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Evaluation Report

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[Status code]							

GHD Limited 626860
Contact: Sam Taylor, Senior Advisor – Freight Systems & Simulation | GHD
180 Lonsdale Street, Level 9
Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia
T +61 3 8651 9255 | **F** +61 3 8732 7046 | **E** sam.taylor@ghd.com | **Ghd.com**

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The Pacific Aviation Regulatory Support Programme (PARS), initiated in 2014, and the Pacific Aviation Security Programme (PACAVSEC), initiated in 2017, aim to enhance aviation security infrastructure and regulatory capacity across nine Pacific Island countries. PACAVSEC focuses on providing airport security equipment, training, and maintenance support, while PARS delivers regulatory oversight and capacity-building support to civil aviation authorities in the region. This evaluation, commissioned by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), assesses the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of both programmes to inform future investments and strategies in Pacific aviation security. The evaluation systematically addresses each specified criterion and provides actionable insights for programme improvement.

Evaluation Scope and Methodology

This evaluation employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative data collection to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the programmes' performance. The evaluation was guided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee OECD-DAC criteria and aligned with MFAT's strategic priorities.

Data Collection Methods

Desk-Based Reviews: Reviewed key documents, including MFAT funding agreements, programme management reports from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), contracts with Smiths Detection, Activity Designs, and Business Cases to establish programme context and objectives.

Semi-Structured Interviews: Conducted with stakeholders such as NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) representatives, NZ Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) officials, Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) staff, Smiths Detection personnel, and Pacific Island aviation authorities.

Focus Group Discussions: Facilitated with local airport security personnel and other programme beneficiaries to gather diverse insights into on-the-ground impacts.

In-Person Deep Dive: Developed a case study in Samoa to illustrate programme impact, complemented by in-person stakeholder engagements.

Analytical Framework

The analysis was grounded in the Theory of Change (ToC), tracing the programmes' intended outcomes from immediate outputs to long-term goals. Data was triangulated across multiple sources to ensure reliability and robustness, with thematic coding applied to identify key patterns and lessons learned.

Limitations

Challenges related to remote stakeholder engagement limited the depth of some qualitative insights. These were mitigated through local coordinators and data triangulation. The primarily desk-based approach limited direct observation of activities in some Pacific states.

Key Findings

1. **The Relationship Between PACAVSEC and PARS:**

   PACAVSEC and PARS, while distinct in their focus, are interdependent components of a cohesive aviation security strategy in the Pacific. PACAVSEC addresses the operational aspects—such as providing security equipment and training airport personnel—while PARS ensures that these measures are aligned with international regulatory standards and are sustainably integrated into national frameworks. The evaluation found that PARS Output 2 plays a critical role in providing regulatory

oversight for PACAVSEC's operational outputs, ensuring their long-term sustainability and compliance with The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards. Grouping findings from both programmes highlights how operational enhancements are supported by regulatory frameworks to create a robust, sustainable aviation security environment.

2. **Relevance:**

   PACAVSEC and PARS align with ICAO standards and the strategic aviation security needs of Pacific Island Countries (PICs). However, local cultural considerations and capacity levels were not fully integrated into training and operational frameworks, particularly in Samoa during rapid scaling efforts related to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).

3. **Coherence:**

   The programmes complement regional aviation security initiatives, including those by PASO and ICAO. However, inconsistencies between PASO and NZ CAA standards led to stakeholder confusion, and overlapping equipment donations from other countries (e.g., China, Australia) further complicated coherence.

4. **Effectiveness:**

   Significant improvements in screening rates and risk detection capabilities were achieved. However, delays in maintenance by Smiths Detection in Kiribati, Tonga, and Samoa, along with inconsistent communication channels, hindered overall effectiveness.

5. **Efficiency:**

   Operational efficiency improved, especially in clearance processes. However, governance inefficiencies, such as unclear contract management between MFAT and CAA, and compliance issues with Smiths Detection, posed challenges to timely delivery.

6. **Impact:**

   The programmes have enhanced regional aviation security, leading to increased direct flights and tourism. However, staff retention challenges in some countries, due to competitive external opportunities, affected the sustainability of these gains.

7. **Sustainability:**

   Long-term sustainability is at risk due to over-reliance on key personnel and limited local capacity to maintain security infrastructure post-contract. There is no long-term strategy for spare parts sourcing beyond the current three-year maintenance contract.

Recommendations

8. **Develop a Unified Monitoring & Evaluation Framework** to align PACAVSEC and PARS activities, ensuring consistent performance tracking, strengthen accountability, and data-driven decision-making.
9. **Enhance Local Capacity** by expanding the train-the-trainer model and reducing reliance on single points of contact for regulatory support. Invest in continuous professional development for local aviation security personnel and address staff retention challenges.
10. **Streamline Governance Processes** by clarifying contract management responsibilities between MFAT and CAA and improving coordination mechanisms with regional stakeholders.
11. **Establish Long-Term Maintenance Strategies** to ensure sustainability beyond the current three-year contract period, including securing ongoing maintenance funding, developing local maintenance strategies, and creating a proximal spare parts pool.

Lessons Learned

12. **Governance Clarity:** Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between MFAT, CAA, and regional partners is essential for streamlined operations. Issues around contract management, particularly with Smiths Detection, highlight the need for a formal Responsibility Assignment Matrix (RACI) matrix.
13. **Capacity Building:** Investing in local talent and reducing reliance on single individuals is critical for sustainable aviation security. While train-the-trainer models show promise, they are undermined by high staff turnover in several PICs.
14. **Stakeholder Engagement:** Continuous and culturally sensitive engagement with local stakeholders ensures programmes remain relevant and effective. The Samoa case study emphasised the importance of tailored communication and local involvement in programme design and delivery.

Conclusion

PACAVSEC and PARS have significantly enhanced aviation security across the Pacific. Addressing governance inefficiencies, enhancing local capacity, and improving coordination with regional stakeholders are critical for ensuring long-term sustainability and impact. These insights will guide MFAT's 2025 Business Case on the future scope and delivery model of aviation security interventions in the Pacific.

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Glossary of Terms

Table 1 Glossary of Terms

AVSEC	Aviation Security
CAA / CAANZ	Civil Aviation Authority New Zealand
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia)
CASP-AP	Cooperative Aviation Security Programme – Asia Pacific
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
EI	Effective Implementation
GASeP	ICAO's Global Aviation Security Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GM	General Manager
ICAO	The International Civil Aviation Organisation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KEQ	Key Evaluation Question
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
Logframe	Logical Framework
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MERL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Research and Learning – evidence-based decision-making framework to foster more effective and efficient outcomes
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NZ	New Zealand
PACAVSEC	The Pacific Aviation Security Activity
PARS	Pacific Aviation Regulatory Support
PARS Output 1 Lead	Athol Glover of CAANZ
PASO	Pacific Aviation Safety Office
PIC / PIN	Pacific Island Country / Pacific Island Nation
RACI	Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed – clarifies roles and responsibilities for successful delivery
RBM	Results-Based Management
SAA	Samoa Airport Authority
SARP	Standards and Recommended Practices
Smiths	Smiths Detection
Theory of Change	Process of thinking through the documentation of how program intervention is supposed to work, why it will work, who will benefit and in what way, and the conditions required for success
ToC	Theory of Change (see above)
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
US	United States of America
USAP	Universal Security Audit Programme – implemented by the Aviation Security Audit Section of ICAO

1. Introduction

1.1 Programme Overview

The Pacific Aviation Regulatory Support Programme (PARS), initiated in 2014, and the Pacific Aviation Security Programme (PACAVSEC), initiated in 2017, are key initiatives funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to enhance aviation security infrastructure and regulatory capacity across nine Pacific Island countries. PACAVSEC focuses on providing airport security equipment, training, and maintenance support, while PARS delivers regulatory oversight and capacity-building support to civil aviation authorities in the region.

PACAVSEC has facilitated the delivery of critical aviation security equipment, including x-ray machines, explosive detection systems, and metal detectors, while also offering technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives. PARS, managed by the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (NZ CAA), ensures alignment with international aviation security standards, including those set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO). These programmes aim to improve aviation security compliance, enhance regional connectivity, and strengthen the economic resilience of participating Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

1.2 Scope

This evaluation provides an independent assessment of the PACAVSEC and the PARS activities from their inception in 2017 to the present. The scope includes:

Activities Evaluated

– PACAVSEC: Delivery of airport security equipment (x-ray machines, walk-through metal detectors, explosive detection systems), technical assistance, and capacity-building initiatives in nine Pacific Island Countries (PICs).
– PARS: Regulatory oversight and capacity-building support provided by the NZ CAA, focusing on aviation security training, regulatory compliance, and the management of security equipment installation.

Geographic Coverage

The evaluation covers nine Pacific Island Countries participating in the aviation security programmes, with a focus on 13 international airports across these nations.

Timeframe

The evaluation covers the period from the initial commitment by New Zealand in 2017 through the procurement and contract development phases, focusing more comprehensively on the delivery and installation period from 2022 to the present.

Evaluation Methods

The scope includes a desk-based review, semi-structured interviews, and a case study in Samoa to provide in-depth insights into programme implementation and impact.

Exclusions

The evaluation does not include a detailed review of PASO's internal operations or unrelated aviation security activities not funded by MFAT.

1.3 Evaluation Objectives

The purpose of this evaluation is to contribute to and provide direction for a Business Case in early 2025 on the future scope, direction, funding, and delivery model for MFAT aviation security interventions in the Pacific. The evaluation aligns with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and aims to provide actionable insights for enhancing programme design, delivery, and outcome.

The following objectives were collaboratively scoped with MFAT[1] to ensure a jointly agreed framing for the evaluation approach.

The evaluation has the following six key objectives, aligned with the OECD-DAC criteria to ensure a rigorous and structured assessment:

15. **Value for Money (Effectiveness and Efficiency):**
Examine if the activities' outputs have been delivered with high quality, within budget, and on time. Assess the efficiency, quality, and appropriateness of the delivery partners, ensuring resources have been used effectively to achieve the intended outcomes.

    This includes an analysis of programme spending patterns against milestones to ensure that financial resources were allocated efficiently and effectively throughout the project lifecycle. The evaluation also examines governance frameworks to assess how responsibilities were assigned and whether stakeholders were held accountable for meeting their commitments. Furthermore, contractual management practices are scrutinised to determine the level of transparency and the quality of reporting, ensuring that project deliverables met both contractual and operational expectations.

16. **Strategic Guidance (Relevance, Coherence, and Sustainability):**
Provide insights and direction for the future of these activities.

    This focuses on their alignment with MFAT's strategic priorities, regional aviation security needs, and long-term sustainability Consideration of regional (PASO) and international (ICAO) best practices around similar and aligned activities as a benchmark. The evaluation explores how PACAVSEC and PARS align with ongoing regional efforts, particularly those led by PASO and ICAO, and assesses opportunities to better complement concurrent initiatives within other regional aviation forums. This objective ensures that the programmes remain relevant and sustainable within the evolving regional and international aviation security landscape.

17. Delivery Model Assessment (Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Impact):

To Review the Value or Effectiveness of the Activities' Delivery Models.

Regulatory oversight and capacity-building frameworks. The evaluation assesses the effectiveness of current delivery models by examining the role of key delivery partners, such as the NZ CAA and Smiths Detection. It also investigates alternative delivery models and supporting mechanisms, including improved training initiatives and the development of accessible standards guidance materials, to enhance the long-term value and impact of the programmes.

18. Decision-Making Support (Relevance, Impact, and Sustainability):

Inform decision-making aimed at reinvesting, scaling up, adapting, continuing, or terminating an activity.

Identifying successful activities that can be contextualised to other Pacific nations. The evaluation identifies which activities have been most successful and explores opportunities for scaling these activities in other Pacific nations. It also deeply interrogates both failures and successes, considering internal and external factors that contributed to these outcomes, to determine risks and the likelihood of recurrence.

