



New Zealand
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Manatū Aorere
Official Diplomatic Reporting
Relating to
“United Nations Peacekeeping Rwanda”

Volume 1 of 5
31 March – 30 April 1994

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To mark the 20th Anniversary of the Rwanda Genocide on 7 April 2014, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is making public its diplomatic reporting for the period March, April, May, June, and July 1994. This material includes the reporting from the New Zealand Ambassador to the UN in New York, who was President of the Security Council in April 1994. It also includes reporting from other New Zealand posts. These files contain the cables sent between Wellington and New York – a record of the unfolding disaster in Rwanda and New Zealand’s work to challenge the Security Council to respond to the genocide and protect innocent civilians, and the obstruction which it encountered from many of the major powers over this period.

This folder contains the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s
official files from 31 March to 30 April 1994

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115/23/37

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 31 March 1994

TO: WELLINGTON
WGTN UNSC ✓No.
No.

2357

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, EAB)

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Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, DSP2

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

As you know, UNAMIR mandate expires on 4 April.

2 Following are:

- (a) SecGen's report on renewal of the mandate;
- (b) French draft resolution;
- (c) US draft resolution.

3 SecGen's report was circulated only this morning. French and American drafts, which reflect fact that they have not been able to agree, especially on the period of the mandate renewal, were given to us this afternoon. At our suggestion, they were then circulated to all Council members.

4 P5 are to meet on Monday morning to try to sort out the differences. Matter will be taken up in informals scheduled for Monday afternoon.

5 Our primary involvement will be to use the good offices of the Presidency to ensure that a resolution is adopted by the time the mandate expires. Accordingly, we can be neutral on the substance. If the differences cannot be resolved in time, it may be necessary to resort to a technical roll-over.

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Security Council

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30 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for an initial period of six months.
2. On 30 December 1993, I submitted to the Security Council a progress report on UNAMIR (S/26927). On 6 January 1994, the Council adopted resolution 893 (1994) by which it, *inter alia*, reaffirmed its approval of the deployment of UNAMIR, as outlined in my report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488), including the early deployment of a second infantry battalion to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The Council strongly urged the parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in furthering the peace process, to comply fully with the Arusha peace agreement on which the schedule contained in my report of 24 September was based and, in particular, to establish a broad-based transitional Government at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with the agreement. It also welcomed the continued efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help to promote and enhance dialogue among all the parties concerned.
3. In a statement by the President of the Security Council on 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8), the Council called for the prompt installation of the transitional institutions provided for in the Arusha peace agreement and reaffirmed that continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation of that agreement by the parties.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. Since my last report to the Security Council on 30 December 1993, intensive efforts have been deployed to facilitate and advance the full and effective implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. UNAMIR, within the overall framework of the Security Council's mandate, has continued to assist those efforts.

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5. In my report of 30 December, I had pointed out that most of the projected tasks of phase I of the four-phase implementation plan approved by the Security Council in its resolution 872 (1993) had been accomplished. That phase was to last approximately 90 days, until the installation of the broad-based transitional Government.

6. Despite the fact that the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) had agreed at Kinyihira on 10 December 1993 to set up the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly before 31 December, this did not take place as a result of the inability of the parties concerned to agree on the relevant modalities, including the lists of members of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

7. In accordance with the Arusha peace agreement, which provided that the incumbent head of State would remain in office until the outcome of elections to be held at the end of the transitional period, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana was sworn in as President of the Republic on 5 January 1994. Expectations that the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly would also be installed on that same day could not be met because of continuing difficulties, especially within the Parti libéral (Liberal Party) and the Mouvement démocratique républicain (Democratic Republican Movement), regarding the lists of their representatives to serve as ministers in the broad-based transitional Government and as deputies in the Transitional National Assembly.

8. As a result of the failure to install the broad-based transitional Government, the completion of phase I of the implementation plan approved by the Security Council has been continuously delayed. My Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, has expressed his concern over this delay to the various political leaders. In its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, the Security Council called for the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government "at the earliest opportunity". Following the adoption of the resolution, I spoke with President Habyarimana on a number of occasions by telephone and also wrote to him on 27 January to convey the strong expectations of the international community, as well as my own, that the broad-based transitional Government should be promptly established. My Special Representative, during his numerous meetings with President Habyarimana and other Rwandese political leaders, has continued to urge them to expedite action for the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government.

9. The prolonged delay in putting the transitional institutions in place has not only prevented UNAMIR from carrying out its tasks in accordance with the implementation schedule approved by the Security Council, but has also contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in the country and posed a threat to the peace process. The failure to establish the broad-based transitional Government constitutes a serious impediment to the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement and to the smooth functioning of State institutions.

10. While various Rwandese political leaders have also recognized the urgent need to establish the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly in order to ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the country, they nevertheless remain deadlocked on the modalities for putting those

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institutions in place. My Special Representative and I have stressed to the Rwandese political leaders that, without the early establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly, it would be difficult to affirm that sufficient progress has been made in the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement to warrant the continued support of the international community.

11. The Governments of Member States, both within and outside the region, as well as the representatives of the Facilitator, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the observer States to the peace process, have supported the efforts by the United Nations to promote agreement among the parties on the setting up of the transitional institutions. Largely because of those efforts, progress has been made in bridging the gap in the positions of the various parties and moving them closer to a compromise in order to facilitate the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government.

12. Following a series of all-party consultations that my Special Representative organized at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali on 7, 10 and 13 February, broad consensus was reached among the various political leaders to set up the transitional institutions on 14 February, while giving the Liberal Party more time to resolve its internal problems and to join those institutions later and leaving the courts to decide on the factional rift within the Democratic Republican Movement. However, reservations to the consensus were expressed by the Mouvement républicain national pour le développement et la démocratie (Republican National Movement for Development and Democracy) and by other elements close to the President, who argued that all outstanding problems should first be resolved before proceeding to set up the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly, so that all political parties concerned could participate in those institutions from the outset. Nevertheless, the key element in that consensus, which provides for the installation of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly even if some political parties are not in a position to participate immediately, has continued to feature in the discussions among the Rwandese political leaders.

13. An agreement reached at meetings of the political parties on 16 and 18 February to establish the transitional institutions on 22 February was set back as a result of the sudden outbreak of violence in Kigali and in other regions of the country beginning on 21 February. This resurgence of violence, in the course of which two prominent political leaders, Mr. Félicien Gatabazi, the Minister of Public Works and Energy who was also the Secretary-General of the Parti social démocrate (Social Democrat Party), and Mr. Martin Bucyana, the President of the Coalition pour la défense de la république (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic), were murdered, an RPF soldier killed and a UNAMIR military observer wounded in an ambush, contributed to heightening tension and worsening the overall political climate. On 23 February, another effort to install the transitional institutions also failed when the ceremony organized for that purpose by President Habyarimana was boycotted by most political parties, including RPF, which in a press release issued on the same day accused the President of trying to impose a unilateral solution to the internal problems within the Liberal Party and the Democratic Republican Movement.

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14. In the face of the deteriorating political and security situation, I telephoned President Habyarimana on 24 February and stressed the need for urgent action to break the political stalemate and to proceed with the establishment of the transitional institutions. I strongly reaffirmed this position when I received the President's Special Envoy on 1 March in New York.

15. Following meetings held on 25 and 27 February at the initiative of the President, the five political parties represented in the current coalition Government indicated in a communiqué dated 27 February that agreement had been reached on a formula to resolve the internal problems within the Democratic Republican Movement but that a consensus had still not been reached on the rift within the Liberal Party owing to the reservations expressed by one of the leaders of that party. Following the announcement of the RPF's rejection of the proposed compromise in a communiqué dated 28 February, my Special Representative met on 1 March with the President of RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwa, at the RPF headquarters in Mulindi, in a continuing search for a solution to the deadlock. He urged all parties concerned to continue the dialogue and to refrain from any actions that could aggravate the situation.

16. On 7 March, President Habyarimana paid a one-day official working visit to Uganda. President Museveni reaffirmed his commitment to assist the peace process and expressed the hope that the deadlock that had delayed the installation of the broad-based transitional Government would soon be overcome. The two Presidents expressed appreciation to the United Nations for its efforts to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement and called on the international community to assist in this regard.

17. During visits to the United Republic of Tanzania by an RPF delegation and by President Habyarimana on 4 and 8 March respectively, the two signatories to the Arusha peace agreement sought the intervention of President Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Facilitator of the Rwandese peace process, to try to break the impasse in the implementation of the agreement. The Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Joseph C. Rwegasira, visited Rwanda from 11 to 18 March to assist the parties in resolving the outstanding issues that are impeding the establishment of the transitional institutions. He held intensive bilateral consultations with various Rwandese political and religious leaders as well as with members of the diplomatic corps, the representative in Rwanda of the Secretary-General of OAU and my Special Representative.

18. At the conclusion of his visit, the Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania stated that his consultations in Kigali had led him to conclude that the stumbling block to putting the transitional institutions in place revolved around the internal problems within the Liberal Party. He stressed that the delay in the political transition caused by the apparent power struggle within the Liberal Party was unacceptable, as it had no legal basis within the framework of the Arusha peace agreement. The proposed composition of the broad-based transitional Government, he emphasized, was within the prerogative of the Prime Minister Designate, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, as long as he respected the lists of ministers proposed to him during consultations with each of the political forces concerned. The Tanzanian Minister also considered as unacceptable the rejection by RPF of the compromise reached within the Liberal

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Party on a formula for sharing the Party's assigned seats in the transitional Parliament.

19. The Prime Minister Designate, in a nationwide radio address on 18 March, announced the proposed composition of the broad-based transitional Government. The following day, the Prime Minister of the current coalition Government, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, announced the names of deputies for the Transitional National Assembly.

20. According to a communiqué issued on 21 March 1994, President Habyarimana met earlier that day with the Prime Minister Designate and informed him that he had received a letter dated 20 March, from one of the two factions of the Liberal Party, protesting against the Prime Minister Designate's choice of candidate for Minister of Justice, a portfolio assigned to the Liberal Party under the Arusha peace agreement. The President requested the Prime Minister Designate to continue consultations with the Liberal Party with a view to reaching an agreement which, according to the President, should be based on the compromise formula reached on 27 February by which the three ministerial positions assigned to the Liberal Party should be divided in a two to one ratio between the Party's two factions, with the faction receiving one ministerial portfolio nominating candidates for the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly.

21. According to the same communiqué, President Habyarimana believed that the list of deputies for the Transitional National Assembly, which he had received on 20 March from the Prime Minister of the current coalition Government, contained a number of anomalies impeding the installation of the Transitional National Assembly. The communiqué again called on the Prime Minister to ensure that the obstacles to the entry of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic in the transitional Parliament were removed; ensure the representation of the "Parti démocrate Islamique" (Islamic Democrat Party) in the Transitional National Assembly; and take into account the recent rulings on cases brought before the courts by some Democratic Republican Movement party members seeking to become members of the Transitional National Assembly. The communiqué concluded that the President would be prepared to preside over the ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions once the above-mentioned concerns had been addressed.

22. Ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions that were scheduled to take place on 25 March 1994 were cancelled as there were still a number of outstanding issues to be resolved.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

23. Despite the increased tensions and insecurity engendered by the political impasse described above, the cease-fire generally appeared to hold during the period under review. UNAMIR forces, whose operational capacity was enhanced with the deployment of additional personnel and equipment, continued to play a stabilizing role.

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24. With the arrival in Kigali on 28 December 1993 of a UNAMIR-escorted 600-man RPF security battalion, the military tasks projected for phase I of the operational plan were effectively concluded, ahead of schedule. It will be recalled that this phase, which commenced with the adoption of Security Council resolution 872 (1993), was to last 90 days and to be completed with the installation of the broad-based transitional Government by 5 January 1994. The persistent stalemate on the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government has delayed the start of phase II operations, which were also scheduled to last 90 days and to comprise preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces of the parties and of the gendarmerie. UNAMIR forces earmarked for phase II operations are nevertheless in place and ready to begin operations on short notice, as soon as the broad-based transitional Government is formed. In addition, preparations for phase III, which would involve the actual disengagement, demobilization and integration process, are well advanced.

25. It will also be recalled, as stated in my report of 24 September 1993, that the projected strength of UNAMIR military personnel was to stand at 1,428 by the end of phase I and to reach a peak, at the end of phase II, with a total of 2,548 all ranks. As of 22 March 1994, UNAMIR had a strength of 2,539 military personnel, from the following 24 nations: Austria (15), Bangladesh (942), Belgium (440), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), Congo (26), Egypt (10), Fiji (1), Ghana (843), Hungary (4), Malawi (5), Mali (10), Netherlands (9), Nigeria (15), Poland (5), Romania (5), Russian Federation (15), Senegal (35), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (25) and Zimbabwe (29). These figures include the 81 military observers serving with the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

26. Under the implementation plan approved by the Security Council on 5 October 1993, UNAMIR operations were to be divided into five sectors. However, in view of the situation that developed in the south of the country following the attempted coup d'état of 21 October 1993 in neighbouring Burundi, a sixth sector was established in February 1994 to cover the requirements identified in my report of 30 December 1993. During the period under review, major developments in the six sectors have included the following:

(a) The Force headquarters, responsible in particular for the command and control of the operations of the UNAMIR military component, has become fully operational with the recent arrival of vehicles, communications and other equipment. It is also increasingly active in conducting and coordinating security operations, coordinating joint meetings with Government and RPF military officials on various issues and undertaking reconnaissance and planning for the disengagement and demobilization process;

(b) The Military Observer Group headquarters has also become fully operational. It exercises command and control over the three established observer sectors, namely the Rwandese government forces sector, the RPF sector and the southern sector. The Military Observer Group continues to conduct reconnaissance, as well as investigatory and escort operations;

(c) The Kigali sector headquarters has reached its full operational strength with the arrival of the remainder of the Bangladesh battalion and

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military observers. The main activities of the sector have included providing security for the RPF battalion and civilian officials encamped in the "CND building" in Kigali, providing security for senior government and opposition leaders and ensuring respect for the Kigali weapons secure area. To deal with the worsened security situation in Kigali, 200 military personnel from the Ghanaian battalion in the DMZ were temporarily redeployed recently to assist the Kigali sector, which has become increasingly involved in monitoring the gendarmerie and assisting it in the maintenance of security in the capital;

(d) The DMZ sector became fully operational in late February 1994 with the establishment of the sector headquarters in Byumba and the deployment of the Ghanaian battalion and the Bangladesh engineer company. The presence of some 1,000 UNAMIR military personnel in the area has permitted greater security and monitoring of the DMZ which, in turn, has encouraged growing numbers of formerly displaced persons to return to their homes in the DMZ area. Major activities of the sector have included patrolling, observation, investigation, demolition and disposal of ammunition and escorting humanitarian operations in the area. A number of minor cease-fire violations have occurred. The violations were investigated and, where required, discussions have taken place to resolve them;

(e) The Rwandese government forces and RPF sectors are fully operational in Ruhengeri and Mulindi, respectively. The main activities of the two sectors have covered reconnaissance of assembly points in preparation for phase III operations, confirming the positions of the Rwandese government forces and RPF forces, monitoring the activities of both sides, monitoring the spontaneous return of refugees and investigating reported incidents. In addition, these sectors constitute an essential contact point with the armed forces of the parties;

(f) The southern sector headquarters was established in February 1994 in Butane as an additional sector from existing resources of military observers and equipment. However, additional transport, communications and other equipment will be needed to meet the operational requirements of this sector. It covers a sensitive and increasingly tense area, resulting from the influx of refugees from neighbouring Burundi, cross-border activities, heightened ethnic tensions, increasing reports of paramilitary training and arms distributions, famine and the continuing volatility of the overall political situation in Burundi and Rwanda itself. The sector is, in particular, frequently called upon to assist humanitarian operations by providing escorts for delivery convoys and security for storage depots and distribution points.

27. Owing in part to the continuing political stalemate, the period under review has seen a rapid and dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Kigali. January and February saw increasingly violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassination of political leaders and assaults on and murders of civilians, developments that severely overstretched the resources and capabilities of the national gendarmerie. Following an upsurge in violent incidents in late February, culminating in the assassination of two prominent political leaders and the ambush of a UNAMIR-escorted RPF convoy, the Government imposed a curfew in Kigali and in other cities. Furthermore, UNAMIR and the United Nations community in Kigali moved into phase II security status for a period of about three weeks. The United Nations community has since returned to

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the phase I security status, as the security situation has begun to stabilize, especially following the increased support provided to the gendarmerie by UNAMIR military and civilian police components.

28. Meanwhile, UNAMIR has stressed to all the parties that there should be no importation of ammunition into Rwanda before the installation of the broad-based transitional Government. My Special Representative has also expressed his serious concern about increasing reports regarding the distribution of weapons to civilians, which constitutes a serious threat not only to public security in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda but also to UNAMIR personnel.

29. The Rwandese government forces have continued, despite repeated protests by UNAMIR, to mine the major route from Kigali to Mulindi and the Ugandan border. Because of the threat that this posed to UNAMIR personnel and to humanitarian convoys, this issue became the topic of discussions at the highest levels between UNAMIR and the Government and resulted in the removal of the mines and the clearance of the route. On several other occasions, the Rwandese government forces have alleged that RPF was using UNAMIR-escorted convoys to smuggle armed personnel and weapons into Kigali. To help to remove such concerns and suspicions, a strict inspection procedure has been initiated to the satisfaction of the two parties.

30. During this reporting period, the deployment of the engineer, logistics and medical units was completed. The engineers are conducting valuable reconnaissance in preparation for the disengagement and demobilization process planned for phase III. The medical unit is functioning and providing basic as well as emergency medical assistance to UNAMIR personnel. Despite continuing shortages, the overall logistics situation has improved with the arrival of vehicles, communications and other equipment from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and ONUK2. In addition, with the recent arrival of helicopters, UNAMIR will be able to enhance its reconnaissance operations and air mobility in the Mission area.

31. The composition of UNAMIR personnel from diverse nationalities has underscored the need for local interpreters and translators mentioned in my last report. The ability of UNAMIR personnel to communicate with the local population could make a difference between life and death, especially in emergency situations.

