

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Manatū Aorere

Official Diplomatic Reporting

Relating to

"United Nations Peacekeeping Rwanda"

Volume 3 of 5 1 June – 30 June 1994

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Official Diplomatic Reporting Relating to

"United Nations Peacekeeping Rwanda"

To mark the 20th Anniversary of the Rwanda Genocide on 7 April 2014, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is making public its diplomatic reporting for the period March, April, May, June, and July 1994. This material includes the reporting from the New Zealand Ambassador to the UN in New York, who was President of the Security Council in April 1994. It also includes reporting from other New Zealand posts. These files contain the cables sent between Wellington and New York – a record of the unfolding disaster in Rwanda and New Zealand's work to challenge the Security Council to respond to the genocide and protect innocent civilians, and the obstruction which it encountered from many of the major powers over this period.

This folder contains the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's

official files from 1 June to 30 June 1994

Volume 3 of 5

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

20:14 (5422)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$284.05
FROM:	NEW YORK	C04540/NYK	01-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING EC POSTS CANBERRA HARARE SANTIAGO DEFENCE	MOSCOW WASHINGTON OTTAWA GENEVA TOKYO	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	(MEA, UNC,	ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP3, EAB)	
DEFENCE DEFENCE	:	PS, DDI)	

subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04529 and fax 2701. At informals this evening Secretariat was asked by the Czech Republic (Kovanda) for an update on the situation of the 30,000 civilians trapped at Kabgayi. Special Rep Gharekhan said that the UN had received reports of the massacre of 500 people who had taken refuge at this place which is in "government" territory about 30 miles from Kigali. UNAMIR had sent four military observers to the area. To be able to achieve this was, in itself, quite a breakthrough for UNAMIR.

- 2 According to Gharekhan there were 38,000 people, mainly Tutsi, at Kabgayi camping under difficult conditions. He said the four observers had yet to report. The UN was therefore not able to confirm the reports of massacres. He then added, contradictorily, that at the hospital they had seen corpses which had been attacked by machetes and had found the general atmosphere among the refugees to be one of fear and nervousness.
- 3 Kovanda suggested that the letter from Archbishop Martino had been sufficiently alarming to warrant the President (Al-Khussaiby) telling the media that members of the Council were concerned about the reports. Al-Khussaiby said he would brief the press in these terms.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/17

Your f e: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

21:13 (5438)			700/NYK/00000/00000	\$1092.76
FROM:	NEW YORK	<	C04550/NYK	02-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	PON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	AB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

W

Summary

- SecGen has issued further report on Rwanda in light of Riza/Baril visit
- Report confirms that the principal perpetrators of the massacres have been "Government" supporters, and states that the killings amount to genocide
- While direct discussions on a ceasefire and an end to the killings are now underway, their success is not a precondition to the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, though success at the talks may have an effect on Phases 2 and 3
- While concept of operations for revised UNAMIR requires adjustment, basic approach which was inherent in the NZ draft resolution and the SecGen's report of 13 May remains, namely that the force will seek to provide protection to assemblies of persons at risk and security to humanitarian relief operations. It would operate out of Kigali and elsewhere as necessary
- Americans now appear to accept concept of operations proposed by SecGen and are anxious to be seen to be more positive to UNAMIR
- We and Americans have agreed to collaborate in the

piusentation of a resolution to the Council

- SecGen castigates international community for slowness of response to the calamity in Rwanda
- SecGen has now received sufficient offers to get Phases 1 and 2 of expanded force underway, but will not do so until suitable protective equipment (APCs) is available
- The US has agreed to make APCs and other equipment available
- Inexorable pressure will come on next week for a New Zealand contribution, particularly on the light of our high profile on the issue including during the Minister's visit

I distile

- Secretariat have already foreshadowed a formal request for NZ assistance and given language SecGen has used. >

and who mented his

Action

- Comments on SecGen's report and on resolution on UNAMIR
- A decision if possible when resolution is adopted next week on a New Zealand offer to UNAMIR, (the idea of making an RNZAF Hercules available to supply the force for a defined period remains the most useful, most highly visible and least risky option).

Report

We have sent by earlier fax the SecGen's latest report on Rwanda which has been prepared in the light of the visit to Rwanda by ASG Riza and the UN Military Adviser, General Baril. The report makes very interesting reading and contains some powerful observations on what has been happening in Rwanda and on the reaction of the international community. We were given a preliminary readout of the report last night by Riza; the report itself was not available until midday today.

The massacres - genocide

- The report validates the sentence for which we had to fight so hard in securing the Presidential statement of 30 April; namely, that the massacres have been carried out principally in areas controlled by "government" forces or supporters. This fact has been acknowledged by the interim government and chiefs of staff of the government forces and the gendarmerie. Some RPF killings, particularly of suspected members of the militia and the interhamwe (the late President's youth militia), have been reported but these are far from being of the same order as the massacres.
- 3 In para 11, the SecGen passes on information indicating

the pi_meditated nature of the killings. In para 36, he states that on the basis of the information that has emerged there can be little doubt that the killings amount to genocide. He notes, however, that the continuing hostilities impede a full investigation and that, in any case, UN procedures "do not lend themselves to immediate action".

Ceasefire negotiations

- 4 The report notes that as a result of Riza's visit, the RPF has agreed to sit down with government military representatives to discuss a ceasefire and that the government side has now accepted the RPF's refusal to negotiate with persons claiming to be the "interim government". The SecGen emphasises that an end to the killings must go hand in hand with a ceasefire (para 39). As he also notes, however, the process of political compromise will take time, and for that reason he proposes that the UNAMIR mandate be extended for six months.
- 5 It is implicit in the report that the timing of the deployment of Phases 1 and 2 of the expanded force is not dependent on the achievement of a ceasefire or on the formal consent of the parties. The limiting condition on deployment is the availability of protective equipment (see below). On the other hand, progress at the ceasefire talks may have a bearing on the method of deployment of Phase 2 (para 23), and success at the talks may even obviate the need for Phase 3 altogether (para 24). The report also looks to the formalisation of the assurances of cooperation that both parties have given to the expanded mandate (para 18).

Concept of operations

- The SecGen notes that there will need to be adjustments to the concept of operations mapped out in the report of 15 May. The principal changes are the lapsing of the requirement that Kigali airport be a neutral zone and the timing of the deployments of Phases 1 and 2 of the expanded force. On the latter, because of the delays in deployment of Phase 1, the SecGen now proposes that Phases 1 and 2 be synchronised and virtually made simultaneously.
- The airport's take over by the RPF and the RPF's refusal to the neutral zone concept have precluded the neutral zone option but, to an extent, have also made this less of a requirement given the RPF's undertaking to allow UNAMIR to continue to use the airport and to deploy a strengthened presence there. On the other hand, RPF control would also make the airport and UNAMIR vulnerable to RPF manipulation. For this reason, (and, Riza told us privately, a US phobia of sending their equipment into Kigali) the revised concept of operations also envisages the use of back up airports and deployment of equipment through Uganda and Burundi. (Riza also told us privately that the likelihood was that the operations at the airport would become safer as the RPF

consol lated its control of the surrounding areas.)

- 8 Despite these adjustments, the basic concept of operations remains as envisaged in our draft resolution proposed last month and articulated in the SecGen's last report. That is, that much of the force would be concentrated around Kigali which is an area of obvious need, is central and offers the best access to other parts of the country. On the other hand, because of the vulnerability of Kigali to possible PRF manipulation and the need to reach people in other parts of the country, particularly the south-west controlled by the government, the revised concept also envisages some of the expanded force and equipment coming in from Uganda and Burundi, (though Riza noted that the extreme sensitivity of the situation in Burundi made the latter option rather precarious.
- 9 Despite the deployment envisaged from bordering countries, this does not mean that the SecGen has bought onto the US concept of an operation focussed on the border areas. Riza told us last night that UNHCR and other agencies were adamant that the establishment of secure areas was undesirable (would encourage ethnic cleansing) and unlikely to be of help to people in real need. Those really frightened for their lives would be reluctant to risk coming into the open to get to secure areas. But those who were fleeing the RPF, particularly members of the militia and the interhamwe, would seek refuge in such areas. That would put UNAMIR in an intolerable situation.
- 10 The essential tasks envisaged for the expanded force are unchanged from Resolution 918: to seek to provide protection for persons at risk and to provide security for humanitarian relief operations. The idea of establishing secure areas remains, but this is expressed in terms of providing protection to assemblies of persons (ie in already established concentrations) rather than in setting up new areas.

US attitude

11 Both the US Mission and the Secretariat told us that the talks yesterday between the Secretariat and the 14 strong team from Washington went reasonably well. Despite some continuing ambivalence on the part of the Pentagon, the US now seems to understand that it makes no sense in the circumstances of Rwanda to insist on the criteria of PDD 25 or to demand that there be as clearly defined a concept of operations as would normally be desirable. As emphasised in paras 25 and 26 of the SecGen's report, UNAMIR must have sufficient flexibility to respond to a very fluid situation. Riza noted that they seemed finally to have got through to the Americans that UNAMIR could not and was not trying to save all of Rwanda or all Rwandans. Thus, the previous US complaints that a force level of 55,000 was required to do the job proposed by the SecGen had fallen away.

- 12 We have had extensive consultations with US Mission on this subject over the past 36 hours. It was clear from the Mission's comments that the Administration is sensitive to the negative impressions that its performance generated in the Council and the (foreign) media and that they want to avoid a rerun this time. We pressed on them the importance of restoring unity in the Council and suggested that our two delegations collaborate in putting a text to the Council. The US (Inderfurth) welcomed the idea and proposed we get together tomorrow once Washington has reacted to the Mission's proposals.
- 13 The US Mission told us they were recommending to Washington support of a resolution to give effect to the latest report. The tone could not have been more different from the US approach of a few weeks ago. If this approach is endorsed by Washington, the atmospherics in the Council will be much improved. US would like to table a draft tomorrow with a view to its adoption early next week.

Content of the resolution

- In formal terms, the only action required by the Council to give effect to the report is to approve the deployment of Phases 2 and 3 and to extend the mandate period for a further six months. It seems to us that it is not necessary or desirable to rewrite the mandate itself which, as set out in Op3 of Res 918, is sufficiently flexible to cover the adjusted concept of operations. However, there are also a number of important political and operational matters in the SecGen's report which could usefully be picked up in the resolution as well:
- genocide: since the SecGen has now gone on the record, it would be invidious for the Council to continue to duck the issue; the least it should do is take note of the SecGen's comments in para 36;
- ceasefire talks: the Council could welcome the initiation of talks but should demand nonetheless that the fighting stop;
- killings: the Council should also demand an immediate end to killings;
- cooperation of the parties: the draft should repeat Op 10 of Res 918 demanding that the parties cooperate with UNAMIR;
- provision of troops and equipment for UNAMIR: the SecGen has now received sufficient offers of troops for Phases 1 and 2 to get underway immediately, but desperately needs equipment (see below); the draft should welcome the offers of troops but emphasise the need for logistic support if the expanded force is to get off the ground;

- provision of humanitarian relief: the draft should welcome the international relief efforts already being made but stress the urgent need for more help; it could also encourage contributions to the trust fund to be established by the SecGen (para 42);
- political process: we should continue to urge the OAU and regional governments to foster a resumption of the peace process;
- interim report: it is probably appropriate to have an interim review, but we should ask the SecGen to provide reports as appropriate and at least before mid-late August (September is out; unless kicked off the Council by then, Rwanda's representative will be President).

SecGen's criticisms of international community

15 A feature of the report which need not be taken up directly in the resolution is the trenchant criticism levelled at the international community by the SecGen for the failure to respond adequately to the Rwandan calamity. His language is inclusive; he seems to recognise that the Secretariat is a part of the problem. His undertaking to conduct a review of the system for responding to crises of mixed conflict and humanitarian dimensions is welcome. It may provide a further platform for advancing some of New Zealand's ideas for systemic reform of the management of peacekeeping and related operations. Meanwhile, his comments serve to underscore the need for rapid responses to the appeal for support for UNAMIR.

Troops and equipment for expanded UNAMIR

- 16 Riza told us that they now have firm offers of troops from Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Together, these total 3,200 troops. When Nigeria, whose confirmation of readiness to participate is imminent, is added, the total comes to 4,000. This is more than enough for Phases 1 and 2, and depending on the ceasefire talks, may be all that is needed by way of combat personnel. Support and logistics are now the problem.
- 17 As noted in paras 21 and 40 of the SecGen's report, not even the troops envisaged for Phase 1 will be deployed until there is adequate equipment to protect the troops. The most pressing need is for armoured personnel carriers (APCs), particularly tracked ones. The US is offering 50 APCs, but as reported earlier, these will take some time to get to Rwanda. The South Africans may help, though their APCs are wheeled, which makes them less usable outside Kigali.

New Zealand

18 The SecGen's comments about the need for logistic support

equip. Int, which realistically will only come from developed countries, make it inevitable that New Zealand will be asked for assistance. We consider that it is imperative that we be able to respond positively if at all possible.

19 The situation in Rwanda is not just another peacekeeping operation to be weighed alongside our contributions to UNAVEM, ONUMOZ, or even UNOSOM or UNPROFOR. As the SecGen has been at pains to point out, this is the most horrible situation to have confronted the international community since the holocaust during World War II. Only the killings in Cambodia rival what has taken place in Rwanda over the past two months. Our credibility as a country committed to the UN and as a member of the Security Council will be on the line. In part this is because of the high profile and (from the African and Secretariat perspectives) highly valuable role we have played on the issue but realistically given what the SecGen's report says only Canada, Ghana and Tunisia can claim any kudos at this time.

20 We know from comments made to us yesterday by Riza that an offer of an aircraft to fly the Nairobi-Kigali supply route even if only for a few months would be enormously helpful to the UN if it could be done quickly. It would do wonders for our image with African countries, and the third world generally. We urge that urgent and positive consideration be given to the suggestion we made to you on this question two weeks ago.

<u>End Message</u>

CONFIDENTIAL.

115/23/37

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file:

19:35	(5444)		700/MEA/00000/00000	\$268.42
FROM: TO:	WELLING NEW YOR		C24150/WN1	03-Jun-1994
cc:	WGTN UNBELLING BRUSSELEGENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO		DEFENCE BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Immediate Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, IS	AC,HRU,LGL,EUR,DP3,DSP3,EA	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

U51108: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04550 and fax 2719.

Guidance

- We welcome US re-engagement with Rwanda and support your suggestion to collaborate with them on a resolution putting Sec-Gen's report into effect. We would, however, be wary of thereby raising expectations about New Zealand's ability to make a contribution to UNAMIR. There is some way to go before we can take a decision on this.
- 3 We have a list of Defence queries we would like you to put before the Secretariat.

Comment

- 4 Thank you for your report. We have not had the time to give the Secretary-General's report more than a preliminary reading, nor have we had the time to consult with others (including the Minister). With this in mind we wish to offer the following brief comments.
- It is clear that we are about to take a leading role again on this issue. We must have some concern this may engender an increased expectation of practical support from New Zealand (not least in the minds of the US), that we may not in the event be able to fulfil. See below para 9. Grateful therefore if you could judge your collaboration with

US and others in this light. We would wish to consult Minister on sponsorship in due course.

Sec-Gen's Report

6 As one comment, we continue to have some misgivings regarding the establishment of "secure areas" which we have raised with you before (our C23246 of 12 May, para 7). We note that Riza and UNHCR are opposed to the establishment of safe areas (your para 9). However, while we would not favour the Sec-Gen's second suggestion to set up new areas, like you we would favour the establishment of measures to provide protection to assemblies of persons. This is a manageable and more realistic task.

Draft Resolution

- In addition to elements contained in your para 14, including taking note of genocide, draft resolution should pick up relevant elements contained in Resolution 918. For instance reference should be made to the importance of the Arusha Agreement to the resolution of the conflict and the ongoing role of regional governments (Tanzania) and the OAU. We concur that the draft should repeat op 10 of resolution 918 demanding that the parties cooperate with UNAMIR. We agree that the Council should welcome the initiation of ceasefire talks, but it should also demand that the fighting and the killing stop.
- We look forward to receiving a copy of the draft resolution in due course.

New Zealand Contribution

- NZDF, with whom we have been working closely on suggested logistics contribution, advise that a number of operational points relating to the proposal to deploy an aircraft and crew are being worked through at present. In particular they should be grateful if you would approach the Secretariat with the following questions:

 What is the concept of operations for the use of the
- aircraft?
- Where would it be based Nairobi?
- With whom would RNZAF operate?
- What would be the frequency of flights in terms of hours per week?
- What would be the type of cargo? Would there be a cargo/passenger mix?
- What airfield would aircraft be likely to operate from, particularly in Rwanda?
- What is the assessment of the risk factor?
- What support would be available in-theatre in terms of re-supply, ground maintenance, fuel etc?
- This is a standard checklist of questions to which NZDF require responses. Even a "don't know" in reply to some

CONFIDENTIAL

C24150/WN1

Page 3

questions would be useful for Defence's purposes. For your information, NZDF indicate that it is likely that any assistance they may be able to provide will need to be reimbursed by the UN at standard rates.

End Message

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK (212) 826-1960

Telephone: Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

6 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC -

DEFENCE

No. No.

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)


DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

COPIED TO UNSC, WEA. UNC. LGL, HEU, OSP3

Page 1 of: 3

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Following is RPF's communique on the SecGen's latest report. It is encouraging that the tone of the communique is far less confrontational than earlier efforts and that no reference is made to the RPF's opposition to the SecGen's Special Rep. It would appear that the RPF may finally have realised that Mr Booh-Booh has been sidelined.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



3 June 1994



H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghall Sceretary-General United Nations New York

H.E. Amb. Sallm Bin Mohammed Al-Khussalby President United Nations Security Council New York

Excellencies,

The Rwandese Patriotic Front welcomes the Secretary General's report S-1994/6-40 to the Security Council and trusts that the Secretary General will receive the support he needs to implement UN Security Council resolution 918 without further delay.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front is pleased that the Secretary General has finally reported to the Security Council that the massacres in Rwanda constitute genocide. His report clearly lays the responsibility for genocide in Rwanda on the so-called interim government, elements of the Rwandan army, the presidential guard and the militia.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front shares the Secretary General's frustrations and disappointment that two months after the genocide in Rwanda started, the International Community has failed to act quickly to end the atrockles that have claimed lives of close to a million people.

Your Excellencies, the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda have totally ignored condemnations by the International Community and are determined to go on with their genocidal earnpaign. Indeed the Secretary General's special envoy Mr. Iqbar Riza reports that leaders of the so-called interim government are still broadcasting messages on radio Milles Collines inciting people to exterminate the Tutsl and other sympathizers of RPF.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front, while welcoming the appointment of a special rapporteur for Rwanda by the UN Human Rights Commission, in view of overwhelming evidence, and according to Articles II and III of the Convention on the Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide:

- Urges the Security Council to formally declare atrocities in Rwanda genocide and create a war crimes tribunal to try the perpetrators of this believes crime.



- Requests the Security Council to adopt a resolution that endorses the distruction and or jamming of Radio Milles Collines immediately to stop further public incitement by government leaders to commit genocide.
- Calls on both the Secretary General and the Security Council to take the necessary measures in accordance with rules 15 and 17 governing representation and credentials on the Security Council, to immediately suspend Rwanda's delegation from the Security Council, in order to express the international Community's indignation, ostracise the genocidal Gitarama regime and protect the moral integrity of the Security Council members whose decisions on the Rwanda crisis risk being tarnished by the participation of representatives of the perpetrators of genocide in their deliberations.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front regrets the loss recently of a courageous UN peace keeper and wishes to extend its condolences to the United Nations, the Government of Senegal and to the family of Captain Mbaye Diagne Bacar.

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front

Claude Dusaidi

Lusail ..

Director for External Relations and RPF Representative to the United Nations

cc: All members of the Sccurity Council

NZ MISSIUN NI

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK Telephi 2: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

6 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAR)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Oped to unsc, mea unc, LGL, HRU, EUR, USP3 Page 1 of: 8

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

DEFENCE

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following are:

US draft resolution on Rwanda; (a)

Our comments thereon which we have forwarded to the US Mission. (b)

please pass to neferce.

June 6, 1994, 12:30 pm

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 which expanded the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and authorized an expansion in UNAMIR's Force level,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Council on 2 May 1994 (\$/FR6T/1994/22) which dealt with improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping, and bearing in mind the factors enumerated therein.

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 May 1994 (5/1994/640),

Noting with concern that, to date, the parties have not ceased hostilities, agreed to a Cease-fire, or brought an end to the violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda,

Reiterating its condemnation of the systematic killing of thousands of civilians in Rwanda,

Expressing its outrage that the perpetrators of these killings have been able to operate and continue operating within Rwande with impunity,

Underscoring that the internal displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighboring countries constitute a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.

Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation.

Commending the efforts of heighboring countries for the hospitality they have shown to refugees fleeing Rwands,

Commending also those countries which have made emergency aid evailable to help alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and those countries which have contributed troops and logistical support to UNAMIR, and reiterating the urgent need for coordinated international action to continue such efforts and to help restore peace in Rwanda.

05. 05. 94 01:45 PM

*U. S. MISSION TO U. N. PO&

3/8

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as with countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

Welcoming the visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda and to the region;

Welcoming also resolution \$-3/1 of May 25 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights sitting in special session, which requested the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to investigate the human rights situation in Rwanda and called for the Special Rapporteur, assisted by a team of human rights field officers, to act in close cooperation with UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Rwanda;

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda.

Stressing that the people of Rwands bear the primary responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country,

- 1. Endorses the Secretary-General's proposal, contained in paragraphs 19-26 of his report of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640), to deploy the first and second phases of UNAMIR in close synchronization;
- 2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 6 December 1994, with the provise that the Secretary-General will submit a report by 8 August for Security Council review of the progress of UNAMIR's military mission, progress toward a cease-fire and political reconciliation, the safety of those populations at risk, and the humanitarian situation;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to report also on various developments as detailed in paragraph 2 of this resolution in good time before the expiration of UNAMIR's current mandate;
- 4. Decides that, in light of paragraph 3 of resolution 918 (1994) and paragraph 18 of the Secretary-General's report of 31 May 1994, and within the limits of evailable resources, the mandate of the military component of UNAMIR will be:
- (a) to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwands, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and
- (b) to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations:
- 5. Reaffirms the continuing mandate of the political component of UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire:

- 6. Welcomes the assurances of both parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate, recognizes that those assurances are essential to the mandate's implementation, and demands that both parties adhere to those assurances;
- 7. Restfirms that, consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence including resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging outies such as contributing to the security of displaced persons, refugees and civilians in protected sites. United Nations and other humanitarian personnel and helping protect the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief, and thus be adequately equipped and provided the rules of engagement to do so;
 - 8. Notes that there is no intention to have UNAMIR assume the role of a buffer force between the two parties, or to take military action to compel the two parties to end their fighting;
 - 9. Affirms the Council's expectation that, following the withdrawal of the United Nations military component, the international community will maintain its commitment to assist the Rwandan people through the work of the United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and other entities, and notes further that UNAMIR's expanded military component will remain in Rwanda only as long as it is needed to provide basic security to populations at risk and security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to them in Rwanda;
 - 10. Demands that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control;
 - Demands further that all parties cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred;
 - 12. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) on the sale to Rwanda of arms related material;
 - 13. Urgas Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of additional UNAMIR
- 14. Requests UNAMIR to facilitate, where possible, the activities of the Special Rapporteur and the team of human rights field officers requested by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission in the furtherance of their mandates and to enlist the cooperation of the parties to the conflict with the Special Repporteur and human rights field officers;

English ... A

US. DS. 84

ر. رياب ريوب

15. Requests also that UNAMIR designate an officer to serve as liaison with the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the purpose of ensuring coordination between UNAMIR and the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda established by the Commission on Human Rights, including the sharing of information from governments, individuals, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and UNAMIR itself, on possible violations of human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law;

ಜಲಾ -ಆರ. ಆತ

01:45

- 16. Demands that all parties in Rwands strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwands, and refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;
- 17. Decides that UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel shall under no circumstances be detained while performing their mandate in Rwanda, and decides further that if such persons should be detained, they shall be released immediately, and that while in the custody of any party to the conflict such persons shall be provided all protections equivalent to those contained in the Geneva Convention related to the treatment of prisoners of war, pending their immediate release and repatriation to United Nations authorities;
- 18. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations which have provided husnitarian end other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;
- 19. Commends the tireless efforts of the UNAMIR Force Commander to prevent more innocent lives from Daing lost, and to bring about a cease-fire between the parties;
- 20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwands within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement and urges the parties to intensify their efforts for political reconciliation;
 - 21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

In general terms, the draft is a good one and certainly goes in the direction we had envisaged. There are, however, some areas where we have problems.

PPP For obvious reasons, we attach a great deal of importance to the Presidential statement of 3 May, but we do not think it is particularly relevant here. As has repeatedly been said in the Council, UNAMIR is at the moment a humanitarian relief operation, not a peacekeeping operation. The inclusion of this para in this resolution would be particularly curious since we did not refer to it be deleted.

PPS E & G: These paras should be brought together and supplemented by reference to the Secretary-General's comments on genocide. We consider it would be a major blow to the Council's credibility were it to continue to duck the issue. We suggest the following amendments:

(a) After PPE, add new PPE Bis:

"Noting the statement in the Secretary-General's report that on the basis of the evidence that has emerged about the magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda, '...there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there has been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group.';"

(b) Relocate PPG as PPE Ter.

OP1 As you may know, we are particularly allergic to stating a Mission's task by reference to paragraph numbers in the Secretary-General's report. In the current case, we think that the point would be covered by the following:

"Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640) and endorses the proposals contained therein for the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR;"

OPs 2-7: We think there are too many thoughts contained in OP2, and, in any event, it is incorrect, linguistically and as a matter of Council procedure, to suggest that the mandate can be conditioned by a "proviso" that the Secretary-General will submit a report. We think OP 3 is of UNAMIR from Res 912 and 918 are restated in OPs 4 & 5, between the political and military components of UNAMIR.

On OP 6, it is basic to the Secretary-General's approach that the consent of the parties is very important to the successful discharge of the mandate. He stops short, however, of saying that consent or cooperation are preconditions to the operation. On OP 7, you will recall that we fought for a stronger statement on this issue at the time of Res 918, but had to settle for what was in Op 4 of that resolution. Given that history, we think it would be better simply to repeat that para, and for it to follow

Accordingly, we suggest that OPS2-7 be replaced by the following:

- OP2 "Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 December 1994;"
- OP3 "Reaffirms that the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:
 - (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
 - (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
 - (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;"
- OP4 Repeat Op 4 of Res 918
- OP5 "Welcomes the assurances of both parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate, recognizes that such cooperation will be important to the effective implementation of the mandate, and demands that both parties adhere to those assurances;"
- OP6 "Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR under constant review and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate, and in any case no later than 9 August 1994 and 9 October 1994, on progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation, and progress towards a ceasefire and political



- OP8 We think it is inappropriate and unnecessary to include as an operative what is a statement of fact in the Secretary-General's report. Our preference would shifted to the preamble.
- OP9 We think this para should be deleted. It looks too far ahead, confuses the distinction between UNAMIR and other UN involvement in Rwanda and pronounces on matters that are not strictly within the purview of the Council. If what is wanted is a reference to the fact that UNAMIR has an end point, even if other UN sufficient to include a preambular para along the following lines:

"Noting that UNAMIR should continue only as long as it is needed to carry out the tasks set out in its mandate,"

OP10 bis We believe that the Council should state clearly that it deplores that genocide has been committed in Rwanda. We propose the inclusion of the following after current OP10:

"Condemns the genocide that has taken place in Rwanda;"

OP17 This para must be deleted. It is inappropriate, dangerous in terms of precedent and internally inconsistent. OP16 is sufficient.

CONFIDENTIAL.

115/23/37

Your f' a: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:26 (5469)			700/NYK/00000/0000	\$393.89
FROM:	NEW YOR	ζ	C04569/NYK	06-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	ON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	В)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA,OPS,DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04456, paras 5-7.

Summary

Council takes up SecGen's report on Rwanda tomorrow, 7 June.

US has prepared draft resolution and sought our comments but has tabled the draft before we had an opportunity to react.

Draft may well be taken up in a working group tomorrow afternoon.

Action

Comments on US draft and our comments thereon.

Report

- To our surprise, no discussion on the SecGen's report on Rwanda was scheduled or held on Friday (3 June) or today (6 June). At our request, however, Rwanda is on the agenda for tomorrow morning's informal consultations. The SecGen's report will be the focus of the discussion, but the US also wants to have their draft resolution before Council members at the same time.
- 3 US Mission sent us a draft of the resolution late on Friday night (3 June) which, they cautioned, had not received

final clearance from Washington. A further revision followed at midday today (6 June), which had Washington's approval.

- We told the US on two separate occasions today that we wanted very much to avoid a divisive discussion in the Council on the resolution and urged them to give us an opportunity to provide them with our comments and talk them through before they tabled their draft. We prepared a set of comments which we faxed to the US Mission this afternoon. We then learned that, subject to a few relatively minor changes made as a result of a discussion in the P5, the US had already sent in their draft to the Secretariat for circulation to Council members.
- 5 The Mission were a little apologetic about proceeding in this fashion, but said that it would not have been politic vis a vis their relations with Washington to have sought to incorporate substantive changes in the text before they tabled it. They understand, however, that we have some serious concerns about their draft. (Indeed, the Mission itself is reasonably sympathetic to the points we have raised with them.) They said it would be easier to persuade Washington to make changes after a discussion in the full Council.
- 6 The US draft and our comments thereon follow by separate fax. Our comments essentially fall into three categories: the references to genocide, the mandate, and legal issues relating to attacks on UN personnel.
- On genocide, the US has said that they are not opposed to including such references but do not want to put them forward in a draft that they propose lest they complicate their life with the Chinese unnecessarily in the leadup to the discussion on DPRK sanctions. The mandate (OPs 2-7) are the critical ones. Our differences with the Americans are not fundamental but we think we need to avoid any suggestion that the mandate is conditional on progress by the parties or even by UNAMIR. Language adopted from resolutions on Liberia and Somalia is not appropriate. The US proposal for OP17 regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions to UNAMIR personnel who might be detained is most unfortunate, particularly as we are trying to sort out this issue in the context of the negotiation of the Convention on Safety of UN Personnel.
- 8 We might also have quibbled with the drafting of the US operative paragraphs 14 and 15 on human rights which are unnecessarily specific. We did not consider, however, that we should take the lead on that aspect of the draft.
- 9 We know from talking to the Canadians that they very much share our views on the draft. The British also have a number of concerns similar to our own.
- 10 Since the US draft is on the table, delegations will make

C04569/NYK

Page 3

preliminary comments on it in tomorrow mornings informal consultations. We would also expect that a working group will be established to consider the draft, perhaps as early as tomorrow afternoon.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

22:28 ((5490)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$622.54
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ	C04580/NYK	07-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	PON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(UNC, MEA, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB	•)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA,OPS,DDI) (GENTLES)	M	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: POSSIBLE NZ CONTRIBUTION TO UNAMIR

Your U51108, para 9; our C04556, para 9.

