelling of the Afghan National Police has proven highly relevant to the challenge of training up a modern, accountable police force.

Timor-Leste: New Zealand's bilateral Community Policing Project a focus on local solutions, and is being undertaken at the explicit request of the government of Timor-Leste who are represented on the project's steering committee. However the degree of real traction within PNTL and the government of Timor-Leste for a community policing approach is unclear.

Context analysis

- Interventions were based on very limited context analysis. Design documents, progress reports and reviews considered by the evaluation team (see annex D) focused narrowly on the *police* as an organisation, and on activities and implementation. They contained very limited analysis of the institutional and governance arrangements for *policing*, nor of the highly context specific nature and causes of insecurity which determine policing priorities – including inter-communal tensions; insurgency; disputes over land/resources where the state grants extraction rights which local communities do not regard as legitimate (both key issues in Bougainville and Solomon Islands); and weak state/society relations.

Box 3.3 Context analysis: Papua and West Papua

Papua and West Papua: The technically led nature of New Zealand's support to community policing in (to date focused on training) does not in its conception adequately address the appropriateness of a community policing model in the complex political context of a secessionist movement and a police force accused of severe human rights abuses and corruption.

Donor harmonisation / co-ordination

- Where the New Zealand deployment is through a multi-national initiative, such as RAMSI, EUPOL or UNPOL, joint command presents a ready-made co-ordination mechanism.
- Where New Zealand's engagement is on a bilateral basis, the tendency has been to conceive co-ordination as 'carving out' a community policing niche. Opportunities to co-ordinate with other donors have been missed (see box 3.4 below). In some cases (for example in Papua New Guinea) this is in part because donor co-ordination mechanisms in general, and around policing issues in particular, are weak.
- AFP and AusAid are key potential partners for New Zealand Police / MFAT (see box 3.4 below).

Box 3.4 Opportunities for harmonised approaches: Bougainville and Timor-Leste

Bougainville: AusAid's Law and Justice Programme is currently supplying an adviser to the Bougainville Police Service, who is supporting the re-structuring of the Service, including integration of CAP. Bougainville provides a significant opportunity for New Zealand and AusAid to co-ordinate on an holistic approach to improving Bougainville's criminal justice system, at the operational and strategic levels – both in Bougainville and Port Moresby (where key decision-making power in relation to the BPS lies). There is scope for stronger engagement with AusAid and with its implementing contractor, Cardno. Encouragingly MFAT and AusAid have now begun to have regular coordination meetings in Port Moresby, but the evaluation team was told that their focus is on operational coordination, rather than on policy and strategic issues such as the future of policing in Bougainville.

Timor Leste: AusAid / AFP's Timor-Leste Police Development Programme has been engaging with core PNTL institutional strengthening over a number of years. New Zealand's design document for the bilateral Community Policing Programme recognises the need to ensure close working relationships with the AusAid / AFP programme, but it is unclear from the design how lessons learnt from New Zealand's community policing work on the ground will feed into the AusAid / AFP programme.

Relevance for partner countries: lessons

- **Increased engagement with context and the broader governance and institutional arrangements of policing is necessary if MFAT is to secure its investment in policing and its ultimate goal of sustainable economic development in fragile and conflict affected contexts.** While New Zealand Police are well-placed to assess the relevance of interventions from a technical police organisational development perspective, complementary skills from outside the New Zealand Police (including from within the partner country) may be necessary to provide initial and on-going broader context analysis.
  [See recommendation 1 in chapter five]

- **Context analysis should lead to interventions being driven by context-specific goals, articulated in results diagrams.** Without careful analysis of the problem, there is a danger that interventions export a developed world presumption of policing priorities. The New Deal for Fragile States emphasises the need for a *country-led and owned* approach to diagnosing the causes and effects of fragility.
  [See recommendation 3 in chapter five]

- **There are clear opportunities for New Zealand to enhance the strategic impact of interventions by stronger co-ordination with AusAid and AFP's broader police reform agenda.**
 *[See recommendations 2 and 3 in chapter five]*

3.4   Transition from peacekeeping to development approach

Transition from peacekeeping to development approach: context

Figure 3.1 on the following page illustrates the typical three overlapping phases of the transition from peacekeeping to a developmental approach. Immediate stabilisation predominantly by a military force (in the case of Solomon Islands, a regional force), is followed by a gradual draw down of the military (*green shirts*) who are replaced by civilian police (*blue shirts*). Local civilian police are supported by an international / regional police force (the PPF in Solomon Islands, UNPOL in Timor Leste) who may undertake both operational policing, and increasingly, institutional strengthening and capacity development of the domestic police. Whilst this transition is represented in figure 3.1 as a forwards trajectory, it is important to recognise that in fragile and conflict affected situations, the process is rarely linear, with setbacks and lapses into conflict that may occur during the transition from conflict to stability.[48]