32. Planning for the demining programme is well advanced. The continued cooperation of both the Rwandese government forces and the RPF is essential, if this programme is to succeed. A mine clearance coordination centre has been established in the Force headquarters and a data bank has been started. Samples of mines used by both parties are expected shortly, so that testing and training can be conducted. Coordination in mine-clearance matters has been established between UNAMIR, the two parties and the various interested humanitarian agencies.

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IV. CIVILIAN POLICE

33. With the arrival of the Police Commissioner, Colonel Manfred Bliem (Austria), on 26 December 1993 and of the police units from Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Mali, Senegal and Togo in January and February 1994, the UNAMIR civilian police contingent (CIVPOL) has set up its headquarters in Kigali and reached its current authorized strength of 60 civilian police monitors. CIVPOL headquarters in Kigali includes a special investigation team, a liaison section and six police monitoring teams.

34. In carrying out its mandate, which is to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the gendarmerie and the communal police, CIVPOL works closely with the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Police Communale (commune police) in Kigali. Its Special Investigation Team, which cooperates closely with the Government Prosecutor and maintains contact with local human rights groups, follows cases involving ethnic or politically motivated crimes, as well as complaints against the gendarmerie itself. Since CIVPOL became operational in January, the Special Investigation Team has dealt with 54 serious crimes, complaints and allegations of human rights violations.

35. During the same period, CIVPOL has received reports of 36 people killed as a result of demonstrations or riots. The Liaison Section monitors the activities of special units of the gendarmerie such as the mobile intervention groups, the airport, road and VIP sections and the training school. The six police monitoring teams are deployed with the gendarmerie's four territorial brigades and the headquarters group as well as to the commune police in Kigali. In response to the recent deterioration in the security situation, which has seriously strained the gendarmerie's limited personnel and logistics resources, CIVPOL has been assisting in patrolling, including night patrols, and in setting up new gendarmerie bases.

36. Since my report of 24 September 1993, as already mentioned above, the security situation in Rwanda and, especially in Kigali, has seriously deteriorated. While most incidents can be attributed to armed banditry, which has been growing as a result of the ready availability of weapons, ethnic and politically motivated crimes, including assassinations and murders, also have increased.

37. These disturbing incidents, unless contained or stopped, could lead to an environment of widespread and heightened insecurity that could hinder seriously the full and effective implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The situation is particularly worrisome because the national gendarmerie, which is responsible for maintaining law and order, is severely handicapped in terms of personnel, equipment and training. Close monitoring by CIVPOL, within the framework of its mandate, of the activities of the national gendarmerie and commune police, to ensure that they are acting in compliance with the terms of the Arusha peace agreement, is therefore a critical need. It is also necessary to give more visibility to the United Nations civilian police monitors, so as to inspire and enhance confidence and promote a greater sense of security within the population.

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38. On the basis of its current authorized personnel strength of 60, the civilian police component has been able to deploy and operate only in Kigali, instead of being able, as originally intended, to function in various parts of Rwanda. It has become evident that an additional 45 civilian police monitors would be required for deployment along a formula of 5 monitors per province, to monitor the 9 territorial companies of the gendarmerie who are responsible for the country's 9 provinces. The primary tasks of these additional police monitors would cover the monitoring of the activities of the gendarmerie and commune police. They would also participate in patrols and, as appropriate, investigate and report on related incidents. Since the cost implications of this proposed personnel increase will be minimal, it is my intention to reflect them in my next submission to the General Assembly.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

39. Since my last report, the humanitarian situation in Rwanda has become even more worrying as new challenges have compounded existing difficulties and deepened the crisis. Effects of the massive population displacements as a result of the conflict, the continuing drought in parts of the country, as well as the shortage of seeds for planting, have increased the threat of famine to hundreds of thousands of Rwandese. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission that was undertaken in February 1994 confirmed a critical food supply situation in all parts of Rwanda. Declining national revenues, owing to the worsening overall economic situation, are hindering efforts to improve seriously deteriorated public services in health, sanitation and social relief and rehabilitation, thus increasing the risks of vulnerability and need among the population. The special requirements of children and women are of particular concern.

40. Owing in large measure to the assistance provided over the years by United Nations and other international humanitarian relief agencies (non-governmental as well as intergovernmental), mortality and malnutrition rates, which are still unacceptably high, have dropped in refugee and displaced-person camps since December 1993. However, other problems persist, including in particular inadequate housing and rampant epidemic diseases due to shortages of medicines and, above all, cramped and unsanitary living conditions in the settlements. Another source of concern is refugees (270,000, primarily from Burundi) and internally displaced persons (370,000) who continue to need humanitarian assistance.

41. Other new challenges involve tensions associated with the consequences and impact of the growing numbers of spontaneous returnees, many of whom left Rwanda years ago. Some, upon returning to the country, have settled on land vacated temporarily by citizens internally displaced as a result of the recent conflict, while others have begun to make claims on land and other property reportedly left behind when they fled the country. These developments have caused or exacerbated tensions in various communities and humanitarian relief agencies are increasingly concerned that, if left unresolved, they could have a damaging effect on the smooth and safe operation of humanitarian relief activities, including in particular repatriation and rehabilitation programmes.

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42. Close inter-agency cooperation and collaboration in the field of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda is facilitating operations to reach those in need. The United Nations Resident Coordinator has also been designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator and is assisted by an Inter-Agency support unit. A disaster management team composed of representatives of concerned United Nations system organizations has been established. Arrangements are under way to put in place an integrated regional early warning and resource mobilization information system.

43. UNAMIR, which assists in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in Rwanda, has stepped up security support for these activities, including providing escorts for convoys and protection for depots and distribution centres. My Special Representative has begun visiting refugee and displaced-person settlements, thus contributing to focusing greater national and international attention on the needs and problems involved. I wish to seize this opportunity to express deep appreciation to those members of the international community who have responded to the humanitarian assistance appeal for Rwanda launched last year and to call once again for continuing, and increased, assistance to meet the growing needs. I would also like to commend the dedicated staff and volunteers who continue to participate in relief operations, often in very difficult conditions, and sometimes at great personal risk.

VI. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS

44. The General Assembly, by its decision 48/479 of 23 December 1993, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments up to the amount of US\$ 51,120,000 gross (US\$ 50,478,000 net) for the maintenance of UNAMIR for the period from 5 October 1993 to 4 April 1994. The cost of maintaining UNAMIR for the period ending 4 April 1994 will therefore be limited to the amount authorized by the General Assembly. In my report to the General Assembly on the financing of UNAMIR, ^{1/} it is estimated that the cost of maintaining the Mission beyond 4 April 1994 would be approximately \$9.1 million gross (\$8.9 million net) per month, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate beyond that date. An amount of \$50.7 million was apportioned among Member States on 21 January 1994 for the cost of UNAMIR. As of 18 March 1994, some \$17.7 million had been received.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

45. UNAMIR has continued to support the efforts of the people of Rwanda to implement the Arusha peace agreement. Through their respect of the cease-fire, the parties have demonstrated that they remain committed to the peace process set out in the agreement. This is, without doubt, a positive development. However, despite the cease-fire, commensurate progress has not been made in the political process.

46. The United Nations was invited to assist in the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement by its two signatories. As the implementation process commenced, there was a general expectation that the new institutions would be

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installed by 5 January 1994 to guide Rwanda through a two-year transitional period. Thus far, only one of those institutions, the Presidency, which was officially installed on the target date of 5 January, has been put in place. Failure to establish the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly has continued to impede the implementation of the other provisions of the agreement.

47. As I have stated, continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation of the Arusha peace agreement by the parties. The United Nations presence can be justified only if the parties show the necessary political will to abide by their commitments and to implement the agreement. To this end, I urge the parties to make a renewed and determined effort to reach agreement on the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly. It is obvious that the establishment of the transitional institutions constitutes an important prerequisite for the revitalization of the peace process and for the promotion of a climate of mutual confidence and cooperation. I therefore urge the parties to set aside their differences and agree to put these institutions in place without further delay or procrastination.

48. Progress made thus far in the negotiations suggests that a compromise could be reached on the transitional institutions. I am encouraged by the fact that, in spite of increasing tensions, the parties have maintained the process of dialogue. The United Nations should continue to support the dialogue and the current initiatives to resolve the remaining differences in order to complete phase I of my implementation plan and to facilitate phase II operations which include the disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces of the parties and gendarmerie.

49. I would therefore recommend that the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period of six months, during which I shall keep the Council fully informed of the pace of progress in the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. However, in the event that the transitional institutions are not installed within the next two months and if, by that time, sufficient progress in the implementation of the next phase of the Agreement has not also been achieved, the Council should then review the situation, including the role of the United Nations.

Notes

1/ A/48/837 and Corr.1.

3/1/01
dt

France

14/15

Translated from French

30 March 1994 - 8 p.m.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as well as its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994,

Recalling its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993 and 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993,

Recalling also its statement dated 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1994 (S/1994/360),

Welcoming the valuable contribution to peace made in Rwanda by UNAMIR,

Expressing its deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the provisional Parliament,

Considering that the fact that these transitional institutions have not been established constitutes a major obstacle to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali and in the UNZ sector,

Concerned also at the deterioration of the humanitarian and health situation ~~in the UNZ sector~~,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda dated 30 March 1994;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until ^{30 September} ~~30 September~~ 1994, on the understanding that the Security Council will, within the next two months, review the situation in Rwanda, including the role played in that country by the United Nations, if the Secretary-General informs it in a report that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement have not been established and that insufficient progress has been made for the implementation of phase II of the Secretary-General's plan contained in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488);

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy 45 additional civilian police to strengthen the machinery in the provinces, as described in paragraph 38 of his report;

4. Regrets the delay in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and urges the parties to resolve their latest differences without delay with a view to the immediate establishment of the transitional institutions required for the continuation of the process, and particularly the implementation of phase II;

310.01
dt

-2-

15/19

5. Welcomes the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected, and commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR;

6. Recalls nevertheless that continued support for UNAMIR will depend upon full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

7. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and facilitate dialogue between all parties concerned;

8. Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and again urges others to provide such assistance;

9. Commends in particular the efforts of the ^{Governance of TANZANIA} Organization of African Unity and its agencies, as well as those of the ~~United Nations~~ in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council;

10. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the question.

US

15/19

March 31, 1994

Draft Resolution on Rwanda

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and all subsequent resolutions;

Taking note of the continuing impasse in implementing key elements of the Arusha peace agreement;

Emphasizing that the Security Council, in resolution 893 of 6 January 1994, authorized the deployment of a second battalion to the demilitarized zone as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 December 1993, and that the international community has thus done its part in ensuring that conditions exist for implementing the agreement;

Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Tanzanian facilitator and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to help promote dialogue between the parties;

- 1) Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 25 March, 1994 (S/);
- 2) Strongly urges all parties to honor their commitments under the Arusha peace agreement, in particular the establishment of a broad-based transitional government;
- 3) Reaffirms the statement by the President of the Security Council on 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8) which expressed deep concern at the deterioration in the security situation, especially in Kigali, and which called the attention of the parties to the consequences of non-compliance with relevant provisions of the agreement;
- 4) Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until June 7, 1994;
- 5) Emphasizes that its support of UNAMIR past June 7, 1994 is tied to the achievement of tangible progress towards implementing the agreement, including the establishment of a transitional government;

- 2 -

6) Requests the Secretary-General to report not later than May 31, 1994 on the situation in Rwanda, the progress made towards implementing the agreement, and the extent to which UNAMIR is capable of fully carrying out its mandate;

7) Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies, and asks him to report on the results of his efforts in his next report;

9) Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

19:53 (4840)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$164.40
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04247/NYK	04-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

At informals today, US and France tabled a compromised joint draft resolution to renew UNAMIRs mandate. The draft proposed a 3 month renewal period (to 30 June 1994) together with a review of the situation in Rwanda to be undertaken by the Council "within the next six weeks". This reflected something of an accommodation between the French desire for a 6 month renewal and a strong US preference to see a short renewal (for only 2 months) coupled with a strong message to the parties to get on with the process of implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement.

2 At informals this afternoon, the NAM (being coordinated by Nigeria for April) made it clear that they opposed the 3 month renewal proposed given that UNAMIR had been so successful, ie the ceasefire agreement had held. They also expressed a strong desire to see a reference in the text to the recommendation in para 38 of the Sec Gen's report for the deployment of an additional 45 civilian police monitors.

3 We indicated a general dislike of artificially short mandates for the purpose of sending political signals.

4 After informals broke to allow time for the NAM to caucus, they returned to make a proposal that the mandate be renewed for 6 months but with pressure being applied to the parties by way of the Council agreeing to undertake an earlier review of the situation/progress. Various drafting proposals were put forward and it was decided to refer the US/French text to a working group.

5 In the event, the working group agreed on a renewal period of 4 months coupled with the insertion of a reference to the proposal relating to the additional 45 police monitors. The review period was retained at "within 6 weeks". Copy of draft resolution by fax (Wgtn only), which is being issued as a Presidential Text in blue tonight.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C042-1/NYK

Page 2

6 The text is agreed ad referendum only, the US emphasised during the working group that it could not guarantee acceptance by Washington.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

16:43 (4838)	700/WSH/00000/00000	\$333.21
FROM: WASHINGTON	C02734/WSH	04-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
CC: HARARE CANBERRA LONDON MADRID OTTAWA	PARIS TOKYO BEIJING MOSCOW SANTIAGO	Priority Routine Routine Routine Routine
TO: Defence		Immediate
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, AMER, EUR, DSP1, EAB)	
DEFENCE HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI)	
DEFENCE MOD	(GENTLES)	

Subject

U04000: SECURITY COUNCIL: NEW ZEALAND PRESIDENCY: RWANDA

Paris' C01742. Your C21388.

Summary

2 US position is to keep Rwanda on a "short leash" with a 2-2.5 month review, pending the formation of a transitional government (TG) in Kilgali. US draft resolution will stress that responsibility for progress lies with the Rwandans themselves. The parties have moved some distance towards compromise but the situation remains tense. Key issue is participation of a (militant Hutu) CDR representative in TG over RPF objections. State does not rule out progress before 5 April mandate renewal. If matter is settled US would move to a six month renewal. US is sympathetic to SG's Report request for more police observers.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We spoke to IO (Zelle) and Africa Bureau (Aiston) on 30 March and again on 4 April. Both told us essentially the same story. US policy on mandate renewal is to make clear to the parties in Rwanda that it is up to them to make progress and to keep pressure on for agreement on the composition of the transitional government. If no agreement is reached on a transitional government before 5 April only a brief ("2 to 2.5

CONFIDENTIAL

month") mandate renewal is preferred by the US. Zelle told us today that France now appears to be willing to accept this.

5 The Administration is also very reluctant to agree to the request for 45 extra police observers. While the US wishes to "maintain a strong force", the additional 45 personnel will not make a crucial difference to the outcome, and their deployment at this time would contradict the point that it is up to the parties on the ground to make progress in the negotiations. An additional consideration for the Administration as they have not yet notified Congress of this possible additional deployment, as it has informally agreed to do with all UN PKOs. (Comment: we sense that financial considerations also play a part on the US position).

6 In the (now unlikely) event that agreement is reached on a transitional government before the vote, the US would support a longer ("six month") renewal and would be prepared to assist, including with additional police monitors. (Comment: There is clearly an element of carrot and stick in this position). State does expect the mandate renewal to go to a vote tomorrow 5 April.

7 Aiston provided a comprehensive review of recent developments in Rwanda. We assume much of the background will be known to you. He stressed that there has been progress in the direction of a transitional government in recent weeks, but that there are still obstacles to be overcome. Tension and sporadic violence continue. As you will recall, the process of forming a transitional government (composed of the MRND party of President Habyarimana and the four opposition parties, plus the RPF) had earlier been complicated by the emergence of splits in some of the coalition partners:

- The MDR (predominantly Hutu successor to the pre-secession government) has split into a hardline and a moderate wing, of which only the latter has been willing to deal with the RPF;
- The Liberal Party (PL) had also split: Commerce Minister Mugenzi leads a Hutu wing; Tutsi Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Lando Ndasingwa leads a breakaway Tutsi group;
- The Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Hutu Public Works Minister Gatabazi remains willing to deal with Tutsi and provides a stabilising influence. No change is reported in the position of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

7 The splits in the MDR and LP had complicated the implementation of the Arusha Accord when factions had put up competing lists of deputies for seats and portfolios allocated under the Accord. In particular Lando's contesting of the Justice portfolio threatened to upset the balance of power between Tutsi and Hutu (the Tutsi RPF already had the Interior

Ministry and Gendarmerie). That dispute had been resolved during the past month: of the eleven LP deputy slots, the Mugenzi faction got 5 and the Lando faction 6. Mugenzi and Lando were confirmed by the PM in their old portfolios and a neutral third person, a Tutsi, was named to the Justice portfolio. The problem of overlapping lists arising from the split in the MDR was resolved through local caucuses.

8 The remaining issue is the question of CDR membership of the transitional assembly. (Only one seat was allocated to this militant Hutu faction under the Arusha Accord.) The PM has publicly committed himself to the full implementation of the Accord, but the RPF has so far opposed CDR participation when the assembly is convened. The RPF has said it would accept the subsequent admission of the CDR member if a majority of deputies agreed (as is likely), but this remains unacceptable to the CDR. The US is also opposed to this "compromise" as it violates the integrity of the Arusha settlement. State notes that the Accord provides for the subsequent expulsion of any member which violates the assembly's code of ethics.

9 Aiston commented that despite the detailed and precise nature of the Arusha Accord, it is not always easy to tell which problems are the result of a real clash of interests and which are the product of negotiating tactics by the players. He did not rule out the possibility that even if the CDR deputy is admitted to the transitional assembly, other problems might surface. (Comment: this perception underlies US determination to sheet home responsibility for progress to the parties themselves).

End Message

04/05/94 21:07 212 758 0827

NZ MISSION NY --- UNSC

003

115/23/37

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

Re: 5 April 1994

WELLINGTON No.
WGTN UNSC No.

2380

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

SFAT (MEA, UN, ISAC, LGL, EAB)

Page 1 of: 3

Copied to UNSS, MEA, ISAC, LGL, DSP7, UN

Subject: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Resolution renewing mandate of UNAMIR adopted unanimously tonight as res
(1994). EOVs were given by Rwanda, Nigeria, Djibouti, France, US,
Zaire and Oman.