- We had a useful discussion with DPKO about a possible contribution by New Zealand of an RNZAF C130 to assist in the supply of UNAMIR and ran through the checklist of questions you provided. We also sought some supplementary information from the Canadians.
- The Secretariat prefaced their remarks by stressing that the fluidity of the situation in Rwanda means that there will need to be considerable flexibility in how the supply operation is structured and implemented. Much will depend on who offers what and on the arrangements that the UN is able to conclude with neighbouring countries and on the conditions on the ground in Rwanda.

Concept of operations

The UN is currently giving priority to establishing a land corridor from Mombasa, Tanzania to Rwanda. If this can be established, then much of the heavy supplies can be trucked in by road. This would have the advantage of minimising costs and would obviate the need to have a large fleet of planes if the operation was entirely supplied by air. The Secretariat noted to us that they are currently sustaining the present force of 450 persons by regular, daily if possible, flights from Nairobi. To sustain an expanded UNAMIR of 10 times that number by air would require about 10

- C130s. They doubt that they could secure that number of aircraft. On the other hand, even if the land corridor is established, they will need dependable air support as well. They certainly need more than the one aircraft currently provided by the Canadians.
- 5 The essential concept of operations is to provide air support to UNAMIR as and when required. The primary task would be to fly equipment and supplies from Nairobi to Kigali. However, as reported earlier, the UN is also exploring bringing in supplies via Uganda and Burundi. The Secretariat told us today that Burundi looks unlikely because of the unstable security situation. But operations through Uganda are on the cards. Accordingly, the aircraft might also be asked to fly supplies from Nairobi to Entebbe. These supplies would then be transported by road to Kabale, the current HQ for UNOMUR, which is being established as a forward mounting area for UNAMIR.

Aircraft base

6 Aircraft operating in support of UNAMIR would be based in Nairobi which is also an air staging point for the UN operation in Somalia and has sizeable facilities.

Other countries likely to be involved

- 7 At the moment, the Canadians fly the only UNAMIR plane. That aircraft, also a C130, needs servicing and the Canadian commitment goes only to the end of this month. That does not/not preclude a Canadian decision to extend. Indeed, the Canadian Mission fully expect that Canada will continue to provide an aircraft for UNAMIR provided they can also maintain their contribution to the Ascona-Sarajevo air-bridge. But, as the Mission said, "we would love some Commonwealth company".
- 8 The Dutch have made a firm commitment to provide a Fokker F27 and the Italians have given an indication, but less than a commitment, that they will provide a C130. The Germans are considering whether they can provide a C160, though the prospects of this are looking rather less bright than before. The Argentines have not responded to the Secretariat approach.
- 9 At this stage, therefore, the indications are that Canada, the Netherlands and Italy will be involved.

Frequency of flights

10 At present, the Canadians are flying two daily round trips between Nairobi and Kigali. Daily flying time is about 8 hours. Assuming a similar schedule for an RNZAF aircraft, the total hours per week would be 40-60.

Type of cargo

11 The cargo would be materiel and supplies, including food and medical supplies. Some personnel, eg military observers, would also be carried.

Airfield in Rwanda

12 As noted above, the airfield of choice in Rwanda is Kigali. If that becomes unavailable, consideration may be given to using alternative airfields in Rwanda. The more likely scenario, however, now appears to be that supplies would be flown to Entebbe and trucked overland from there.

Risk factor

- 13 This is clearly difficult to quantify. As happened in the past, flights would be suspended if Kigali airfield comes under attack (eg mortar fire). But, all the experience to date suggests that such attacks are not directed at the aircraft but at the RPF forces stationed nearby. The Canadian aircraft has been hit once by a bullet (when ASG Riza was on board) but that was only discovered after the plane had landed.
- 14 The standard operating procedure is that the aircraft does not try to land if there is any danger. On advice from the UNAMIR personnel on the ground, it returns to Nairobi if there is any danger of shelling when it is due to land.

In theatre support

15 It would be advisable for NZ to do what the Canadians do and bring its own ground support crew. They would have access, however, to the sizeable facilities available at Nairobi.

Reimbursement

16 There is no suggestion that the UN request is other than on the standard UN terms, including reimbursement. Any offer of a New Zealand plane should be made conditional on reimbursement of standard costs and UN picking up operational costs in theatre.

Movement control unit

- 17 As noted in our earlier message, the request from the Secretariat included a request for a movement control unit of approximately 20 persons. This is separate from the request for a cargo aircraft.
- 18 The Secretariat told us that it is envisaged that the unit would control the movement of personnel and equipment between Nairobi and Kigali and, perhaps, Mombasa. Some of the unit would therefore, be stationed in Kigali.

19 The Secretariat have approached a range of countries: Australia, Denmark, Netherlands and Singapore, as well as New Zealand, for such a unit. They need only one such unit.

Consultations with the Canadians

20 It occurs to us that there might be value in asking Ottawa to talk to the Canadians to ascertain more information about how the current air supply operation works. We are advised that the relevant person in Ottawa is Lt Col Rob Clark, Director Policy, telephone (613) 992-3984.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

19:37 (5487)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$660.79
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ.	C04577/NYK	07 - Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	FON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EA	В)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Sec Gens report widely welcomed with some noting its "challenging" content especially his view that the UN system failed in dealing with the crisis in Rwanda
- Working Group convened to prepare draft resolution for possible adoption tomorrow
- emphasises urgent need for logistic support, especially from Council members

Action

For information

Report

At informals today, US confirmed their willingness to extend UNAMIRs mandate and give the go ahead with expanded deployment. US emphasised the urgent need for logistic support to be given to the troops which are now available, drawing specific attention to "many in the Council having the necessary equipment".

Nigeria noted that now that African states had agreed to provide the troops, it hoped that others outside the continent would provide the logistic support needed.

- must .ot be conveyed that the problem remains an African one" Nigeria emphasised. If the Council did not act "speedily" it would be "vicariously liable for the tragedy in Rwanda".
- 3 Secretariat noted that 8 African states had confirmed to the UN that they are ready to send troops to Rwanda (Senegal, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Congo, Namibia and Tanzania). All however had made it a precondition that they be adequately equipped and supported, and that the necessary financial resources be made available.
- 4 Secretariat also noted that at summit meeting of front line states in Harare South Africa offered a field hospital and 50 APCs. Secretariat also tell us that France will equip the Senegalese troops, that Italy has firmed up its offer for a C130 and that the Dutch will also come in with an aircraft probably an F27.
- 5 All delegations welcomed the Sec Gen's report as "excellent" (many commenting on its challenging content) and general agreement was expressed on the need for urgent action in the form of adopting a resolution if possible tomorrow. UK supported NZ proposals, circulated informally to delegations, to amend US draft.
- 6 Working Group is currently working on text which we will fax when available.

Genocide

- 7 Many delegations spoke of the need to make specific reference to "genocide" including Pakistan, Argentina, Spain and Czech. Intervention by Spain was particularly thoughtful on the question of genocide and the Council's competency under Article 8 of the Genocide Convention to adopt measures to address the genocide taking place (or any of the other acts mentioned in Article 8 of the Convention). In this regard Spain drew attention to paras 8 and 11 of the Sec Gen's report in which the continued broadcasts inciting ethnic killings by Radio Mille Collines in "government" held areas, and the previous inflamatory broadcasts made before the events of April are referred to.
- Spain noted that it was punishable under the Genocide Convention to either commit genocide, or incite others (as Radio Mille Collines has) to commit it. In the view of Spain, these broadcasts, and those involved in either supporting them or allowing them to continue "constitute direct incitement to commit genocide and are punishable as such under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention".
- 9 Spain also noted the urgent need to begin the investigation of genocide given that, (as the Sec Gen's report noted) as time goes on it becomes increasingly difficult to locate witnesses and evidence. "At some stage" Spain said it would be appropriate for the Council to address

this issue, for example by considering the establishment of a special investigative body as done in the Yugoslav context in res 780.

Human Rights

10 China indicated it did not have instructions but expressed specific difficulty with the paras in the US draft which related to establishing coordination between UNAMIR and the Special Rapporteur on human rights (op 13 and 14 of US draft) and Human Rights Commissioner. Brazil also indicated this was "breaking new ground" and required "further consideration" on their part. Oman (in its national capacity) seemed finally to have abandoned its earlier position that there should be no Council action before a cease-fire was achieved.

Failing of UN

- 11 For our part, we recalled that we had had reservations about postponing, at the time res 918 was adopted, the decision to deploy phase II until a further report was received from the Sec Gen. We welcomed the US announcement that they were now ready to endorse deployment of phase II of the expanded UNAMIR and emphasised the need to proceed rapidly with the aim of the work being completed tomorrow.
- 12 We referred to the fundamental problem identified in the Sec Gen's report that the UN system had failed in dealing with the crisis in Rwanda and noted that the Sec Gens indication that he would conduct a review of the structure was very important for the Council. It was a real shame that it had taken nearly 4 weeks to bridge the relatively minor differences between delegations who had wished to proceed at the time res 918 was adopted (eg NZ) and others which required further information (eg US) and come to this point now of authorising the expanded UNAMIR in whole.
- 13 (It seems very clear to us that had the Council shown more commitment to an expanded UNAMIR at the time res 918 was adopted some weeks ago the UN would now be a great deal further down the track of actual deployment, especially given the chicken and egg situation which developed and led to a stalemate at certain crucial times that states were not willing to commit to an operation when the Council itself had not committed to one.)
- 14 President summed up briefly by noting that the logistic and financial assistance to the troops available was very important and that a specific reference to "genocide" was supported.

Situation on the Ground

15 Secretariat (Gharekhan) briefed the Council on the situation on the ground noting that there had been heavy

exchange of fire at "Gaddafi Crossing" in Kigali. This had resulted in no major changes in the relative positions of the two sides. The "government" had launched a counter-offensive to push the RPF off the road they hold to Gitarama and appeared to be readying itself for a major counter-offensive against the RPF. The RPF had however repelled the attack and was pushing into the hills south of Kigali.

- 16 On 4 June there had been heavy bout of mortar fire at Kigali airport resulting in UNAMIR briefly suspending the Canadian flights to Kigali airport. A strong protest had been lodged with the "government forces". UNAMIR had also requested Ugandan cooperation in allowing it to use Entebbe airport with transportation of supplies going through Kabale in southern Uganda en route for Kigali.
- 17 UNAMIR had recently evacuated further displaced persons from both the stadium and a church in Kigali. There remained some 4326 displaced persons at the stadium and 936 at the airport.
- 18 As regards the cease-fire talks, the force commander has had 2 rounds of talks with each side but there was no agreement yet. The next meeting is scheduled for Monday. The Sec Gen's Special Rep has also had discussions with the OAU Sec Gen in Addis and the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights would be leaving Geneva on 10 June to travel to Rwanda and on to Burundi and Tanzania, accompanied by the Special Rapporteur on Torture and others.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 'le:

3/88/1 Our file =

700/NYK/00000 / O 0000 \$60.54 17:22 (46744) 07-Jun-1994 FROM: NEW YORK C04576/NYK TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Priority Priority CC: DEFENCE MFAT (UNC, MEA, DSP3) P/S MFA DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI) DEFENCE MOD (GM POL)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: POSSIBLE NZ CONTRIBUTION

Le signe amount of spen

L Willberg Forsyth

Ward Rider Hughes Kember McMaster Foster

McCormick Rush

Tyne

Dalton Watson

" cry we not 464

Your U51186.

2 We are sorry about the problem that arose. The Evening Post caught us in an unguarded situation. The information is publicly available here and in this knowledge and against the background of general guidance to be as forthcoming as possible with the press we simply confirmed information that is already in the public arena. In future, with those kinds of requests, and especially when the PR is not available to handle them, we will refer anguiries to the Minister's Office. handle them, we will refer enquiries to the Minister's Office.

As to the specific proposal in your message that requests from the UN for troop contributions be kept confidential and out of the public domain until Ministers have had a chance to consider them there is clearly a misunderstanding on this score. It is not possible to keep such requests, or the fact that they have been made, in confidence.

It is a matter of public record around the UN, both by delegations and the media, which countries have been asked for contributions to particular operations. The Secretariat does not treat such information as confidential. Many countries, including us, need to know who they may be operating with. Yesterday, for example, when following up Defence's specific questions, we asked and were told exactly which other countries had been asked to provide aircraft to assist UNAMIR. Similar information was provided on which countries had been asked to provide movement control units. As always the UN press corps know as soon as the requests are made - if not before. The Secretariat are quite open about making this information available to the media.

End Message

Ø 001 · 006

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK Tele, one: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

7 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC No.

DEFENCE

No. —No.

2751

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Gpied to UNSC, MEA UNC, CCL, IFRU, EUR, BP3 Page 1 of: 6

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our earlier message refers.

- Following is text of draft resolution on Rwanda as it emerged after 7 painstaking hours of working group consideration this afternoon and evening. Negotiations proceeded on the basis of a revised US draft which incorporated most of the points we had made to the US.
- If the outstanding points of difficulty can be ironed out in informals tomorrow morning, the draft may be put to a vote in the afternoon. Otherwise, the vote will be on Thursday, 9 June.
- Points to note are:
- Given the support expressed in informals, we proposed a more PP6 direct reference to genocide. We think the outcome is very good. Having secured that, we and the others of similar mind (Spain, Czech Rep, US) agreed that there was no need to push for an operative reference as well, especially as there was no follow up proposal. We noted, however, that the Council would have to consider this issue further.
- The US was persuaded to accept these preambular references in PP9&10 substitution for their earlier operative proposals.
- After lengthy discussion of a number of alternatives, our PP16 simpler and more direct formulation on the appointment of a Special Rapporteur was widely supported. The Chinese delegate, however, had to insist on brackets, pending consultation with Beijing. The US and Brazil worked out the formulation on OP10.
- OP2 In the interests of transparency, Brazil insisted that the resolution be specific about the endorsement of the SecGen's proposals. The US, UK and France opposed; hence the brackets. We also had reservations about the potential rigidity that this could impose on the operation, and noted that a plan of deployment is different from a mandate. The issue will be considered further tomorrow.

2

OP3

The most worrying proposal came from the Russians who, taking a leaf from the US book on Somalia, proposed that the mandate be limited to three months and that it be subject to a one month review. We opposed this strenuously, noting the very detrimental effect that that would have on the process of encouraging potential troop contributors. The US and UK supported us. The Russians agreed not to insist that their proposal be reflected in the text and to consult further with Moscow.

OP7

The US took some of our amendment on this para but retained "essential". Others were content to go along. We registered that the term "essential" went close to making cooperation of the parties a precondition to the operation, but noted that it might be barely tolerable given the reference to "effective implementation" of the mandate.

7 June 1994, 10.00 p.m.

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 which expanded the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and authorized an expansion in UNAMIR's force level,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 May 1994
(S/1994/640),

Bearing in mind the statement made by the President of the Council on 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Noting with concern that, to date, the parties have not ceased hostilities, agreed to a cease-fire, or brought an end to the violence and carnage affecting civilians,

Noting with the gravest concern the reports that genocide has occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

Reiterating its strong condemnation of the ongoing violence in Rwanda and, in particular, the systematic killing of thousands of civilians,

Expressing its outrage that the perpetrators of these killings have been able to operate and continue operating within Rwanda with impunity,

Noting that UNAMIR is not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties,

Noting also that UNAMIR will continue only as long as required for it to carry out the tasks for which it was established,

<u>Underscoring</u> that the internal displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries constitute a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Reiterating the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda,

Commending the countries which have provided humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees, as well as emergency aid to alleviate the sufferings of the Rwandan people, and those countries which have contributed troops and logistical support to UNAMIR, and reiterating the urgent need for coordinated international action in this respect,

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the contributions of the countries of the region, especially that of the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and encouraging them to continue their efforts,

Welcoming the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,

[Noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,]

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

- Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640);
- 2. <u>Endorses</u> the Secretary-General's proposals for the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR [in particular
- (a) the immediate initiation of the deployment of the two additional battalions in phase 2 in close synchronization with phase 1;
- (b) the continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the two battalions envisaged for phase 3; and
- (c) flexible contingency planning during all three phases to ensure effective use of available resources to respond to an unstable situation.]
 - 3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until [9 December] 1994;
- 4. Reaffirms that the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:
- (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
- (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;
- 5. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;
- 6. <u>Demands</u> that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control;

- 7. <u>Welcomes</u> the assurances of both parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate, <u>recognizes</u> that such cooperation will be essential to the effective implementation of the mandate, and <u>demands</u> that both parties adhere to those assurances;
- 8. <u>Demands further</u> that all parties cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred;
- 9. <u>Urges</u> Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of additional UNAMIR forces;
- 10. Requests that UNAMIR extend its close cooperation with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office to include the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;
- 11. <u>Demands</u> that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwanda, and refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;
 - 12. Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia:
- (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation; and
- (b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken extend to all persons engaged in the operation;
- 13. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;
- 14. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a special trust fund for Rwanda and invites the international community to contribute generously to it;
- 14. <u>Commends</u> the tireless efforts of the UNAMIR Force Commander to prevent more innocent lives from being lost, and to bring about a cease-fire between the parties;
- 15. Commends also the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, invites them, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region to continue their efforts, and demands that the parties undertake serious efforts to bring about political reconciliation;
- 16. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR under constant review and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate, and in any case no later than 3 August 1994 and

1

-4-

9 October 1994, on progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress toward a cease-fire and political reconciliation;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your le: 3/88/1

Our file: 522/1/1

19:45 (5477)			700/MEA/00000/00000	\$240.65
FROM:	WELLINGT	CON	C24211/WN1	07-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	ζ		Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO WGTN UNS		BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)			
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

U51199: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04569 and fax 2741.

2 We agree with your assessment of the US draft and with the comments you have offered on it. We have four additional observations.

Arusha Agreement

- 3 PPI calls for the parties to recommit themselves to the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement (the same language as in SCR 918). Op 20, however, refers to a political settlement "within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement". There is a case for consistency and we believe the latter wording is more apposite given that presumably some aspects of the Arusha Agreement will need to be renegotiated (our U47317 of 15 April para 6). It may be worth asking the Secretariat for their reading of the continuing relevance of the Arusha Agreement in full to the changed circumstances.

 Mandate
- We note that the UNAMIR mandate as adjusted by SCR 912 and expanded by SCR 918 does not include a role in "political reconciliation". Your revised op 6 could be interpreted to suggest that this is the case. It would seem desirable, given the point you make about UNAMIR being at the moment a humanitarian operation, to end at "ceasefire" and to clarify

-

that political reconciliation is a subject on which the Sec-Gen is asked to report.

Human Rights

- We share your preference not to take a lead on ops 14 and 15. We would not be surprised if others raise difficulties with these paras (which effectively extend the UNAMIR mandate into the area of human rights). Strictly speaking these paras are not necessary since the point is made in pps M and N. Moreover the CHR resolution requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make arrangements for close cooperation with UNAMIR and other UN agencies. It also asks the Sec-Gen to provide all necessary assistance to the Special Rapporteur to fulfil his mandate.
- If an active reference is considered necessary, then a general request to the Sec-Gen to facilitate the work of the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur could be included in the preamble. This might be suggested in the event that others raise objections to ops 14 and 15 as drafted.

Regional Peace and Security

We note that the last preambular paragraph of SCR 918 has been omitted (ie. that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region). Is this an oversight? There may be a case for reinstating this reference as part of the continuing context of Council action.

End Message

--- UNSC

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

8 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC ~

No.

No. W

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD:

SFAT (MEÁ, UNC, LGĹ, HRÚ, EÚR, DP3, DŠP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

GREATO UNSC. MEA UNCLUL, GUR, DSP3, HEU)

Page 1 of: 9

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U51312.

- 2 Following are the text of Res 925 (1994), which was adopted unanimously this evening, plus the text of the New Zealand EOV given by the Permanent Representative after the vote.
- There were some relatively minor, though not easily negotiated, changes made to the text over the course of the day as a result of Chinese efforts to soften the language on genocide (PP6) and the reference to the appointment of the Special Rapporteur by the CHR (PP16) and American insistence on beefing up the "end point" reference (PP10) and to slim down the mandate para (OP4).
- In the end, the Chinese had to settle for relatively small changes to PP6. The Americans proposals for PP10 and OP4 provoked a lengthy and confused debate about whether to consolidate the existing mandate of Res 912/918, as we (and they) had originally proposed, or whether, as Washington insisted this afternoon, to put the focus on the not significantly different tasks set out in para 18 of the SecGen's latest report.
- The substantive but unacknowledged objective of the US changes was to remove from the mandate the obligation to provide support to humanitarian relief operations, a concept missing (inadvertently) from the language in the SecGen's report. The untidy compromise was to reaffirm in PP1 that the old mandates continue, to use the report language in PP10 and to shorten the description of the "tasks" in OP4, but in the fuller language of Res 918.
- As an exercise in providing precision in mandates, the changes to PP1, PP10 and OP4 were a fiasco. But they were insisted on by the Pentagon which fears the potential burdens that could fall on them if required to provide support as distinct from security to humanitarian relief operations.
- All delegations spoke in explanation of vote. The French and the Presidency tried beforehand to persuade Rwanda not to speak but Bizimana insisted. His statement, however, was very mild and contained a condemnation of the massacres in Rwanda.

8 Other notable features of the statements were:

Djibouti: the focus on human rights might play well at home for Council members but did not deal with the fundamental issue of how to stop the killing; the Security Council must have a standing force at its disposal as proposed by former USG and peacekeeping guru Brian Urquhart;

Czech Rep: genocide in Rwanda amounts to another holocaust with machetes replacing gas chambers;

Nigeria: countries outside Africa must now support the African offers of troops, particularly with contributions of logistic support; Rwanda is an international problem which must be solved internationally;

Russian Fed: flexibility in operation of UNAMIR is necessary but fluidity of situation means that Council must keep tighter control on UNAMIR than normal; hence importance of reviews in August and October;

Spain: adoption of the resolution is not the end of the Council's consideration of the SecGen's report: consideration should be given to establishing a commission of experts to investigate human rights abuses;

China: UN bodies must stay within their areas of competence; the Council should not link its work to that of the CHR;

US: US is leasing 50 APCs to UNAMIR, and US agencies have provided almost US\$100 million on humanitarian and emergency relief supplies since the death of the Presidents; others have a role to play.

Our remarks about the need for structural reform in the system for responding to crises such as in Rwanda were listened to closely, and were warmly applauded afterwards by the Canadians.



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

15-0-0

S/1994/684* 8 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SIRES 925 (1994)

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 and 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, which set out the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640),

Bearing in mind the statement made by the President of the Council on 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Noting with concern that, to date, the parties have not ceased hostilities, agreed to a cease-fire, or brought an end to the violence and carnage affecting civilians,

Noting with the gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of the ongoing violence in Rwanda and, in particular, the systematic killing of thousands of civilians,

Expressing its outrage that the perpetrators of these killings have been able to operate and continue operating within Rwanda with impunity,

Noting that UNAMIR is not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties,

Moting also that UNAMIR's expanded military component will continue only as long as and to the extent that it is needed to contribute to the security and protection of displaced parsons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations,

S/15 1/684 English Page 2

Underscoring that the internal displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries constitute a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Reiterating the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda,

Commending the countries which have provided humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees, as well as emergency aid to alleviate the sufferings of the Rwandan people, and those countries which have contributed troops and logistical support to UNAMIR, and reiterating the urgent need for coordinated international action in this respect,

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the contributions of the countries of the region, especially that of the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and encouraging them to continue their efforts,

Welcoming the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,

Noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

- 1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640);
- 2. Endorses the Secretary-General's proposals contained therein for the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, in particular:
- (a) The immediate initiation of the deployment of the two additional battalions in phase 2 in close synchronization with phase 1;
- (b) The continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the two battalions envisaged for phase 3; and
- (c) Flexible implementation of all three phases to ensure effective use of available resources to accomplish the tasks listed in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) below;
- Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR, expiring on 29 July 1994, until 9 December 1994;
- 4. Reaffirms that UNAMIR, in addition to continuing to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire, will:

- (a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and
- (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
- 5. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;
- 6. Demands that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control;
- 7. Welcomes the assurances of both parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate, recognizes that such cooperation will be essential to the effective implementation of the mandate, and demands that both parties adhere to those assurances;
- 8. <u>Demands further</u> that all parties cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred;
- 9. Urges Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of additional UNAMIR forces;
- 10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that UNAMIR extend the close cooperation it has with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office also to the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;
- 11. Demands that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwanda, and refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;
 - 12. Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia:
- (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation; and
- (b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken extend to all persons engaged in the operation;
- 13. <u>Commends</u> the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, <u>encourages</u> them to continue and increase such assistance, and <u>urges</u> others to provide such assistance;

S/1994/684 Eng! h Page 4

- 14. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a special trust fund for Rwanda and invites the international community to contribute generously to it;
- 15. Commends the tireless efforts of the UNAMIR Force Commander to prevent more innocent lives from being lost, and to bring about a cease-fire between the parties;
- 16. Commends also the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, invites them, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region to continue their efforts, and demands that the parties undertake serious efforts to bring about political reconciliation;
- 17. Decides to keep the situation in Rwands and the role played by UNAMIR under constant review and, to that end, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate, and in any case no later than 9 August 1994 and 9 October 1994, on progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation;

18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Mr President,

New Zealand warmly welcomes the adoption of this resolution today. Its adoption will enable the Secretariat and countries contributing troops and equipment for UNAMIR to move ahead speedily with the deployment of the expanded force.

It is important, however, to remember the history of today's resolution. As I said at the time we adopted Resolution 918 almost four weeks ago, we were very disappointed that that resolution, adopted against the background of horrific reports of human brutality, approved only a tentative first phase of the expanded United nations presence in Rwanda. We would have much preferred the Council, in that resolution, to have taken the step it has taken today and approved the whole concept of operations proposed by the Secretary-General in his earlier report.

We believe that the tentativeness displayed by the Council in adopting Resolution 918 sent a very confused signal to potential troop contributing countries about the Council's commitment to the idea of an expanded UNAMIR. As we think subsequent events have shown, that signal had the result of delaying decisions by troop contributing countries to commit themselves to the operation.

At the same time, we want to express our warm apprefiation of the willingness shown by a number of African countries to offer troops, notwithstanding this "orange light", and also by those coutries such as the United States which have made very substantial offers of assistance with equipment.

It is particularly welcome that this resolution ends the doubt about the determination of the Council to do what is necessary for Rwanda. This resolution gives effect to the Council's wish that UNAMIR should deploy as soon as possible to provide security for Rwandans at risk and for essential humanitarian relief operations.

In New Zealand's view, it is very important that this resolution states clearly the Council's grave concern at the genocide that has taken place in Rwanda. The systematic killings of thousands upon thousands of innocent civilians has characterised the terrible violence in Rwanda. There is no doubt in our minds that genocide has occurred, and it is significant that at last the Council has formally recognised that.

New Zealand welcomes the recognition given in this resolution to the importance of close cooperation between UNAMIR and the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights and the recently appointed Special Rapporteur for Rwanda. Reconstruction of Rwandan society on the basis of respect for human rights will be an important task for the future and the United Nations must be equipped to support the people of Rwanda in this effort.

It is auspicious that this resolution has been adopted on the day that the parties have resumed their ceasefire talks. We cannot stress too strongly the importance of the parties ceasing the appalling and unnecessary hostilities immediately and honouring their assurances to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate. We demand that they agree to a ceasefire and work hard to find peaceful solutions to the violence which has engulfed their country.

Nevertheless, even if a ceasefire were to come, we are conscious that UNAMIR will be operating in an unstable and dangerous environment. It is important that this resolution has reiterated the fact that UNAMIR has the authority to act robustly in defence of its mandate, and can take forceful action against militias or anyone else who threaten protected sites and populations.

We will continue to follow the situation in Rwanda closely and look forward to further progress reports from the Secretary General.

In conclusion, Mr President, I would like to comment briefly on the remarks contained in the final section of the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General says that the delay in the international response to the genocide in Rwanda demonstrates the inadequacy of the international community's system for responding to crises of this nature. We endorse fully the Secretary-General's assessment that the system requires review to strengthen its reactive capacity.

One obvious deficiency in the system is the lack of an appropriate mechanism within the Council for a proper discussion of the concerns that led to the decision in Resolution 918 to delay authorisation of the full force for Rwanda. We understand fully the wishes of those Council members and potential troop contributing countries who sought greater clarity in the concept of operations for the expanded force. The questions that were asked were important ones and deserved answers. But we had no forum for discussion of such "hands on" issues.

Recent history has demonstrated many times that the informal consultations of the Council do not provide an appropriate forum for Council members to explore with the Secretariat at the necessary working level the important,

but technical issues involved. Nor do bilateral discussions between individual Council members and the Secretariat, which do not permit an interchange of ideas between the range of Council members, provide an adequate alternative.

Thus, in the absence of a resolution of these important issues, in the tragic case of Rwanda the Council was forced to temporise. That was bad for the United Nations and bad for the people of Rwanda. We consider that the proposed review of the United Nations system for responding to deficiency.

New Zealand has made specific proposals to address this issue on two occasions over the past 12 months, first informally and more recently in the formal proposals put forward during New Zealand's presidency of the Council in April. Document S/PRST/1994/22 of 3 May records that it was not possible to reach agreement on measures to improve the Council's management of peacekeeping operations. But ensure that this process of review is actively pursued.

Your f'le: 115/23/37

1 100

Our file:

3/88/1

9)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$686.12
EW YORK	C04600/NYK	10-Jun-1994
ELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
EIJING RUSSELS ENEVA ONDON OSCOW ARIS OKYO EFENCE	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
(MEA, UNC, L	GL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	В)
ZDF (DSIA, OPS, GENTLES)	DDI)	/
	EW YORK ELLINGTON EIJING RUSSELS ENEVA ONDON OSCOW ARIS OKYO EFENCE (MEA, UNC, L	EW YORK C04600/NYK ELLINGTON BONN CANBERRA CANBERRA HARARE DNDON MADRID DSCOW OTTAWA ARIS SANTIAGO WASHINGTON EFENCE (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our u/n fax of 8 June concerning the adoption of Res 925(1994) on Rwanda.

Summary

- Spain proposes that Council set up commission of experts on breaches of humanitarian law in Rwanda
- Informal discussions are under way to get Rwanda off the Council or at least to remove or neutralise the current representative before Rwanda's Presidency in September

Action

Comments on Spanish draft resolution

Report

Commission of experts

As noted in our fax (not to others) forwarding the text of Res 925 (1994) of 8 June, the Spanish said in their EOV that the adoption of that resolution should not mean the end of the Council's consideration of the SecGen's report. They foreshadowed the idea of the Council requesting the SecGen to establish a commission of experts to examine information on violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda. The Spanish have this afternoon circulated to all Council members the draft

resolucion in our accompanying fax (Wellington and Geneva only) which proposes the establishment of such a commission.

