TETRA TECH
International Development

Low Emission Climate Resilient Development Programme

Mid-term Review Report – March 2026

Contents

Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	French Development Agency
CFAN	Climate Finance Access Network
CFS	Climate Finance Strategy
COM	Council of Ministers (Vanuatu)
DFAI	Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland
DoCC	Department of Climate Change
EV	Electric Vehicle
FCAP	Fiji Climate Action Program
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRDP	Pacific Framework for Resilient Development
FBoS	Fiji Bureau of Statistics
FNBC	Fiji National Building Code
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GFC	Green Finance Centre (Papua New Guinea)
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GoPNG	Government of Papua New Guinea
ICFS	International Climate Finance Strategy (New Zealand)
IGFP	Inclusive Green Finance Policy
KAS	Kiribati Agriculture Strategy
KEQ / KRQ	Key Evaluation Question / Key Review Question
KII	Key Informant Interview
LECRD	Low Emission Climate Resilient Development
LT-LEDS	Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy
MEIDECC	Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change & Communications
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MELAD	Ministry of Environment, Lands and Agriculture Development
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)
MOUs	Memorandum of Understanding
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCCC	National Climate Change Coordination Committee
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution (Paris Agreement)
NZ / NZD	New Zealand / New Zealand Dollar
PINs	Project Idea Notes
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRIF	Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility

QFFD	Qatar Fund for Development
RSF	Resilient Sustainability Facility
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
STO	Short-Term Outcome
TCCF	Tonga Climate Change Fund
TERM/TERMPlus	Tonga Energy Road Map / Tonga Energy Road Map Plus
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSDF	Tonga Strategic Development Framework
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar

Executive summary

Overview

The Low Emission Climate Resilient Development (LECRD) Programme supports Pacific Island countries to strengthen the policy, institutional and investment foundations needed to pursue low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. Implemented by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and funded by New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), with Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland (DFAI) support in Phase 2, the programme addresses a common structural challenge across Pacific contexts: while governments have made substantial climate commitments, many face constraints in translating these into coherent policy frameworks, institutional arrangements, and investment pathways that can guide implementation and mobilise climate finance.

Phase 1 of LECRD (June 2020 – December 2024; NZD 6.5 million) supported Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Tonga and Vanuatu. Activities focused primarily on upstream enabling work, including policy development, institutional strengthening, technical analysis and capacity building. Phase 2 (November 2023 – February 2027; NZD 5.3 million) continues support in these countries and expands the programme to Solomon Islands, with increased attention to operationalising policy frameworks, strengthening implementation systems and mobilising climate finance.

This Mid-Term Review (MTR), conducted between October 2025 and March 2026, assesses programme performance across both phases up to December 2025. The review evaluates LECRD's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and identifies considerations for strengthening implementation during the remainder of Phase 2 and informing future MFAT–GGGI collaboration.

Overall assessment

The review finds that LECRD remains a relevant and generally effective upstream programme that has contributed to strengthening enabling conditions for climate action in Pacific Island countries. Across both phases, the programme has produced a substantial body of technical outputs and supported policy processes aligned with national development and climate priorities. Its embedded delivery model and demand-driven engagement with partner governments have been widely valued by stakeholders and have enabled sustained engagement on complex policy reforms.

The programme's strongest contributions are evident at the level of policy development, institutional strengthening and improved evidence-informed decision-making. LECRD has helped governments develop strategies and regulatory frameworks, strengthen climate finance systems, and access specialised technical expertise in areas where capacity is often limited.

At the same time, most results remain concentrated at the enabling and early outcome level. Evidence of sustained implementation, investment mobilisation at scale, or broader system-level change remains limited or still emerging. This partly reflects the upstream nature of the programme, which is designed to address enabling conditions rather than directly finance implementation. It also reflects the reality that many reforms supported by LECRD require longer timeframes and additional financing or institutional follow-through beyond the programme's immediate scope.

Overall, the programme can be characterised as a credible upstream mechanism that has helped establish important foundations for climate action. The key challenge moving forward will be translating these enabling foundations into more sustained implementation, institutionalisation and investment.

Relevance and coherence

LECRD remains strongly aligned with national climate and development priorities across participating countries. Programme activities are typically identified through engagement with partner governments and are embedded within national policy or planning processes. This demand-driven approach has supported strong government ownership and helped ensure that technical assistance responds to country priorities.

Within MFAT's broader climate portfolio, LECRD occupies a strategic niche focused on upstream policy and institutional support for mitigation, climate governance and climate finance systems. This focus remains highly relevant in Pacific contexts, where implementation constraints often stem from limited institutional capacity, fragmented regulatory frameworks and insufficient financing mechanisms.

However, the programme's role is not always clearly differentiated from other climate-related technical assistance initiatives supported by MFAT and development partners. In practice, mandates can converge in areas such as climate finance systems, governance reform and NDC implementation support. While the review did not identify significant duplication, clearer articulation of LECRD's strategic niche and stronger coordination with related initiatives could enhance programme coherence.

Complementarity with other development partners is strongest where LECRD's upstream policy work is linked to subsequent financing or implementation initiatives. The programme's work on inclusive green finance in Papua New Guinea illustrates this potential pathway, where institutional reforms have attracted additional engagement from other partners. In other contexts, however, such pathways remain less clearly defined.

Efficiency and delivery model

The review finds that the MFAT–GGGI delivery model is broadly fit-for-purpose for upstream policy reform and institutional strengthening in Pacific contexts.

A central strength of the programme is its use of embedded technical assistance. Long-term advisers working within government institutions have enabled sustained engagement, improved coordination and stronger institutional relationships. Stakeholders consistently reported that this model offers advantages over short-term consultancy arrangements, including greater responsiveness to government needs, improved trust and continuity in policy processes.

The programme has also demonstrated operational flexibility. Activities have been adjusted in response to political changes, capacity constraints, recruitment challenges and evolving government priorities. This adaptability has helped maintain programme relevance across a dynamic operating environment.

Nevertheless, efficiency is affected by several operational and contextual constraints. Recruitment delays and periods of limited staffing have occasionally slowed implementation. In some cases, uncertainty around reporting arrangements for embedded staff has created tension between programme management requirements and government accountability structures. Adaptive management practices are evident but remain largely informal and relationship-based rather than embedded within clearly defined programme management processes.

Effectiveness

Across both phases, LECRD has delivered a wide range of technical outputs supporting climate policy development, regulatory reform and institutional strengthening. These include national strategies and planning frameworks, analytical studies, regulatory instruments, capacity-building initiatives and stakeholder engagement processes.

Evidence suggests the programme has contributed to improved evidence-informed decision-making and strengthened government capability in specialised climate policy areas. In several cases, LECRD support has helped governments advance complex reforms that would otherwise have been difficult to progress due to capacity constraints.

However, evidence of sustained implementation and system-level outcomes remains limited. In several countries, policies and strategies supported by LECRD have been endorsed but have not yet been fully operationalised, or remain dependent on further financing and institutional follow-through.

Progress varies across the portfolio. Papua New Guinea shows the strongest trajectory toward institutionalisation and climate finance mobilisation, particularly through the establishment of the Green Finance Centre and development of inclusive green finance frameworks. Other countries demonstrate more sporadic progress in policy development, planning and institutional strengthening, with implementation pathways still evolving.

Integration of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) considerations has improved in Phase 2 compared to Phase 1. GESI provisions are now more visible within programme planning and reporting. However, evidence that gender and inclusion analysis substantively shapes project design or implementation remains limited, and integration remains uneven across the portfolio.

Sustainability

LECRD has generated several foundations that could support longer-term climate action, including policy frameworks, institutional mechanisms and strengthened technical capacity. Sustainability prospects are strongest where reforms are anchored within institutions with clear mandates, linked to financing mechanisms or supported by strong political leadership.

The establishment of the Green Finance Centre within the Bank of Papua New Guinea provides the clearest example of institutional embedding and potential long-term sustainability within the portfolio.

However, sustainability risks remain across many programme activities. Reforms often depend on a small number of institutional champions, while broader institutional capacity remains constrained. In several cases, policies and strategies supported by the programme are not yet linked to clear implementation financing, regulatory enforcement mechanisms or government budget processes.

These risks highlight the importance of strengthening the connection between upstream policy work and downstream implementation pathways.

Conclusions and future considerations

Overall, the LECRD programme represents a strategically relevant and well-regarded modality for upstream climate policy support in the Pacific. It has helped governments strengthen enabling environments for climate action and has produced a substantial body of technical work aligned with national priorities.

The programme's embedded delivery model, flexible programming approach and strong alignment with partner government priorities are widely recognised strengths.

Looking forward, the central challenge for LECRD will be to strengthen the pathways through which upstream policy and institutional reforms translate into sustained implementation and investment

outcomes. The review finds that while the programme has been effective in developing enabling frameworks, the transition from policy formulation to operationalisation remains uneven across the portfolio. Addressing this gap will require more deliberate attention to how reforms move from design to implementation, including the institutional, regulatory and financing conditions required for uptake.

For the remainder of Phase 2, the programme could place greater emphasis on identifying and supporting implementation pathways for priority reforms. This may include clarifying sequencing from technical studies and policy frameworks through to regulatory adoption, institutional mandates, implementation planning and financing mobilisation. Where appropriate, activities could more explicitly identify the actors responsible for implementation and the resources required to operationalise reforms.

Key considerations for the remainder of Phase 2 and any future phase include:

- Strengthening links between upstream policy support and implementation financing, including clearer alignment with climate finance mechanisms, development partner programmes and national budget processes.
- Expanding engagement with financial institutions and private sector actors, particularly where implementation depends on investment decisions, market incentives or financial sector participation.
- Improving monitoring systems to track implementation and investment outcomes, including more systematic monitoring of policy uptake, institutional changes and follow-on financing catalysed by programme support.
- Integrating gender equality and social inclusion considerations earlier in programme design, so that GESI analysis can inform the selection and design of activities rather than being applied primarily during implementation or reporting stages.

Looking beyond the current phase, the review suggests that the programme could benefit from a more selective portfolio approach that concentrates effort on a smaller number of reforms with clearer implementation pathways and stronger prospects for institutionalisation. This would enable deeper engagement with priority reforms and may increase the likelihood that upstream policy work translates into tangible system-level change.

1. Introduction

The **Low Emission Climate Resilient Development (LECRD) Programme** supports Pacific Island countries to strengthen policies, institutions, and investment pathways that advance low-emission and climate-resilient development. The Programme is designed to address persistent structural and capacity constraints that limit governments' ability to translate climate commitments into coordinated planning, regulatory reform, and bankable investment pipelines.

Phase 1 (NZD 6.5 million; June 2020 – December 2024) was funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and implemented primarily by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Phase 1 focused on strengthening policy frameworks, developing sectoral strategies and roadmaps, and establishing enabling conditions for climate and green finance.

Building on this foundation, **Phase 2** (NZD 5.3 million; November 2023 – February 2027) is co-funded by MFAT and Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAI). It continues support in the original five countries and expands to Solomon Islands. Phase 2 places increased emphasis on operationalising policy frameworks, strengthening implementation systems, mobilising finance, and embedding lessons from Phase 1 to enhance delivery effectiveness and sustainability.

With Phase 2 at its midpoint, MFAT commissioned Tetra Tech International Development (Tetra Tech) to undertake an independent Mid-Term Review (MTR). The Review was conducted between October 2025 and March 2026. This report presents the Review's findings and analysis and identifies considerations to strengthen Phase 2 implementation and inform future programming decisions.

1.1 Review purpose and scope

Review purpose

The purpose of the MTR was to provide an independent assessment of LECRD's performance and strategic positioning across Phase 1 and Phase 2 (to December 2025), and to inform evidence-based adjustments for the remainder of Phase 2 and any subsequent phase.

Specifically, the Review sought to:

1. Assess progress toward intended outputs and short-term outcomes across both phases.
2. Examine how lessons from the Phase 1 internal review have informed Phase 2 design and implementation.
3. Evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the GGGI-led delivery model and associated coordination and management arrangements.
4. Identify practical, evidence-based recommendations to strengthen performance and maximise impact over the remaining implementation period.
5. Generate strategic insights to inform future MFAT–GGGI collaboration and potential future phases of support.

Review scope

The MTR examined LECRD performance across both Phase 1 and Phase 2 implementation to December 2025. The scope of the Review was defined by the following parameters:

- **Programmatic coverage:** The Review focused on the GGGI-implemented components of LECRD. Non-GGGI workstreams were discontinued following the Phase 1 internal review and were therefore excluded from assessment.
- **Geographic coverage:** The Review considered programme implementation across all six participating countries: Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
- **Performance dimensions:** The Review assessed progress toward intended outputs and short-term outcomes, the integration of Phase 1 lessons into Phase 2 design and delivery, and the performance of the GGGI–MFAT delivery model. It also examined cross-cutting dimensions including gender equity and social inclusion (GESI), resilience integration, coordination arrangements, and sustainability prospects.
- **Level of analysis:** The Review assessed LECRD's contribution to strengthening policy frameworks, institutional capability, climate governance systems, and enabling conditions for low-emission and climate-resilient development. Given the upstream and catalytic nature of the programme, the analysis focused on contribution rather than attribution of higher-level development impacts.

The primary audiences for this Review are MFAT, DFAI, and GGGI, with findings intended to support evidence-informed decision-making for the remainder of Phase 2 and to inform strategic considerations for any future phase.

1.2 Report structure

Section 2 outlines the methodology applied in the Mid-Term Review, including the evaluation approach, data collection methods, analytical approach, and key limitations.

Section 3 provides background on the LECRD Programme, including its rationale, design evolution, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Framework and geographic coverage, establishing the context for subsequent assessment against the Key Review Questions (KRQs).

Sections 4 presents the Review findings, structured around the KRQs. These sections analyse progress toward outputs and outcomes; the application of Phase 1 lessons in Phase 2; the effectiveness and efficiency of the GGGI-led delivery model; the integration of GESI; and the sustainability of programme results.

Section 5 synthesises overall conclusions and presents practical, evidence-based considerations to strengthen Phase 2 implementation and inform strategic decisions regarding any future phase of the programme.

2. Review approach and methods

The Review was commissioned by MFAT and conducted between October 2025 and March 2026. It was designed as a participatory and utilisation-focused exercise to generate practical, evidence-based findings to inform Phase 2 implementation and future programming decisions. Oversight was provided by an Evaluation Steering Group comprising representatives from MFAT and GGGI. The Steering Group endorsed the Review Plan, provided strategic guidance at key stages, and participated in validation of emerging findings. Final analysis and conclusions remain the responsibility of the Review team.

The Review was implemented in four stages: (i) inception and refinement of the analytical framework and tools; (ii) data collection; (iii) analysis and structured sensemaking; and (iv) reporting and finalisation.

2.1 Methodology

Evaluation approach

The Review adopted a utilisation-focused, realist approach aligned with the KRQs and the Analytical Framework set out in Annex 7: Analytical Framework. The methodology examined not only whether results have been achieved, but how and under what conditions programme interventions have contributed to change across diverse Pacific contexts.

Performance was assessed against four criteria embedded within the KRQs: effectiveness (including gender equity and social inclusion), efficiency, relevance and coherence, and sustainability. Analysis was guided by the MEL framework, assessing the coherence of the results chain and the plausibility of contribution pathways.

Given the upstream nature of LECRD, and the presence of multiple development partners in climate governance reform, the Review applied a contribution lens. Findings assess the extent to which LECRD plausibly influenced observed changes rather than attributing results solely to programme interventions.

Data sources

Consistent with the Analytical Framework, the Review drew on multiple sources of evidence to enable triangulation:

 **Desktop review**	A structured analysis of programme documentation, including design and planning documents, Project Idea Notes, MEL frameworks, progress and annual reports, the Phase 1 internal review and closure report, selected technical outputs, and relevant national policies and strategies (see Annex 6: Key documents reviewed).
 **Key informant interviews**	Semi-structured interviews with MFAT (Wellington and Post), GGGI regional and country teams, partner government representatives, and selected stakeholders across all six participating countries (in-person in Tonga and Fiji and remotely for remaining countries). A total of 60 stakeholders were consulted (see Annex 5: Stakeholder consulted).
 **Illustrative case studies**	More in-depth examination in Fiji and Tonga to analyse contribution pathways, contextual enablers and constraints, institutional ownership, and delivery model dynamics.
 **Monitoring data review**	Analysis of available output- and activity-level monitoring data, primarily for Phase 2 reported progress against Phase 2 indicators. Due to limitations in Phase 1 monitoring systems, quantitative data were used mainly to assess output delivery, with qualitative evidence informing assessment of outcome-level progress.
 **Sensemaking and validation**	Emerging findings were tested through a structured workshop with the Evaluation Steering Group to strengthen factual accuracy and practical relevance.

Data analysis

Data were systematically coded and synthesised against the KRQs and associated criteria using structured thematic analysis. Cross-country comparison enabled identification of recurring patterns, contextual variations, and delivery model dynamics.

Findings were prioritised based on the strength, consistency, significance and triangulation of evidence. Where evidence was limited or mixed, this is explicitly noted in the report.

2.2 Key Review Questions

The KRQs, aligned to the Review objectives in Section 1, guided all aspects of data collection and analysis. Interview guides and analytical tools were structured to ensure consistency across stakeholder groups and countries. The full Analytical Framework is presented in Annex 7: Analytical Framework.

Table 1. Key Review questions

Criteria	Key Review Questions	Sub-questions
Effectiveness	***KRQ 1.*** To what extent have LECRD Phase 1 and 2 activities contributed to achieving their intended outcomes and demonstrated adaptive learning?	**1.1** How far have Phase 1 and 2 interventions advanced the outcomes identified in the MEL framework? **1.2** What factors are enabling or constraining progress towards outcomes? **1.3** To what extent has the programme demonstrated adaptive management in response to contextual changes? **1.4** Which elements of Phase 1 learning have been retained or strengthened in Phase 2?
	KRQ 2. To what extent has MFAT and GGGI enhanced inclusive (GESI) and resilient development in its programming?	**2.1** How systematically have GESI and resilience screening tools and guidance been applied across countries? **2.2** What evidence exists that these approaches have been adopted or replicated by government institutions?
Efficiency	***KRQ 3.*** How fit-for-purpose is the GGGI–MFAT delivery model for achieving LECRD outcomes in the Pacific context, and how efficiently do internal systems and governance arrangements support delivery?	**3.1** How do the delivery model's characteristics (partner-led, flexible and adaptive, embedded, and collaborative) manifest in practice across countries? **3.2** Has GGGI's embedded approach delivered unique value relative to other models of technical assistance or regional delivery mechanisms?
Relevance & coherence	***KRQ 4:*** To what extent is LECRD responsive to Pacific countries' evolving climate and development priorities?	**4.1** How has GGGI ensured country ownership through co-design and alignment with national planning frameworks? **4.2** How coherent and complementary is LECRD with other regional and national climate and development initiatives supported by MFAT, partner governments, and other development partners?
Sustainability	***KRQ 5:*** To what extent have LECRD approaches achieved sustainable change in Pacific contexts?	**5.1** What strategies are most effective for maintaining and scaling results after programme completion? **5.2** How do institutional arrangements, partnerships, and policy instruments contribute to or limit sustainability?

2.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings:

- **Staff turnover and institutional memory:** Changes in personnel across partner agencies and GGGI since Phase 1 reduced continuity and limited retrospective reflection in some cases.
- **Programme boundary clarity:** In some contexts, stakeholders found it difficult to distinguish LECRD activities from other GGGI or climate-related initiatives, requiring clarification during consultations.
- **Stakeholder coverage:** Scheduling constraints and geographic dispersion limited the breadth of consultations in some countries. Remote engagement reduced opportunities for wider participation.
- **Phase 1 monitoring limitations:** Phase 1 did not operate under a fully developed programme MEL framework with defined baselines and indicators, limiting availability of quantitative outcome-level evidence.
- **Contribution rather than attribution:** Given the complexity of climate governance reform and the presence of multiple actors, findings assess plausible contribution rather than direct causal attribution.
- **Efficiency measurement constraints:** The review lacked systematic evidence to quantify cost-efficiency or value-for-money. As a result, efficiency assessments are based largely on stakeholder perceptions and indicative sequencing.

3. Background

This section provides an overview of the LECRD programme, including its rationale, design evolution, geographic scope, and the focus of Phases 1 and 2. It situates LECRD within the broader Pacific climate and development context and describes the programme's intended role in addressing structural and capacity constraints faced by Pacific Island countries.

3.1 The LECRD programme

Pacific Island countries are among the most climate-vulnerable nations globally. Small, open economies, geographic isolation, and high exposure to climate-related hazards combine with limited fiscal space and technical capacity to constrain governments' ability to respond effectively to climate change. Without sustained and coordinated support, these constraints risk undermining progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Paris Agreement commitments, and longer-term national development objectives.

Historically, climate action across the Pacific has been delivered primarily through discrete mitigation, adaptation and resilience projects. While these interventions have addressed specific needs, Pacific governments and development partners have increasingly highlighted the limitations of project-based approaches in addressing systemic and cross-cutting climate challenges. This has contributed to growing emphasis on integrated, long-term, and programmatic approaches that embed climate considerations within national and sectoral policies, legislation, institutions, and investment planning processes.

In many Pacific Island countries, long-term strategies such as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), sector plans, and adaptation strategies have been developed. However, translating these frameworks into operational plans, regulations, and investment decisions has required sustained institutional capacity, regulatory systems, and financing mechanisms. Strengthening these enabling environments has therefore been identified as an important component of national climate responses.