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[48] World Development Report. See work of Louis Kriesberg; Dean Pruitt, Jeffrey Rubin and Sung Hee Kim, and William Zartman

Figure 3.1 Exit strategy: transition from peacekeeping to development approach

	Phase 1: peacekeeping	**Phase 2: transition**	**Phase 3: development**
	Military peacekeepers		
	International / regional civilian police		Domestic police
	Instability External legitimacy for police		Stability Internal legitimacy for police
Key functions:	Stabilisation: military peacekeepers create the space for civilian policing		
		Military peacekeepers maintain surge capability	
	International / regional police may (a) support local police operationally and / or (b) undertake monitoring, observing and reporting	International / regional police increasingly focus on reinforcing or re-establishing the domestic police force through institutional strengthening and capacity development	Domestic police force supported by through institutional strengthening and capacity development takes increased responsibility for policing Development of early warning systems for conflict prevention
Policing approaches (domestic and international / regional police):	Strong focus on security and restoring and maintaining law and order	Increasing focus on community based approaches to policing	

Box 3.5 Solomon Islands and Timor Leste: examples of transition

Deployments in **Solomon Islands** and **Timor-Leste** exhibited the following characteristics: a period of tension, conflict and destabilisation before the deployment, followed by short, sharp military and 'public order' policing with formed tactical police units engaged to suppress violence and arrest offenders, followed by a transition into stabilisation. Once the situation had calmed down (although with setbacks for example in Solomon Islands the 2006 riots in Chinatown), there followed a withdrawal of military units and a period of joint command with local police in which the focus shifted to restoring the capacity of local police to take the sovereignty of policing their country.

For police work, the key shift occurs during phase 2 in figure 3.1, with a re-focusing from operational policing (provided directly by the external force and/or by supporting the domestic force to undertake operational policing) to long term institutional strengthening and capacity development. These activities require quite different skills to the tactical skills required when police operate in formed groups to suppress public violence and disorder. Phase 2 involves the development of a more strategic, long term focus based on a clear view of *what success would look like* through supporting the local police to develop an agreed policing philosophy, strategic direction and concept of operations.

Transition from peacekeeping to development approach: findings

- The transitions that occurred during the evaluation period were all in the context of New Zealand Police deployment as part of a regional or international force, and so the ability of New Zealand Police to affect the timing or mode of transition was constrained by operating under a joint command.

- New Zealand Police's focus on advice, mentoring and capacity development is well-suited to the developmental phase. Opportunities were taken, often at the initiative of individual officers, to move from a rank and file advisor in day to day policing role - to capacity development, technical assistance, advice, mentoring and capacity development.

- As discussed in section 2.3.1 in chapter 2, New Zealand had limited engagement with supporting the development of the mandate for local policing.

- Initial police involvement in peacekeeping during phase 1 can have the effect of retarding proper attention to the police's state building / rule of law role. In Afghanistan, arguably the police's state building / rule of law role was undermined by their peacekeeping role, by encouraging separation from the population and a continuous militarisation of their mission.

- The timing of the transition is difficult to judge on the ground. But there appear to have been missed opportunities and delays in moving towards the developmental phase (see box 3.6 below). Delays in moving from peacekeeping / operational model to a capacity development one, fail to build the legitimacy of the state, and may even undermine it.

For example in Solomon Islands, survey evidence suggests that the international PPF is more trusted than the local RSIPF (see perception survey evidence in box 2.2 above).

Box 3.6 Delays in the transition process: Solomon Islands and Afghanistan

Afghanistan: A *Police-e-Mardomi* initiative ('people's policing') is now mandated as part of the Afghan Ministry of Interior's police strategy, with oversight given to a designated unit in the ministry. However the New Zealand Police contingent in Bamiyan did not make a concerted effort to inculcate community policing skills until this year. In delaying community policing approaches, New Zealand was presumably influenced by coalition policing priorities - but the peaceable context in Bamiyan offered an opportunity to showcase the value of community-sensitive policing.

Opportunities may also have been missed for in-the-field outreach and training. Several deployments have sought to expand the training and mentoring process out into the field in support of District Commanders and their men. Although Bamiyan has recently become more dangerous, this was not the case in the early years of the intervention - and such outreach could have been a greater part of the post-training course follow-up process.