- The draft follows closely the format and language of Res 780(1992) which called for the establishment of the commission of experts into war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, with the references to the Geneva Conventions replaced by references to the Genocide Convention. The covering note advises that the draft will be raised at the next round of informal consultations. These are scheduled for Monday, 13 June.
- 3 We know from informal discussions that the British and Americans are not enthusiastic about the idea of the UN pursuing in Rwanda a path similar to that taken in Yugoslavia. But that reluctance stems not from the gravity of the matter (which is undeniable) but from an unwillingness for the UN to be forced to investigate and punish crimes in countries in which they have no direct interests. In the US case, there is also a concern that acknowledgement that genocide has occurred will lead to pressure for the US to become directly involved. This last point was the subject of a NY Times article today (see earlier fax Wellington only).
- 4 Part of the US/UK reluctance probably also relates to the current difficulties in getting the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal up and running. They would prefer not to have to repeat that sort of exercise and they know that once a commission has been established and evidence has been collected, there will inevitably be pressure to set up a tribunal along the lines of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal. Indeed, Op4 in the Spanish draft is more specific that the equivalent in Res 780 and refers directly to the objective of ensuring that persons responsible for committing crimes are brought to justice. It points, therefore, to the establishment of a tribunal.
- We understand from the British that the Legal Office has raised two questions with the Spanish about the draft. The first concerns funding to cover the costs of the Commission. The costs of the Yugoslav Commission were to be met from within existing resources, but in reality the Commission was reliant on the services and facilities provided free of charge by its energetic Chair, Bassiouni. New funding will be required for a Rwanda Commission. The second issue was the time frame for the investigation. The Yugoslav Commission went on far longer than had been expected and the Secretariat had been left with the job of trying to force it to wrap up its work. The Legal Office has suggested that the Spanish draft should set a time period within which the Commission should complete its task.
- 6 Notwithstanding their reservations, the British at least recognise that there is little chance of turning the initiative off now that it has been tabled and made public. (The Spanish have also circulated their draft to the media.)

For our part, we can see no sustainable basis for the Council to refuse to follow the path proposed by the Spanish. Indeed, to do so would be tantamount to saying that war crimes and genocide in Africa are of less importance than those carried out in Europe. Moreover, the establishment of such a process may even help the process of political reconciliation in Rwanda if it serves as a means of getting the leaders of the interim government out of the way. Unlike the situation in Yugoslavia, it seems that those responsible for organising the killings are not necessary to political process. The ceasefire talks are being conducted by the military leaders in charge of the government forces, not the political personalities who set up the interim government.

Exclusion of Rwanda from the Security Council

- As mentioned by phone (van Bohemen/Ward), there have been a number of informal discussions among Council members on what to do about Rwanda's seat on the Security Council. The Spanish and Czechs have been very exercised on the point, and the Spanish have told us that they intended to convene a meeting of Non-NAM Council members, though they have not done so as yet. We took the precaution earlier this week of sounding out the P3 on their views since we expected that they would have theological concerns unrelated to Rwanda which would predispose them against any move to expel Rwanda or to challenge the credentials of the current representative and leave an empty seat.
- 9 There have been various discussions on the subject among P5 members over the past week and the P5 have agreed to take up the matter as a group on Monday, 13 June. They have all recognised the public relations debacle that could ensue if Rwanda is the President in September when their Heads of State and Government are in town for the General Assembly and they are forced to shake hands with Bizimana, the current PR who takes his instructions from the interim government.
- The Americans had been considering the possibility of trying to persuade the Africans to call for a vote in the Assembly which would rescind the decision to elect Rwanda. Even if the Africans could be persuaded (which would not be easy to organise), and even if it were legally possible for the Assembly to curtail in this way the membership rights bestowed by Article 23(2) of the Charter (which must be open to question), such a decision would require a 2/3 majority which would be difficult to achieve. A more logical and straight forward course would be to challenge Bizimana's credentials under the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure. But since, if successful, that would result in an empty seat, the Ps are unenthusiastic. They are concerned at the precedent that this would establish. (Noone thinks it would be a good idea to give the seat to the RPF.)
- 11 The French are trying to promote a less drastic solution,

namely that Bizimana should be persuaded, in accordance with a maximalist interpretation of Rule 20 of the Provisional Rules, to stand aside from all discussions in the Council during his Presidency and to leave it to the next in line to fill the Presidency on an interim basis. But that scheme has two flaws. One is that we would have to endure two months of Spain as President which, given the prolixity of the Spanish PR, would be no small price for other Council members to pay. A more fundamental objection is that, under the last sentence of Rule 20, Bizimana would still retain his ceremonial responsibilities under Rule 19, so that would not solve the PR problem.

12 The British are now inclining to the view that the only clean solution would be for Rwanda to be persuaded to resign their seat, and thus pave the way for the election of a new member. Resignation is not without precedent. We understand that when there has been a deal to split a Council term, the country taking the first year must, in formal terms, resign before the succeeding State can take its place. But, while that may be the cleanest solution, it will not be an easy one to secure.

13 Discussion is still at a very preliminary stage. We will report further on this issue following the P5 meeting.

<u>End Message</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your f le: 3/88/1 Our file: 701/19/1/3/7

17:22 (5541)	700/LGL/00000/00000	\$249.91
FROM:	WELLINGT	ON C24445/WN1	13-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(LGL, MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)	
			

Subject

U51656: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

YM

Your C04600 and accompanying fax refer.

Commission of Experts

- 2 The call for establishment of a Commission of Experts on Rwanda represents a natural follow-on from the requests addressed to the SecGen in the Presidential statement of 30 April 1994 and SR 918 (1994).
- We have only one substantive point to make on the Spanish draft resolution: we recommend the deletion of "grave" from OPs 1 and 2, where it is currently used to qualify "violations of international humanitarian law". In our view, the Commission should not be required to draw a distinction between violations of ihl and grave violations of ihl. It appears that the word "grave" may be a hang-over from Res 780 on which the Spanish draft is largely based. (That resolution referred to "violations of international humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions...")
- 4 Once the Commission of Experts on Rwanda is established, the next obvious question will be the establishment of a tribunal. While we share the US/UK concerns about the difficulties associated with getting the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal up and running, we agree fully with your para 7 that the UN <u>must</u> be seen to be treating Rwanda with the same degree of seriousness with which it treated Yugoslavia.

Exclusion of Rwanda from Security Council

We look forward to your further reporting based on P5 and other consultations on this issue.

End Message

3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK TELE 'ONE: (212) 826-1960 FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE:

13 JUNE 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC ~

NO.

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DEFENCE

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB) DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

PAGE 1 OF:

spired to unse, MEA, UNC LGL, EUR, DSP3)

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA SUBJECT:

Letter from Rwanda urging increase in UNOMUR and deployment of UNAMIR as a "buffer face" is attached for your information.



Security Council

Distr. GENERAL

S/1994/691 9 June 1994 ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 8 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a note verbale, dated 1 June 1994, addressed to you by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda, concerning the situation in Rwanda.

In this note, the Government of Rwanda, while expressing regret that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) is obstinately pursuing its logic of war with massive support from Uganda, urgently appeals to the Security Council to take the action necessary to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to compel Uganda to withdraw the men and the arms it has supplied to RPF.

In this connection, the Government of Rwanda requests that its complaint concerning the aggression committed by Uganda against Rwanda, which was the subject of its letter of 16 May 1994 (see S/1994/586), be considered at the earliest possible opportunity in order to restore peace in Rwanda and avert a conflagration in the subregion.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(<u>Signed</u>) Jean-Damascène BIZIMANA Ambassador Permanent Representative 10 10 84 10 91 LEAT 100 001 NE RECORDER 11 --- 1/50

£ 11113 .1 4

S/1994, 591 English Page 2

Annex

Note verbale dated 1 June 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to draw his attention to the following.

1. The Government of Rwanda welcomes the strengthening of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the expansion of its mandate pursuant to Security Council resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994.

The Government of Rwands regrets, however, that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), obstinately pursuing its logic of war with massive support from Uganda, persists in violating paragraph 1 of section A of the above-mentioned resolution.

By opting to pursue its war of aggression against Rwanda through its proxy, RPF, Uganda is preventing the deployment of the strengthened UNAMIR and the performance of the Mission's functions.

The Government of Rwanda urgently appeals to the Security Council to take the action necessary to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to compel Uganda to withdraw the men and the arms it has supplied to RPF.

The Government of Rwanda considers, moreover, that the complaint which it lodged on 16 May 1994 concerning Uganda's aggression should be considered at the earliest possible opportunity in order to restore peace in Rwanda and avert a conflagration in the subregion.

- 2. In view of the stubborn refusal of RPF to engage in a dialogue with the Government of Rwanda on the establishment of a cease-fire and the settlement of the political problems that have arisen, the Security Council should consider, inter alia; the deployment of a buffer force capable of compelling the parties to desist from the fighting.
- 3. The Government of Rwanda reiterates its position concerning the embargo which has been imposed against Rwanda while the other party to the conflict continues to enjoy unimpeded access to arms and even troops supplied by its allies, who are accomplices in the aggression against Rwanda.

The Government of Rwanda believes that the embargo imposed against Rwanda in fact encourages the aggressor to seek a military victory and hence to escalate the hostilities and increase the suffering of the population. This is what has happened in Rwanda since the adoption of resolution 918 (1994).

There is therefore an urgent need for an embargo against the aggressor rather than against the victim of the aggression. The latter must be able to exercise its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The Government of Rwanda reiterates its request that the numerical strength and the logistical means of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) be increased so that the Mission will be better able to carry out its assigned tasks.

The Government of Rwanda would like the Security Council to deal with this note as a matter of urgency.

Your f'le: 115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

			10000000000000000000000000000000000000		
16:49 (5546)			700/NYK/00000/00000	\$533.63	
FROM:	NEW YOR	Х	C04602/NYK	13-Jun-1994	
TO:	WELLING	ron	WGTN UNSC	Priority	
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	5	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine	
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)				
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		10	
		A. M.			

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Spanish raise proposal for special commission to investigate massacres; NZ supports further discussion
- Secretariat confirm yet more reports of massacres
- Consensus is emerging on the problem of Rwandan Presidency of Council; prevailing view is that he should be advised that if Rwanda agrees to defer its Presidency for an undefined period his credentials will not be challenged

Action

For information.

Report

At informals today Spain flagged (under other matters) its draft resolution to establish a special commission to investigate breaches of humanitarian law - including genocide. As you know the resolution picks up, and advances, the points in the 30 April Presidential Statement and the Sec Gen's report. We lent support by calling for an early discussion of the principles involved in the draft, asking the President to add it to the work programme.

- 2 Secretariat (Gharekhan) gave a brief on the situation on the ground. The cease-fire talks have resumed today at UNAMIR HQ although there was not much progress made at the talks last week.
- The situation in Kigali is very tense with heavy fighting reported in the last few days. The RPF continues to pressure "government" held pockets in Kigali. Elsewhere in the country it appears the "government" forces are building a buffer zone in order to halt further RPF advances south. This morning the RPF announced it had taken control of Gitarama (the town in which the "government" had earlier established its HQ). In Ruhengeri (in the north) the p[position of the two sides had not changed.
- 4 The OAU Summit (meeting in Tunisia) has established a Committee on Rwanda with the objectives of brokering a cease-fire, stop the massacres, encourage dialogue and help implement the Arusha Agreement. All appeals at the Summit (including one from the South African Foreign Minister) had failed to bring the parties face to fact despite both sides having delegations in Tunis at present.
- 5 Secretariat reported what appears to be another massacre in "government" held area (Kiyumba?) where 250 mainly Tutsi civilians were sheltering in a church under the protection of two French and German priests. Armed men wearing civilian clothes entered the church on 11 June and first took 10 people away. Shots were heard following which tear gas was thrown into the church. After more armed men arrived, 180 civilians were taken from the church, the armed men saying that they were assisting in the "evacuation" of these people. Gunfire followed in which the priests were injured, at least 16 bodies of those taken from the church were seen by the priests before they managed to escape to the ICRC in Kigali. UNAMIR is to attempt to investigate this event.
- 6 There was also a separate report of 63 persons and 9 catholic priests killed in RGF held section of Kigali. Secretariat reported that RPF has declared its intention to investigate and punish those responsible for the RPF killing of Archbishop Nsengiyumva and 9 others in Kabgayi.
- 7 UNAMIR reports there is a pattern of harassment evolving. Both sides appear to be attempting to intimidate UNAMIOR in Kigali. It is becoming increasingly difficult to observe conflict zones. On 8 June a UNAMIR group was involved in a very tense situation in which a French journalist was injured and the rest made a narrow escape.
- 8 On 9 June UNAMIR HQ was hit by antitank or artillery fire aimed at the HQ buildings. A UNAMIR convoy was also shelled as it made its way to cease-fire talks.

Rwanda Credentials

9 P5 consideration of this issue was preempted by this subject being raised at an extended discussion over the weekend amongst most PRs on the Council. Meeting mainly focussed on peacekeeping issues in general but the specific question of Rwanda was raised. Bizimana was not present. After an extensive canvassing of the options and the legal position a clear trend emerged in favour of Bizimana being given an ultimatum. If he would acquiesce in the President (probably Marker next month) announcing that Rwanda had requested "due to its limited resources and other problems" that its Presidency be deferred, and if he keeps a very low profile especially on sensitive issues, then the members of the Council who would otherwise challenge his credentials will withhold such action.

10 Olhaye (Djibouti) who is currently chair of the African Group volunteered to be the one to put this proposition to Bizimana. We will keep in touch with developments.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

(15/23/37

Your f 'e: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:45 (5567)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$571.71	
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ.	C04615/NYK	14-Jun-1994	
TO:	WELLING	PON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate	
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine	
MFAT	(LGL, UNC, HRU, MEA, ISAC, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)			aB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)			

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Spain's proposal to establish special commission to investigate genocide gets useful support
- NAM reserve position
- US has still to come to a position and China may want to consider the text further
- Nigeria is most cautious , calling the initiative premature
- Canadians expect Kigali airport to be out of range of "government" forces very soon as RPF moves them off the one position from which they could shell airport
- Canadians repeat their hope that NZ will help with airlift if at all possible

Action

For information

Report

2 Spain had the opportunity to introduce their draft resolution to establish a special commission of enquiry. Most members of the Council spoke in support of the initiative with the notable exception of Nigeria (DPR Ayewah) which expressed a view that it was premature to consider the matter and that they would have a "major difficulty" with it.

- 3 While referring to the "unmistakable human rights dimension to the conflict in Rwanda" US indicated it had yet to finalise its position on the proposal. US is giving thought to any implications there might (conceivably) be for UNAMIR's neutrality and noted its interest in hearing the findings, expected shortly, of the Special Rappourters recent enquiry. UK did not speak as a result, we understand, of Hanay challenging London's negative instructions. UKMISS objective is to seek instructions which at least are not "obstructionist" on the issue given FCO's apparent reluctance to go down the investigative route.
- interestingly appeared to China be open consideration of the text proposing a drafting addition to Op4 so that it would be clear that the resolution was aimed at bringing to justice those in Rwanda, (ie not elsewhere). The proposal being to add the words "in Rwanda" to the end of Op4. They did however highlight 3 comments. The first being that given the situation in Rwanda was appalling and that the Council needed to react to it, they were prepared to consider a proposal which sent a political signal and which did not go beyond the scope of the Council's mandate. Secondly, they believed the initiative involved legal questions which would require more time to consider. Thirdly, they reminded Council members that at the time resolution 780 (1992) establishing the FRY special commission was adopted, China had made a statement that it did not believe that that would constitute a precedent. Since that time the international community had "learned some lessons" and had a better understanding of what it "should or should not do".
- 5 France indicated it could accept the text as it stands (though it would prefer to see Ops 1 and 2 reversed in order). Russia, Argentina, Czech, and Brazil were supportive and welcoming of the Spanish initiative. Brazil mentioned it was presently considering how the proposal would "fit into the overall process of considering what has happened in Rwanda", ie the division of labour between the Special Rapportour and the proposed special commission. They were also considering what the implications of establishing the special commission might be for future follow up action, eg establishing a tribunal?
- 6 For our part we said that in principle we supported the initiative. We said we saw the work of the Special Rappatour and that of the proposed commission as different and distinct. The Human Rights Commission's mandate was more forward looking in that we hoped it would help Rwanda to restablish itself as a state in such a way as it any repetition of these events could be avoided. In this context it would be better for the specific instances of past

violations to be considered by the special commission. We could accept amendments which specifically drew attention to the HRC mandate but we did not believe it was necessary to make such references if this would cause difficulties for some delegations.

7 Pakistan, on behalf of NAM, indicated that the NAM would require time to consider the draft. Except for Nigeria, none of the other NAM members spoke, including of course Rwanda.

Comment

- 8 The Nigerian position is something of a surprise given their apparently helpful role in Geneva at the time the Human Rights Commission resolution was adopted. At this stage we can't tell whether their reluctance to play a similar role here represents merely being out of step with their mission in Geneva on human rights whether it represents a change (and hardening) of their position vis a vis human rights or whether it is simply a personal idiosyncracy of their DPR. Whatever we can expect a further round of discussions in the Council on this matter.
- 9 Other point of interest on Rwanda today is that the Sec Gen confirmed the appointment of the new Special Rep for Rwanda. (Booh Booh's contract was not renewed.) CV for Shaharyar Mohammad Khan, a previous Foreign Secretary from Pakistan, follows by fax.
- In the absence of any update on the situation on the ground from Garekhan, we asked the Canadians about the status of Kigali airport which has been closed for several days. Canadians told us that the reason for the airport closure is the failure on the part of the "government" forces to provide a adequate assurances that they will not shell it. Their ability to shell is apparently now limited to occupation of one hillside. Canadians expect them to be moved off it by the RPF and for the airport to be out of artillery/mortar range very soon.
- In light of this Canadians have provided a second plane (for a very short period only) to help clear the backlog of freight. Canadians also mentioned that the overland route from Uganda on which UNAMIR had been relying for resupply in recent days had proved less than satisfactory given the ability of militias to interrupt convoys despite their being in RPF territory. Canadians also stressed to us again their urgent desire for NZ to join them in this exercise.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL.

115/23/37

Your le: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:56 (5587)			700/NYK/00000/0000	\$660.79
FROM:	NEW YOR	Χ	C04621/NYK	15 - Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING	гоп	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	5	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISA		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAR	3)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE		(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Special Rep for Rwanda met with NP10 today
- Special Rep urged NP10 members to do what they can to produce the necessary logistical resources to get troops to Rwanda as soon as possible
- Reports of cease-fire agreement reached at OAU summit
- Secretariat report that some 60 children were massacred yesterday
- There are reports of decreasing fighting in Kilgali
- It remains uncertain whether ceasefire brokered at OAU Summit will have any force in the field

Action

For information

Report

The new Special Rep (Khan) called on the NP10 group today in preparation for his mission to Rwanda. He calls on the P5 tomorrow. This was the first time a Special Rep has met with a large group of members of the Council before beginning a

mission and was particularly welcome given the enormous difficulty of the task in Rwanda. As you know from his CV Khan has a good deal of experience as Pakistan's last Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Marker described him as "one of the best".

- Khan seems to have a determination to roll up his sleeves on the mission indicating he would leave for Rwanda next week after he has had a chance to meet with the ex-Special Rep Booh Booh for a briefing here in NY. Noting that the lack of facilities was "immaterial" he said he was prepared to live in Rwanda and was determined to get to Kigali "somehow". Khan emphasised his neutral credentials and expressed a hope that he would act transparently in order to be most effective.
- The Special Rep called on the NP10 members to do what they could to bring logistic assistance to get troops to Rwanda more quickly than was the present case. He noted that at the earliest it was 3 weeks before the first Ghanain contingent could be deployed. If troops could be there earlier this would help the people of Rwanda in a concrete way. "Many lives could have been saved" he said as a result of the psychology if the Council had evidenced an earlier commitment to an expanded UNAMIR Khan said.
- 4 On the question of Arusha, he noted that while the Agreement was very important and would be a base for the future, he did not believe that the solution should be imposed on the people of Rwanda, it was rather a matter for them to determine from within.
- 5 All NP10 members (including Rwanda) spoke in welcoming his appointment and expressing a desire to cooperate. We noted that no other UN mission had quite the same sense of tragedy about it and we drew attention to the two types of tasks he would face. On the one hand there would be the important peace building role as a go between with the two factions, and on the other, the Council's mandate given to him to protect civilians at risk.
- It was possible to conceive of a likely tension between these two roles. Given that the need to protect human life was paramount we warned him that he should keep in mind the possible need to use an appropriately robust level of force against those who may wish to continue practices of massacring civilians. We wanted him to know that if that became necessary he would have the backing of the Council to use every bit of force available under the rules of engagement. We also noted that a lesson learnt in recent times was that there was a tendency for the Council to stand back and wait for a mandate review period to come up before considering a clearly deteriorating situation. In this context we urged him to come to the Council early and gave our commitment to respond by taking, if necessary, a more hands on interest in events in the field (if those in the field called for it).

- This was widely supported by others. Nigeria went on to note that Khan had the opportunity to "wipe the sense of shame that the Council had failed to respond to the problem" and would "remove the frustration felt in dealing with the problem of Rwanda." While recommending that the Special Rep coordinate closely with the OAU Sec Gen and with the leaders of the sub-region, Gambari nonetheless, emphasised the unacceptability of the international community having initially treated Rwanda as "an African problem" and one for them alone to find troops etc for.
- 8 Djibouti laid emphasis on the need to obtain a cease-fire and indicated that once a cease-fire had been obtained it would be possible to discuss other matters such as genocide.

Cease-fire

- 9 Secretariat (Gharekhan) briefed the Council on the situation at informals today. The OAU summit meeting in Tunis had ended on a high note today with the RPF rep announcing that regional talks held in the margins of the meeting had resulted in a cease-fire agreement, including agreement to cease all hostilities and genocide. The Rwanda "government" side, also present in Tunis, had said it would also observe the cease-fire and that the two parties would revisit certain aspects of the Arusha Agreement and would proceed to establish the transitional government after which the "government" side would disappear.
- 10 News of this cease-fire is encouraging and the Special Rep (at the above meeting) noted that the latest news out of Kigali was that military fire appeared to be decreasing in Kigali. It will however take a day or two to see if it sticks.
- Il Gharekhan reported that there had been eyewitness accounts given to UNAMIR of 60 Tutsi children being massacred at St Paul's church in the "government" sector of Kigali. The RPF rep here cautioned that their position at Tunis had been to allow the "government" 3 days in which to bring its forces under control to stop the killing of civilians. The news of the massacre of the children gave some cause for doubt about how well the "government" side might be able to fulfil the bargain.
- 12 Gharekhan noted that the 7th round of cease-fire talks had been held yesterday and that the next round was scheduled for tomorrow. The airport remains closed and although the transfer of displaced persons had resumed on Monday afternoon (with 550 persons relocated), it had had to be suspended yesterday.

Situation on the Ground

13 UNAMIR had discussed with the RPF and "government" forces

the removal of clergy from Kabgayi as called for by the Holy See as well as a proposal to build a compound in Kigali for displaced persons. The RPF was expected to reply shortly to these proposals.

- 14 The delivery of humanitarian assistance has intensified to both the stadium and King Fasal Hospital in Kigali. Medecines Sans Frontieres has reported that the stadium in Cyangugu (where there are a large number of civilians at risk sheltering) appeared to be calmer and the hospital was well equipped.
- 15 The Human Rights Special Rappatour has returned to Nairobi and had talks with the UNAMIR Force Commander and other UN agencies. He had been unable to visit Kigali however.

Spanish Draft Resolution

16 There was no discussion of the Spanish proposal today at informals. As you know, the Council is waiting for the NAM to coordinate its position. We understand from Pakistan that as NAM coordinator their objective is to delay its consideration for as long as possible. In an interesting gloss to the Nigerian position, they say their position is "exactly the same as NZ's except on the question of timing". This of course is the crucial point. We also understand from the UKMISS that they have new instructions to be "warmly supportive" of the Spanish initiative. China says its position is to wait for NAM lead.

Your / le: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

14:15 (5598)			700/NYK/00000/00000	\$431.97
FROM:	NEW YOR	rK	C04628/NYK	16-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING PARIS	TON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Routine
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSEI GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW SANTIAG WASHING	s o	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA TOKYO DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	В)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA,OPS,DDI) (GENTLES)		1

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- French are seriously considering mounting international force to intervene in Rwanda
- According to the British, the French do not propose to seek Security Council endorsement but are hoping for the blessing of the SecGen
- The French Mission are saying nothing for the moment

Action

We propose consideration of instructions to Paris to argue against any French intervention.

Report

Two minutes after sending our fax 2797 which downplayed media reports that France was considering mounting an intervention operation in Rwanda to halt the massacres, we received a call from the British who told us that the French were indeed serious and had approached the British "and others" to participate. The British said that the French had told them that the intention was only to stay in Rwanda until such time as the expanded UNAMIR was in place. The British also said that the French were not proposing to seek Council approval of such a mission but were trying to get the blessing of the

SecGen.

- When we called the French Mission for further information and comment, we were told that the Mission knew little about the initiative and that they were waiting for further advice from Paris. They claimed that no action was currently underway in New York in relation to any French intervention.
- 3 The British said they were currently considering their position. A critical issue would be the attitude of the parties. Like us, the British thought that the RPF not be keen to see the French back in Rwanda given their close links to the Habyrimana regime. They did not know the timing of the proposed intervention but assumed that it was intended to take place very soon if it went ahead.
- 4 The British were interested to know our reaction to the possibility of French intervention given the role we had played in Council discussions on Rwanda. We said we would need to reflect on the news and its implications. Obviously, at one level, any action which brought an end to the massacres had to be welcomed. But the implications of unilateral intervention, whether by France alone or in the company of others, which took place without the sanction of the Security Council or the request/consent of the parties, were serious and could not be lightly glossed over.

RPF Reaction

5 The RPF have told us that they have issued a statement warning that they would oppose, by force if necessary, any French intervention.

Comment

- 6 It seems to us that this is an extremely dangerous development. Unilateral intervention could only complicate enormously the UN mission. It has all the potential to follow exactly the disastrous pattern of the US intervention in Somalia leaving an impossible aftermath for the UN to manage. In this case it would be even worse.
- 7 In practice it is impossible to see how a French intervention force could avoid being drawn into the conflict between RGF and RPF. At best they would be drawn into the kind of "buffer" which the UN definitely does not want to happen. At worst they would become part of the problem by being identified as protecting the RGF.
- 8 The most useful thing the French could do if they want to make "a grand gesture" would be to send a significant fleet of transport aircraft to Africa in order to uplift the UNAMIR contingents and for them to deliver at the same time the heavy equipment which they have promised tot he Senegalese.

Recommendation

9 We recommend that you ask Paris to urgently indicate to the French grave reservations about any intervention other than by UNAMIR in accordance with the Security Council's existing resolutions.

115/25/37

Your f le:

Our file:

197/1/1

21:16 (5599)		700/PAR/00000/00000	\$520.88	
FROM:	PARIS	C01931/PAR	16-Jun-1994	
TO:	WELLINGT NEW YORK		Priority Priority	
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW SANTIAGO DEFENCE	HARARE MADRID OTTAWA	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine	
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)	W	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

FM Juppé announced yesterday that France was ready to intervene in Rwanda along with its principle European and African partners to stop the massacres and protect those threatened with extermination.

France is said to be discussing the initiative with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Americans.

Action

For information.

Report

- In a surprise announcement late yesterday afternoon, FM Juppé said that France "would be ready to intervene in Rwanda with its European partners or African countries to protect groups threatened with extermination". He noted that the operation could take place "in the near future" if the ceasefire, concluded Tuesday between the RPF and the interim government in the margin of the OAU Summit, was not respected.
- Our contacts in the Quai d'Orsay were unobtainable for comment today. We have however faxed to Wellington only a copy of an article that that appeared in Liberation this

morning under Juppe's name outlining French policy and the background to the initiative. The article emphasises the failure of the international community to respond to the situation in Rwanda and, while specifically not accusing the UN, notes that the long delay in strengthening UNAMIR has been complicated by the need to equip those African countries willing to send troops. France is providing FF20 million for this purpose. "Nothing must slow down the deployment of the UN troops which alone will allow lives to be saved." Juppé also stresses the importance of finding a political solution to the conflict through the efforts of neighbouring countries. He calls on the international community to support and protect those surviving moderates in Rwanda capable of playing a constructive role in the task of political reconstruction and concludes:

"It is no longer the time for crossing one's arms and deploring the massacres but of taking initiatives. The urgent need for international intervention must lead us to use our imagination and courage. If UNAMIR is taking its time in arriving in Rwanda, why not use some of the 18,000 UN troops still present in Somalia and who could be rapidly deployed to Kigali? I have suggested this to the UN Secretary-General who is favourable in principle. We are actively working to put this in place through our representative in New York.

If this isn't enough, France is ready with its principle European and African partners to prepare an intervention on the ground to end the massacres and to protect the populations threatened with extermination.

No solution should be discarded to end the Rwandan tragedy. France is ready to place its part in this effort."

4 Few other details of what is being considered have emerged today. A number of questions remain unanswered - not the least of which the relationship between any French intervention force and UNAMIR. It is not clear which European or African countries might be approached to join France. Tonight's Le Monde suggests that France is discussing the issue with Belgium, Germany, and Italy - none of which are considered likely to be every keen in light of their recent experiences in Rwanda and Somalia. The issue could also have been raised with George Moose, in charge of African Affairs at State Department, who is in Paris today. What little public comment there has been from the Minister's office has stressed the importance of France taking some action now in response to mounting public pressure.

Comment

5 It is certainly true that the Government has come in for a lot of flak over its policy on Rwanda. There has been a good deal of criticism of France's support for the Rwandan Government (including its assistance to members of the former

President's family now resident in Paris). At the same time, the nationalist Right has deplored the way in which France so easily abandoned Kigali and what it sees as France's responsibilities in Francophone Africa. The delay over strengthening UNAMIR has allowed others, like former Humanitarian Affairs Minister Kouchner - due back in Kigali today - to highlight the Government's own ineffective response to the crisis. The initiative may therefore be as much a response to domestic political pressures as to the current situation in Rwanda. In any event, it does not appear to have been particularly well-thought out. France may claim that it does not take sides in the conflict but it is hard to see the RPF accepting French intervention on the ground.

6 We will try and obtain a readout from the Quai tomorrow and report further then.

<u>End Message</u>

100 10 34 11.47 William 165 0527 AL MISSIUN AL --- 6.456 was that were

NYPM File: /3/88

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK Teleph(:: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

16 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC -DEFENCE WASHINGTON

No. No. No. No.