1. Mr. [Signature]
2. file.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

115/23/37

10:31 (4847)

700/WSH/00000/00000

\$44.43

FROM:	WASHINGTON	C02737/WSH	05-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	NEW YORK	Immediate
CC:	WGTN UNSC	BEIJING	Routine
	CANBERRA	LONDON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, DSP1, AMER, EAB)

Subject

U04003: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

New York's C04247. Your C21540.

2 State was "taken by surprise" by the 4 month compromise on the mandate renewal, according to IO (Zelle). State does not yet have clearance to support the DR. However it appears likely that, given the six week interim review and the absence of the additional police observers, the US will reluctantly accept the blue.

3 Our C02734 penultimate line of para 2 should have read "unsympathetic".

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

21:05 (4869)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$224.20
FROM: NEW YORK	C04260/NYK	06-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
MFAT	(MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi killed, most likely by assassination, in plane crash at Kigali airport.
- Council President asked to make immediate statement to the press, expressing condolences on behalf of Council members.

Action

For information only

Report

Secretariat (Gharekhan) informed the Council at informals this afternoon of reports of the deaths of Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a plane crash over Kigali airport today (6 April). He was unable to confirm press reports and had no information about the timing of the incident or any other information. You will have seen AFP and Reuters reports that residents in the center of Kigali (9 miles west of the airport) reported loud explosions followed by sporadic shooting after dark during which a small plane could be heard circling, apparently unable to land.

2 The Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were apparently returning from a one-day regional summit meeting in Dar es Salaam convened by Tanzania's President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and devoted to situation in Rwanda and Burundi.

3 We said that as President we would be willing to make a statement expressing the Council's shock and conveying condolences.

4 French (Merimee) emphasised the significance of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

incident for the peace process noting that there could well be serious security repercussions in Rwanda. This raised questions about both the safety of UN personnel on the ground and about the mandate of UNAMIR, the UN must "help with the security situation in Kigali", he said. The readiness of fanatics to derail the peace process was particularly disturbing.

5 Rwanda (Bizimana) confirmed that President Habyarimana had been assassinated and that at present the recovery of the burned bodies is being undertaken. He noted that the President was accompanied by close advisers also. No doubt it was carried out by the "enemies of peace" he said. The situation in Kigali will be difficult and he went on to express appreciation to the UN for "standing by" the people of Rwanda to date and said he believed that the UN force in Rwanda would have a "beneficial effect" hoping that it would "take steps to limit the situation" on the ground.

6 The outcome was that the President was asked to convey to the media an immediate statement concerning the incident expressing, on behalf of all Council Members, their shock, their condolences to both the families and people of Rwanda about the incident and expressing their firm hope that the security situation did not deteriorate as an immediate consequence and to appeal for calm. This was done at the conclusion of informals. A more formal statement was also read into the record of the Formal Council meeting which followed (on Bosnia)

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 197/1/1,168/1/1

15:17 (4880)	700/PAR/00000/00000	\$194.30
FROM: PARIS	C01754/PAR	07-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
CC: BEIJING LONDON MOSCOW HARARE	CANBERRA WASHINGTON OTTAWA	Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	(MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL:RWANDA

New York's C04260.

2. We spoke to Ligniere (UN Section) this afternoon about the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a plane crash at Kigali airport yesterday. She did not have a lot to add to press reports and New York's reftel but the following may be of interest:

* The Belgian Ambassador had reported that the plane had been hit by gunfire but for the moment there was no confirmation of this. France had no firm information on who might have carried out the attack.

* The security situation in Kigali was deteriorating.

* France would call for the Security Council to request a report from the Security-General (possibly an oral report) in an effort to establish the facts about the crash. It would also call on the UNSG to do what it could to ensure the safety of UNAMIR troops and government leaders. It was doubtful however that UNAMIR, as presently constituted, could do much if the situation continued to deteriorate.

3. According to press reports, French troops in Central Africa have been put on alert. Light and heavy arms fire has been heard around the Rwandan capital this morning but Bujumbura remains calm.

4. Since speaking to Ligniere, AFP has reported that three Rwandan Ministers (members of the opposition) have been abducted, along with three UNAMIR soldiers who were protecting them, by "elements" of the Presidential guard.

Comment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

C01754/PAR

Page 2

5. We will check again with the Quai before our close of play and report any further if necessary. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the possibility that France may consider sending in troops to either assist UNAMIR troops or evacuate foreigners cannot be discounted.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115 723/37

04/07/94 20:51 212 758 0827

NZ MISSION NY

UNSC

001

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 7 April 1994

To: WELLINGTON No. 2396
WGTN UNSC ✓ No.

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

From: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, EAB)

Page 1 of: 3

~~Revised to UNSC, MEA, UNC, ISAC, LGL, DSP I~~

Subject: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/16) adopted in formal Council session tonight after briefing from Gharakhan follows. Events are unfolding rapidly, we now know for example that 11 Belgian peacekeepers have been killed. You will see from media reports that prominent members of the government have been killed with absolutely no government in control. There is total chaos in Kigali and significant fears for UN personnel, civilian population and the foreign community.

1. *M. J. [Signature]*
2. *file*

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your le:

Our file: 3/88/1

22:17 (4899)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$373.70
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04272/NYK	08-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council receives report on situation in Rwanda and letter from Sec Gen.
- France, US and Belgium are well down the tracks with plans for military action to evacuate nationals. Both France and US prefer to do this under UN auspices. Belgian position is unclear.
- There is some indication of an improvement in Kigali with the announcement of an interim president and 5 ministers but the chance of this sticking is unclear.
- Council may need to meet in the weekend to consider possible requests to alter UNAMIR mandate or to authorise member states to take necessary measures.
- We gave the Council a strong lead that if the situation does deteriorate the Council should oversee any action not stand back and watch unilateral intervention (Congo is on many minds).
- Council agreed with our proposal to set up monitoring arrangements over the weekend and to request the Secretariat to do appropriate contingency planning. President was also asked to give a detailed media briefing.

Action

For information only

Report

CONFIDENTIAL

2 Secretariat (Riza) briefed Council at informals this afternoon on the developing situation in Rwanda. He also provided additional information to the President shortly afterwards. The situation remains very concerning but there has been some progress. UNAMIR Force Commander and the Special Rep have been engaged in intensive efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement in Kigali and to establish some interim authority which can take control and to whom the Presidential Guard (the group that had gone nuts after the presidents assassination) might begin to take orders and stop killing people.

3 Efforts continued all day toward a cease-fire. Though originally scheduled to take effect from 10am (NY time) Friday, and postponed during the day, it now seemed to have been agreed and having some effect. Additionally, on the political front, an interim president has been named, together with 5 Ministers. The interim president appears to come from the late President's political party and although the appointments were negotiated by the UN with the Gendamerie and the army, and the RPF advised, it is unclear whether this is acceptable to the RPF and whether it will stick. (As a precondition to its agreement to the cease-fire, the RPF had asked for those who had engaged in the killing to be held responsible. The UN's response to the RPF had been to make an appeal for the cease-fire to be concentrated on first and then for consideration to be given to those other issues later.)

4 The conditions for the UN in brokering these arrangements have been very difficult. Although UNHQ here in NY could communicate with the UNAMIR force commander, and with also the Special Rep, it was difficult for the force commander and the Special Rep to communicate with each other in Kigali. Electricity is out (resulting in loss of telecommunications). A further major worry for UNAMIR is food, petrol and other logistics if the airport remains out. Four more days and the situation will be critical.

5 Riza reported 2 further Belgian nationals had been killed and France (Merimee) advised that 2 French citizens had also been killed. Of the 2 Ghanain peacekeepers kidnapped yesterday, one had been released and one was detained but could be observed in a compound and was OK. A number of foreign nationals had taken refuge in embassy compounds and UNAMIR were attempting to guard these.

6 The President reported to the Council the points made during a call on him by the Representative of the RPF on instruction from his HQ. During this call the RPF Rep advised that the RPF would be respecting its position behind the demilitarised lines held in accordance with the Arush Peace Agreement. He also noted that the RPF had so far shown restraint but indicated that they would prefer that any evacuation of foreign nationals be done by UNAMIR. The RPF Rep made it clear that any unilateral evacuation force would

be considered as a hostile force if it entered without their consent or remained in Rwanda for longer than the period necessary for the evacuation.

7 Although RPF was totally opposed to any change in UNAMIRs mandate which would result in it engaging in a combat role, they had no problem with the exercise of its present mandate in a self defence role. He made it clear though, that any intervention by UNAMIR in RPF movements would result in the force being considered as hostile. In his personal estimation, much of the political leadership had been assassinated and it would be difficult now to form an administration.

8 France indicated that the main objective was to reestablish some authority in Kigali and that UNAMIR and the Special Rep were playing a positive role in this. As to the possibility of the evacuation of foreign nationals, there were two issues for the Council to consider, what would be UNAMIR's role in any evacuation and what would be its future.

9 Nigeria indicated that the African Group was scheduled to meet on Monday to discuss the Rwanda issue.

10 US indicate that the situation is extremely grave and that the Council did not have enough information about what would be involved in an evacuation. US understanding is that it would require an air drop of troops into Kigali to take over control of the airport, now under the control of the Presidential Guard, and to establish a security perimeter of some distance around the airport to enable its use. UNAMIR does not have the equipment or resources on the ground to do this and "much homework" was required on this issue. It is not just a question of beefing up UNAMIR as it presently exists.

11 Outcome of discussion was Presidential summing up as set out in para 1 above.

Comment

12 In the best case, no further action may be necessary. In the worst, emergency evacuation will be required and a force sent. The UNAMIR Commander has asked for 24 hours in which to establish whether the cease-fire, and the positive political developments stick and what alternatives should be considered.

13 It is possible that over the weekend either the French or the US may come to the Council seeking UN cover along the lines of that provided in Somalia.

14 Council President will receive a briefing from Riza at 10.30am on Saturday with a view to considering a possible Council meeting later in the afternoon. We will let you know what transpires. Copy of the Sec Gen's letter follows by fax.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04272/NYK

Page 4

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your (le:

Our file: 3/88/1

22:40 (4900)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$156.90
FROM: NEW YORK	C04273/NYK	08-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Our C04272.

The Secretariat has called us as President to advise that they have just been advised by the Force Commander in Kigali that about an hour ago (2am Kigali time) three French military aircraft landed at Kigali Airport and discharged approximately 150 French combat troops.

2 As of the present time UNAMIR who have made contact with the French are unaware of their precise orders but they assume that their primary mission is to secure the airport in advance of the landing of a more substantial force after daylight.

3 We requested Secretariat to circulate this information by fax to all Security Council members.

4 Clearly the French were further down the intervention track than our contacts here were aware. We suspect these developments will make it inevitable a Security Council meeting will be required tomorrow (9 April).

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

23:21 (42190)

700/NYK/...../.....

\$142.00

FROM:	New York	C04276/NYK	08-Apr-1994
TO:	Wellington	Wgtn UNSC	Immediate
CC:	Beijing	Canberra	Routine
	Harare	London	Routine
	Moscow	Ottawa	Routine
	Paris	Washington	Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Our C04273.

We have spoken to French Mission. They have no instructions and the events in the last hour or so at Kigali Airport seem to have taken them by surprise.

2 The Mission's reaction is still to favour seeking UN approval for the operation which is under way and they are so recommending to Paris.

3 It is late Friday evening here and few other PRs are available. We have advised Gambari (Nigeria). He gulped. Clearly the African members of the Council will have difficulty dealing with this issue.

4 Our guess is that we may be facing a proposal for a resolution tomorrow under which the Council would be asked to authorise (albeit ex post facto) the operation. No doubt the resolution authorising the original US operation in Somalia will be used as a model. We would not rule out the possibility of having to vote on the issue.

5 One other suggestion which has been floated in some quarters of the Secretariat is to attach the French troops to UNAMIR. We think this would be a bad idea, risking the UNOSOM mistake of confused missions and mandates and inevitably the French will not want UN Command.

6 Another possibility of course is that Paris will decide to ignore the UN and not seek Council support for their action at all. Depending on African reaction this could create a much more complex situation.

7 We have been unable to reach MFAT officers by phone so we have conveyed the essence of our earlier messages and this one to Blumhardt by phone for passing to the Minister.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G04276/NYK

Page 2

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

04/08/94 22:19 212 758 0827

NZ MISSION NY --- UNSC

001

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 8 April 1994

WELLINGTON
WGTN UNSC✓

No.
No.

2406

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

SFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DPS1, EAB)

Page 1 of: 2

Copied to UNSC, MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DPS1

Subject: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Re: IPT.

Copy of Sec Gen's letter to the Council on Rwanda follows.



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

REVISED

8 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

The members of the Security Council are aware of the tragic situation in Rwanda, and have been kept informed of the reports being received from my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNAMIR.

UNAMIR is engaged in intensive efforts to secure agreement on a cease-fire in Kigali, and to promote the establishment of an interim political authority to fill the present vacuum until some normality can be restored. Unfortunately, so far these efforts have been unsuccessful, but are continuing.

The Security Council, in the Presidential Statement of 7 April 1994, has expressed concern about the safety and security of the civilian population and of the foreign communities living in Rwanda as well as of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel. I fully share this concern and have been in contact with the Force Commander of UNAMIR in this regard.

It is quite possible that the evacuation of civilian staff from the United Nations system, as well as other foreign nationals, might become unavoidable, in which event UNAMIR would be hindered in providing assistance under its present mandate and rules of engagement. The members of the Security Council might wish to give this matter their urgent attention.

Should UNAMIR be required to effect such an evacuation, the Force Commander estimates that he would require two to three additional battalions for that purpose.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading 'Boutros Boutros-Ghali', is written above the printed name.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

His Excellency
Mr. Colin Keating
President of the Security Council
New York

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

18:49 (4911)	700/WSH/00000/00000	\$160.43
FROM: WASHINGTON	C02755/WSH	11-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC	NEW YORK	Immediate Routine
CC: BEIJING CANBERRA LONDON MOSCOW	BRUSSELS HARARE PARIS OTTAWA	Routine Routine Routine Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, CONS, LGL, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

U04029: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: US VIEWS

Your C21746.

Summary

2 All US citizens wishing to leave Rwanda have now been evacuated. US may assist an isolated group of Germans. US is looking closely at UNAMIR mandate - no decisions made but a growing feeling that withdrawal may be necessary. US is now (with embassy closed) receiving limited reporting from Kilgali. There is talk of a truce from tomorrow am.

Action

3 For information.

Report

4 We checked in with State's newly-convened Rwanda Task Force (Zelle) on 11 April. State reported that most Americans in Rwanda had now been evacuated. Exceptions were a few missionaries who had opted to stay and one or two still reporting from Kilgali. The US Embassy there was now closed and all staff had been removed.

5 The US understands a group of Germans has been stranded "atop a hill" en route to the border by a minefield blocking their road. State said the US may assist with their removal but gave no details.

6 State understands that the UN Secretariat briefed the Council this afternoon - only US comment worth reporting was their understanding that UNAMIR is now unable to fulfill its mandate (though they acknowledged that Kilgali airport is now secure and some patrolling is being conducted).

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7 This has apparently led to debate within the US system over the future of the mandate. No firm US position is yet available. Our contact indicated however that there is some feeling growing that if UNAMIR cannot perform its mandate and if UN personnel are under threat then the Council should consider its withdrawal.

8 Our contacts had little to add to media reports (Washington Post articles follow by bag to Wgtn) on the situation in Kilgali. With the closure of its embassy the US is now only receiving reports from one source in Kilgali by radio. The provisional government appears to be holding together for now, but its control over the situation is minimal. A truce appears to have been negotiated by the UN to take effect from 6 am tomorrow. The RPF has signed off on this (for the purposes of allowing foreigners to leave) but refuses to negotiate directly with the provisional government.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your (le:

Our file: 3/88/1

19:27 (4913)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$523.20
FROM: NEW YORK	C04282/NYK	11-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
MFAT	(MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04276

Summary

- The Council met on Saturday to consider Franco/Belge unilateral national action to evacuate foreign nationals, (now almost complete)
- Council receives further report of continuing grave situation today and further report expected tomorrow (Tues) - No further UN casualties
- UNAMIR assisting with national efforts to evacuate and with protection of civilians, as possible, given its limited means

Action

For information only

Report

2 Following the French unilateral action to land forces in Kigali, we decided it would be necessary to convene informal consultations of the Security Council. France subsequently approached us for a meeting "to brief Council members of their actions". We accordingly convened meeting on Saturday amidst intense media interest in developments on the ground.

3 Prior to the meeting Rwandan Ambassador (Bisimana) called on the President. Bisimana indicated that UNAMIR should continue its efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement and expressed concern about reports that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), (rebel forces against the late President's Presidential Guard responsible for the bloodshed following the President's assassination), was now moving on three

CONFIDENTIAL

fronts toward Kigali with the express intention of moving in while Kigali was in turmoil.

4 Rwanda requested that the UNOMUR observer forces on the Rwanda/Uganda border be instructed to monitor the situation closely following the movement of RPF forces in that region. Rwanda had no objection to the UN continuing to engage in contact with the new authorities in Kigali and believed the Special Rep had a role to play in remaining in contact with these new authorities on the political level. The evacuation was a humanitarian operation with which the new authorities of Rwanda agreed. As "a member of the Council", Rwanda was committed to such "humanitarian objectives".

5 President also had an opportunity to discuss situation with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Representative (Dusaidi). He indicated that RPF had no difficulty with evacuation efforts but with the previous caveats as to time and purpose. RPF forces were on the move and it was plain that their objective was to make the most of the turmoil in Kigali in achieving military or political advances.

6 Beginning the Council meeting, the secretariat (Riza) provided an update on the situation which had deteriorated sharply (by Saturday). A large number of displaced persons were now sheltering in a sports stadium where the Bangladeshi battalion is stationed. Part of the RPF forces had moved through the demilitarised zone (DMZ) in the north and were heading for Kigali, though there had been no reports that these forces had yet engaged in any fighting. The UN force commander was trying to work with the "Crisis Committee" (ie the "new authorities" of the Rwandan Government). The RPF forces denounced the new authorities (because - in their view - they represented the Presidential Guard).