Solomon Islands in 2009[49] it was recognised that the PPF should change its focus from providing a high visibility police presence in Honiara and other provinces and technical and logistical assistance to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), towards intensive organisational support and capacity development for the RSIPF. But progress has been slow, and it is clear that the RSIPF remains a long way from being a being able to stand alone without PPF support.

Transition from peacekeeping to development approach: lessons

- **New Zealand Police have a strong contribution to make to international appreciation of the role of community policing in transitioning from peacekeeping to development.**
  [See recommendation 8 in chapter five.]

- **There is scope for New Zealand to adopt a more strategic approach by engaging with issues around police mandate,** in view of the *whole of policing* approach necessary for effective establishment of community policing (see box 2.7 in chapter two).
  [See recommendations 1, 2 and 3 and 4 in chapter five]

- **There is need for stronger and on-going context analysis to enhance New Zealand Police's ability to adjust its focus in response to the fluid environment typical in fragile and conflict affected contexts.** Delays in moving from operational policing to capacity development (Solomon Islands), and from aid-dependency to a focus on sustainability (Bougainville), can threaten statebuilding and sustainability.
  [See recommendations 3 and 7 in chapter five]

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[49] Partnership framework between Solomon Islands Government and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, April 2009

3.5 Conclusions

Within the boundaries of its engagement – primarily around technical capacity building - New Zealand support has been relevant to context, and has responded to the needs of particular situations. This includes the transition from a peacekeeping to a developmental approach. However overall, limited context analysis means that broader relevance to country context in fragile and conflict affected situations is harder to see, and the New Zealand police programme has not addressed, or been sufficiently contextualised within the various fundamental security and policing issues including the causes and effects or fragility, such as inter-communal violence and disputes over land/ resources; and the role of non-state actors who may be seen as more legitimate providers of security than the formal police.

Chapter 4: Efficiency – findings and lessons

Key findings

- The programme has generally been properly resourced, although there is scope for stronger MFAT engagement with police work (IDG and more broadly).
- Stronger harmonisation with other donors – especially AusAid and AFP – has the potential to enhance the strategic impact of New Zealand Police's work.
- There is limited scope to improve value for money through cost savings.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the overall efficiency of New Zealand's police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts. It considers how well human resources and institutional relationships were used to deliver results, and whether the same results could have been achieved with fewer resources or at lower cost.

4.2   Use of human resources and MFAT/New Zealand Police arrangements

Use of human resources and MFAT / New Zealand Police arrangements: findings

- The programme has been properly resourced for technical police inputs (subject to comments in section 2.3.2 in chapter 2 e.g. in relation to some imperfect skills matching and short-term deployments). New Zealand Police deploy mainly sworn police officers, with non-sworn staff deployed where appropriate (for example for communications work in Solomon Islands). The model has clear advantages for both New Zealand Police and the Partner Country. (See Pacific Report chapter 5 section 5.2.1)

- Particularly in fragile and conflict affected contexts where the political and security context is complex, there was scope for considerably tighter engagement between MFAT (both IDG and MFAT more broadly) and New Zealand Police. This would enable New Zealand police's technical inputs to be informed by and feed into MFAT's broader understanding of the policing context. (See Pacific Report chapter 5 section 5.2.2)

Box 4.1 Example of limited MFAT engagement

The evaluation team was informed in relation to one high profile police intervention in a fragile state that only about 5% of the MFAT aid manager's time was spent on engaging with it and with New Zealand police on the ground. It is recognised that resources are constrained, and there are competing demands, but this would seem insufficient engagement for a highly political and strategic bilateral intervention in a complex environment.

Use of human resources and MFAT / New Zealand Police arrangements: lessons

- **The developing partnership agreement between MFAT and New Zealand Police provides an opportunity for stronger engagement by MFAT in police work** to complement New Zealand Police's technical inputs.
  [See recommendations 1, 2 and 3 in chapter five]

4.3   Relations with other donors

Relations with other donors: findings

- New Zealand Police have co-ordinated well with officers from other donor countries when operating under a joint command.
- But when working bilaterally, opportunities for strategic co-ordination with other like-minded donors, particularly AusAid, AFP and their contractors who engage with broader aspects of policing than New Zealand Police, were missed. Such co-ordination offers opportunities to increase the strategic impact of New Zealand Police's inputs (see Pacific Report chapter 5 section 5.3).