19. Continuous Improvement (Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability)

Improve Effectiveness and Efficiency of This Activity or Related Activities by Utilising the Lessons Learned of What Works, What Does Not, and Why.
Assess demonstrated improvements against lessons learned and ongoing programme feedback. The evaluation uses lessons learned as a benchmark for assessing in-progress developments and identifies areas where continuous improvement can be applied. By understanding what has worked and what has not, the evaluation aims to inform future programming and enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of PACAVSEC and PARS.

20. **Alignment with Broader Policy Goals (Relevance and Coherence):**
Discuss the alignment, relevance, and coherence of PACAVSEC and PARS with New Zealand's broader policy goals in the Pacific.

    This includes addressing geostrategic risks associated with the ineffective deployment of aviation security programmes, such as the security of critical infrastructure. The evaluation also ensures that aviation

[1] *During inception meeting*

security interventions contribute to New Zealand's strategic influence and regional partnerships in the Pacific, supporting broader foreign policy objectives.

1.4 Objective and DAC Criteria Alignment

This evaluation's objectives are aligned with the OECD-DAC criteria to provide a structured, outcomes-focused assessment of the program's performance. This alignment enables a consistent framework to evaluate both immediate outcomes and long-term contributions to MFAT's strategic goals.

Aligning objectives with the DAC criteria ensures a rigorous and systematic approach to assessing program effectiveness. Each objective is mapped to specific criteria to evaluate the program's performance comprehensively:

Relevance: Objectives 2 and 4 focus on relevance by aligning with regional and international best practices, while also guiding future decisions.

Effectiveness: Objectives 1, 3, and 5 address effectiveness by examining the quality of outputs, reviewing delivery models, and applying lessons learned to enhance outcomes.

Impact: Objectives 3 and 4 consider the broader implications of the activities' success, focusing on achieving long-term results and informing decisions for future impact.

Coherence: Objective 2 directly relates to coherence by evaluating alignment with regional (PASO) and international (ICAO) standards, ensuring the activities are consistent with established frameworks.

Efficiency: Objectives 1, 3, and 5 emphasise efficiency in terms of cost, time, and resource use, as well as finding the most effective and streamlined ways to achieve desired results.

Sustainability: Objectives 2, 4, and 5 address sustainability by looking at long-term alignment, potential for scaling, and ensuring that successful activities are maintained and adapted for future needs.

The relationship between the objectives and evaluation criteria can be found in **Appendix B**.

The objectives also guide the development of Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) that target critical program aspects, such as effectiveness and impact. By grounding each KEQ in both the objectives and DAC criteria, the evaluation gathers targeted data, supporting a structured analysis that provides actionable insights aligned with MFAT's priorities.

2. Assumptions and Limitations

The evaluation operates under several key assumptions and faces specific limitations that may influence the interpretation of findings:

2.1 Assumptions

Stakeholder Participation: It is assumed that key stakeholders, including MFAT, CAA, PASO, and local aviation authorities, provided accurate and comprehensive information during interviews and focus groups.

Data Reliability: It is assumed that the data collected from document reviews, stakeholder interviews, and on-site observations are reliable and reflect the true state of programme implementation and outcomes.

Consistency of Standards: The evaluation assumes consistent application of international aviation security standards across all participating Pacific Island countries.

Relevance of Benchmarking: It is assumed that regional (PASO) and international (ICAO) best practices are appropriate benchmarks for assessing PACAVSEC and PARS activities in the Pacific context.

2.2 Limitations

Remote Engagement Challenges: Due to geographical and logistical constraints, some stakeholder engagements were conducted remotely, which may have limited the depth of qualitative insights gathered.

Data Availability: The evaluation relies heavily on existing programme documentation and stakeholder feedback. Limited access to real-time operational data and on-site observations in certain countries may affect the comprehensiveness of the analysis.

Temporal Scope: The evaluation reflects conditions and information available at the time of data collection. Changes in programme implementation or external factors occurring after data collection are not accounted for in this report.

Potential Bias in Stakeholder Feedback: The reliance on self-reported data from stakeholders may introduce bias, particularly where there are vested interests in programme outcomes.

2.3 Disclaimer

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3. Key Findings

This section presents the principal findings derived from the evaluation, synthesizing insights across various data collection methods, including stakeholder interviews, document reviews, and field observations. The analysis highlights key themes and trends relevant to the Pacific Aviation Security Programme, offering a comprehensive understanding of its performance and outcomes. These findings are intended to guide MFAT in considering future investments and strategic directions for aviation security in the Pacific region.

The findings are organised according to the following OECD-DAC evaluation criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Coherence, Efficiency, and Sustainability. Each criterion is explored in relation to how the programme has contributed to strengthening aviation security and regulatory capacity across PICs.

The section begins by examining the interrelationship between the PACAVSEC and the PARS**,** before delving into specific thematic findings aligned with the evaluation criteria.

3.1 The Relationship Between PACAVSEC and PARS

3.1.1 Complementary Objectives and Interdependencies

The PACAVSEC and the PARS are two distinct, but interconnected initiatives funded by MFAT to enhance aviation security and regulatory capacity across PICs. PACAVSEC primarily focuses on providing airport security equipment, training, and maintenance support, while PARS delivers regulatory oversight and capacity-building support to civil aviation authorities.

PACAVSEC and PARS were designed to achieve specific, yet interrelated objectives within the broader framework of aviation safety and security in the Pacific region:

PACAVSEC (Operational Focus):

Objective: Enhance aviation security by providing modern security equipment, technical assistance, and capacity-building for airport authorities.

Key Activities: Installation of screening equipment (e.g., x-ray machines, metal detectors), training of security personnel, and implementation of airport identification systems.

PARS (Regulatory Focus):

Objective: Strengthen regulatory frameworks governing aviation safety and security to ensure compliance with ICAO standards.

Key Activities: Development of State Safety Programmes (SSPs), technical assistance for civil aviation authorities, and regulatory oversight of aviation security measures.

While PACAVSEC addresses the operational implementation of aviation security, PARS ensures these measures are aligned with international standards and sustainably integrated into national regulatory frameworks.

3.1.2 PARS Output 2: The Regulatory Backbone of PACAVSEC

A key finding of this evaluation is the role of PARS Output 2, which provides regulatory oversight and technical assistance specific to aviation security. This output directly complements PACAVSEC by ensuring that:

Security Equipment and Training Provided Under PACAVSEC Are Regulatory Compliant: PACAVSEC's provision of security equipment and training enhances on-the-ground security measures. However, without regulatory oversight from PARS Output 2, these measures risk becoming unsustainable or misaligned with evolving international standards.

Sustainability of Security Enhancements Is Ensured: Through PARS Output 2, civil aviation authorities receive support to institutionalise security practices, ensuring long-term compliance and sustainability. This regulatory support is essential for maintaining the effectiveness of PACAVSEC's contributions beyond the programme's lifespan.

3.1.3 Justification for Grouping Results: PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 vs. PARS Output 1

The decision to group results into 'PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2' and 'PARS Output 1' reflects the distinct yet interconnected nature of these programmes:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2: Both focus on aviation security – PACAVSEC from an operational perspective and PARS Output 2 from a regulatory standpoint. Grouping these results provides a comprehensive view of how operational enhancements (e.g., new security equipment, trained personnel) are supported by regulatory frameworks to ensure sustainability and compliance.

PARS Output 1: This output focuses on aviation safety regulatory frameworks, including the development of State Safety Programmes (SSPs) and compliance with ICAO's USOAP standards. While related to overall aviation governance, it addresses a broader spectrum of safety issues beyond the security-specific focus of PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2.

This grouping enhances the clarity and coherence of the evaluation findings and aligns with the programme design and results frameworks outlined in the Activity Design Documents (ADDs).

3.2 Relevance (REL)

The PACAVSEC and the PARS are aligned with international aviation standards set by the ICAO and address the strategic aviation security needs of PICs. Both programs have made significant strides in enhancing aviation security across the region, but several areas require further attention to maximise relevance.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

How well do the aviation security activities align with the strategic priorities and needs of PICs?

Key Evaluation Sub-Questions:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2:

1. How well have the aviation security activities aligned with the strategic priorities of the PICs?
2. Are there opportunities to expand out and vary the standard installation procedures for the equipment to better cater for PIC needs on an activity per activity basis?
3. To what extent has the support and prioritisation of aviation security upgrades by PIC governments contributed to project outcomes?

PARS Output 1:

1. How effectively has the project ensured PIC compliance with ICAO standards?
2. Has the development of State Aviation Security oversight met the capacity and engagement expectations across PICs?

Alignment with International Standards and National Priorities:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 are well-aligned with ICAO standards, ensuring that security measures and regulatory frameworks meet global expectations. PACAVSEC has facilitated the delivery of critical aviation security equipment, such as x-ray machines, explosive detection systems, and metal detectors, while PARS Output 2 has provided regulatory oversight to ensure these measures comply with ICAO standards. This alignment has facilitated increased compliance among PICs, contributing to safer aviation operations. For instance, Tonga's corrective action plan following a USAP audit was delivered on time with the support of PARS Output 2, demonstrating effective regulatory alignment.

However, beyond compliance, the programmes also support national development goals such as enhancing regional connectivity and tourism growth. For example, improved aviation security has led to an increase in direct flights and boosted tourism in countries like Vanuatu, contributing to broader economic resilience.

Consideration of Local Contexts and Capacity Constraints:

While PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 align with international standards, there is a noted gap in incorporating local cultural contexts and capacity levels into training and operational frameworks. In Samoa, for example, the rapid scaling efforts related to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) highlighted a lack of tailored approaches that consider local customs and operational capacities. Additionally, stakeholders in Niue noted that security culture training could be better localised to reflect the unique regional context.

Capacity constraints also impact programme relevance. The evaluation noted an over-reliance on key personnel for regulatory oversight and technical support. For example, delays in maintenance and insufficient local expertise in Kiribati and Tonga highlight the need for more sustainable, capacity-sensitive solutions.

Stakeholder Engagement and Needs Assessment:

Stakeholder feedback indicates that while PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 address overarching security needs, there is variability in how well individual country requirements are met. For example, while the PARS Output 2 Lead was praised for understanding cultural nuances and fostering positive compliance cultures in countries like the Cook Islands, there were initial disagreements in Samoa and Tonga regarding capacity support modalities. A more robust needs assessment process, involving continuous stakeholder engagement, would ensure that PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 activities remain relevant to the evolving security landscapes of each PIC.

Adaptability to Regional Dynamics and Broader Development Goals:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 have shown adaptability in response to regional dynamics, such as changes in geopolitical influences and the introduction of overlapping equipment donations from other countries (e.g., China, Australia). However, these overlaps have sometimes led to inconsistencies in equipment standards and maintenance protocols, affecting the coherence and relevance of the security infrastructure. For instance, Chinese equipment donations often lacked post-installation support, complicating the integration with existing systems.

In addition to security improvements, the programmes contribute to broader development objectives such as regional economic growth and geostrategic stability. Strengthened aviation security supports regional trade, enhances tourism, and aligns with New Zealand's broader foreign policy goals in the Pacific.

A coordinated approach to equipment standardisation and maintenance, in collaboration with other donors, is recommended to mitigate these issues and ensure continued relevance in the face of evolving regional dynamics.

3.3 Effectiveness (EFCT)

The PACAVSEC and the PARS have made measurable progress in improving aviation security infrastructure and regulatory compliance across PICs. The effectiveness of both programmes is assessed through their ability to deliver intended outputs and outcomes, while adapting to contextual challenges and evolving security needs.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

To what extent have the implemented activities met their intended outcomes in improving aviation security in participating PICs?

Key Evaluation Sub-Questions:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2:

1. Across the lifecycle, what have the key issues been from commissioning, equipment costing, delivery, installation, and configuration through to asset disposal? What strategies have been deployed to effectively manage these, including addressing site readiness, infrastructure challenges, and logistical variations (e.g., flight delays, pre-approvals, and freight costs)?
2. What measures have been implemented to mitigate equipment deterioration in tropical environments, and how robust are contingency and supply chain plans to ensure the availability of critical spare parts?
3. What training curriculums and schedules were implemented by Smiths Detection to ensure the correct operation and management of equipment by local staff, and what assurance activities were undertaken to evaluate training effectiveness?
4. How have maintenance schedules been prepared and implemented to ensure the successful operation of equipment, and how is maintenance reporting managed to meet response time KPIs?