7 Very provocative statements were being broadcast on air against foreign nationals following the landing of French forces. A UNDP convoy had taken agency staff and dependents out of Kigali toward Burundi and although they had received minor attacks and some injuries, they were not serious. The airport was under the control of the French with a UNAMIR (Belgian) contingent also at the airport.

8 The French then briefed the Council on the French unilateral action to land forces to evacuate nationals in terms which made it clear that Paris had no intention of seeking any UN cover for this operation. 190 men had landed on 8/9 April to take control of the airport and more would be arriving with a total French contingent of 300 for the operation. The Belgians would be landing additional forces. They were a "peaceful" force whose intervention the new Rwandan authorities had "consented to".

9 French emphasised the humanitarian nature of the operation and that it would be strictly limited in time. The French Government had felt that French nationals were in

danger (2 had been killed) and they were without protection. The first duty of any government France emphasised was the protection of its nationals. (Although it would be prepared to evacuate other foreign nationals whose governments requested this assistance.) But any questions relating to UNAMIR's role or presence was an entirely separate matter for the UN to determine.

10 The US strongly supported the "national decisions" involved in the joint Franco/Belge operation and emphasised the separate nature of the operation from any UN decisions concerning UNAMIR. Given the deterioration in the situation in Kigali, the UN decisions needed urgent consideration.

11 Nigerians, "representing the OAU", took the view we expected that although the Council must show understanding for the humanitarian nature of the national operations, the Council should also be concerned with the protection of Rwandan civilians, including giving some thought to beefing up UNAMIRs presence for such a role. During subsequent protracted discussion about the justification for the French intervention, Gambari (supported by Brazil, Russia and Argentina) made it clear that what was important in this context was the assurances given by the French that their operation would be first of a purely "humanitarian nature in exceptional circumstances" and secondly, would be strictly "limited in time". It was the strong wish of the African group (supported by China) that this rationale be placed "on the record" by the President by his making a statement to the media to this effect.

12 In the event it was not possible to reach agreement on this. The US and France (supported by the UK) reserved, in very strong terms, the "right" of governments to take national decisions regarding military operations. The French could not accept the President making any statement reflecting on the evacuation at all. This was solely a matter for France.

13 This aspect of the debate continued for some time and under increasingly difficult circumstances. Pakistan (and Brazil) characterised the difficulties as being short term on the one hand (ie relating to UNAMIR's future) and long term on the other (ie the Security Council responsibility for the long term political situation in Rwanda which historical evidence showed had a real likelihood of having an impact on the peace and security of the region). Finding a way to involve the OAU in the process of bringing peace to the region was important.

14 Secretariat (Anan) went on to emphasise the need for the two types of operations, now side by side, (and with Belgian forces participating in both) to cooperate closely. There was every indication that France would instruct its force to cooperate closely and this was welcome. However, if UNAMIR was to stay, the question of its mandate might need

consideration.

15 In subsequent discussion the US reserved its position as regard to what UNAMIRs role might be in the evacuation process. Rwanda made an intervention toward the end of discussion noting agreement to French actions, supporting the Special Rep's efforts to establish authority which could fill the political vacuum and welcoming the continued role of UNAMIR.

16 Accordingly, the President was asked to make statement to the media which noted that the Council had met and been briefed by the secretariat and by France; that it had discussed the situation of UNAMIR and begun to discuss the long term situation including UN support for the restoration of stability in Rwanda. The statement did not venture into the question of the French evacuation efforts. There was much interest in the position of the RPF forces now and the implications of the evacuation efforts on that developing situation.

Monday Meeting

17 At informals today Rwanda was again discussed and a further briefing received from the secretariat (Riza). Mortar and shelling is continuing in Kigali with a hospital having been hit (30 dead and large number of injuries). Efforts were continuing to reach a "truce" (as opposed to a cease/fire which RPF has ruled out unless it is considered in the context of a peace settlement). The army was now taking on more of a control role (the Guandarmerie had previously) and the Defense Minister had now returned to Kigali (he had been scheduled to fly on the plane which carried the assassinated President).

18 No further UN personnel had been injured or killed.

19 The majority of the foreign community had now been evacuated and both the RPF and the army were delivering on their promises to cooperate in this. Most UN civilian staff, including non-essential UNAMIR support staff have now left (either by road convoy or by airlift). The UN had chartered planes for this and also used the French/Belgian resources. Cooperation between UNAMIR and the national operations was very good. UNAMIR is escorting convoys of evacuees and is assisting with maintaining the control of the airport. UNAMIR was also guarding large concentrations of Rwandan civilians at the stadium (6,000) and at one of the hospitals (8,000).

20 The new authorities seemed to be exercising more authority but the situation was still unclear. The new acting PM had been scheduled to meet with the Special Rep today but this had had to be postponed for security reasons. Some RPF forces remain at their original positions behind the DMZ, while some had moved through the zone and were already

at the outskirts of Kigali. There were two alternative scenarios: either the parties reach some political settlement and a cease-fire is agreed within the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement which provides a framework for the peace process to go forward; or the situation deteriorated further and UNAMIRs viability will have to be reviewed. Perhaps the crunch decision will need to be taken in 1-2 days.

21 France emphasised that it was important that the RPF had not made things worse to date and that they must return to their previous positions. The evacuation had been largely successful, some 600 French nationals having now left with just 20 unaccounted for. The airport remains calm enabling aircraft to use.

22 A further briefing would be provided by the secretariat tomorrow (Tues).

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End Message

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115/23/37

Your (le:

Our file: 3/88/1

21:11 (4922)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$358.80
FROM: NEW YORK	C04292/NYK	12-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
MFAT	(MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

RWANDA

Our C04282.

Summary

- President invited to consult troop contributing countries urgently.
- Council to take decision about UNAMIR future tomorrow (Wed) including possibility of total or partial withdrawal - awaiting Special Representative's recommendations.
- RPF forces in control of major position in Kigali and interim authorities have left for Burundi border area. Fighting has diminished.
- Evacuation nearly complete. Foreign forces given until 7.00 pm (local time) Wednesday to leave but there is some flexibility.

Action

For confirmation that NZ can be flexible on future of UNAMIR mandate bearing in mind wishes of Special Representative and troop contributing countries.

Report

2 Secretariat (Riza) provided further briefing on situation in Rwanda to Council members at informals this afternoon. A report from Special Representative Booh Booh is expected tomorrow morning (Wed) containing recommendations on future of UNAMIR. To the extent that its main task was to assist the parties in implementation of the Arusha Agreement, the mandate for UNAMIR is exhausted and may now be impossible to carry out (at least in the very short term). Urgent

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200

decisions are therefore required as to the future of that PKO.

3 On situation in Rwanda, Riza noted that it was still chaotic with both ethnic and random killings continuing. Although there is less "shooting" now, pockets of fighting continue. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has now entered Kigali and taken all the strong points in the city (including positions near the airport). They had received no strong resistance from the government forces and it was unclear if they were regrouping for combat.

4 The Defence Minister remains in Kigali and the Special Rep is in contact with him. The RPF refuses to accept his authority or to enter into negotiations with him or with other representatives of the government. Whereas two days ago it was the government forces assuring the Special Representative that they would bring order to Kigali, it was now the RPF making this claim.

5 The evacuation of foreign nationals has gone "rather well" with good cooperation from both the French and Belgium contingents at the airport with UNAMIR. France had extended its presence (possibly at the request of Belgium) but would be withdrawing shortly. It had so far not been possible to receive firm approval from RPF that these forces could stay on for a further 48 hours. Although RPF had insisted on setting a time limit until 7 pm (Local time) Wed for the completion of the evacuation, Force Commander General Doltaire is confident that they will in fact agree to some flexibility. (The reason for the time limit is that RPF forces near the airport intend to open fire on government forces remaining at the airport after that time.)

6 There is now disorder in other parts of the country and reported shelling of a northern town near the DMZ, near the Uganda/Rwanda border from which UNAMIR forces were currently trying to evacuate school students and some nuns.

7 As to UNAMIR the Bangladesh engineering battalion and part of the Ghanain battalion have transferred from the DMZ in the north to Kigali to assist UNAMIR forces there.

8 France confirmed that the evacuation of their nationals was almost complete and that French troops would be leaving Rwanda tomorrow (Wed). Merimee emphasised that France had no intention of remaining but that this would leave a political and security vacuum. Considering the separate question of the future of UNAMIR there were two extreme options: either strengthen UNAMIR and give it a new mandate, or totally withdraw the force altogether.

9 Even if the RPF was successful militarily given the demographics of 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi, this would not be a lasting solution and RPF would be required to enter negotiations. One option Merimee floated (on a personal basis) would be to establish a "safe area" around the airport

with a reduced UNAMIR force remaining there for the time being and avoiding combat.

10 NAM had caucused for considerable period on Rwanda question prior to informals. Gambari also noted African group discussions on the subject took place yesterday. For NAM the two important considerations are that the evacuation is almost complete leaving a security vacuum in Kigali, and that there was an urgent need for the SC to send a message to the RPF about the need for a continuing commitment to reaching peace in the context of the Arusha Peace Agreement. NAM had begun work on a draft resolution and intends to table this tomorrow.

11 UK (supported by Spain and Russia) outlined the four possible scenarios it could foresee - strengthen UNAMIR with a new mandate; totally withdraw it; leave it there as is; or scale it down (as was done in Angola). The decision however must not be delayed and there was a need for some precision in the recommendations to be made by the Special Representative tomorrow as to what precisely the mandate should be - if part or all the force remained. Spain (among others) added that complete withdrawal would send a signal of UN failure in this crisis. US suggested another half way option of leaving UNAMIR in existence but withdrawing it to a neighbouring country for time to await developments.

12 Argentina (Cardenas, supported by US and Czech) then proposed that in light of the urgent decisions required about UNAMIR's future it would be sensible for the President to consult the troop contributing countries on an urgent basis. President will consult principal troop contributing countries tomorrow morning in preparation for consideration of Special Representative's recommendation relating to UNAMIR's future. Some delegations urged that a decision be taken tomorrow.

13 It was also agreed President would make a statement to the media about the Council's continued concern about situation, the urgent need for parties to reach agreement on ceasing hostilities and to remind them that the Arusha Peace Agreement was the only durable means for peace.

14 President also met with RPF Representative and gave him a strong serve that any sympathy Council had for their efforts to stop the killing would evaporate if either they caused further killing or they did not in fact show by deeds that they intended to establish broad based transitional government by negotiation with all parties to the continuing dispute. RPF Reps response was not entirely satisfactory. He said that although they were engaged in a military solution today, the fighting had diminished and they would indeed begin to consult other "democratic" parties about peace in the near future. He also reaffirmed RPF intention to continue cooperation with UNAMIR. However he also said that they could not contemplate negotiating with remnants of previous Government given the recent killings. So quite how

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04292/NYK

Page 4

broad based they intend to be remains to be seen.

15 We understand from Belgian Mission (informally) that they are inclined to the view that Belgian contingent of UNAMIR should now be evacuated together with national Belgian force.

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End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file:

115/23/37

17:48 (4926)	700/UNS/00000/00000	\$160.43
FROM: WELLINGTON	C21870/WN1	13-Apr-1994
TO: NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
PARIS	HARARE	Priority
BEIJING	MOSCOW	Priority
CANBERRA	OTTAWA	Priority
GENEVA		Priority
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, DSP1, EUR, EAB)	

Subject

U47075: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04292.

Guidance

Confirm you can be flexible on future of UNAMIR mandate. You should bear in mind following considerations and take account of views of Special Representative and troop contributing countries.

Report

- 2 As we see it the two key considerations are:
- the safety of UNAMIR personnel;
 - whether UNAMIR's mandate is still relevant and can be carried out.
- on the safety question, the decision on whether to withdraw completely, scale the operation back to a minimum or stay, is essentially an operational one for the Force Commander to take.
- if the situation remains one of high risk, and if the Force Commander and Special Rep are unable to get convincing assurances from RPF and remnants of Rwandan Govt as to UNAMIR safety, withdrawal should take place immediately
- we are not attracted by idea of trying to establish a "safe area". In the absence of guarantees, this would still leave troops vulnerable.
- if, however, the risk to personnel is assessed to have lessened; the necessary assurances are available and Special Rep considers they will be honoured, there may be a case for a (perhaps reduced) UN presence to remain

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to try to help stabilise the situation and restore some sort of governmental authority.

- that may well require UNAMIR's mandate to be re-written.

3 On the issue of UNAMIR's mandate, the context in which the Arusha Peace Agreement was negotiated and was being implemented has changed entirely. We are not sure it is realistic to remind the parties that Arusha is the only durable means for peace. The continuing relevance of its provisions needs to be reassessed.

- if the Council's judgement is that the mandate is still relevant and can be implemented, there may be some advantage in the US proposal to withdraw to a neighbouring country for a (brief, specified) time. This would enable rapid redeployment. On the other hand, any prolonged period in a neighbouring country would soon show a negative cost benefit.
- we do not agree with Spain that complete withdrawal would send a signal of UN failure or the proposition that withdrawal would leave a security vacuum. That would only be the case if UNAMIR had a mandate to enforce security. It does not and should not. The situation has changed because of events totally beyond UNAMIR's control.

4 We welcome the agreement to consult troop contributors. The Council's response will need to take account of their views as well as those conveyed by the Special Rep and Force Commander.

5 We have received an enquiry from a relative of a New Zealander believed to be in Rwanda. Information about this man is vague. His name is Mathew Rakena Raymme. He is said to be working with a UN Communications Workshop - presumably under the auspices of one of the UN humanitarian agencies. It is possible he was joined in Rwanda in January by his wife and two children. If he was with the UN we would assume he has been evacuated and his name would appear on agency lists. Grateful if New York and Geneva could make appropriate enquiries.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37
CC 115/23/10

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

22:24 (4934)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$239.20

FROM:	NEW YORK	C04305/NYK	13-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MEETING

Your C21870

Summary

- We as President convened meetings with all Troop Contributing countries to UNAMIR.
- This first time initiative was well received as long overdue and enabled TC countries to exchange views about UNAMIR participation at critical juncture in its future.

Action

For information only.

Report

In a major breakthrough in Security Council practice President convened meetings with ambassadors of troop contributing countries to UNAMIR today. First meeting (in the morning) was with larger contributors (Bangladesh, Belgium, Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Uruguay, Congo, Senegal, and Russia) together with France and US. Second meeting (in the afternoon) was with smaller contributors (Austria, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Fiji, Hungary, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Togo).

2 All participants at each meeting especially welcomed the initiative and expressed appreciation for the opportunity to exchange views and to communicate with President of Security Council about the very significant and grave situation in Rwanda at present. For two years, Egypt noted it had been advocating the need for this kind of get together. Other

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassadors noted that they were forced to rely on the New York Times for information about conditions their forces in UNAMIR faced in Rwanda.

3 US later confirmed to President that they were extremely pleased with the format we had established and believed it was an excellent precedent for future such meetings. It confirmed their support for our initiative to try to formally capture this development in the procedures of the Security Council ("for the future when NZ is no longer in a position to take the lead").

4 President was able to advise Council at informals this afternoon of the meetings and to pass on the general sense of troop contributors that all were concerned about the safety and security of their forces and at the same time concerned with the possible perception that the UN might leave Rwanda prematurely. They universally expressed appreciation for the measures the Sec Gen had already taken for safety of personnel and were concerned about the modalities of UNAMIR and with what it would do both in the short and long term.

5 At the morning meeting, Belgium indicated that its government's view was that the Belgium contingent in UNAMIR was particularly at risk, given the continuing anti-Belge feeling in Rwanda at present. Because it would need to concentrate more on its own security than on carrying out any UNAMIR mandate, it was more of a liability to UNAMIR than a help. No other troop contributing country expressed desire to pull out of UNAMIR however.

6 Only difficulty for President came when Nigeria followed by Russia pushed the morning meeting toward a consideration of the future mandate of UNAMIR. This was clearly uncomfortable for France given its opposition to structured consultation with troop contributors but the process was preserved by the President underlining that the meeting was for an exchange of views and that he did not intend to sum up the outcome but would report all the trends to the Council. It is only regrettable that the sheer horror of the situation in Rwanda was the catalyst which enabled us to make a breakthrough on this important issue.

End Message

04-18-94 22:00 212 758 0827 NZ MISSION ST 444 UNSC 11/23/37

NYPM FILE:

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
TELEPHONE: (212) 826-1960 FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

TO: WELLINGTON
WGTN UNSC✓

NO. 2430

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

PAGE 1 OF: 8

Forwarded to UNSC, MEA, UNC, EUR, DSP1

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Our accompanying cable refers.

Attached is draft resolution and letter from Secretary-General to President of Security Council.

Draft Resolution on the Situation in RwandaThe Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR);

Noting its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress will be made in establishing all the transitional institutions under the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Recalling its statement of 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994 (16) which, inter alia, reaffirmed the centrality of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peace process in Rwanda;

Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Welcoming the initiatives of the late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to work towards a resolution of the conflict in their countries within the framework of a negotiated political settlement and in collaboration with regional leaders;

Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of

the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994;

Appalled at the ensuing large scale violence which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, and the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population;

Deeply concerned by continuing looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order;

Expressing its deep concern also ^{for} at the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief;

Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to ^{international} peace and security; 15 LF

1. Expresses regret at the tragic incident in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi lost their lives, and invites the Secretary General to collect all available information with all means at his disposal and report to the Council as soon as possible; practicality?

2. Expresses regret also at the ensuing violence which has

claimed the lives of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Government Officials and thousands of other civilians;

3. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

4. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the (mindless) violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda; and in this connection, demands that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) agree without delay to an effective ceasefire and that both parties return to the positions held by them before the present hostilities;

5. Decides, in the light of the current security situation in Rwanda, to increase the strength of UNAMIR and to revise its mandate to enable it to contribute to the restoration of law and order and the establishment of the transitional institutions within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement; dead?

6. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and urges the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to extend its cooperation to the United Nations in this

regard;

7. Urges all countries, in particular those of the region,

to refrain from any action that would further exacerbate the situation in Rwanda;

8. Calls upon the parties in Rwanda to accept the futility of a military solution to the political problem and, in this respect, work towards a negotiated political settlement;

9. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Rwandese throughout the country and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

10. Strongly appeals to both parties, (in particular the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)) to commit themselves to the peace process leading to a comprehensive political settlement in Rwanda on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement; problem? ✓

11. Affirms its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

12. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Rwanda and to report to Council as the situation warrants, at least, not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

13 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to inform you that H.E. Mr. Willy Claes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, held a meeting with me in Bonn on 12 April 1994 during which we reviewed the situation in Rwanda. On behalf of the United Nations, I took the opportunity to reiterate to the Minister sincere condolences on the death of ten Belgian soldiers serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) as well as deep gratitude and appreciation for Belgium's contribution to UNAMIR.

The Minister conveyed to me his assessment of the situation in Rwanda which, according to him, has deteriorated drastically in recent days and continues to grow rapidly worse. He informed me that the Government of Belgium has decided to withdraw its contingent serving with UNAMIR at the earliest possible date. The Minister assured me that his Government would like the withdrawal of its contingent to take place in a coordinated manner.

In the light of this decision by the Government of Belgium, it is my assessment that it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively. The continued discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate will become untenable unless the Belgian contingent is replaced by another, equally well equipped contingent or unless the Government of Belgium reconsiders its decision to withdraw its contingent.

†

His Excellency
Mr. Colin Keating
President of the Security Council
New York

In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary, and send their recommendations to me in this regard. I shall keep the Council informed.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

22:51 (4937)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$411.07
FROM: NEW YORK	C04308/NYK	13-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C21870

Summary

- Council still favours ongoing presence for UN in Rwanda if at all possible.
- NAM resolution to be discussed tomorrow.
- Ceasefire meeting brokered by UNAMIR.
- Belgian withdrawal gets sympathy.
- Secretary-General's intervention ignored.

Action

For information only (bearing in mind your C21870).

Report

There were two major developments today relating to UNAMIR. First, the Security Council received a letter from the Sec Gen (accompanying fax to Wgtn only refers) which conveys advice that the Sec Gen had met with the Belgian Foreign Minister (in Bonn on 12 April) and been advised that Belgium would be withdrawing its contingent with UNAMIR "at the earliest possible date". Sec Gen went on to make the assessment that it would therefore be difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its mandate and that he had asked his Special Rep and Force Commander "to prepare plans [and make recommendations] for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary".

2 This letter angered not only the Belgians but all members

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the Council. It was followed up by a letter from the Belgian Permanent Rep hoping to put something of a "gloss" on the Sec Gen's letter to the effect that the risks for the Belgian contingent were particularly acute and that in the circumstances of anti-Belge sentiment in Kigali, its contribution was more of a hinderance than a help to UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate. That is, it would have to focus more on its own protection than on any carrying out of UNAMIR objectives. Belgium (and UK/France) were particularly put out by the inference in the Sec Gen's letter that it was Belgium's fault if UNAMIR had to withdraw. Similarly the NAM were outraged at the cavalier approach the Secretary-General had adopted. By contrast they expressed understanding and support for the Belgian decision.

3 Second major development was that, following up its indication at informals yesterday, Nigeria on behalf of the NAM and the OAU undertook intensive consultations (including with P3) and tabled a draft resolution at informals which proposed the beefing up of UNAMIR and a revision of its mandate. Draft is in our accompanying fax to Wgtn only.

4 The significance of this latter development is a reflection of the wide spread view amongst UN members that the UN must not "abandon Rwanda in its most desperate hour of need". This sentiment was universally expressed in some form or other by troop contributing countries together with the expression of their real and continuing concern about the safety and security of the force. It was notable, however, that in his introduction of the text Gambari described the proposal in much more open and exploratory terms than the Op would suggest.

5 For the Africans in particular it is not acceptable that the international community can focus exclusively on evacuating foreign nationals and leave the civilian population of Rwanda totally without assistance. For them, the least the UN should do is to continue its efforts to reach a cease-fire and to remain as a channel of communication between the RPF (now largely, though not totally, in control of Kigali) and the remnants of the Government forces (who except for the Defence Minister are in exile in the south).

6 The US has warned us in private that while the delegation agrees with this overall trend they are expecting problems from Washington.

Comment

7 This is not to say that this task must be carried out by UNAMIR as it is presently constituted, but that in some form the UN needs to try to achieve this objective. What we have is something of a dilemma for the international community between what is hoped to be achieved by the UN and what in practical terms can be done now the Belge contingent is to

leave, ie in terms of its numbers, equipment and other resources.

8 The Sec Gen's letter was not in this connection not at all helpful for Council members. Yesterday the Council asked for an assessment from the field on the various "half way" options. Today it was even clearer that no Council member supports either of the two extreme options of either a "pack up and leave" scenario or a full scale "chapter VII, Somalia type operation". The Council has accordingly pressed the secretariat for this kind of assessment focussing on the practicalities of what might be possible and also the strong sentiment that total UN withdrawal would not be particularly welcome.

9 There are essentially two scenarios which can be contemplated at this time. Either the RPF make good on their promises to stop the killing, agree to a cease-fire agreement and move toward the establishment of a broad based transitional authority, or they enter a period of revenge against the horror inflicted by elements of the government forces and the killing continues.

Secretariat Briefing

10 The secretariat briefing at informals (Riza and De Soto) gave some encouraging news. UNAMIR has been continuing its efforts at providing a channel of communication between the two sides and agreement had been reached for them to meet to discuss a cease-fire tomorrow (Thurs) at UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali. The force commander has been doing a particularly good job in this connection.

11 Secretariat also mentioned that news of the Belge pull out and possible UNAMIR pull out had led to a general deterioration in attitudes to the UN in Kigali with ordinary people believing the UN would abandon them. Both sides to the conflict had appealed to the Force Commander for UNAMIR to stay on. UNAMIR was currently engaged in protection of concentrations of civilians (though conditions were expected to get increasingly difficult as regard the provision of food and water to these groups), in escort duties for evacuations, carrying out specific missions to reach individuals in isolated areas, efforts to reach a cease-fire and efforts in relation to establishing the necessary political dialogue between the parties.

Outcome of Meeting

12 President noted at conclusion of informals that there was a long way to go in considering the future of UN involvement in Rwanda. The issue would be returned to again tomorrow. The NAM draft resolution included two types of issues (general issues relating to situation in Rwanda and the specific policy issue of mandate for future of UNAMIR). There would be benefit in a working group meeting tomorrow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04308/NYK

Page 4

morning to consider the non policy issues ie all elements of the DR except Op5. Informals will take up tomorrow the central question of the mandate for UNAMIR in light of the secretariat's advice as to the practicable options available in the afternoon.

13 President spoke to the press along the above lines on behalf of Council members.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

21:52 (4948)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$320.65
FROM: NEW YORK	C04314/NYK	14-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
BRUSSELS		Routine
MFAT	(MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04308

Summary

- Sec Gen proposes either UNAMIR (minus Belge) remain or it be reduced but acknowledges that neither option can really be satisfactorily addressed until prospects for a ceasefire are clearer.
- Council believes priority is to apply pressure on the parties to reach a ceasefire.
- President proposes that decision about future mandate be put off for five days with clear message that unless a ceasefire is agreed UNAMIR may well pull out.
- In consultation with Nigeria and France we have proposed operative paragraphs for a resolution to implement that proposal.

Action

For information

Report

2 Responding to the desire made plain yesterday on the part of Council members to have some options on which to focus consideration of Council action, secretariat (de Soto and Riza) gave following advice at informals this afternoon: Sec Gen had formulated essentially two possible options for future of UNAMIR "both predicated on the assumption that a cease-fire would be agreed" between the parties in the next few days.

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3 The first option outlined by Riza was that UNAMIR stay on minus the Belgians. In these circumstances the total remaining force would be redeployed into Kigali since there would be no point leaving a remnant of it at the demilitarised zone. The political (and military reality) is that the DMZ is unlikely to have any significance in the future given that it no longer represented the actual lines between the parties. This option would assume that some progress based on the Arusha Accords was in play.

4 The second option was that a substantially reduced UNAMIR remain to promote agreement on resumption of a peace process. This would comprise just the Special Rep plus his personal staff and a security detail (estimated by the Force Commander to require up to 150 soldiers), making a total of about 200 UNAMIR personnel. This option would recognise that there may not be any quick resumption of the peace process and that in those circumstances the full UNAMIR would not be sustainable. Nonetheless there would be value in assisting in establishing a channel of communication between the two parties.

5 It was also possible to conceive of a third option, Riza noted, that would be a combination of the two above. That is, option 1 could slide into option 2 say if within 3 weeks there was no clear sign that the peace process would in fact resume, then UNAMIR (minus the Belgians) could scale back to the a small political presence.

6 The Sec Gen's preference (but a marginal one we guess) said Riza emphasised is for the Council to adopt option 1. The only problem with the options, identified by both the UK and US, is that they are based on an assumption about circumstances which do not presently exist, ie a ceasefire.

7 That led Riza to clarify rather more what the Force Commander wished for. This was welcome since it is recommendations from the field which members have been particularly concerned to receive rather than observations from the SC in Madrid or wherever. The Force Commander had stressed that both sides want UNAMIR to remain and that what he badly required was something on which to apply pressure to the parties in order for them to accept a ceasefire.

8 At conclusion, President proposed that the resolution now under consideration would put off making a decision on UNAMIR's future until in practical terms it was determined whether a ceasefire would in fact be agreed. Delegations are reflecting on this overnight and discussions will resume tomorrow (Fri) at noon.

9 We have followed up the proposal by consultations with Nigeria and France and produced the following OPs which could be a stand alone resolution (our preference) or part of the NAM text.

"Demands that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire throughout Rwanda;

Decides that, if within five days of the adoption of this resolution, there is an effective ceasefire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Further decides that, if within five days of the adoption of this resolution, there is no effective ceasefire in place, the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda."

10 Our accompanying fax contains the NAM draft as amended by a working group which met twice today. The square brackets around the final PP and Op 7 represent the political decision which will hopefully be taken about UNAMIR's future tomorrow. It also contains the results of our discussions tonight with Nigeria and France on some paragraphs which are designed to achieve President's proposal and be dropped into the text at Op7.

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End Message

NYPM File: 3/88/1

0001

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 14 April 1994

PAGE 1 OF: 4

TO : WELLINGTON

NO:

2438

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

TO : WGTN UNSC

NO:

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our cable of 14 April refers.

Attached for your information is a copy of the Draft Resolution on the Situation in Rwanda.

2/4

14 April 1994
5.00 p.m.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Noting its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress would be made in establishing the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Recalling its statement of 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16 which, inter alia, reaffirmed its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and urged all parties to implement it fully,

Stressing that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains central to the peace process in Rwanda,

Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement, particularly those provisions relating to the cease-fire,

Welcoming the initiatives of the late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to work towards resolving the problems in their countries through peaceful means and in collaboration with regional leaders,

Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994,

Appalled at the ensuing large scale violence in Rwanda which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population, and the significant increase in refugees to neighbouring countries,

Deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali,

Expressing its deep concern also for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, and personnel of

Non-Governmental Organizations, who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief,

[Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security,]

1. Expresses regret at the tragic incident in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi lost their lives, and reiterates its invitation to the Secretary-General to report to the Council as requested in its statement of 7 April 1994;

2. Expresses regret also at the ensuing violence which has claimed the lives of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Government Officials and thousands of other civilians;

3. Condemns the ongoing violence in Rwanda, particularly in Kigali, which endangers the lives and safety of the civilian population;

4. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of and injury to several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

5. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda; and in this connection, [demands that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) agree without delay to an effective cease-fire] and that both parties return to the positions held by them before the present hostilities;

6. Commends the active role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Force Commander to bring about a cease-fire and to mediate between the parties in order to bring about the earliest resolution of the Rwandan crisis;

[7. Decides, in the light of the current security situation in Rwanda, to increase the strength of UNAMIR and to revise its mandate to enable it to contribute to the restoration of law and order and the establishment of the transitional institutions within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;]

8. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and invites the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations in this regard;

[9. Urges all countries, in particular those of the region, to refrain from any action that would further exacerbate the situation in Rwanda;]

low
realistic?

4/4

[9. Calls on all Member States, in particular neighbouring countries, acting individually or through regional organisations, to cooperate fully with the efforts of the United Nations and the OAU to bring about an end to the crisis in Rwanda;]

10. Calls upon the parties [in particular the Rwandese Patriotic Front] to renew their commitment to [the peace process in Rwanda on the basis of] the Arusha Peace Agreement, and to accept the futility of a military solution to the political problem;

11. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need throughout Rwanda and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

12. Affirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

13. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the events in Rwanda and to report fully to the Council on the evolving situation and at least, not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your file:

Our file:

17:08 (4981)

700/BRU/00000/00000

\$279.51

FROM: BRUSSELS

C01639/BRU

15-Apr-1994

TO: WELLINGTON

WGTN UNSC

Priority

CC: NEW YORK

Priority

LONDON

Routine

WASHINGTON

PARIS

Routine

BEIJING

MOSCOW

Routine

OTTAWA

CANBERRA

Routine

HARARE

Routine

MFAT

(UNC, MEA, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C22009/WN1.

Summary

Belgians recommend to Sec-Gen the immediate withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel but are prepared to leave Belgian equipment in place should UNSC decide to maintain a minimal detachment. The Belgian assessment is that the fighting in Rwanda will continue and that no early cease fire is likely.

Action

For information.

Report

As reported direct to New York (Williams/Kember telecon and direct fax), we attended today a Belgian briefing, and spoke immediately thereafter with Belgian officials, concerning their assessment of the situation in Rwanda. Our following fax (Wellington only, NY has a copy already) contains text of a letter to Sec-Gen from Belgian Foreign Minister Claes dated 15 April. The letter, in summary, advises that the Belgians consider that a continued UNAMIR presence involves grave risks and that Belgium recommends suspension of the UN mission. Belgium argues that the proposition to wait five days before choosing between the three options suggested by the Security Council (New York's C04314) poses unacceptable risks to UN personnel. In any case, Belgium confirms its withdrawal of Belgian personnel but it is prepared, should the UNSC decide on a continued UNAMIR presence, to make available to UNAMIR equipment left behind by the Belgian contingent.

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2 T Belgian assessment of the outlook for Rwanda is very pessimistic. The Belgians consider that the warring parties have no interest in seeking an early cease fire, but will press on for continued military advantage. Belgian army personnel present at the briefing emphasised the heavy armaments, including multiple rocket launchers, held by the warring factions. The Belgians underlined the extent of anti-Belgian sentiment which led them to the decision that a continued Belgian presence was a danger not only to the Belgians, but also the broader UN presence in Rwanda. While hoping that the parties will negotiate a cease fire, the Belgians see little if any prospect of a cessation of armed fighting, particularly within the next five days. They ruled out any possibility of Belgium maintaining any presence in Rwanda in these circumstances. The Belgians concluded however that the decision of a continued presence was one for the UN Security Council to take.

3 We understand from New York that Foreign Minister Claes has conveyed these sentiments direct to PR Keating in his capacity as President of the Council.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

17:43 (4952)	700/UNS/00000/00000	\$148.09
FROM: WELLINGTON	C22009/WN1	15-Apr-1994
TO: NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: LONDON	PARIS	Priority
WASHINGTON	MOSCOW	Priority
BEIJING	BRUSSELS	Priority
CANBERRA	OTTAWA	Priority
HARARE		Priority
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, DSP1, EUR, EAB)	

Subject

U47317: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04314.

Summary

We agree first priority is get a ceasefire. We have reservations about the tactics of setting a five-day deadline and threatening UNAMIR's possible withdrawal. Getting a recommitment to the Arusha peace process may take some time and could involve renegotiation of its provisions.

Report

- 2 We think the following considerations are important:
- the first priority is to get a ceasefire. The Council should emphasise that.
 - If UNAMIR can assist in this process, it should be made available to help, even though this has meant moving beyond its present mandate.
 - What UNAMIR can do and how many forces might be dedicated to this immediate, short-term task is best left to the Force Commander and Special Representative jointly to recommend;
 - The Commander is now playing a good offices role - something more commonly undertaken by the Sec-Gen and his staff. If within a short period a ceasefire is unattainable, whether it is appropriate for UNAMIR to continue to play this role will need to be considered.
- 3 With these considerations in mind and from this distance, the second option put forward by Riza is the most attractive. This would enable the Force Commander to continue

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the role you have reported he is usefully playing as a channel of communication and in trying to broker a ceasefire, with the blessing of both parties.

4 Given the strong sense in the Council and among troop contributors that UNAMIR should not withdraw and that the UN should stick beside Rwanda in its hour of greatest need, it seems odd to be setting a deadline with the threat that UNAMIR may pull out.

5 A stand-alone resolution aimed at getting a ceasefire seems the best immediate course. Perhaps the first two paras in your Paragraph 9 by themselves would suffice, leaving aside the question of how the Council might respond if a ceasefire is not achieved in five days.

6 It seems to us that if a ceasefire is achieved, the process of getting a re-commitment to the Arusha peace process could take some time. You have noted that the DMZ is unlikely to have future relevance. The protocols on power sharing and on integration of the armed forces may well be subject to renegotiation. We wonder if it is realistic for the Council to call for the parties to return to previous positions and place emphasis now on full implementation of the Arusha agreement, as the NAM draft tends to do.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

22:06 (4990)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$419.32

FROM:	NEW YORK	C04323/NYK	15-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine
	BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C22009.

Summary

- Belgians mount intensive campaign for all of UNAMIR to come out of Rwanda with Belgian contingent.
- NAM press for resolution premised on maintenance of UNAMIR at current strength.
- US say that the only resolution they could countenance today would be one winding up UNAMIR.
- UK attempt to promote compromise based on Secretariat's option 2 (reducing UNAMIR to a political presence with necessary security protection) was acceptable to US but rejected by NAM and was ruled out by Secretariat because of security implications.
- Consensus was finally reached on Presidential proposal not to decide today on the future of UNAMIR but to convey the Council's insistence on a ceasefire and to signal a willingness to pull UNAMIR out should the situation become too dangerous.

Action

For information.