In response to these needs, MFAT partnered with GGGI to design and implement the LECRD Programme. LECRD was conceived as a flexible, multi-country programme to support Pacific Island countries governments in developing and embedding policies, strategies, regulations, standards, and investment planning processes that support low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways. MFAT's partnership with GGGI emerged through a competitive options analysis and stakeholder consultation process, which identified GGGI as a well-positioned partner with an established Pacific presence, embedded delivery model, and demonstrated experience supporting low-emission development strategies and policy reform.

The LECRD programme aligns with key global, regional, and New Zealand policy frameworks, including:

- The Paris Agreement
- Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- The SAMOA Pathway
- The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
- Pacific Framework for Resilient Development (FRDP 2017)
- Kainaki II Declaration (2019)
- Aotearoa New Zealand's International Climate Finance Strategy (ICFS)

Delivery approach and cross-cutting features

LECRD is delivered by GGGI using an embedded, demand-driven delivery model. In each participating country, activities are intended to be identified and designed collaboratively with partner governments and documented through Project Idea Notes (PINs), which outlines the project rationale, strategy, budget, and anticipated results. This approach aims to support alignment with national priorities while maintaining coherence with programme-level objectives.

The programme design incorporates adaptive management principles, with flexibility built into project identification, design, and sequencing to accommodate differing country contexts and evolving priorities. Phase 2 incorporates an updated programme architecture that includes a strengthened MEL framework and clearer alignment with the outcomes of MFAT's International Climate Finance Strategy.

GESI is a cross-cutting element of the LECRD programme design. In Phase 2, GESI considerations are more explicitly articulated through the inclusion of gender and social inclusion analysis during project design, requirements for consultation with women, youth, and marginalised groups, and the integration of GESI-related actions within project plans. The Phase 2 design also provides for dedicated programme-level GESI expertise to support implementation and reporting across participating countries.

Phase 1 (2020-2024)

Phase 1 of LECRD was funded solely by MFAT with a total budget of 6,522,739 NZD. Its aim was to establish the foundational policy, institutional, and planning conditions necessary for low-emission, climate-resilient development in Pacific Island countries. Implemented between 2020 and 2024, Phase 1 supported five countries, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu, reflecting diverse governance, institutional, and climate contexts across Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia.

The programme was implemented through a portfolio of 16 country-level projects agreed with partner governments. Phase 1 prioritised upstream, enabling-environment support, focusing on national systems, rules, and capacities, rather than direct investment or service delivery. This approach sought to strengthen country ownership, align climate action with national development frameworks, and act as a catalyst for sustained implementation beyond the life of individual projects.

Phase 2 (2023-2027)

Phase 2 of LECRD commenced in November 2023 as a co-funded partnership between MFAT and Ireland's DFAI. With a total budget of NZD 5.3 million and an expanded geographical scope to include the Solomon Islands, Phase 2 is scheduled to end in 2027.

Building on Phase 1 experience, Phase 2 represents a shift from primarily establishing strategies and policies toward deepening implementation, strengthening coherence, and improving programme-level performance management. Key design refinements include a move toward fewer, larger, and longer-duration projects; clearer articulation of programme-level objectives and outcomes; strengthened monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems; and more systematic integration of gender equality and social inclusion.

The overarching goal of Phase 2 is to strengthen Pacific governments' capacity to plan, finance, and implement low-emission, climate-resilient development through inclusive and evidence-based decision-making. This goal is operationalised through the following four programme objectives:

1. Increase governments' ability to make decisions about long-term opportunities and priorities through evidence-driven, inclusive and participatory consultation processes.
2. Increase government capacity and capability (knowledge, skills, systems) to develop plans to deliver on their climate priorities.
3. Support governments to work with sectoral stakeholders (e.g., private sector institutions, and universities) to enable them to implement plans (policies, regulations, standards, etc.).
4. Support government's capacity for developing and implementing LECRD plans and strategies that respond to the priorities of women, youth, and marginalised groups, and demonstrate the benefits that this delivers.

Phase 2 is underpinned by a revised MEL Framework, including a new Theory of Change (see Figure 1). The Theory of Change assumes that sustained improvements in knowledge, systems, institutional capacity, and stakeholder engagement will enable governments to transition from planning to implementation and investment mobilisation. The Theory of Change is anchored in the long-term and short-term outcomes of New Zealand's International Climate Finance Strategy.

For the implementation of Phase 2 LECRD activities, GGGI continues to work closely with partner governments grounded in an institutional partnership to support decision making shown in the table below:

Country	Stakeholder group
Fiji	The Climate Change Division and Ministries of Public Works and Forestry
Kiribati	The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Agricultural Development
Solomon Islands	The Ministry of Climate Change, Forestry and Finance
Tonga	The Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change and Communications
Vanuatu	The Ministries of Climate Change, Public Infrastructure and Finance
Papua New Guinea	Climate Change Authority

Key activities

LECRD activities are structured as a portfolio of country-level projects implemented within an overarching programme framework. Across both phases, activities have focused on strengthening the enabling conditions for low-emission, and climate-resilient development rather than financing infrastructure or direct service delivery. This has positioned LECRD as an upstream, systems-oriented programme intended to influence long-term policy, investment, and institutional behaviour. LECRD activities have clustered around four interrelated areas:

1. **Policy, strategy, and planning support.** LECRD has supported partner governments to develop or update national and sectoral policies, strategies, roadmaps, and legislative instruments that integrate climate mitigation, adaptation, and development objectives. This has included long-term low-emissions development strategies, sectoral roadmaps (e.g. energy, transport, construction), and supporting policy or regulatory reforms. Activities have typically combined technical analysis with extensive consultation to ensure alignment with national development priorities and existing planning frameworks.
2. **Climate and green finance enabling frameworks.** A second core activity stream has focused on strengthening national systems for mobilising, managing, and directing climate and green finance. This has included development of climate finance strategies, green finance policies and taxonomies, establishment or strengthening of dedicated financing mechanisms, and support to improve governments' readiness to access international climate finance. These activities have sought to link planning outputs with investment pipelines and financing decision-making.
3. **Regulatory, standards, and institutional reforms.** LECRD has supported the development or revision of regulations, standards, and institutional arrangements that operationalise climate policy commitments. Examples include emissions and fuel standards, green procurement frameworks, building codes, and governance arrangements for climate funds. Activities in this area have aimed to move beyond strategy formulation toward enforceable rules and clearer institutional mandates.
4. **Capacity building and stakeholder engagement.** Across all activity areas, LECRD has invested in strengthening individual and institutional capacity through training, mentoring, and embedded technical assistance. Activities have targeted public officials, regulators, financial institutions, private sector actors, and civil society stakeholders. Capacity building has been closely linked to policy and regulatory processes, with the intention of supporting implementation rather than stand-alone skills development.

Table 2. Summary of activities by country

Phase	Fiji	Kiribati	Papua New Guinea
1	Focused on low-emissions policy and regulatory foundations: analysis and recommendations on fossil fuel subsidy reform, vehicle emissions standards; plus, support to implement the Climate Change Act through building code sustainability updates, strengthening Greenhouse Gas (GHG) data/Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) capacity (incl. Fiji Bureau of Statistics), and establishing voluntary emissions reporting mechanisms.	Supported climate-resilient agriculture planning and greener public procurement. Key activities included a 5-year action framework to implement the Kiribati Agriculture Strategy (KAS) and associated stakeholder engagement; plus, development/ adoption of green procurement guidance (incl. checklists integrated into the procurement manual) and delivery of green procurement training across public and private stakeholders.	Built an inclusive green finance enabling framework: development and launch of the Inclusive Green Finance Policy (incl. inclusive/green taxonomy and diagnostic), establishment of a Green Finance Centre (GFC) within the central bank, Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) with multiple financial institutions, and support to pilot green lending products and build market awareness/capability.
2	Early-stage development of a sustainable bamboo construction industry: targeted research (inventory, mechanical properties, feasibility/value chain), capacity building and awareness, and development of bamboo-related guides/ codes/ regulations for resilient and inclusive construction.	Establishment of an Environmental Fund: enabling environment/conditions assessment; high-level design options and recommendations; progression toward detailed design/regulations (dependent on Government decisions), alongside planned training and communications/ outreach to build awareness and demand.	New project still in design; expected to be developed with the Climate Change and Development Authority, with implementation pending MFAT approval of the Project Idea Note.

Phase	Tonga	Vanuatu	Solomon Islands
1	Energy transition planning and early implementation support: development and approval of TERMPlus (2021–2035) and an associated investment plan; follow-on support on e-mobility, including analysis of Electric Vehicle (EV) costs and recommendations to incentivise EV transition and address system requirements.	Developed economy-wide decarbonisation and transport policy foundations: preparation and Government endorsement of a Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) informed by emissions pathways/scenarios and prioritised mitigation actions; plus, fuel and vehicle emissions standards policy briefs endorsed by the Council of Ministers, with additional legal drafting instructions and public communications materials.	**N/A**
2	Embedding climate finance in long-term planning: development of a Climate Finance Strategy; strengthening the Tonga Climate Change Fund via operational/ communications materials to increase (inclusive) access and uptake; and marketing/prioritisation of TERM investment opportunities to catalyse clean-energy investment.	Operationalising cleaner vehicle/fuel standards: development of SOPs for enforcing fuel and vehicle emissions standards at ports of entry, inspector training, and public awareness activities.	Establishing readiness and policy for high-integrity carbon trading: readiness assessment and needs analysis for international carbon markets (Article 6/voluntary markets), institutional/governance recommendations, capacity building for steering committee/stakeholders, and development of a (gender-responsive) carbon trading policy.

Theory of change

Figure 1. LECRD Theory of Change (ToC)



4. Findings

4.1 Relevance and coherence

This section assesses **KRQ 4**, the extent to which LECRD remains aligned with Pacific countries' climate and development priorities and whether it is coherently positioned and implemented within MFAT's climate portfolio and the broader regional climate architecture.

Coherence is assessed in two dimensions: internal coherence (programme logic and integration) and external coherence within MFAT's climate investments, and complementarity with national and development partner initiatives. Relevance is examined in terms of alignment with nationally identified priorities, responsiveness to government demand, contextual fit and adaptability to changing political and institutional circumstances.

4.1.1 Internal and external coherence (KRQ 4.2)

Key findings:

- LECRD has a coherent and defensible upstream design logic targeting structural barriers to climate investment and implementation.
- Operationally, LECRD functions as a flexible portfolio rather than a tightly integrated programme, and its identity is not always clearly distinguished from other GGGI-supported initiatives.
- LECRD fills a credible upstream niche aligned with MFAT's climate ambition. However, boundaries between LECRD and other MFAT-supported climate mechanisms (CFCSP, NDC Hub) are not always clearly differentiated.
- Complementarity is strongest where reforms are embedded within national systems and sequenced with other donor support.

Internal coherence

According to MFAT interviewees, LECRD was established during the 2018–2019 expansion of New Zealand's climate finance as a modality to strengthen upstream policy, regulatory and strategic foundations in Pacific Island countries. Rather than managing numerous small, transaction-heavy advisory investments, LECRD was designed as a bundled technical assistance mechanism delivered through a single partnership with GGGI. This modality was intended to reduce administrative burden while supporting governments to translate national commitments into investable action.

At the level of strategic intent, internal coherence is strong. The programme's theory of change – that strengthened policy and regulatory frameworks improve institutional readiness, which in turn facilitates climate investment and implementation of climate initiatives – is logically consistent and appears well aligned with partner governments' own diagnosis of structural barriers. For example, stakeholders from the Fiji Government explicitly linked legislative reform, the development of harvesting codes and treatment regulations as necessary foundations for developing the bamboo construction industry. Across interviews, government stakeholders emphasised the 'enabling' characteristic of the programme framing activities as prerequisites for climate action.

> *"There's been an improvement because of the TERM Plus work … they've been focused specifically on those enabling environments to address first"*[1].

However, operational coherence is more limited. Country-level activities are primarily shaped by national demand and sector priorities, with minimal functional interdependence between them. This makes activities in each country substantively distinct. While they share an upstream enabling orientation and a similar approach to the provision of embedded technical support, in-country stakeholders experience LECRD as a standalone nationally embedded project, referring to the "bamboo project," "green finance work," or "the carbon trading policy", for example, rather than to LECRD as an integrated programme.

Phase 2 introduced clearer programme-level objectives, a strengthened MEL framework and placed greater emphasis on mainstreaming GESI across activities. While these adjustments have improved design clarity and reporting alignment, the modular nature of implementation makes LECRD's programme identity somewhat diffuse at a country level. As such, internal coherence rests less on structural integration or thematic consistency and more on a common overarching approach. Specifically, this is achieved through:

[1] Tongan Government stakeholder

- A shared theory of change linking upstream reform to downstream climate outcomes.
- A single delivery partnership providing a consistent embedded delivery model.
- Administrative efficiency achieved through bundling of advisory support.

In the Pacific context, such a portfolio model can be considered a strength, as flexibility enhances responsiveness to diverse country contexts and evolving demands. However, limited structural integration across the portfolio (where country activities are not sufficiently aligned to enable common approaches, pooled resources or systematic transfer of learning), together with an indistinct programme identity, places greater pressure on MEL systems and programme-level narrative to clearly articulate LECRD's distinct contribution and demonstrate how its diverse activities advance shared objectives.

Coherence within MFAT's portfolio

Within MFAT's broader climate portfolio, LECRD is positioned as an upstream enabling/catalytic modality. Its outputs are designed to influence planning and investment rather than finance infrastructure or implementation directly. This positioning aligns well with MFAT's stated intent of strengthening institutional foundations for climate action.

Although LECRD has a relatively clear focus on emissions-related enabling frameworks and policy reform, interviews suggest that its boundaries with other MFAT-supported technical assistance initiatives are not always clearly differentiated. As other mechanisms operate across broader adaptation, mitigation and institutional strengthening agendas, in practice their mandates can converge. This is particularly true with efforts aimed at governance reform and climate finance systems such as those associated with the Climate Finance Capacity Support Programme (CFCSP) and NDC-related support.

Although the Review uncovered no direct evidence of duplication, the distinction between LECRD and other upstream technical assistance mechanisms was not always clearly articulated in interviews. Some MFAT and programme stakeholders suggested that clearer differentiation, or even rationalisation of upstream capacity mechanisms, could strengthen portfolio coherence and reduce administrative complexity. MFAT stakeholders emphasised that if consolidation or closer integration is to be considered, this would require careful harmonisation of intended outcomes, MEL systems and frameworks to preserve strategic clarity and avoid creating new forms of incoherence.

It is important to note, however, that the perceived lack of distinction between LECRD and other MFAT climate technical assistance mechanisms does not necessarily indicate redundancy. At its best, LECRD initiatives are considered complementary to related mechanisms, operating in adjacent or reinforcing spaces within a shared reform agenda. In such cases, blurred boundaries may reflect close alignment of purpose and sequencing rather than weakness.

Overall, LECRD's conceptual niche within MFAT's portfolio is sound, but clearer communication of programme distinctiveness and results would strengthen coherence.

Complementarity with national, regional and development partner initiatives

At a country level, LECRD interventions are well anchored in national priorities and institutional frameworks. Stakeholders consistently described activities as emerging from national priorities and building on existing reform agendas rather than being externally imposed. For example, in Solomon Islands, carbon trading reform was described as Cabinet-driven, with LECRD responding to an identified need for technical and institutional capacity.

The embedded delivery model reinforces complementarity by situating technical assistance within existing ministry structures and coordination mechanisms. Rather than creating parallel advisory tracks, LECRD activities are typically integrated into national planning. Catalytic effects are most evident where upstream reforms are deliberately sequenced with or trigger follow-on investment. The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Green Finance Centre provides the clearest illustration of this. LECRD-supported policy and institutional groundwork that enabled subsequent engagement and financing by the French Development Agency (AFD). This sequencing reflects effective external coherence, where LECRD functioned as an enabling layer within a broader ecosystem of climate finance actors.

However, catalytic effects are not uniform across the portfolio. Three recurring risks were identified:

1. **Overlap and sequencing challenges.** Often, multiple actors operate in adjacent policy spaces, such as carbon markets, NDC implementation, energy planning, and climate finance readiness. Without deliberate coordination, strategy development may not align with financing windows or other regulatory reform efforts.
2. **Weak implementation pathways.** Where upstream outputs are not explicitly linked to financing mechanisms, national planning or budget allocations, reforms risk remaining theoretical rather than transformative.
3. **Limited visibility across actors.** New Zealand High Commissions/Consulates and line ministries do not always have a comprehensive overview of the intersections between different donor-funded initiatives.

Finally, while partner governments are aware of GGGI support, they are not always aware of the specific funding source. This is exacerbated by the fact that GGGI often operate through other fundings sources in similar policy space, reducing clarity about LECRD's distinct role. The blurred distinction between LECRD and other GGGI-supported initiatives is both a strength and a risk. On one hand, overlapping engagement allows GGGI to identify synergies and coordinate across funding streams. As one stakeholder noted:

> *"there's so much overlap in lots of the work he's doing",* [but this overlap is] *"great … because he's been able to get synergies … to increase the impact of the project".*

On the other hand, blurred boundaries can complicate LECRD's visibility regarding New Zealand's and Ireland's funding/support and LECRD's specific role within crowded climate landscapes.

Overall, external complementarity is strongest where LECRD activities are firmly embedded in national systems, actively coordinated with development partners and explicitly linked to sequenced financing or regulatory implementation. Where implementation pathways are weak and programme identity is diffuse, there is a risk that activities are not clearly recognised as part of a coherent programme. This can contribute to duplication of effort, missed opportunities for synergy with other initiatives, and more fragmented or isolated delivery. A clearer and more consistently articulated programme identity would help position LECRD as a coordinated intervention that supports alignment and strengthens collective impact across the climate portfolio.

4.1.2 Country ownership and alignment (KRQ 4.1)

Key findings:

- Country ownership is a substantive and consistently reported strength of LECRD, reinforced by embedded delivery and MFAT's flexible, demand-responsive engagement.
- Country ownership appears to be genuine but unevenly institutionalised, and remains vulnerable to capacity constraints, leadership turnover and political transition.

Country ownership is embedded in LECRD's design and delivery model and is strongly supported by stakeholder consultations. Across interviews, government representatives were able to clearly situate LECRD-supported activities within national policies, development frameworks and sector strategies. In Tonga, for example, GGGI's support to the Tonga Strategic Development Framework (TSDF3) and associated climate finance work was explicitly framed as strengthening national development planning rather than introducing an external agenda. As one senior official noted:

> *"The connection between what GGGI is doing and … our Tonga Strategic Development Framework for the next 10 years is very important. We have worked very closely and we are currently working very closely with GGGI".*

Similarly, in Solomon Islands, carbon trading reform was described as a government-driven initiative, with one stakeholder emphasising that *"the government pushed for this policy"*. In PNG, green finance reforms and the establishment of the Green Finance Centre were characterised as central bank-led, with MFAT and GGGI support embedded through formal steering committees and institutional structures. These examples support the idea that LECRD initiatives are generally anchored in domestic policy processes rather than externally imposed.

The embedded delivery model is central to this ownership dynamic. Placing technical advisers within ministries and working alongside government officials was widely regarded as strengthening trust, improving responsiveness and ensuring that outputs are developed within national systems. As one stakeholder reflected, the model of embedding advisers who understand the local context:

> *"Is really beneficial… it really helps to drive things forward and provide real-time support when it's needed".*

This proximity facilitates iterative co-design and ensures that outputs are developed within government systems rather than in parallel to them (see Section 4.2.2 for more detail).

MFAT's approach as a donor further reinforces ownership. Government partners consistently described MFAT as flexible and responsive to nationally defined priorities. In Fiji, flexible financing arrangements were described as giving ministries *"a lot of freedom to actually identify the climate change projects that we want to do,"* rather than prescribing specific actions. This flexibility was seen as strengthening alignment and trust and reinforces the finding that LECRD support responds to government agendas. However, the evidence also points to some vulnerabilities in ownership.

1. Capacity constraints can narrow the scope of meaningful co-design. In contexts where ministries have limited staff or technical expertise, drafting, coordination and technical functions may shift toward GGGI advisers. While this does not negate ownership, it may reduce the depth of government-led design and increase dependence on embedded advisers. This is clearly expressed by a GGGI officer who notes that:

"In terms of the government driving it … they don't have the capacity to work side by side. This is a challenge".

2. Champion dependency is a recurring theme. In several cases, momentum behind reforms was closely associated with committed individuals within key ministries/agencies. When these individuals transferred roles or exited government, progress slowed and activities required renewed advocacy. This suggests that ownership is sometimes anchored in individuals rather than fully institutionalised.
3. Political and administrative turnover can disrupt continuity. In Kiribati, for example, the administrative leave of the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Agricultural Development (MELAD) Secretary was noted as potentially affecting the relevance and momentum of Environment Fund work. Across interviews, stakeholders acknowledged that political transitions or ministerial changes can alter reform priorities, requiring revalidation of objectives and renewed relationship-building.

These vulnerabilities highlight a distinction between procedural ownership (consultation, endorsement and participation) and institutionalised ownership (formal mandates, budget allocations, regulatory embedding and cross-ministerial integration). Evidence of institutionalisation is emerging in several contexts. In Fiji, for instance, stakeholders reported that Fiji had secured budget for a principal carbon market officer.

Overall, LECRD demonstrates strong alignment with national priorities and supports genuine country ownership through embedded delivery and flexible donor engagement. Ownership is most robust where reforms are integrated into formal planning frameworks, institutional mandates and budget systems, and where cross-ministerial structures reduce dependence on key individuals.

4.2 Efficiency

This section assesses **KRQ 3**, the efficiency and fitness-for-purpose of the MFAT–GGGI delivery model in achieving LECRD outcomes in Pacific contexts. Efficiency is understood not only as timeliness, but as the relationship between inputs (funding, staffing, governance effort and transaction costs) and the quality, usability and durability of outputs and short-term outcomes.