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES) Gred to unsc, unio

Page 1 of: 4

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

As you know, the US tried hard to present itself as taking a constructive lead in the adoption of Res 925 approving the deployment of Phases 2 and 3 of the expanded UNAMIR. This was a deliberate decision, taken in response to strong criticism from human rights groups over the US performance on the adoption of Res 918. Unfortunately, the basic problems which had led to the US position on Res 918 (insistence on applying the strict criteria of PDD 25, reluctance to treat Rwanda with the same degree of interest and urgency as that accorded to areas where the US is directly engaged (Bosnia, Haiti)) continued to influence US consideration of Res 925.

- It is noticeable that press comment on the US performance has become significantly tougher in recent days, notwithstanding the Administration's efforts to appear more positive. We sent you last week the NY Times article about the US position on genocide. Following is the text of a very critical editorial in the Times yesterday, 15 June, plus a serial of the from today's Times which indicates that the oriticism follow-up article from today's Times which indicates that the criticism
- Also enclosed is a separate article from today's Times which reports remarks by French Foreign Minister, Juppe, to the effect that France has been considering military intervention if the massacres continue. The comments may have some useful deterrent effect. But, given the towards the French, we would be very surprised if the French vere to intervene, even if the principal targets of such intervention were jovernment sponsored militias.

NY TIMES EDITORIAL 18 JUNE 1994

Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda

One can stipulate that the U.S. has no vital interests or historical ties in Rwanda that might justify sending troops to this tormented central African country. That said, the Clinton Administration chose an awful time to delay logistical aid to U.N. peacekeepers, and a worse time to apply a semantic sponge to crimes against humanity.

Just the other day, President Clinton was in France summoning the memories of a just war against a genocidal foe. Meantime the appalling butchery continues in Rwanda, where rebel militias last week slaughtered three Catholic bishops; the worth of a cease-fire agreement announced yesterday remains to be tested. Yet a paralyzed Pentagon quibbles over nickels and dimes instead of rushing U.S. armored vehicles to the first elements of a projected force of 5,500 U.N. peacekeepers.

The bill to the U.N. for this logistical aid is \$9.5 million, with delivery costs reckoned at about \$6 million; the U.N. is also being charged a leasing fee of \$375,000 for the 50 M-113 armored personnel carriers. Defense officials insist that the vehicles

cannot be flown from Frankfurt to Entebbe in Uganda until the lease agreement is concluded by the U.N. The green-eyeshade brigade is doubtless right, but this is not a routine arms transaction; it is a response to a humanitarian disaster. Blame for not slashing through this red tape rests with the White House and the National Security Council.

This haggling over leasing arrangements is being perpetrated by the U.N.'s leading deadbeat; the U.S. owes nearly \$2 billion in treaty-mandated dues and assessments. What adds a truly dismaying flavor to this miserable affair is the Administration's simultaneous admonition to its officials to avoid describing the massacres in Rwanda as genocide. Instead, spokesmen have been instructed to say that "acts of genocide may have occurred."

This dainty euphemism flies in the face of daily reports of ethnic killings that can only be called genocidal. What really seems to worry the Clinton team is that talk of genocide may increase clamor for doing more to stop it, especially since the U.S. is a party to the Genocide Convention.

U.S. to Supply 60 Vehicles For U.N. Troops in Rwanda

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Spread to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 16 - Reacting to criticism that Washington has responded too slowly to the killing in Rwanda, the Administration has speeded up plans to equip United Nations peacekeepers there with armored personnel carriers, officials said today

The Administration has also decided to describe the deaths there as genocide, after once instructing its spokesmen to say only that "acts of genocide may have occurred.

The Administration's resolve is being driven by the White House, which has faced criticism that its efforts to stop the massacres in Rwanda were inadequate and ensnared in red tape.

The armored vehicles for the expanded peacekeeping mission are to be taken from United States Army stocks in Germany Administration officials had said it would take three weeks to transport the vehicles to Uganda, a delay that would put off the deployment of African peacekeeping troops in neighboring Rwanda.

Applying the Right Label

But Administration officials said a plan had been approved today at a White House meeting to move the vehicles to an Air Force base near Frankfurt and begin flying them to

Uganda on Sunday. Even as the White House was putting the finishing touches on its plan, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared a letter to President Clinton urging him to acknowledge formally that genocide is occur-ring in Rwanda. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans have been killed since April 6, when the mysterious crash of the Rwandan President's plane set off a cycle of mass ethnic and political killings.


The letter, which is to be sent on Thursday, was signed by virtually all the committee members, including Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, the ranking Democrat, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina,

the senior Republican.

The issue of the personnel carriers arose last month, when the United Nations sought 50 of them for the Ghanaian vanguard of an planned force of 5,500 peacekeepers, mostly African. Only 450 lightly armed peacekeepers are currently deployed in Rwanda, far too few even to assure the safety of people in the capital.

While the Administration has ruled out sending United States troops to

Agreement at last on what the Pentagon will charge for personnel carriers.



American cargo planes are to ferry armored personnel carriers to Entebbe, Uganda, for use by United Nations troops in Rwanda.

Rwanda, it is willing to help equip the

force to ferry civilians to safety.

During his recent trip to Europe,
Mr. Clinton said Washington would "provide the armored support necessary if the African nations will provide the troops."

But while the Pentagon was willing to provide M-113 armored personnel carriers, it was not prepared to do so free, and insisted that the United Nations reimburse Washington for use of the vehicles, spare parts and shipment to Entebbe, Uganda, where the United Nations would take control

In recent days the talks appeared to have hit a snag when the Pentagon raised its cost estimate by 50 percent and insisted that the United Nations also pay to fly the vehicles back to Germany. That drove the cost to \$15 million, \$11 million of which was for transportation.

The United Nations, which is strapped for money to pay for peace-keeping operations, balked at the increased cost and proposed that the vehicles be returned by ship. Today Administration officials said the issue had been resolved, essentially in favor of the United Nations, the cost will be about \$10 million, and the vehicles will return by ship.

3UNE 01

A Shorter Timetable

To speed the shipment, the Air Force is to use huge C-5 planes in-stead of the smaller C-141's it had planned to use. Each C-5 can carry six personnel carriers. Officials said it would take only four or five days to fly the vehicles to Uganda.

Ghanaian troops are to go to Entebbe to learn to use the vehicles, and American officials said they hoped the training could be compressed into

a few days.

Ten armored personnel carriers

are also being sent from Somalia to Rwanda to help equip the peacekeepers. The Ghanaians have 300 troops in Rwanda and 500 more who are ready to go as soon as the personnel carri-

The Word From Christopher

Administration officials said today that President Clinton and Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, had been concerned about assertions that the Administration was moving too slowly and had pressed the Pentagon to step up its efforts.

The change in the Administration's public statements on the killings in Rwanda was reflected in a comment on Friday by Secretary of State Warren Christopher that acts of genocide had occurred in Rwanda. "I think that is the operative term, from a legal standpoint," he said. "If there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that."

The Administration's previous instructions to officials to say only that there may have been acts of genocide in Rwanda had brought criticism from lawmakers and human rights groups that Washington was trying to play down the extent and nature of the killing.

France May Move In to End Rwanda Killing

PARIS, June 15 (Reuters) — The Foreign Minister said today that France and its European and African allies were prepared to intervene militarily in Rwanda if massacres continued and a cease-fire was not respected. The cease-fire was announced in Tunis by the Organization of African Unity.

The Minister, Alain Juppe, told reporters that intervention could take place "relatively soon if we learn of new massacres in coming days."

"If massacres continue and if the cease-fire is not respected, I say to-day that France, along with its main European and African partners, is prepared to launch a ground intervention to protect groups threatened with extinction," he said.

Mr. Juppe, who spoke after testifying before the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, said President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had discussed military intervention earlier today.

Tutsi Report a Slaughter

He also said he had suggested to the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that 2,000 to 3,000 United Nations peacekeepers be transferred from Somalia to Rwanda.

Even as Mr. Juppé was suggesting that further atrocities could bring armed intervention, a United Nations official quoted members of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda as saying that Hutu forces had killed 60 teen-aged Tutsi boys after abducting them.

The official, Maj. Jean-Guy Plante, speaking to reporters in Kigali, said the Tutsi had reported that the 60 boys were taken away on Tuesday from the Ste.-Paul church and killed near a bridge at Rugenge, in a part of

the city that is controlled by forces of the interim Government.

"There is a big hole there where a lot of massacres have taken place," Major Plante said.

The official said six Tutsi reported that the Hutu militia forces had come through a hole in the fence at the bottom of the Ste.-Famille compound to take the boys away.

The Tuisi, who said they had fled the compound Tuesday night after seeing the teen-agers abducted, appealed for help in a letter to the international community.

The six, who are hiding in a Kigali hotel, said the abductions had been carried out on the orders of a local government administrator whom they did not name.

The letter, addressed to the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, begged his group "to do all in its power to prevent the imminent execution of a plan of massacre threatened against us." The letter was also sent to the Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, to President Clinton and to other world leaders and human rights groups.

It said almost 300 of the 4,000 people sheltering in the complex had been abducted and killed since April 6, although this could not be confirmed.

But in general, fighting seemed to subside in Kigali, and in Tunis, the Organization of African Unity ended its annual meeting today on an optimistic note after negotiating a ceasefire agreement in Rwanda.

fire agreement in Rwanda.
"In view of the urgency of the situation and in their strong desire to restore peace, which has been seriously compromised in Rwanda, the parties to the conflict have agreed to

put an immediate end to hostilities," the 53-member organization said in a communique.

The statement was issued after three days of meetings and after the interim President and a representative of the Tutsi-led rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, agreed to a cease-fire.

But the deputy commander of the United Nations force, Brig. Gen. Henry Anyidoho, said in Kigali that he had not been officially informed of a cease-fire agreement. Despite the luli in fighting, he added, it was not clear if the rival forces had heard about it either, because Government and rebel troops traded mortar and small-arms fire for most of the day.

NY TIMES 16 JUNE 1994

115/23/37

Your le:

Our file:

197/1/1

20:12 (5609)		700/PAR/0000/00000	\$490.24
FROM:	PARIS		C01934/PAR	17-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT NEW YORK	· ·	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
CC:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA HARARE OTTAWA TOKYO DEFENCE	;	BONN CANBERRA MADRID MOSCOW SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISA	C,HRU,LGL,EUR,DP3,DSP1,EAB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF MOD	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C24667.

Summary

France is serious about pursuing its initiative. The extent to which it is likely to gain European support should be clearer after the WEU meeting in Brussels this afternoon. For the moment only Senegal has indicated that it will provide troops. Action may move to New York over the weekend where the French will attempt to obtain UNSC blessing. How, and on what basis, is not clear. Somalia could serve as a precedent. France wants international and UN backing but may be prepared to intervene without the agreement and cooperation of the RPF. Any intervention would be temporary and provide protection for civilians until more UNAMIR troops can be deployed.

Action

For information.

Report

2. We spoke to Cillard (Rwanda, Quai D'orsay) this afternoon. He was not able to add much to de Bellescize's demarche. He confirmed that France wanted international and UN backing for the initiative. There was absolutely no question of France intervening without this. He was not

however clear what the legal basis would be. "This was something for the lawyers." His own view, shared he said by some of his Quai colleagues, was that the US intervention in Somalia provided a precedent of sorts. The intervention force would be transitional - "not even two months" and would remain in place until UNAMIR was strengthened. This could take 4-5 weeks. It was necessary to move very quickly. "Not tomorrow but within a few days."

France was waiting on the WEU meeting in Brussels this afternoon to know which, if any, WEU members might be prepared to provide troops for an international intervention Italy and Spain were possibilities. Germany might have been willing had its Constitution not stood in the way. According to the British Embassy whom we also spoke to this afternoon, the Elysee had confirmed that only Senegal had so far indicated a firm commitment to provide troops. (Cillard had confirmed that France was in the process of equipping the Senegalese troops.) Our British contact also told us that the UK had not definitely precluded providing some form of London had received a bit of a shock yesterday assistance. morning when French General Lanxade had called his British counterpart to announce that France was going to intervene in Rwanda under WEU auspices through Burundi and to request British support. Since then the British had tried to turn the French towards obtaining UN endorsement of the operation as an element of the UNAMIR effort. Our contact expected a good deal of discussion on this in New York over the weekend. He noted, as have the French press, that since the UNSG had given the proposal his support, the Secretariat could be expected to work hard to ensure that a proper legal UN framework was found.

RPF

We asked Cillard whether France would be prepared to see the intervention force deployed without the agreement of the RPF. He noted that this would be a very difficult political decision but in his view France would not hold back if this was the only thing standing in the way of deployment of an intervention force. (According to the British, it was not inconceivable that the RPF might decide to cooperate.) Cillard said that discussions were taking place between France and RPF. There had been a good deal of contact. Dialogue with the RPF was not however easy. The RPF claimed that France was partisan but it was not. It had pulled its troops out of Rwanda when it said it would in accordance with the Arusha Accords. The RPF had not expected it to do so. The RPF had requested a high-level visit to Paris and France had agreed. The visit had in the end been cancelled by the RPF. France was always ready to talk to the RPF - indeed any of players in the Rwandan conflict.

Political Reconciliation

5. Cillard expanded a little on the references in

yesterday's article by Juppe to French interest in supporting political moderates in Rwanda. He noted that many of the moderates had been killed but there were still enough on both sides, including in the Rwandan army, to form a government broadly consistent with the Arusha Accords. What was important for France was that no group should be excluded. Cillard confirmed that France had welcomed to Paris the moderate Hutu former Prime Minister designate (name ?) whom it regarded a key potential player in the formation of new Government.

April Attack on Presidential Plane

6. Juppe has vehemently denied an allegation made today in the Brussels newspaper, <u>Le Soir</u>, that two French soldiers were involved in the attack on President Habyarimana's plane on 6 April, describing it as "a pure and simple fabrication."

Comment

7. France seems determined to push ahead with this initiative. While it may not make a lot of sense to most people, this initiative has undeniably refocussed international attention on Rwanda and the appalling humanitarian situation there. Maybe France is simply trying to call the international community's bluff. That could be, nobody seems to know what Juppé's real motiviation might be. In the event that European support is not forthcoming, the possibility cannot be ruled out that France might still consider going ahead with Francophone African support - provided it continues to receives a nod from the UNSG.

Your le: Our file: 18:55 (5608) 700/MEA/00000/00000 \$398.00 FROM: WELLINGTON C24667/WN1 17-Jun-1994 TO: NEW YORK Immediate PARIS Priority CC: BEIJING BONN Routine BRUSSELS CANBERRA Routine GENEVA HARARE Routine LONDON MADRID Routine MOSCOW OTTAWA Routine SANTIAGO TOKYO Routine WASHINGTON DEFENCE Routine WGTN UNSC Routine MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB) P/S MFA

Subject

DEFENCE HONZDF

DEFENCE MOD

U52093: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04628 and Paris' C01931.

Summary

2 - The French Ambassador called on us (Powles) today to explain French thinking and to seek support in principle for proposed intervention if fighting and massacres continue. He gave impression of a strong tactical element in Juppe's announcement - to put pressure on the parties to make the ceasefire stick, and to placate French domestic criticism.

(DSIA, OPS, DDI)

(GENTLES)

- We said we shared French sense of urgency about the need to stop further massacres. We nevertheless saw a number of difficulties with the proposal. Our first preference was to speed up deployment of UNAMIR. We would need to take account of the evolving situation, including further discussions among UNSC members in New York. We would get back to him and would value further information as he received it.

Action Required

- 2 New York to keep us informed of views of other Council members and Secretariat.
- Paris to continue dialogue with Quai contacts drawing on our comments below as appropriate, and keep us informed of

French views.

Report

- The French Ambassador called on us today at short notice to talk about Juppe's announcement that France was ready to mount an intervention force in Rwanda. Reading from his instructions, the Ambassador described the situation in Rwanda as traumatic with continued fighting and massacres despite the efforts of the international community which was being blamed for lack of immediate action. The crucial question was whether the Tunis ceasefire agreement would be respected, or the massacres go on. Juppe had announced on 15 June that if they did not stop France was ready to launch an intervention on the ground with its main European and African partners with a view to protecting groups threatened with extermination. It would be a military exercise with a humanitarian vocation, would support UNAMIR in terms of SCR 925 op 4, and would aim to (a) ensure the security and protection of people threatened in several humanitarian sites, and (b) evacuate those threatened to safer areas.
- The force would have a limited duration until UNAMIR was fully operational (including deployments drawn from UNOSOM II). In any case it would run for not longer than two months. France had no intention of acting alone and had sought participation from Belgium, Italy, Spain and its WEU partners, as well as African countries including Senegal and Ghana. The Ambassador said France wanted the force to have a WEU label. It would move forward only with support from the UN. Boutros-Ghali had already indicated agreement. The reaction of the Security Council remained to be determined. Coordination of the operation with UNAMIR would be assured. It would enter Rwanda by road from neighbouring countries and aim at reaching Kigali. France was urging other countries to support the proposal in principle.
- He commented that the proposal clearly implied that the recently agreed ceasefire would not hold and that massacres would continue. The intervention would bring a necessary element of "military muscle" which UNAMIR was unable to do. This was how France envisaged it for the time being, but they were still in an exploratory phase and would be watching developments closely over the next 24-48 hours to clarify whether an intervention was necessary and the views of their partners.
- In response we noted that New Zealand attached importance to a UN solution. Our preference was for a quick deployment of the strengthened UNAMIR which already had a presence in Rwanda. This was what we had been working for in the Council in cooperation with France. We asked whether France intended to seek support for their proposal in the Council. The Ambassador thought so. We foresaw some other members having difficulty with it given the history of discussions on the UNAMIR mandate. We agreed with France on

the continuing need to apply pressure to the two parties, but we saw problems with this particular course of action. We would want to take account of further consultations and clarification of positions among Council members and would be interested in responses of countries whose participation France had sought. We said we would consult the Minister on the Ambassador's approach and would appreciate further information as the Embassy received it.

Comment

- While the evolving situation in Rwanda needs to be taken into account, we have serious reservations about the French proposed intervention which would "fight its way in" commando-style (according to the Ambassador) without the consent of all the parties. We agree with New York that this could considerably complicate and confuse subsequent UN action. On the other hand we are conscious of the public pressures to which the French are responding and the overriding need to stop further massacres in Rwanda.
- We are aware too of arguments as to a right to intervene in extreme humanitarian situations (and the situation in Rwanda is pretty extreme), perhaps even unilaterally in some exceptional situations where, for example, the "government" concerned acquiesces and other action is not being taken. Where genocide is concerned, however, we note that the Genocide Convention itself supports multilateral (United Nations) action by virtue of Article VIII which provides that "any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide...". This supports the proposition that intervention other than by UN forces in the present case should at least have the general blessing of UNSC.
- 10 <u>For Paris</u>: New York's C04628. We would not wish you to take a firm stand against any French intervention in your contacts with the Quai. You should however express our considerable reservations about the practical implications of the proposal and our clear preference at this stage for action to speed up an effective UNAMIR response.
- Il We did not take the opportunity to quiz de Bellescize about his reference to drawing on UNOSOM forces. But we would be cautious about this proposition too. Picking up troops (whose?) equipped, trained and mandated for the Somalia operation and putting them into Rwanda seems a recipe for confusion and worse. It also suggests UNOSOM troops are hanging around with nothing better to do. That might suit those wanting to pull the plug on UNOSOM but we have been among those arguing against stripping UNOSOM precipitately.

Page 4

C24667/WN1

115/23/37

Your le:

Our file: 186/1/1

19:20 (5611)		700/LON/00000/00000	\$222.14	
FROM:	LONDON		C03998/LON	17-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	ON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
CC:	NEW YORE BEIJING BONN CANBERRA GENEVA SANTIAGO MADRID DEFENCE	7	PARIS MOSCOW BRUSSELS OTTAWA WASHINGTON HARARE TOKYO	Priority Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISA	.C, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, E	AB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

U05199: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

British are also concerned as to how French initiative will tie back into UNAMIR and UN resolutions. But they will not knock it "for political reasons". They will not contribute troops, but could provide some logistical back up. They hope French proposals will be clearer after today's WEU meeting. They do not expect decisions on action to come out of that meeting.

Action required

For information only.

Report

Your U52093, New York's C04628 and Paris' C01931.

We touched base today on Rwanda today with the FCO (Holmes and Clarke, respectively Assistant Heads of African (Equatorial) Dept and UN Dept). They confirmed that French had made a specific approach to them (Juppe to Hurd) for support, but British have reserved their position, having yet to see any firm proposals. In fact, they described French initiative as "vague". They hope the situation will be clearer after this afternoon's WEU meeting. Their representative to the meeting has largely a "listening brief", but will make it clear the UK will not be providing

any troops. It is possible they might provide logistical support. (UK was asked by UN to provide 50 APCs, but has instead offered 50 trucks). British will not knock the French proposal "for political reasons" (ie sake of the relationship). They also understand that "some" are frustrated with the length of time it is taking to get the expanded UNAMIR in place. (Holmes suggested that the French may be hoping to bridge the gap before UNAMIR is up to strength). But like us, they are concerned as to how the French initiative will tie back in with UNAMIR and UN resolutions. They have heard French suggestion of drawing down on UNOSOM troops, but are not clear how this would work or be of benefit.

2 Holmes said he understood the French had said they would not go in with storming paratroopers, but Clarke acknowledged the problems inherent in going in without the consent of the parties. British are not expecting a decision to come out of the WEU today on the French initiative, despite the French concern not to delay. Our interlocutors offered to brief us on the meeting on Monday. We will report further then.

Your Lle:

. . .

115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

21:36 (5618) 700/NYK/00000/00000 \$1143.59 FROM: NEW YORK C04641/NYK 17-Jun-1994 TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate CC: PARIS BRUSSELS Immediate BONN CANBERRA Routine **GENEVA** Routine HARARE LONDON MADRID Routine MOSCOW Routine OTTAWA BEIJING SANTIAGO Routine TOKYO WASHINGTON Routine DEFENCE Routine MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB) P/S MFA DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI) DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- French outline their position to Council in similar terms to their presentation in Wellington
- Public responses are cool in Council
- Privately most delegations inside and outside the Council are very much opposed
- Senior Secretariat personnel believe French intervention would be a disaster, but Boutros Ghali has been persuaded personally by Juppe to support the initiative
- French honour is now on the line and delegation has instructions to push ahead with resolution
- Draft was circulated late this evening: text by fax
- We warned Merimee privately that he should not assume we would be on the same side

Action

For information.

Report

At informal consultations today (17 June) French Ambassador Merimee explained to the Security Council their proposal that there be a UNITAF type intervention force in Rwanda. Merimee said that his government did not feel that the international community could allow further time to elapse if there was some possibility of offering relief to the population. France's proposal was predicated on the fact that it would be some time before UNAMIR could be fully deployed in Rwanda. If a ceasefire was agreed, or if UNAMIR was in place earlier than envisaged then there would be no requirement for such a force and France would not pursue the idea. Also France would not act alone. It was seeking partners in Europe and Africa and had had some encouraging replies although no firm commitment. Senegal was almost certain to participate and Ghana's response had been helpful. (Comment: Canada tells us that Ghana has said to them that it does not support the French idea.)

- 2 Merimee said that it would be purely humanitarian and a follow up to the UNAMIR mandate (Resolution 925 Op 4a). It would endeavour to ascertain where groups of people were threatened and take them to safe areas where they would be protected from attack. Merimee said that the force might be tasked with saving Tutsi lives and repelling attacks by the Hutu militia. While the force would not be seeking confrontation, if it were opposed by any elements, then the French (sic) troops would not hesitate to use force.
- 3 The French troops would only be there for two months, ie the likely interval between now and the arrival of UNAMIR reinforcements. Merimee claimed that even under the best of scenarios (ie the transfer with the permission of the troop contributors of some troops from Somalia to Rwanda) it would be at least 4 to 6 weeks before UNAMIR was in a position to act. (Comment: This is false. See para 16 below.)
- 4 Force would be a multinational not a national force. But given the rules of engagement and the possibility of combat it was essential, so far as the French Government was concerned, that the force be under national command.
- 5 Merimee said that the French Government was aware of criticism which could be levelled at the proposal. The RPF had said that it was not in favour; it feared that French intervention could conceivably reverse the trend which might bring it victory by indirectly giving encouragement to the other side. But France had to make a choice. If the massacres continued there needed to be rapid intervention. France was prepared to do this, with partners, so long as UNAMIR was not fully deployed. Merimee added that he thought there would not necessarily need to be direct contact with the RPF. The massacres were in the government controlled zone and that would be the priority area for operations. (Comment: French troops would be in RGF territory behind the front lines just as they were prior to establishment of

UNAMIR and again would in practice serve as a deterrent against RPF advances.)

6 Merimee said that France had already withdrawn once before from Rwanda. So there was no reason to doubt that it would be acting in good faith. Merimee said that as soon as a final decision was taken by his Government he would submit a draft resolution to the Council modelled on that which authorised deployment of UNITAF in Somalia in November 1992. France hoped that support from the Council would not be denied.

P5 Position

- 7 None of the P5 responded to the French proposal.
- 8 Hannay told us that his view and that of their experts in London is that the proposal is crazy. However for bilateral reasons they would make this known in private. The UK also told us that there had been an EU meeting in Brussels today at which the proposal was discussed. Apparently the French got no tangible support aside from ambiguous expressions of "admiration" that they were prepared to undertake this mission. Hannay said Belgium, Spain and Germany had been critical. No member state offered to participate though the UK understood that Italy had said it might participate "if several others do as well".
- 9 As for the US, Christopher is expected to speak to Juppe very soon about the proposal and until then the US is not ready to make its position known. US Mission have told us that they and the Africa Bureau believe it is a disastrous policy. However Strobe Talbott had declined advice that the US should speak against the idea expressing concern that this would give the media another stick to bash the US. The Mission is interpreting their position for now to be that they will not oppose the proposal if the French have partners and if the Council gives its blessing by way of resolution.
- 10 US will be saying to the French bilaterally that they are concerned about the possible "perception" that they will be entering Rwanda in order to assist the "government" which is now quite close to defeat by the RPF, having been pushed out of Gitarama and almost out of Kigali. One member of the US Mission told us that their assessment is that the French intervention would undoubtedly help the RGF. (Merimee admitted to us privately that in his view also this was an inevitable outcome.)
- 11 US also told us that they believe it is essential that this French proposal not divert energy away from arrangements under way to deploy UNAMIR. To this end they are proceeding with the immediate delivery of their APCs to the area and will be supplying the Ghanains with other equipment. US emphasised they also wish to see other countries provide the airlift and other equipment UNAMIR needs as soon as

possible. "Delay", said Inderfurth, "which you all criticised the US for", is now the responsibility of others.

12 The Chinese and Russians do not yet have instructions. For the Russians it is possible that they may see a linkage between the French request for Council approval of their proposal and the Russian proposal for Georgia, making it difficult for them to oppose.

NP10 Responses

- 13 NP10 Council members were taken by surprise and no NP10 members had instructions apart from New Zealand. Comments were generally noncommittal.
- 14 For our part, we thanked the French for their presentation to the Council. We said we had two observations. First, we understood the desire to respond to a very serious humanitarian crisis that the Council had been grappling with for some time not always with success. Secondly, we said that the situation in Rwanda was very volatile. There had been negative reactions from parties to the conflict. We said we would need to consider this aspect further in particular the problems of any intervention force fitting in with UNAMIR and the impact on UNAMIR's future ability to operate in Rwanda.
- 15 In responding to these comments Merimee agreed the relationship between the French force and UNAMIR was an important issue. He said that France wished there to be a "clear distinction" between the French force and UNAMIR since "UNAMIR should not loose its neutral character as it would if it were too involved with the French force". Because of this they would prefer to "observe a distinction even though the mandates would be similar." He also agreed that efforts to deploy the expanded UNAMIR should not be interrupted.
- 16 In response to a question from Spain, Gharekhan said that most of the African troops were ready to go now but just required the logistic support. Air lift and APCs are the "main problem". He reported the Secretariat hoped the Ghanians would arrive late next week and also that they had a "reasonable hope" that one other African battalion could also be in place in "a reasonably short period of time".
- 17 Gharekhan appealed to member states to do what they can urgently to support these efforts.

Nigerian View

18 Gambari, who was not at the Council this morning, told us privately that Nigeria did not support the French idea for intervention. He believes Africa will have very serious problems with it. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will remain true once the French lobbying machine goes into overdrive in Francophonia.

Canadians

- 19 Canadians tell us that Gen Dallaire has reported from talks he had with RPF that RPF said there cannot be 2 UN mandated operations in Rwanda, one of which they do not support. Apparently if the French proceed, and the UNSC agrees, RPF will withdraw its support for all UN operations, since in their view it would be difficult to distinguish between the 2 forces.
- 20 Canadians' have told the French privately they are absolutely opposed to the French proposal and that France's efforts would better be directed to deploying and equipping an expanded UNAMIR as soon as possible. We understand they will be conveying to the French their strong preference that they work through UNAMIR and avoid any other complicating factors or for the French to jeopardise UNAMIR's position.

Other Reactions

21 The Brazilian, Argentine and Spanish delegations expressed strong reservations to us privately particularly citing the report of the special commission of enquiry into the Somalia debacle as reason for not supporting France's initiative.

Rwandan PR

We understand from the US that Bizimana is now signalling he will not be cooperative about stepping aside from the presidency in September. Djibouti put the proposal to him a day or so ago and initially it seemed on track. However, at P5 meeting yesterday at which France gave a briefing on their initiative, we understand China reported a conversation they had had with Bizimana. He had said he was "very optimistic that things would change before the end of this month", (ie that he would be accepted as legitimate), China then asked Merimee directly if Bizimana was therefore referring to the French initiative to enter Rwanda. This caught Merimee by surprise who responded that until Juppe had made the announcement, no one in the Rwanda "government" knew of their initiative. (He did not deny, however, that for some time the RGF has been pressing for such help from Paris with increasing desperation.) Others have recalled to us the closeness of links between France and the late Habirimana regime.

Situation on the Ground

23 Secretariat (Gharekhan) reported at informals that there had been 12 UNAMIR casualties today. A Uruguayan Major had been killed and a Bangladeshi Major wounded in a reconnaisance mission some 10km out of Kilagi en route to Ruhengeri. The mission was attempting to determine a viable route for humanitarian supplies to the north. A UNAMIR

inspection team would go to the site to investigate. The Bangladeshi is being medivaced to Nairobi by Canadian aircraft.

24 An observer team on reconnaissance to Gitarama had reported many civilian casualties and corpes in houses. There was heavy fighting in Kigali and an RPF raid on St Famile Church to free Tutsi sheltering there. Some 40 casualties amongst the militia and gendarmarie were reported and a number of refugees released. The militia had attempted a raid on the Hotel mille Collines where some 400 Tutsi are sheltering. The RPF had forced its way into the hospital and taken stretchers and 2 boxes of drugs from Medecine Sans Frontiers.

Postscript

25 Since drafting the above French have circulated draft resolution (which implies definite decision in Paris to proceed). It is modelled closely on the UNITAF precedent and confirms rumours that they have Boutros Ghali on board because it is predicated on the concept of a SG's recommendation to proceed in this manner.