Relations with other donors: lessons

- **There is scope for a stronger focus on harmonised donor approaches in intervention design.**
  [See recommendations 2 and 3 in chapter five]

4.4   Value for money

The evaluation team considered whether the same results could have been achieved with fewer resources and/or at lower cost - in other words, whether the 'unit cost' of delivery has been as low as it could have been (see Pacific Report chapter 5 section 5.4 for full discussion).

Value for money: findings

- There is limited scope to improve value for money through cost savings. Potential cost savings are: longer-term deployments of New Zealand Police; enhanced use of officers from other countries (particularly in the Pacific region); and use of private contractors – including local contractors.

Value for money: lessons

- **The New Zealand model offers good value for money, with modest unit costs.** There is limited scope to improve efficiency.
  [See recommendation 5 in chapter five]

4.5 Reporting

Reporting: findings

- New Zealand Police's financial reporting to MFAT on international police work is on an operational 'line by line' basis. Current procedures do not facilitate reporting against outcomes identified in intervention results diagrams. (See Pacific Report chapter 5 section 5.5)

Reporting: lessons

- **Outcome-based financial reporting requires strengthened results diagrams and results measurement tables.** It is currently very difficult to measure results against outcomes, as they are dependent on undocumented assumptions, and tend to be output driven. MFAT is currently working with New Zealand Police to strengthen activity design documents.

  [See recommendations 3 and 7 in chapter five]

4.6 Conclusions

Overall New Zealand Police work has been undertaken efficiently. Scope to enhance the efficiency of the work at the operational level further lies with: strengthening the partnership relationship between MFAT and New Zealand Police; enhancing engagement with other donors, particularly AusAid and the AFP; and supplementing the work of New Zealand Police with the use of private contractors.

Chapter 5: Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

The overarching recommendation is that MFAT should continue to fund New Zealand Police's international police work in fragile and conflict contexts. New Zealand Police have delivered strong technical inputs, at modest cost. This chapter makes recommendations on how this work could be further improved – particularly in relation to sustainability and relevance.

 The key recommendation is to develop the currently technically-led approach into a more strategic, politically informed, and context-specific one. This will require a different allocation of resources for police work, with much greater investment in diagnostic work including context and political economy analysis; on intervention design; and on more robust monitoring and evaluation, particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where lessons about what works in policing and its contribution to statebuilding and peacebuilding are emerging internationally. This implies much stronger engagement from MFAT (by IDG and at the broader policy and diplomatic levels).

The recommendations below must be considered within the context of available resources for policing work (for which non-programme allocations are estimated to remain constant over the next three years), and prioritised accordingly. Many of the recommendations are already in the process of being taken forward by MFAT and New Zealand Police, and the developing partnership agreement between them provides an excellent opportunity to consolidate this process.

5.2 Recommendations

5.2.1 Conceptual framework / theory of change for police work

This evaluation comes at a time when MFAT and New Zealand Police are moving their relationship to a more strategic level through a new partnership agreement. This provides an opportunity to establish a common understanding of what *police work* entails – and the respective roles of MFAT and New Zealand Police in achieving programme goals. The results diagram (figure 1.1 in chapter 1) together with the conceptual framework presented in annex C (including, importantly, the assumptions linking programme outcomes to goal) may be a starting point for this understanding.

> **Recommendation 1: Develop a clear conceptual framework and identify resources to operationalise it.**
> - As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should explicitly set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change in their developing partnership agreement, and identify and define the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT in contributing to the desired change: i.e. MFAT (IDG and more broadly) focusing on political influencing and broader institutional / governance analysis and engagement; NZP focusing on technical capacity building with partner country police forces).
> - New Zealand Police should develop explicit *community policing principles for international work*, emphasising the need to adopt context specific approaches in fragile and conflict affected situations where the legitimacy of the state (and so of the police) may be contested, where the underlying causes of conflict (e.g. inter-communal tensions) may require very context specific approaches to community policing, and where non-state actors may be considered to be more legitimate providers of security than the police.

5.2.2 Political and strategic engagement

Operationalising a broader approach to policing does not mean that the New Zealand Aid Programme should necessarily support interventions in every aspect of the governance and institutional arrangements for policing. It does mean that there should be stronger analysis and engagement in the political and strategic issues. Sustainable reform to support affordable police forces also requires tackling deep seated systemic issues – for example possible impunity in relation to human rights abuses, corruption and recurrent budgets and human resources – also requiring engagement at the political/ policy level. MFAT /New Zealand Police should therefore strengthen their engagement:

- Identify specific entry points for political engagement including through regional or multi-national body (such as RAMSI in Solomon Islands or the UN in Timor-Leste) and forming alliances with like-minded donors.
- Consider setting up within ISG a strategic unit with multi-disciplinary skills responsible for steering international police work, taking forward strategic thinking about the nature of policing, and the development of context-specific policing interventions. The unit would have funds for strategic studies and be responsible for maintaining strategic relationships including with AFP.
- Consider New Zealand Police having a presence in AFP in Canberra to leverage the expertise, skills, experience of both New Zealand Police and AFP
- Consider the scope for MFAT and New Zealand Police to work closely with other agencies such as the NZ Defence Force and the National Assessments Bureau at the strategic level.