The analysis examines how the defining characteristics of the delivery model - partner led, flexible and adaptive, embedded and collaborative - operate in practice across countries. It also assesses whether the embedded approach delivers distinctive value relative to other technical assistance modalities, and how internal systems and governance arrangements enable or constrain performance.

Efficiency judgements are based primarily on qualitative data and analysis rather than formal cost-effectiveness analysis or Value for Money analysis.

4.2.1 Fitness-for-purpose of the MFAT–GGGI delivery model (KRQ 3.1)

Key findings:

- The delivery model is broadly fit-for-purpose for upstream policy, regulatory and institutional reform in Pacific contexts.
- The defining characteristics of the model (partner-led, flexible and adaptive, embedded, and collaborative) are visible in practice across countries and generally operate as intended.
- Efficiency is strongest where institutional anchoring, leadership continuity, and governance clarity are present.
- Adaptive management is functioning but remains largely relational rather than systematised.

Overall fitness for upstream reform

Across interviews and documentary review, the MFAT–GGGI delivery model is consistently described as appropriate for upstream policy and institutional strengthening in small, capacity-constrained Pacific administrations. Stakeholders emphasised that upstream support requires sustained engagement rather than intermittent consultancy, and that the model is structured accordingly.

Importantly, upstream policy support, when successful, can represent an efficient form of intervention where relatively modest investments can catalyse larger downstream financing and coordinated government action. In PNG, for example, support to the Green Finance Centre established the institutional and governance architecture that subsequently attracted additional development partner engagement. As one PNG stakeholder points out:

"I think that's what a benefit of this project has been … going in where others aren't going and then opening a crack and getting people interested. So in PNG you know MFAT come in first and then … the French Development Agency were then really interested in it and then picked it up".

However, while there is qualitative evidence that upstream reforms have enabled follow-on activity, there is limited systematic documentation quantifying the cost-efficiency or value-for-money of these catalytic effects. The evidence base for efficiency therefore rests primarily on stakeholder perception and observed sequencing.

Partner-led delivery in practice

Across all countries consulted, LECRD activities were described as emerging from government-identified needs. Interviews confirm that project scoping typically begins with dialogue between GGGI country teams and ministries, followed by refinement with MFAT and other stakeholders. In Solomon Islands, the demand for support on developing a carbon trading policy was explicitly framed as Cabinet-directed, with one official noting that:

> *"We were asked by the cabinet to implement this … the government pushed for this policy."*

In PNG, the Green Finance Centre was described as central bank-led, with GGGI assisting in securing *"seed funding"* through LECRD and supporting institutional design rather than driving the agenda.

This reflects the intended partner-led characteristic of the model, as articulated in the programme Theory of Change. However, interviews indicate that partner leadership varies in depth and is mediated by institutional conditions, including:

4. **Institutional anchoring.** Where activities are anchored within ministries with recognised convening authority, endorsement processes are smoother and cross-ministry coordination is enhanced. In PNG, anchoring activities within the central bank was described as a *"gamechanger",* ensuring that work was perceived as being *"run not as an outsider, but as an insider"*.
5. **Counterpart continuity.** Leadership turnover can slow decision-making and require revalidation of priorities. In Kiribati, for example, stakeholders noted that progress slowed after the landscape was changed by the departure of *"a GGGI champion".* As a result, significant effort was required to explain and rationalise ongoing work.
6. **Political economy dynamics.** In sectors with overlapping mandates or contested authority, traction depends on negotiation and relationship management. The model provides space for engagement but does not eliminate coordination challenges.

Flexibility and adaptive management

Flexibility is widely regarded by stakeholders as a comparative strength of the delivery model. Government partners repeatedly contrasted MFAT's approach with more rigid donor programming cycles. As one government partner observed:

> *"Once they [other donors] already have their work programme in place, it's very hard to change, or to expand some of the scope … but with MFAT, we realised that it's … quite flexible".*

Another emphasised flexibility allows support to be inserted *"at the right time"* when policy windows or technical gaps emerge.

Examples identified during interviews include:

- Adjustments to sequencing of consultations where participation was low (Solomon Isalnds, Kiribati).
- Recalibration of engagement following government transitions (Fiji, Tonga).
- Refinement of scope in response to changes (Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji).
- Reallocation of attention across countries depending on momentum (Kiribati, Solomon Islands).

These examples demonstrate that adaptive management is occurring in practice and this is contributing to enhanced efficiency in volatile environments. However, adaptive processes are largely relational and informal. Decisions to pivot, extend, drop or re-sequence activities are typically negotiated between Wellington and GGGI country teams based on dialogue and judgement rather than predefined criteria. There is limited documentation of formal pause-and-review points, predefined performance thresholds linked to continuation or exit decisions, or explicit use of monitoring data to trigger resourcing decisions.

While this iterative approach can support responsiveness and reduce bureaucratic delay, it may also reduce transparency and predictability in how strategic decisions are made. In particular, decisions related to scaling activities up or down, reallocating resources across projects, or responding to shifts in performance or context are often managed through largely informal processes. Given the exposure of activities to external and political economy factors, this can make it difficult to clearly articulate the basis on which programme resources and effort are prioritised.

Greater clarity around adaptive decision-making processes, including defined reflection points, explicit criteria, and predefined milestones linked to decision triggers, could strengthen transparency and consistency. For example, a more deliberate "pilot and scale" approach, where progress against agreed milestones informs decisions on continuation, expansion, adaptation or exit, could help ensure that resource allocation decisions are more

systematic and evidence-based, while still preserving the flexibility that stakeholders value. Adaptive management practices are discussed further in Section 4.3.3.

Collaborative delivery and governance

Formal collaboration is promoted through structured consultation platforms. In all countries, interviewees identified platforms such as steering committees and technical working groups as the basis for broad-based collaboration. In Solomon Islands, for example, carbon trading policy development was progressed through a mandated steering committee and technical working groups that clarified institutional roles and provided structured review pathways. In PNG, green finance governance arrangements involved regular engagement across treasury, the central bank and other ministries.

These structures contribute to efficiency by:

- Clarifying institutional responsibilities.
- Reducing duplication of advisory inputs.
- Providing predictable endorsement pathways.

However, institutionalisation of these structures is mixed. In some contexts, committee participation has been inconsistent, and membership has been contested where sectoral mandates overlap. Workshop fatigue and consultation overload were also mentioned as risks in environments with multiple donor-supported initiatives.

Internal systems and activity management

While the delivery model is structurally sound, efficiency is shaped by internal systems and activity management arrangements. Several recurring issues emerged across interviews that affect how efficiently inputs are converted into outputs.

- **Recruitment and staffing** processes have, in some contexts, constrained mobilisation. Delays in finalising agreements, clarifying scope of work or agreeing on terms of references slowed deployment of dedicated project staff. Interviews consistently observed that when dedicated in-country staff were already in place, progress was smoother and outputs were delivered more predictable. Conversely, in contexts experiencing staffing gaps and recruitment challenges, momentum was slowed and transaction costs increased.
- **Programme management attention** has also affected efficiency. During periods of vacancy or transition, senior programme personnel have taken on additional project management responsibilities. While this has ensured continued delivery, it constrains capacity for higher-level oversight, cross-country learning and strategic coordination.
- **Reporting requirements** have evolved over time and present a further efficiency trade-off. Phase 1 reporting was perceived as insufficiently contextualised and weak on articulating outcomes. In response, Phase 2 reporting has become more detailed and structured. However, several interviewees described reports as comprehensive but sometimes burdensome and heavy on detail. Striking the right balance between accountability, learning and proportionality remains an ongoing management consideration.

In summary, at the programme level, bundling advisory support under a single partnership arrangement reduces transaction costs for MFAT relative to managing multiple bilateral contracts. This consolidation supports administrative efficiency and consistency of technical approach. However, country-level projects continue to operate largely independently, and cross-country exchange remains episodic rather than systematically structured. As a result, opportunities to generate efficiency gains through shared knowledge management, replication of tools or standardised approaches may not be fully realised.

4.2.2 Value-add of GGGI's embedded approach (KRQ 3.2)

Key findings:

- GGGI's embedded approach delivers distinctive value relative to fly-in fly-out or remote technical assistance models.
- The strongest areas of value-add are reduced transaction costs, strengthened institutional trust, and enhanced convening capacity.
- Embedding contributes to institutional continuity and incremental capacity development, though sustainability depends on broader system conditions.
- The model is resource-intensive and sensitive to staffing continuity, role clarity and governance arrangements.

Distinctiveness relative to alternative modalities

When asked about the LECRD model, interviewees consistently highlighted the value of the embedded approach and contrasted this with more conventional technical assistance models. Whereas short-term technical assistance

was described as intermittent and transactional, embedding was perceived as sustained, relational and institutionally integrated. In Tonga, one interviewee stated explicitly:

> *"I do think the model of GGGI embedding staff within government for long periods of time is important. I don't think the fly-in, fly-out model works".*

Similar sentiments were expressed in PNG and Vanuatu, where officials noted that advisers stationed in-country are better able to:

> *"Familiarise themselves with the local community and government [which] helps with the delivery".*

This distinction is central to the perceived value-add. The embedded model alters the operating conditions of delivery by positioning advisers within the institutional system rather than alongside it. While there is limited quantitative comparison of cost-effectiveness across modalities, stakeholder testimony consistently indicates that embedding generates a depth of institutional traction that short-term consultancy would struggle to achieve.

However, as it is resource-intensive and dependent on staffing continuity, the embedded approach is not without trade-offs. Recruitment delays or vacancies can slow delivery and divert programme management attention. Embedding also does not eliminate political economy constraints such as contested mandates and incentives, leadership turnover and institutional fragility.

Reduced transaction costs and procedural friction

A primary efficiency gain associated with embedding is reduction in transaction costs. In small Pacific administrations, coordination can be slow due to limited staff capacity and procedural bottlenecks. Embedded advisers reduce the need for repeated briefings, external correspondence and formal clearance processes that typically accompany external consultants.

In PNG, embedding within the central bank was described as a "*gamechanger*" because the programme was perceived as internally driven rather than externally imposed. In Fiji, stakeholders noted that where dedicated staff were in place, outputs were reviewed, signed off and progressed efficiently. This was contrasted to projects without embedded staff which experienced substantial delays. These examples indicate that embedding reduces procedural friction, thereby improving the efficiency with which inputs are converted into usable outputs.

The efficiency of the model has also been significantly enabled by GGGI's broader programme footprint in the region. In several countries, LECRD has been able to draw on in-country staff funded through other GGGI programmes and projects, reducing the need for dedicated LECRD-funded positions. Given the relatively small size of individual LECRD projects, it may not have been feasible to fund full-time embedded staff within country budgets alone. Instead, LECRD has benefitted from shared resourcing arrangements, in some cases at no direct cost to the programme. For example, Climate Finance Officers in Kiribati and Solomon Islands provided substantial support to LECRD activities while funded under other initiatives. This has allowed the programme to maintain an embedded presence and continuity of engagement that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve within available resources. Conversely, this also indicates that the effectiveness of the embedded model is partly contingent on the presence of complementary programmes and staffing structures in-country.

However, uncertainty around accountability and reporting arrangements emerged as a point of tension and a potential impediment to efficiency. In Fiji, ministry officials sought to align the reporting of embedded staff (working on a non-LECRD project) more closely with internal timelines and management structures in order to strengthen accountability. As one official noted,

> *"They [Ministry leadership] are quite strict on reporting lines and the work being done by embedded officers. Because we need to have more accountability. But sometimes we have seen that a piece of work has been stretched over more months than required"*.

In response, the ministry proposed establishing dual reporting lines, whereby embedded staff would continue to report contractually to GGGI while also reporting functionally to ministry leadership in line with internal work planning and performance expectations. However, this arrangement was subsequently deemed unfeasible by GGGI's legal team. As the same interviewee explained:

> *"GGGI's legal team has come back to us saying that they cannot put in the dual reporting lines".*

GGGI's position reflects broader institutional, legal and operational considerations, including maintaining its neutrality as an embedded technical partner, ensuring compliance with staff regulations and contractual obligations, and avoiding administrative complexity that could affect delivery efficiency and staff wellbeing. The issue therefore remains unresolved and illustrates the importance of clearly defined accountability arrangements for embedded staff.

Strengthened trust, ownership and durability

Beyond procedural efficiency, embedding appears to strengthen relational trust and institutional ownership in ways that are difficult to replicate through short-term or remote technical assistance. Across interviews, government

counterparts often described GGGI not as an external contractor delivering a discrete assignment, but as a technical partner working alongside ministries over time. This distinction was frequently framed in contrast to conventional consultancy models. As one interviewee explained:

> *"If you look at the other consultants, they come as an external partner, do their job and leave. This can create a lack of trust between the government and the consultant".*

The implication is that continuity of presence and day-to-day engagement helps shift the relationship from transactional service delivery to institutional partnership.

This has efficiency implications. Where advisers are perceived as part of the team, agencies are more willing to share internal constraints, engage candidly in problem-solving, and co-produce outputs. This increases the likelihood that policies and strategies are endorsed and operationalised rather than remaining consultant-authored documents.

However, trust and ownership are not automatic. Interviewees emphasised that relational competence is critical, with several stakeholders highlighting the importance of advisers who *"listen carefully and work with the stakeholders".* One official described a situation in which he felt that GGGI had advanced an initiative that did not align with current ministry priorities. As he recounted,

> *"They went to a donor, not MFAT actually, some other donor, saying that we are interested in this, and when they reached out to us, I said 'no … we don't see the need to continue or do a second phase at this stage. I would rather invest into this other programme'".*

This illustrates that trust can become strained when embedded advisers are perceived as pursuing parallel agendas or not fully aligned with partner decisions.

Capacity development and longer-term efficiency

Embedding also enhances efficiency by strengthening institutional capability. Through "learning by doing," ministry staff build skills while delivering outputs. As one official described, it is:

> *"Killing two birds with one stone — you're doing the work, while the staff around you is learning from how you're doing those jobs".*

This accompaniment-based approach allows capacity building to occur concurrently with technical delivery, reducing future reliance on fully external expertise.

Two related dynamics emerge from stakeholder descriptions of capacity support provided through LECRD: capacity building and capacity supplementation. Capacity building occurs where embedded advisers support the development of systems, procedures and skills that remain within institutions beyond the immediate activity. Capacity supplementation occurs where embedded staff temporarily fill expertise or capacity gaps to prevent reform processes from stalling. While supplementation improves short-term efficiency, its long-term value depends on whether knowledge is also transferred and internalised. Embedding is most efficient where supplementation evolves into durable capacity building rather than remaining dependent on continued external presence.

4.3 Effectiveness

This section assesses **KRQ 1** and **KRQ 2**. It explores the extent to which LECRD Phases 1 and 2 have contributed to achieving their intended outcomes and demonstrated adaptive learning over time. Effectiveness is assessed against the Phase 2 MEL framework[2], which clarifies four interrelated objectives:

1. Strengthened evidence-informed and participatory decision-making.
2. Enhanced government capacity to develop and implement LECRD plans.
3. Improved collaboration with sectoral stakeholders to enable implementation.
4. Systematic integration of GESI and resilience considerations.

Given LECRD's upstream and policy-oriented positioning, the analysis distinguishes between:

- Delivery of outputs (strategies, frameworks, regulatory instruments, technical studies).
- Evidence of uptake and institutionalisation.
- Early signs of implementation and financing mobilisation.

[2] While Phase 1 data collection and reporting were not systematically structured around these outcomes or their associated indicators, the Review has retrospectively mapped Phase 1 activities, outputs, and documented effects against the Phase 2 objectives. This enables a consistent analytical frame across both phases. A full mapping of the Phase 1 Short-Term Outcomes against the Phase 2 objectives is provided in Annex 4.

Across both KRQs, findings are framed in terms of contribution rather than attribution, recognising the long-term and multi-actor nature of policy reform and climate investment processes.

4.3.1 Progress toward outcomes (KRQ 1.1)

Key findings:

- LECRD has made its clearest contribution at the output and early short-term outcome level, establishing upstream enabling foundations (policies, strategies, frameworks, technical products) that are necessary precursors to downstream investment and implementation.
- In a smaller number of cases, these foundations have begun to progress beyond output delivery to early institutionalisation, formal adoption, or catalytic follow-on effects, most clearly in PNG and, to a lesser extent, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati and Vanuatu.
- Across the portfolio, evidence of sustained implementation, system-level change and long-term results remains limited or still emerging, reflecting both the upstream nature of the programme and weaknesses in Phase 1 outcome tracking.
- Phase 2 has improved the articulation of intended results and strengthened the MEL architecture, but in most countries, it is still too early to observe medium-term outcome change, particularly where activities remain in design, validation or early implementation stages.

This section assesses progress toward LECRD's intended short-term outcomes across both phases. Because Phase 1 and Phase 2 use different results architectures, the assessment applies the Phase 2 MEL framework as the principal analytical lens and retrospectively maps Phase 1 activities and results against those four objectives. This provides a more consistent basis for judging progress across the full period while recognising that Phase 1 reporting was not originally structured against the current indicators or outcome statements. Annex 4 presents the conceptual mapping between Phase 1 short-term outcomes and the Phase 2 objectives.

Overall, the evidence indicates that LECRD has contributed most clearly to the front end of reform processes. Across both phases, the programme has supported governments to generate technical evidence, develop policy and planning instruments, test institutional options, and engage relevant stakeholders around emerging climate and development priorities. This is consistent with the programme's design and with the types of constraints it is intended to address. As a result, progress is most visible in strengthened enabling conditions and policy development processes. Evidence of downstream implementation, financing mobilisation, or wider system change is more limited, and in several cases remains prospective as activities supported under Phase 2 were still underway at the time of the latest progress report (August 2025).

Objective 1: Strengthened evidence-informed decision-making

Progress under the first objective is one of the strongest features of the portfolio. Across both phases, LECRD has generated a substantial body of analytical work, technical studies, policy advice and consultative processes intended to improve the quality of government decision-making. These outputs have helped clarify policy options, address evidence gaps and, in several cases, support national discussion on issues that were previously underdeveloped or technically complex.

Phase 1 provides multiple examples. In Fiji, LECRD supported analytical work on fossil fuel subsidy reform, vehicle standards, building code sustainability provisions, greenhouse gas data systems, and voluntary emissions reporting mechanisms. In Kiribati, it supported the five-year action framework for implementation of the Kiribati Agriculture Strategy and the development of sustainable procurement guidance and checklists. In Vanuatu, LECRD supported the Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy and policy briefs on fuel and vehicle standards. In Tonga, TERMPlus provided a consolidated roadmap for energy planning.

Phase 2 continues this pattern. Current activities remain heavily oriented toward evidence generation and decision support, including bamboo research in Fiji, enabling-environment and design work for the Kiribati Environment Fund, readiness assessment and governance analysis for Solomon Islands carbon trading, and climate finance strategy work in Tonga. These activities are contributing to stronger policy dialogue and more clearly framed reform options.

However, there is stronger evidence on the generation and use of analytical inputs during policy development than on consistent translation into implemented reform. Some analytical outputs have informed formal decisions or next-stage work, but others remain only partially adopted, not yet operationalised, or awaiting follow-through. The programme has therefore strengthened the conditions for evidence-informed decision-making more clearly than it has demonstrated sustained evidence-informed implementation.

Objective 2: Enhanced government capacity to develop and implement LECRD plans

LECRD has made a credible contribution to strengthening government capacity and capability, although the depth and durability of this contribution varies across countries. The strongest evidence relates to practical capability enhancement through embedded advisory support, joint drafting, tailored training, and accompaniment in technically specialised policy areas. This is consistent with the programme's delivery model, which combines technical inputs with ongoing engagement rather than relying solely on short-term consultancy.

The clearest example remains Papua New Guinea. Phase 1 support contributed to development and launch of the Inclusive Green Finance Policy, establishment of a green taxonomy, agreements with multiple financial institutions, and the creation of the Green Finance Centre within the Bank of PNG. These achievements indicate not only the production of policy outputs, but also the creation of an institutional platform through which green finance capability could potentially be embedded and further developed. However, it is worth noting that continuation and downstream effects are dependent on follow-on support from AFD and broader institutional factors, rather than LECRD alone.

Other examples are more modest but still meaningful. In Fiji, support to the Fiji Bureau of Statistics and work on voluntary emissions reporting helped strengthen technical understanding of greenhouse gas data systems and reporting requirements. In Kiribati, green procurement training and the agriculture action planning process appear to have strengthened practical knowledge among government and other stakeholders. In Tonga, the iterative support around TERMPlus, electric vehicle analysis, and climate finance planning has contributed to planning capability in specialised areas.

However, evidence of durable institutionalisation is less consistent. Across the portfolio, the Review found stronger evidence of immediate skills transfer and increased familiarity with technical issues than of sustained institutional capability embedded in procedures, mandates, and resourcing. High turnover, limited absorptive capacity, and uneven continuity within partner institutions have constrained the extent to which capability gains can be retained and accumulated over time. The most defensible conclusion is therefore that LECRD has strengthened planning and technical capacity during programme implementation, but evidence that these gains have translated into sustained institutional capability is more limited.

Objective 3: Improved collaboration with sectoral stakeholders

Progress under the third objective is moderate but uneven. Multi-stakeholder engagement is a common feature across the portfolio, and there is credible evidence that LECRD has broadened participation in policy development and validation processes. Across activities, this has included engagement with line ministries, regulators, financial institutions, utilities, academia, civil society, and private sector actors. In several cases, this has improved the relevance and legitimacy of technical outputs and helped connect government reform processes with actors likely to influence implementation.