Report

Belgian Foreign Minister called President early this morning to advise of their intention to withdraw all Belgian troops, both those sent in to secure the evacuation of Belgian nationals and those in UNAMIR, by the end of the coming

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weekend. Claes went on to paint a very grim picture of the situation in Rwanda and urged that all of UNAMIR troops be pulled out as part of the Belgian evacuation. He basically said that the remaining troops would have neither the equipment or the ability to protect themselves if the Belgians left. Subsequent contact with the Secretariat revealed that he had given a similar message to the Sec-Gen. We learned soon after that the Belgians had mounted a lobbying campaign, particularly in Europe, along the same lines and had made public statements to the same effect in Brussels.

2 Secretariat (Riza) agreed that Belgian assessment had to be taken seriously but at the same time said it did not square with what they were hearing from UNAMIR. While fighting was continuing between RPF and Government Forces and killings were being carried out behind the Government lines, the situation behind the RPF lines at least had stabilised. Both sides continued to affirm their wish for UNAMIR to stay and the Special Rep and Force Commander were holding direct talks with the parties today. Riza said that the Special Rep and the Force Commander continued to believe that the threat to withdraw was their best leverage over the parties, but indicated that the people in the field would prefer to be left with some flexibility on the point and not to be bound to a fixed time frame by a Council decision.

3 At the morning informal consultations, Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM caucus, reiterated their support for a modified version of the Sec-Gen's option A, viz maintaining UNAMIR at current strength. The US (Walker) then spoke to say that the US was conscious that the situation was very fluid and unstable but that if a decision on UNAMIR's future was to be taken today, then the only resolution the US could support would be one calling for the withdrawal of the force.

4 Prior to the lunch time adjournment, Hannay proposed that the Council adopt a resolution today based on the NAM draft and incorporating the Sec-Gen's option B entailing the maintenance of a military presence in Kigali with a much reduced military presence only to provide security for UN personnel.

5 We used the early part of the afternoon for informal discussions with US, Nigeria, France and UK. US (Albright) said, after talking to Christopher, that they could go along with Hannay's proposal. Gambari also indicated a willingness to explore NAM tolerance for Hannay's compromise. However, he paused when we raised the point which the British had conveniently overlooked, namely that option B was premised on the achievement of a ceasefire. We noted that the Belgians and the Secretariat all considered that the security of the airport was essential in current circumstances (which was why UNAMIR was deploying half of the Ghanain battalion there to take over from the Belgians) and questioned whether option B was credible in the absence of a ceasefire.

6 Riza and Baril (Military Adviser) subsequently confirmed our hesitations. They reiterated that option B was only sustainable if there was a ceasefire. Otherwise, the political presence would have no assured exit route if UNAMIR became the target of attacks. They were also gravely concerned at the implications of an announcement today by the Council that they would be withdrawing or scaling down UNAMIR. This risked both sides indulging in a scramble for territory and perhaps in attacks on UNAMIR to grab their equipment.

7 Word came out of the NAM caucus that they too had rejected the British proposal and Gambari told us he would prefer that there be no decision today rather than one which would signal a diminution of the UN's commitment to Rwanda. We then showed him a paper we had prepared, and with which the Secretariat expressed strong agreement, which would record the Council's position on the Belgian withdrawal, its insistence on a ceasefire and its determination not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk. Our initial draft also had paragraphs indicating the Council's willingness to consider a revised UNAMIR mandate if the parties agreed to a ceasefire and, conversely, to pull UNAMIR out if they did not and the situation continued to deteriorate.

8 After consulting his NAM colleagues, Gambari told us he could go along with the paper. The British, Americans and French also said they could live with it.

9 When the informal consultations resumed, Riza, at our request, gave his assessment of the security implications of any announcement by the Security Council today of a withdrawal or a suspension of UNAMIR. His assessment effectively put an end to the British proposal for the meantime. A substantial Chinese intervention to the effect that their Embassy in Kigali, which was continuing to function effectively and was reporting that there was no general animosity towards foreigners, also had a marked effect. We were able to advise, on the basis of consultations this afternoon, that Ghana and Bangladesh, the two major contributors to UNAMIR, were willing to maintain their troops in place as long as the UN considered they had a useful role to play.

10 Our paper was then circulated and found to be generally acceptable. Hannay lamented that the Council was not being more robust in its consideration of the situation in Rwanda but the limitations of the situation were made apparent when the US and Nigeria indicated that they would have difficulty with certain aspects of the draft - namely the paragraphs hinting at a willingness to contemplate an extension of UNAMIR's presence under a revised mandate (a problem for the US) and at a willingness to pull UNAMIR out in the absence of a ceasefire (a problem for Nigeria). Walker asked that both

paras be dropped.

11 At Hannay's proposal, the paragraphs that were deleted were replaced by one indicating the Council's intention to keep UNAMIR's strength and mandate under constant review. This addition, when coupled with the previous paragraph stating the Council's determination not to allow UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk retains the essential message to the Rwandan parties that UNAMIR may be pulled out if they do not agree to a ceasefire.

12 Given the political sensitivities, we judged it unwise to press for our paper to be converted into a presidential statement. Instead, it was agreed that it would be used as the basis of the President's comments to the press. We also made it available to delegations and, indeed, to the media. Copy of the paper as agreed is contained in our accompanying fax.

Comment

13 As we had pointed out at the morning informals, a decision not to pull out UNAMIR or to amend its mandate is itself a decision. We and the Secretariat consider that what was done today was appropriate to the political situation in the Council and to the circumstances on the ground in Rwanda. The Belgian campaign for total withdrawal was seen by Council members as motivated at least as much by a desire for political cover back home as by concern for UNAMIR's safety. Given what we were hearing from the field, it would have been precipitate and dangerous to have suddenly gone public with a resolution authorising total or even partial withdrawal at this stage. The Special Representative and the Force Commander continue to believe that UNAMIR are in no immediate danger and can continue to play an important role. We can only hope they are correct.

14 Whatever happens over the next few days, it is clear that the Council will soon have to consider the future role, if any, of UNAMIR. Today's discussions show that it will be no easy task to reach an agreed position.

End Message

115/23/37
NYPM File: 3/88/1NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 15 April 1994

TO: WELLINGTON
WGTM UNSC ✓No.
No.

2450

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

Page 1 of: 3

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Following is paper agreed at end of informals this evening.

15 April 1994
1930

- The members of the Council have had a thorough discussion today about the situation in Rwanda and its implications for UNAMIR.
- They took carefully into consideration information provided by the Secretariat, as forwarded by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNAMIR Force Commander, as well as that provided by the Foreign Minister of Belgium.
- Council members took note of and fully understood Belgium's decision to withdraw its troops in UNAMIR at the same time that it is repatriating the troops that have been providing security for the evacuation of foreign nationals.
- They also took into consideration the willingness of other major troop contributing countries to maintain their troops with UNAMIR as long as there is a useful role for them to perform.
- In the members' view, the immediate priority in Rwanda is the establishment of a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander have been in contact with both parties to try to secure this objective.
- Council members urge the Special Representative to make every effort to facilitate a ceasefire. In this regard, the Council members welcomed the willingness of the Organisation of African Unity to promote a ceasefire in Rwanda.
- Council members demand that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table.
- The members reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country.

3/2

- Council Members commend the efforts made by the leaders of the sub-region at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and urge the leaders of the region to persevere and intensify their efforts for peace, in cooperation with the United Nations and the OAU.
- But, the situation is grave and Council members are determined not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk.
- Council Members intend to keep under constant review the force levels and activities of UNAMIR and to take decisions in this regard at the appropriate time.

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 186/1/1

17:14 (4985)	700/OTT/00000/00000	\$137.52
FROM: OTTAWA	C01758/OTT	15-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Routine
CC: NEW YORK	WASHINGTON	Routine
LONDON	PARIS	Routine
BRUSSELS	HARARE	Routine
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, AMER, DSP1, EUR, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Canada's view (St-Hillaire, Deputy, West and Central Africa and Maghreb Relations) is that at present UNAMIR is performing helpful functions both in terms of a good offices and humanitarian role without undue danger to the UN troops. While indicating that neither the original mandate nor the Arusha Accords now had much relevance, St-Hillaire said that Canada was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal, particularly while the UN was able to exert some beneficial effect on the situation. Canada's current preference was to maintain UNAMIR at its current strength of around 2000, which St-Hillaire understood to be the existing strength following the departure of the Belgian contingent.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

Your file:

Our file:

115/23/37

17:43

700/UNS/00000/00000

\$148.09

FROM: WELLINGTON U47317 15 Apr 1994

TO: NEW YORK WGTN UNSC IMMEDIATE

CC: LONDON PARIS PRIORITY
 WASHINGTON MOSCOW PRIORITY
 BEIJING BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 CANBERRA OTTAWA PRIORITY
 HARARE PRIORITY

MFAT (UNC, MEA, DSP1, EUR, EAB)

Willberg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Forsyth	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ward	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rider	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hughes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Kember	<input type="checkbox"/>
McMaster	<input type="checkbox"/>
Foster	<input type="checkbox"/>
McCormick	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rush	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tyne	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dalton	<input type="checkbox"/>
Watson	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04314.

Summary

We agree first priority is get a ceasefire. We have reservations about the tactics of setting a five-day deadline and threatening UNAMIR's possible withdrawal. Getting a recommitment to the Arusha peace process may take some time and could involve renegotiation of its provisions.

Report

- 2 We think the following considerations are important:
- the first priority is to get a ceasefire. The Council should emphasise that.
 - If UNAMIR can assist in this process, it should be made available to help, even though this has meant moving beyond its present mandate.
 - What UNAMIR can do and how many forces might be dedicated to this immediate, short-term task is best left to the Force Commander and Special Representative jointly to recommend;

U47317

- The Commander is now playing a good offices role - something more commonly undertaken by the Sec-Gen and his staff. If within a short period a ceasefire is unattainable, whether it is appropriate for UNAMIR to continue to play this role will need to be considered.

3 With these considerations in mind and from this distance, the second option put forward by Riza is the most attractive. This would enable the Force Commander to continue the role you have reported he is usefully playing as a channel of communication and in trying to broker a ceasefire, with the blessing of both parties.

4 Given the strong sense in the Council and among troop contributors that UNAMIR should not withdraw and that the UN should stick beside Rwanda in its hour of greatest need, it seems odd to be setting a deadline with the threat that UNAMIR may pull out.

5 A stand-alone resolution aimed at getting a ceasefire seems the best immediate course. Perhaps the first two paras in your Paragraph 9 by themselves would suffice, leaving aside the question of how the Council might respond if a ceasefire is not achieved in five days.

6 It seems to us that if a ceasefire is achieved, the process of getting a re-commitment to the Arusha peace process could take some time. You have noted that the DMZ is unlikely to have future relevance. The protocols on power sharing and on integration of the armed forces may well be subject to renegotiation. We wonder if it is realistic for the Council to call for the parties to return to previous positions and place emphasis now on full implementation of the Arusha agreement, as the NAM draft tends to do.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

20:59 (5019)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$263.12
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04341/NYK	19-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: TROOP CONTRIBUTING MEETING: RWANDA

Summary

- Troop contributing countries very grateful for further opportunity to meet on UNAMIR
- Need for political guidance from Council as to mandate of UNAMIR
- Primary question for Council should be are there useful functions for UNAMIR in Rwanda? This needs to be established urgently
- Africans insist on linkage with Bosnia and indicate that UN should do no less for Kigali than it is trying to do for Gorazde.

Action

For information only

Report

2 We convened a further meeting of all the UNAMIR troop contributing countries in order to provide them with feedback on the Council's recent discussion of the situation in Rwanda as it relates to UNAMIR. All were very grateful for the opportunity to be heard and to be briefed on developments. In a welcome initiative from the secretariat troop contributors are also receiving daily briefings from DPKO.

3 A range of views amongst troop contributors was put forward. There was an impassioned plea from Ghana (and a similar view expressed by Tunisia and Senegal) for the UN not to abandon Rwanda and not to value "the blood of some" more highly than that of others in the context of noting that the

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UN and NATO were particularly active on the question of Bosnia right now. Ghana noted that they had participated in many PKOs and had not done so because they anticipated it would "be rosy". They emphasised their commitment to stay on with UNAMIR despite any difficulties noting that at the first sign of no ceasefire the UN should not withdraw.

4 Canada announced that they were in fact putting additional people into UNAMIR. Five personnel had arrived early this week and a further 5 would be arriving in the next week or so. They also have 2 aircraft assisting with resupply and evacuation efforts. The Canadian position is that UNAMIR should be maintained "as long as it has a useful function" though they recognised the need to establish a realistic mandate for the force.

For their part they will "support whatever size makes sense".

5 Others including Uruguay expressed disquiet with what seemed to be a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. Togo was concerned about lack of adequate resources in light of Belge withdrawal. Bangladesh noted that they were not comfortable with a situation where the only meaningful role for the force was to defend itself against attack. They would also like to see protective equipment flown in.

6 For Bangladesh the question is can UNAMIR play a meaningful role in Rwanda? Given that their prevailing concern is for the safety of their troops the priority was for the parties to agree to a cease-fire. In the event that one was not forthcoming, relocation of UNAMIR to a neighbouring area was an option in Bangladesh's mind. They gave a strong indication that although they are willing to stay for the time being, "if 10 or 12 Bangladeshi troops were killed" there would be a "radically different approach" on the part of Bangladesh.

7 The President noted in conclusion the range of views and drew attention to the central question for the Council which was whether UNAMIR could undertake a useful function in Rwanda at present and when would it establish a new mandate if this were so. We recalled that on Friday the Council had decided to give it a "short period" to see if a cease-fire would be forthcoming and that that short period was now coming to an end.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

20:55 (5017)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$238.37
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04340/NYK	19-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- SecGen to make a recommendation to Council on future of UNAMIR tomorrow (Wed);
- General feeling that Council needs to take a decision about this promptly in light of the exhaustion of UNAMIR mandate;
- However basic division between US (for withdrawal) and Nigeria (to beef operation up) is likely to remain;
- Situation has deteriorated in Kigali, some non-essential personnel have been withdrawn but force commander (and UNAMIR) engaged in useful work

Action

For information only

Report

2 Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided a further update on Rwanda where the situation continues to deteriorate. Fighting and killing has increased in Kigali. There has been an exchange of fire and fighting between the RPF (rebels) and the "so called" Rwanda Government Forces (remnants of the army and Presidential Guard).

3 Although neither party is "overtly" hostile to UNAMIR forces, the "government forces" have been responsible for worrying incidents including shelling the stadium where the Bangladesh contingent of UNAMIR is sheltering some 5,000 displaced persons. UNAMIR HQ had a lucky miss with a mortar landing on the roof but luckily not exploding. This ceased

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however when the UNAMIR force commander complained. There was no indication that UNAMIR was specifically targeted.

4 "Government forces" had also sought "co-management" of the airport with UNAMIR, though UNAMIR had rejected this as one-sided, preferring to see the airport remain as "neutral" and under its control. Under these circumstances, Gharekhan said he "would not be surprised if the "government forces" turned hostile to UNAMIR".

5 UNAMIR continues its efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement between the parties but the immediate prospects look "bleak". Although the "government forces" have agreed to one, the RPF had imposed some preconditions relating to the halting of further massacres (of Tutsi by the "government forces") and hostile radio broadcasts, the disbanding of the bandit style Presidential Guard, and the dissolution of the "interim government" now in exile in the south. Effectively this meant no agreement to the cease-fire in the short term.

6 Tomorrow the SecGen will come to the Council with a recommendation for the future of UNAMIR. Gharekhan "hinted" but would not be drawn further, that it was likely not to be a recommendation for a "sudden total withdrawal" and was likely either to be a recommendation for keeping the bulk of the force on or retaining a smaller number (either option 1 or 2 put to the Council last week). It is also conceivable that the recommendation would fall somewhere in between, ie a force which is large enough to hang on to the airport and to do some meaningful humanitarian work but smaller than the current level.

8 UK (supported by Brazil) emphasised the need to take a decision promptly in the next few days. (Our IPT reports on troop contributing meeting we convened today on UNAMIR).

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

21:30 (5039)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$304.15
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04348/NYK	20-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- No recommendation yet from Sec Gen about UNAMIR future
- President underscores difficulty of Council not expressing any formal views on one of the most horrific tragedies and need for a decision by end of the week

Action

For information only

Report

2 In fact the secretariat did not come up with a recommendation from the Sec Gen on the future of UNAMIR today. The situation is evolving to the extent that it has been difficult to arrive at a clear recommendation. Our guess is that this is likely to be a result of a number of factors ie the force commander may be reviewing his own recommendations in light of the situation on the ground, the politics of making what would be a very difficult recommendation (if one were to be made to withdraw UNAMIR on safety grounds) for the Africans in light of the UN's activism and absorption with the question of Bosnia, and signs that at least some of the troop contributors may be getting cold feet. (In latter respect secretariat deny Reuters reports about troop departures. Only personnel to leave have been "non-essentials" is the unarmed observers)

3 Secretariat (Garekhan) provided a briefing however in which the situation was characterised as remaining tense. Fighting was intense yesterday morning (Tues) but had declined toward the end of the afternoon. The ICRC had

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evacuated the wounded refugees from the stadium, the shelling of which by the "government forces" had left 40 dead and 100 seriously wounded. There had been heavy fighting at provincial centres outside Kigali.

4 UNAMIR is continuing with its efforts to get the parties to agree to a cease-fire and while the RPF still have difficulty with direct contacts with the "government forces" they were prepared to continue the discussions with UNAMIR to this end.

5 The Belge contingent of UNAMIR has completely departed, together with some 264 non-essential UNAMIR personnel. At present there are 1707 UNAMIR personnel left in Rwanda, mostly in Kigali. All but 87 of the personnel assigned to the DMZ in the north have already been relocated to Kigali with the remainder scheduled to have gone to Kigali today.

6 The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, especially the sanitary conditions at the stadium and hospital where the refugees are located. UNAMIR escorted some 18 ICRC trucks to deliver food to those in the stadium yesterday.

7 There is no change at the airport, both "government forces" and UNAMIR personnel are present. The RPF is not far away but not actually at the airport. There had been no progress in attempting to have it recognised as a neutral area. There is no deliberate hostility toward UNAMIR. The danger to them primarily comes from the risks of getting caught in the cross-fire or being caught in the "government" shelling of the stadium.

8 The UK reiterated the necessity to have a decision before the end of the week, noting that if the troop contributors decided (unilaterally) to pull out that would look "worse" than if the Council stayed "one step ahead" and decided to withdraw the force first.