PARS Output 1:

1. How effectively is CAA supporting PICs in meeting ICAO Annex 17 SARPs and other aviation security standards?
2. How successful have training and capacity-building efforts been in ensuring regulatory compliance and minimising personnel turnover within the CAAs?
3. Did the training cover incident response or scenario planning, and did it re-test materials provided via Smiths?

Programme Delivery and Operational Outcomes:

PACAVSEC has effectively delivered aviation security equipment, including x-ray machines and explosive detection systems, to multiple PICs, significantly enhancing on-the-ground security measures. These operational enhancements have led to increased screening rates and improved risk detection capabilities. However, the effectiveness of these measures is closely tied to the regulatory oversight provided by PARS Output 2, which ensures compliance with evolving international standards.

Key issues emerged around equipment installation and configuration, particularly in environments with unexpected infrastructure limitations. For instance, delays in maintenance and inconsistent site readiness were reported in Kiribati and Tonga, impacting the immediate operational capacity of installed equipment.

Training Effectiveness and Capacity Building:

The training provided under PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 has generally been effective in upskilling airport security personnel. Smiths Detection implemented participatory training curriculums, but these lacked formal mandatory assessments. Post-training assurance activities were primarily carried out by CAAs to evaluate effectiveness. However, high staff turnover in some PICs undermined the sustainability of these training efforts.

PARS Output 1 has played a critical role in enhancing regulatory compliance through targeted capacity-building initiatives. The programme's "train-the-trainer" approach has successfully built a pool of local aviation security experts, reducing reliance on external support. Nevertheless, retention challenges remain a barrier to fully realising these capacity-building gains.

Logistics and Supply Chain Management:

Variations in logistics, such as flight delays and pre-approval processes, were managed with improvements over time, although significant challenges persisted with border clearance and equipment sourcing delays, especially in Kiribati, Tonga, and Samoa. Smiths Detection developed contingency plans to address external disruptions and ensure the availability of critical spare parts. However, maintenance response times and hotline KPIs were not consistently met, and equipment deterioration in tropical environments remains a concern.

Regulatory Oversight and Compliance:

PARS Output 1 has been instrumental in supporting PICs to meet ICAO Annex 17 SARPs and other international security requirements. The programme provided comprehensive training and regulatory guidance, helping PICs achieve higher compliance levels. Notably, Tonga's corrective action plan following a USAP audit was successfully delivered with the support of PARS Output 1.

Stakeholders across the region have expressed positive feedback regarding the responsiveness and effectiveness of PARS regulatory support. However, some initial disagreements on capacity support modalities in Samoa and Tonga highlighted the need for more tailored approaches.

Challenges and Areas for Improvement:

Despite significant achievements, challenges persist in ensuring the consistent effectiveness of programme activities. Maintenance delays, logistical inconsistencies, and high staff turnover continue to impact the sustainability of gains made. Addressing these issues through enhanced local capacity building, improved logistics planning, and robust maintenance strategies will be critical for maintaining programme effectiveness.

3.4 Impact (IMP)

The PACAVSEC and the PARS have had a significant impact on regional aviation security, regulatory capacity, and broader socio-economic outcomes across PICs. This section evaluates the long-term effects of both programmes, considering their contributions to aviation safety, economic development, and institutional resilience.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

What are the observed or expected long-term benefits of these activities on aviation security, regulatory capacity, and broader socio-economic outcomes in the Pacific region?

Key Evaluation Sub-Questions:

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2:

1. How have the programmes contributed to long-term improvements in aviation security infrastructure and operational capacity across PICs?
2. To what extent have the programmes enhanced regional connectivity, tourism, and economic growth through improved aviation security?
3. How sustainable are the security enhancements provided by PACAVSEC, particularly in light of staff retention challenges and evolving security threats?

PARS Output 1:

1. How has the strengthening of regulatory frameworks under PARS Output 1 contributed to long-term aviation safety and compliance with international standards?
2. What has been the impact of capacity-building initiatives on the institutional resilience of CAAs in PICs?
3. How effectively have the programmes fostered a culture of continuous improvement and knowledge sharing among regional aviation stakeholders?

Impact on Regional Aviation Security and Safety:

PACAVSEC and PARS have significantly enhanced aviation security across the Pacific, leading to increased compliance with international standards and improved operational capacity at airports. The provision of modern security equipment and comprehensive training has improved risk detection capabilities and screening processes, contributing to safer and more secure aviation environments.

The programmes have also fostered greater regional collaboration and standardisation of security practices, aligning PICs with global aviation security frameworks. However, the long-term sustainability of these gains is at risk due to challenges related to staff retention, limited local capacity, and the absence of a long-term maintenance strategy.

Socio-Economic Impact:

The improvements in aviation security have had positive ripple effects on regional connectivity and economic development. Enhanced security measures have led to increased direct flights to PICs, boosting tourism and facilitating trade. This has contributed to broader economic resilience in the region, particularly in countries like Vanuatu and Tonga, where tourism is a key economic driver.

However, the sustainability of these socio-economic benefits is contingent on addressing underlying challenges, such as high staff turnover and the need for continuous investment in local capacity building. The over-reliance on key personnel and external support poses a risk to the long-term viability of these gains.

Institutional and Regulatory Impact:

PARS Output 1 has played a critical role in strengthening the regulatory frameworks governing aviation safety in PICs. The programme's capacity-building initiatives have enhanced the institutional resilience of CAAs, enabling them to maintain compliance with ICAO standards and effectively oversee aviation security measures.

The "train-the-trainer" model has been particularly effective in building local expertise and reducing reliance on external support. However, high staff turnover remains a significant barrier to the full realisation of these capacity-building efforts. The development of a unified Monitoring & Evaluation Framework is recommended to align PACAVSEC and PARS activities and ensure consistent performance tracking and continuous improvement.

Challenges and Areas for Improvement:

Despite the positive impacts, several challenges persist that may limit the long-term effectiveness of the programmes. These include:

– **Staff Retention Challenges:** Competitive external opportunities have led to high turnover rates, undermining the sustainability of capacity-building efforts.
– **Limited Local Capacity:** Over-reliance on key personnel and external support has hindered the development of self-sustaining regulatory and operational frameworks.
– **Lack of Long-Term Maintenance Strategy:** The absence of a comprehensive maintenance plan beyond the current three-year contract period poses a risk to the sustainability of security infrastructure.

Addressing these challenges through enhanced local capacity building, governance improvements, and long-term strategic planning will be critical to ensuring the lasting impact of the programmes.

3.5 Coherence (COH)

This section assesses how PACAVSEC and PARS integrate with existing regional and international aviation security frameworks. It examines the alignment of these programmes with initiatives led by organisations such as the PASO and the ICAO. The section also explores how overlaps with other donor-supported activities have been managed and evaluates the programmes' contributions to a cohesive regional aviation security architecture.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

How do the activities integrate with and complement existing regional (e.g., PASO) and international (e.g., ICAO) aviation efforts?

Key Evaluation Sub-Questions:

1. How well do PACAVSEC and PARS align with other regional aviation security initiatives, including those led by PASO and ICAO?
2. Are there overlaps or conflicts with other donor-supported aviation security programmes, and how have these been managed?
3. To what extent do the programmes contribute to a cohesive regional aviation security architecture?

Alignment with Regional and International Frameworks

PACAVSEC and PARS align with international aviation security standards, particularly those set by the ICAO. The programmes have promoted regulatory compliance and operational security enhancements consistent with ICAO's Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).

Inconsistencies between the regulatory approaches of PASO and the CAANZ under PARS have caused confusion among recipient aviation administrations. PASO's broader audit remit occasionally conflicts with the performance-based approach adopted by PARS. Stakeholders found PARS' performance-based framework more interpretable and practical compared to PASO audits, indicating a need for improved coordination between these entities to ensure consistent compliance pathways.

Coordination with Donor-Supported Initiatives

Instances of overlapping support from other donors have been identified. Chinese equipment donations in several PICs often lacked post-installation support and frequently broke down, undermining long-term operational effectiveness. Similarly, older Australian equipment in Kiribati and issues with Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) equipment in the Solomon Islands further complicated the donor landscape.

These overlaps have led to duplication of resources and inconsistent equipment standards across airports. While PACAVSEC's equipment installations meet specific regulatory requirements, such as those from the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), other donor equipment may not align with these standards, undermining the coherence of aviation security infrastructure in the region.

Contribution to a Regional Aviation Security Architecture

PACAVSEC and PARS have contributed to developing national aviation security plans that align with broader regional objectives. The integration of security equipment and regulatory support has improved compliance rates across several PICs, enhancing the overall security culture in the region.

PASO's limited capacity to integrate technical advisory services from PARS has hindered the creation of a cohesive regional architecture. Stakeholders recommended more regular communication between PACAVSEC, PARS, and PASO to align objectives and avoid duplication of efforts, ensuring compliance equivalence with Annex 17 and other regulatory frameworks.

3.6 Efficiency (EFFI)

This section examines the extent to which PACAVSEC and PARS have utilised resources effectively to deliver activities within planned timeframes and budget constraints. It evaluates resource allocation, contractor performance, and the efficiency of governance structures in achieving the programmes' objectives.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

Were the resources utilised in an optimal way to deliver activities within the planned timeframe and budget constraints?

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2:

1. How effectively were resources allocated and managed to ensure timely delivery of aviation security activities across PICs?
2. How well did contracted resources, including Smiths Detection, perform in terms of project management, technical expertise, and addressing local resourcing limitations?

3. To what extent were logistical processes, such as equipment installation, training delivery, and maintenance, managed efficiently to meet operational requirements?

PARS Output 1:

1. How effectively was regulatory support provided to ensure compliance with international aviation standards and were reporting and communication processes efficient and transparent?
2. How well did training and capacity-building initiatives enhance the efficiency of CAA in managing aviation security operations?

Resource Allocation and Management

Resource allocation across PACAVSEC and PARS faced challenges related to clearance processes and contractor management. For PACAVSEC, clearance issues were the most significant barrier to efficient delivery, with most PICs experiencing delays due to unclear processes and the absence of designated contact points. Over time, improvements were made through the introduction of pre-clearance processes and standardised templates to streamline future implementations.

Post-COVID, operational efficiency improved as lessons from the pandemic were integrated into more streamlined procedures. However, the reactive nature of the programmes in responding to member needs limited proactive planning and resource allocation.

Governance and Contractor Management

Governance structures and contractor management presented inefficiencies that affected project delivery. The CAANZ holds contractual responsibility for managing Smiths Detection, yet issues around enforcing compliance created delays. Smiths Detection's delayed responses to maintenance requests, particularly during critical incidents in Kiribati, Tonga, and Samoa, risked non-compliance with international standards and affected airline operations. Additionally, repeated withholding of key information by Smiths Detection, both before and after contract finalisation, further complicated efficient delivery.

Strategic programme reporting was often too high-level, lacking the detail needed to provide insights into the rationale behind activities. Resource constraints, notably with only one full-time staff member managing PARS Output 1, limited the efficiency of administrative tasks such as reporting and planning. While in-kind administrative support was available, it did not address strategic management needs, contributing to reporting ambiguities and inconsistent expectation management.

Logistical Processes and Delivery

Logistical processes for equipment installation and training delivery encountered both internal and external challenges. Delays in equipment delivery were frequently attributed to inefficiencies in approval processes and insufficient coordination between MFAT and CAA. The management of Smiths Detection contracts posed particular challenges, with ambiguity in escalation processes leading to delays in addressing non-compliance.

Despite these challenges, PACAVSEC and PARS demonstrated adaptability, improving clearance processes and increasing the use of standardised templates to enhance delivery efficiency. However, the programmes remain heavily delivery-focused and reactive, which can hinder proactive planning and efficient resource utilisation.