Again, PNG provides a strong example of collaboration extending beyond consultation into more operational forms of partnership. The Green Finance Centre and related policy work engaged multiple financial institutions, several of which signed agreements and began developing green loan products aligned to the inclusive green taxonomy This suggests early movement beyond consultation toward collaborative implementation mechanisms within the financial sector.

Fiji's Phase 2 bamboo initiative also points toward a potentially stronger model of cross-sector engagement. The work has involved ministries, Fiji National University, industry actors and other stakeholders in research, standards development, and awareness-building around bamboo as a possible low-carbon construction material. However, much of this work was still focussed on research, feasibility and enabling-stage activities during the Review period.

Elsewhere, collaboration has more often remained at the level of consultation, awareness-raising, or validation rather than sustained implementation partnership. This is still important, particularly in upstream reform processes, but the evidence that such engagement has consistently translated into joint delivery, investment mobilisation, or durable cross-sectoral mechanisms remains limited outside a smaller number of stronger cases. Overall, LECRD has improved the breadth of policy dialogue with sectoral stakeholders while evidence that this has translated into established implementation partnerships with demonstrable follow-through is more limited.

Objective 4: Integration of GESI and resilience

Progress under the fourth objective is the weakest and least well evidenced at an outcome level. There is clear evidence that Phase 2 has made GESI more visible in the programme architecture, including in project documentation, consultations and reporting. There are also examples of broader stakeholder representation and project-level Gender or GEDSI Action Plans have been developed for five countries.

However, across the portfolio, evidence remains much stronger on process than on substantive influence. In most cases, the Review found clearer evidence of who was consulted than of how gender, social inclusion, or resilience analysis materially shaped the design of reforms, institutional arrangements, or implementation priorities. This

partly reflects the sequencing of Phase 2 activities, whereby some projects remain in the consultation stage, while in others GESI analysis and planning were introduced only after activities had already been broadly defined.

For this reason, the Review finds that progress under this objective is partial and improving but still limited in depth. This is examined in more detail under Section 4.3.5 (KRQ 2).

Summary of progress across the results chain

Table 3 below summarises where evidence is strongest across the programme results chain. It distinguishes between relatively well-documented activity and output delivery, and the more limited evidence currently available on uptake, use and longer-term outcomes. Further detail on progress towards outcomes by country and objectives can be found in Annex 4: Outcome summary by country and objective.

Table 3: Summary of progress by result level

Results level	Programme intent	Summary of progress	Evidence rating	Implications for programme performance
Activities	Technical assistance, research, consultation, training, policy drafting and advisory support	Across both phases, LECRD has implemented a substantial portfolio of upstream advisory activities across participating countries. Phase 1 activity delivery is well documented in programme closure and completion reports. Phase 2 activities are also clearly defined, although several remained underway at the time of the Review (August 2025).	Strong – extensive activity implementation	The programme has been effective in delivering planned advisory activities and maintaining engagement across countries. Implementation capacity and operational delivery have generally not been major constraints.
Outputs	Studies, policies, roadmaps, guidelines, training packages, institutional concepts and draft reforms	Phase 1 generated a substantial body of outputs, including Fiji's Sustainability Chapter and GHG-related tools, Kiribati's agriculture action framework and green procurement addenda, PNG's Inclusive Green Finance Policy and Green Finance Centre, TERMPlus in Tonga, and Vanuatu's LT-LEDS and standards policy briefs. Phase 2 has also produced or is developing a range of technical outputs, though several were still in progress during the Review period.	Strong – outputs are clearly documented	LECRD has been successful in producing technical and policy outputs that address key enabling constraints. However, outputs alone do not guarantee implementation, and their influence depends on uptake by partner institutions.
Immediate Outcomes	Improved evidence base, increased stakeholder knowledge, stronger planning capability and broader participation in policy design	There is credible evidence across both phases of improved availability of policy-relevant evidence, strengthened policy dialogue, and indications of increased technical understanding among participating stakeholders. This is visible in areas such as Fiji's emissions data work, Kiribati's green procurement training, PNG's green finance engagement, Tonga's planning support, and early awareness-building in Solomon Islands.	Moderate – improvements in knowledge and policy dialogue still emerging	LECRD has contributed to stronger evidence-informed policy processes and improved technical understanding among government counterparts. However, evidence that these improvements are consistently translating into sustained institutional capability remains uneven.
Intermediate Outcomes	Adoption, use or early operationalisation of policies, plans, financing mechanisms and institutional reforms	A smaller number of outputs progressed to formal approval or early operationalisation, including approval of Kiribati's agriculture framework, adoption of green procurement addenda, launch of PNG's Inclusive Green Finance Policy and Green Finance Centre, approval of TERMPlus, and endorsement of Vanuatu's LT-LEDS and standards policy briefs. However, evidence of sustained use and implementation remains uneven across countries.	Limited – some policy uptake, but implementation is uneven	Where outputs have connected with institutional mandates or financing mechanisms, progress toward implementation is visible. However, many outputs remain at planning or policy stage, and further institutional and financial support is often required for implementation, which is beyond the programme scope.
Long-term Outcomes	Stronger implementation pathways, financing mobilisation, and movement toward low-emission, climate-resilient development	Longer-term outcomes remain largely prospective. In a few cases, particularly PNG, there are plausible pathways toward wider system effects, but these were not systematically tracked in Phase 1 and are still emerging in Phase 2.	Early stage – long-term outcomes not yet measurable	The programme's upstream orientation means that longer-term impacts depend on subsequent implementation and investment processes that extend beyond the timeframe of the Review. Current evidence therefore primarily reflects enabling foundations rather than realised system-level change.

Overall summary of progress toward outcomes

Taken together, the evidence indicates that LECRD has made credible progress toward its intended short-term outcomes, but that progress is uneven across the four objectives and across countries. Its strongest contributions have been in generating relevant evidence, supporting upstream planning and reform processes, strengthening immediate technical capability, and broadening engagement around emerging policy issues. In a smaller number of cases, these contributions have progressed further into institutional anchoring, formal adoption, or catalytic follow-on effects.

The clearest cumulative progress is visible where LECRD outputs have connected with wider institutional or financing processes. Papua New Guinea is the strongest example, while Tonga and Kiribati also show meaningful progress in planning and policy terms. Vanuatu's Phase 1 outputs were significant but have yet to result in consistent downstream operationalisation. Fiji shows credible progress in both phases, though much of the Phase 2 bamboo work remains at an early enabling stage. Solomon Islands has made a promising start, but it is too early to draw stronger conclusions.

Overall, LECRD can most confidently be assessed as having strengthened enabling conditions for future climate action rather than having already delivered widespread implementation or system-level change. This reflects both the programme's upstream design and the long time horizons typically associated with policy and institutional reform. It also reflects weaknesses in outcome tracking, particularly in Phase 1.

4.3.2 Enablers and constraints (KRQ 1.2)

Key findings:

- Progress is strongest where reforms are anchored in institutions with clear mandates, political backing and convening authority (e.g. central banks, planning ministries), and where embedded advisers operate within trusted relationships.
- The most persistent constraints are structural: limited absorptive capacity, leadership turnover, contested mandates and weak enforcement or financing pathways.
- Political economy dynamics materially shape whether policies move from adoption to implementation.
- Data, MEL and implementation financing gaps continue to limit verification of medium-term outcome change.

Institutional anchoring, political backing and the role of champions

A consistent enabling factor across cases considered to be performing well is strong institutional anchoring combined with visible political commitment. However, the evidence suggests that institutional anchoring alone is insufficient, with progress most durable when reforms are championed by identifiable individuals with authority and convening power. Conversely, the absence or turnover of such champions is a significant barrier to translating policy outputs into implementation.

In Papua New Guinea, the Inclusive Green Finance Policy and GFC were anchored within the Bank of PNG. This provided not only technical credibility and regulatory authority, but also high-level institutional leadership. Central bank engagement ensured that green finance was framed not as an environmental add-on, but as a financial stability and macroeconomic issue. Stakeholders emphasised that central bank ownership was decisive in catalysing follow-on financing. The GFC's institutional positioning within a powerful, recognised entity enabled reforms to move beyond strategy to mobilise external support.

Tonga's experience with TERMPlus illustrates both the importance of high-level endorsement and the risks when reforms lack an active champion. TERMPlus received Cabinet approval and was formally positioned as the overarching energy roadmap. This provided initial legitimacy and alignment with national planning frameworks. However, interviews suggest that approval did not translate into sustained leadership. Energy sector coordination has remained fragmented, with the Energy Advisory Committee meeting infrequently and investment priorities not consistently aligned. Stakeholders described a "*vacuum*" in which TERMPlus exists as a document but lacks a driving force to convene actors, arbitrate competing interests, and maintain momentum.

One stakeholder described the situation as the roadmap being *"on paper without a champion to drive it",* highlighting how donor coordination and investment sequencing become incoherent in the absence of a clear sector lead. In this context, political instability, board turnover within the state-owned utility, and shifting ministerial priorities have compounded the problem. The result is not outright rejection of TERMPlus, but drift, where investment decisions remain contested, donors engage bilaterally rather than through a coordinated platform, and implementation is limited.

Kiribati's Environment Fund initiative further reinforces the importance of champions and consistent leadership. Progress has been slowed by the absence of an active cross-ministerial steering structure and by limited

engagement from senior officials. Leadership turnover within MELAD required repeated re-briefings and re-validation of work, stalling momentum. Operational staff reported difficulty securing timely approvals and convening decision-makers. In this case, there is no clear institutional home with sufficient authority to drive the reform across ministries, and no sustained senior-level champion advocating for the initiative. The result is protracted consultation cycles and limited ownership beyond the focal ministry.

Across these cases, it is clear that:

- Where reforms are anchored in institutions with regulatory or fiscal authority and backed by senior champions (e.g., PNG Central Bank), progress moves from policy formulation toward institutionalisation and financing mobilisation.
- Where reforms lack an empowered institutional home or lose a champion (e.g., TERMPlus in Tonga; Environment Fund in Kiribati), progress towards outcomes is at risk.

Champion dependency, however, also presents risks. In several contexts, progress has been closely associated with individual leaders. However, when champions leave, reforms may require re-socialisation, re-justification, and renewed relationship-building. This underscores a structural tension within the embedded model: it can successfully cultivate champions and leverage political windows, but without institutionalisation mechanisms (formal mandates, steering committees, regulatory embedding, budget allocations), reforms remain vulnerable to political change.

Absorptive capacity, staff turnover and political economy dynamics

Limited absorptive capacity is a consistent structural constraint across participating countries. Small administrations operate with thin staffing, high workloads and limited specialist expertise, meaning that policy reform competes with immediate operational priorities. The evidence indicates that even where outputs are delivered on time and endorsed, progress toward implementation is often slowed by limited capacity and reliance on a small number of officials. Staff turnover compounds this constraint.

The findings further suggest that some of the capacity building delivered in Phase 1 was individual rather than institutional. Workshops and technical trainings strengthened knowledge among participants, but in high-turnover environments these gains are not always retained within the system. Stakeholders questioned the extent to which training translated into sustained changes in procedures or decision-making routines.

Documentation practices also appear uneven. While formal outputs (strategies, reports, policy documents) are generally well recorded, less attention has been given to documenting anticipated implementation pathways, stakeholder agreements, risk assessments and sequencing assumptions. In contexts of frequent leadership change, the absence of concise handover documentation increases the likelihood that reforms lose traction or require partial redesign.

Underlying these capacity constraints are political economy dynamics that materially shape reform trajectories. Interviews point to inter-ministerial competition, territorial behaviour, donor fragmentation and shifting political priorities as recurring features. In some contexts, limited cross-agency ownership or competing mandates slowed progress. In others, political transitions altered reform momentum or required recalibration. These dynamics suggest that technical quality alone is insufficient to secure implementation, with sustained progress depending on navigating institutional incentives, power relationships and political stability.

Overall, the evidence indicates that absorptive capacity constraints, staff turnover and political economy dynamics are not peripheral risks but central determinants of whether upstream reforms progress beyond policy formulation toward institutionalisation and implementation.

Implementation pathways and financing constraints

A recurring theme across Phase 1 and early Phase 2 is the central programme assumption that upstream enabling work will catalyse downstream investment and implementation, even where that downstream activity is not directly financed under LECRD. This assumption is explicit in the Phase 2 Programme Design, which positions LECRD as strengthening long-term planning, regulatory frameworks and investment pipelines as a precursor to climate finance mobilisation and implementation. It is also consistent with Phase 1's design logic, which focused on structural and policy barriers rather than direct capital investment. However, evidence suggests that whether this assumption holds depends heavily on conditions beyond the programme's control.

Both documentary evidence and interviews indicate that assumptions about follow on actions and engagement were pathways often implicit rather than explicitly mapped and documented. Indeed, interview data suggests that in several countries, stakeholders were uncertain about what successful implementation would look like beyond policy endorsement. References to "operationalisation" were common, but concrete sequencing steps (e.g. regulatory enactment, procurement reform, budget tagging, pipeline development) were not always clearly articulated or widely understood.

This does not invalidate the upstream approach, but it exposes its conditional nature. Examples include:

- Fiji's indicative carbon budget, which set strategic direction but required integration into national budget processes and subsequent financing decisions to drive sectoral shifts.
- Tonga's TERMPlus, which achieved Cabinet endorsement but has faced questions regarding investment sequencing and financing clarity, with some stakeholders expressing concern that elements risk stalling without clear funding streams.
- Vanuatu's fuel and vehicle standards, where moving from policy briefs to enforceable regulations required further legal drafting, compliance systems and administrative resourcing.

When the enabling logic works, it is efficient and catalytic, with relatively modest advisory inputs unlocking larger flows of climate finance and institutional reform. However, when financing does not follow, reforms risk remaining aspirational.

In summary, LECRD's core assumption, that upstream enabling work can catalyse downstream climate action, is conceptually sound and supported in selected cases. However, its realisation is contingent on the clarity with which implementation pathways are articulated and pursued as well as contextual conditions outside the control of the programme.

4.3.3 Adaptive management (KRQ 1.3)

Key findings:

- LECRD has demonstrated consistent operational adaptability across both phases, including scope revisions, resource reallocations, sequencing adjustments and modified engagement approaches in response to political and institutional changes and external shocks.
- Adaptive management is primarily relational and judgement-based, enabled by embedded delivery and close MFAT–GGGI dialogue, rather than triggered by predefined performance thresholds or formal decision rules.
- In several cases, adaptive responses preserved relevance and delivery momentum; however, systematic evidence linking adaptive decisions to improved outcome-level impact remains limited due to monitoring and attribution constraints.

Adaptability in changing contexts

As already discussed, across both phases LECRD has operated in volatile policy environments characterised by government transitions, staff turnover, natural disasters, COVID-19 restrictions and recruitment constraints. The embedded, multi-year design has enabled iterative adjustments without requiring wholesale redesign.

The Phase 1 Internal Review noted that the embedded model allowed projects to adapt to *"government changes, adverse weather, and the pandemic".* This continues in Phase 2, where multiple examples of sequencing shifts and scope recalibration in response to contextual constraints are evident. Key examples include:

- In Kiribati, prolonged delays in formal feedback on Environment Fund reports and difficulties establishing a cross-ministerial steering mechanism led to a shift in engagement strategy. Rather than relying solely on formal validation workshops, the approach was adjusted toward smaller thematic "mini workshops" and more frequent informal communication to better match government availability and decision-making rhythms. This illustrates adaptive management at the level of delivery modality.
- In Vanuatu, recruitment challenges for developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for fuel and vehicle standards significantly delayed progress. Rather than narrowing ambition, recruitment processes were extended and consultant packaging revised to secure suitable expertise. This preserved the integrity of intended outputs while accepting slower timelines.
- At the activity level, technical products have also been refined through iterative consultation. For example, in Tonga, analytical work on electric vehicles was adjusted to focus more directly on decision-relevant cost comparisons rather than broader modelling, strengthening its practical utility. In Solomon Islands, readiness assessment work for carbon trading was sequenced to prioritise institutional and governance mapping before drafting policy instruments, reflecting a pragmatic ordering of reform steps.

Portfolio-level flexibility

Adaptive management is also evident at portfolio level. During Phase 1, funds were reallocated from a discontinued Fiji battery regulation initiative to expanded support for Tonga's energy roadmap following shifts in national priorities and post-disaster needs. This reflected responsiveness to evolving government demand and risk context.

In Phase 2, divergence in country progress has been accommodated through flexible scheduling rather than enforcing strict deadlines. While Fiji and Solomon Islands progressed against outputs, PNG's project start has been delayed due to competing priorities at the Green Finance Centre. Rather than forcing premature activity, the

programme has deferred submission of the PNG PIN and has maintained engagement to secure eventual government ownership.

Such flexibility is structurally enabled by the programme-earmarked funding mechanism described in the Phase 2 design documentation. Projects can be approved on a rolling basis and adjusted in response to evolving national demand without the need to renegotiate a new contract framework.

Strategic adaptation: learning from Phase 1

Adaptive management is also evident at the strategic level in the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. The Internal Review identified weaknesses in results articulation, monitoring and reporting coherence, GESI and reporting. In response, MFAT and GGGI co-designed a strengthened Theory of Change, identified programme-level objectives, strengthened GESI integration (including recruiting a Pacific-based GESI resource and reinstating contextual and GESI reporting sections), and developed a more comprehensive MEL plan. This is discussed in more depth in section 4.3.4 below.

Overall, LECRD demonstrates credible and consistent adaptive management across multiple levels. The embedded model and flexible funding structure are key enabling conditions, allowing the programme to remain relevant in changing Pacific policy environments. However, adaptation remains predominantly relational and judgement-driven rather than systematically defined.

4.3.4 Uptake of Phase 1 lessons (KRQ 1.4)

Key findings:

- Phase 2 reflects deliberate efforts to strengthen results clarity, MEL systems and inclusion integration in response to Phase 1 learning, but these changes have only partially addressed the weaknesses identified in Phase 1.
- Persistent challenges remain in relation to outcome measurement, systematic evidence on implementation and benefits, and programme distinctiveness within a crowded technical assistance landscape.

Phase 1 concluded with an Internal Review and an Activity Completion Report, both of which included explicit recommendations to strengthen Phase 2 design and delivery. Table 4 below presents a structured comparison between the principal lessons and recommendations emerging from Phase 1 and the corresponding design and management responses incorporated into Phase 2. It then provides an assessment of the current status based on documentary evidence and stakeholder interviews.

Taken together, the evidence indicates that Phase 2 has responded credibly to the main design and management weaknesses identified in Phase 1, particularly through a stronger MEL architecture, clearer programme logic, improved reporting templates and more explicit GESI provisions. However, these changes should be understood as strengthening the programme's operating framework rather than fully resolving the underlying constraints. Outcome measurement, systematic implementation tracking, private sector engagement, and consistent institutional uptake remain uneven and continue to limit the extent to which Phase 1 lessons can be considered fully embedded in practice.

Table 4: Summary of responses to Phase 1 lessons/recommendations

Phase 1 lessons / recommendations	Phase 2 design response	Current status
1. Clarify objectives and strengthen MERL framework to better articulate outcomes and performance story.	Revised Theory of Change; identified programme-level objectives; strengthened indicators; comprehensive MEL Plan; revised reporting templates aligned to objectives.	**Substantially addressed at design level.** Results articulation, programme logic and reporting coherence have improved through the revised Theory of Change, MEL Plan and reporting templates. However, outcome-level data collection and performance measurement remain constrained by limited resources, uneven data availability and incomplete operationalisation of some MEL methods.
2. Reinstate contextual, risk and GESI information in progress reports.	Reporting templates revised to reintroduce contextual narrative, risk tracking and GESI sections; MEL integrated into quality assurance.	**Largely addressed structurally.** Reporting templates now provide for stronger contextual, risk and GESI reporting, and progress reports are more comprehensive than in Phase 1. However, the depth and consistency of reporting still varies, and improved reporting does not yet consistently translate into stronger evidence on outcomes or implementation progress.
3. Strengthen GESI integration from the design stage and ensure adequate resourcing, including Pacific-based expertise.	Systematic integration of GESI in Phase 2 PINs; recruitment of regional GESI specialist; strengthened gender analysis and monitoring of consultation inclusivity.	**Partially addressed.** Partially addressed. Phase 2 has introduced stronger GESI provisions through PIN requirements, improved analysis expectations, action plans, and dedicated specialist support. This has increased the visibility of GESI in programme systems and reporting compared to Phase 1. However, integration and implementation remain uneven across countries and projects, resourcing constraints persist, and evidence of substantive influence on project design, delivery and results, remains limited.
4. Broaden consultation beyond government to include non-government stakeholders in shaping plans.	Increased emphasis on stakeholder mapping, inclusion of private sector and civil society in consultations and governance mechanisms.	**Partially addressed.** Phase 2 places greater emphasis on stakeholder mapping and engagement beyond government, including private sector and civil society actors. There is evidence of broader participation in some initiatives, but the consistency and depth remain uneven.
5. Improve programme visibility and ensure MFAT support is clearly communicated.	Stronger articulation of MFAT and DFAI partnership in reporting and documentation; improved internal coherence of programme narrative.	**Partially addressed.** MFAT and DFAI's role is more clearly reflected in programme documentation and reporting, and the programme narrative is more coherent than in Phase 1. However, evidence suggests that programme-level visibility and distinctiveness remain uneven, particularly in relation to how LECRD is differentiated from other climate-related technical assistance mechanisms.
6. Include explicit implementation support, enforcement mechanisms and financing pathways to move beyond policy formulation.	Increased emphasis on implementation readiness, legal drafting, financing alignment (e.g. climate finance strategies), and institutional embedding.	**Substantially strengthened in design, but only partially realised in practice.** Phase 2 places greater emphasis on implementation readiness, legal and regulatory follow-through, financing alignment and institutional embedding. However, evidence of sustained institutional embedding and implementation remains uneven across countries and often depends on government decisions, absorptive capacity and follow-on support.
7. Strengthen evaluation and impact tracking, including baseline data and long-term monitoring.	Strengthened MEL Plan; clarified indicators; increased attention to outcome tracking and data collection systems.	**Partially addressed.** The MEL Plan provides a clearer basis for outcome tracking and data collection than Phase 1. However, baseline information, long-term tracking and consistent application of MEL methods remain incomplete, and the programme still has limited evidence on downstream implementation and impact, which in part reflects the programme stage and extent progress to date.