9 At the conclusion of discussion President observed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to explain credibly why in the face of the most horrific killings the Council could remain formally silent. It is becoming difficult to explain why the Council is not pointing the finger at those responsible given that it was quite clear from the secretariat and from UNHCR reports that it was one particular party which was responsible. President also emphasised the importance of making a decision as soon as possible and that one merit of the NAM draft resolution (our fax 2438 of 14 April) was that it did address this issue.

Comment

10 President also had the opportunity to talk with the RPF representative and to impress on him the need for RPF to reach a cease-fire, though it is not difficult to see their

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04348/NYK

Page 3

point about not wanting to enter formal negotiations with Rwandese "government forces" while those same forces are engaged in the current butchery.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/173/32
NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 21 April 1994

TO: WELLINGTON
WGTM UNSC✓

No.
No.

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

Page 1 of: 9

Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNK, EUR, DSP1

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

van Bohemen/Griffiths telecon of 21/22 April.

2 Following is:

- (a) Sec-Gen's report on UNAMIR which came out at midday today;
- (b) text of Resolution 912 (1994) which was adopted 15-0-0 tonight in implementation of Alternative II in the SecGen's report.

3 Council members were persuaded by Secretariat of the need to take a decision tonight on UNAMIR's future because of strain on troops caused by prolonged uncertainty as to the future of the force.

4 Council members were unanimous in agreeing that Alternative III (complete withdrawal) was not an option and that Alternative I (expanding UNAMIR and converting it into a Chapter VII enforcement operation) was also unrealistic in present circumstances. Thus, they were left with Alternative II, a modified version of Option 2 presented last week but no longer predicated on a ceasefire. Africans were not keen but accepted Alternative II as the only realistic option in the circumstances.

5 Since we had to suspend tonight's debate on Gorazde to take up Rwanda, most Council members chose not to give EOVs. Nigeria, Oman, Djibouti and Rwanda spoke before the vote; France spoke after the vote.

6 President is to brief UNAMIR troop contributors tomorrow afternoon.

Ms McCormick

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

19:29 (5066)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$263.12
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04356/NYK	22-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine
	BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: TROOP CONTRIBUTORS: RWANDA

Our fax of 21 April

Summary

- President briefs troop contributors on last night's urgent Security Council decision to reduce UNAMIR to about 270;
- about 600 troops will remain in Kigali for next few days to allow flexibility in light of any positive outcome of tomorrow's Arusha talks.

Action

For information only

Report

2 President convened further meeting of troop contributors to follow up the Council's decision on UNAMIR in Rwanda taken last night. Meeting was again well received and the hope expressed that our successor Presidents would also make them a practice. President indicated that he would convene a meeting again next week in light of the developments over the weekend.

3 President began briefing for troop contributors by referring to the urgent need conveyed to the Council by the SecGen's military adviser that taking a decision on UNAMIR's immediate troop levels was crucial. (General Barrell had noted that UNAMIR troops had been on alert to evacuate every night for the past week and aside from the general risk to safety, the stress was becoming overwhelming). Another critical factor in provoking yesterday's decision (although we did not mention it because of its sensitivity) was the

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Bangladesh decision that its troops should either be relocated out of Rwanda on a temporary basis or they would withdraw them completely.

4 President noted that at the last meeting he had convened there was a general sense of the need to redefine the mandate. Last night's resolution established a new mandate which was transitional in nature and represented an attempt to adjust it to the situation which prevailed in Kigali for the next short while. This could be for a couple of weeks to a month or so. The President noted that the majority of Council members wished however to see UNAMIR restored to its previous mandate (something along the lines of its original mandate to assist in implementing a peace process) should the situation in Kigali improve.

5 Although it was not public, the President conveyed the information that approx 500 UNAMIR troops had left today (Fri) and a further 500 or so would leave tomorrow for Nairobi. That would leave about 600 troops in Kigali at least for the weekend. There would not therefore be the immediate drop to the "about 270" figure adopted by the Council on the recommendation of the SecGen yesterday. This 600 figure principally represents the Ghanain battalion (though not all), the Tunisians and some military observers and would allow some flexibility in the planning over the coming days. In the immediate term it would mean the airport could remain secure.

6 If there is any breakthrough at the political talks being convened in Arusha tomorrow (Sat), ie any prospect of reaching a cease-fire or significant moves in that direction, this would mean that UNAMIR could rapidly resume some of its functions. On the ground the situation is no better nor worse. UNAMIR is reasonably confident that the refugees which had sought their protection in the stadium and hospital in Kigali would be protected or at least could be transported to areas where they would be under less threat.

7 Egypt emphasised that it was important for peacekeeping operations in general that the UN was not seen to rush to make decisions in a way in which its credibility would be questioned. The OAU is discussing the matter at present and they suggested the President make contact with the OAU SecGen.

8 In answer to a question from Senegal about the future options, the President noted that at least for a short period because many of the evacuated troops would still be in Nairobi this meant the troops could be rapidly redeployed to Kigali. Thus if a cease-fire is agreed over the weekend, it was conceivable the SecGen would come to the Council to request redeployment. If this took longer than a few days, then of course the wishes of the troop contributing countries would be important in deciding what then happened to them. A resolution would be required if they were to stay for any length of time in Nairobi.

CONFIDENTIAL

C04356/NYK

Page 3

9 Bangladesh noted that it had been important for them that the troops be relocated to Nairobi so that they were available for immediate redeployment if necessary. (Copy of Bangladesh letter to President yesterday follows by fax to Wgtn only).

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

21:38 (5075)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$452.21
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04362/NYK	25-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, LGL, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Genocide reported by Medecines Sans Frontieres
- Council considers what, if any, options it may have to take action in this appalling situation

Action

For information and thoughts on appropriate Council action.

Report

2 Sec Gen of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) called this afternoon to brief the President on events over the weekend at Butare hospital administered by MSF. Butare is the second largest city in Rwanda and is in the southern part, under the control of the "government forces". MSF noted about 40% of its population was of Tutsi ethnic background.

3 On Friday the government army forces rounded up all the local staff of the hospital and killed them, saying they would return to kill all the patients the next day. On Saturday they came back and killed all 170 patients being treated by MSF. The patients had been injured in earlier conflicts with militia and with the army forces and were being treated for machete wounds. In answer to President's question, MSF confirmed that those doing the killings were wearing regular Rwanda army uniforms and emphasised that this was the most brutal act they had experience of in their 20 year history as an organisation.

4 MSF also reported that 140 people under the protection of the ICRC travelling to Zaire had been killed. According to MSF when the killing started the Presidential Guard began to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

systematically kill people on a "list" of about 1500 of those in opposition to the President. This included Hutu members of the opposition. In more recent times the "government forces" had moved to targeting all Tutsis. If the situation did not improve in the south then, according to MSF, there would be no more Tutsis in the south "within a few weeks".

5 Because the MSF now had no staff and no patients in Butare they had withdrawn from their operation. Since then they had visited the Dutch and Belgian Foreign Ministers as well the King of Belgium to draw attention to what they described as a clear policy of genocide on the part of the Rwandan government forces.

6 MSF appealed to the Council to implement "safe areas" around hospitals. They said that there were many people in need of medical assistance who were afraid to get attention especially when they knew it was not safe even in the presence of ex-pat medical staff. (In their experience in the past, this had usually provided some measure of security). If the UN could implement a security perimeter around the hospitals, people would be able to travel from places of hiding in the bush or in their homes. This is "the minimum" MSF was seeking from the international community for immediate assistance. In their opinion this could work. Butare is only 2 1/2 hours drive from the Burundi border and their staff did the journey regularly.

7 In the short term, there would be 2 million people in the south (coming mostly from Kigali) who were in dire need of food, water and other basic necessities. This will require a major aid effort MSF noted.

8 President briefed Council on this call and Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided briefing on weekend events. The situation in Kigali remains very tense. There were no significant changes. The RPF continues to have control of various positions in the hills around Kigali and the north and north-east remain in their control, while the south and south-west are in the control of the "government forces". Elsewhere, the RPF forces were advancing but had slowed under opposition from the "government forces".

9 Over the weekend some 1000 UNAMIR troops had been evacuated from Kigali. Now there are 444 remaining (including 72 military observers). Although the evacuated personnel spent time in Nairobi over the weekend (to see if there was any prospect of progress at the cease-fire talks which had been scheduled for Saturday in Arusha), most had now been repatriated to their own countries. (The secretariat commented privately to us that the repatriation of the Bangladeshi forces had not been entirely unwelcome by the Force Commander).

10 As to the Arusha cease-fire talks, coordinated by Tanzania as the Arusha peace "facilitator", these had not

taken place as scheduled for Saturday. Although the Tanzanian government had asked UNAMIR to airlift the "interim government" party from a border location in Zaire, a short distance from Butare, the "interim government" had not showed up at the appointed time. This meant that they were not even in Arusha for the talks.

11 The RPF had showed up but was not, in any event, prepared to talk with the "interim government". It would however have been acceptable to them to talk with the Rwandan army (not represented at Arusha). The RPF position was that it wanted to present Tanzania and the OAU (represented at Arusha by its Sec Gen) and the UN with a unilateral ceasefire, but subject to certain conditions (previously reported). If the conditions are met, the unilateral cease-fire was due to come into effect at midnight tonight (Mon), local time.

12 The Under Sec Gen for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hanson, visited Kigali with a small team of UN agency reps over the weekend. The visit was to assess the urgent needs of the people of Kigali. UNAMIR continues to provide protection for people in the stadium and the Force Commander is trying to arrange "swaps" to get people to safer areas.

13 After a pause, and initiated by Argentina, there followed a long discussion in the Council as to what the appropriate response, if any, there might be. Argentina (supported by Czech, Spain and Pakistan) noted that each time the Council met it received a briefing on the atrocities in Rwanda and that it needed to show that it was not "indifferent" to the situation. Argentina proposed that the President make this clear to the media.

14 The UK disagreed and said that instead there was a need for the Council to support the efforts of the OAU and neighbouring countries in their efforts to get the parties together to talk about a cease-fire. It was readily agreed that the President could call in the ambassadors concerned to convey the Council's view (calls have been set up for tomorrow for this purpose). The UK also noted that the Council was in the "unenviable position" of not wanting to make statements on the one hand which it could not follow up on, or of hand wringing concern without action on the other. Filling time with empty resolutions was also a "sterile" activity Argentina added.

15 Spain then suggested that some thought be given to what if any responses the Council could make. In FRY a tribunal was created together with a special investigating commission, in Liberia an ad hoc commission of enquiry had been established to look into the Hrbel massacre. Could not something similar be done here, at the very least to open a file in which the evidence of the MSF could be deposited so that over the longer term action is taken to have the perpetrators of this genocide held responsible?

16 At this point, the US (Albright) made what she described as a "very difficult proposal", she noted that in any similar situation, the Council would ask the President to call in the Ambassador of the state concerned to ask, on behalf of the Council, for an explanation. In this connection she had in mind asking why did the "interim government" not show in Arusha. After a long pause, Rwanda volunteered the information that a "Minister for the Interior" of the "interim government" had travelled to Arusha from Dar es Salaam to the talks on instructions from the "interim government" and that it was the RPF who refused to enter negotiations with this Minister.

17 In summing up this very difficult and depressing discussion, President noted that it would be very important for the Sec Gen to continue his efforts and that he would call in the ambassadors of the neighbouring countries as requested to convey support for regional efforts, and that it would be important for delegations to reflect on the discussion, recognising there might be a range of options (identified by Spain), while not overestimating the Council's ability to do something about the situation. He agreed to make a statement to the media which would convey this together with the discussion of the MSF information.

End Message

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115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

20:57 (5102)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$230.23

FROM:	NEW YORK	C04377/NYK	26-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C22387

Summary

- President meets with OAU, Tanzanian and Ugandan Reps and conveys Council's strong support for continued OAU/regional efforts.
- Constraints of regional group however mean UN is only organ capable of making realistic progress - question is how?
- President lays out some options for Council.

Action

For information only

Report

2 President met with the PR of Uganda and Charge ai of Tanzania, together with the OAU rep, and secretariat (Riza USG) and (Annabi DPKO) today to follow up Council's decision that its support for regional initiatives and OAU action be conveyed. Following is report of the meeting made orally to Council:

- President followed up Council's decision yesterday to call in the PRs of Tanzania, and Uganda and the representative of the OAU to convey the Council's strong desire to work in partnership with the OAU and with regional leaders
- OAU and Uganda expressed disappointment about UN's decision. President briefed them on the realities of the

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events leading up to the Council's decision on Thursday to reduce UNAMIR to a small political presence

- Neither Tanzania nor OAU had received briefings on what happened in Arusha and why the parties did not get together for the talks (national holiday in Tanzania today)
- Tanzania expressed its appreciation for the UN's assistance in putting on a flight to Zaire for the purpose of transporting the government side, who did not in fact show up
- OAU touched on the need for close cooperation between the OAU and the UN, in practice however this is likely to happen most successfully on the ground between the OAU rep and the Sec Gen's Special Rep.
- President urged neighbouring states and OAU to apply whatever political pressure they could to the parties to come to a cease-fire. OAU agreed this was one of their major objectives
- Although there is no immediate timeframe, a very real timeframe exists for 29 July when UNAMIR's mandate expires under Res 909, though the Sec Gen is to report by 6 May on situation)
- Looking ahead there was a need for the OAU to identify which of its members would be prepared to contribute forces in the future when it might be possible to strengthen UNAMIR
- Uganda noted the budgetary constraints for regional states and OAU noted it would not like to see the funding problems encountered in Liberia for example. Uganda also noted it would take a very large contingent, even larger than that contemplated at UNAMIR's peak (2500) to maintain peace in a post conflict situation in Rwanda
- Tanzania noted the historical connection between such strife in one area and the neighbouring states. The situation was quite likely to spill over.
- All agreed that the cease-fire was the critical factor since there was no suggestion at this stage that any sought to send combat troops to Rwanda to wage war on the parties. President emphasised that should this be contemplated it would be important for there to be further discussion with the UN

3 The President then went on to make the following observations.

- The regional countries are willing to help but are limited in terms of capacity (budgetary, organisation

etc),

- Realistically, only the UN has the capacity to coordinate efforts to get the two parties together and the Special Rep and Force Commander are doing this now but extra political weight might be needed,
- The Council might ask the secretariat to begin contingency planning for the strengthening of UNAMIR once conditions on the ground improve sufficiently bearing in mind that stabilising the regions would have to be at least as high a priority as Kigali,
- If there was ever a time when it would be useful to think of a Security Council mission to a troubled area, this would surely merit consideration at this point,
- The suggestions made by Spain yesterday should be pursued with a view to the evidence of genocide and other breaches of international humanitarian law being collected by the secretariat with a view to action which might be taken in the future.

4 Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided a further short briefing on the situation on the ground in respect of which there had been no significant change since yesterday. There had been heavy artillery and mortar fire in Kigali during the last 24 hours and the new element had been that on 2 occasions mortars had struck the airport. There had been some damage of the airport though it was not "significant" and it was still functioning. This fire was attributed to the RPF. (According to Canadians, Force Commander has said that if conditions deteriorate at the airport UNAMIR will hunker down at its HQ).

5 An exodus of displaced persons had been observed travelling north from Kigali. (We know from the Canadians that these people came from the stadium and are travelling along a safe corridor to behind the RPF lines. Canadians advise that the RPF warned them to leave the stadium in preparation for (final?) RPF assault on Kigali and that most have now left).

6 The Force Commander has been very active in continuing to consult both parties. (Secretariat advised during private meeting that he was shuttling between Kigali and Butare in a helicopter and by ground means under extremely dangerous conditions). The Special Rep is presently in Nairobi but is returning to Kigali. (We understand that media have reported RPF as now calling for his resignation though Secretariat are seeking clarification of this.)

7 The very small humanitarian team was able to distribute some medicine and sanitary supplies to people in the stadium under UNAMIR protection. (We understand from Canadians however that with the virtual pull out of ICRC and the

Medecines Sans Frontieres pull out there is now almost no-one distributing humanitarian aid (even though UNAMIR can get some supplies into Kigali). Canadians advise that ICRC stopped distributing food because the food was making the recipients into worse targets for massacre, acting like a magnet for additional problems.

8 There remain 444 UNAMIR personnel in Kigali in total.

9 Our accompanying fax (Wgtn, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels only) contains letter from RPF to President about Council inaction in the face of genocide, together with DHA update report (Wgtn only).

10 There is a real need for UN members to begin to think laterally about what steps can be taken in the face of this continuing tragedy. In this regard it might be useful to canvas the views of Canadians (especially given their experience with Rwanda as a target Canadian aid recipient country, and with providing the Canadian Force Commander), perhaps also with French and Belgians as to what if anything further could be done. At present none of the big players on the Council are particularly seized of the problem and seem unlikely to become so unless public opinion or media attention develop.

11 As to Nigerian position, they noted privately that they are in a "difficult" position now given that they argued forcefully for an increase in UNAMIR's strength at a time when the Council agreed to radically downsize. This accounts for their relative silence for the time being.

End Message

04/28/94 23:29 212 758 0827

NZ MISSION NY →→→ UNSC

001

NYPM File: 3/88/1

Telephone: NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
(212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 28 April 1994

TO: WELLINGTON No.
WGTV UNSC No.

2521

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB) Page 1 of: 5
Refused to UNSC, UNC, MEA, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP1

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following are:

- (a) draft Presidential statement prepared by Czech PR, Kovanda, which was discussed at informals today;
- b) draft Presidential statement which we have prepared this evening and which will be considered at informals tomorrow (29 April).

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

00:17 (43858)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$641.30
FROM: NEW YORK	C04387/NYK	29-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
PARIS	HARARE	Priority
BRUSSELS		Priority
MFAT	(MEA, HRU, UNC, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council has extensive discussion on various proposals for urgent action on Rwanda including possible arms embargo
- New Zealand calls for Council action including possible arms embargo
- President asked to draft statement following strong and unanimous support for urgent action in the face of continuing reports of horrific and overwhelming tragedy amounting to genocide

Action

For instructions overnight

Report

2 It seems that the continuing reports of butchery in Rwanda are at last galvanising members of the Council to respond to the prodding we have been giving on the need for further action. There has been a steady stream of NGO reports of brutality continuing.