3.7 Sustainability (SUS)

This section evaluates the long-term viability of the PACAVSEC and the PARS initiatives. It considers the resilience of local capacities, the sustainability of equipment and regulatory frameworks, and the extent to which institutional arrangements can maintain programme benefits beyond their current funding cycles.

Key Evaluation Question (KEQ):

What measures have been put in place to ensure that the benefits and improvements from these activities are maintained over time?

PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2:

1. How effectively have financial, human, and technical resources been allocated to ensure the continued maintenance and operation of aviation security systems post-project?

2. To what extent have partnerships with regional bodies (e.g., PASO) supported the sustainability of regulatory oversight and technical support?
3. Are existing measures sufficient to maintain the long-term functionality of aviation security equipment in challenging tropical environments?

PARS Output 1:

1. How well have capacity-building efforts, such as the train-the-trainer model, contributed to sustainable regulatory compliance?
2. What mechanisms are in place to ensure institutional resilience and mitigate the risks of staff turnover and limited local capacity?

Over-Reliance on Key Personnel

A significant challenge to sustainability is the over-reliance on key personnel, particularly the PARS Output 1 Lead. Stakeholders reported engaging with this individual in 80% of interactions, creating a single point of dependency that threatens the continuity of both PACAVSEC and PARS. This dependency risks programme disruptions during critical requests or incidents, highlighting the urgent need for further delegation and distributed leadership within the programmes.

Capacity Building and Staff Retention

While the train-the-trainer model under PARS has successfully built local expertise, high staff turnover undermines these gains. Competitive external opportunities have led to frequent departures of trained personnel, limiting the sustainability of capacity-building initiatives. For instance, in countries like Kiribati and Tonga, the loss of key staff has compromised the continuity of aviation security operations, despite initial progress in regulatory compliance.

Long-Term Maintenance Strategies

The sustainability of aviation security infrastructure is further threatened by the absence of a comprehensive long-term maintenance strategy. Currently, spare parts are sourced on an ad hoc basis, and there is no clear plan for maintaining a proximal spares pool beyond the existing three-year maintenance contract. Delays in spare parts procurement, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, have already caused disruptions in equipment functionality. Although stakeholders have shown some tolerance for these delays, continued reliance on temporary solutions poses a risk to the long-term viability of the programmes.

Institutional and Financial Sustainability

PARS Output 1 has played a crucial role in enhancing regulatory frameworks, but its sustainability is contingent on reducing reliance on external support from the CAANZ. Many PICs lack the financial and technical capacity to sustain regulatory compliance independently. The development of local funding mechanisms and increased investment in continuous professional development are essential to address these gaps. Furthermore, PASO's limited capacity to integrate technical advisory services from PARS highlights the need for improved coordination and resource sharing to ensure long-term regulatory sustainability.

Emerging Challenges and Future Considerations

Emerging threats, such as cybersecurity risks, require ongoing adaptation of training and operational frameworks. Currently, the focus remains heavily on traditional security measures, with limited attention to evolving risks. Ensuring that training programmes remain relevant and responsive to new threats will be critical for maintaining the sustainability of aviation security improvements. Additionally, partnership agreements must be clearly defined, with transparent obligations to ensure consistent support from regional bodies like PASO.

Despite these challenges, PACAVSEC and PARS have laid a strong foundation for sustainable aviation security in the Pacific. Continued investment in local capacity, governance improvements, and strategic planning will be essential to secure the long-term benefits of these programmes.

4. Lessons Learned

This section highlights the key lessons derived from the implementation and evaluation of the PACAVSEC and the PARS. These lessons offer valuable insights to inform future aviation security initiatives in the Pacific region and guide strategic decision-making.

1. Importance of Governance Clarity:
Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between MFAT, the CAANZ, and regional partners is critical for streamlined operations. Ambiguities in contract management, particularly with Smiths Detection, created inefficiencies in programme delivery. Implementing a formal RACI matrix would enhance accountability and clarify responsibilities across all stakeholders.

2. Capacity Building Requires Sustainable Approaches:
While the train-the-trainer model has successfully built local expertise, high staff turnover in PICs undermines these gains. Investing in continuous professional development and mentorship programmes is essential to reduce reliance on key individuals and ensure long-term institutional resilience. Countries like Kiribati and Tonga experienced disruptions due to the loss of trained personnel, highlighting the need for robust succession planning.

3. Integration of Local Contexts Enhances Programme Effectiveness:
Tailoring training materials and operational frameworks to local cultural practices and operational maturity improves programme relevance and effectiveness. The rapid scaling efforts in Samoa during CHOGM revealed the need for more culturally sensitive training and stakeholder engagement. Incorporating local contexts into programme design fosters stronger stakeholder buy-in and programme success.

4. Continuous Stakeholder Engagement Ensures Programme Relevance:
Regular communication with local aviation authorities and stakeholders is essential to maintain programme relevance and adaptability. The evaluation identified that while initial stakeholder consultations were effective, continuous engagement is needed to address evolving needs and ensure alignment with local priorities. For example, inconsistencies in stakeholder expectations in Samoa and Tonga highlighted the need for ongoing dialogue.

5. Proactive Risk Management and Contingency Planning Are Critical:
The absence of comprehensive risk management frameworks for non-contracted delivery partners, such as airport authorities and airlines, created implementation barriers. Proactive risk identification and contingency planning are essential to mitigate delays and operational disruptions. This includes addressing logistical challenges, such as shipping delays and equipment maintenance issues, to ensure smooth programme delivery.

6. Long-Term Maintenance Strategies Are Vital for Sustainability:
The sustainability of aviation security infrastructure is threatened by the lack of a long-term maintenance strategy. Delays in spare parts procurement and the absence of a proximal spare parts pool have disrupted equipment functionality in several PICs. Developing local maintenance agreements and securing ongoing funding are critical to ensuring the continued functionality of security infrastructure beyond the current contract period.

7. Coordination with Regional and International Partners Enhances Programme Coherence:
Inconsistencies between the regulatory approaches of PASO and CAA created confusion among recipient aviation administrations. Strengthening coordination with regional partners, such as PASO and ICAO, ensures consistent regulatory guidance and avoids duplication of efforts. Regular collaboration and alignment of objectives are essential to build a cohesive regional aviation security framework.

8. Emerging Security Threats Require Adaptive Training Frameworks:
Current training programmes focus heavily on traditional security measures, with limited attention to emerging threats like cybersecurity. Adapting training curricula to address evolving security challenges is critical for maintaining comprehensive aviation security preparedness. Ensuring that training remains relevant and responsive to new threats will support the long-term resilience of aviation security in the Pacific.

These lessons learned underscore the need for strategic planning, stakeholder engagement, and continuous improvement to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of aviation security programmes in the Pacific region.

5. Recommendations

This section presents strategic recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the PACAVSEC and the PARS. The recommendations are derived from key evaluation findings and align with best practices in aviation security and regulatory capacity-building.

5.1 Cross-Programme Recommendations (PACAVSEC and PARS):

3. **Develop Unified Results Based Management and Monitoring & Evaluation Frameworks:**

   Establish a cohesive Logical Framework (Logframe) and M&E Framework that align both PACAVSEC and PARS activities. This unified approach will ensure consistent performance tracking, facilitate data-driven decision-making, and promote continuous improvement across operational and regulatory components (Appendix F and G).

4. **Enhance Local Capacity:**

   Expand the train-the-trainer model to reduce reliance on key individuals for regulatory support. Complement this with continuous professional development and structured mentorship programmes to address staff retention challenges and build a resilient local aviation workforce. Strengthening local capacity will ensure sustainability and long-term programme success.

5. **Streamline Governance Processes:**

   Clarify contract management responsibilities between MFAT and the CAANZ. Introduce a formal RACI matrix (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) to delineate roles and responsibilities in the areas of equipment installation, regulatory training, and maintenance support. This will ensure efficient management and reduce operational ambiguities across both programmes.

6. **Establish Long-Term Maintenance Strategies:**

   Develop comprehensive maintenance and sustainability plans that extend beyond the current three-year contract period. These should include securing long-term funding commitments, fostering local maintenance capabilities, and establishing a proximal spare parts pool to ensure operational continuity and system resilience. A long-term approach will reduce the risk of equipment failures and improve service reliability.

7. **Strengthen Donor Coordination:**

   Coordinate closely with other donor-supported aviation initiatives to avoid duplication of efforts, particularly regarding equipment donations and regulatory reforms. Regular stakeholder meetings with PASO, ICAO, and other relevant partners should be institutionalised to align objectives, standardise security infrastructure, and streamline compliance pathways. Improved donor coordination will enhance programme efficiency and ensure effective resource utilisation.

8. **Strengthen Leadership Resilience and Distributed Expertise:**

   Reduce reliance on key personnel by implementing a structured delegation plan and enhancing knowledge transfer mechanisms. Identify and train at least one additional personnel to ensure continuity in stakeholder engagement and technical oversight. Develop a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for regulatory and technical processes to institutionalise knowledge and prevent dependency on a single individual. Introduce a mentorship and leadership development programme to strengthen capacity and facilitate succession planning. These measures will enhance programme sustainability, ensuring consistent regulatory and technical support across PACAVSEC and PARS.

5.2 PACAVSEC and PARS Output 2 Recommendations:

9. **Improve Fault Management and Training Standards:**

   Introduce mandatory competency assessments within Level 1 fault management training to ensure that participants meet established technical standards. Transition from non-assessed participation to a structured evaluation framework to enhance the quality, consistency, and effectiveness of training initiatives. Ensuring competency-based assessments will improve the overall quality of technical training and service delivery.

10. **Develop Risk and Contingency Plans for Non-Contracted Parties:**

    Implement proactive risk management frameworks for non-contracted stakeholders such as airports, government bodies, and airlines. These plans should identify potential barriers to programme implementation and establish clear contingency measures to mitigate operational disruptions. Risk management planning will improve resilience and reduce disruptions to programme implementation.

11. **Enhance Local Maintenance Agreements:**

    Promote long-term ownership and sustainability by supporting local maintenance strategies and establishing maintenance agreements with PICs. Regular check-ins between the CAA and local airport authorities will help identify and pre-empt emerging operational issues, fostering resilience and self-sufficiency.

12. **Scope Future Installations Individually:**

    Tailor future equipment installation contracts to account for local deployment needs and site-specific requirements. This localised approach will ensure that equipment is optimally deployed, maintained, and integrated into the existing infrastructure, enhancing its operational relevance and effectiveness.

5.3 PARS Output 1 Recommendations:

13. **Localise Training Content:**

    Adapt training materials to reflect local cultural practices, language preferences, and operational maturity levels. This regional and country-specific customisation will improve training relevance, enhance knowledge retention, and foster stronger engagement among participants.

14. **Conduct Refresher Training and Technical Capacity Gap Analyses:**

    Implement periodic refresher training sessions and conduct annual technical capacity gap analyses to identify skill gaps, address areas of lost capacity, and target future training efforts more effectively. This approach ensures continuous professional development and minimises the risk of knowledge attrition.

15. **Align Regulatory Oversight with PASO:**

    Engage with the PASO prior to inspections to harmonise regulatory advice and ensure consistency in the interpretation of corrective actions. Establish clear protocols for acceptable alternate compliance pathways and methods of demonstration to mitigate discrepancies and promote regulatory coherence. Strengthening regulatory alignment will improve compliance and reduce inconsistencies across the region.

16. **Enhance Reporting Transparency and Accessibility:**

    Develop strategic reporting templates that clearly outline training areas, programme achievements, and progress indicators. Ensure that reports are accessible to non-technical stakeholders, including policymakers and community leaders, to promote transparency and informed decision-making. Improving accessibility of reports will support better policy decisions and stakeholder engagement.

17. **Renew Focus on Emerging Security Needs:**

    Integrate cybersecurity and other emerging aviation security threats into training curricula and operational frameworks. This forward-looking approach will ensure that aviation security personnel are prepared to address evolving risks and maintain comprehensive security preparedness.