Phase 1 lessons / recommendations	Phase 2 design response	Current status
8. Enhance private sector engagement through incentives and public–private partnerships.	Greater engagement with financial institutions and investment actors; focus on green finance instruments and pipelines.	**Partially addressed.** Phase 2 includes stronger engagement with financial institutions and investment-oriented actors in selected areas, particularly green finance. However, private sector engagement remains uneven across the portfolio, and evidence of sustained changes in incentives, partnerships or uptake is still emerging. The Fiji bamboo initiative highlights a complementary pathway, whereby public sector-led enabling work is beginning to stimulate downstream interest from private sector and civil society actors, even in the absence of formal public–private partnerships.

4.3.5 Inclusive and resilient development (KRQ 2.1–2.2)

Key findings:

- Visibility and procedural integration of GESI have increased in Phase 2 relative to Phase 1, though implementation in practice remains uneven.
- GESI implementation is most evident at the process level, including structured engagement with women's groups; broader representation within coordination mechanisms (e.g. Technical Working Groups); and the development of project-level Gender/GESI Action Plans with defined objectives and disaggregated monitoring expectations.
- Application remains uneven across countries and activities. Integration is strongest in Fiji and Solomon Islands, where activities include more explicit inclusion design elements, while integration has been more limited or delayed in other contexts, including Vanuatu and PNG.

Application of GESI and resilience screening tools and guidance

Phase 2 reflects a clear strengthening of the visibility and procedural integration of GESI relative to Phase 1. The Phase 2 Programme Design Document explicitly commits to a structured two-track approach to gender equality and social inclusion, including gender assessments, project-level GESI Action Plans, application of gender and poverty markers, and integration of GESI into annual work planning and reporting. This responds directly to lessons from Phase 1, which found that inclusiveness was largely process-oriented and recommended stronger gender analysis and metrics in Phase 2.

In practice, available evidence indicates that GESI integration has become more visible in Phase 2, but its implementation in practice varies considerably across countries and activities. Integration is strongest where inclusion considerations are incorporated into consultation design, governance arrangements or project documentation.

In Phase 2, GESI integration is most visible through:

- Development of project-specific Gender/GESI Action Plans across countries (Fiji bamboo, Kiribati Environment Fund, Solomon Islands carbon trading, Tonga climate finance, Vanuatu vehicle emissions), which set out objectives on inclusive governance, participation and disaggregated monitoring.
- Structured consultations with women's organisations, youth networks and organisations of persons with disabilities, including targeted GESI consultations in Fiji's bamboo project and inclusive stakeholder engagement in Kiribati's Environment Fund design.
- Explicit integration of gender and inclusion considerations into carbon market readiness and governance processes in Solomon Islands, including Technical Working Group composition and disaggregated data collection and feedback.
- Formal inclusion commitments in project-level action plans, such as participation targets, disaggregated monitoring and inclusive outreach modalities in Vanuatu's vehicle emissions standards project.

Across the portfolio, inclusion is most consistently operationalised through consultation processes and stakeholder representation rather than through systemic changes to policy design or regulatory frameworks. For example, the Solomon Islands carbon trading process expanded participation beyond the Project Steering Committee to a 38-member Technical Working Group including civil society and representatives of marginalised groups. In Tonga, targeted workshops to validate the TSDF3 included specific sessions with representatives of women's, youth and disability organisations. These examples illustrate what some interviewees felt was a limitation in the extent to which the program can meaningfully integrate GESI issues due to its upstream and advisory nature. According to one GGGI representative:

> *"We recognise it, but I think the reality is we're really supporting some advisory outputs like, policy documents. So, we're at our entry point for improving the gender or GESI aspects".*

Resilience considerations are also reflected in some thematic design processes. Tonga's TSDF3 consultations incorporated priorities related to inclusive disaster preparedness, water security and women's economic resilience. The Kiribati Environment Fund design includes equity criteria within its assessment framework. However, resilience considerations appear to be incorporated indirectly through sectoral priorities rather than through the systematic application of resilience screening tools across all activities.

Timing, resourcing and approach to GESI integration

Despite these advances, systematic integration remains limited. Interview evidence suggests that GESI analysis was often undertaken after core project concepts had already been defined, in part reflecting delays in recruiting a regional GESI advisor and challenges in securing suitably qualified expertise. While GESI inputs were reviewed by

HQ-based specialists, the absence of dedicated regional capacity during early design stages meant that GESI considerations were not consistently embedded in initial activity selection.

This raises a broader question regarding the effectiveness of the current resourcing model. While the introduction of a Pacific-based GESI advisor represents a positive step, there is limited evidence to suggest that a single regional role is sufficient on its own to drive consistent, context-specific integration across multiple countries and sectors. GESI integration appears to have the most potential where it is supported by sustained engagement with country teams and government counterparts, rather than through intermittent or advisory inputs alone.

As a result of the sequencing and resourcing constraints, GESI Action Plans have at times functioned as supplementary instruments rather than shaping the fundamental design of activities. In several contexts, including activities in Vanuatu and PNG, integration has been more limited or occurred later in the implementation cycle. If a more transformative approach is intended, GESI analysis would need to occur earlier in the project cycle and inform project selection, sequencing and resource allocation.

Navigating partner-led delivery and advancing GESI

There is also a balance to be struck between advancing inclusion and maintaining government ownership. While this was not a widely held concern, one interviewee noted that certain inclusion requirements were not always perceived as directly relevant to core project objectives, and in some cases risked being seen as externally driven.

This highlights that the key issue is less about resistance, and more about the degree to which there is underlying demand for GESI within partner systems. Where inclusion is not clearly linked to sectoral priorities or immediate policy objectives, it may be perceived as additional rather than integral. In this context, the partner-led model remains appropriate, but may require more deliberate strategies to promote and strengthen demand for GESI over time, rather than assuming it will emerge through standard consultation processes.

At the same time, the programme design implicitly acknowledged this risk and sought to address it through the recruitment of a Pacific-based GESI advisor and a partner-led approach to GESI integration. The intent was to enable context-sensitive application, grounded in local systems and priorities rather than prescriptive compliance. However, given that this issue was raised in only one interview, it should be treated as a potential risk to monitor rather than a systemic constraint.

This underscores the importance of continuing to embed GESI through context-specific engagement, clearly demonstrating its relevance to sector outcomes, and ensuring that inclusion is integrated as part of core project logic rather than applied as an external requirement.

Adoption or replication by government institutions

Evidence of adoption is most promising where inclusive provisions are embedded within formal government systems rather than remaining project-level practices. Examples include:

- In Kiribati, the proposed Environment Fund design integrates equity and inclusion criteria into its multi-criteria assessment framework and recommends representation of vulnerable groups within governance arrangements. If adopted, these provisions would institutionalise inclusive governance within a government-administered financing mechanism.
- In Solomon Islands, the Technical Working Group established to support carbon trading policy development includes representatives from women's and disability organisations and incorporates disaggregated consultation tools and safeguards considerations. This provides a mechanism for integrating inclusion considerations within emerging carbon market governance arrangements. However, this level of inclusive engagement has been enabled in part through additional funding (e.g. UK FCDO support), highlighting that meaningful inclusion carries significant resource implications and may involve trade-offs with the scale or pace of technical outputs if not adequately resourced.
- In Tonga, LECRD support to TSDF3 and climate finance strategy processes enabled inclusive consultation processes highlighting disability access, outer island vulnerability and women's economic resilience. Embedding climate finance priorities within TSDF3 creates a potential pathway for institutional uptake within national planning processes. However, evidence of sustained replication or institutionalisation remains emerging rather than confirmed.

Overall, where inclusive provisions are incorporated into governance rules, eligibility criteria, reporting requirements or regulatory instruments, they are more likely to persist beyond individual projects or advisers. Where inclusion depends primarily on project-level initiatives or embedded personnel, sustainability is likely to remain more fragile.

4.4 Sustainability

This section assesses **KRQ 5**, the extent to which LECRD-supported results are likely to be maintained and extended after programme support reduces or ends. Given LECRD's upstream orientation, sustainability is assessed less in terms of "continued activities" and more in terms of whether reforms and institutional changes persist through use, updating and operationalisation. This means that sustainability is less about whether specific activities continue, and more about whether LECRD-supported reforms become embedded in government systems, influence investment decisions, and continue to evolve after programme support reduces.

4.4.1 Prospects for sustaining and scaling results (KRQ 5.1)

Key findings:

- LECRD has generated several durable "foundations" (policy instruments, institutional mechanisms, skills transfer) but sustainability is uncertain and remains most fragile where outputs lack (i) legal or budgetary "teeth", (ii) an implementation pathway, or (iii) an institutional home with ongoing resourcing.
- Sustainability appears most promising in a small number of cases where LECRD support has moved beyond policy drafting to institutionalisation, including creation or strengthening of financing vehicles and embedding functions within existing national entities (for example PNG's Green Finance Centre within the Bank of PNG).
- The dominant risks to sustainability are recurrent across contexts: staff turnover and reliance on individual champions, limited absorptive capacity, weak incentives and enforcement, funding uncertainty, and limited follow-up monitoring of whether policies are implemented after "handover".

Across the portfolio, evidence suggests that sustainability prospects improve where outputs are deliberately designed with an "afterlife" through institutional anchoring, implementation enablement and financing alignment, though in most cases these pathways remain contingent on government decisions, financing availability or follow-on support.

Institutional anchoring and operational homes

Where LECRD outputs are embedded within entities with a clear mandate, established routines and ongoing authority, sustainability prospects appear more promising. The Green Finance Centre, for example, has been institutionalised within the Bank of PNG, supported by governance arrangements and ongoing engagement with financial institutions, creating a platform that can continue to drive green finance reforms beyond the life of a discrete technical assistance activity. As one PNG respondent notes:

> *"When they finish their support, they already have established ToRs. We call it an accredited unit under the Ministry of Finance. Which is very good … So they are helping us with that kind of sustainability planning."*

Other country examples demonstrate earlier stages of institutional embedding. In several contexts, institutional arrangements are still evolving and remain dependent on future government decisions, operationalisation steps, or additional resourcing.

From "policy complete" to "implementation-enabled"

Phase 1 experience demonstrates that technical quality and endorsement are not sufficient to secure sustained results. Policies and strategies often stall when the next steps are not explicit and resourced, particularly where enforcement and compliance mechanisms are underdeveloped. In recognition of this, several Phase 2 initiatives are structured explicitly around operationalisation: legal amendments, regulations, SOPs, training and resourcing for enforcement agencies. Vanuatu's shift from policy briefs on vehicle and fuel standards toward legislative refinement, regulations and enforcement SOPs illustrates an attempt to move reforms into the implementation system, although several of these steps remain in development and their effectiveness will depend on adoption, enforcement capacity and sustained government commitment.

Sustainability requires financing pathways, not only technical completion

A consistent message across documents and interviews is that upstream reforms are most likely to persist when they are linked to financing mechanisms that make implementation feasible. In Tonga, stakeholders explicitly linked the viability of policy frameworks to whether they connect with budget and investment decision-making. One interviewee described TERMPlus as "gathering dust", attributing this in part to the absence of an empowered champion and a weak link between strategy and budgeting. This reinforces a wider portfolio implication: where reforms are not connected to funding streams, incentives or budget processes, sustainability is constrained even when outputs are endorsed.

By contrast, Kiribati's Environment Fund concept is intended as a long-term national financing vehicle under the Environment Act (2021), with early attention to capitalisation and replenishment options (levies and taxes) and governance arrangements to support continuity. However, the fund remains at a design and decision stage, and its sustainability potential will depend on government approval, operationalisation arrangements and successful mobilisation of financing sources. This is a consistent finding across countries, as one government respondent pointed out:

> *"In terms of sustainability, we were meant to find additional funding from other development partners to do the next phase".*

Capability transfer that is resilient to turnover

Capacity building is cited by programme implementers as an important pathway to sustainability. However, interviews and documentation suggest that training and technical accompaniment alone are insufficient unless they are deliberately designed for high-turnover public sector environments. In several cases, stakeholders noted that capacity gains may dissipate when trained officials move roles or leave government service. As one government representative reflected:

> *"I don't know how much of those people have been retained, because we did not have a sustainability plan."*

This highlights a recurring challenge across Pacific administrations: individual training does not necessarily translate into durable institutional capability unless mechanisms are in place to transfer knowledge beyond the original participants.

Interviews suggest that more systematic "familiarisation" and refresh processes are needed to ensure that new officials understand what has been produced, what decisions remain pending, and how tools and frameworks are intended to be used. In several cases, programme staff reported conducting repeated orientation sessions to update government counterparts on progress and maintain institutional continuity. One respondent explained:

> *"I conducted five trainings last year just to familiarise government staff with what has been progressed and what they need to understand. If we don't do the training in a manner that achieves sustainability, then the training will not help."*

Some partners have begun experimenting with more durable approaches to knowledge transfer that move beyond one-off training events. These include retaining training materials within institutional teams, developing guidance documents, filming training sessions, and requiring new staff to review relevant materials as part of onboarding processes. As one respondent described:

> *"Training people in person is a good thing, but how do you sustain that? What we've started doing is keeping all the content and training materials within the teams, so when new staff come in they are required to go through it."*

These approaches reflect an emerging recognition that sustainable capacity development requires institutionalisation of knowledge, not only skills transfer to individuals. In practice, this means embedding technical knowledge in organisational routines, documentation, and role responsibilities so that it remains accessible even as personnel change.

The LECRD delivery model partially mitigates turnover risks through embedded advisers who maintain continuity on the programme side and provide ongoing technical accompaniment. However, sustainability remains vulnerable where knowledge transfer is not embedded in government systems. Without mechanisms such as standard operating procedures, technical manuals, formal role assignments, and periodic refresher processes, institutional memory can remain dependent on a small number of individuals. In such contexts, staff turnover can require repeated re-familiarisation and slow progress toward implementation.

Scaling through replication and peer learning

In the context of LECRD, scaling is less about expanding a single intervention geographically and more about enabling the replication and adaptation of workable approaches across countries facing similar structural constraints. Given the programme's upstream orientation, scaling pathways primarily involve transferring policy models, regulatory approaches, institutional arrangements and technical tools that can be adapted to other national contexts.

The Fiji bamboo initiative provides an early example of this potential pathway. While still in the research and enabling phase, the project is already being referenced by stakeholders as a model that could inform similar sustainable construction and green building initiatives in other Pacific Island countries where locally available natural materials could support low-emissions and climate-resilient housing solutions.

More broadly, Phase 1 experience suggests that structured peer learning and deliberate packaging of "what works" could strengthen sustainability across the portfolio. In small administrations with limited technical capacity, exposure to tested policy models and templates can reduce the time and transaction costs associated with designing reforms from first principles.

However, while some cross-country learning has taken place, it remains limited in scope. LECRD project managers have been brought together through virtual sessions to exchange lessons, identify risks, and discuss mitigation strategies across their respective projects. This represents a positive step toward knowledge sharing within the programme.

However, given the diversity and context-specific nature of projects, significant opportunities remain to extend learning beyond programme teams to a wider set of stakeholders in other countries who could benefit from and potentially adapt emerging approaches. As a result, opportunities to support replication and generate efficiency gains across the programme remain underdeveloped at this stage.

4.4.2 Institutional arrangements and partnerships (KRQ 5.2)

Key findings:

- Sustainability is strengthened where LECRD outputs are anchored in institutions with clear mandates and convening authority and where multi-agency governance arrangements translate technical products into agreed roles, rules and routines.
- Policy instruments are more likely to endure when they are supported by legal authority, operational guidance (for example SOPs), enforcement capacity and incentives. Where these are absent, endorsed policies risk remaining aspirational.
- Sustainability is constrained where partnerships and institutional arrangements are overly dependent on individual champions, where agencies lack capacity to maintain momentum, and where monitoring systems do not track post-endorsement implementation and use.

Institutional arrangements that support sustainability

LECRD's delivery model supports sustainability most effectively where it reinforces partner-led arrangements that provide (i) a clear government home, (ii) multi-agency coordination, and (iii) embedded technical accompaniment that operates within government processes. Across stronger cases, these elements reduce the likelihood that outputs remain "project-owned" and increase the likelihood they are integrated into business-as-usual systems.

In practice, these sustainability pathways are most visible in a small number of initiatives that aim to embed reforms within institutional frameworks:

- Vanuatu: sustainability is pursued through converting standards into enforceable instruments via amendments to the Motor Vehicle Imports (Control) Act (CAP 221), associated regulations, SOPs for enforcement, and training and resourcing for implementing agencies. Several of these steps remain in development, and sustainability will depend on adoption, enforcement capacity and ongoing government commitment.
- Kiribati: sustainability is pursued through establishment of a national Environment Fund aligned with the Environment Act (2021), including governance structures (board, committees, secretariat) and explicit attention to replenishment options that would enable ongoing national financing beyond donor project cycles. As noted above, this mechanism remains under development, and its longer-term viability depends on government approval and successful mobilisation of funding sources.
- PNG: sustainability is supported through institutionalisation of the Green Finance Centre as a department within the central bank and through partnerships that have attracted follow-on support and embedded reform commitments in wider systems.

These examples illustrate a common pattern whereby sustainability improves when LECRD outputs are attached to durable governance instruments (acts, regulations, operational manuals), embedded within institutional routines (committees, funds, regulatory enforcement), and linked to financing pathways.

Policy instruments: enabling conditions and limits

The evidence indicates that policy instruments contribute to sustainability when they are legally backed, accompanied by implementable guidance, and connected to incentives and enforcement mechanisms. Vanuatu provides a clear illustration of the implementation gap: policy endorsement has value, but sustained results depend on the supporting regulatory and operational infrastructure, including SOPs, compliance systems and a realistic transition period for affected stakeholders.

Where policy instruments are not paired with institutional capacity and incentives, sustainability is weaker. This is particularly evident in contexts where multiple policies are developed in parallel, but implementation capacity and attention is thin. Stakeholders described the practical risk that strategies can become inert when government systems are not equipped or incentivised to implement them, even when the technical content is sound.

Constraints that systematically limit sustainability

Three recurring constraints emerge across interviews and documentary evidence:

- **Champion dependency and turnover.** Momentum often sits with a small number of individuals. When these champions leave, reforms require re-briefing, renewed advocacy and, in some cases, partial revalidation. The TERMPlus example illustrates how endorsement can persist while leadership and convening energy dissipate, weakening sustained use.
- **Absorptive capacity and resourcing.** Even where ownership is genuine, limited counterpart capacity can shift delivery and coordination functions toward embedded advisers, increasing the risk that progress slows once external support reduces.
- **Limited post-endorsement monitoring and follow-up.** Sustainability is difficult to verify, and to manage adaptively, when reporting and MEL systems track production and endorsement more consistently than ongoing use, compliance or implementation. This limits visibility over whether outputs are functioning as intended after handover and reduces the ability to identify where targeted “implementation enablement” is needed.

Overall, the programme is increasingly designing for sustainability through institutionalisation, regulatory follow-through and financing mechanisms. However, the extent to which these pathways translate into sustained implementation will depend on factors largely outside the programme’s direct control, including government prioritisation, budget allocation and the availability of follow-on technical and financial support.

Evidence suggests that sustainability prospects remain uneven across the portfolio. Stronger pathways are visible in PNG, Tonga and selected areas of Fiji, while progress in Kiribati and Vanuatu remains earlier-stage and contingent on future government decisions, financing arrangements and implementation follow-through.

At the same time, the portfolio remains exposed to structural constraints that are endemic in small Pacific administrations: turnover, thin capacity, contested mandates and weak enforcement incentives. The sustainability challenge therefore is not primarily about producing stronger policies, but about whether reforms become sufficiently embedded in institutions, budgets, routines and enforcement systems to remain active once programme support reduces.

4.5 Illustrative country case studies

4.5.1 Tonga – From energy roadmap development to implementation support

Tonga illustrates both the strengths of the LECRD programme's upstream policy support and the conditions required for such reforms to translate into implementation. Across both phases, LECRD support evolved from establishing a national energy transition framework to providing targeted technical assistance aimed at supporting implementation planning and climate finance integration. The case highlights several key findings of this Review: LECRD's strongest contributions lie in developing enabling frameworks and analytical foundations (KRQ 1.1); the embedded delivery model has enabled adaptive and responsive support (KRQ 1.3); and the sustainability of results depends on whether reforms become embedded in national systems and linked to financing pathways (KRQ 5.1).

Consistent with the broader portfolio findings presented in Section 4.3, the Tonga experience illustrates how LECRD's most visible results occur at the level of enabling frameworks and analytical foundations, while downstream implementation depends on subsequent institutional and financing decisions.