3 Our accompanying fax (Wgtn only) contains RPF press release alleging that France is resupplying arms to "government forces" under cover of "humanitarian flights" made to Zaire. (We have drawn this to the attention of the French delegation who were dismissive but undertook to check with Paris).

4 Also included is "Human Rights Watch" release detailing atrocities, ICRC update, call from Amnesty International for RPF not to engage in killings, and article about inability

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(because of rules of engagement) for other peacekeepers to intervene in Belgians' deaths.

5 At this afternoon's consultations Nigeria emphasised that there are two types of fighting going on in Rwanda, that between the RPF and the "government forces" (RGF), and that being perpetrated against innocent civilians behind their lines. The Council had tended to concentrate on only the first in emphasising the need to have a cease-fire before the UN could take action.

6 Letter from OAU was distributed reporting on a meeting of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Addis today (copy by fax to Wgtn only). Nigeria informed the Council of the outcome of a meeting the African group held in NY this morning where it resolved to take the following action:

- convene an emergency meeting of the OAU Central Organ at the Foreign Minister level even before the meeting scheduled for Tunisia soon is held;
- have OAU Central Mechanism for Conflict Resolution assist in the coordination of efforts including those of the regional states (eg to avoid the situation over the weekend where the RPF went to Tanzania to sign a cease-fire agreement and the RGF went to Zaire to sign a separate document)
- consider proposals for stopping the killing such as sending a contingent of armed forces and military police, and place this contingent in an expanded UNAMIR (eg like the ECOWAS contribution in Liberia)
- establish a contact group to follow up these points and to develop proposals for Security Council action
- consider recommending to Council that a preventative group be deployed to Burundi (eg as in the case of Macedonia) to try to prevent problem engulfing the whole region.

7 Following this, Czech characterised Council action as having been focussed 80% on getting UNAMIR out of Rwanda and 20% on getting a cease-fire, with no substantive consideration of how to stop the ongoing genocide. For Czech they recalled their experience with the "scrupulous" reports of human rights organisations during "less happy times than now in Czech". Noting they had no particular "axe to grind" and being neither a past "colonial power", an "arms exporter" nor a "regional power", they tabled a draft Presidential Statement (worked up without too much consultation with other delegations). The draft firmly points the finger of blame for genocide at the Rwandan "government forces" (copy by fax to Wgtn only).

8 There was a long and substantive debate about the various options before the Council. The US (Albright) noted that all Council members were frustrated about the situation and the Council had to "do better". In this vein, US referred to a number of ideas "floating around" including:

- Security Council arms embargo (given that US had "heard" that the Rwandan army was actively seeking to buy arms at present)
- Council action to call on the Rwanda army to instruct its forces to cease killing civilians
- encouragement to neighbouring states to facilitate cross border humanitarian assistance (in this connection US noted it had been in touch with Dept of Humanitarian Affairs and offered assistance with the delivery of humanitarian assistance)

9 At this point one or two odd positions were taken. The French were quick to support Nigeria's proposal but showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm with either the Czech or US suggestions. They did however support giving thought to the idea of a preventive force deployment to Burundi.

10 Russia (quite duplicitously since two weeks ago they had been vigorous proponents of withdrawing UNAMIR altogether) noted that the Council had taken "very timid steps" in connection with the "terrible extermination of people in Rwanda" which "deserved greater attention" and was not "doing anything to put an end to it" (despite the "good steps to protect UNAMIR"). "Why haven't we thought about collectively putting an end to this?" Russia asked, "it is not enough to observe this, we must do something".

11 Djibouti expressed readiness to consider a statement, though the Czech draft was "not helpful" under the circumstances of there being no cease-fire. Yet again Djibouti manifested its unwillingness to point the finger at the RGF. Spain referred to the widespread violation of international humanitarian law and supported the OAU, and US approaches and "some" of the ideas in the Czech draft and invited President to draft an appropriate statement on behalf of all.

12 Pakistan expressed the view that the Council action has "not been sufficient" and that "silence is not to be tolerated further". They expressed the view that the statement should also focus on the cease-fire question and on the 2 types of killing identified by Nigeria. Having a Presidential statement tomorrow "at the latest" was "the minimum".

13 UK took the position that the Council needed to work with the African group. A statement of condemnation was not useful. It would be an apology for action but no real action

could be taken except to look at improved coordination between the OAU and regional states efforts and those of the Special Rep and the Force Commander. There was a "disconnect" in this respect highlighted by the events relating to the different locations apparently attended by the parties last weekend.

14 It would be important in this regard for the neighbouring states to consult closely with the UN. He wanted to avoid the construction of an "overambitious" proposal which relied on UN resources or didn't "fit well with UNAMIR". The UK delegation was "open to consideration of a statement" but it would need to contain elements which were intended to bring together the OAU and the UN efforts.

15 Oman noted a need for caution in supporting any initiative involving the neighbouring states and agreed with the UK on the form of the statement. Oman suggested it was important for the OAU to visit the region to assess what is happening and to "pinpoint" the causes and background to the conflict. Oman was also upset by the reference in para 9 of the OAU letter to OAU "dismay" at the Council's decision to reduce drastically UNAMIR forces.

16 China recalled that it had always held the view that the international community should not give up its efforts and should exert greater efforts in view of the worsening situation. China identified 3 levels of coordination required: that between African states themselves (eg Zaire and Tanzania), between African states and the Special Rep and Force Commander on site, and that between the Council and the OAU. The problems they could see with the Czech draft was that it did not address the 2 types of killing identified by others, did not identify a future solution to the problem and may not take into account the views of the secretariat (especially those of the Special Rep). Nonetheless China was ready for the "arduous task" of producing something urgently.

17 Brazil recalled that the situation in Rwanda is one of the most dreadful events since World War II and noted the emerging consensus in the Council to consideration of action on an urgent basis. Brazil said it could support "some" of the OAU proposals in a statement but others would require looking into further. In Burundi the question was not only of preventive deployment but also of preventive diplomacy.

18 Argentina referred to the need for action also on the means available to the African states, highlighting the capacity problem for the area and agreed with Pakistan that it was a serious moral problem which was capable of infecting other areas in the region. The statement needed to be generic rather than specific and to be a warning about human rights abuses but not to cut across any responsibilities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

19 In our national capacity we recalled that from the outset

we had been among those who had strongly advocated an ongoing commitment from the UN to Rwanda. We noted that we did not find it disturbing to see the OAU referring with "dismay" to the Council's decision to downsize UNAMIR. The fact that we had had to take this decision had been to all of our dismay. We agreed that what was not being addressed was the killing of civilians. It would continue even if a cease-fire was obtained. This was where the Council was subject to criticism and constituted the rationale for the Czech draft. A statement would be better, though, if it were action orientated and went beyond merely expressing statement of horror. It was increasingly difficult to explain to the media why the Council had not taken action.

20 If there is credible evidence that one party is in the arms market then the Council had a serious responsibility to consider an arms embargo. It would be difficult to justify taking no action if later it was found that one party purchased significant quantities of arms. There was also the Nigerian points about the need for cooperation with the OAU, though it had to be realised that the OAU in fact had limited resources to take the lead in the effort on the ground. As the OAU rep had pointed out the UN would need to be "the glue" which helped the OAU to work out the issue. We also endorsed the Nigerian idea of needing to reflect on the Council taking preventative action in Burundi. We emphasised that if an arms embargo would require a resolution which could be worked on, in the meantime a statement would allow some action in the immediate future. The negotiation of it however could not be allowed to go on too long.

21 Secretariat (Gharekhan) endorsed idea of a statement but cautioned against the use of those words in the Czech draft which could endanger UNAMIR lives (ie the reference to the information having come from the secretariat). It was hoped the African contact group would keep closely in touch with DPKO and DPI about mutually reinforcing each others efforts. The need for coordination was also emphasised, though there was currently no difficulty with coordination of humanitarian efforts given that UNAMIR was involved in what humanitarian relief remained. Secretariat also emphasised what would be most helpful to UNAMIR would be reference to need to secure the airport as required by UNAMIR.

22 President concluded discussion by noting that all agreed that there was an urgent need to adopt a Presidential statement but that most delegations required instructions. We undertook to produce draft for consideration tomorrow with a view to its adoption tomorrow also. (Our IFF contains our draft.)

Meeting with Rwandan PR

23 We should also report meeting between President and Rwandan PR yesterday, during Ministers visit to NY at which Rwandan PR sought to make a "clarification" to the effect

that the involvement of regional states would be unwelcome. In particular he said it would "not be acceptable" for Uganda to participate in any "help in the conflict", especially in any UN force which might be expanded in the future. He said that "it would not be productive for Rwanda to have the presence of neighbouring countries in any Peacekeeping role in Rwanda."

24 President expressed the clear sentiment that under the "inhuman" circumstances prevailing in Rwanda now, this was bordering on the "outrageous". President emphasised that there is no sympathy in the Council believes that the regional countries do have a role in helping to stop the killing and in getting the parties back into a peace process. President said it was offensive for Rwanda to be asking for the Council's help in sorting out the situation and at the same time seeking to lay down conditions as to which troops would and would not be acceptable. President urged Rwandan PR to avoid taking such provocative positions.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 115/23/37

17:41 (5118)	700/UNS/00000/00000	\$123.41
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FROM:	WELLINGTON	C22615/WN1	29-Apr-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
	PARIS	HARARE	Routine
	BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (UNC, MEA, HRU, LGL, DSP3, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

U48378: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04387.

Guidance

We support draft Presidential statement, and Council consideration of arms embargo.

Comment

2 We welcome Council reengagement with Rwanda, with Presidential statement as a first step. We have no problems with your draft.

3 We can go along with consideration of an arms embargo. In proceeding to negotiation of one (if it comes to that) key considerations should be that it be effective, practical and enforceable - which will require commitment by neighbouring countries. Their and OAU views on that would be helpful.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pages: 11

30 April 1994

New Zealand Mission
to the United Nations

115/23/37

To: WATN
WATN UNSCIMMEDIATE

SFAT (MEA, HRU, UNC, LAL, DP3, DSP1)

Security Council: Rwanda

Copy of:

- Presidential Statement adopted
30 April (1am)- Sec Gen's letter of 29 April
asking Council to reconsider its
action on Rwanda- dropped on table -
no prior discussion
with Pres, &
other SC members
to be discussed
this week.- Draft resolution submitted by
New Zealand but not in the event
voted on given agreement / consensus
with Presidential Statement language
(slightly modified)11.58 pm
res, talked with
Pres to vote.
if WATN didn't
agree to Presidential
statement. They did.

Cable report follows 2/4/94

FW.

As Adopted S/PRES/1994/24

2/11

30 April 1994

The Security Council is appalled at continuing reports of the slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda, and reported preparations for further massacres. It endorses the concern expressed by the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the massacres and wanton killings have continued unabated in a systematic manner in Rwanda. It recalls that such killings have already been condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994.

Attacks on defenseless civilians have occurred throughout the country, **especially** in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda. The Security Council demands that the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control. It calls on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such attacks and to commit themselves to ensuring that persons who instigate or participate in such attacks are prosecuted and punished.

The Security Council condemns all these breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible. In this context, the Security Council recalls that the killing of ~~members~~ of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

*Rwanda/RPF
wouldn't allow
for genocide.*

The Security Council reiterates the demand in its resolution 912 (1994) for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities between the forces of the interim Government of

Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. It commends the efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to mediate such an outcome, and requests them to continue their efforts in liaison with countries of the region and the OAU. It also commends the courage and determination of UNAMIR personnel in affording protection to civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.

The Security Council welcomes the efforts that have been made by countries of the region, with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, to bring about an end to the fighting and the killings in Rwanda. It also commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Rwanda.

The Security Council is deeply concerned at the situation of the many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have been forced to flee the fighting and killings in Rwanda.

The Security Council calls on all States to assist the UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States. The Council calls on States bordering Rwanda, working with the OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda.

The Security Council calls on all Rwandan parties to guarantee the protection of displaced persons and refugees in Rwanda and refugees outside Rwanda and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian assistance.

The Security Council underlines the urgent need for coordinated international action to help bring peace to Rwanda and to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people. It requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU and countries of the region, to take appropriate measures to ensure that international efforts to assist the situation in Rwanda are carried out in an effective and coordinated manner, and to ensure that all relevant parties are kept fully informed.

The Security Council emphasizes the importance of Kigali airport for the provision of international relief efforts to Rwanda, as well as for the requirements of UNAMIR. It calls on the parties to allow the airport to be kept open at all times for such purposes.

The Security Council stresses the importance of ensuring that the situation in Rwanda does not affect adversely the security and stability of neighbouring countries.

The Security Council warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms. It appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict. It states its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda.

The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda. It reiterates its conviction that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country. It calls again on the parties to renew their commitment to this Agreement.

5/11

4

The Security Council requests the Secretary-General:

(a) in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU, to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view to assisting in the restoration of law and order in Rwanda and in providing security for displaced persons;

(b) to work with UNHCR, the OAU and countries of the region to take such preventive diplomatic steps as may be necessary to prevent the spread of violence and atrocities to neighbouring countries;

(c) to explore urgently ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons;

(d) to consult the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on measures to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced persons congregated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi,

(e) to bring to its attention any information that he might receive concerning arms flows into Rwanda, and to consult the countries of the region and the OAU about the practical implementation of an arms embargo on Rwanda, and

(f) to make proposals for investigation of the reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict.

The Security Council states its intention to consider urgently the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 April 1994 (S/1994/518) and further recommendations that the Secretary-General may provide.

6/11



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

29 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I regret to have to inform you that the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has reported a further deterioration of the situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda.

The capital city is effectively divided into sectors controlled by the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reports strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but enjoy little effective protection. Massacres continue on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.

A new complication is that in recent days both sides have begun to express lack of confidence in UNAMIR's impartiality and this is affecting their cooperation with my Special Representative and the Force Commander.

His Excellency
Mr. Colin R. Keating
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York

7/11

These developments raise serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR by resolution 912 on 21 April 1994. In particular, it has become clear that that mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres. At best it can provide limited protection to small groups of threatened persons in the city of Kigali and it would be unable to save them if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last three weeks. This humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the international community.

In considering what action should be taken, it has to be recognized that the disastrous incident of 6 April which caused the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi has had two consequences which require different responses from the international community. First, that incident sparked a resumption of fighting between the Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Secondly, it reawakened deep-rooted ethnic hatreds, which have plagued Rwanda in the past and which have again led to massacres of innocent civilians on a massive scale.

The revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR in resolution 912 on 21 April is an adequate response to the first of these consequences. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have been making strenuous efforts to help the parties agree to a ceasefire and a return to implementation of the Arusha Accord. Those efforts have not yet succeeded but the present mandate and strength of UNAMIR are sufficient for them to continue.

The events of the last few days have confirmed, however, that UNAMIR's revised mandate is not one which enables it to bring the massacres under control. Some of these have been the work of uncontrolled military personnel but most of them have been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order

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in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda. It has become clear that the horrors for which they are responsible can be ended only if law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity.

In these circumstances, I urge the Security Council to reexamine the decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take, or could authorize Member States to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate. But I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leave the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

9/11

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/522
29 April 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

New Zealand: draft resolutionThe Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it condemned the ongoing violence in Rwanda and demanded an immediate end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda,

Appalled at continuing reports of the slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda, and reported preparations for further massacres,

Endorsing the concern expressed by the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the massacres and wanton killings have continued unabated in a systematic manner in Rwanda,

Recalling that such killings have already been condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994,

1. Takes note that although attacks on defenceless civilians may have been perpetrated by all parties, in the main they appear to have occurred in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda;

2. Recalls that the killing of the members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes genocide and is a crime punishable under international law;

3. Condemns all breaches of international humanitarian law, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible;

4. Demands that the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control;

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5. Calls on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such

attacks and to commit themselves to participate in such attacks are prosecuted and punished;

6. Reiterates the demand in its resolution 912 (1994) for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between the forces of the interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front;

7. Commends the efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to mediate such an outcome, requests them to continue their efforts in liaison with countries of the region and the OAU and also commends the courage and determination of UNAMIR personnel in affording protection to civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR;

8. Welcomes the efforts that have been made by countries of the region, with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, to bring about an end to the fighting and the killings in Rwanda and commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Rwanda;

9. Expresses deep concern at the situation of the many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have been forced to flee the fighting and killings in Rwanda;

10. Calls on all States to assist the UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States and calls on States bordering Rwanda, working with the OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda;

11. Calls on all Rwandan parties to guarantee the protection of displaced persons and refugees in Rwanda and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian assistance;

12. Determines that there is an urgent need for coordinated international action to help bring peace to Rwanda and to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU and countries of the region, to take appropriate measures to ensure that international efforts to assist the situation in Rwanda are carried out in an effective and coordinated manner, and to ensure that all relevant parties are kept fully informed;

13. Emphasizes the importance of Kigali airport for the provision of international relief efforts to Rwanda, as well as for the requirements of UNAMIR and calls on the parties to allow the airport to be kept open at all times for such purposes;

14. Stresses the importance of ensuring that the situation in Rwanda does not affect adversely the security and stability of neighbouring countries;

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15. Warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms, appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and expresses its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda;

16. Reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda, reiterates its conviction that the

15. Warns that the situation in Rwanda would be further seriously aggravated if either of the parties were to have access to additional arms, appeals to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and expresses its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda;

16. Reaffirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda, reiterates its conviction that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country and calls again on the parties to renew their commitment to this Agreement;

17. Requests the Secretary-General:

(a) in consultation with the Secretary-General of the OAU, to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view to assisting in the restoration of law and order in Rwanda and in providing security for displaced persons;

(b) to work with UNHCR, the OAU and countries of the region to take such preventive diplomatic steps as maybe necessary to prevent the spread of violence and atrocities to neighbouring countries;

(c) urgently to explore ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons;

(d) to consult the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on measures to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced persons congregated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi;

(e) to bring to its attention any information that he might receive concerning arms flows into Rwanda, and to consult the countries of the region and the OAU about the practical implementation of an arms embargo on Rwanda; and

(f) to make proposals for investigation of the reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict;

18. Decides to consider urgently the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 April 1994 (S/1994/518) and further recommendations to the Secretary-General may provide.