    By implementing these recommendations, PACAVSEC and PARS can enhance their operational efficiency, regulatory alignment, and long-term sustainability, ensuring continued contributions to aviation security and regional development in the Pacific.

5.4 Implementation Considerations

To ensure the effective execution and sustainability of the recommendations, the following key implementation considerations should be integrated into planning and decision-making. These considerations align with OECD-DAC best practices, lessons from MFAT-funded evaluations, and regional aviation security priorities.

5.4.1 Training and Capacity Building

Integration with regional bodies: Explore opportunities to integrate future training with the Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAA-Fiji) and the Cooperative Aviation Security Programme – Asia Pacific (CASP-AP).

Alignment with international standards: Cross-reference training activities with ICAO's aviation security priorities and the EFCT2 training framework to ensure regulatory alignment.

Localised training materials: Adapt ICAO-provided materials, such as the Human Factors Starter Pack, to better suit Pacific Island operational contexts.

Cybersecurity inclusion: Build cybersecurity modules into the PARS 1 curriculum, considering the varying digital maturity levels across Pacific jurisdictions.

5.4.2 Contract and Governance Structures

Strengthening accountability in equipment installations: Retain the existing master head contract but introduce sub-contracts to clearly assign accountability for each installation. Develop a clear process flow for equipment installation and maintenance before assigning responsibilities.

Stakeholder coordination and compliance alignment: Hold a joint planning session to define long-term infrastructure and capability goals. Conduct a cross-alignment review of the CAA International Aviation Strategy 2025 when released. Review past compliance challenges and address unresolved differences in compliance interpretation.

5.4.3 Risk Management and Sustainability Measures

Ongoing maintenance and operational resilience: Conduct short, 15-minute monthly check-ins with each airport to confirm all security equipment is operational. Develop fallback and contingency resourcing responsibilities in the event of urgent incidents or staff non-availability. Identify vacant staff positions that can be leveraged as a resourcing pool.

Procurement and local supply chain readiness: Work with Smiths Detection to determine which maintenance tasks could be locally outsourced. Identify spare parts that could be locally sourced, reducing reliance on international procurement delays.

5.4.4 Evaluation and Continuous Improvement

Data-driven training assessments: Send a stakeholder survey on training effectiveness and conduct a stocktake of past training programs to guide future improvements. Use ICAO aviation security priority areas to thematically group regulatory training topics for assessment.

Monitoring performance against strategic goals: Develop a Theory of Change framework to align current security programs with future strategic aspirations. Share training materials with Smiths to inform the development of post-training assurance mechanisms.

6. Conclusion

The evaluation of the PACAVSEC and the PARS demonstrates that both programmes have significantly contributed to enhancing aviation security and regulatory capacity across PICs. These initiatives have

strengthened compliance with international aviation standards, improved operational efficiency, and fostered regional collaboration in aviation security.

PACAVSEC has been instrumental in delivering critical security infrastructure, such as modern screening equipment and associated training, thereby improving on-the-ground security measures in airports across the Pacific. Simultaneously, PARS has provided essential regulatory oversight, ensuring that operational enhancements align with ICAO standards. Together, these programmes have created a robust foundation for aviation security in the region.

However, several challenges persist that could undermine the long-term sustainability of these achievements. Over-reliance on key personnel, high staff turnover, and the absence of comprehensive maintenance strategies pose risks to the continuity of programme benefits. Coordination gaps between regional partners, such as PASO and the NZ CAA, have created regulatory ambiguities, while unclear governance structures and reporting mechanisms have hindered efficient programme delivery. The lack of a formal RACI matrix and strategic reporting frameworks has further complicated the alignment of operational and regulatory activities.

Despite these challenges, the lessons learned from PACAVSEC and PARS highlight clear pathways for improvement. Strengthening local capacity, streamlining governance processes, and fostering better coordination with regional and international partners will be critical to sustaining the gains made. Proactive risk management, continuous stakeholder engagement, and adaptation to emerging security threats, such as cybersecurity, will further enhance the resilience and effectiveness of aviation security in the Pacific.

The strategic recommendations provided in this report offer actionable steps to address these challenges and build on the successes of PACAVSEC and PARS. By developing unified governance frameworks, improving reporting processes, and investing in local capacity, MFAT, in collaboration with regional stakeholders, can ensure that the Pacific region continues to benefit from robust, sustainable, and internationally compliant aviation security frameworks. This will not only enhance regional connectivity and economic resilience but also contribute to broader goals of regional stability and development in the Pacific.

Appendices

Appendix A

Methodology

A Methodology

A.1 Evaluation Design and Approach

This evaluation employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods to ensure comprehensive and reliable findings. The design aligns with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and is structured around MFAT's Theory of Change (ToC), tracing the programmes' intended impact pathways from outputs to long-term outcomes.

The evaluation process was conducted in three key stages. Stage 1 focused on defining the evaluation scope and setting up the process. This included the development of the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the Evaluation Plan, which outlined the scope, schedule, deliverables, and key stakeholders. An initial desk-based review of programme documentation was also carried out to provide background and context.

In Stage 2, data collection was undertaken through a combination of semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and further document reviews. Additionally, in-country case studies, including a deep dive in Samoa, were conducted to provide contextual insights into programme implementation.

Stage 3 involved the analysis and reporting phase. Data collected were triangulated and subjected to thematic analysis guided by the OECD-DAC criteria. A collaborative Sensemaking Workshop was held to validate preliminary findings with key stakeholders, ensuring the evaluation's robustness and credibility.

A.2 Data Collection Methods

Multiple data collection methods were employed to capture a comprehensive understanding of the programmes' performance.

A desk-based review was conducted, analysing key documents such as MFAT Funding Agreements, contracts with Smiths Detection, CAA programme reports, country-specific progress reports, and past performance reviews. This provided a thorough understanding of the programme's operational and strategic framework.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of key stakeholders, including MFAT representatives, CAA officials, PASO staff, Smiths Detection personnel, and Pacific Island aviation authorities. The semi-structured format allowed for flexibility in exploring emerging themes while ensuring consistency across interviews.

Focus group discussions were organised with local airport security personnel and other programme beneficiaries. These discussions provided collective insights into the on-the-ground impact and challenges associated with PACAVSEC and PARS.

An in-person case study in Samoa offered an in-depth examination of programme implementation, outcomes, and the local context. This case study was instrumental in understanding the practical implications of the programmes in a specific country setting.

A.3 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework was designed to ensure that the evaluation findings are robust, valid, and aligned with MFAT's strategic priorities. The evaluation integrates the OECD-DAC criteria and MFAT's ToC to trace the pathways from programme outputs to long-term impacts.

The ToC, derived from the Results Frameworks outlined in the Aviation Regulatory and Aviation Equipment Activity Design Documents (ADDs), was used to map how programme activities contribute to short-term, medium-term, and long-term outcomes (see Appendix C and Appendix D). These frameworks provided the foundational logic for the evaluation, ensuring that findings accurately reflected the programmes' intended goals, outputs, and outcomes as initially defined by MFAT and its partners.

The evaluation systematically applied the OECD-DAC criteria to assess the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Coherence, and Sustainability of both the PACAVSEC and the PARS. This approach provided a comprehensive understanding of the programmes' performance across multiple dimensions.

The analytical framework integrates both PACAVSEC and PARS to provide a holistic assessment of aviation security in the Pacific. While the initial programme design treated these components as distinct, the evaluation recognised their interdependence, particularly in sustaining operational improvements through robust regulatory oversight.

This integrated approach is reflected in the development of a unified Logical Framework (Logframe) (Appendix F), which aligns operational outputs—such as equipment provision and staff training—with regulatory outcomes, including compliance with ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) standards and the strengthening of national aviation authorities.

To enhance the reliability of findings, data triangulation was employed. Data from document reviews, interviews, focus groups, and field observations were cross-checked to ensure consistency. Thematic coding and comparative analysis were used to identify key patterns and lessons learned.

Quality assurance measures, including regular spot checks and response verification, were implemented throughout the evaluation process. These measures ensured data accuracy and consistency, contributing to the overall robustness of the evaluation.

A.4 Alignment of Objectives with Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation objectives have been aligned with the OECD DAC criteria to provide a comprehensive and outcomes-oriented assessment of the program's performance and impact within MFAT's Theory of Change framework. By applying Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Coherence, and Sustainability, this evaluation examines how the program's outputs contribute to short-term, medium-term, and long-term outcomes, leading towards the ultimate program goal. This alignment with the DAC criteria enables a structured analysis that traces pathways of change, assesses both immediate and systemic impacts, and ensures that findings are actionable and consistent with MFAT's strategic priorities. This approach also supports comparability with other evaluations, allowing MFAT to benchmark results and strengthen accountability, learning, and continuous improvement across its portfolio.

A.5 Limitations and Risks

Despite the rigorous methodology, the evaluation faced certain limitations and risks that may influence the interpretation of findings.

Geographic constraints posed challenges, as some stakeholder engagements had to be conducted remotely due to logistical issues in accessing certain Pacific Island Countries. This may have limited the depth of qualitative insights gathered.

The evaluation relied heavily on desk-based data and existing documentation, which may have restricted access to real-time operational data. Additionally, there was variability in stakeholder responses, posing challenges to ensuring the consistency and completeness of data.

The temporal scope of the evaluation reflects conditions at the time of data collection. Any subsequent changes in programme implementation or external factors occurring after data collection are not accounted for in this report.

There was also a risk of potential bias due to the reliance on self-reported data from stakeholders. This may have introduced biases, particularly where stakeholders had vested interests in the programme outcomes.

To mitigate these risks, flexible scheduling and the use of local networks were employed to enhance stakeholder engagement. Data triangulation and validation through the Sensemaking Workshop helped address potential biases and data gaps, ensuring that the evaluation findings are robust, reliable, and aligned with MFAT's strategic goals for aviation security in the Pacific.

Appendix B

Relationship Between Objective and Evaluation Criteria

B.1 Table Relationship Between Objective and Evaluation Criteria

No.	Objectives:	Evaluation Criteria
1	To examine if the activities' outputs have been of high quality, and to cost and time; assess the efficiency quality and appropriateness of the delivery partners	**Effectiveness**: This objective addresses the quality of outputs and the review of the delivery models, ensuring that the activities are being implemented effectively. **Efficiency**: It focuses on the cost, time, and resource use in delivering outputs, emphasising the need for an efficient process to achieve desired results.
2	Provide insight and direction for the future of these Activities	**Relevance**: This objective is to ensures that the activities align with best practices and inform future decision-making, keeping the activities relevant in both regional and international contexts. **Coherence**: It also evaluates the alignment of the activities with regional and international frameworks, such as PASO and ICAO standards, ensuring consistency with established frameworks. **Sustainability**: This objective considers how well the activities are aligned with long-term strategies and the potential for them to be maintained or scaled in the future.
3	To review the value or effectiveness of the activities' delivery models	**Effectiveness:** This objective examines the delivery models to assess how well the activities have achieved their intended outputs, focusing on lessons learned to improve outcomes. **Efficiency:** It also emphasises finding cost-effective and efficient ways to deliver the project outputs while maintaining quality. **Impact**: By considering the broader implications of these activities, this objective focuses on long-term outcomes and how they contribute to future decision-making and broader impacts.
4	Inform decision-making aimed at reinvesting, scaling up, adapting, continuing, or terminating an Activity	**Relevance**: This objective assesses whether the activities are aligned with future needs and whether they have successfully informed future decision-making processes. **Impact**: It considers the long-term implications of the activities, ensuring that the project's success informs future decisions with lasting results. **Sustainability**: This objective emphasises ensuring that the activities are designed for long-term success, aligning with broader goals and enabling scaling where appropriate.
5	Improve effectiveness and efficiency of this Activity or related Activities by utilising the lessons learned of what works, what does not and why	**Effectiveness**: This objective focuses on improving outcomes through lessons learned and enhancing the quality of outputs. **Efficiency**: It addresses efficiency in terms of cost, time, and resource use, ensuring that future efforts are streamlined and effective. **Sustainability**: This objective focuses on maintaining successful activities and ensuring their adaptation to meet future needs.