In Phase 1, LECRD supported the Government of Tonga to develop the Tonga Energy Roadmap 2021–2035 (TERMPlus) through the Department of Energy in Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change & Communications (MEIDECC). TERMPlus consolidated Tonga's climate, energy security and development priorities into a single strategic framework and established ambitious targets, including achieving 70 percent renewable electricity generation by 2025 and 100 percent by 2035. LECRD also supported development of the TERMPlus Investment Plan, translating the roadmap into an indicative programme of investments and financing requirements. These outputs addressed a recurring constraint identified across Pacific contexts: governments often have strong policy ambition but lack coherent frameworks linking long-term strategies to concrete investment pathways.

Stakeholders described TERMPlus as broadly aligned with Tonga's national development and climate priorities and as reinforcing existing policy commitments rather than introducing a new external agenda. This reflects a broader programme finding that LECRD has generally been responsive to country priorities and gains traction when support is embedded in existing national planning processes (KRQ 4.1). However, interviews also suggested that familiarity with and operational use of the roadmap varies across government agencies, highlighting the common challenge of translating strategic policy frameworks into routine institutional practice.

In Phase 2, LECRD support adapted in response to evolving needs. Rather than focusing primarily on new strategy development, the programme shifted towards more practical implementation support. In particular, rather than developing a standalone Climate Finance Strategy, LECRD supported the Government to embed climate finance considerations directly within Tonga's core economic planning framework - the Tonga Strategic Development Framework (TSDF3). This approach reflects a deliberate shift toward supporting implementation by integrating climate finance priorities into the Government's primary policy and planning instrument, rather than producing a separate strategy document.

Phase 2 support has therefore centred on three main areas: (i) embedding climate finance within national policy and planning processes (notably TSDF3) as a mechanism to support implementation; (ii) supporting communications and operational strengthening of the Tonga Climate Change Fund; and (iii) supporting investment planning and flows linked to TERMPlus priorities. At the time of the Review (August 2025), both the Climate Finance Strategy and TSDF3 processes were still under development. These activities illustrate the programme's adaptive management approach and its ability to move from policy formulation toward enabling implementation and investment mobilisation.

At the same time, Tonga demonstrates one of the central limitations identified in the Review: policy and planning outputs alone do not guarantee implementation. Interview evidence suggests that while TERMPlus established a clear strategic direction, progress has been vulnerable to turnover in key government positions and remains dependent on sustained institutional leadership, effective coordination across government agencies, and alignment between policy priorities and budgeting processes. This reinforces broader programme-level findings that sustainability is strongest where reforms are institutionalised within routine government systems and linked to financing and implementation mechanisms.

Overall, the Tonga case illustrates how LECRD has contributed to establishing the strategic and analytical foundations for energy transition and climate finance planning, while also demonstrating that sustained implementation depends on whether these frameworks become embedded in budgeting, institutional mandates and financing decisions. It also highlights the programme's broader lesson: upstream policy support can create important enabling conditions for change, but long-term impact ultimately depends on whether these frameworks become embedded in government systems and supported by sustained financing and institutional ownership.

4.5.2 Fiji - Exploring bamboo as a low-carbon construction pathway

Fiji illustrates how the LECRD programme has supported partner governments to explore new climate-compatible development pathways while highlighting the conditions required for these pathways to translate into implementation. Across both phases of the programme, LECRD engagement in Fiji evolved from supporting climate policy development and analytical work to exploring bamboo as a potential low-emission construction material. The case demonstrates several core findings of this Review: LECRD has been effective in convening actors and developing enabling evidence and policy foundations (KRQ 1.1 and KRQ 1.2); the programme's embedded delivery model has enabled adaptive engagement with evolving government priorities (KRQ 1.3); and the sustainability of results depends on whether these analytical foundations translate into regulatory change, investment and industry uptake (KRQ 5.1).

In Phase 1, LECRD support in Fiji focused on strengthening the analytical and policy foundations for climate action. Activities included support to energy policy processes, emissions data systems and analytical work related to carbon budgeting and emissions reporting. Government stakeholders indicated that this work contributed to building the evidence base required for emerging policy areas such as carbon markets and emissions monitoring systems. For example, capacity building with the Fiji Bureau of Statistics supported the development of greenhouse gas data collection and reporting systems that later informed national climate reporting processes and policy development.

These activities reflect a broader programme finding that LECRD's early contributions often focus on strengthening technical knowledge and institutional capacity rather than generating immediate sector-level change. In Fiji, these upstream activities helped create analytical foundations that later policy and regulatory work could build upon.

In Phase 2, LECRD support shifted toward exploring bamboo as a climate-compatible construction material through the Fiji Bamboo for Adaptation and Mitigation initiative. The project aims to assess whether bamboo could provide a locally available, low-emission alternative to conventional building materials such as steel and cement while supporting affordable housing and rural livelihoods. Activities have included bamboo resource inventories, mechanical strength testing of local species, value-chain and production assessments, and preparatory work toward the potential development of voluntary national bamboo standards for construction.

Testing undertaken with Fiji National University confirmed that locally available bamboo species possess structural properties comparable to some timber materials when properly treated, while forestry studies identified sufficient bamboo stocks in some regions to support early industry development. These findings contribute to the technical evidence base that could inform future consideration of bamboo as a construction material.

Beyond technical research, the Fiji bamboo initiative illustrates the programme's convening role. The project has brought together ministries, academic institutions, private sector actors and technical experts through steering committees, standards working groups and consultations. Stakeholders widely acknowledged that this coordination was valuable in a sector that previously lacked clear institutional ownership, with earlier attempts to develop a bamboo industry in Fiji stalling partly because no ministry had taken responsibility for bamboo as a construction material.

At the same time, Fiji highlights a potential risk in the programme's ability to translate upstream work into implementation. Much of the programme's activity to date has focused on feasibility studies, standards development and analytical research. At the time of the Review (August 2025), the initiative remained at research and enabling stage, with regulatory codes, technical guides and demonstration projects not yet initiated. Several stakeholders noted that the next critical step is demonstration through prototype buildings that can validate bamboo construction under Fiji's climatic conditions, particularly cyclone exposure. Without such demonstrations, there is a risk that engineers, financial institutions and homeowners may remain hesitant to adopt bamboo construction despite the available technical evidence, potentially limiting uptake and downstream impact.

The case also illustrates broader structural barriers to scaling the sector. These include entrenched perceptions of bamboo as a "poor-man's material", limited treatment and processing infrastructure, the absence until recently of bamboo-specific building standards, and uncertainty about long-term supply chains. Interviews also indicated that institutional coordination and supply chain development, including bamboo plantations, treatment facilities and skills development, will be essential before bamboo construction can scale beyond pilot initiatives.

Despite these challenges, the Fiji case demonstrates how LECRD can support policy exploration and sector innovation at an early stage. The programme has helped establish the preliminary regulatory and stakeholder networks needed to consider bamboo construction as part of Fiji's climate and housing strategies. It has also raised the profile of bamboo within government and industry discussions and initiated discussions around potential future regulatory and standards development. This reflects a wider programme pattern identified in the Review: LECRD's comparative advantage lies in generating the evidence, stakeholder coordination and regulatory groundwork needed for new climate-compatible sectors to emerge, while actual market development depends on subsequent investment and regulatory decisions.

Overall, Fiji illustrates both the strengths and limits of LECRD's upstream approach. The programme has contributed to building the analytical and institutional foundations required to explore a new low-carbon construction pathway. However, the long-term impact of this work will depend on whether these foundations translate into demonstration projects, supply chain development and regulatory adoption that enable bamboo construction to scale within Fiji's housing sector.

5. Conclusions and future directions

5.1.1 Conclusions

The Mid-Term Review finds that LECRD remains a relevant and credible programme within the Pacific climate and development landscape. Its core rationale is sound, with the programme addressing persistent gaps between high-level climate ambition and the institutional, regulatory, planning and financing conditions required to translate that ambition into action. Across both phases, LECRD has been most effective where it has worked upstream to strengthen enabling environments and where this support has been sufficiently embedded in government systems to move beyond technical advice toward institutional uptake.

While LECRD has made credible progress toward its intended short-term outcomes, this progress is uneven across countries (partly reflecting variations in resourcing) and strongest at the level of immediate institutional effects rather than downstream implementation or demonstrable long-term change. Across the portfolio, the programme has produced a substantial body of strategies, frameworks, technical analyses, draft regulations, operational concepts and capacity support. In several countries these outputs have contributed to better-informed decision-making, stronger planning processes, and improved institutional readiness. This is particularly evident in Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji, and to a lesser but still meaningful extent in Kiribati and Vanuatu. Solomon Islands is at an earlier stage but shows a promising start. At the same time, evidence of medium-term behavioural, financing and implementation changes remains limited, reflecting both the long-term nature of change and weaknesses in outcome tracking, particularly in Phase 1.

The LECRD delivery model is broadly fit for purpose in Pacific contexts and is one of the programme's main strengths. The Review finds that the model's defining characteristics - partner-led design, embedded delivery, flexibility and collaborative engagement - are visible in practice and have broad support among partner governments. In small and capacity-constrained administrations, the embedded approach appears to reduce transaction costs, strengthen trust, improve responsiveness and support continuity in reform processes that would be difficult to sustain through shorter-term or more transactional forms of technical assistance. The model has been particularly effective in supporting iterative policy and institutional reform where close accompaniment and real-time problem solving are required. However, performance depends heavily on staffing continuity, role clarity, the quality of relationships, and the presence of credible institutional counterparts. Where those conditions are weak, the effectiveness of embedding is reduced.

Country ownership is a genuine and widely reported strength of LECRD, but it is not always deeply institutionalised. Across countries, stakeholders generally described LECRD activities as aligned with nationally defined priorities rather than donor-driven agendas. This reflects both the demand-responsive programme design and the way GGGI advisers work within national institutions. However, ownership remains vulnerable to limited absorptive capacity and leadership turnover. In several contexts, momentum has depended on a small number of committed officials or reform champions. Where those individuals depart, shift roles or lose influence, progress slows and activities require renewed explanation and revalidation. This suggests that while procedural ownership is strong, deeper institutionalisation through mandates, budgets, inter-agency arrangements and implementation remains incomplete in parts of the portfolio.

LECRD's strongest results and best sustainability prospects occur where upstream work is coupled with an institutional home, a practical implementation pathway and some form of financing or enforcement logic. PNG provides the clearest example, where policy and diagnostic work contributed to the establishment of the Green Finance Centre within the Bank of PNG and created a platform for continued reform and follow-on financing. Where outputs are not linked to legal authority, budgetary processes, implementing institutions or incentives, they risk remaining technically sound but only partially used.

The main constraints on performance are structural rather than technical. Limited absorptive capacity, staff turnover, political and administrative instability, contested mandates and incentives, unclear accountability arrangements, and weak implementation financing recur across countries. These factors shape whether outputs move from design and endorsement into operational use. They also explain why technically strong outputs do not always translate into change. The programme's adaptive and embedded model helps manage these constraints but cannot remove them entirely. This means that future performance depends on moving beyond technical outputs to deliberately focus on institutionalisation, political economy risk and implementation follow-through.

Phase 2 reflects a meaningful response to Phase 1 learning, but some of the issues identified in Phase 1 remain only partially resolved. The programme now has a clearer theory of change, stronger MEL architecture, improved reporting templates and more explicit attention to GESI. This represents an improvement in programme design. However, persistent challenges remain in demonstrating programme-level distinctiveness, systematically tracking outcomes beyond output completion, and translating a stronger design architecture into equally strong evidence on results. In other words, Phase 2 has improved the framework for performance management, but the full benefits of that improvement are not yet visible in the evidence base, partly due to the programme stage and progress made to date.

GESI considerations have become more visible in Phase 2 but are not yet consistently translating into GESI-responsive outcomes. The Review finds clear evidence that GESI is more systematically reflected in project documentation, consultation processes and reporting than in Phase 1, with positive examples of broader stakeholder engagement and more deliberate inclusion of women in Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands.

However, this progress has been stronger in terms of participation and intent than in influencing core design decisions, institutional practices, or the distribution of benefits. In many cases, GESI analysis has been applied after project concepts were already defined, limiting its ability to shape activities in a more substantive way.

Overall, the programme has made important progress in strengthening the visibility and consideration of GESI, but more consistent and targeted efforts are still needed to ensure that activities lead to meaningful, GESI-responsive outcomes in practice.

LECRD occupies a valid niche in MFAT's climate portfolio, but its distinctiveness is not always clearly visible to stakeholders. The programme has a coherent upstream enabling logic and is broadly complementary to national priorities and wider donor activity. However, its boundaries with other climate-related technical assistance mechanisms are not always well articulated, especially where mandates converge around climate finance, governance reform and institutional strengthening. This does not necessarily indicate duplication, but it does reduce the clarity of LECRD's programme identity and makes it harder to communicate and evidence its unique contribution. Stronger programme-level articulation of where LECRD adds distinctive value would improve portfolio coherence and strengthen strategic positioning.

Taken together, the Review concludes that LECRD is performing reasonably well as an upstream, enabling and catalytic programme, and that the underlying model remains relevant and worth sustaining. The principal challenge for the remainder of Phase 2 is not whether the programme should continue to support upstream reform, but how to strengthen the conversion of upstream outputs into implementation-ready, institutionally embedded and more demonstrably sustainable results. This requires sharper prioritisation, stronger implementation pathways, better outcome tracking, earlier and deeper GESI integration, and a more explicit strategy for moving from policy completion to use, uptake and follow-on investment.

5.1.2 Future considerations

The recommendations below are intended to strengthen performance over the remainder of Phase 2 and to inform consideration of any future phase.

#	Theme	Recommendation	Risks if not adopted	Responsibility	Priority
1	Strategic prioritisation and focus on implementation pathways	**Consider concentrating effort on a smaller number of implementation-ready reforms over the remainder of Phase 2.** The programme could consider giving greater priority to a limited number of reforms in each country that show a strong combination of government demand, institutional anchoring, and realistic prospects for implementation. This would help shift attention from completion of upstream outputs alone toward implementation readiness, including legal instruments, operational procedures, institutional arrangements, financing pathways, or enforcement mechanisms where relevant. Programme MEL and reporting could also be used more deliberately to inform decisions about where to sustain, scale back, or deepen support.	Resources may continue to be spread across multiple early-stage activities, reducing the likelihood that reforms progress beyond policy development into operational use during Phase 2.	Both (MFAT & GGGI)	High priority – Immediate (for the remainder of Phase 2)
2	Implementation pathways and planning realism	**Make implementation pathways more explicit at both project and programme level.** For priority activities, GGGI could more systematically articulate what needs to happen after a strategy, study, policy, or framework is completed for it to influence practice. This might include identifying likely next steps, responsible institutions, approval points, financing requirements (and possible other donor support), implementation partners, and major assumptions or risks. These pathways could be reflected more clearly in Project Idea Notes, reporting, and periodic management discussions.	Outputs may remain technically sound but conceptually incomplete, with limited shared understanding of what would be required for downstream uptake or implementation.	GGGI, with MFAT oversight and review	High priority – Immediate and ongoing during Phase 2
3	Adaptive management and portfolio review	**Introduce more structured decision criteria and trigger points within the existing flexible delivery model.** While the programme benefits from adaptive management, decisions on adjusting activities are largely informal and relationship based. MFAT and GGGI could consider defining clearer criteria and predefined triggers (e.g. progress against milestones, evidence of uptake, changes in context, or implementation feasibility) to guide decisions on whether activities should continue, be scaled, adapted, or discontinued. This would support more transparent, consistent and timely resource allocation while preserving flexibility.	Activities may continue without sufficiently clear review of their likely value, reducing opportunities to redirect effort toward areas with greater traction or implementation potential.	Both (MFAT & GGGI)	High priority – Establish in the next management and reporting cycle
4	Monitoring, evaluation and learning	**Refine MEL to better capture uptake, use, and follow-on effects, not only output delivery.** The revised MEL architecture is an improvement on Phase 1, but the programme may benefit from a sharper focus on what happens after outputs are produced. For selected priority activities, monitoring could place greater attention on whether outputs are endorsed, used, updated, operationalised, financed, or incorporated into institutional processes. A small number of practical uptake markers may be more useful than a larger set of	The programme may continue to face difficulty evidencing contribution beyond output delivery, limiting both accountability and learning about what types of upstream support are most catalytic.	GGGI, with MFAT review	Medium-high priority – Start now and refine progressively through Phase 2

#	Theme	Recommendation	Risks if not adopted	Responsibility	Priority
		activity-focused indicators. Strengthening this aspect of MEL may require additional resourcing, particularly to support post-delivery tracking, follow-up engagement with partners, and periodic assessment of implementation progress.			
5	GESI and inclusive resilience	**Consider bringing GESI analysis earlier into activity selection and design, while strengthening approaches to build partner demand for inclusion.** The Review suggests that GESI integration has become more visible in Phase 2, but often after activities were already broadly defined. The programme could consider involving GESI analysis earlier in the project cycle so that it informs problem diagnosis, activity choice, consultation design, and implementation pathways from the outset. At the same time, navigating the balance between a partner-led model and advancing GESI will likely require a stronger focus on demand creation rather than compliance. This could involve more explicitly demonstrating how GESI contributes to core sector outcomes (e.g., improved policy effectiveness, increased access to finance, or more feasible implementation pathways) so that inclusion is seen as integral rather than additional. Together, these approaches may help move GESI integration beyond process and participation toward stronger influence on the substance of activities, while remaining context-sensitive and partner-led.	GESI may remain largely procedural, with limited influence on core design choices or on the likelihood that reforms respond meaningfully to the priorities of women, youth, and marginalised groups.	GGGI (including GESI support), with MFAT strategic support	Medium-high priority – Apply to all remaining and any newly designed Phase 2 activities
6	Programme coherence and communication of value-add	**Articulate LECRD's distinct value proposition more clearly within the broader climate portfolio.** The programme occupies a credible upstream niche, but the Review suggests that its role is not always clearly differentiated from other technical assistance mechanisms. MFAT and GGGI could consider communicating more explicitly how LECRD complements, rather than duplicates, other New Zealand-supported initiatives, particularly by positioning it as an embedded and enabling mechanism that supports governments to move from climate ambition toward implementable policy, institutional, and financing conditions. This includes clarifying how LECRD adds value alongside bilateral programmes, regional initiatives, and other partners by focusing on upstream systems, coordination, and investment readiness. This clearer positioning could be reflected more consistently in reporting, programme communications, and engagement with New Zealand High Commissions/Consulates and partners.	LECRD may continue to be perceived as one of several overlapping advisory mechanisms, reducing clarity about its distinct contribution and making results harder to communicate.	Both (MFAT & GGGI)	Medium priority – Short term
7	Cross-country learning and replication	**Consider making more deliberate use of cross-country learning where there are emerging examples of traction.** The Review points to some potentially replicable approaches, but cross-country exchange remains limited. The programme could consider packaging and sharing practical lessons, institutional models, and implementation experience across countries where reform challenges	Potentially useful approaches may remain country-specific, and opportunities to improve efficiency or accelerate uptake through peer learning may be missed.	GGGI, with MFAT support	Medium priority – Progress during the remainder of Phase 2

#	Theme	Recommendation	Risks if not adopted	Responsibility	Priority
		are comparable. This is particularly relevant where countries are working on related issues. Learning opportunities could also be extended beyond programme teams to relevant external stakeholders (e.g. government counterparts in other countries, regional bodies, and development partners) who may benefit from and adapt emerging approaches. This could be supported through more deliberate communication and knowledge-sharing mechanisms to promote uptake, replication, and wider programme visibility.			
8	Future portfolio design	**If future support is considered, a more selective portfolio model could be explored early.** The Review suggests that the LECRD model remains relevant and worth sustaining, but that future performance is likely to depend on sharper prioritisation and clearer pathways from upstream reform to implementation. If MFAT and DFAI consider a subsequent phase, they could consider a portfolio with fewer, more focused reform initiatives where New Zealand/Irish funding can play a strategic catalytic role, allowing for deeper and more sustained resourcing of priority initiatives rather than resources being spread too thinly across a large number of activities, supported by clearer selection criteria, stronger implementation logic, and more deliberate attention to institutionalisation, financing alignment, and outcome-oriented MEL.	A future phase may reproduce the same pattern of dispersed upstream outputs without sufficiently strengthening the conditions required for implementation and sustainability.	MFAT and DFAI, with GGGI input	Lower immediate priority – For any future phase design

Annex 1: LECRD Phase 1 Project timeline[3]

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
Fiji	Low emissions in the energy sector Phase 1 (FJ16)	Recommendations on removing fuel subsidies and fiscal incentives on cleaner sources of energy	The study identified potential areas for fossil fuel subsidy reform that triggered the development of a new project (Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FJ29)) and new funding stream (of approx. US$200k through MFAT's bilateral Fiji Climate Action Program (FCAP)) to further explore how to implement fossil fuel subsidy reforms in Fiji and in turn promote a more sustainable and efficient subsidy framework. However, there has been limited progress to further refine an approach to implement fossil fuel subsidy reforms and it seems this has been de-prioritised by the relevant Government Departments.	Launched in July 2021	12 months	Project Completed in October 2022
		Recommendations on vehicle standards	Despite frequent follow-up and communication with the relevant Government Department, it is currently unknown whether cabinet has approved the policy brief yet and whether standards have been implemented in Fiji.			
		Regulation for battery disposal and recycling	N/A			
	Climate Change Bill Implementation Support - Phase 1 (FJ17)	Reviewed building code including considerations on sustainable energy, water and resource efficiency, etc.	The Sustainability Chapter was endorsed by government and is in the process of being integrated into the ongoing-official review of Fiji´s National Building Code, which Asian Development Bank (ADB)/Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) and the task force are undertaking, with support from Wavefront Consultants. The Chapter r provided increased guidance for inclusivity and gender responsive decision making. Building code is expected to be adopted by mid-2025 by Parliament, a year and a half after government submits for their consideration. Planned completion date by Public Works Ministry is June 2024 for parliamentary submission.	Launched in July 2021	12 months	Project Completed in March 2022
		Fiji Bureau of Statistics (FBoS) capacity to collect data on GHG emissions is strengthened	The detailed assessment co/created with Fiji Bureau of Statistics (FBoS) and other key stakeholders, resulted in determining strategic needs thorough a systematic desktop review of FBoS's statistical information and databases/datasets that feed or potentially could feed into Fiji's national GHG inventory, as per the mandated requirements under the Climate Change Act 2021 regarding FBoS' extended responsibilities in activity data and/or GHG information collection, compilation and sharing.			
		Voluntary reporting mechanism of emissions	All methodologies, guidelines and tools were developed, disseminated and appropriated by private sector companies, both large and small, to be able			