Even with politically-informed and strategic engagement, the limits to what external parties can achieve need to be recognised. For example In Afghanistan, despite billions of dollars allocated to police training, equipment and reform by a uniquely-positioned and potent international coalition, capture of the policing function by national and local power-brokers remains a serious impediment to its evolution into an institution that serves and protects common citizens.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen engagement on policing at the political and strategic level.

- Through context / political economy analysis identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement in interventions, entry points and strategies for engagement (including through multi-national bodies such as RAMSI and the UN and through forming alliances with like-minded donors). Enhance engagement on policing issues at the diplomatic level at post.
- New Zealand Police should strengthen strategic engagement with the AFP, including possibly through a secondment to Canberra. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AFP.
- New Zealand Police's ability to engage with policing at the strategic level should be enhanced by the formation of a strategic unit in ISG with multi-disciplinary skills.
- New Zealand Police and MFAT (led by IDG) should work at the analytical / strategic level with other relevant agencies e.g. New Zealand Defence Force and the National Assessments Bureau.

5.2.3 Diagnostic work before engagement

Each intervention should be underpinned by explicit and documented context-specific problem identification; context analysis (including political economy analysis); and risk assessment. Where initial engagement is in response to a crisis, diagnostic work should be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter. Consideration should also be given to adoption of conflict sensitive approaches in New Zealand's police work.   A simple analytical framework[50] should be developed for initial and on-going analysis to explore:

(i)   the nature of the problem to be addressed i.e. the underlying causes of conflict (e.g. inter-communal issues and / or disputes over resources);

(ii)   the legality and legitimacy of the state, and of the police as the public face of the state;

(iii)   the political drivers of change and incentives of different players to undertake reform;

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[50] The World Development Report 2011 presents a broader framework (less focused on police work) -- an analysis of internal and external 'stress factors' and institutional capabilities; a diagnosis of transition opportunities; an identification of confidence-building measures; a program for longer-term institutional development (see Overview p. 23 and Main Report pp. 248-50).

(iv)   the role and legitimacy of the police in relation to non-state dispute resolution systems;

(v)   the relationship between the police and different communities; and

(vi)   the strength of the criminal justice system as a whole.

The New Deal for Fragile States emphasises the need for a *country-led and owned* approach to diagnosing the causes and effects of fragility.

New Zealand Police are currently not well-placed to undertake this type of analytical work, which should be distinguished from pre-deployment / operational scoping. This requires a wider range of competencies, including governance and political economy skills. It is recommended that MFAT should undertake responsibility for taking forward this work, drawing on analysis undertaken by academics, international development specialists, NGOs (or contracted out to them), as well as New Zealand Police. Such expertise may be available in partner countries for example in universities or NGOs. In addition, undertaking interventions in partnership with other development agencies (such as AFP or AusAid) provides an opportunity for common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches.

Recommendation 3: Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.

- As a first step to strengthening diagnostic work, MFAT should develop a simple analytical framework for initial and on-going context analysis based on the six point framework set out in paragraph 5.2.3

- MFAT (IDG) should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led *fragility assessment* (most appropriately in the Pacific region for example in Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States in consultation with partners in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

- MFAT (led by IDG) and New Zealand Police should determine where responsibility for enhanced diagnostic work lies – to what extent with MFAT and to what extent with New Zealand Police, and what additional resourcing (including technical competencies) are needed to enable it to take place.

- MFAT (IDG) should explore with AusAid / AFP the potential to promote joint understandings of security and justice issues, common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches including joint monitoring and evaluation.

5.2.4   Intervention design

On the basis of sound diagnostic work, a context (country) specific goal should be developed for each intervention (rather than a generic goal of 'safe and secure communities'). It should be the goal which drives intervention design (rather being driven by outputs as at present). Results diagrams should be supplemented with a clear and context specific *theory of change* which articulates the assumptions on which each intervention is based. Clarity about goals

is particularly important where initial engagement is through peacekeeping. When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality. In the context of a joint command (such as the PPF / RAMSI or UNPOL / a UN mission) responsibility for such a plan would lie with the joint command structure.