Appendix C

Results Framework: PARS

The results framework below includes a results diagram, outputs/inputs table, results measurement table and a monitoring and evaluation work plan.

C.1 PARS Results Diagram

Goal of the Activity: An internationally compliant Pacific aviation sector that supports sustainable economic development.



C.2 PARS Outputs/Inputs Table

Outputs from the Results Diagram	Activities to Deliver Outputs	Inputs to Resource Activities
Output 1: Complete design of Programme Implementation Plans, i.e. Regional Implementation Programme and the PIC Activity Plan(s).		
1.1 Complete	Desk-based research and preparation of Programme Implementation Plans, i.e. Regional Implementation Programme, PIC Activity Plan Introduce the Programme to PICs and then perform a `GAP Analysis' to refine the Programme Implementation Plans. Commence implementation.	CAANZ staff resources. Travel Expenses. Discuss and implement milestones and methods with PICs and obtain sign-off (at no cost to MFAT).
1.2 Design and document an applicable (and scalable) SSP for each PIC.	Desk-based research and preparation of SSPs for each PIC using ICAO best practice. Work to continuously to improve the SSP.	CAANZ staff resources. Travel expenses.
Output 2: Technical assistance and training to support implementation of the PIC Activity Plan(s) and the State Safety Programme (SSP).		
2.1 Capacity planning	Facilitate the development of a Resource Plan. This will include reviewing the capacity and capability within PASO to deliver consultancy services.	CAANZ staff and contractors. Travel expenses. PICs to justify and seek authorisation for appropriate resources as required. PICs to source assistance from PASO with funds provided by the World Bank (~$300,000.00).
2.2 Training and mentoring undertaken.	Deliver multi-level (CEO to frontline) over the period of the programme for each participating PIC.	CAANZ staff and contractors. Travel Expenses.

	Training to both be on-site familiarisation and classroom. PICs may see benefits in observing SMS and a SSP in action. On occasions and perhaps in consultation with ICAO and other partners some regional training initiatives can be rolled out. Provide on-going mentoring, coaching and advisory support to ensure new learnings are consolidated.	CAANZ Staff prepare training materials. CAANZ Staff and sub-contractors to deliver training. CAANZ Staff remotely and on-site provide on-going mentoring, coaching and advisory support to ensure new learnings are consolidated.
Output 3: PASO Council representation, liaison with ICAO and other partners to enhance capacity and capability.		
3.1 Capacity building plan to strengthen PASO finalised.	Assist as a Council member higher performing Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO). PASO Needs assessment based on desk-based and country-specific research and consultations (telecons) to identify capacity and capability gaps. Implementation of training and mentoring programme.	CAANZ staff and contractors. Travel expenses.
3.2 New PASO business plan finalised.	Engagement and consultation process for the development of a new Business Plan for PASO.	CAANZ staff and contractors. Travel expenses.

C.3 PARS Results Measurement Table

Results	Indicator(s)	Baseline Information and Targets	Methodology/Data Sources
Long-Term Outcomes			
PICs demonstrating their improved capacity and capability for regulatory oversight, governance and rulemaking to operate the aviation sector in their country to achieve internationally recognised standards. This	Number of PICs achieving ICAO USOAP rating of ~60% by the end of the Activity.	All participating PICs achieving ~60% rating by June 2020.	Review Regional Programme Report and PIC Activity Reports. ICAO Reports.

Results	Indicator(s)	Baseline Information and Targets	Methodology/Data Sources
should be reflected in an ICAO USOAP Rating of ~60% by 2020.			World Bank authentication visit. May initiate and independent assessment to an ICAO visit?
Medium Term Outcomes			
PICs SSP is assessed and moves into a continuous improvement programme.	Number of PICs moving into continuous improvement programmes each year.	3 PICs by end of Year 3 3 more PICs by end of Year 4 3 more PICs by end of Year 5 Baseline = 0	Annual Implementation Reports and internal assessment judgement. ICAO Reports.
PICs become increasing compliant with ICAO USOAP rating scale.	Number of PICs achieving ICAO USOAP rating of 45% after 3 years.	All participating PICs achieving ~60% rating by June 2020. Baseline = varies by PIC	PIC civil aviation authority annual report. ICAO Reports.
PASO is fully functional and is providing professional services to PICs in a competent and reliable manner.	PASO is well regarded by members who actively utilise services, number of PICs who pay membership dues in timely manner.	All PICs are members and paying their dues by the end of the Activity. Baseline = varies by PIC	PASO Annual Report World Bank independent assessment report?
Short-Term Outcomes			
ICAO acknowledges and encourages PICs to progress their Activity Plans.	Number of PICs actively engaging with and PASO and ICAO and progress their PIC Activity Plans.	PIC Activity Plans are developed, current and progress is satisfactory.	Annual Implementation Reports and internal assessment judgement. ICAO Reports
PICs have the knowledge to implement the ASP and SSP.	PICs actively implementing their State Safety Programmes (SSP) systems/processes.	SSP is reviewed.	Annual Implementation Reports and Activity Plans are reviewed. An audit may be requested to verify `actual' implementation.

Results	Indicator(s)	Baseline Information and Targets	Methodology/Data Sources
PASO progresses the development and implementation of their Business Plan.	PASO Council reports to CAANZ on status of Business Plan.	PASO Business Plan – progress is updated against the planned milestones.	PASO Annual Report and Business Plan reviewed Attendance at the PASO Council meeting(s) and the AGM.

C.4 PARS Outputs

Outputs			
Output 1: Complete design of Programme Implementation Plans, i.e. Regional Implementation Programme and the PIC Activity Plan(s).	Number of SSPs developed.	9 – one per PIC (half by end of Year 1 and the other half by end of Year 2). Baseline = 0	Complete a Regional Implementation Plan and report on progress. Complete PIC Activity Plans and report on progress. Review at the Quarterly Programme Management Meeting. PIC reports to ICAO through Online CMA.
Output 2: Technical assistance and training to support implementation of the PIC Activity Plan(s) and the State Safety Programme (SSP).	Number of agreed training plans developed.	9 – one per PIC (half by end of Year 2 and the other half by end of Year 3). Baseline = 0	Complete PIC Activity (and Training) Plans and report on progress. Review at the Quarterly Programme Management Meeting.
	Number of training / monitoring interventions per PIC per annum.	4 per PIC Baseline = 0	Complete PIC Activity (and Training) Plans and report on progress. Review at the Quarterly Programme Management Meeting.
Output 3: PASO Council representation, liaison with ICAO and other partners to enhance capacity and capability.	Completion of the PASO Business Plan	New PASO Business Plan progressing to schedule by the end of Year 2. Baseline = 0	Reports from the PASO Council Meeting (non-confidential). Report from PASO AGM. Attendance at Meetings.
	Number of training / monitoring interventions per annum.	5 from Year 2	Complete PIC Activity (and Training) Plans and report on progress. Review at the Quarterly Programme Management Meeting.

Appendix D

Results Framework: PACAVSEC

D.1 PACAVSEC Results Diagram

Goal of the Activity: A reliable and safe Pacific aviation sector that supports sustainable economic development.



D.2 PACAVSEC Outputs/Inputs Table

Outputs from the Results Diagram	Activities to Deliver Outputs	Inputs to Resource Activities
Output 1: Aviation safety training and technical assistance provided to Pacific civil aviation safety regulatory authorities.		
1.1 Preparation of planning based on requirements to meet ICAO USOAP ratings.	Undertake gap analysis on regulatory compliance for all 9 PICs. (Note that 3 have now been completed). Develop 'corrective action plans' that are costed and sequenced to remedy the 'gaps' and identify who will resource and maintain 'remedial actions. Develop country-specific implementation plans for each PIC. This will feed into the Implementation Plan for this Activity. Support PCAAs to prepare SSPs.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ Principal aviation safety adviser and other staff and contractors. Travel expenses. PICs: Relevant PCAA personnel. PIC legal etc. dept. (e.g. Crown law) and promulgate regulations.
1.2 Implementation of regulatory oversight assistance to support corrective action plans.	Based on above mentioned 'corrective action plans', provide the advice and training (in conjunction with PASO and the PCAAs) to improve regulatory compliance – i.e. ratings and progress work plans. (Note that training may be able to take place on 'side-line' of PASO steering committee meetings, and for NZ-based training or work placements, consider use of Short-Term Training Scholarships (STTS). Support PCAAs to 'upload' compliance documentation to ICAO website. Support PCAAs to prepare for ICAO USOAP audits. Publish any relevant materials.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ Principal aviation safety adviser and other staff and contractors. Travel expenses. Publication of resource materials. Use of STTS. PICs: Relevant PCAA personnel. Venues and Comms.
Output 2: Aviation security training, technical assistance and equipment provided to Pacific airport authorities.		
2.1 Provision of security-related technical advice.	Provide coordination and oversight activities of the program by dedicated resources. Prepare workplans based on internal and external oversight activities which have a direct relationship with the USAP audit gap analysis for compliance. This work plan will be costed and sequenced and will identify who will resource and maintain 'remedial actions'. Provide technical advice, education and support to PIC airport and regulatory authorities' AvSec teams as per the workplan's agreed priorities.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ Pacific security adviser and other staff and contractors, including a new role of dedicated technical engineer. Travel expenses. PICs: Relevant airport authority AvSec personnel.

Outputs from the Results Diagram	Activities to Deliver Outputs	Inputs to Resource Activities
2.2 Provision of prioritised security equipment.	Identify list of priority security equipment requirements and how to sequence, based on life of current equipment and the WB's PAIP. Engage an external procurement adviser for transparency and neutrality purposes to run a tender process. Procure said equipment items, as per procurement rules and regulations and to match sequencing. Install and commission said items. Implement ongoing maintenance contracts with Supplier, including a 'helpdesk' (or similar) support system.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ Pacific security adviser and other staff and contractors. (Including procurement adviser). Travel expenses. Supplier contract expenses. PICs: Relevant PCAA and airport authority personnel. Customs, security, warehousing etc. expenses. Asset management responsibility.
2.3 Provision of security related training and mentoring.	Develop agreed workplans to meet training requirements for AvSec staff working at airport authorities. Identify NZ and Pacific AvSec trainers, who can meet PIC needs. In conjunction with PICs identify Pacific AvSec personnel who can be trained and certified to be trainers and also support the inspector capability of PASO. Develop and publish (produce and disseminate) training materials. (This should be trialled before finalised and in some cases may need some translation and/or to be made country specific with examples and the like). Deliver training programme – both on-site and in classroom settings. (Aim to increase % of women). Provide ongoing mentoring and coaching. Implement a developmental programme where secondments between PIC Avsec units and Regulators could be initiated either to New Zealand or within the Pacific to further develop and enhance individuals to better understand their operational and quality assistance systems and responsibilities and what needs to be achieved from a quality assurance perspective. Support and engage with other donors who have an interest in aviation security and safety outcomes of certain PIC, specifically the international departure terminal development in Honiara, Solomon Islands. Further develop and enhance the Airport Identity Card systems of the 9 PICASST Countries, that consists of hardware, software and security feature requirements as specified in ICAO Doc 8973. (Equipment purchased under 2.2 above). Support Specialist and Developmental training activities for PICs where they will be in a position to deliver specific (i.e. Dangerous Goods Recertification, which needs to be done every two years) training themselves rather than being provided by New Zealand. New Zealand will	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ Pacific security adviser and other staff and contractors who deliver training and ongoing mentoring and coaching. Printing and training expenses. Travel expenses. Consider use of STTS. PICs: Relevant airport authority AvSec personnel. Venue for training and refreshments.