115/23/37

Your _..le: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:37	(5615)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$431.97
FROM:	NEW YORK	<	C04637/NYK	17 - Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	Ю	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE		BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	aB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: UNOMUR

Summary

- Mandate for UNOMUR (observer mission in Uganda on border with Rwanda) expires 21 June
- Sec Gen reports force has been effective to date in verifying no military assistance reaches Rwanda from Uganda
- But recommends phase down of UNOMUR over three months given dramatically changed conditions in Rwanda and little rationale for monitoring one border and not others
- President's draft resolution circulated

Action

For instructions

Report

Our IFF contains Sec Gens report on UNOMUR, the mandate of which expires on 21 June. Sec Gen's report concludes that UNOMUR has been effective in pursuance of its mandate in monitoring cross border arms flows from Uganda. The Sec Gen recalls that in his last report he noted that clandestine cross-border traffic had decreased appreciably and that, at that time, movement was restricted and only along well-used routes across the border. He also recalls his conclusion that there was no evidence of any significant traffic in armaments.

- 3 The report notes that despite the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda, the situation of cross-border traffic from Uganda "does not appear to have changed during the reporting period". (Under usual circumstances this would present a case for renewal of the mandate.) However, Sec Gen's report notes that the mission was intended to be a "factor of stability in the area" and to contribute to the negotiated settlement of the Rwandese conflict.
- 4 Report goes on to draw attention to the drastically changed situation in Rwanda and to the arms embargo established against Rwanda in res 918. Under these circumstances the report concludes, "there appears to be little rationale for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others." On the other hand, it is noted that the flow of arms is one of the major areas of concern in the cease-fire talks presently under way under UNAMIR's auspices in Rwanda.
- 5 The Sec Gen concludes therefore that UNOMUR should continue its monitoring activities until an effective cease-fire is established but simultaneously be phased out over a period of three months. The recommendation therefore is to renew the mandate for 3 months during which there would be a phase down leading to a complete windup at the end of the 3 month period (ie by 21 September 1994).

Comment

- Despite Rwandan PR's (undiplomatic) allegations about Uganda supplying RPF with arms, and his recent calls for intensified efforts by UNOMIR, it seems the Sec Gen prefers to see UNOMUR phased out completely. This could well be the first UN operation closed down, presumably something the US would particularly welcome.
- 7 It seems odd to be closing down a successful arms control mechanism when one of the biggest problems in Rwanda is the flow of arms and consequent killings amongst civilians and combatants alike. There is however an element of unfairness in Uganda being monitored for assistance to the RPF and not other neighbouring states for assistance to the "government" forces. Under these conditions the only alternative would be to deploy similar missions in all neighbouring states, and in the present climate this would be unthinkable.
- 8 Grateful instructions on Presidential draft resolution (our IFF refers) which implements Sec Gen's recommendations. The item is scheduled for discussion at informals on Monday.

NE MISSION NE --- ENSK

NYPM FILE:

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

T PHONE: (212) 826-1960

FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE:

17 JUNE 1994

TO:

LD:

WELLINGTON

NO. 18/4 PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

WGTN UNSC

SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

Gred to VIUSC, MEA, UNIC

PAGE 1 OF: 3

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Attached is text of draft resolution circulated by French delegation.

SENT BY: UN NYK HQ

June 17, 1994 - 7 pm

The Security Council.

- Restriction all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwands, in particular its resolutions 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate and force level of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwands (UNAMIR),
- Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of ... June 1994 B. (S/1884/...),
- Teking into ecceunt the time needed to gather the necessary resecurces for C. the effective deployment of UNAMIR,
- Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic killings of the civilian D. population,
- Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General E. towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwands,
- Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the F. Organization of African Unity (OAU),
- Welcomes the Secretary-General's report dated .. June 1994 (\$/1994/...) 1. and approves its recommendations;
- Welcomes also the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the setablishment of an operation simed at ensuring the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda (S/1994/...);
- Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the 3 Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer refered to in paragraph 2 above to use all necessary means to achieve the objectives set out in resolutions 916 (1994) and 925 (1994), with a priority to the provisions of paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 925 (1994):

- 4. Decides that the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will be limited to the transitional period during which UNAMIR will not be able to carry out its mandate effectively;
- 5. <u>Call upon</u> all Member States to respond urgently to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support, in order to enable UNAMIR to fulfil its mendate effectively as soon as possible;
- 6. Requests Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with UNAMIR and to set up appropriate mechanisms to this end :
- 7. Demands that all parties to the conflict and others concerned immediately bring to an end the systematic killings in areas under their control and allow Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to Implement fully the mission set forth in peregraph 3 above;
- B. Requests Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of their action in Rwands through the Secretary-General and to present a report upon the completion of their mission;
 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

115/23/3>

Your i _e:

Our file:

17:59 (5625)	7	00/BRU/00000/00000	\$418.56
FROM:	BRUSSELS	G C	01766/BRU	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING NEW YOR		GTN UNSC	Priority Priority
cc:	PARIS MADRID GENEVA BEIJING HARARE OTTAWA BONN	R M W. C.	ONDON OME OSCOW ASHINGTON ANBERRA EFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(UNC, MEA, ISAC, HR	U,LGL,EUR,DSP1,EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DS1A, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C24728/WN1

- 1. Belgian MFA (Fontaine, West/Central Africa) advise they are meeting their Minister (Claes) this evening to discuss the approach Belgium should adopt in a meeting of Western European Union (WEU) members Tuesday on the French proposal. Our contact was careful to avoid predicting his Minister's decision on this issue (which is highly political for the Belgians see below) Fontaine advised, in confidence, that the main points of MFA advice to Claes are as follows:
- Belgium should indicate a favourable stance in principle to the French initiative.
- Any French-led intervention in Rwanda should have the endorsement of the United Nations, and should have a clear objective, mandate and time frame.
- the action must remain humanitarian in nature
- 2 Fontaine considered Belgium's approach in tomorrow's WEU meeting might well be to seek further details from France on how it would propose to ensure that the above requirements might be met.
- 3 Fontaine did not forsee any Belgian military contribution as at all likely. Belgium is however considering the

possibility of offering logistical support. Belgium has left considerable equipment in and bordering Rwanda following its recent withdrawal from that country. The intention to date has been that this might be offered to UNAMIR. However "on a case by case basis" it may be that any French-led force could be given access to such equipment.

Comment

4 The deaths of Belgian troops earlier this year in Rwanda would make any decision to commit new Belgian troops there unpalatable. That said, Rwanda (as a former Belgian colony) retains considerable interest for the Belgian government and media. This factor, and Belgium's close bilateral links with France (just days before Belgium will be looking for continued French support for Belgium PM Dehaene's candidacy for the EU Commission Presidency at the Corfu EU Summit) will make any decision on the French initiative highly political for the Belgians. We would not be surprised to see them offer both moral and logistical support, if the conditions outlined above can be seen to be satisfied.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

111/23/27

Your file:

ţ. ...

Our file:

161/1/1

626)	700/BON/00000/00000	\$444.72
BONN	C01519/BON	20-Jun-1994
WELLINGTON		Priority
NEW YORK PARIS BRUSSELS ROME MOSCOW BEIJING CANBERRA HARARE	WGTN UNSC LONDON MADRID GENEVA WASHINGTON SANTIAGO OTTAWA DEFENCE	Priority Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
(UNC, MEA, I	SAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)	
	, DDI)	
	WELLINGTON NEW YORK PARIS BRUSSELS ROME MOSCOW BEIJING CANBERRA HARARE (UNC, MEA, I	BONN C01519/BON WELLINGTON NEW YORK WGTN UNSC PARIS LONDON BRUSSELS MADRID ROME GENEVA MOSCOW WASHINGTON BEIJING SANTIAGO CANBERRA OTTAWA HARARE DEFENCE (UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB) HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

Your U52172 poses the hard questions, most of which cannot as yet be answered until further information on objectives and tasks is provided by the French. The German Foreign Office considers that this is something which France has to deliver on to its partners. They are for this reason cautious towards the initiative and there is no question of German participation. However, at the end of the day and for political reasons, Germany will probably fall in behind the French.

Action

For your information - your C52172 refers.

Report

We spoke to Timmermann, Rwanda desk officer in the German Foreign Office. Germany, like others in the WEU, had "welcomed" the French initiative, just as they welcomed any idea which could assist in improving the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. That being said, they, like others, were cautious.

2 The major problem was that the overall objectives of the French initiative were unclear. One could not, for example, determine whether this was the right strategy to pressure the

parties to negotiate a ceasefire (if that was France's objective). Neither could one yet assess whether intervention might have the effect of encouraging the RGF to continue fighting. Certainly the declared position of the RPF, as evidenced by their letter to the UN Secretary-General opposing the proposed intervention, could signficantly complicate the position of UNAMIR and affect its future viability. The Foreign Office had no new information on the situation on the ground as they were working on the same media reports that you are.

- 3 Timmermann thought it was now up to the French to provide significantly more details on its initiative, particularly to persuade other countries of its value. During the discussions in the WEU, members had not opposed the initiative, but only Italy had come forward with an offer of assistance. The German Foreign Office considered that the WEU was not the appropriate body to take this action further. Rather any action should be taken under a UN umbrella, especially as a Chapter VII operation appeared to be contemplated. The TOR, objectives, and mandate of any intervention force needed to be discussed and agreed in the UNSC. Countries should not go it alone.
- We asked about the option of speeding-up the deployment of the additional UNAMIR troops, as well as the possible German contribution. Timmermann agreed that the French were using the slow deployment of UNAMIR as one of the main reasons for their initiative. However, he did not wish to be drawn on whether a faster deployment was possible. On a possible German contribution to UNAMIR, there was still talk of the offer to provide relief flights for the civilian population, "circumstances permitting". But in reality it was very uncertain whether this would come off. The issue had caused considerable disagreement within the Federal Government. The environment was just too insecure and domestic political considerations too great for a contribution at this time. There was, of course, no question of German participation in the proposed French intervention.

Comment

5 While Germany was cautious, we were told that at the end of the day, they would not oppose the French initiative and would support an agreed UNSC resolution which sought to improve the situation in Rwanda. We assess that bilateral political considerations are a major influencing factor. Timmermann thought that the initative arose because of enormous domestic political pressure in France to take concrete action to assist the humanitarian situation in Rwanda and that this was what was driving the French. This domestic pressure is likely to lead France to exerting pressure on its international partners.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your / le:

Our file:

115/23/37

17:26 (5620)			700/UNS/00000/00000	\$360.98
FROM:	WELLINGT	ON	C24728/WN1	20-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK		WGTN UNSC	Priority
cc:	PARIS BRUSSELS ROME MOSCOW BEIJING CANBERRA HARARE DEFENCE		LONDON MADRID GENEVA WASHINGTON SANTIAGO OTTAWA BONN	Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Routine
MFAT		(UNC, MEA, ISA	C, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS,	DDI)	

Subject

U52172: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Thanks your C04641

We remain cautious about France's proposal for an intervention force and hope it will not take precipitate action in the Council.

- 2 As posts will see from the following we have a number of questions that need clarifying before we would be able to consult Minister about a position to take in the Council.
- 3 New Zealand's immediate objectives in regard to Rwanda are:
- to see a stop to the fighting and killing;
- to see arrangements in place to protect and look after threatened and displaced populations and provide security for relief operations.

In looking to achieve these objectives, we want so far as possible to avoid prejudiceing prospects for a sustainable political settlement, within the broad framework of the Arusha Accords.

4 Regarding the first objective, the talks sponsored by UNAMIR Commander Dallaire have not so far succeeded. An intervention force holds out that prospect.

- Regarding the second objective, we have supported the early deployment of an expanded UNAMIR. Our concern is that an intervention force might cut across or complicate the task of an expanded UNAMIR. As New York put it in informals (C04641, para 14), how would an intervention force fit in with UNAMIR or impact on UNAMIR's future ability to operate in Rwanda?
- The RPF attitude is a major consideration. France cannot expect to be perceived as a disinterested party. The signs we have seen to date of the RPF position are not encouraging. If the RPF regards a French-backed intervention force as hostile, the prospect is only more fighting. By all accounts the RPF is a well-armed, disciplined force. The French could face an imbroglio.
- 7 RPF hostility could also lead it to reject UN involvement, deny access to Kigali airport and refuse to cooperate with an expanded UNAMIR. This would jeopardise the second objective outlined above.
- 8 France has said it will proceed with an intervention force if;
- there is no ceasefire;
- it has WEU and African support;
- it has UN endorsement.
- 9 With regard to the first of these conditions, it would be helpful to get an up-to-date assessment of the situation on the ground. What are RPF military objectives and how close are they to achieving them? After the capture of Gitarama it was confidently asserted that the RPF were about to chase the last of the Government forces from Kigali and positions from which they could threaten the airport. Yet latest media reports suggest heavy fighting around the capital still exists, with UNAMIR caught in the middle suffering casualties. How does Dallaire assess the situation and the prospect of the ceasefire talks he has been leading? Will France's initiative put pressure on to reach an agreement? Is this its purpose?
- It seems France is not finding it easy to line up credible WEU and African support. We have seen reports that Belgium, UK and Italy have all said no to troops, although noises have been made about logistical support. Spain seems cautious. We understand the WEU is to meet again Tuesday 21 June to further consider France's proposal. Except for Senegal and Zaire, the Africans seem cautious. New York reports a negative Nigerian view, but we note a Reuters report that France is to send a special envoy to African capitals, starting with Lagos, to explain its objectives. African views as they develop will bear on our own considerations.

- As to UN endorsement, the French clearly have Boutros-Ghali's backing. If Sec-Gen is to write to Council urging intervention, we will need to see extent to which he addresses this in relation to UNAMIR and its role. Are the reservations of Council members, including the other permanent members, likely to jell into any disposition to oppose or abstain on the sort of UNITAF-inspired resolution the French have circulated? No-one will want to be seen as opposing a measure aimed at stopping genocide. US and Russia may see useful precedent in humanitarian intervention in terms of their inerests in, eg. Haiti and CIS.
- France has also said an intervention force is necessary because the expanded UNAMIR will not be properly up and running for another 4-6 weeks. Yet the Secretariat says Ghana's forces are ready to go and the US airlift of APCs is imminent. Is the deployment of substantial part of an expanded UNAMIR in fact imminent? Will France's moves in any way accelerate deployment? And if so, would early deployment scotch the French initiative? Is the notion of using UNOSOM forces (probably Pakistan?) still in play? Our C24677 noted reservations we have about redeployment of UNOSOM.
- 13 It would be a concern if the French initiative encouraged the interim government and RGF to prolong the fighting, with the calculation that to do so might increase the prospect of French intervention.
- We should be interested in posts'reporting on the questions we have raised. This will help us determine a position before the next discussion in informals. The US reaction will be significant in determining the Council's response, if it comes to that. Washington's readout, especially following reported Juppe/Christopher telecon would be appreciated.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your fire: 115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

20:45	(5636)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$787.78
FROM:	NEW YORI	К	C04649/NYK	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING PARIS CANBERRA		WGTN UNSC OTTAWA	Immediate Immediate Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS MOSCOW LONDON DEFENCE TOKYO	3	BONN GENEVA HARARE MADRID SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, LGL, I	SAC,HRU,EUR,DP3,DSP1,EAB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA,OPS,DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Discussion in Council today suggests French draft resolution lacks sufficient support for adoption
- US, Russia and UK indicate support
- Nigeria and China come out with strong reservations in addition to New Zealand and Brazil
- Sec Gen writes to Council inviting consideration of French proposal
- Boutros-Ghali tells us in a private meeting that in his view intervention by a major power, on whatever basis, is worth the risks and more important than UNAMIR
- RPF continue to oppose French force
- Secretariat decides that French initiative has already significantly increased risk to UNAMIR and Francophone troops are to be pulled out immediately

Action

For information and instructions please

Report

- At Council informals today, French draft resolution which would mandate French led operation in Rwanda was circulated. Only change to the text you have is that new text (op 4) now contains a time period for deployment of the force which would be "limited to the transitional period preceding the arrival, at the latest around the middle of August, of reinforced UNAMIR."
- Merimee introduced text of resolution giving 3 reasons why it was necessary for the force to have a Chapter VII mandate. First, the operation would entail a "great deal of risk" and the force needed to have a "free hand", secondly, it was important to maintain a distinction between it and UNAMIR, and lastly Chapter VII would allow them to go in with no agreement of the parties, not as a peacekeeping mission but to "save lives">
- He emphasised that France did not intend to remain longer than it would be needed until UNAMIR could carry out its mandate. An officer of the General Staff from Paris had been talking to the secretariat over the weekend about coordination and as to how to "get in UNAMIR's way as little as possible". France was continuing its contacts with the RPF in Kigali and wished to emphasise its political neutrality. The objective for France was for the resolution to go into blue tonight for adoption tomorrow.
- 4 P4, Spain and Czech spoke in support of the initiative. Spain introduced a raft of minor drafting changes to the text but no-one else was ready to discuss the text.
- 5 US supported the French proposal to bridge the gap till the expanded UNAMIR could arrive. They reiterated that the force must be multilateral, and welcomed Senegal's intention to participate. The US said it was accelerating the deployment of US equipment and announced a willingness to provide logistic support as well. Interestingly they noted that the French force "must not intervene in the fighting or support the government or its forces."
- As expected UK Mission lost the battle and was instructed for bilateral reasons to support the French proposal but indicated that they had queries relating to the period when there would be 2 Council mandated operations in Rwanda, one acting under Chapter VII and the other under Chapter VI with the forces having different rules of engagement. They essentially wished to consider "at the outset" how this operation would not lead to difficulties for UNAMIR.
- Russia was also supportive with something of a condition to the effect that the force must have "an extremely clear mandate, be limited in time, and fulfill the other criteria of regular PKOs to the effect that regular reports are received by the Council, and significantly, that the assistance of the parties was a "sine qua non" to the

operation.

- 8 Czech and Djibouti were very supportive, Djibouti proposing that the text be amended to laud the French proposal (ie add "Noting with keen appreciation" in PP E). Czech did also note that it would be useful to have the agreement of the parties to the conflict.
- 9 NAM has yet to meet to coordinate its position and would be doing this afternoon. Despite this Nigeria noted that the French proposal involved a "number of difficulties". Nigeria said it would prefer the Sec Gen to put additional pressure on governments which had indicated that they may be in a position to contribute to an expanded UNAMIR. They also had doubts about UNAMIR operating in parallel with another force.
- 10 Argentina is awaiting instructions but emphasised the need for the Council to double its efforts to enable UNAMIR to deploy as soon as possible in order to carry out the mandate in res 925. Brazil indicated that it was also awaiting instructions and shared some of the fundamental concerns. They referred to their traditional position of being cautious in giving blessing to multinational forces.
- 11 China indicated that the view of the NAM and Africans would be important for them. They referred to their main objectives as being to deploy an expanded UNAMIR as soon as possible and to for the ultimate political solution to depend not on military means but through the Arusha Peace Agreement process. Their preliminary comments were that they believed the lessons of Somalia needed to be taken account of, if action is to be taken a clear mandate and time limit is required, that it is "very necessary" to secure the agreement of the parties, and that China had a traditional position on Chapter VII operations although it might be possible to tailor the reference to Chapter VII in the resolution to tie it to some very specific intentions on the part of France.
- 12 For our part, we recalled that we were among those in early May who had proposed a Chapter VII mandate for the expanded UNAMIR and had been disappointed that this was not possible at the time. If it were appropriate to use force, we emphasised our preference that this be used by the UN not by states who would be given the protection of Chapter VII when UNAMIR is not. We noted that there was a substantive need to discuss the proposal and consider the risks of going down this track instead of putting the effort into expanding UNAMIR. We said we did not want petrol to be thrown on the fire by mistake.
- 13 We also pointed to the illogicality of the claim that UNAMIR cannot be deployed immediately. Senegal had indicated both a readiness to participate with France but also with UNAMIR. We noted we had not seen any concept of operations and that in our opinion it would be preferable for the force to be coordinated by the UN, ie for the effort and logistics

to go into an expanded UNAMIR.

Security Situation

14 Secretariat (Anabe) tells us that already the French proposal is creating severe difficulties for UNAMIR. Francophone personnel are being targetted in Kilgali and given the potential risks, the secretariat have decided to withdraw all Francophone personnel from UNAMIR immediately. Privately, Anabe, was in complete agreement with our intervention in the Council.

Next Step

15 The French request for the resolution to be put in blue was put aside by the President in the face of the reservations raised. There will be further consultations tomorrow.

Meeting with Secretary General

16 In a private meeting with Boutros-Ghali (which we had requested several weeks earlier on another issue) he indicated that in his view the French initiative offered the opportunity - which he had been striving for for months - to get a great power actively involved on the ground. That would make the difference and it was worth any risk because in the long run (he implied France would be there for at least a year) France would be able to put an end to the killings and also to stabilise the situation in Burundi.

Comment

- 17 The SecGen's analysis is quite staggering. Indeed his senior advisers who were present were constantly trying to qualify his remarks. He seemed quite unconcerned by the fact that exactly the same gungho approach on Somalia, including his willingness to accommodate the US at all costs in the early stage, lead the UN into a serious American generated disaster. We can see history repeating itself. And in this case, unlike Somalia where the US intervened with a credibly neutral humanitarian position, in Rwanda France carries heavy political baggage.
- 18 We find it hard to judge the situation will play itself out in the Council. The French Mission tell us that their public reason for wanting to go it alone is the need for Chapter VII authority for the use of force. But they acknowledge our argument that this could easily be given to UNAMIR. They say the real reason is a political desire in France to act decisively somewhere in a military operation under their own flag.
- 19 Given the political commitment which they have put in to this point we have to assume that France will push very hard and that the other countries with reservations will be

subjected to the same sort of misleading lobbying that Paris has already reported.

- 20 We have seen nothing that persuades us that the reservations that you have and which New Zealand has expressed are not wellfounded. Indeed they are widely felt. Many like the Canadians and Australians strongly agree.
- 21 You will appreciate that we are reluctant to suggest proposals relating to the text. That would imply acceptance of the principle. We still think it is a bad initiative and that we should continue to press France to go under the UNAMIR umbrella. But at the end of the day if it becomes clear that France has won support of the Council and you judged the risks of supporting the resolution were less than the risks of continuing to reserve our position we would suggest four areas which might be our minimum requirements for changes in the text:
- a a defined time limit;
- b a requirement for timely reports;
- c a proviso in the operative paragraphs that would ensure that the operation remains neutral and does not become a buffer or interposition force;
- d acceptance that UNAMIR can have no lesser authority than this coalition and should therefore also be under Chapter VII.
- 22 Text of SecGen's letter and most recent communique from RPF follow by fax.



115/23/37

NYPM File: 381

New Zealand Mission to the United Nations New York

Telephone: (212) 826-1960	Fax: (212) 758-0827
Date: 20 Jul 1994	Page 1 of 15
WGTN UNSC	2819 PRECEDENCE: IMMEdiate
LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC)	GL, 18AC, Heu, EUR, 093, 0001, EAR) &
SUBJECT: SELLICIA	OUNGL: EWAMOA
Our IPT refers.	
Logy of Secgers	letter and lett gren
releases follow	

At Coms, please pan-P/S MPA Defence Hangof X MAA, Ox, MI) Defence MOD



19 June 1994

Dear Mr. President,

Since the breakdown of the peace process in Rwanda in the wake of the tragic events of 6 April 1994, I have reported to the Security Council on several occasions, repeatedly stressing the need for an urgent and co-ordinated response by the international community to the genocide which has engulfed that country.

The Security Council initially decided, by resolution 912 (1994) adopted on 21 April, to adjust the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and to reduce its strength to 270 all ranks. However, in my letter of 29 April to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/518), I pointed out that the situation had deteriorated to the point where it had become necessary to consider what further action the Council could take, or authorize member states to take, in order to contribute to the restoration of law and order, to end the wanton violence and massacres of defenceless civilians and to promote a ceasefire.

On the basis of my report of 13 May (S/1994/565), the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994) on 17 May, authorizing the expansion of the force level of UNAMIR up to 5,500 troops and expanding its mandate to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk as well as to provide security and support for humanitarian relief operations. The Council requested me, as a first phase, to immediately bring up to full strength the mechanized infantry battalion already in Rwanda, and further requested me to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment.

On the basis of a further report which I submitted to the Security Council on 31 May (S/1994/640), following the visit of a special mission from Headquarters to Rwanda, the Council adopted resolution 925 (1994) on 8 June, endorsing my proposals for the simultaneous deployment of the first and second phases of the expanded operation, and requested me to continue urgent preparations for the deployment of the third phase. As of 18 June, UNAMIR

His Excellency Mr. Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby President of the Security Council New York

3

consists of a total force of 503 all ranks (354 troops, 25 military staff personnel and 124 military observers) under the command of Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire. Two Canadian C-130 aircraft are also supporting the mission. I must again reiterate my admiration for the dedication and courage of all UNAMIR personnel, despite serious casualties.

In anticipation of the expansion of the mandate of UNAMIR, I had written, on 30 April, to a number of Heads of State in Africa to encourage them to provide troops, and to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), asking him to support my requests. I pursued my efforts through numerous contacts with Heads of State and Governments during my visit to South Africa in early May, and with African leaders at the OAU Summit conference in Tunis earlier this month. At the same time, the Secretariat had already commenced efforts to secure the equipment and troops required by UNAMIR for the implementation of phases one and two. Accordingly, over 50 potential contributing countries were approached.

To date, the United Nations has received offers for the following:

- Ethiopia: motorized infantry battalion (fully

equipped);

Ghana: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);

Senegal: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that it be

fully equipped);

- Zambia: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);

- Zimbabwe: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Congo: infantry company (on the condition that it be fully equipped);

 Malawi: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);

- Mali: infantry company (on the condition that its

equipment requirements are met);

- Nigeria: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Italy: 1 aircraft (most probably C-130, not to fly into Rwandese air space);

- Netherlands: 1 Fokker 27 alreraft inct to Rwandese air space);
- United Kingdom: 50 trucks for infantry ar - United States: 50 armoured personnel darr
 - .APCs).
- France, on a bilateral basis, has offered million Franch Francs to Senegal to cover equipment requirements of 200 men.

Some countries have indicated an interest, not yet made commitments, to provide the following

- Australia: 1 medical company;
- Canada: a communication company;
- Italy: 20 water/fuel trucks;
- Romania: a surgical team;
- Russian Federation: 8 transport helicopte: number of heavy transport cargo aircraft.

On the basis of the offers for troops and ec received so far, and of the discussions between ; Secretariat and the Governments concerned, the Ur Nations expects, in the best of circumstances to the deployment of the first phase of UNAMIR in the week of July 1994. This envisages bringing the battalion presently in Kigali to its full strengwhich confirmation of the offer from Ghana is exp Meanwhile, 10 APCs, which are being transferred : United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), already started arriving in Rwanda as part of the deployment of the first phase. In addition, the States will start airlifting 50 APCs to Entebbe on 24 June.

The deployment schedule for the second phase expanded operation, which was intended to be syn with phase one, cannot be determined at this time confirmations of the resources required, namely infantry battalions, a communications unit and c: logistic support, have not yet been received from Governments concerned. Moreover, the Secretaria still not been able to secure offers for medical support units. In the absence of firm commitmen: military logistic units, it will be necessary to civilian contractor on an emergency basis. Such contractual alternative already exists within UNC it would be extended to UNAMIR until the necessa: logistic support from Governments can be secured

In the conditions prevailing in Rwanda, it is clear that additional troops can only be deployed once the necessary equipment to support them is on the ground, and after the troops have been trained to use the equipment with which they may not be familiar. It also is noteworthy that, although Governments are expected to offer fully trained and equipped units for UN operations, almost all offers received from Governments are conditional in one way or another. The difficulties that the Secretariat has faced in securing resources for UNAMIR's expanded mandate show that there is no guarantee that the stipulated conditions can be met. Even if they can, protracted negotiations will be required, not only with the Governments making these conditional offers, but also with other Member States. In this context, it should be noted that none of those Governments possessing the capacity to provide fully trained and equipped military units have offered so far to do so for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions to deal with the situation in Rwanda.

In light of the above, it is evident that, with the failure of member states to promptly provide the resources necessary for the implementation of its expanded mandate, UNAMIR may not be in a position, for about three months, to fully undertake the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions. Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda has continued to deteriorate and the killings of innocent civilians has not been stopped. Furthermore, the parties have not yet come to an agreement for a ceasefire in the talks under UNAMIR auspices, nor have they respected the ceasefire to which they agreed at the recent OAU summit in Tunis.

In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of 29 April (S/1994/518) and a precedent exists for it in the United States-led operation (UNITAF) which was deployed in Somalia in December 1992. If the Security Council decides to authorize an operation on these lines, I consider it would be necessary for it to request the Governments concerned to commit themselves to maintain their troops in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the

necessary strength to take over from the multinational force and the latter has created conditions in which a peace-keeping force operating under Chapter VI of the Charter would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. This would imply that the multinational force should remain deployed for a minimum period of three months.


The activities of the multinational force and UNAMIR would be closely coordinated by the respective force commanders, who would take into account the fact that the former would be operating under Chapter VII of the Charter. UNAMIR would continue to fulfil, to the extent permitted by the resources made available to it, its mandated responsibilities in and around Kigali and at the airport. It would also continue to assist in providing support for the delivery of humanitarian aid to accessible areas. During this period, UNAMIR would operate on the assumption that the parties will cooperate with the activities of the mission. However, in the event that the safety and security of UNAMIR personnel were to be jeopardized, I would immediately reassess the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

It is self-evident that the efforts by the international community to restore stability in Rwanda, both by halting the genocide and by securing a ceasefire, are directed to a resumption of the Arusha peace process. In this connection, as the Council is aware, my new Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, plans to take up his assignment shortly.


I should be grateful, Mr. President, if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Bonker Souther Chief.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



مرسند د مث الد مر وال المرد . عد

H.E Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby President, United Nations Security Council, New York



20 June 1994

Your Excellency,

RE: FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN RWANDA

The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) is dismayed by the decision of France to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. The purpose of the proposed military is allegedly to stop the massacres.

Your Excellency, many countries across the world have responded favourably to the request of the U.N. Secretary General for men and materials for a successful implementation of resolutions 918 and 925. To date, more than 7,000 soldiers have been offered, mostly by African countries. It is reported that some countries like Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have their own equipment. Others such as Ghana have agreed to provide troops so long as the necessary equipment is available. Some of the equipment, like the Armoured Personnel Carriers the United States of America promised to supply, is already in the region. With troop offers far exceeding what we consider adequate, namely a 2500-man mission, the U.N. mission in Rwanda should have taken off by now.