Recommendation 4: Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should in their developing partnership agreement specify a design processes leading to a clear planning framework (context analysis; problem identification; theory of change; goal development leading to outcomes which determine outputs and activities; identification of assumptions underlying the proposed intervention).

- When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality (see generic example in annex F).

- MFAT (IDG) should develop clear guidance notes for New Zealand Police on how to design policing interventions based on the above two recommendations.

5.2.5 New Zealand Police's deployment model

There is scope for New Zealand Police to re-consider some aspects of their deployment model:

- Police advisers should have a stronger focus on capacity development /mentoring / advising, and should be actively discouraged from substituting for local staff, which could unintentionally undermine, rather than build up, local capacity - even at the risk of slower progress on implementation;

- Police advisers should be of the appropriate rank and have appropriate experience when counter-parted with an officer from a partner country;

- Care should be taken to ensure police skills are matched with requirements of the local police force. In some cases New Zealand Police may need to source specialist skills (e.g. in change management or coaching) from outside New Zealand Police. In some cases appropriate skills may be available locally (for example in relation to social development issues or gender). Local consultants represent value for money as they provide local knowledge at lower cost. The partner police force should be involved in the selection of advisers (especially long term ones);

- The policy of short term (six-month deployments) should be reconsidered when operating in a developmental context. It may be that fewer, longer term deployments may be more effective, and so provide better value for money than more, shorter term deployments;

- Pre-deployment training should be reviewed in the light of feedback from staff returned from deployment.

In addition, MFAT and New Zealand Police should consider whether there would be advantages in complementing the police work undertaken by New Zealand Police, with some contracting out (see two alternative models in box in annex F). If the field were widened, and some international work put out to tender, it could reduce abstraction issues for New Zealand Police, and enable the deployment of senior, experienced former officers. Consideration should also be given to entering into partnerships with other regional police services, perhaps by expanding on the current arrangements whereby officers from other Pacific islands join New Zealand Police teams.

Recommendation 5: Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.

- As a first step, as part of the developing partnership agreement with MFAT, NZ Police should review its approach to police organisational and individual skills development and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement (e.g. deployment length, explicit exit strategies for deployed staff, use of local staff where appropriate).
- MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should consider alternative models of provision, including some contracting out to retired officers to increase the seniority of officers provided and reduce abstraction rates.

5.2.6 Gender and human rights

There is scope for MFAT to strengthen its approach to incorporating gender and human rights issues in its policing work by providing guidance and training; linking to partner country national gender and human rights processes; and ensuring that design processes always involves listening to women and civil society on gender and human rights issues. Gender and human rights should be explicit in new country-level results diagrams (and associated results measurements tables).

These recommendations are important in their own right, but in addition there is a strategic case to be made for deeper and broader gender mainstreaming, including in relation to police human resource policies. For example police women have a key role in operationalising effective community policing.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.

- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing[51] so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work. The advice should include a focus on fragile and conflict affected situations including on operationalising UN resolution 1325 (on the role of women in peacebuilding) in the context of police work
- MFAT (IDG) should provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights.

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[51] Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

> The advice should include a focus on fragile and conflict affected situations including where the police are accused of human rights abuses arising out of conflict.
>
> - In guidance on intervention design (see recommendation 4 above) MFAT (IDG) should include a requirement to link into partner country national gender and human rights processes into intervention design and monitoring and evaluation (including adopting national gender and human rights indicators where appropriate) to promote sustainable approaches.
>
> - Where appropriate include gender and human rights expertise on the design team, and ensure that intervention design processes always involve listening to the voice of women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.

5.2.7 Monitoring and evaluation

Work being undertaken by MFAT to strengthen activity design documents is a good starting point for strengthening the monitoring and evaluation of interventions. Each intervention should have locally developed and owned indicators which where possible are aligned with partner police force's own monitoring and evaluation and management information systems. As well as ensuring a focus on robust initial outcome indicators (as well as output reporting), it is important to build lesson-learning loops into intervention design, to ensure that the initial design is re-considered and adapted as implementation progresses. This is particularly important in unstable, fragile and conflict affected contexts, where the context of interventions may change over time.