[3] Low Emissions Climate Resilient Development Programme Phase 1 Closure Report (2025)

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
		and emissions reduction data are in place.	to initiate their voluntary reporting at facility level. Large emitters, given their high representation in terms of emissions, but also, green entrepreneurs, given their genuine drive for sustainability, were engaged and taken throughout the practical exercise to apply them into their operation, so they can also contribute to Art. 32's implementation to feed it with their activity data efficiently and effectively.			
	CC Bill Implementation Support - Phase 2 (FJ17)	Capacity development program for building industry	96% of training attendees agreed that the training and learning process helped in enhancing their knowledge and skills in low carbon building principles and practices in Fiji 93% agreed that the subject matter of the training aligned to the broader green building objectives for the Fiji low carbon buildings sector 89% agree that the training provided them with the knowledge and learning of the evolving low carbon buildings landscape in Fiji. 88% foresee that they will use the learnings from the training in their daily work going forward	Launched in April 2022	14 months	Project Completed in November 2023
		Implementation tools for Sustainability Chapter	Ministry of Public Works and ADB-Wavefront Consultants adopted the scorecard as the voluntary tool of the Fiji National Building Code (FNBC) to measure the energy efficiency component. It has been already applied-used during the public awareness sessions of the FNBC´s that took place on December 2023 in Suva with 60+ public-private sector professionals.			
	Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Study (FJ29)	Fiji's indicative Carbon Budget (2026-2030)	N/A	N/A	12 months	Project removed from LECRD Programme
	Indicative carbon budget- 2026-2030 (FJ21)	Roadmap for Subsidy reform in Fiji Subsidy reform implementation	Additional validation and discussion are required as per Climate Change Act 2021 before submission of the carbon budget before the Parliament of Fiji. Climate Change Division (Fiji) (CCD) is working with formalising NCCC (National Climate Change Coordination Committee). CCD has communicated that 31 March as the original deadline set in the bill, is not being compulsory in accordance with Climate Change Act 2021, because the new government has consulted with the Solicitor General´s Office and agreed they will do a thorough review of this legislation to define a clearer way forward with prioritised actions. Phase III of the Carbon Budget work will commence with New Zealand MFAT funding (Fiji Climate Action Plan (FCAP). This is expected to further develop Fiji's National Budgeting Methodology and deliver a refined carbon budget by October 2024.	N/A	6 months	Project Closed and Funded under another programme
Kiribati	Agricultural action plan (KI02)	5-year plan to implement the Kiribati Agriculture Strategy (KAS)	The Action Plan was subsequently approved and formally launched on 6th April 2022. It has also been posted on the MELAD website. The Action	Launched in June 2021	12 months	Project Completed

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
			Framework is being used within MELAD who hold strong ownership of the document because of the highly consultative approach in its development.			in March 2022
		Project Idea Notes (PIN) for priority projects	The specific concept notes/PINs are currently unfunded. However, the objective to increase and sustain supply and consumption of fresh vegetables was taken up through the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD)-Government of Kiribati project as mentioned above, which focussed on improved supply of fresh vegetables working with schools, communities and small-scale agribusinesses.			
		Capacity building workshops	3 events for key stakeholders were held to increase knowledge and understanding about the KAS and seek stakeholders' views on priority areas for action, this helped to shortlist project proposal ideas from 20 to 4.			
		Communications / Dissemination Strategy	A"Communication Plan: For The 5-Year Action Framework to the Kiribati Agriculture Strategy (2020 – 2030)" was developed in March 2022. It outlines the pathway for the successful launch and widespread dissemination of the 5-Year Action Framework of The Kiribati Agriculture Strategy (KAS) 2020-2030 and its 4 concept notes			
	Green Procurement (KI07)	Integration of Sustainable procurement of lighting and cooling appliances into the Procurement Manual	On 30th April 2024 the Government of Kiribati agreed to add the two drafted addendums to its procurement manual to support sustainable procurement in Kiribati.	Launched in October 2022	17 months	Project Completed in March 2024
		Sustainable Procurement Guidelines	On 30th April 2024 the Government of Kiribati agreed to adopt the two checklists into its public procurement manual and procurement processes. They were also included in the public procurement training given in Sept/Oct 2023			
		Green Procurement Training	- 67% of workshop attendees felt that their understanding of sustainable procurement increased because of the training. - 80% of workshop attendees thought the Green Procurement Checklists were useful or very useful. - 90% of workshop attendees thought they would be able to use the checklists in their daily work			
Papua New Guinea	Inclusive Green Finance Policy Phase 1 (PG11)	Green taxonomy based on PNG's goals and priorities	5 Financial Institutions namely BSP, MiBank, Mama Bank, ANZ and Kina Bank agreed to change their lending philosophy by signing MoU's with Bank of PNG and GGGI. Through this program, all 5 Financial institutions incorporated green lending in their lending operations and developed green loans to pilot them. Currently these loans are being piloted.	Launched in June 2021	18 months	Project Completed in February 2023

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
		Diagnostic report on the state of green finance in PNG	Some key outcomes from the diagnostic report on why banks resist sustainable lending in PNG: - New business models - New and evolving technology - Mainly entrepreneurs of small business applying for green loans - No government and central bank incentives for banks to lend in sustainable space			
	Establish Green Finance Centre (PG 11)	Establishment of a Green Finance Centre.	The establishment of the GFC has led to the effective implementation of the Inclusive Green Finance Policy and IGFP Roadmap. Being impressed with the progress of GFC, IMF included 2 Reforms from the 10 Reforms as part of the Resilient Sustainability Facility (RSF) budget support to Government of PNG (GoPNG). Total budget support is USD ~260M of which USD ~52M will be through GFC's deliverables, aligned to the Inclusive Green Finance Policy (IGFP) Roadmap developed as part of the IGFP	Launched in September 2022	15 months	Project Completed in December 2024
		Application of the Green taxonomy to the books of 1-2 financial institutions.	The 5 FI's have developed loans aligned to the Inclusive Green Taxonomy. The Inclusive Green Taxonomy was also utilised to screen and tag existing loans in the FI's lending portfolio.			
Tonga	TERMPLUS - Phase 1 (TO02)	A strategic/policy document to guide the development of Tonga's energy sector (TERM-Plus Document)	The Government of Tonga Cabinet officially approved (CD #736) the TERMPLUS on the 7th of September 2022 and subsequently launched the TERMPLUS at the conclusion of Tonga's Climate Change Awareness week on the 23rd of September 2022.	Launched in August 2021	20 months	Project Completed in November 2023
		Investment plan to support the implementation of the TERM-Plus.	In February 2023, the Director of Energy at the Tonga Department of Energy, Ministry of MEIDECC officially acknowledged the TERMPLUS Investment Plan via email.			
	TERMPLUS Phase 2 (TO02)	Cost benefit analysis of policy options for an increased uptake of Electric Vehicles (EVs) to EV in Tongatapu	The report led to Government of Tonga requesting development of a feasibility study for the transition of Government's vehicle fleet to EVs. This was delivered by Climate Finance Access Network (CFAN) in 2025. Impacts should be assessed during programme evaluation.	Launched in September 2022	17 months	Project Completed in May 2024
		Study on tariff and power sector infrastructure requirements to enable the transition	The Government of Tonga utilised the public charger locations and load profile in Tonga report as part of its preparation for Pacific Island Forum Leaders meeting in September 2024. The information was used to determine that hybrid vehicles instead of EVs would be best. The report establishes the cost and identifies potential pilot project locations, whether this is utilised by Government for investment should be confirmed during an evaluation of the programme.			

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
		Recommendations on how to incentivise Tonga's transition EVs	There is currently no information about what the Government of Tonga has done with the recommendations. Such information could be gathered during an evaluation of the programme.			
Vanuatu	LT-LEDS (VU12)	LEDS Process-Institutional Arrangements, Coordination, and Multi-Stakeholder engagement Process Organised	The workplan was developed in close coordination with the relevant Government Departments and Ministries, ensuring stakeholder ownership of the process. The workplan was subsequently used to implement the project.	Launched in June 2021	20 months	Project Completed in December 2022
		A report on the current situation in Vanuatu (to support the development of a LT LEDS)	In May 2022, this report was updated to include/consider adaptation, following funding secured from AFD.			
		Estimates of Vanuatu's GHG emission projections	The report and its findings were used to inform the LT LEDS. It is currently unknown whether the Government has used the estimates for any other purpose. This could be assessed during an evaluation of the project or LECRD programme.			
		Prioritised Actions to mitigate climate change	The findings were used to inform the LT LEDS. It is currently unknown whether the Government has used the prioritised actions identified for any other purpose. This could be assessed during an evaluation of the project or LECRD programme.			
		A Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS)	Vanuatu government has fully endorsed the LT-LEDS, announced it at COP27, launched it in Port Villa in December 2022 and submitted it to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in January 2023. It was published on the UNFCCC Website on 17th May 2023. The extent to which the LT LEDS has been implemented is currently unknown. Such information could be gathered during an evaluation of the LECRD programme.			
	Fuel-vehicle standards (VU14)	A policy brief and recommendations on national fuel standards and appropriate regulatory frameworks to promote cleaner fuels and lower emissions in Vanuatu	The Vanuatu Council of Ministers (COM) endorsed the Vanuatu Fuel Standard Policy Brief in August 2023	Launched in August 2022	15 months	Project Completed in October 2023
		A policy brief and recommendations on	The Vanuatu Council of Ministers (COM) endorsed the Vanuatu Vehicle Emission Standards Policy Brief in August 2023			

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Contribution to Outcomes/Impact	Project start	Project duration	Project status
		national vehicle standards and appropriate regulatory frameworks to promote efficient land transport in Vanuatu.				
		Legal drafting instructions for the regulation of a) Fuel Standards b) Vehicle Emission Standards	There is currently no information about the Government of Vanuatu has done with the instructions.			
		Gender Sensitive communication Materials on Vehicle Emission Standards and Fuel Standards	There is currently no information about what impact the communication materials had on raising awareness.			

Annex 2: LECRD Phase 2 current projects, expected outputs and outlined project activities[4]

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Project activities
Fiji	Supporting the early-stage development of a sustainable bamboo industry for construction, particularly to support the development of affordable housing.	1. Report(s) on findings of the Fiji bamboo research. 2. Events and initiatives to raise awareness and share knowledge about bamboo research findings. 3. Training courses (and associated materials) to increase the capacity of key stakeholders to sustainably produce and use bamboo in Fiji. 4. Proposed guides and codes to inform the sustainable production and use of bamboo in the construction sector in Fiji	1. Engage with stakeholders and conduct research and analysis to identify gaps between current and best practices with respect to the production and use of bamboo in construction in Fiji 2. Host events/ initiatives to raise awareness and knowledge about the research findings, including conducting training. 3. Develop evidence-based policies, regulations and/or codes to inform the sustainable production and use of bamboo in Fiji
Kiribati	Helping the Government establish a national Environment Fund.	1. Assessment of the Enabling Environment and "Conditions for Success" for an Environmental Fund (EF) in Kiribati. 2. Recommendations on what the purpose and mandate, scope of activities and other key attributes (legal structure, financial structure, source of funding, governance, asset management) of an Environmental Fund in Kiribati should be based on robust evidence and extensive stakeholder consultation. 3. Communication and outreach materials and initiatives that raise awareness and support for an Environmental Fund in Kiribati. 4. Training on Environmental Funds that builds the capacity of key stakeholders in Kiribati. 5. Detailed Regulations and Procedures to manage the proposed Environmental Fund that were developed in consultation with key stakeholder and based on best available evidence.	1. Gather evidence and conduct analysis on Environmental Funds and the local Kiribati experience and context 2. Design an Environmental Fund for Kiribati – high level and detailed. 3. Develop and implement a communication and outreach plan to raise awareness and support for an Environmental Fund 4. Provide training on Environmental Funds to Government Officials and other key stakeholders
Solomon Islands	Developing a Carbon Trading Policy to enable high-quality, high-integrity carbon training.	1. An assessment of the readiness of the Solomon Islands (SI) to participate in high-quality, high-integrity international carbon trading (through voluntary carbon markets and through Article 6 mechanisms) and what it needs to be able to successfully access and participate in these international markets. 2. Recommendations on the Institutional and Governance structures and processes to enable and support international carbon trading (through Article 6 and Voluntary Carbon Markets) in the Solomon Islands 3. Training on international carbon trading that builds the capacity of key stakeholders, including women and youth. 4. A Carbon Trading Policy for the Solomon Islands	1. Gather evidence and conduct consultations and analysis on the readiness of the Solomon Islands to implement international carbon trading 2. Make recommendations on the Institutional and Governance structures and processes to enable and support international carbon trading (through Article 6 and Voluntary Carbon Markets) in the Solomon Islands 3. Enhance key stakeholders' awareness, knowledge and understanding about international carbon trading and carbon markets 4. Develop a carbon trading policy for the Solomon Islands
Tonga	Embedding climate finance in long-term national economic	1. A Climate Finance Strategy (CFS) for Tonga and the integration of climate finance into other policy documents that were developed through a consultative process and the establishment of an inclusive	1. Develop Climate Finance Strategy for Tonga 2. Develop Communication Materials to support Tonga Climate Change Fund

[4] LECRD Phase 2 Programme Design Document (2021)

Country	Project	Expected outputs	Project activities
	planning, strengthening the Tonga Climate Change Fund (TCCF), and catalysing clean-energy investment.	project steering committee. 2. Communication and Operational Materials for the Tonga Climate Fund developed to increase the number of climate change activities, programmes and projects approved and implemented by the Fund, particularly those developed by and benefiting women, youth and other marginalised groups. 3. Increased marketing of prioritised Energy Investment opportunities in Tonga	3. Identify priority investments from the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM) and Develop a Communication, Marketing and Engagement Strategy to raise awareness and knowledge about the opportunities
Vanuatu	Supporting the transition to cleaner fuels and greener vehicles	1. Legislative and Regulatory amendments to enforce vehicle emissions standards established. 2. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for enforcing fuel standards. 3. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for enforcing vehicle emission standards. 4. SOP Training. 5. Public awareness and Communication Campaign on vehicle and fuel efficiency	1. Make legislative changes to Vehicle Imports Control Act (CAP 221) 2. Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for enforcing fuel Standards at Port of Entry 3. Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for enforcing Vehicle Emission Standards at port of entry 4. Train Government Inspectors on the SOPs and raise public awareness about the Standards
Papua New Guinea	*A Project Idea Note was under development and pending at the time of this review*		

Annex 3: Alignment between Phase 1 and Phase 2 outcomes

The table below presents a conceptual mapping between the Phase 2 MEL Objectives and the Phase 1 Short-Term Outcomes (STOs). The purpose of this mapping is to demonstrate continuity in the programme's theory of change across phases, while also highlighting how Phase 2 refines, disaggregates, and strengthens the original results framework.

While the Phase 1 STOs articulated broad outcome domains (policy and regulatory frameworks, institutional contribution to evidence-based planning, and inclusive strategy development), the Phase 2 objectives separate and systematise these into clearer analytical categories: decision quality, institutional capacity, implementation enablement, and GESI integration. This mapping therefore clarifies how Phase 2 builds on, rather than replaces, the foundations established in Phase 1.

Phase 2 – Programme Objectives	**Phase 1 – Short-Term Outcomes**		
	STO 1 - PIC Governments have supporting policies, legislation and regulations in place to guide LECRD investment and development	**STO 2** - PIC institutions and stakeholders are able to contribute to high-quality, evidence-based LECRD planning	**STO 3** - LECRD strategies and plans are developed inclusively with engagement from all sectors, especially marginalised groups
Objective 1: Increase government's ability to make decisions about long-term opportunities and priorities through evidence-driven, inclusive and participatory consultation processes	**Strong alignment.** Provides the analytical and consultative foundation that underpins the development of policies and regulations referenced in STO 1.	**Strong alignment.** Directly supports institutions' ability to contribute to evidence-based planning processes.	**Strong alignment.** Explicit emphasis on inclusive and participatory consultation processes strengthens STO 3.
Objective 2: Increase government capacity and capability (knowledge, skills, systems) to develop plans to deliver on climate priorities	**Moderate alignment.** Institutional capability is necessary for drafting and operationalising policies and regulatory frameworks under STO 1.	**Strong alignment.** Direct continuation and systematisation of STO 2's focus on institutional capacity to undertake planning and review.	**Moderate alignment** where strengthened institutional capacity improves the quality and inclusiveness of engagement processes.
Objective 3: Support governments to work with sectoral stakeholders to enable implementation of plans	**Strong alignment.** Extends STO 1 beyond policy formulation to enabling implementation and investment uptake.	**Moderate alignment** where stakeholder collaboration enhances institutional learning and adaptive planning.	**Moderate–strong alignment.** Broadens STO 3's cross-sector engagement into implementation partnerships (e.g., finance, private sector, SOEs).
Objective 4: Support government capacity to develop and implement LECR plans that respond to the priorities of women, youth and marginalised groups, and demonstrate benefits	**Partial alignment** where policy and regulatory frameworks integrate GESI-responsive provisions.	**Moderate alignment** where institutions strengthen capacity to integrate GESI into planning processes.	**Very strong alignment.** Elevates and systematises STO 3 by explicitly tracking GESI evidence, institutional engagement of equity actors, integration into plans, and demonstration of benefits.

Annex 4: Outcome summary by country and objective

This annex complements the analysis in Section 4.3.1 by presenting a more detailed, country- and objective-level assessment of progress toward LECRD outcomes across Phases 1 and 2. Consistent with the main report, it applies the Phase 2 MEL framework as the primary analytical lens and retrospectively maps Phase 1 evidence against the four Phase 2 objectives. This provides a common basis for assessment across both phases, while recognising that Phase 1 monitoring was weaker, more output-focused, and not originally structured against the current objective and indicator set.

Country progress summaries

Fiji

Fiji has generated a substantial body of analytical work across both phases, but the strongest evidence remains at the level of evidence generation, technical development and early coalition-building rather than policy adoption or operational change. In Phase 1, LECRD supported the Sustainability Chapter for the Fiji National Building Code, GHG data and reporting systems, voluntary emissions reporting guidance, and early carbon-budgeting work. The interim carbon budget should be treated carefully: LECRD supported an internal draft and methodological groundwork, but the work was subsequently taken forward under the Fiji Climate Action Programme rather than completed within LECRD itself.

In Phase 2, the bamboo project had, by end-August 2025, completed two of the five planned studies and delivered early training, GESI consultations and technical working group engagement. However, codes, guides and regulatory proposals had not yet started, and the remaining studies were still underway. It is therefore more accurate to conclude that Phase 2 has strengthened the evidence base and stakeholder platform for possible future reform, rather than advanced regulatory integration or implementation.

Kiribati

Kiribati shows meaningful progress across both phases, but with slower movement from analysis to formal institutional uptake in Phase 2. In Phase 1, LECRD contributed to the Kiribati Agriculture Strategy Action Framework and to green procurement guidance, checklists and training that were subsequently adopted into government systems.

In Phase 2, LECRD produced three important knowledge products for the proposed Kiribati Environment Fund: an enabling-environment analysis, an international experience review, and high-level design options and recommendations. These provide a credible analytical basis for future decision-making, but government review, cross-ministerial engagement and design decisions were still pending at end-August 2025. Planned detailed regulations, wider training and communications had not yet started. Progress is therefore best characterised as real but stalled at the transition point between design and formal decision-making.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea remains the best example of Phase 1 progress extending beyond output delivery into institutional anchoring and catalytic effects. Phase 1 support contributed to the Inclusive Green Finance Policy, Green Taxonomy and Green Finance Centre, and helped establish a continuing platform for green finance engagement with the financial sector. Documentary evidence also indicates that this work attracted follow-on interest and support from other actors, including AFD and IMF-linked reform processes. However, those wider developments should be interpreted as follow-on effects to which LECRD contributed, not as outcomes attributable to LECRD alone.

In Phase 2, however, progress had not yet moved beyond design stage by end-August 2025. A draft Project Idea Note existed, but implementation had not started. It is therefore important not to overstate cumulative progress on the basis of anticipated Phase 2 work. Overall, PNG remains a strong Phase 1 case with no substantive Phase 2 outcome evidence yet available.

Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands joined the programme only in Phase 2 and remains at an early stage. Initial progress has focused on introductory carbon markets training, Technical Working Group formation, bilateral consultations and the start of a readiness and capacity needs assessment. This has helped establish a relevant evidence base and a relatively inclusive policy-development architecture, but not yet a completed policy, governance model or implementation mechanism.

At end-August 2025, the readiness assessment was still in progress, recommendations on institutional and governance arrangements had not yet started, and the Carbon Trading Policy itself had not yet been drafted. Solomon Islands should therefore be described as promising but still early-stage.

Tonga

Tonga demonstrates comparatively strong cumulative progress, particularly in planning support and climate-finance-related policy development. In Phase 1, LECRD supported TERMPlus and its investment plan, which were formally approved and provided a consolidated framework for energy sector planning. Phase 1 also included analytical work on EV transition options.