The prospect of a permanent member of the Security Council supporting and then ignoring Security Council resolutions to launch a unilateral operation in a country in which that permanent member has had a partisan and controversial involvment raises very strong questions about the motives of the mission. It does also raise the question as to what value members of the Council attach to its decisions. The direct responsibility which French governments, present and past, bear for the tragic situation in Rwanda is a matter which should be treated with the seriousness it deserves:

- i) France is a long-term supporter of the governments which organized and supervised the acts of genocide in Rwanda.
- to the criminal regime (see the 1994 Arms Project Report of Human Rights Watch).
- of the regular army and the militia who are at the forefront of the ongoing atrocities.
- Rwandese government forces for three years to prop up the districtal resume of the late President

Habyarimana. Reputable human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Africa watch have documented how the Rwandese government forces killed thousands of innocent civilians during the three-year period (October 1990 to December 1993) when the French were still openly fighting on the government side. The French troops never intervened to stop those massacres, and the French government never condemned them.

- v) We have good reason to believe that there are even now French troops who are caught up in the beseiged government army camps in Kigali. The proposed French operation, therefore, could indeed partly be a rescue mission, among other things. This may explain why President Mitterand finds the intervention so urgent that he had to declare that his operation cannot wait for Security Council authorization.
- vi) France is one of the few countries which have recognized the rump government, hosted some of its officials who are very notorious for their role in inciting atrocities through the media, and has granted asylum to the masterminds of the genocide in Rwanda who are commonly known as "Escadron de la Mort".
- vii) French political and diplomatic support for the regime of the late President Habyarimana encouraged intransigence on the part of the regime during the Arusha peace talks and stalled the process of implementing the Arusha Agreement.
- viii) It has recently been reported and repeated by very credible newspapers in Bolgium that President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by French Military officers acting on behalf of extremists who wanted to derail the peace process.

In view of this very detrimental role of france in Rwanda in the recent past, her apparent good faith should not be taken for granted when the issue of the proposed French intervention is up for discussion. The intervention is, in our view, intended to assist the authors of the genocide in Rwanda to prosecute the war, to protect them from being brought to justice for their war crimes, and to preserve a role for them in the futura politics of the country.

The RPF condemns the proposed French intervention unreservedly. We have, for the duration of the war in Rwanda, considered France a party to the conflict in every respect. We equally consider the return of France to Rwanda a hostile act of war against the Rwandan people, and the RPF will fight the proposed intervention by any means at its disposal for as long as is necessary.

-3-

In the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the parties, the RPF intends to proceed with its operations to rescue the Rwandese at risk, to restore law and order in the country, and to bring the criminals to justice regardless of the presence of the French troops in Rwanda.

we are of the firm opinion that the solution to the crisis in Rwanda must be found in the context of resolution 918 and 925/1994 of the U.N. Security Council, and we reaffirm our strong support for the U.N. humanitarian mission mandated by those resolutions. We request members of the Security Council to prevail upon France to illustrate its good faith in this matter by putting the resources which it plans to use in its unilateral mission at the disposal of the U.N. force.

Your Excellecy, the RPF wishes to draw your attention and that of the Council to the very grave consequences which the intervention of France will give rise to. French intervention will have a destabilizing effect in the region. In Rwanda itself, it will bring to an end the ongoing ceasefire negotiations and it will lead to an escalation of the conflict as Rwandese government forces see the prospect of military backing by France. The RPI itself will be compelled to re-evaluate its commitment to the U.N. mission proposed by the Security Council.

Finally, the return of French troops to Rwanda may have severe repercursions on the continued relevance of the Arusha Peace ignerment as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front urges Your Ecxellency and, through you, all Security Council members, to recall and uphold resolutions 918 and 925 which authorised the Secretary General to expand UNAMIR and give it a humanitarian mission, including the protection of people threatened by genocode. These resolutions have received wide support both within the international community and in Rwanda. The Security Council must not allow France to usurp the role of the U.N. while furthering its own interests in Rwanda. It is indeed unfortunate, but nevertheless incumbent upon the Rwandese Patriotic Front, to point out that if the United Nations and all interested parties had heeded our warnings, Rwanda would have been saved the worst tragedy in its history. The task at hand is for all of us to avert any further catastrophe in Rwanda, which an intervention by France at this stage would inevitably bring about.

Patrick K, Mazimhaka

Vice-Chairman RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

Member Security Council (all).

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Washington, June 18, 1994

PRESS RELEASE

PRENCH MILITARY BACKING FOR THE PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPf) is dismayed by the decision of france to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. The purpose of the proposed military intervention is allegedly to stop the massacres.

The United Nations Security Council by resolutions 918 and 925/1994 devised a plan to send a humanitarian U.N. force of 5,500 soldiers for exactly the same purpose. Many countries across the world have responded favourably to the request of the U.N. Secretary General. Todate, more than 7,000 soldiers have been offered. It is reported that some countries like Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have their own equipment. Others such as Ghana have agreed to provide troops so long as the necessary equipment is available. Some of the equipment like the APC's promised by the USA is already in the region. The U.N. mission appeared well on the way to taking off.

The prospect of a permanent member of the Security Council by passing the mechanisms determined by the Security Council to launch a unilateral operation in a country in which that permanent member of the Security Council has historically had partisan and contraversial involvement raises very strong questions about the motives of the mission.

The direct responsibility which French governments, present and past, bear for the tragic situation in Rwanda is a matter which should not be treated lightly:

- France is a long time supporter of the clique that organised and supervised the execution of genocide in Rwanda.
- ii) France has been and remain the principal arms supplier to the regime as indicated in the 1994 Arms Project Report of Human Rights Watch.
- iii) France trained the Presidential guards, much of the regular army and the militia who are at the fore front of the ongoing atrocities.
- rench troops fought side by side with the discredited Rwandese government forces to prop up the dictatorial regime of the late President Habyarimana for 3 years. Reputable human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Africa Watch have documented how the Rwandese government forces killed thousands of innocente civilians during the period (October 1990 to December 1993) when the French were

still openly fighting on the government side. The French troops never intervened to stop those massacres and the French government never condemned them.

- We have credible intelligence that there are even now French troops who are caught up in the besieged government army camps in Kigali. The French operation may partly be a rescue mission. This may explain why President Mitterrand has announced today that their operation can not wait for the U.N. Security Council authorization.
- vi) France is one of the very few countries which have recognized the rump government, hosted some of its officials who are very notorious for their role in inciting atrocities through the media and has granted asylum to the masterminds of the genocide in Rwanda who are commonly known as "Escadron de la Mort".
- vii) French political and diplomatic support for the regime of the late President Habyarimana encouraged intransigence on the part of the regime during the Arusha peace talks and stalled the process of implementing the Arusha Agreement.
- viii) It has recently been reported and repeated by very credible newspapers in Belgium that President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by French Military officers acting on behalf of extremists who wanted to derail the peace process.

In view of the very detrimental role of France in Rwanda in the recent past, her good faith should not be taken for granted when the issue of the proposed French intervention is up for discussion. The intervention is in our view intended to assist the authors of genocide to prosecute the war, to protect them from being brought to justice for their war crimes and preserve a role for them in the future politics of the country.

The RPF condemns the proposed Prench intervention unreservedly. We have for the duration of the war in Rwands considered France a party to the conflict in every respect. We equally consider the return of Prance to Rwands a hostile act of war against her people. The RPF will fight the proposed intervention by any means at its disposel and for as long as is necessary.

In the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the parties the RPF intends to proceeds with its operations to rescue Rwandese at risk, restore law and order and to bring the killers to justice regardless of the presence of the French troops in Rwanda.

We are of the firm opinion that the solution to the crisis in Rwanda must be found in the context of resolutions 918 and 925/1994 of the U.N. Security Council and we reaffirm our strong support for the U.N. humanitarian mission mandated by those resolutions. We request members of the Security Council to prevail upon France to illustrate its good faith in this matter by putting the resources

which it plans to use in its unilateral mission at the disposal of U.N. force.

The RPF wishes to draw the attention of the International Community to the very grave consequences which the intervention of France will give rise to. French intervention will have a destabilizing effect in the region. In Rwanda itself, it will bring to an end the ongoing ceasefire negotiations and lead to an escalation of the conflict as Rwandese government forces see the prospect of military backing by France. The RPF itself will be compelled to reevaluate its commitment to the U.N. mission proposed by the security council. Finally, the return of French troops to Rwanda may have severe repercursions on the continued relevance of the Arusha peace agreement as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda.

For the Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

Syanima

Mr. Gerald Cahima Special Envoy to the United Nations and the USA.

Contact: Tel: 301-588-8566 or 703-553-0452

Fax: 703-553-0458

RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Bx1, 18.06.1994

13

APPEL A LA MOBILIBATION GENERALE.

A tous les Rwandais de l'intérieur du pays et de la disspora, Maintenant vous connaisses la part de la Prance dans l'élaboration du plan de génocide dont vos parents, frères et seeurs ont été victimes.

Aujourd'hui la France, parachevant son plan, vole au secours des bourreaux aux abois. Elle réussira, comme dans le passé à tromper l'opinion internationale et avoir son aval, voire même son souties.

Aux pays africains qui veulent suivre la France dans l'achèvement de son sinistre plan nous disons: " Soyez Prudents ". Peut-être que vous avos des dettes à régler à la Prance mais trouvez d'autres moyens que le sang des Rwandais.

A toute la Communauté Internationale, ne vous rendes pas complice d'un projet auquel vous n'aves pas été associé.

Rwandelses et Ewendeis,

Ne vous laisses pas intimider par des déclarations fallaciouses des diplomates français menaçant de répondre par la force à vos ectes de légitimes défense.

Le sang qui coule dans les veines de leurs soldats est aussi rouge que le vôtre.

Mobilisez-vous pour tenir en échec le plan de trahison française. Après tout vous êtez Rwandais, vous devez vivre ou mourir au Rwanda et pas ailleurs. Vous en avez le temps, les moyens et la détormination.

Restes vigilants et penses toujours à 500.000 Rwandais victimes du machiavélisme français, de ses armes et de ses amis bourreaux. Ils out été sacrifiés pour que vous retrouvies votre dignité.

DE Jacques BIHOZAGARA. Membre du Bureau Politique

3. A venues de l'Observatore, 92. 1160 S reveals, Belgium. Tol: 32/2-974-5892 Fex: 21-2-374-4636



RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Le 17.06.94

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

LES VICTIMES DU DOUBLE-JEU FRANCAIS.

Parmi les plus grandes victimes du double-jeu français, il y a lieu de citer : les Mations Unies, le FPR, certains pays de l'Union Européenne et la plupart des pays francophones d'Afrique.

Les Nations-Unies d'abord car elles sont entrain de dérailler suite au marathon français destiné à faire avaliser ses initiatives d'intervention au Rwanda. Comment peut-on expliquer que l'ONU, après autant d'énergie dépensée pour l'application de la Résolution 918 s'écarte aussi rapidement de sa piste au profit d'une initiative française issue d'un cadre inhabituel?

En tout cas le PPR se réserve le droit de revoir ses engagements vis-à-vis des Nations Unies, au cas où une quelconque force serait

Le PPR n'a pas été épaigné par le double-jeu de la France parce qu'il a suffi d'un entretien informel avec Monsieur Bernard MOUCHNER et Monsieur Gérald LAROME, Directeur de la Cellule d'Urgence au Ministère Français des Affaires étrangères pour que la France parle de l'ouverture au Nord d'un COULOIR HUMANITAIRE (GATUNA-BYUMBA-KIGALI). Cet axe qui sert depuis plus d'une année de Couloir de lavitaillement des populations déplacées est utilisé indistinctement par toutes les organisations d'assistance humanitaire et son fonctionnement ne date pas d'hier.

Quant à certains pays de l'Union Européenne et de l'Afrique francophone, le PPR espère qu'ils sont assez mûrs pour ne pas se laissez entraînés par la france qui, visiblement a des comptes è rendre avec des Rwandais.

La clarification apportée hier par Monsieur Alain Jupé ne change rien ni aux intentions de la Prance ni à la position du PPR vis-à-vis d'elle. Ces enfants, femmes, hommes, orphelins, invalides auxquels la France vole au secours sont nos frères et soeurs. Ils ont été mutilée par les armes que la France a fournies et continue de fournir. Ils sont victimes d'un plan de GENOCIDE que la France connaissait apparemment (voir le Soir du 17.06.94)

L Arares do l'Observada, 88. 1160 Brussis, Balebon 761: 32-2-574-5862, Pp. 12-2-374-4696

Soyez sûrs qu'ils sont avec nous pour dire non à toute forme de participation, si humanitaire soit-elle de la France au Rwanda.

Que les pays qui sont aujourd'hui mobilisés par la France pour intervenir au Rwanda sachent avec qui et pourquoi ils s'engagent car des bruits courent déjà comme quoi il y aurait des soldats français traqués dans des camps militaires de RIGALI.

Dr. Jacques BiHOZAGARA. Membre du Bureau Politique.

HILLIAM

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your ..le:

115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:14	(5631)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$355.81
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ	C04643/NYK	20 - Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	ON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	i	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, LGL, I	SAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	aB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: UNOMUR

Summary

- Council renews UNOMUR's mandate for final 3 months (till 21 September)
- Resolution amended to spell out operational phase-down
- At France's initiative, possibility of having another look at extending UNOMUR's mandate is left open by requesting further Sec Gen report by 21 September

Action

For information

Report

- 2 Council adopted resolution 928 (15-0-0) today renewing UNOMUR's mandate for a final 3 month period Significant changes from draft resolution included deletion of both pp5 (reference to no cross-border movement of arms) and pp7 (reference to UNOMUR continuing until there is a cease-fire), to Op2 as you proposed and to op3 so as to delete the specific date on which UNOMUR would be terminated and leave open a further report before final termination.
- 3 As regards pp5, US proposal for its deletion was accepted. While it is probably true that UNOMUR has not

Mrs Medominte

detected any cross border flow of arms there was a degree of scepticism amongst Council members that there has been no flow at all from Uganda in recent months. US said that they believed arms had crossed the border and the para was therefore factually wrong.

- 4 Proposal to delete pp7 was based on the slightly conflicting nature of the Sec Gen's recommendation (which UK drew attention to) that UNOMUR continue in place until there is a cease-fire but be closed down on 21 September (ie regardless of whether there is in fact a cease-fire by then). This aspect of the report has therefore been dropped.
- 5 Most significant proposal was from France which argued that the situation on the ground may have changed by September in which case it might be appropriate to revisit the question of UNOMUR's termination. In those circumstances they proposed that the Sec Gen be asked to provide a further report before the (final) mandate expires on 21 September.
- 6 New pp was agreed reaffirming need for observance of general arms embargo.
- 7 We secured amendment to op2 as per your C24739 to spell out the operational phase-down rather than to merely refer to para 14 of Sec Gen's report.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your ('.e: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

19:14 (5621)			700/MEA/00000/00000	\$185.12
FROM:	WELLING	FON	C24739/WN1	20-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	ζ		Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO WGTN UNS		BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, LG	L, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	1 B)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

U52184: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: UNOMUR

Your C04637 and fax 2810.

- 2 It is encouraging that no movement of arms or armed personnel from Uganda into Rwanda has been detected by UNOMUR during the reporting period. The Council has no reason not to accept this conclusion on the face of it (although it seems to defy logic that the RPF has not been resupplied from somewhere during the last two months).
- 3 We can go along with the Sec-Gen's recommendation that, predicated on the establishment of an effective ceasefire, the mandate of UNOMUR be renewed for three months during which it would be reduced in phases leading to a close-down by 21 September. We agree there is an illogicality in continuing to monitor one border and not others.
- 4 We would prefer op 2 to spell out the operational phase-down rather than refer to para 14 of the Sec-Gen's report. This would help put op 3 into proper context. As currently drafted there seems to be an inconsistency between the wording of op 3 and the close-down by 21 September which the Sec-Gen recommends.

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your (le: 115/23/37

....**

Our file: 3/88/1

19:14 (5631)		**************************************	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$355.81
FROM:	NEW YORK	ς	C04643/NYK	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	CON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, LGL, I	SAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	В)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: UNOMUR

Summary

- Council renews UNOMUR's mandate for final 3 months (till 21 September)
- Resolution amended to spell out operational phase-down
- At France's initiative, possibility of having another look at extending UNOMUR's mandate is left open by requesting further Sec Gen report by 21 September

Action

For information

Report

- Council adopted resolution 928 (15-0-0) today renewing UNOMUR's mandate for a final 3 month period Significant changes from draft resolution included deletion of both pp5 (reference to no cross-border movement of arms) and pp7 (reference to UNOMUR continuing until there is a cease-fire), to Op2 as you proposed and to op3 so as to delete the specific date on which UNOMUR would be terminated and leave open a further report before final termination.
- 3 As regards pp5, US proposal for its deletion was accepted. While it is probably true that UNOMUR has not

detected any cross border flow of arms there was a degree of scepticism amongst Council members that there has been no flow at all from Uganda in recent months. US said that they believed arms had crossed the border and the para was therefore factually wrong.

- 4 Proposal to delete pp7 was based on the slightly conflicting nature of the Sec Gen's recommendation (which UK drew attention to) that UNOMUR continue in place until there is a cease-fire but be closed down on 21 September (ie regardless of whether there is in fact a cease-fire by then). This aspect of the report has therefore been dropped.
- 5 Most significant proposal was from France which argued that the situation on the ground may have changed by September in which case it might be appropriate to revisit the question of UNOMUR's termination. In those circumstances they proposed that the Sec Gen be asked to provide a further report before the (final) mandate expires on 21 September.
- 6 New pp was agreed reaffirming need for observance of general arms embargo.
- 7 We secured amendment to op2 as per your C24739 to spell out the operational phase-down rather than to merely refer to para 14 of Sec Gen's report.

ACTION

Watson

Your file:

Our file:

197/1/

TOUL II	·re•	our rire. 197/	
20:11 (47713)	700/PAR/00000/00000	\$648.04
FROM:	PARIS	C01936/PAR	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
cc:	LONDON ROME MOSCOW WASHINGTON CANBERRA HARARE BONN	BRUSSELS MADRID GENEVA BEIJING SANTIAGO OTTAWA DEFENCE	Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, I	SAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS	, DDI)	Willbarg Fore of the Werd
<u>Subject</u> SECURIT	Y COUNCIL: RWANDA		Ricer Hugins 2 Kombo
Your C2	4728.		MoCs
Summary			Tyne Dallon

- France's objective in proposing an intervention force in Rwanda is not to try and stop the fighting but simply to protect those populations under threat. France has no military or political objectives in mind.
- The mandate for the intervention force will be the same as UNAMIR's to protect the civilian populations under threat. The force will work to reassemble those threatened in safe areas under its protection.
- France will not seek confrontation with the RPF. It will keep well away from RPF-controlled areas.
- France claims widespread support for its initiative in the Council and on the part of African countries (including Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya).
- Amongst Council members only New Zealand and perhaps Brazil are thought by France to hold any reservations about the proposal. New Zealand is asked not to express its reservations publicly.

Action

For information.

Report

- 2. We called this afternoon on Lapouge (Deputy Head, UN Section) to go over some of the questions you raised in your reftel. He reitierated that France's objective in proposing an intervention force was solely a humanitarian one to protect those populations threatened by the Hutu militia. France was not going in with the aim of stopping the fighting. It had no political or military agenda. French troops would be no where near the military front. France would not seek confrontation with the RPF but if attacked would of course respond. It did not expect the intervention force would be in Tutsi-controlled areas so the possibility of confrontation with the RPF should be limited. French troops would however be prepared to use force against Hutu militia to prevent further massacres as provided for under the proposed Chapter VII mandate. The intervention force would try to reassemble those threatened into safe areas under its protection.
- 3. Lapouge confirmed that France had made a big effort to convince the RPF of the sincerity of its intentions. The French Ambassador to Rwanda (Marlaud) was in Kampala to talk the RPF. (Tonight's <u>Le Monde</u> reports that Kagamé has refused to meet him.) French representatives had also spoken to the Deputy Prime Minister of the transitional government in Brussels. France had some hope that it would be able to convince the RPF to agree to the deployment of the intervention force. France was not totally pessimistic on this score.

International support

- 4. Lapouge went on to claim wide-spread international support for the proposed intervention force:
 - The UNSG was very positive.
- The US was also very much in favour. Christopher had told Juppé that "not only do I support you but I admire you".
- Russia was not likely to cause a problem because of Georgia. China was also not expected to be difficult.
- There was a "slight reluctance" on the part of the UK but London was after all a very close ally of France and unlikely to stand in the way.
- The only Council members to be at all hestitant were New Zealand and (perhaps) Brazil. In light of the wide-spread support for initiative, France hoped that New Zealand would not make its views known publicly.

- The NAM was very positive. "All the Africans were very much in favour."
- 5. We asked Lapouge what would happen if the proposal failed to receive the support of the Council. In view of the above, Lapouge did not consider this scenario very likely but noted that France was nevertheless determined to move ahead if necessary with the approval of the UNSG and/or by means of an exchange of letters between the UNSG and the UNSC.
- 6. Lapouge acknowledged that for the moment despite this wide-spread support, only Senegal had offered troops. An agreement in principle (for Senegal to provide 200-300 troops according to Le Monde) was signed during Juppé's visit to Dakar over the weekend. Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana were also very positive as well but it was not yet clear whether they would provide any material support. France still expected Belgium and Spain to provide logistical support, the Netherlands and Denmark were also possibilities and the US could also come up with something.

Planning underway

7. Lapouge said that planning was underway to bring the intervention force in through Zaire. Burundi would have be a possibility but Bujumbura had enough problems and "France did not wish to embarass the Burundi Government". Assuming that the DR was voted on today or tomorrow, the french troops would be deployed by the end of the week, early next wekk at the latest. Lapouge gave the impression that the intervention force would remain in the RFG-controlled south-west region. There was no mention of Kigali. (Comment: Juppé has refused to divulge publicly too many details about the force but it is thought that France is considering sending between 1,000-2,000 men. The Elysée and the PM's office announced in a joint communiqué last Saturday that France would send the "necessary means" to save human lives and put an end to the massacres".)

UNAMIR

- 8. Finally, we asked Lapouge why France had chosen to launch its initiative when it did and why it could not work to strengthen UNAMIR instead. He said that Juppé had decided to act last week in response to public pressure in the wake of the massacres of children and bishops the week before. France could not continue to wait forever for UNAMIR to be strengthened. France would have liked to have acted within UNAMIR but its participation had been vetoed by the RPF.
- 8. Lapouge stressed however that France had no intention of remaining any longer in Rwanda than was absolutely necessary. This was why Paris had asked its NY mission to amend the text of the DR to make it clear that the intervention force would leave as soon as the extra UNAMIR

troo! Were in place and, in any event, by mid-August.

Comment

- 10. Lapouge was not entirely at ease during our meeting. The large discrepancy between what he claimed was support for the French initiative both in and out of the Council and New York's reporting (their CO4641) may have explained some of his discomfort. He was clearly trying to sell us a line which he was rather afraid we might not be swallowing.
- 11. The French initiative also holds very high risks. Our impression is that France will now go ahead no matter what. All areas of the government machinery have now given it their support. It is more than ever now a matter of national pride. France's African policy would be in complete disarrary if it does not intervene. But it is hard to see how France can possibly come out of this without a few scratches. Officials are trying to limit the potential damage the amount of time the force will be on the ground and the possiblity of confrontation with the RPF but even so the chances of France coming out of this one with international image enhanced cannot be that great.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

Your ile:

Our file:

ACTION 161/1/1 COPY

17:46 (47717) 700/BON/00000/00000 \$444.72 FROM: BONN 20-Jun-1994 C01519/BON TO: WELLINGTON Priority NEW YORK CC: WGTN UNSC Priority Routine PARIS LONDON Routine BRUSSELS MADRID ROME GENEVA Routine MOSCOW WASHINGTON Routine Routine BEIJING SANTIAGO CANBERRA OTTAWA Routine DEFENCE Routine HARARE

MFAT

(UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

DEFENCE HQNZDF

(DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Willberg Forsyth Ward Rider Hughes Komber McMasser Footer McCormink Rush Type Dallon Watson

Summary

Your U52172 poses the hard questions, most of which cannot as yet be answered until further information on objectives and tasks is provided by the French. The German Foreign Office considers that this is something which France has to deliver on to its partners. They are for this reason cautious towards the initiative and there is no question of German participation. However, at the end of the day and for political reasons, Germany will probably fall in behind the French.

Action

For your information - your C52172 refers.

Report

We spoke to Timmermann, Rwanda desk officer in the German Foreign Office. Germany, like others in the WEU, had "welcomed" the French initiative, just as they welcomed any idea which could assist in improving the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. That being said, they, like others, were cautious.

The major problem was that the overall objectives of the French initiative were unclear. One could not, for example, determine whether this was the right strategy to pressure the

part is to negotiate a ceasefire (if that was France's objective). Neither could one yet assess whether intervention might have the effect of encouraging the RGF to continue fighting. Certainly the declared position of the RPF, as evidenced by their letter to the UN Secretary-General opposing the proposed intervention, could signficantly complicate the position of UNAMIR and affect its future viability. The Foreign Office had no new information on the situation on the ground as they were working on the same media reports that you are.

- 3 Timmermann thought it was now up to the French to provide significantly more details on its initiative, particularly to persuade other countries of its value. During the discussions in the WEU, members had not opposed the initiative, but only Italy had come forward with an offer of assistance. The German Foreign Office considered that the WEU was not the appropriate body to take this action further. Rather any action should be taken under a UN umbrella, especially as a Chapter VII operation appeared to be contemplated. The TOR, objectives, and mandate of any intervention force needed to be discussed and agreed in the UNSC. Countries should not go it alone.
- We asked about the option of speeding-up the deployment of the additional UNAMIR troops, as well as the possible German contribution. Timmermann agreed that the French were using the slow deployment of UNAMIR as one of the main reasons for their initiative. However, he did not wish to be drawn on whether a faster deployment was possible. On a possible German contribution to UNAMIR, there was still talk of the offer to provide relief flights for the civilian population, "circumstances permitting". But in reality it was very uncertain whether this would come off. The issue had caused considerable disagreement within the Federal Government. The environment was just too insecure and domestic political considerations too great for a contribution at this time. There was, of course, no question of German participation in the proposed French intervention.

Comment

5 While Germany was cautious, we were told that at the end of the day, they would not oppose the French initiative and would support an agreed UNSC resolution which sought to improve the situation in Rwanda. We assess that bilateral political considerations are a major influencing factor. Timmermann thought that the initative arose because of enormous domestic political pressure in France to take concrete action to assist the humanitarian situation in Rwanda and that this was what was driving the French. This domestic pressure is likely to lead France to exerting pressure on its international partners.

CONFIDENTIAL.

115/23/37

Your ' le:

Our file: 186/1/1

18:19 (5627)			700/LON/00000/00000	\$302.36
FROM:	LONDON		C04003/LON	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	гои	WGTN UNSC	Priority
cc:	PARIS BRUSSELS BONN MOSCOW TOKYO CANBERRA MADRID SANTIAGO	L	WASHINGTON GENEVA BEIJING DEFENCE HARARE OTTAWA	Priority Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC,	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EA	В)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	-	(DSIA, OPS, DI	DI)	

<u>Subject</u>

U05206: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

A/G

Your U52172, New York's C04641 and our C03998.

Summary

France tells WEU meeting on 17 June that its proposed operation would be WEU coordinated rather than WEU operation as such. Participants at meeting make suitable noises of concern about situation in Rwanda and of sympathy with French good intentions, but little substantial is forthcoming. Matter will be discussed at resumed WEU meeting on 21 June. UK will contribute on logistics side if everyone else does. At discussion in UNSC today, they will be asking a number of questions about the French proposal, including coordination with and impact on UNAMIR. They do not think early expansion of UNAMIR will turn off the French, who are talking about arriving in Rwanda this week. Idea of calling on UNOSOM seems to have gone down the tube.

Action required

For information.

Report

We spoke today with the FCO (McLean, Assistant Head, African Dept (Equatorial)) to get a read out on the 17 June WEU meeting.

WEU meeting

- 2 McLean, reading from a reporting cable, said that it sounded as if France had had the same problems in the WEU as it had in the UNSC. France had told the meeting it could make 2,000 troops available, with 800 of them arriving in the first few days. Their function would be to provide an interim presence until the expanded UNAMIR was in place. McLean said France did not make it clear how this force would fit in with the existing UNAMIR operation on the ground. France had it in mind that it would be the single leader of a multinational force under a WEU label (ie coordinated by the WEU, but not a WEU operation as such).
- The consequent tour de table produced expressions of concern about the situation in Rwanda and recognition of France's good intentions. But little concrete. Italy said it might be able to supply some troops, although not nearly as many as France. Belgium said it would consider its position. Germany commented that "not everyone" would be there. The Netherlands said it might be prepared to provide a field hospital outside Rwanda. It warned, however, that any force deployed would find itself in the position of trying to keep the peace. UK representative commented that the WEU should be careful that it was acting in response to the explicit wishes of the UN. In his summing up, the WEU Chair said that what France proposed was not a WEU operation as such, but a WEU-coordinated operation under UN authority. The goals of this operation, its command and control arrangements etc needed further work. It would be premature to report to the UNSC at this stage. The WEU would meet again to discuss this issue on 21 June after consultations with capitals.
- McLean said Hurd had told Juppe in response to his original approach that the UK would look at providing logistical support if France specified what it needed, although it would not want this to cut across what it was doing with the UN. McLean noted that costs were very tight, and any gesture the UK made would have to be modest. He speculated that Hurd believed France would welcome some modest gesture on the part of a European partner more a demonstration that the UK was supportive of its approach than of significant practical benefit. The UK would wait and see how other WEU countries responded at tomorrow's meeting. If everyone else was making a gesture, the UK would not want to be left out.

<u>UNSC</u>

5 In New York, UK would be posing a number of questions at today's discussions about the French draft resolution: what would the mandate for the French led operation be; how would it coordinate with UNAMIR; what would its impact on UNAMIR be, including for UNAMIR's credibility if the operation was

short-lived but robust; what was the timetable for deploying the African forces pledged to UNAMIR; what would be the funding arrangements for the operation; what were the Secretary-General's views; was the Secretariat working on recommendations for the UNSG to put to the Council? McLean said UK was somewhat puzzled by the reference to a report by the UNSG in the draft resolution (New York's C04641), thinking that a report from the SG may need to be requested by the UNSC. They would also like the term of the French operation to be specified in the draft resolution - it is "too open-ended" at present.

6 McLean said he doubted the early expansion of UNAMIR could take place soon enough to head off the French initiative - they were talking about going in this week. In response to our question, McLean said he thought the idea of using UNOSOM troops had, for practical reasons, "gone down the tube".