> **Recommendation 7: Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.**
>
> - As a first step MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop clear guidance on development of indicators for police work based on the points below.
>
> - Intervention-level results measurement tables should contain indicators that are context specific and 'actionable' i.e. indicators are linked to both the partner police's management information systems to inform national decision-making and meet MFAT's requirements to demonstrate strategic progress. (The indicative programme-level results measurement table in annex G contains generic indicators and which may assist with the development of intervention-level indicators, together with suggested sources for data collection).
>
> - MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop strong procedures for monitoring and evaluation to feed into lesson learning about what works and why. Recommended procedures include: establishment of clear planning framework (see recommendation 4); establishment of outcome level baselines; regular outcome-focused monitoring and reporting by NZP and MFAT; periodic NZP/ MFAT meetings in country formally to review intervention assumptions and theory of change, with

specialist assistance (e.g. political economy analysis) where required; and regular independent evaluation. (See also recommendation 8 on lesson-learning across interventions).

- There should be a strong focus on piloting new approaches before they are rolled out, accompanied by robust monitoring and evaluation.

5.2.8 On-going learning about statebuilding and peacebuilding

Internationally, knowledge about what works in fragile and conflict affected situations is limited but developing, including through formation of the g7+ group of fragile states, the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility, and the joint donor/fragile states International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The g7+ and the New Deal embody the latest thinking about how to diagnose and deal with fragility. Other donors (including the World Bank building on the 2011 World Development Report and DFID, who have substantial engagement in police work in fragile and conflict affected contexts) are developing knowledge and experience, which could usefully be fed into New Zealand's learning in this area. MFAT should ensure that learning from New Zealand's own police programmes in fragile and conflict affected contexts, particularly in relation to community policing, is effectively consolidated and disseminated, and applied to inform the design and implementation of future police work.

Recommendation 8: Consolidate and disseminate MFAT's on-going learning about peacebuilding and state building.
- As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should allocate this on-going area of work to a specified member of staff (or contract it out), and form a working group to identify the existing knowledge base within MFAT (and across government) as well as internationally.
- MFAT should identify mechanisms to ensure that learning started through the working group is on-going, disseminated and used effectively (such as briefing papers, round-table learning meetings, and involvement of the staff member in police work design and on-going monitoring and evaluation).

Table 5.1 Summary of recommendations

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility[52]	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium-term/ long-term)
1.	**Develop a clear conceptual framework / theory of change for police work and identify resources to operationalise it.**			
	• Explicitly set out an agreed conceptual framework / theory of change in developing MFAT/ NZP partnership agreement, and identify and define the respective roles of New Zealand Police and MFAT in contributing to the desired change (MFAT (IDG and more broadly) – political influencing and broader institutional / governance analysis and engagement; NZP – technical capacity building with partner country police forces)	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	• Develop explicit *community policing principles for international work*, emphasising the need to adopt context specific approaches particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations where the legitimacy of the state (and so of the police) may be contested, where the underlying causes of conflict (e.g. inter-communal tensions) may require very context specific approaches to community policing, and where non-state actors may be considered to be more legitimate providers of security than the police.	NZP	High	Medium-term
2.	**Strengthen engagement on policing at the political and strategic level.**			
	• Through context / political economy analysis identify specific policing issues requiring political engagement in interventions, entry points and strategies for engagement (including through multi-national bodies such as RAMSI and the UN and through forming alliances with like-minded donors). Enhance engagement on policing issues at the diplomatic level at post.	MFAT (IDG post with broader policy and diplomatic input) / NZP	High	Immediate
	• Enhance strategic engagement with the AFP, including possibly through New Zealand Police secondment to Canberra. As a first step, MFAT (IDG) should share this evaluation report with AFP.	MFAT (IDG) /NZP	Medium	Immediate
	• Form a strategic unit in NZP ISG with multi-disciplinary skills.	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Medium-term

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[52] Unless stated otherwise, responsibility lies with Wellington, rather than post

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility[52]	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium-term/ long-term)
	• Work at the analytical / strategic level with other relevant agencies e.g. New Zealand Defence Force and the National Assessments Bureau.	MFAT (IDG led with broader policy input) / NZP	Medium	Long-term
3.	**Substantially strengthen diagnostic work before engagement.**			
	• Develop a simple analytical framework for initial and on-going context analysis based on the six point framework set out in paragraph 5.2.3	MFAT (IDG)	High	Immediate
	• MFAT (IDG) should support (or contribute to supporting, for example with AusAid) a country-led *fragility assessment* (for example in Solomon Islands) under the New Deal for Fragile States in consultation with partners in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.	MFAT (IDG/ NZ's representative at the International Dialogue)	High	Immediate
	• Determine where responsibility for enhanced diagnostic work lies – to what extent with MFAT and to what extent with New Zealand Police, and what additional resourcing (including technical competencies) are needed to enable it to take place.	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	• Explore the potential for tighter engagement with AusAid to promote joint understanding of security and justice issues, common context analysis, problem identification, and harmonised approaches, including joint monitoring and evaluation.	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Immediate
4.	**Invest more in the design of interventions to ensure value for money.**			
	• As a first step, MFAT (IDG) and New Zealand Police should in their developing partnership agreement specify a design processes leading to a clear planning framework (context analysis; problem identification; theory of change; goal development leading to outcomes which determine outputs and activities; identification of assumptions underlying the proposed intervention).	MFAT (IDG)/ NZP	High	Immediate