In Phase 2, LECRD support shifted toward embedding climate finance in the national planning architecture through work on TSDF3 and associated climate finance content, as well as communications and operational support for the Tonga Climate Change Fund. A large public consultation process informed TSDF3 development. However, TSDF3 and the integrated climate finance strategy work were still under development by end-August 2025, and the Sustainable Energy Investment Forum had been postponed. Tonga therefore remains one of the stronger examples of upstream policy support and planning influence, but the evidence does not yet support claims of financed implementation or advanced investment mobilisation in Phase 2.

Vanuatu

Vanuatu illustrates both the significance of Phase 1 achievements and the limited Phase 2 trajectory to date. In Phase 1, LECRD supported the Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategy and policy briefs on fuel and vehicle standards, which were endorsed. These were important enabling outputs.

In Phase 2, however, progress had been substantially weaker than originally intended. At end-August 2025, the legislative/regulatory amendments output had been cancelled, SOPs for fuel standards and vehicle emissions had not yet been delivered, training had not begun, and public awareness activities had not commenced. A consultant had only just been secured. It is therefore more accurate to conclude that Phase 2 had not yet generated substantive operational progress by the review cut-off, despite a credible intention to do so.

Progress summaries by objective

Objective 1: Strengthened evidence-informed decision-making

This objective assesses whether LECRD generated relevant evidence, supported inclusive and participatory processes, and contributed to more informed policy and planning decisions. Across the portfolio, evidence is strongest on technical studies, policy analysis, consultation processes and drafting support. Evidence is weaker on whether those inputs consistently translated into adoption, implementation or downstream investment decisions, especially in Phase 2 where several activities were still at design or validation stage.

Country	Phase 1 evidence	Phase 2 evidence	Combined assessment of progress	Progress rating
Fiji	Strong evidence base through fossil fuel subsidy analysis, vehicle emissions work, Sustainability Chapter, GHG systems strengthening and related technical guidance. Carbon budget work should be treated cautiously: LECRD supported an interim draft and methodology, but subsequent development shifted to FCAP.	Bamboo work strengthened the evidence base through inventory, mechanical testing and broad consultations. By end-August 2025, only two of five bamboo studies were complete; guides, codes and regulations had not yet started.	Strong continuity in evidence generation across both phases. Main strength is evidence development and consultation; main limitation is that evidence-to-adoption remains incomplete, particularly in Phase 2.	Strong
Kiribati	Agriculture Action Framework and green procurement work generated concrete evidence that informed formal approvals and adoption.	Three substantial KEF evidence products completed, but formal government review and design decisions were still pending.	Relevant evidence has been produced in both phases, but Phase 2 illustrates that analysis has not yet translated into formal decision-making or implementation planning.	Moderate
Solomon Islands	Not applicable.	Readiness assessment, bilateral consultations and TWG processes began building an evidence base, but the readiness assessment was still underway, and governance recommendations had not yet started.	Early but relevant progress. Too early to assess influence on final policy choices or institutional arrangements.	Early
Tonga	TERMPlus and investment planning provided strong evidence-based planning support and were formally approved.	TSDF3 and climate finance strategy work advanced through extensive consultation but were still under development at end-August 2025; investment forum postponed.	One of the strongest examples of evidence feeding into national planning architecture. Gap remains between planning quality and evidenced implementation or financing decisions.	Strong
Vanuatu	LT-LEDS and related standards work created a credible evidence base for reform, with formal endorsement of key outputs.	Very limited Phase 2 progress by the cut-off. Consultant recruitment only; no substantive SOP or regulatory support yet delivered.	A credible Phase 1 foundation exists, but Phase 2 had not yet sustained that momentum.	Moderate
PNG	Diagnostic work, policy and taxonomy development strongly influenced green finance direction and institutional set-up.	Phase 2 remained at design stage only.	Strong Phase 1 influence, but no substantive Phase 2 evidence yet.	Moderate

Across both phases, LECRD has clearly improved the availability of technical evidence and broadened the basis for policy discussion. This is most evident in Fiji, Tonga and PNG. At the same time, evidence of consistent translation from technical analysis into implemented reform remains much weaker across the portfolio, reflecting both timing constraints and limited post-output tracking, especially in Phase 1.

Objective 2: Enhanced government capacity to develop and implement LECRD plans

This objective focuses on whether LECRD strengthened government knowledge, technical capability, systems and confidence to develop and operationalise climate-related plans and frameworks. Evidence is strongest where support was embedded, iterative and linked to real drafting or institutional processes. It is weaker where progress relied mainly on one-off training or where Phase 2 implementation had not advanced.

Country	Phase 1 evidence	Phase 2 evidence	Combined assessment of progress	Progress rating
Fiji	Capacity support through FBoS training, SOPs, GHG data work, building training and implementation tools. Evidence strongest on immediate capability gains.	Bamboo work provided early technical capability building around inventory, testing, harvesting and treatment. This remained early-stage and had not yet translated into institutionalised system change.	Repeated investment in technical capability across both phases. Evidence remains stronger for immediate skills transfer than for durable institutionalisation.	Strong
Kiribati	Capacity gains visible through green procurement training and MELAD's planning engagement in the agriculture framework.	Phase 2 focused more on analytical support than actual delivered training. KEF-related capacity building had largely not yet occurred by end-August 2025.	Phase 1 showed clearer capability gains than Phase 2. Cumulative progress is moderate but not deepened recently.	Moderate
Solomon Islands	Not applicable.	Introductory carbon markets training and TWG engagement built initial awareness and capability among government actors.	Useful foundation-building, but not yet evidence of deeper systems capability or institutional practice change.	Early
Tonga	Phase 1 strengthened planning and energy sector capability through TERMPlus, though evidence is more implicit than systematically measured.	Embedded support to NPD on TSDF3 and climate finance content appears to be strengthening core planning capability through joint drafting and iteration.	Strong cumulative progress, especially because support is learning-by-doing and system-oriented rather than purely workshop-based.	Strong
Vanuatu	LT-LEDS process and standards work built planning familiarity and technical exposure.	Intended Phase 2 capacity building had not yet been delivered by end-August 2025.	Phase 1 support was meaningful, but there is little new Phase 2 evidence.	Moderate
PNG	Strongest Phase 1 case: policy, taxonomy and Green Finance Centre created a continuing institutional capability platform.	No substantive Phase 2 capability-building evidence yet.	Strong evidence of institutional capability deepening but driven almost entirely by Phase 1.	Strong

Overall, LECRD has made a meaningful contribution to government capability, particularly where support involved accompaniment, joint drafting and embedded technical assistance. However, the evidence across the portfolio remains stronger for capacity transfer during implementation than for long-term retention and institutionalisation.

Objective 3: Improved collaboration with sectoral stakeholders

This objective assesses whether LECRD strengthened engagement and collaboration with private sector actors, civil society, SOEs, professional associations, academia and other stakeholders relevant to implementation. Multi-stakeholder engagement is a consistent programme feature, but the degree to which this moved beyond consultation into implementation-oriented partnership varies substantially.

Country	Phase 1 evidence	Phase 2 evidence	Combined assessment of progress	Progress rating
Fiji	Private sector and professional engagement through GHG pilots and green building training but limited downstream uptake evidence.	Bamboo work broadened engagement across ministries, universities, associations and firms. This is still coalition-building around possible future implementation rather than implementation itself.	Sector engagement has deepened, especially in Phase 2. Evidence of actual implementation partnerships remains limited.	Moderate–Strong
Kiribati	Green procurement work engaged ministries, SOEs and private businesses in a practical way.	KEF work has seen more limited sectoral engagement because formal validation and wider dissemination had not advanced.	Stronger Phase 1 engagement than Phase 2. Current momentum is constrained by delayed government decisions.	Moderate
Solomon Islands	Not applicable.	Early engagement architecture includes civil society, private sector, academia and development partners through TWG and training.	Good participatory foundation, but not yet evidence of implementation-oriented partnership.	Early–Moderate
Tonga	TERMPlus involved multi-stakeholder dialogue, but limited evidence of sustained mobilisation beyond government and utility actors.	TSDF3 consultations were broad, and TCCF/energy investment work sought wider engagement, but the investment forum was postponed and mobilisation remained prospective.	Dialogue is strong, but conversion into implementation partnership or investment mobilisation remains incomplete.	Moderate
Vanuatu	Stakeholder engagement occurred through LT-LEDS and standards validation. Follow-through by implementing actors was limited.	Phase 2 start-up delays meant wider engagement had not yet occurred by the cut-off.	Stakeholder collaboration has not yet deepened in Phase 2.	Limited–Moderate
PNG	Strong financial-sector collaboration, including MOUs and development of green lending products aligned with the taxonomy.	No substantive Phase 2 collaboration evidence yet.	PNG remains the strongest case of stakeholder engagement linked to operational change, but this is overwhelmingly a Phase 1 story.	Strong

Overall, collaboration with sectoral stakeholders has been a clear design feature of LECRD, but implementation-oriented partnership is uneven across the portfolio. PNG remains the clearest example of engagement moving beyond consultation into operational change. Fiji's bamboo work may be building a useful coalition, but as of end-August 2025 it remained in an enabling stage.

Objective 4. Integration of GESI and resilience

This objective considers the extent to which LECRD activities incorporated GESI and resilience considerations in policy development, consultation and technical outputs. Given the programme's upstream nature, most evidence relates to participation, consultation architecture and design intent, rather than demonstrable changes in outcomes for women, youth or other marginalised groups. The Phase 2 MEL framework also places stronger explicit emphasis on GESI than Phase 1 did.

Country	Phase 1 evidence	Phase 2 evidence	Combined assessment of progress	Progress rating
Fiji	Limited but identifiable GESI elements in the Sustainability Chapter and some participation in training and consultations.	Phase 2 bamboo work included explicit GESI consultations and analysis of barriers facing women and marginalised groups. Evidence remains mainly procedural and analytical.	Clearer attention in Phase 2 than Phase 1, but not yet strong evidence of influence on final policy content or benefits distribution.	Moderate
Kiribati	Female participation in training and consultations was relatively strong, but influence on reform content was limited.	KEF design work incorporated inclusive governance considerations, but operationalisation had not progressed.	GESI is visible mostly at the level of representation and design intent.	Moderate
Solomon Islands	Not applicable.	Deliberate inclusion of women and non-state actors in TWG and training from the outset. Too early to know whether this will shape policy content or outcomes.	Inclusion is embedded in the consultation architecture, but outcome-level effects are not yet evidenced.	Early–Moderate
Tonga	TERMPlus included a Gender Chapter, one of the clearer Phase 1 examples of explicit GESI integration.	TSDF3 consultations included diverse stakeholders, including women, youth and disability groups. Evidence still relates mainly to consultation and participation rather than substantive gender-responsive provisions.	Relatively strong conceptual integration, but limited evidence of downstream effects beyond process.	Moderate
Vanuatu	Some participation in consultations, but little evidence that GESI shaped policy design.	Phase 2 delays meant there was very little GESI-related evidence by the cut-off.	Evidence of GESI integration remains limited.	Limited
PNG	Inclusive finance framing is present, but explicit gender-responsive measures are not well documented.	No substantive Phase 2 evidence yet.	Inclusion is reflected mainly in programme framing rather than explicit gender-responsive design or monitoring.	Limited–Early

GESI remains the least well-evidenced of the four objectives. Across both phases, there is credible evidence of more inclusive consultation processes and stronger visibility of GESI in Phase 2 programme systems. However, GESI integration has usually been procedural rather than transformative. In most cases, analysis appears to have come after activities were already selected and broadly designed, which limited its influence on core activity choice and design parameters.

Annex 5: Stakeholders consulted

The primary data collection phase took place from November to December 2025 through a combination of both Key Informant interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Following the in-country mission, remote consultations were undertaken which enabled the Review team to conduct a total of 30 in-person consultations, 29 remote consultations, and 1 written interview response consulting with 60 respondents:

Stakeholder type	Stakeholder organisation	Modality and number of interviews	Location
Tonga (14)			
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	Ministry of Finance - Aid Management	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Energy	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	Tonga Power Limited - Strategic Planning Unit	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	Tonga Power Limited - Strategic Planning Unit	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	Tonga Power Limited - Strategic Planning Unit	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Implementing Partner	GGGI	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	MEIDECC - Climate Change	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Government of Tonga	National Planning Office (Prime Minister's Office)	1 x KII	Nuku'alofa, Tonga
Fiji (16)			
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Environment	1 x FGD (2 respondents)	Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Environment		Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Trade	1 x FGD (2 respondents)	Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Trade		Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Women	1 x FGD (3 respondents)	Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Women		Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Women		Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Public Works	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Government of Fiji	Ministry of Forestry	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Non-government organisation	Bamboo Association	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Non-government organisation	Pacific Arc Construction	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji
Non-government organisation	Fiji National University	1 x KII	Suva, Fiji

Stakeholder type	Stakeholder organisation	Modality and number of interviews	Location
Non-government organisation	Head Base Innovation Center	1 x KII	Remote
Papua New Guinea (3)			
Government of Papua New Guinea	Bank of Papua New Guinea	1 x KII	Remote
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 X KII	Remote
Government of Papua New Guinea	Climate Change and Development Authority	1	Survey response
Vanuatu (3)			
Government of Vanuatu	Department of Energy	1 x KII	Remote
Regional organisation	Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme	1 x KII	Remote
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 X KII	Remote
Solomon Islands (6)			
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 x KII	Remote
Government of Solomon Islands	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology (MECDM)	1 x FGD (4 respondents)	Remote
Non-government organisation	Solomon Islands National Council of Women	1 x KII	Remote
Kiribati (3)			
Implementing partner	Green Global Growth Institute	1 X KII	Remote
Government of Kiribati	Government of Kiribati	1 X KII	Remote
Government of Kiribati	Government of Kiribati	1 X KII	Remote
New Zealand (5)			
Government of New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	1 x KII (2 respondents)	Remote
Government of New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade		
Government of New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	1 x KII (2 respondents)	Remote
Government of New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade		
Government of New Zealand	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	1 x KII (1 respondents)	Remote

Annex 6: Key documents reviewed

Documents provided and reviewed to date included in the document review are listed below.

- Development of a Carbon Trading Policy for the Solomon Islands PIN (2024)
- Fiji Gender Action Plan for Fiji Bamboo Climate Resilient Project
- Gender Action Plan for the Kiribati Environment Fund
- GEDSI Action Plan for the Solomon Islands LECRD Program – Carbon Trading Policy Development
- Gender Action Plan for Tonga Climate Finance Strategy
- Gender Action Plan for Vanuatu Vehicle Emissions Standards Project
- LECRD Project Idea Note – Establishing an Environment Fund for Kiribati (2024)
- LECRD Project Idea Note – Fiji bamboo to adapt and mitigate climate change (2024)
- LECRD Project Idea Note – Strengthening the Legal and Operational Framework for Vehicle Emissions Standards in Vanuatu (2024)
- LECRD Phase 2 Project Idea Note – Tonga Climate Finance Strategy and donor engagement support
- LECRD Phase 1 updated MEL Framework (2024)
- LECRD Phase 1 Closure Report GGGI (2025)
- LECRD Phase 1 Activity Completion Report (2025)
- LECRD Phase 1 Business Case (2020)
- LECRD Phase 1 Internal review with responses from GGGI (2023)
- LECRD Phase 1 Programme Design Document (2021)
- LECRD Phase 2 Technical Progress Report March to August 2025 (2025)
- LECRD Phase 2 Business Case (2023)
- LECRD MEL Plan (2024)
- LECRD Phase 2 Programme Design Document (2024)
- Tonga Energy Road Map 2021-2035 TERM PLUS (2024)
- Tonga Second Nationally Determined Contributions Review Report (2025)
- Tonga's Third Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) (2025)

Annex 7: Analytical Framework

The Analytical Framework outlines how each Key Review Question will be addressed, linking lines of inquiry to the specific evidence sought, data sources, and methods for data collection and analysis. It provides a clear and systematic structure to guide the Review, ensuring consistency, transparency, and triangulation across multiple evidence streams.

Criteria	Key Review Questions	Evidence to be sought	Sources and methods
Effectiveness	**1.1** How far have Phase 1 and 2 interventions advanced the outcomes identified in the MEL framework?	• Evidence of progress against MEL outcome indicators across the four objectives. • Documented and reported examples of policy, institutional, or behavioural change attributed to LECRD support. • Stakeholder perceptions of results and contribution to national outcomes.	**Sources:** MEL framework, GGGI progress reports, Phase 1 closure report, government documentation, stakeholder interviews. **Methods:** Document review; KIIs with MFAT, GGGI, and government officials; Brief case studies (Fiji, Tonga).
	1.2 What factors are enabling or constraining progress towards outcomes	• Contextual, institutional, and operational factors influencing results (enablers and barriers). • Evidence of coordination and resource adequacy. • Stakeholder views on delivery effectiveness, technical quality, and responsiveness. • Variation in performance between countries and sectors.	**Sources:** Interviews with MFAT, GGGI, government partners; country reports; project logs. **Methods:** Thematic analysis of KIIs; document review; contribution analysis; cross-country comparison.
	1.3 To what extent has the programme demonstrated adaptive management in response to contextual changes?	• Examples of adjustments made to activities, focus, or partnerships in response to political, economic, or environmental change. • Evidence of feedback loops and decision-making processes. • Perceptions of flexibility and responsiveness.	**Sources:** MFAT and GGGI management records; MEL reports; stakeholder interviews. **Methods:** Process mapping, qualitative analysis of KIIs with MFAT, GGGI, and Post staff; review of meeting notes and annual plans.
	1.4 Which elements of Phase 1 learning have been retained or strengthened in Phase 2?	• Evidence of Phase 1 lessons applied to Phase 2 design and implementation. • Stakeholder perceptions of learning uptake and impact on delivery quality. • Reflection on Phase 1 recommendations.	**Sources:** Phase 1 closure report; Phase 2 design and MEL framework; MFAT and GGGI interviews. **Methods:** Document analysis; KIIs; comparative review of Phase 1 and 2 frameworks.
	2.1 How systematically have GESI and resilience screening tools and guidance been applied across countries?	• Evidence of use of GESI and resilience screening tools in project design and implementation. • Documentation of gender and social inclusion activities. • Stakeholder perceptions of application and consistency. • Extent of integration into MEL reporting.	**Sources:** Project design docs, MEL reports, country GESI tools, GGGI guidelines. **Methods:** Desk review; KIIs with GGGI GESI officers, government partners and MFAT
	2.2 What evidence exists that these approaches have led to change (adopted or replicated by government institutions, and led to more inclusive outcomes)?	• Examples of institutional adoption or replication (e.g., inclusion of gender/resilience in national frameworks). • Policy or budget references demonstrating uptake. • Stakeholder accounts of practice change or institutionalisation.	**Sources:** Government policy documents; interviews with ministries and line agencies; MEL data. **Methods:** KIIs; case study analysis (Fiji/Tonga), document review.

Criteria	Key Review Questions	Evidence to be sought	Sources and methods
Efficiency	**3.1** How do the delivery model's characteristics (partner-led, flexible and adaptive, embedded, and collaborative) manifest in practice across countries?	• Evidence of partner-led co-design and embedded implementation. • Perceptions of collaboration between MFAT, GGGI, and governments. • Examples of adaptation and resource reallocation. • Evidence of value for money in delivery.	**Sources:** MFAT and GGGI management records, interviews with country partners. **Methods:** KIIs with MFAT, GGGI, and partner governments; process analysis; comparison of delivery models.
	3.2 Has GGGI's embedded approach delivered unique value relative to other models of technical assistance or regional delivery mechanisms?	• Perspectives from governments and partners on GGGI's added value. • Evidence of capacity retention and sustained partnerships. • Examples of embedded support improving coordination, efficiency, or policy outcomes.	**Sources:** Interviews with governments, MFAT, and other partners. **Methods:** KIIs, comparative analysis; stakeholder mapping.
Relevance	**4.1** How has GGGI ensured country ownership through co-design and alignment with national planning frameworks?	• Alignment of LECRD activities with national climate plans, NDCs, and sector strategies. • Evidence of government leadership in project design and decision-making. • Perceived relevance and responsiveness to national priorities.	**Sources:** National policies and NDCs; design docs; interviews with ministries, MFAT New Zealand High Commissions/Consulates, and GGGI country teams. **Methods:** Document review; KIIs.
	4.2 How coherent and complementary is LECRD with other regional and national climate and development initiatives supported by MFAT, partner governments, and other development partners?	• Documentation of how LECRD aligns with and adds value to broader regional frameworks (e.g., 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, PCCP, NDC Hubs). • Examples of collaboration or joint planning with other initiatives. • Stakeholder perceptions of LECRD's distinct role, comparative advantage, and contribution within the wider regional architecture.	**Sources:** MFAT and GGGI programme design and progress documentation, Government plans, plans from other programmes. **Methods:** Document review; KIIs.
Sustainability	**5.1** What strategies are most effective for maintaining and scaling results after programme completion?	• Evidence of institutionalisation of outputs and sustained practice. • Examples of scaled or replicated initiatives. • Stakeholder perceptions of sustainability.	**Sources:** Government plans, MEL data, MFAT and GGGI documentation. **Methods:** Document review; KIIs with governments and GGGI; case studies.
	5.2 How do institutional arrangements, partnerships, and policy instruments contribute to or limit sustainability?	• Evidence of institutional ownership and leadership in sustaining LECRD results. • Strength and durability of partnerships with government and regional actors. • Policy or budget integration of LECRD-supported initiatives.	**Sources:** Interviews with government officials, MFAT, GGGI, and national partners; policy and budget documents. **Methods:** KIIs; case study examples; document review.