Your file:

Our file:

ACTION COPY

Routine

700/BRU/00000/00000 L \$418.56 17:59 (47721) C01766/BRU 20-Jun-1994 FROM: BRUSSELS TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Priority NEW YORK Priority Routine CC: PARIS LONDON Routine ROME MADRID Routine GENEVA MOSCOW Routine BEIJING WASHINGTON Routine HARARE CANBERRA Routine OTTAWA DEFENCE

MFAT

(UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF

(DS1A, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD

(GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

BONN

Your C24728/WN1

- 1. Belgian MFA (Fontaine, West/Central Africa) advise they are meeting their Minister (Claes) this evening to discuss the approach Belgium should adopt in a meeting of Western European Union (WEU) members Tuesday on the French proposal. Our contact was careful to avoid predicting his Minister's decision on this issue (which is highly political for the Belgians see below) Fontaine advised, in confidence, that the main points of MFA advice to Claes are as follows:
- Belgium should indicate a favourable stance in principle to the French initiative.
- Any French-led intervention in Rwanda should have the endorsement of the United Nations, and should have a clear objective, mandate and time frame.
- the action must remain humanitarian in nature
- 2 Fontaine considered Belgium's approach in tomorrow's WEU meeting might well be to seek further details from France on how it would propose to ensure that the above requirements might be met.
- 3 Fontaine did not forsee any Belgian military contribution as at all likely. Belgium is however considering the

1	Forest		(9/2+N _E)
T	VVI : LI	i	_
ľ	Pie 3/	1	_
Ť	Huga in	1	
1	Karasa		
Ī	for the	chica and	
ì	Farm		
ľ	No.C.		
Ì	Rush	1	
-	Type:		
i	Daires		
Ì	Watson	1	
ŀ		- 10	

Wilberg 17

poss Jility of offering logistical support. Belgium has left considerable equipment in and bordering Rwanda following its recent withdrawal from that country. The intention to date has been that this might be offered to UNAMIR. However "on a case by case basis" it may be that any French-led force could be given access to such equipment.

Comment

4 The deaths of Belgian troops earlier this year in Rwanda would make any decision to commit new Belgian troops there unpalatable. That said, Rwanda (as a former Belgian colony) retains considerable interest for the Belgian government and media. This factor, and Belgium's close bilateral links with France (just days before Belgium will be looking for continued French support for Belgium PM Dehaene's candidacy for the EU Commission Presidency at the Corfu EU Summit) will make any decision on the French initiative highly political for the Belgians. We would not be surprised to see them offer both moral and logistical support, if the conditions outlined above can be seen to be satisfied.

Our file:

186/1/1 19:02 (47766) 700/OTT/00000/00000 \$310.88 FROM: OTTAWA C01921/OTT 20-Jun-1994 TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate CC: PARIS LONDON Routine BRUSSELS MADRID Routine ROME GENEVA Routine MOSCOW WASHINGTON Routine BEIJING Routine SANTIAGO CANBERRA BONN Routine HARARE DEFENCE Routine MFAT (UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, AMER, DSP1) (EAB) Williamo P/S MFA Pere DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI) 10.5 DEFENCE MOD Filds HL K5.71 Subject SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA 14: W.C.

SUMMARY

Canada declined over the weekend a French requestions received Friday for troops/logistics support for the French Dalich intervention force. Canada privately hopes that the proposal Water will not be given UN cover as it considers that it is not the right answer to the problem, and would more likely than not backfire on the UN. Canada's objectives in Rwanda are the same as New Zealand's, and it has called for an early deployment of UNAMIR TWO. Dallaire believes the French action has already had negative repercussions on the ground in Kigali. Canada considers that UNOMUR did not have the capacity to effectively police the Ugandan/Rwandan border and accordingly cannot verify accurately just what has happened there.

ACTION

For information: your U52172.

REPORT

DFAIT (Lessard, Director, West and Central Africa and Maghreb Relations) said that the French HOM submitted a request Friday (17 June) for Canadian troops/logistics support for its intervention force. Minister Ouellet on Sunday approved Canada's response, to the effect that it was not in a position to support the initiative. Canada would prefer to make its response in context of the existing approved plan to reinforce UNAMIR. Canada recognised the good intentions of the French, and suggested that they

prov e assistance to UNAMIR and aircraft for humanitarian assistance. Having regard to Canada's important relationship with France, Minister Ouellet indicated that Canada should not publicly criticise the proposal.

- Lessard said that in their view the French proposal was a high risk strategy which was likely to leave a worse mess for the UN to handle once the intervention force departed. Dallaire believed it would make the situation unmanageable, but was unable to comment publicly as the Secretariat had received instructions from the SecGen to be both supportive of the French proposal and the reinforcement of UNAMIR (please protect). The UN Secretariat (DPKO) was also opposed to the proposal.
- 5 Lessard remarked that the stakes for the UN were very high, as if Rwanda ended up as another debacle like Somalia then the reputation of the UN would be further weakened. The French initiative did not constitute peacekeeping, as it was not possible to impose peace through force. We might note that when we talked with Balloch (ADM, Asia Pacific) earlier in the day on another matter and touched on the Rwandan situation he robustly asserted that the initiative would not work. It was perceived as intervention on one side and even if the French succeeded in suppressing some of the conflict it would simply resurface when they departed in August.
- 6 Lessard said that the proposal constituted a political trap for other countries as there was pressure from the public to see something done. The public did not perceive that the UN plan (UNAMIR TWO) was in progress, and in any event were unable to properly evaluate what was the best thing to do. France was working at two levels, saying on the one hand that they had to intervene urgently and would act tomorrow, and on the other saying that they had to have UN approval.
- 7 Lessard noted that the designated prime minister under the Arusha Accords Mr Twagiramungu (a moderate Hutu) would be in Ottawa on Tuesday 21 June (we shall seek a report). Twagiramungu was an influential figure who had a particular legitimacy as the designated PM. According to press reports had spoken out against the French intervention.
- 8 In response to our query Lessard suggested that the French were largely acting for domestic political reasons. The media had been harshly critical of the French Government over Rwanda, but were now lauding the new initiative. France was not qualified to provide troops to UNAMIR as they were not acceptable to the RPF. That was also a difficulty with their initiative.
- 9 Concerning other support for the French proposal, Lessard said that at official level Ghana had indicated that consideration of support at the political level would require them to reassess their participation in UNAMIR. The French

cle ly had the clout to get a number of African states on side, and indeed the President of Benin who had been in Paris had announced support. The EU's position was that it would assist with logistics but not troops.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND

- 10 Lessard said that they had no evidence to suggest that the RPF had changed from its strategy of seeking military victory. The evidence was that the RPF was making slow progress on the ground, but their forces were thin on the ground and supply routes were stretched. They were not in full control behind their own front lines. DFAIT had no specific information, but Lessard suggested that one would be rash to assume that the RPF would prevail any time soon. No one really knew what was going to happen. The RPF could be willing to negotiate once it believed it controlled enough territory to isolate their Hutu enemy (the "hardliners") in one part of the territory. DFAIT had no reason to believe that a ceasefire was possible anytime soon.
- Il Lessard advised that he had talked with the Canadian mission in Nigeria earlier in the day (20 June), which had been in touch with General Dallaire. After allowing the departure of the humanitarian flight carrying the UNAMIR casualties (and the fatality) from Friday, the RPF had barricaded Kigali airport so that it was unusable (just, Lessard commented, when the humanitarian need had become even greater). Dallaire believed that this action and the intensified fighting resulted from RPF concern about the prospect of French intervention. The RPF did not of course believe the French claim that they would only intervene in "government" held territory. Following the reported Senegalese support for the proposal, the RPF had informed Dallaire that any Senegalese UNAMIR troops would be treated as enemy. Canada had no knowledge whether there was any connection between the French proposal and the RPF attack on the UNAMIR truck.
- 12 Lessard indicated that it was difficult to speculate about the secondary effects of the French proposal on the situation on the ground, except that as reported above Dallaire believed that it had had immediate negative effects.

UNOMUR

- 13 We asked Lessard about the SecGen's report on UNOMUR. Lessard retorted that it was a red herring. With 80 officers based in fixed locations and only travelling from time to time on prior notice in difficult territory it was not possible to prove that military supplies were not crossing the border. It was a fiction to believe otherwise. Lessard said Canada did not have specific information to prove otherwise, but believed that supplies were crossing the border.
- 14 We have faxed (Wgton and New york only) two press clippings, and the official briefing on the Canadian position

for :e in Parliament.

Your file:

Our file:

115/23/37

17:26		700/UNS/0000	0/00000	\$360.98
FROM:	WELLINGTON	U52172	20 Jun 1994	
ro:	NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	PRIORITY	Willbarg
				Forsyth
C:	PARIS	LONDON	PRIORITY	Ward
	BRUSSELS	MADRID	PRIORITY	Rider
	ROME	GENEVA	PRIORITY	-D Hughes
	MOSCOW	WASHINGTON	PRIORITY	Kember
	BEIJING	SANTIAGO	PRIORITY	McMasser
	CANBERRA	OTTAWA	PRIORITY	Foster
	HARARE	BONN	PRIORITY	McCormick
	DEFENCE		ROUTINE	Rush
				Tyne
FAT	(UNC, MEA, ISAC	C, HRU, LGL, EUR,	DSP1, EAB)	Dalton
	507 55 51		TOTAL MARKET ASSESSMENTS	Watson
/S MFA	A E HQNZDF (DSIA, O	OPS. DDI)		Later and the same

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Thanks your C04641

DEFENCE MOD

We remain cautious about France's proposal for an intervention force and hope it will not take precipitate action in the Council.

- As posts will see from the following we have a number of questions that need clarifying before we would be able to consult Minister about a position to take in the Council.
- New Zealand's immediate objectives in regard to Rwanda are:
- to see a stop to the fighting and killing;
- to see arrangements in place to protect and look after threatened and displaced populations and provide security for relief operations.

In looking to achieve these objectives, we want so far as possible to avoid prejudiceing prospects for a sustainable political settlement, within the broad framework of the Arusha Accords.

- Regarding the first objective, the talks sponsored by UNAMIR Commander Dallaire have not so far succeeded. An intervention force holds out that prospect.
- Regarding the second objective, we have supported the early deployment of an expanded UNAMIR. Our concern is that an intervention force might cut across or complicate the task of an expanded UNAMIR. As New York put it in informals (CO4641, para 14), how would an intervention force fit in with UNAMIR or impact on UNAMIR's future ability to operate in Rwanda?
- The RPF attitude is a major consideration. France cannot expect to be perceived as a disinterested party. The signs we have seen to date of the RPF position are not encouraging. If the RPF regards a French-backed intervention force as hostile, the prospect is only more fighting. By all accounts the RPF is a well-armed, disciplined force. The French could face an imbroglio.
- RPF hostility could also lead it to reject UN involvement, deny access to Kigali airport and refuse to cooperate with an expanded UNAMIR. This would jeopardise the second objective outlined above.
- 8 France has said it will proceed with an intervention force if;
- there is no ceasefire;
- it has WEU and African support;
- it has UN endorsement.
- With regard to the first of these conditions, it would be helpful to get an up-to-date assessment of the situation on the ground. What are RPF military objectives and how close are they to achieving them? After the capture of Gitarama it was confidently asserted that the RPF were about to chase the last of the Government forces from Kigali and positions from which they could threaten the airport. Yet latest media reports suggest heavy fighting around the capital still exists, with UNAMIR caught in the middle suffering casualties. How does Dallaire assess the situation and the prospect of the ceasefire talks he has been leading? Will France's initiative put pressure on to reach an agreement? Is this its purpose?

- It seems France is not finding it easy to line up credible WEU and African support. We have seen reports that Belgium, UK and Italy have all said no to troops, although noises have been made about logistical support. Spain seems cautious. We understand the WEU is to meet again Tuesday 21 June to further consider France's proposal. Except for Senegal and Zaire, the Africans seem cautious. New York reports a negative Nigerian view, but we note a Reuters report that France is to send a special envoy to African capitals, starting with Lagos, to explain its objectives. African views as they develop will bear on our own considerations.
- As to UN endorsement, the French clearly have Boutros-Ghali's backing. If Sec-Gen is to write to Council urging intervention, we will need to see extent to which he addresses this in relation to UNAMIR and its role. Are the reservations of Council members, including the other permanent members, likely to jell into any disposition to oppose or abstain on the sort of UNITAF-inspired resolution the French have circulated? No-one will want to be seen as opposing a measure aimed at stopping genocide. US and Russia may see useful precedent in humanitarian intervention in terms of their inerests in, eg. Haiti and CIS.
- France has also said an intervention force is necessary because the expanded UNAMIR will not be properly up and running for another 4-6 weeks. Yet the Secretariat says Ghana's forces are ready to go and the US airlift of APCs is imminent. Is the deployment of substantial part of an expanded UNAMIR in fact imminent? Will France's moves in any way accelerate deployment? And if so, would early deployment scotch the French initiative? Is the notion of using UNOSOM forces (probably Pakistan?) still in play? Our C24677 noted reservations we have about redeployment of UNOSOM.
- 13 It would be a concern if the French initiative encouraged the interim government and RGF to prolong the fighting, with the calculation that to do so might increase the prospect of French intervention.
- We should be interested in posts'reporting on the questions we have raised. This will help us determine a position before the next discussion in informals. The US reaction will be significant in determining the Council's response, if it comes to that. Washington's readout, especially following reported Juppe/Christopher telecon would be appreciated.

Your (le: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

115/	1	27
"7	1	1

19:14 (5621)		700/MEA/00000/00000	\$185.12
FROM:	WELLINGTON	C24739/WN1	20-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK		Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO WGTN UNSC	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	(MEA, UNC	,LGL,ISAC,HRU,EUR,DP3,DSP3,EA	В)
P/S MFA		מת מת	

DEFENCE HQNZDF

(DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD

(GENTLES)

Subject

U52184: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: UNOMUR

Your C04637 and fax 2810.

- 2 It is encouraging that no movement of arms or armed personnel from Uganda into Rwanda has been detected by UNOMUR during the reporting period. The Council has no reason not to accept this conclusion on the face of it (although it seems to defy logic that the RPF has not been resupplied from somewhere during the last two months).
- We can go along with the Sec-Gen's recommendation that, predicated on the establishment of an effective ceasefire, the mandate of UNOMUR be renewed for three months during which it would be reduced in phases leading to a close-down by 21 September. We agree there is an illogicality in continuing to monitor one border and not others.
- We would prefer op 2 to spell out the operational phase-down rather than refer to para 14 of the Sec-Gen's report. This would help put op 3 into proper context. As currently drafted there seems to be an inconsistency between the wording of op 3 and the close-down by 21 September which the Sec-Gen recommends.



NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY 37 OBSERVATORY CIRCLE, NW. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

> Phone: (202) 328-4800 Fax: (202) 867-5227

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

DATE: 20 JUNE 1994

PAGES: 1 OF 2

FROM: WASHINGTON

FAX NO. (202) 265-9240

TO:

WELLINGTON

and in cheek

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

CC:

NEW YORK - Sent 4.40 pm

LD:

WGIN UNSC. (VIA COMS please) DIMEDIATE UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, AMER, EUR, DSP1, EAB

SUBJ: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Attached is a US non-paper on the proposed French intervention in Rwanda. As you will see, it takes a broadly supportive line towards the French proposal.

Earliest we could see State is early morning 21 June. will report in details asap thereafter.

Williams Forsym Ward Alasr Hugaria Keniber Nich desease Foliar McCormiak Push Tyne Dalton Watson

NON-PAPER ON FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT INTERNATIONAL-AFRICAN INITIATIVE ON RWANDA

- o France has proposed a multinational force, under UN auspices, to intervene in Rwanda as soon as possible to protect threatened civilians until the regular UNAMIR contingents can arrive. The French have asked several African and other countries to participate along with the French.
- o The mandate of the force would be the same as that of the expanded UNAMIR -- to help protect populations at risk. The force would serve only as a "bridge" pending arrival of expanded UNAMIR. Like UNAMIR, it would not attempt to interpose itself between the two warring parties.
- o There is an immediate need to stop the killings in Rwanda. This must be our first priority. For this reason, we support the French proposal, which offers the possibility to bring very rapid protection to civilian populations.
- o We want the mission to have the sanction of the UN and to be fully coordinated with UNAMIR. Our preference is to have a Security Council resolution authorizing the mission.
- o We are aware of the RPF's concerns over French intervention. However, this is a multilateral effort and the purpose is to protect civilians and save lives, not to intervene in the fighting between government forces and the RPF or to support the government or its forces.
- o The French are consulting with the RPF and other interested parties. We have encouraged these consultations and would like to see the force win the acceptance of all relevant players.
- o We are willing to provide logistics and equipment for the initiative, but U.S. troops would not be involved in the operation.
- o In the meantime, we are working with the UN to accelerate deployment of expanded UNAMIR. We have completed a lease with the UN for 50 Armored Personnel Carriers [APC's] and plan to start delivery next week.
- o We are working on other equipment requests for UNAMIR now and are willing to provide logistical support as well.

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

12:29 (47854)		700/WSH/00000/000	00	\$492.41
FROM:	WASHING	ron	C03039/WSH		21-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT WGTN UNS		NEW YORK		Immediate Immediate
cc:	PARIS CANBERRA ROME MOSCOW BEIJING HARARE	A	LONDON OTTAWA MADRID GENEVA SANTIAGO BONN		Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority
TO:	Defence				Immediate
MFAT		(UNC, MEA, AMER, EAB)	ISAC, HRU, EUR, DSP1,	LGL)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		1	
Subject U04454:	SECURITY	COUNCIL: RWANDA		[c	Dev.

Your C42779. Our fax of 20 June (Wgtn and NY only).

Summary

US support for the French initiative is more nuanced than their public statement or French reports suggest. While the US finds it impossible to oppose the French offer to bring an end to the killing in Rwanda, it has expressed concerns that the operation be multilateral, under a UN umbrella, for a defined time period, and that France make "every effort to convince the RPF of its good intent". However the US shares French view that there is no way to get UNAMIR in place quickly enough to stop the killings, nor does it support a Ch VII mandate for UNAMIR.

Action

2 For information.

Report

3 We met early today with State's Rwanda desk officer (Aiston, Office of Central African Affairs). We set out some of New Zealand's concerns. We stressed that deployment of a national force with robust rules of engagement could (a la Somalia) cause difficulties for the UN force which must take

William grant	T
Foreyth	Γ
Ward	T
Rider	T
Hughes	P
Kemour	T
MgNasier	-
Februar	Î
McConrolek	1
Rush	Г
Тупе	T
Daiton	-
Watson	Γ
	-

over from it, and noted recent reports of targeting of Francophone UNAMIR personnel. Aiston took careful note of these points and undertook to pass them on.

- In setting out US views, Aiston noted that the US found it politically impossible not to support a credible initiative to bring an immediate end to the killings in Rwanda. It would be "a mistake for the international community to forgo this offer to save lives". Secretary Christopher had thus indicated to FM Juppe that the US would support the French proposal.
- In conveying its support, the US had also expressed privately to France a range of concerns about their proposal, which Aiston remarked were similar to New Zealand's:
- (a) The French initiative should be under a "UN umbrella" (i.e. a Chapter VII UNSC mandate);
- (b) Participation in the intervention should be "as broad as possible";
- (c) France should make "every effort" to persuade the RPF of its good intent, i.e. that the French role would be limited to the protection of civilians (largely Tutsi);
- (d) There should be close cooperation between the French-led coalition and the UN. While the US sees some advantages in a national-led command structure, it wanted appropriate links and reporting to the UN Secretariat and UNSC. The US wants the DR strengthened on this point (and could be receptive to a specific proposal on reporting requirements).
- Aiston commented that the US had also discussed with France the importance of strict neutrality of the French forces in the discharge of their mandate. Implicit in the US understanding of the French proposal was that it would "not necessarily" be a barrier to RPF forces and would not seek to be a buffer or interposition force. (Comment: there may also be room within US instructions to see a strengthening of the DR on this point).
- We asked about the US understanding of the RPF reaction to the French proposal. Aiston conceded that it had been negative. The problem is that the RPF does not believe French declarations of good intent. However the RPF's US representatives had hinted that if the operation was UN-sponsored and truly multilateral they may reconsider their position. (State did not necessarily interpret these statements to have the backing of the RPF leadership in Rwanda). Continuing RPF opposition does not affect US support for the French plan the US was well aware that they were likely to have problems with it. The US view is that French action is driven by domestic human rights outrage. Although "political" in that sense, it was "clear" that France was not

motiv ed by other military or strategic objectives.

- State's information on most recent international reaction added little to your own. State's information on EU views tallied with yours the British are "lukewarm", Belgium was supportive in principle but not in materiel, Germany had some reservations but would not oppose; Italy would lend active support "if others did". The US had no information on the Danish or Dutch positions but was due to receive embassy representatives later today. Among the Africans, only the Senegalese had offered active support. (Aiston noted the apparent anomaly that this could be made available immediately to France but would take some weeks to deploy with UNAMIR). Ghana had not yet, according to US information, confirmed its support for the French initiative.
- On the military situation, State confirmed reports that the RPF was beginning to be stretched thin. However RPF was continuing to drive towards any areas where there were remaining Tutsi populations, especially Butari. State noted that there were few Tutsi (left) in the North West, which was a Hutu stronghold, and the US assessed the RPF would not attack in this region where it would face heavy resistance.
- In response to probing on how the French announcement had impacted on the situation, State noted that the RPF had stepped up the level of fighting in an apparent attempt to make maximum territorial gains before the French arrived. Commenting on implications for the ceasefire talks, Aiston said that State's first priority is to see the killing stopped, but it also believed that the French action could, with appropriate international assistance, be "leveraged" into forcing a ceasefire agreement. The reverse did not hold: by waiting for a ceasefire agreement, we would not see an early end to the killings.
- Aiston did not feel that there has been any "evolution" in US policy between its early opposition to an expanded UNAMIR and its current support for the French proposal. Rather the US had a "bad PR problem". It was and is "working feverishly" to get UNAMIR deployed. Even when the US had raised questions in New York about the end point and plan of operations for the expanded UNAMIR, Aiston argued that this "did not slow the deployment down", as the search for troop contributions continued in parallel with the US/UN discussions. State has been "pushing the bureaucracy" both in Washington (i.e. DOD) and in New York (i.e. the UN).
- The US does not share our view on the need for UNAMIR to have no less robust a mandate than any French-led force. France does not want a repeat of what happened to the Belgians it will not go in "with its hands tied". Chapter VII mandate for France was appropriate as it was a different mission from that assigned to UNAMIR, for which the proposed H VI authority would be sufficient. There were advantages in keeping the two operations distinct. (Aiston noted that

Page 4

UNAL R One did not even have a mandate to protect civilians).

- Aiston went on to say that US assessed that if France "was there for two months and had fought its way in, they are likely to have done all the hard work" before UNAMIR-2 was deployed. We disputed this: 1-2,000 French troops would hardly subdue 20,000 RPF and some 40,000 (ragged) RGF forces. Aiston said that US reporting indicated RGF forces were now down to 20,000 due to desertions, and the French, with the advantages of being "Western, well trained and equipped and nationally commanded", would be able to achieve their objectives. (Comment: Aiston's reply did not address the implications for UNAMIR of any such French action).
- On the question of a US contribution, Aiston noted that the 50 US APCs had been ready for delivery to Entebbe last weekend, but that the UN had requested a delay while it moved 10 APCs from Somalia to Rwanda. Rather than store the APCs in theatre, the US had held off shipment until this week. The first shipment could go as early as 22 June. Main deployment would begin on Friday 24 June and it would take until 29 June to get all 50 APCs to Entebbe. Aiston made no mention of any additional US assistance to the French operation. We will check further.

Your fire: 115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
21:44 (5650)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$520.88
FROM:	NEW YOR	C04652/NYK	21-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING:	FON WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3) (DSP1, CEO, EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U52265.

Summary

- French have amended draft resolution to secure support/acquiescence of enough Council members to adopt the resolution and will push it to a vote as a French text tomorrow, 22 June
- France objects to our request for a report from the Force Commander and for consultations with troop contributors
- Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Brazil continue to have serious reservations and Missions are recommending abstentions to their capitals
- Humanitarian NGOs are targeting us with calls and faxes urging that we oppose the resolution
- Secretariat, UNAMIR Force Commander, non-Council members, and OAU continue to have grave reservations about the French initiative and privately commend the stand we have taken
- The RPF remain implacably opposed to the initiative, have withdrawn consent for UNAMIR's presence and insist that UNAMIR withdraw to avoid getting caught up in French-RPF

fighting

- Secretariat report that French initiative is already having negative impact on contributions for expanded UNAMIR (though Canadian Cabinet agreed today to deployment of 300 person signals detachment to UNAMIR)
- We recommend that New Zealand withhold support from the French resolution

Action

Voting instructions

Report

Informal consultations this afternoon were devoted to further consideration of the French resolution. Merimee circulated a revised text which incorporated a number of amendments following various consultations the French had had with the US, Brazil, Spain, the Czech Rep, and the NAM Caucus. Despite these changes, the only enthusiastic support came from the Russians who, as Moscow has commented, clearly see value in the initiative for their own purposes.

- Spain and the UK played their part as loyal Europeans and helped the French out with drafting suggestions, and the US indicated support, subject to establishing clearly in the text that financial responsibility for the venture lies with the participating states and any others that choose to help them. The Argentines, who had told us beforehand they were uncomfortable with their overnight instructions to support the text, secured, at our suggestion, clarifying words at the end of what is now PPF that the French force shall not be an interpositional force between the parties.
- We spoke early in the discussion to repeat our basic reservations with the proposal which would require UNAMIR to operate alongside a separately constituted and differently empowered force, and urged the French to reconsider the option of putting their troops under blue helmets and giving UNAMIR Chapter VII authority. We also said that before the Council took a decision it should have a detailed report from the Force Commander on the likely implications for UNAMIR of the introduction of the French force and that there should be consultations with actual and potential troop contributors to UNAMIR.
- In response, Merimee said that while France would have preferred to have been able to participate in a UN-commanded operation, circumstances made that impossible: the RPF's attitude towards France meant that French participation in UNAMIR would have compromised the neutrality of the UN Force. Moreover, the French force had a different and dangerous task to fulfill and needed the protection offered by a unified national command. He dismissed the request for

- a repose from Dallaire by noting that the SecGen would not have supported the idea if he had been concerned for the safety of his personnel.
- 5 The Chinese said they remained concerned about the attitude of the parties and that of the OAU. When Merimee offered satisfaction on neither, Brazil repeated the request, but to no greater effect. (Despite their lobbying efforts, the French have made little headway with the RPF or the OAU see below). Nigeria (Ayewah) made a convoluted intervention, the upshot of which seemed to be that the latest French draft, while an improvement, exacerbated their concerns, and that the resolution could have a negative impact on those countries that had already signalled their willingness to contribute to UNAMIR. They urged the French to make haste slowly.
- No other Council member spoke in the general discussion. A member of the Pakistani delegation made a point of telling us privately that he fully agreed with everything we said and was very concerned at the implications of the resolution for Russian intervention in Georgia, Tajikistan and even Afghanistan. Although the French had had some success in persuading Marker to maintain silence, on the basis that any Pakistani profile could complicate the task of the Khan (the former head of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and newly-appointed Special Representative for Rwanda), the delegation were going to recommend an abstention. He also noted that they had had strong representations from the Malaysians and the Sri Lankans urging opposition to the proposal.
- At French urging, the President took the Council through a paragraph by paragraph review of the text. Merimee said he would be happy to consider all proposals but, turning to us, said he could not accommodate suggestions that were counter to the thrust of the French initiative. We agreed to this procedure on the understanding that the text would remain a French draft and that there could be no question of the text being turned into a Presidential text or of any delegation being committed to the outcome. A number of further changes were made to the text, though none were of much The French said that will put the text under significance. their name in blue tonight (see accompanying fax) for a vote tomorrow. Merimee pressed very hard for adoption in the morning, but was resisted by the Nigerians and the Pakistanis who said their instructions may not arrive until later in the day.
- 8 There is manifest concern among the NGO community at the French initiative. We received phone calls this morning from Britain from Oxfam UK and from Africa Rights urging us to maintain our opposition to the proposal and telling us that their concerns are widely held among NGOs operating in Rwanda, including, they said, Medecines sans frontieres (France). This afternoon, we were the subject of a fax

attack rom humanitarian NGOs and Rwandans living in America pleading with us to oppose the proposal. They are deeply concerned at the implications that the French force, coupled with RPF opposition to it, will have on the humanitarian relief situation and on the morale of Rwandans in general. Africa Rights, which has just had one of their principles return from a lengthy visit to the country insisted that the introduction of a French force would be of major concern to ordinary Hutu as well as to the Tutsi.

- 9 It has also been plain from various conversations we have had today with the Secretariat and with non-Council members that the widely-held apprehensions about the motivation for the French initiative and its implications for UNAMIR and the wider UN continue. None of the Secretariat we spoke to on the political and military sides bothered to hide their profound disagreement with their CEO's judgment.
- 10 Speculation as to the bona fides of the French initiative is rife. One interesting piece of information we learned from the Secretariat this afternoon is that the RPF claims that French military advisers have remained in the country and have been training some of the Hutu militias are correct. Some are out in the countryside but some are in Kigali. It was interesting therefore that the French told us that one reason for the urgency was that they consider that Kigali could fall to the RPF at any time.
- The Canadians confirmed that Dallaire is firmly opposed to the French force and has said so publicly, and that as a consequence the French seem to have started a campaign for his removal. In the informals themselves, ASG Riza, when asked for the views of the Force Commander noted that Dallaire was bound by the SecGen's decision and had been instructed to implement the necessary coordination with the French force. However, he went on to note that Dallaire had advised that there would be no problems with the French force if the RPF were to change their position to support the French initiative. But if they remained opposed, there could be very serious complications for UNAMIR, whose headquarters are located in an RPF-held sector of Kigali and which is dependent on resupply either through the RPF-held airport or through the RPF-held territory to the North-east.
- Il Riza noted that there had already been some signs of a hardening of RPF attitudes; the APCs coming from Somalia had been held up for three days on the border. As if to underscore his own reservations, when the French declined to answer China on the OAU position Riza took the initiative to show us and the Nigerians the OAU communique where it is stated clearly that the OAU believes any intervention must be within the framework of UNAMIR.
- 12 The RPF opposition to the French force remains obdurate. Today, they have taken the next step and have advised that if the Council approves the French force it should also

authorize the withdrawal, perhaps temporarily, of UNAMIR since they are concerned that their personnel will not be able to distinguish clearly between UNAMIR and French personnel. Text of RPF letter is in accompanying fax. Even allowing for the element of bluff, the threat to UNAMIR is unmistakeable. The Secretariat have told us that they are already evacuating out the Senegalese and Congolese members of UNAMIR and at this afternoon's consultations Riza confirmed that Dallaire is drawing up contingency plans for total withdrawal of the force. Meanwhile, flights into Kigali are subject to individual approval by the RPF who have taken steps to render the airport unusable to any attempt by the French to land there.

13 Non-Council members such as the Canadians, the Australians, the Ghanaians and the Zimbabweans have told us of their reservations about the French proposal. The Australians consider that that proposal could well delay a decision by Canberra on Australian participation in UNAMIR. The Nigerians told us that a number of the Africans who had committed themselves to participate in the expanded force are now reconsidering. Even the Ghanaians, the remainder of whose mechanised battalion were to be deployed on Friday, 24 June, is now reconsidering. This confirms the Secretariat's worst fears about the SecGen's decision to endorse the French initiative. (On the positive side, however, the Canadians tell us that their Cabinet gave formal approval this morning to a 300 strong signals detachment to join UNAMIR. A reconnaisance team is already on the way to Rwanda.)