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility[52]	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium-term/ long-term)
	● When an intervention begins with peacekeeping, the design should include a dynamic context-specific transition plan setting out the strategy for the transition from a peacekeeping to a capacity building modality. (See generic example in annex F).	MFAT (IDG post with broader policy and diplomatic input)/ NZP	High	Medium-term
	● Develop clear guidance notes for New Zealand Police on how to design policing interventions based on the points above	MFAT (IDG)	High	Immediate
5.	**Reconsider some aspects of New Zealand Police's deployment model.**			
	● As part of the developing partnership agreement with MFAT, New Zealand Police should review its approach to police organisational and individual skills development and set key aspects out in the partnership agreement (e.g. deployment length, explicit exit strategies for deployed staff)	NZP	Medium	Immediate
	● Consider alternative models of provision, including some contracting out to retired officers to increase the seniority of officers provided and reduce abstraction rates.	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	Medium	Medium-term
6.	**Strengthen the mainstreaming of gender and human rights.**			
	● Adapt the gender advice provided for the Partnership for Pacific Policing[53] so that it can be adopted by New Zealand Police as generic advice for police work, including operationalising UN resolution 1325 (on the role of women in peacebuilding) in the context of police work	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term
	● Provide similar advice in relation to mainstreaming human rights, including on dealing with situations where the police are accused of human rights abuses arising out of conflict.	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term

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[53] Gender Guidance: Partnership for Pacific Policing, August 2011. Mike Sansom

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility[52]	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium-term/ long-term)
	● In guidance on intervention design (see recommendation 4 above) include a requirement to link partner country national gender and human rights processes into intervention design and monitoring and evaluation (including adopting national gender and human rights indicators where appropriate) to promote sustainable approaches.	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term
	● Where appropriate include gender and human rights expertise on the design team, and ensure that intervention design processes always involve listening to the voice of women and civil society on gender and human rights issues.	MFAT (IDG post, or Wellington if intervention is managed from there) / NZP	High	Medium-term
7.	**Invest more in monitoring and evaluation to ensure clear evidence of what works.**			
	● Develop clear guidance on development of indicators for police work based on the points below.	MFAT (IDG)	High	Immediate
	● Intervention-level results measurement tables should contain indicators that are context specific and 'actionable' i.e. indicators are linked to both the partner police's management information systems to inform national decision-making and meet MFAT's requirements to demonstrate strategic progress. (The indicative programme-level results measurement table in annex G contains generic indicators and which may assist with the development of intervention-level indicators, together with suggested sources for data collection).	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate

No.	Recommendation	Responsibility[52]	Impact (high/ medium/ low)	Priority (immediate/ medium-term/ long-term)
	• MFAT (IDG) should work with New Zealand Police to develop strong procedures for monitoring and evaluation to feed into lesson learning about what works and why. Recommended procedures include: establishment of clear planning framework (see recommendation 4); establishment of outcome level baselines; regular outcome-focused monitoring and reporting by NZP and MFAT; periodic NZP/ MFAT meetings in country formally to review intervention assumptions and theory of change, with specialist assistance (e.g. political economy analysis) where required; and regular independent evaluation. (See also recommendation 8 on lesson-learning across interventions).	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Immediate
	• There should be a strong focus on piloting new approaches before they are rolled out, accompanied by robust monitoring and evaluation.	MFAT (IDG) / NZP	High	Medium-term
8.	**Consolidate and disseminate MFAT's on-going learning about peacebuilding and state building.**			
	• Allocate this on-going area of work to a specified member of staff (or contract it out), and form a working group to identify the existing knowledge base within MFAT (and across government) as well as internationally.	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term
	• Identify mechanisms to ensure that learning started through the working group is on-going, disseminated and used effectively (such as briefing papers, round-table learning meetings, and involvement of the staff member in police work design and on-going monitoring and evaluation).	MFAT (IDG)	Medium	Medium-term