Outputs from the Results Diagram	Activities to Deliver Outputs	Inputs to Resource Activities
	provide a support role in mentoring and developing certain individuals. There is also developmental training in the capacity of the Aviation Security Professional Management Course which is an activity included on ICAO annual calendar. Support on Island activities by the Cooperative Aviation Security Program – Asia Pacific (CASP – AP) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), where the ICAO Regional Office Entities from Thailand have exposure to the Pacific Region and clearly understand the challenges of the Pacific. Provide operational support and advice to the Fiji Islands (i.e. Civil Aviation Authority Fiji, Airports Fiji Limited, Fiji Airways and the Service Provider), through coordination activities and specific training activities.	
Output 3: Pacific aviation enabling environment supported.		
3.1 Provision of support to strengthen the role of PASO.	Provide assistance to Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) and its governing Council as requested and as appropriate to NZ's role as an Associate member and as part of the Pacific Regional Agencies programme. This may include direct core funding from MFAT to PASO, which may include a 'transition' process. It may include tagged funding to response to PASO's request for a Corporate Services Manager.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: Outputs 1 and 2 PASO funding contribution: Funding of agreed PASO roles – grant contribution. Core funding. PASO: Relevant staff. Venue and refreshments.
3.2 Regional meetings.	Fund the attendance of PIC delegates at Asia Pacific Meetings and Conferences (i.e. the Annual Cooperative Aviation Security Program Asia Pacific (CASP-AP) & The Annual Regional Aviation Security Coordination Forum (RASCF). Fund the annual Regional Aviation Safety and Security Conference (2 delegates per PIC – one from the airport authority and on from the regulator.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ International and Regulatory Strategy Unit staff and contractors. Travel expenses. CAANZ: Relevant support staff to arrange travel.
3.3 Respond to ad hoc requests.	Prepare policy advice, as requested. Attend meetings and prepare reports as required.	MFAT-funded MOU with CAANZ: CAANZ International and Regulatory Strategy Unit staff and contractors. Travel expenses.

D.3 PACAVSEC Results Measurement Table

Note that all data will be disaggregated by sex and other relevant variables, MFAT has standards indicators for its Strategic Results Framework (SRF) – Global Development Results (G) and Direct Development Results (D)

Results	Indicator(s)	Baseline Information and Targets	Methodology/Data Sources
Long-Term Outcomes			
Pacific Island countries have improved aviation safety and security.	Number of PICs achieving and maintaining ICAO USOAP ratings by the end of the Activity. SRF 6.5D - safety audit scores by international regulatory agency for aviation.	All participating PICs achieving continuous improvement in their ratings, e.g. ~50% rating by the end of 2022.	PCAAs Annual Reports and SSPs. ICAO Reports. World Bank Reform Program Evaluation Report. May initiate and independent assessment to an ICAO visit? Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Number of PICs achieving and maintaining improved ICAO USAP ratings by the end of the Activity. SRF 6.5D - safety audit scores by international regulatory agency for aviation.	All participating PICs achieving continuous improvement in their ratings, e.g. ~60% rating by the end of 2022.	PCAAs Annual Reports and SSPs. ICAO Reports. World Bank Reform Program Evaluation Report. May initiate and independent assessment to an ICAO visit? Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
Medium Term Outcomes			
Pacific Island Countries become increasing compliant with the ICAO USOAP/USAP Rating Scales.	Number of PICs using continuous improvement programmes each year.	3 PICs by end of Year 3 3 more PICs by end of Year 4 3 more PICs by end of Year 5 Baseline = 0	PCAA annual reports. ICAO Reports. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Reduced 'incident' reporting.	All PCAAs report less incident, violations, breaches (terminology?) annually. (Note might go up initially if reporting is more accurate). Baseline – tbc	PCAA reporting. ICAO reporting and EIs.
	Increased size and competence of technical inspectorate pool. (m/f)	X number by end of 2018 and an annual increase of x. (Consider net of PICs and staff to be targeted). Baseline – tbc	PASO Annual Report. Training reports.
PASO is fulfilling its functions under the PICASST and is providing advice and	PASO is well regarded by members who actively utilise technical inspectorate and other	All PIC members increasingly using services (need to establish how to define and measure this).	PASO Annual Report. World Bank independent assessment report?

technical assistance to PCAAs in a competent and timely manner.	services, including payment in a timely manner).	Payments increasingly made in a timely manner (again need to find a way to measure over time). Baseline = varies by PIC	Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
Short-Term Outcomes			
Pacific Island Countries have the knowledge and resources to implement their State Safety Programme (SSP).	Number of PCAAs demonstrating active engagement with PASO and ICAO to progress their SSPs, e.g. use of CMA.	SSPs are developed in all PICs by the end of 2019. PASO and ICAO report active engagement and commitment to progress issues over life of Activity. Baseline = how many SSPs in place at start. (Does CAANZ know?)	Annual Implementation Reports and internal assessment judgement. ICAO Reports. PASO report. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Number of PCAA and airport authority staff using skills received from training and TA support. (m/f) SRF capacity development indicator 10.	X #over agreed time period by PIC. (Note that absolute numbers may not be high, could consider using %). Baseline - tbc	Staff and manager (or client) surveys 6 months later. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
The effective operation and maintenance of required safety and security equipment at target airports in the Pacific.	Number of PICs with the necessary functional equipment to meet and progress SSPs which feeds into improved ICAO USOAP and USAP ratings.	Need to map out status of equipment and plan to upgrade. Baseline - tbc	Annual Implementation Reports and Activity Plans are reviewed. An audit may be requested to verify `actual' implementation. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
PASO is equipped and resourced to provide regulatory oversight of civil aviation safety and security.	Organisation capacity development e.g. PASO Council reports on status of implementing its new Strategic Plan. SRF Capacity development indicator 15.	Staff demonstrate skills and abilities to progress the Strategic Plan against the planned milestones. Baseline = tbc	PASO Annual Report and Strategic Plan reviewed. Surveys of staff, inspectors and members. (Note that it may be necessary to 'buy in' organisational assessment tools.) Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	PASO has a viable funding model.	An agreed funding model, with agreed implementation plan, is in place by the end of 2018. Funding model implemented over life of new Strategic Plan.	PASO annual budget. Report against implementation of Strategic Plan and its supporting documents. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).

D.4 PACAVSEC Outputs

Outputs			
Output 1: Aviation safety training and technical assistance provided to Pacific civil aviation safety regulatory authorities.	Regular use of gap analysis reports and corrective action plans to inform the sequencing of interventions. (Note that need to state rationale for interventions and what is the purpose and whether correct people are available and able to effect change – this will feed into indicator below).	Need to clarify the importance and sequencing of gap analysis work and using the information to develop corrective action plans. This work needs to be done for all nine PICs – target by end 2018 (CAANZ to confirm this in APR for 2017). Baseline = 3 gap analysis reports completed by 30 June 2017.	Completed gap analysis reports for each PIC. Completed PIC 'Corrective Action Plans' and reports on progress. PIC reports to ICAO through Online CMA. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Number of SSPs developed. (Not sure that CAANZ can be measured on this cos up to PICs – so maybe STO?)	9 – one per PIC (3 by 31 December 2017 and reminder by 31 December 2018). (This will depend on above info) Baseline = 0 – tbc	Completed and submitted SSPs. PIC reports to ICAO through Online CMA. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Number of TA or training interventions to support regulatory oversight compliance. (Need to define an 'intervention' and track against workplan for each PIC). (note – collect sex disaggregated data).	Approximately 2 per PIC per annum – linked to the corrective action plan with details set out in workplan. (Note that in some PCAAs have limited # of staff; and the need to 'track' uptake of the training and TA and feed this into a process for continuous improvement). Baseline = 0 for this Activity.	Participant surveys (or similar) at the time of the training/ mentoring intervention and some months later to determine level of 'uptake'. PIC Human resource plans. PIC reports to ICAO through Online CMA. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
Output 2: Aviation security training, technical assistance and equipment provided to Pacific airport authorities.	Number of agreed TA interventions delivered in areas prioritised to meet ICAO compliance. (Note these will be defined, based on need and consistent with workplan).	Approx. 2 per PIC per annum – but details to be set out in Activity costed workplan to ensure they are linked to corrective action plans. (Note that the sequencing of training and TA support will follow gap analysis work and the development of corrective action plans. It will vary between PICs over the life of the Activity). Baseline = 0	Map against gap analysis and corrective action plans that feed into the costed workplan. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).

	Number and type of security equipment provided to each PIC. (Needs of each PIC has already been determined).	Refer to workplan for sequencing of commissioning security equipment over the period 1 January 2018-31 December 2019. Baseline = 0	Procurement, contracting and commissioning documentation. Inventory for each PIC airport. Asset management/ maintenance plans, and implementation thereof (Supplier agreements). Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
	Number of people trained or mentored per PIC per annum. (Need to ensure that the training is being delivered to 'relevant' people who are able to effect change. All training and mentoring needs to track against the agreed workplan for each PIC). (note – sex disaggregated data kept on training).	At least 10 per PIC per annum – but details set out in training plan and reflects in Activity workplan. (Note that in some PIC airports have limited # of staff; and the need to 'track' uptake of the training and TA and feed this into a process for continuous improvement). Baseline = 0	Participant surveys (or similar) at the time of the training/ mentoring intervention and some months later to determine level of 'uptake'. PIC Human Resource plans. PIC reports to ICAO through Online CMA. Activity Progress Report (quarterly and annual).
Output 3: Pacific aviation safety and security enabling environment supported.	Completion of the PASO costed workplan and reports that follow the adoption of the Strategic Plan.	New PASO Strategic Plan progressing its annual costed workplan to schedule by the end of 2018. Baseline = 0	New Strategic Plan 2018-2022, and Business Plan. Annual costed workplans approved by PASO Council Meeting (approx. November). Report against workplan from previous year at PASO AGM.
	Funding model to ensure viability of PASO in place.	Realistic funding model to ensure PASO long-term viability being implemented by 2021. (Any incremental targets?)	PASO annual report.
	Increased use of PASO inspectorate pool.	Steady growth and use of pool over life of Activity (exact numbers tbc and updated). Baseline = 0	PASO workplan and budget. PASO Annual report.

Appendix E

Logical Framework (Logframe)

E. Logical Framework (Logframe) – Pacific Aviation Security Initiative (2025-2027)

E.1 Purpose of the Logframe

The Logical Framework (Logframe) provides a structured approach to defining and measuring the success of the Pacific Aviation Security Initiative. It serves as a high-level results framework that outlines:

– The overall impact that the initiative seeks to achieve.
– Specific outcomes that contribute to this impact, including improved ICAO compliance, enhanced aviation security infrastructure, and strengthened regulatory oversight.
– Outputs and activities required to achieve these outcomes, such as training programs, security equipment upgrades, and regional regulatory collaboration.
– Indicators, baselines, and targets to track progress over time.

By clearly defining objectives and expected results, the Logframe ensures that all stakeholders, including PASO, CAANZ, ICAO, and MFAT, are aligned in their efforts to enhance aviation security and regulatory compliance in Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

E.2 Logical Framework (Logframe)

Table 2 Logical Framework

Objective Level	Indicator	Baseline (2024)	Target (2027)	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Impact	Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have a safe, secure, and sustainable aviation sector supporting economic development, trade, and tourism.	Most PICs fail to meet ICAO USOAP/USAP standards, with ratings as low as 3% to 40%.	80% of PICs achieve compliance with ICAO standards by 2027.	ICAO USOAP/USAP audit reports	PIC governments remain committed to aviation security improvements.
	Economic growth in the aviation sector (e.g., trade and tourism growth attributed to safer aviation).	Economic data not linked to aviation safety.	10% increase in aviation-related trade/tourism revenue by 2027.	National economic reports	Aviation safety improvements translate into increased economic activity.
	Passenger confidence in aviation safety/security (survey-based).	No current data on passenger confidence.	80% of surveyed passengers express confidence in aviation security by 2027.	Passenger surveys at airports	Tourists recognise and respond to security improvements.
Outcomes	1. PICs achieve sustained compliance with ICAO USOAP and USAP standards.	Ratings vary from 3%-40%.	All 9 target PICs achieve ≥60% USOAP/USAP ratings by 2027.	ICAO audit reports	ICAO standards remain stable without major new compliance requirements.
	2. PIC airports operate modern, ICAO-compliant	Security equipment outdated in most PICs.	100% of target airports have functioning, ICAO-compliant security	Asset maintenance logs, ICAO reports	Adequate funding for maintenance and spare parts is sustained.

Objective Level	Indicator	Baseline (2024)	Target (2027)	Means of Verification	Assumptions
	security infrastructure.		equipment by 2027.		
	3. PIC aviation personnel demonstrate technical proficiency to sustain compliance.	Limited trained personnel, high turnover.	200+ aviation security personnel trained, with 50 becoming certified trainers (30% female participation) by 2027.	Training attendance records, ICAO/ NZCAA reports	Local personnel remain engaged in aviation security roles.
Outputs	1. Aviation regulatory oversight strengthened in PICs.	Gap analyses completed in 3 out of 9 PICs.	All 9 PICs have gap analyses and corrective action plans by 2026.	Corrective action plans, ICAO reports	PIC governments provide necessary regulatory cooperation.
	2. Modern aviation security equipment installed and maintained.	Minimal modern security equipment.	13 airports have full ICAO-compliant security installations by 2027, with ongoing maintenance support systems in place.	Procurement and installation records	Transparent procurement ensures high-quality equipment delivery.
	3. Local aviation personnel trained and certified.	Ad hoc training, no structured certification program.	200 personnel trained (30% women), 50 certified as trainers by 2027, with ongoing mentorship and secondment programs.	Training logs, participant surveys, test results	Training programs are sustained beyond donor funding.
Activities	1. Conduct regulatory gap analyses and develop corrective action plans for PICs.	Partially completed for 3 PICs.	All 9 PICs have ICAO-compliant corrective action plans by 2026.	Corrective action plans, ICAO reviews	PIC governments actively participate in aviation security reforms.
	2. Procure and install modern security screening and surveillance equipment across all target airports, with ongoing maintenance support systems set-up.	Identified need for standardisation.	All security upgrades completed across 13 target airports by 2027, with ongoing maintenance support systems in place.	Procurement contracts, ICAO reports	Suppliers deliver on time and meet specifications.
	3. Deliver structured training and certification programs for aviation security personnel.	Limited structured training available.	Annual training programs launched, certifying at least 50 personnel per year, with on-the-job mentoring and secondments.	Training records, participant feedback, test results	Trainees remain engaged in the aviation sector post-certification.

Appendix F

Results-Based Management (RBM) Table – Pacific Aviation Security Initiative (2025-2027)

F.1 Purpose of the Results-Based Management (RBM) Table

The **Results-Based Management (RBM) Table** provides a **detailed breakdown of performance indicators**, baselines, and targets at various levels of the initiative. It ensures that all activities are:

- **Clearly linked to strategic goals** outlined in the Logframe.
- **Measured using quantifiable indicators** for impact, outcomes, and outputs.
- **Aligned with international best practices** from **ICAO, MFAT, and PASO** to ensure aviation security improvements.

The RBM Table supports **evidence-based decision-making**, allowing stakeholders to **track progress, identify challenges early, and adapt strategies** as necessary. It serves as a key **performance management tool** for monitoring the **effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability** of aviation security investments in **PICs**.

F.2 Results-Based Management (RBM) Table

Results	Indicator(s)	Targets (2027)	Baseline (2024)	Methodology / Data Sources
Long-term Outcomes	1. PICs achieve sustained aviation security and safety, supporting economic growth.	80% of PICs achieve ICAO compliance standards.	*Most PICs fail to meet ICAO USOAP/USAP standards (3%-40% compliance).*	ICAO USOAP/USAP audit reports, ICAO assessments
	2. Aviation security improvements contribute to trade and tourism growth.	10% increase in aviation-related trade/tourism revenue.	*Economic data not directly linked to aviation security.*	National economic reports, tourism and trade statistics
	3. Increased passenger confidence in aviation security.	80% of passengers report confidence in airport security.	*No baseline passenger confidence survey exists.*	Passenger satisfaction surveys at airports
Medium-term Outcomes	1. PICs sustain compliance with ICAO USOAP and USAP standards.	All 9 target PICs achieve ≥60% USOAP/USAP rating.	*ICAO compliance ratings vary from 3%-40%.*	ICAO audit reports, national compliance reports
	2. Aviation security infrastructure is modernized and maintained.	100% of target airports (13) have ICAO-compliant security systems, with O&M support systems in place.	*Security equipment outdated or lacking at most PIC airports.*	Equipment procurement and maintenance records
	3. Skilled workforce sustains aviation security improvements.	200+ trained personnel (30% women), 50 certified trainers, with mentoring and secondment programmes.	*Limited trained personnel, high turnover.*	Training attendance logs, certification records
Short-term Outcomes	1. Regulatory gap analyses completed, and corrective action plans implemented.	All 9 PICs have gap analyses and corrective action plans by 2026.	*Only 3 of 9 PICs have completed regulatory gap analyses.*	Corrective action plans, ICAO compliance tracking

Results	Indicator(s)	Targets (2027)	Baseline (2024)	Methodology / Data Sources
	2. Aviation security equipment procurement and installation completed.	All 13 target airports receive necessary security upgrades.	*Many airports lack modern security screening and surveillance equipment.*	Procurement contracts, ICAO security assessments
	3. Comprehensive training and certification program launched.	Annual training programs implemented; at least 50 staff trained per year.	*Training programs ad hoc, limited structured certification.*	Training records, ICAO certification logs
Outputs	1. State Safety Programs (SSPs) and corrective action plans developed.	All 9 PICs with ICAO-compliant SSPs by 2027.	*Limited SSPs in place across PICs.*	ICAO reporting, PASO oversight reports
	2. Aviation security screening and surveillance equipment procured and installed. With maintenance support systems set up.	13 airports receive ICAO-compliant equipment by 2027, with ongoing maintenance support systems in place.	*Equipment is outdated, lacks uniformity across PICs.*	Equipment procurement records, installation reports
	3. Regional aviation security workforce trained and certified.	200 personnel trained, 50 certified as trainers by 2027, with mentorship and secondment programmes.	*No structured, large-scale training program exists.*	Training logs, ICAO certification assessments

Appendix G

Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Pacific Aviation Security Initiative (2025-2027)

G.1 Purpose of the M&E Framework

This framework provides a structured approach to assess progress, effectiveness, and impact of aviation security initiatives in PICs. It ensures compliance with ICAO USOAP/USAP standards, enhances aviation security, and supports trade and tourism growth.

G.2 M&E Framework - Indicators, Baselines, Targets & Data Sources

Results Level	Indicator(s)	Baseline (2024)	Target (2027)	Data Collection Methods	Responsible Entity
Impact	% of PICs achieving ICAO compliance	3%-40% ICAO compliance ratings in PICs	80% of PICs achieve ICAO standards	ICAO USOAP/USAP audit reports, ICAO SSP assessments, PASO monitoring	PASO, CAANZ, ICAO
	Trade & tourism growth linked to aviation security	No direct impact data available	10% increase in aviation-supported trade & tourism revenue (ADB & MFAT)	National economic reports, ADB & MFAT data	MFAT, National Governments
	Passenger confidence in aviation security	No baseline passenger survey exists	80% of passengers report confidence (measured via airport surveys)	Passenger satisfaction surveys (initiated in 2025)	CAANZ, PASO, ICAO
Outcomes	% of PICs with regulatory gap analyses & corrective plans	3 out of 9 PICs have gap analyses	9 PICs have ICAO-compliant plans by 2026	ICAO compliance reports, PASO annual reports, ICAO SSP monitoring	PASO, National Governments
	% of airports with ICAO-compliant security equipment	Few airports meet ICAO screening standards	100% of target airports (13) compliant	Equipment procurement and maintenance records, regional procurement models	CAANZ, PASO, Airport Authorities
	Number of trained aviation security personnel	Limited structured training available	200 trained, 50 certified as trainers (30% female participation)	Training logs, participant assessments, on-the-job mentorship reports	PASO, ICAO, National Authorities
Outputs	Number of PICs with ICAO-compliant State Safety Programs	SSPs incomplete in most PICs	All 9 PICs have ICAO-compliant SSPs by 2027	ICAO reporting, ICAO SSP assessment reports, PASO reports	PASO, CAANZ
	Number of airports receiving security upgrades	Equipment outdated in most airports	13 airports upgraded by 2027, including on-going O&M support systems.	Procurement records, ICAO reports	CAANZ, National Governments
	Number of personnel trained in aviation security	No large-scale structured training program	200 trained (30% women), 50 certified trainers by 2027, with mentorship and secondment programmes.	Training reports, mentorship & secondment records, PASO certifications	PASO, ICAO, National Authorities

G.3 Monitoring Plan

Table 3 M&E Framework – Monitoring Plan

M&E Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Responsible Entity
Baseline Data Collection	Establish baseline indicators for impact areas	Q1 2025	PASO, CAANZ, ICAO
Quarterly Progress Reviews	Track short-term output and implementation progress	Quarterly	PASO, MFAT, CAANZ
Annual Performance Reviews	Assess progress on medium-term outcomes	Annually	PASO, ICAO, MFAT
ICAO Compliance Audits	Verify USOAP/USAP compliance improvements	Bi-annual	ICAO, PASO
Stakeholder Consultations	Gather qualitative insights for adaptive management	Annually	PASO, National Authorities
Mid-term Evaluation	Assess implementation effectiveness and sustainability	2026	MFAT, PASO, ICAO
Final Impact Evaluation	Evaluate impact on aviation security & economic growth	2027	MFAT, PASO, ICAO

G.4 Data Collection & Verification Methods

Method	Description	Frequency
Surveys	Passenger confidence, workforce training evaluations	Annual
Compliance Audits	ICAO assessments of PICs' aviation security compliance	Bi-annual
Focus Group Discussions	Feedback from airport authorities & aviation personnel	Annual
PASO & ICAO Reports	Financial oversight & compliance tracking	Quarterly
Procurement & Maintenance Logs	Equipment functionality & maintenance records	Quarterly

G.5 Evaluation Plan

Evaluation Type	Purpose	Methodology	Timing
Process Evaluation	Assess efficiency & implementation effectiveness	Stakeholder interviews, document review	Mid-2026
Outcome Evaluation	Measure medium-term impacts (safety, compliance)	Comparative ICAO compliance assessment	Late 2026
Impact Evaluation	Evaluate long-term economic & security outcomes	Economic & security data analysis	2027

G.6 Learning & Adaptive Management Strategy

- **Quarterly data analysis** informs ongoing adjustments to security equipment procurement, training needs, and regulatory priorities.
- **Annual stakeholder meetings** to review lessons learned and refine implementation strategies.
- **Integration with ICAO & PASO workplans** to ensure ongoing compliance beyond the project period.

G.7 Risks & Mitigation Measures

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation Strategy
Political instability in PICs impacting aviation security policy	Medium	High	Before project commencement, formal agreements with State authorities will be secured to prevent delays. Ongoing government engagement and multilateral cooperation will be maintained.
Slow adoption of ICAO aviation security regulations	Medium	Medium	Strengthened technical assistance & compliance tracking will ensure ICAO adoption. PASO will track ICAO CMA self-assessments and enforce corrective actions.
Delays in aviation security equipment procurement & installation	High	High	A regional procurement model will streamline supply chain management. Long-term supplier contracts with maintenance agreements will ensure timely delivery and sustainability.
High turnover of trained aviation security personnel	High	Medium	The mentorship & skills development approach will provide career pathways to enhance retention. Cross-state training will mitigate gaps in staffing.
Health & safety risks for aviation security consultants in PICs	Medium	High	A Health & Safety Plan will be completed prior to each consultant visit and approved by project managers. Training for high-risk environments will be provided.
Funding shortfalls for regulatory support	Medium	High	Business case will be developed for ongoing funding of the regulatory support.

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