Voting positions

14 A vote on the resolution tomorrow is almost a certainty. Our guess is that the French can count on 10 positive votes. China, Pakistan, Nigeria are recommending to their capitals that they abstain. The Brazilians are considering doing the same:

Recommendation

- 15 We recommend that New Zealand not support the resolution. The evidence continues to mount that this is a badly conceived operation with questionable motivation. The NGO community is opposed and recognises that it is unlikely to save lives. It is inconsistent with the principles we have consistently espoused regarding the deployment of UN forces. Even if is able to do some immediate good, it threatens to leave the UN with a bigger mess to clean up afterwards.
- should abstain and that we should be prepared to do so even if we are on our own; For better or worse, we have become identified at the conscience of the Council on Rwanda. It would do us little credit with other Council members, the wider UN membership or with NGOs were we to compromise our

C04652/NYK

Page 6

princles and go along with a consensus on such a bad product. In our judgment, a tough EOV would not of itself be convincing.

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 31/1/1

12:48 ((47785)	700/CBA/00000/00000	\$208.56
FROM:	CANBERRA	C02992/CBA	21-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
cc:	NEW YORK WASHINGTON BRUSSELS MOSCOW MADRID DEFENCE TOKYO	PARIS OTTAWA BEIJING HARARE LONDON SANTIAGO	Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority
MFAT P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	L HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS	GL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP1	Foreyth Ward Rider Hughes
Subject		VANDA: AUSTRALIA	MG Der MC MC M
Summary		alia af their proposal	Ruch Tyne Daten Watson

French have informed Australia of their proposal, but have not sought their support for it. DFAT is unconvinced by French claims of support for the operation. Proposal may complicate a decision on an Australian contribution to UNAMIR.

Action

2 For information.

Report

DFAT (Armitage, UN Political Section) advises that French called on them yesterday to discuss proposal to mount a French-led operation in Rwanda. Embassy did so at a junior (First Secretary) level, and on a courtesy basis only. They did not request any support, political or material, for the initiative. Embassy's presentation matched that given by French in other capitals and in New York, particularly in terns of the very upbeat assessment they offered of the "widespread" support the proposal enjoyed. DFAT tested them on this, and on possible reaction of RPF to French involvement. They were unconvinced by French responses, and share the concerns you have already identified about the proposal.

- We asked Armitage about the implications of French involvement for Australia's possible contribution of a medical team. Armitage told us that if Australia went ahead with a contribution (and this is not yet certain see below), it would probably be deployed in August. From what they understood of French proposal, it would withdraw from Rwanda about that time. So timing was not a problem. The difficulty was in the fact that Australia had no sense of what the conditions on the ground, and the status of UNAMIR, would be by the time of the French withdrawl. This would complicate a decision on an Australian contribution which was to have been taken by the Australian Cabinet next week.
- 5 Armitage noted that Australia had been irritated by a reference in the UNSG's letter of 19 June to the Council to the effect that Australia has already "indicated an interest" in supplying a medical team. They had not advised the Secretariat along these lines, because it was not yet certain that they would do so. Cabinet's deliberation on a contribution could not be predicted. (Australian Mission had expressed concern about reference in letter with Secretariat which claimed that this information had been included on the basis of "media reports").
- 6 Comment: French initiative, at least in Australia's case, may have opposite effect to that desired. It has created a climate of uncertainty in Canberra about the shape and status of UNAMIR after the French withdrawl. If this scares off potential contributors it will obviously undermine rather than reinforce UNAMIR's long-term chances of success.

Your { le: 3/88/1 Our file: 19:34 (5641) 700/MEA/00000/00000 \$342.46 FROM: WELLINGTON C24779/WN1 21-Jun-1994 TO: NEW YORK Immediate CC: BEIJING BONN Routine BRUSSELS CANBERRA Routine GENEVA HARARE Routine LONDON MADRID Routine Moscow OTTAWA Routine PARIS SANTIAGO Routine TOKYO WASHINGTON Routine DEFENCE WGTN UNSC Routine MFAT (MEA, LGL, UNC, HRU, ISAC, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HONZDF

(DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD

(GENTLES)

Subject

U52265: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- French re-emphasise in Wellington urgency and humanitarian focus of proposed intervention, and seek New Zealand support for consensus adoption of resolution tomorrow.
- We share French humanitarian objectives but repeat our concerns about the potentially negative impact on UNAMIR.
- That Boutros-Ghali has thrown his weight behind French initiative is undeniably significant and can be expected to affect public perceptions.
- Instruction for you to seek further clarifications but to go along with (amended) resolution if consensus unexpectedly emerges.
- French Ambassador made a further demarche instruction this afternoon to emphasise the importance France attached to urgent action in Rwanda, and to express the hope that NZ and France could reach a common position in the Council tomorrow.
- He noted that the French position had been fully explained to Beeby. A divergence between French and New Zealand views had been evident in Keating's remarks in the

Council yesterday. He stressed that France was under pressure to respond quickly because of the magnitude of the killings. Waiting for reinforcement of UNAMIR - even with the best of wills this would be at least two months away - would take too long. The French purpose was strictly humanitarian. France had no desire to become involved in the internal affairs of Rwanda nor to interpose itself between the two sides. The draft resolution made that very clear. It would withdraw as quickly as possible once the expanded UNAMIR was deployed. He hoped that NZ would be able to support consensus on the resolution tomorrow.

- In response we emphasised that NZ shared France's concerns about the urgent need to protect people at risk in Rwanda and to end the killings. We understood the French desire to do something quickly. We had ourselves been pushing for a more robust and rapid UN response than it had been possible to obtain from the Council. Our primary concern was to ensure that the UN efforts and process that were already underway were not undermined.
- The concerns we had expressed and the clarifications we sought related primarily to the impact of the proposed intervention on UNAMIR and its ability to continue to operate. We were concerned that with one of the parties openly hostile to the French proposed action, and perceiving it as partisan and provocative, there was a real risk that it would not serve as a bridge to an expanded UNAMIR but would jeopardise the UNAMIR operation. There had already been reports of immediate negative effects on the ground. Apart from the threat of the RPF withdrawing cooperation from UNAMIR, there was the real risk of troop contributors being diverted, and of an expanded UNAMIR deployment being confused and further delayed. We continued to favour French cooperation with and support of UNAMIR. de Bellescize said France had expressed willingness to support and equip forces in the framework of UNAMIR.
- Ambassador inquired if our attitude would change if the RPF could be brought on side. The main purpose of the intervention was after all to save Tutsi lives. (He noted it had been possible to find some common ground with the RPF for a French truck convoy to be sent to Kigali.) We replied that would certainly ease our concerns.
- 7 He had no details of potential troop contributors to the French intervention apart from Senegal. He described the 21 June WEU meeting as crucial.

Instructions

In view of worrying information that France's proposal is already causing difficulties for UNAMIR, leading to Secretariat decision to withdraw Francophone personnel, we think it would be useful for Council to seek assessment of UNAMIR force commander of impact, both in terms of safety of

personnel and ability of UNAMIR to perform its tasks including efforts to promote ceasefire.

- 9 We also think Council should be urged to consult present and potential troop contributing countries to UNAMIR, before taking a step that could have significant implications for that operation.
- We told de Bellescize that New Zealand expected further discussion in Council to clarify matters. We do not wish to see Council pushed precipitately. However, if France tables a text in blue, you should ask for delay while seeking instructions.
- In the event that things steamroll ahead in the Council, and France pushes for a vote tomorrow, you have authority to seek the sorts of amendments outlined in your para 21. You might also try to ensure that arrangements for coordination and liaison between any new force and UNAMIR are better defined.
- It seems unlikely that a consensus on the French proposal will suddenly emerge. If it did so, however, we would not want New Zealand to stand aside, particularly as Boutros-Ghali has thrown his weight behind the French. We would then look at expressing our reservations in an EOV.
- 13 The Minister has seen this message.

Your (le: 3/88/1

Our file: 701/19/1/3/7

18:14	(5640)		700/LGL/00000/00000	\$277.67
FROM:	WELLINGT	ON	C24774/WN1	21-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	ζ	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	1	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(LGL, UNC, ME	A, HRU, ISAC, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EA	AB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	

Subject

U52262: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: GENOCIDE FOLLOW-UP

Your C04644.

Summary

- The Minister agrees that you may co-sponsor the Spanish draft resolution, but co-sponsorship should be conditional on Spain agreeing to hold back until the dust enveloping the French intervention initiative has settled.
- Our comments on the revised text of the resolution are set out below.

Co-Sponsorship

- 2 Acknowledging the logic in para 3 of your C04644, and given the parallels between Res 780 and the Spanish draft, the Minister has agreed in principle to New Zealand co-sponsorship of the draft resolution establishing a Commission of Experts for Rwanda.
- It has been agreed that New Zealand co-sponsorship of this resolution would reflect and reinforce our condemnation of the atrocities which are being committed in Rwanda. Co-sponsorship of the Spanish resolution would also be an appropriate follow-on from our support for the resolution on Rwanda adopted at the Special Session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in

May, which called for (inter alia) further investigation of human rights abuses occurring in Rwanda.

That said, we agree that it will be critical for the successful adoption of the Spanish resolution that it not be derailed by the French intervention initiative in the interim. New Zealand support for the Spanish proposal should therefore be conditional upon Spain agreeing to hold back briefly to allow the situation to settle down.

Draft Resolution

- We note that some aspects of the drafting in the preambular paragraphs have already been tightened up (eg "enable the determination of responsibility" has replaced "definite culpability" in PP 4), but leave it to your discretion to suggest any minor drafting changes as you see fit (your para 6 refers).
- New PP 7 is particularly interesting: we have been unable as yet to locate a precedent for such explicit linkage between the application of international humanitarian law and the fulfilment of the Council's primary responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security. We are not saying that we have any objection to the proposition, but we should be interested to know whether it is novel and the background to this paragraph.
- Our comments on the deletion of "grave" (our U51656 of 13 June refers) from OPs 2 and 3 are still valid.
- We note that "breaches of the Convention on Genocide" in OP 2 of the earlier Spanish text has been deleted and replaced with "possible acts of genocide". We assume this substitution was a political decision, to ensure as much support as possible for the draft resolution. While a stronger reference in OP 2 may have been preferable, we are pleased that the reference in OP3 to the Convention on Genocide has been retained.
- 9 We have no difficulty with new OPs 5-7:
- OP5 we agree that the Special Rapporteur deserves a special reference, and it is only sensible that his efforts should be coordinated with those of the Commission of Experts.
- OP6 "all concerned" in OP 6 is all-encompassing, but sufficiently general so as not to cause particular affront.
- OP7 new OP 7 goes some of the way to allay British concerns, which we share, about sources of funding for the Commission. As you note, as a co-sponsor we may feel ourselves under a greater obligation to contribute.

α 2	Λ	7	7	4	/T.7%T	7
42	4	1	/	4	/WN	1

Page 3

Your file:

Our file: 42/1/2 115/23/37

1			, <u>,</u>
13:17 (47829)	700/MAD//	. \$241.40
FROM:	Madrid	C00278/MAD	21-Jun-1994
TO:	Wellington	Wgtn UNSC	Priority
cc:	EC Posts Beijing Geneva Moscow Santiago	New York Defence Harare Ottawa Washington	Priority. Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, E (DSP2)	CUR, ISAC, LGL, HRU, EAB, DSP	1)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS	, DDI)	ACTION

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: SPAIN

Your U52172.

Summary

Spain is likely to announce later today or tomorrow that it will provide some logistic support for the proposed French intervention in Rwanda.

Action

For information only.

Report

- In response to para 14 of your reftel we have spoken to the Spanish Foreign Ministry (De Carvajal, DG for Security and Disarmament) about the possibility of Spanish participation in the proposed French intervention in Rwanda. We have also cross-checked the information we received with the British Embassy here.
- 5 De Carvajal told us that will be politically difficult for Spain not to make a gesture of support for the proposed French intervention force in Rwanda, provided of course that the Security Council approves the sending of the force. France is clearly determined to press ahead and expects its closest friends to back it. There are, of course, important questions to be decided, such as how to dovetail the force with UNOMIR. The precise nature of the Spanish gesture of support is still being worked out.

T
1
1
1
7

offer logistic support for the French intervention. This could be in the form of a C130 aircraft, or military equipment, or even perhaps a small engineer unit, but not front-line troops. The Spanish offer is likely to be made at today's WEU meeting in Brussels, and would become public in the next day or so. "The Spanish will not want to be left on the sidelines if this goes ahead". It follows that Spain will not obstruct the French efforts to obtain Security Council endorsement of the intervention. The Embassy commented that the Spanish position was in effect similar to the British position.

Comment

7 The Spanish media have of course paid great attention to Rwanda since the present crisis began, and have reported in detail on the atrocities and the rescue of Spanish citizens (mainly missionaries) from that country. The Government would have strong public support for a decision to assist the French intervention force, and could also expect diplomatic advantages, e.g. over the Spanish candidacy for SG of the WEU, from supporting the French at a time when they expect it.

115/23/37

Willberg

Foreyon Ward Rider

Hugho

Me. Buch

Tyne Dalte

Wat.

Your file:

Our file: 186/1/1

18:04	(47853)	700/LON/00000/00000	\$315.93
FROM:	LONDON	C04012/LON	21-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
cc:	NEW YORK		Priority
	PARIS	MOSCOW	Routine
	BEIJING	BONN	Routine
	BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
	OTTAWA	DEFENCE	Routine
	HARARE	MADRID	Routine
	SANTIAGO	GENEVA	Routine
	ROME	WASHINGTON	Routine
	TOKYO		Routine
			•

MFAT

(MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, ISAC, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF

(DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD

(GENTLES)

Subject

U05213: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA, GEORGIA

Your U52265 and New York's C04649.

Summary

Our FCO contact thinks it a good idea to get the UNAMIR Force Commander to brief the Council and for the Council to hold consultations with troop contributors. He asks whether we had thought of suggesting that humanitarian agencies be asked to brief the Council on the impact on their work of the French initiative. British do not, however, think the French are stoppable.

Implications of the French initiative for Russian role in the "Near Abroad" are disturbing. Russians have produced draft resolution on Georgia which is "awful" - no time limit for CIS presence, no clarity about its relationship with UNOMIG. British expect Sec-Gen to issue a report on Georgia about 27 June after consultations between the Russians and the Secretariat. As UNOMIG mandate expires on 30 June, a rollover resolution will be necessary.

Action required

For information only.

Report

CONFIDENTIAL

When we spoke today to Clarke, Assistant Head, UN Dept, FCO, he clearly regretted that, for the sake of the bilateral relationship, UK is supporting the French initiative. He commented that while UK cannot echo our reservations in the Council, they would be happy if our doing so held back the French. We said we would be proposing that the UNAMIR Force Commander brief the Council, and consultations be held with present and potential troop contributors. Clarke thought this useful, and asked whether we had thought of suggesting a briefing from humanitarian agencies - the effect on their work was likely to be quite profound. Nevertheless, he did not think the French were stoppable, given the political capital they had invested to date.

- 2 Clarke agreed that the French initiative had disturbing implications for Russia's role in the "near abroad" (Moscow's C02842). In this context, he said that instructions had yesterday been sent to UKMIS in New York on a Russian draft resolution on the CIS force and the expansion of UNOMIG. Clarke described the Russian resolution as "awful". Inter alia, there is not time limit for the presence of the CIS force, and no clarity about its relationship with UNOMIG. There were still difficulties about guarantees for UNOMIG's freedom of movement.
- 3 We touched base later on with Eastern Dept (Fisher). She said that since the Russian Federation Council's refusal a couple of weeks ago to deploy peacekeeping troops to Georgia, Russian troops already on the ground had undertaken some mine clearing and started to deploy along the Inguri River. The Russian Federation Council today approved deployment of peacekeeping troops for up to six months. They should be able to be deployed (mainly in the Gali region) relatively quickly.
- On the Russian draft resolution, Fisher said that as might be expected, its focus was very much on welcoming the CIS forces and highlighting that if they were not deployed, instability would spread etc. It also proposed the expansion of UNOMIG to 150 and the establishment of a voluntary fund for contributions to the CIS operation. Fisher said instructions to UKMIS had been that the resolution would need to be toned down, but that UK would not in any case be in a position to take a decision until discussions between Russia and the UN Secretariat on interoperability and transparency between CIS and UNOMIG had been completed and the Secretary-General had issued his report. In response to our question, Fisher said that she had not had a recent report on the talks, but she understood the S-G's report would be issued about 27 June. She noted that UNOMIG's mandate was due to expire on 30 June, and that it would need to be rolled over by a technical resolution for a couple of weeks while the S-G's report was considered. We asked Fisher about the UK position on expansion of UNOMIG (bearing in mind the Foreign Secretary's difficulties). She said the UK was willing to consider expansion, but wanted to see first what

-CONFIDENTIAL

C04012/LON

Page 3

the { indate would be for the CIS force and clarification of UNOMIG's role.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your file: Our file: 17:01 (47831) 700/MOS/..../.... \$292.23 FROM: Moscow C02846/MOS 21-Jun-1994 TO: Wellington Priority CC: New York Priority Beijing Bonn Routine Brussels Canberra Routine Defence Geneva Routine Harare London Routine Madrid Ottawa Routine Paris Santiago Routine Tokyo Routine Washington Wgtn UNSC Routine MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, ISAC, LGL, EAB, DSP3)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Russia supports in principle, the French proposal and the flexibility (with respect to PKOs) which the proposal requires of the UN. The attitude of the RPF is a concern; Russia would like to be reassured that an acceptance in one form or another of the French plan is forthcoming from both Wilberg sides in the conflict.

Action

For your information.

Summary

Your C24728 and also our C02842 refer.

- We called on MFA today (Vladimir Sergueyev, Director Political Division, International Organisations Directorate) and ran passed him your questions. In responding, he made it clear that Russia accepted the need argued by the French here, for something to be done to address the crisis in Rwanda. Steps taken so far had not stopped the killing and the French proposal was a decisive move which offered some hope. Sergueyev offered the view that the course being proposed did not fit neatly into the UN's rules for PKOs but neither, in his view, did the original American involvement in Somalia. Both situations required some form of departure from the rules which he claimed were, nevertheless, important.
- 3 Sergueyev said that his ministry was concerned at the apparent attitude of the RPF and accepted that the French proposal carried certain risks. An indication of, if

Biadiara	1
Forsyth	1
Ward	
Rider	
Hughes	1-2
Kemr	-
Mc ·	-
Fo3.4	
McC. lok	
Rush	
Tyne	
Dalto-	
Wats	
AND TO PERSON AND THE PERSON AND THE PERSON	

nece: .ry passive, support from the RPF was desirable and should be sought. Sergueyev thought that where the French were to be deployed would help limit the risk of engagement with the RPF and, from his comments, he appeared to hold some store by the French promise of a short-term deployment pending further UN involvement.

- 4 In discussing our concerns, Sergueyev accepted that there were domestic considerations which had influenced the French decision but these in themselves did not alter the Russian view.
- 5 Without prompting, we were reminded that the Russian government was generally seeking a more "flexible" approach by the UN to PKOs, an approach which would allow the organisation to "respond to the reality of a situation" such as that in Rwanda and not be hamstrung by the letter of its rules. Sergueyev said that they hoped others would adopt a similar approach which the Russians had promoted in the cases of the CIS conflicts.

Comment

It came through pretty clearly in what was otherwise a standard but useful briefing, that the Russians are not unpleased with the French move, or that it appears to be gaining support. As we have reported before, the Russians have felt let down by the Security Council's failure to respond more sympathetically to the situations it faces on its borders - notably in Georgia - and Russia's attempts to deal with them in what they regard as an internationally acceptable manner.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

115/23/37

Your file:

115/23/37

Our file:

16:51 (5657)			700/BRU/00000/00000	\$246.62
FROM:	BRUSSELS		C01773/BRU	22-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING	TON	WGTN UNSC	Routine
cc:	NEW YORK EC POSTS DEFENCE		WASHINGTON	Priority Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, H	EUR, DSP3)	
DEFENCE DEFENCE	CE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, D CE MOD (GENTLES)		S, DDI)	
Subject	450000000000000000000000000000000000000			

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

M

As you may know from media reports, the WEU Permanent Council yesterday met to discuss Rwanda. Text of the decision made is below:

BEGINS

"Press Guidelines"

Brussels, 21 June 1994

The WEU Permanent Council met today to discuss further the situation in Rwanda.

A number of member States confirmed their readiness to contribute to the initiative to alleviate the terrible sufferings in Rwanda, subject to a new decision from the United Nations Security Council, taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of expanded UNAMIR.

In this context, the Council has decided to give WEU's support to the efforts of its member States by ensuring the coordination of their contributions.

To this end, the Council confirmed the mandate given at its last meeting to the Planning Cell and instructed it to act as a contact and coordination point between contributing states and the headquarters commanding the operation.

The Council welcomes the readiness of certain African States to contribute to the international humanitarian efforts in Rwanda which it considers essential.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

C01773/BRU

Page 2

The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Rwanda, notably in the light of decisions of the United Nations Security Council."

ENDS

We have been unable today to gain any detailed insight from contacts into the discussions, though we understand that no WEU member had disagreed with the decision as issued above, although Germany and Luxembourg did not participate in the exchange of views. Belgium has yet to make any firm decisions on what legislative support it may provide to the French force. Our Belgian MFA contact emphasised, however, the point in the WEU announcement that contributions to assist the French effort were "subject to a new decision from the UN Security Council."

14 MIDDION VI --- 1:50 1-1-5-51-1

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 22 June 1994

TO: WELLINGTON

No. WGTN UNSC . No. DEFENCE

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

No.

LD: P/S MFA SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

UNSIC, MEA, UNC Gard to

Page 1 of: 8

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Please find attached copies of French resolution as adopted and EOV as delivered.



14:54

UG 22 94



Security Council

10-0-5 (NZ) Brazis Res: 929 (1094)

PROVISIONAL

5/1994/737 21 June 1994 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH

France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate and force level of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Determined to contribute to the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Rwanda to continue and redouble their efforts at the national, regional and international levels to promote these

Stressing the importance of the cooperation of all parties for the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda,

Having considered the latter of the Secretary-General of 19 June 1994 (\$/1994/728),

Taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of UNAMIR, as expanded in resolutions 918 (1994) and

Noting the offer by Hember States to cooperate with the Secretary-General towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda (S/1994/734), and stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an inter-position force between the parties,

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and neighbouring States to bring peace to Rwands,

Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda,

Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community,

210603

Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

- 1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and agrees that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength;
- 2. Welcomes also the offer by Member States (S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the offer will be borne by the Member States concerned;
- 3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994);
- 4. <u>Decides</u> that the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will be limited to a period of two months following the adoption of the present resolution, unless the Secretary-General determines at an earlier date that the expanded UNAMIR is able to carry out its mandate;
- 5. Commends the offers already made by Member States of troops for the expanded UNAMIR;
- 6. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to respond urgently to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support, in order to enable expanded UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate effectively as soon as possible and <u>requests</u> the Secretary-General to identify and coordinate the supply of the essential equipment required by troops committed to the expanded UNAMIR;
- 7. Welcomes, in this respect, the offers already made by Member States of equipment for troop contributors to UNAMIR and calls on other Members to offer such support, including the possibility of comprehensive provision of equipment to specific troop contributors, to speed UNAMIR's expanded force deployment;
- 8. Requests Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with UNAMIR and also requests the Secretary-General to set up appropriate mechanisms to this end;
- 9. Demands that all parties to the conflict and others concerned immediately bring to an end all killings of civilian populations in areas under their control and allow Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to implement fully the mission set forth in paragraph 3 above;

- 1133101 VI --- 1.36

19 4 of 8 8 1991 -11-English Page 3

- 10. Requests the States concerned and the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this operation and the progress made towards the fulfilment of the objectives referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above;
- 11. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made towards completing the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR within the framework of the report due no later than 9 August 1994 under paragraph 17 of resolution 925 (1994), as well as on progress towards the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement;
 - 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

رد د منافقاً المنافقاً المنافقاً المنافقاً المنافقاً المنافقات المنافقات المنافقات المنافقات المنافقات المنافقا

The war of the form



NEW ZEALAND MISSION to the UNITED NATIONS

Ngā Māngai mo Aotearoa



EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON RWANDA

DELIVERED BY

MR COLIN KEATING

NEW ZEALAND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

WEDNESDAY 22 JUNE 1994

CHECK NOW HOT DELIVERY

EXPLANATION OF VOTE : RWANDA

Mr President

1

New Zealand has abstained on this resolution. I need to explain why. But first let me say we admire and greatly respect the humanitarian motivation that France has shown in putting this resolution before the Council. There is no difference between us on the objectives or motives. Only the means.

New Zealand's credentials on the need for an urgent and forceful intervention in Rwanda to protect civilians from systematic slaughter are second to none. It is very well known that almost two months ago New Zealand circulated a draft resolution calling for an expanded United Nations operation under Chapter VII. I therefore repeat we share one hundred percent the humanitarian intentions which underlie the French initiative. But good intentions are not enough in this sort of situation.

We are not convinced that this operation will be able to protect civilians from massacres. We think that there is, to the contrary, a very grave risk that the operation will become bogged down and worse still that it will undermine the United Nations attempt to put in the field the kind of operation that will work.

14 ALDSTON 21

--- 1 156

Mr President, this concern is based not only on our own judgment of the situation, but also on the representations we have received from private humanitarian organisations and NGOs with practical experience of the situation in Rwanda. They too are very concerned that this operation will not achieve the noble humanitarian objective on which it is based and in fact make the situation worse.

Mr President, Somalia has shown us that even where we have the best of humanitarian intentions, if we do not employ the right means tragedy can be the result. We have already seen the evidence. Trying to run two separate operations in parallel with different command arrangements does not work and, in the long run, those who we set out to save/are those who suffer. The Security Council must learn from history.

Mr President, we also have another reservation about this initiative. There is already clear evidence that this initiative is electly having negative impacts on UNAMIR. Countries who were offering to support UNAMIR are hesitating. The security risks have dramatically increased.

Mr President, we have strongly urged that France redirect the energy, enthusiasm and resources which it is employing in this initiative to support the one operation which we believe would be effectively able to curtail the massacres - that is UNAMIR. If that energy, enthusiasm and money were put at the disposal of the United Nations we have no doubt that the delays which UNAMIR is currently facing would disappear overnight.

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your le:

Our file: 197/1/1

16:46 (5656)			700/PAR/0000/00000	\$635.29
FROM:	PARIS		C01940/PAR	22-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT NEW YORK		WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW SANTIAGO		BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA TOKYO DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC (DSP1, CEO, EAR			SAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3) EAB)	
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, (GENTLES)	DDI)	
Subject				

Summary

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

- Beeby was called into the Quai this morning by the newly-appointed Head of UN (Colin de Verdière).
- France requested New Zealand support for French DR on Rwanda. Beeby was told that France did not understand why New Zealand would wish to delay its adoption in the Council by proposing consultation procedures which were not part of the Council's usual procedure. France wanted the DR adopted today. Any further delay could have serious adverse effects on UNAMIR.
- Beeby informed de Verdière that New Zealand Ministers had not yet taken a decision but were leaning towards abstention.
- He was told that France would not understand how a country like New Zealand could refuse to give its support. "We are counting on our friends".
- RPF statements should not be taken at face value.
- France seems unsure whether China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Brazil might abstain.

Action

For information.

Report

- 2 Beeby was called to the Quai by De Verdière (the newly appointed Head of UN Section and replacement for Lafon) at short notice this morning to discuss the French DR on Rwanda.
- Beeby informed de Verdière that he had just spoken to Wellington and been advised that Ministers were considering New Zealand's position on the DR and, while no decision had yet been taken, they were leaning towards an abstention.
- De Verdière said that France did not understand New Zealand's position (as expressed by the NZPR in New York yesterday) and why we would wish to delay the deployment of the intervention force. France did not accept that another report by the UNAMIR Commander was necessary. New Zealand was trying to change the procedures and customs of the Council by calling for a consultation with troop contributors and the UN Commander. France would not accept any further delay. To do so would be "extremely silly" (in the sense of naive, simple-minded - the French word he used was "benêt ") . France could not understand how New Zealand could wish to delay the deployment of the intervention force when we shared the same concerns about the humanitarian situation in Rwanda and had worked closely together in the Council on this question. He went on. If New Zealand was to abstain this would be of great concern to France. This issue was being managed at "the highest levels" in Paris. "We are counting on our friends."
- Beeby reiterated that New Zealand's major concern was the possible effect the French intervention force might have on UNAMIR. This was precisely why Keating had called for consultations with troop contributors and a report by the UN Commander. In reply, De Verdière said that the longer the French intervention force was delayed the more serious the effects on UMAMIR were likely to be. The intervention force would facilitate UNAMIR's tasks in the future. It was not France's intention to intervene anyway and anyhow. The situation in Rwanda required an urgent response. France was prepared to assume its responsibilities and accepted the considerable risks involved.
- 6 Beeby asked about the RPF. De Verdière responded by noting that the declarations of the RPF should not be taken at face value. The RPF understood what was going on, and accepted that France's only motivation was a humanitarian one, even if it did not say so in public. There was no question of France seeking confrontation with the RPF. Balladur had made this very clear in a statement to members of the National Assembly majority last night (see our separate message).

- 7 Finally, Beeby asked about the voting intentions of other Council members, in particular China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Brazil. De Verdière began by saying that China would vote in favour and that France was "more or less optimistic" about the others. When Beeby suggested that they all might abstain, de Verdière backtracked slightly, saying "We aren't sure".
- 8 De Verdière indicated obliquely to us, and his colleague confirmed after the meeting, that France expected the resolution to be passed.
- 9 De Verdière urged Beeby to convey to the New Zealand Government France's wish that New Zealand not delay a Council decision and not abstain on the resolution. He undertook to do so immediately.

Comment

- 10 De Verdière's characterisation of New Zealand's concerns as "procedural" misrepresents the New Zealand position. He seemed to be suggesting that New Zealand was only interested in using the French DR to push its concerns about the need for greater consultations with troop contributors and UN operations commanders.
- 11 The fact that New Zealand might go as far as to abstain on the resolution probably came as something of a shock, implying as it does, that we have more fundamental concerns about the French proposal which we do indeed have. De Verdière clearly found it difficult to accept New Zealand's concerns about the adverse effects of the French operation on UNAMIR despite the fact that Francophone countries are being withdrawn from Kigali.
- 12 France seems determined as ever to go ahead despite mounting criticism of the intervention force proposal in the media and signs of increasing concern within the Government and, according to some reports, the Elysée. Unless our abstention led to a rejection of these, our assessment is that a New Zealand abstention would not do any lasting damage to the bilateral relationship. It would be unrealistic however to expect ready French support for any future initiatives New Zealand might wish to take in the Security Council.

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telepho...: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758~0827

Date:

22 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON

WGTN UNSC / DEFENCE

ΝΦ. No. NO. UIN

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

UNSC, MEA, UNC

Page 1 of: 5

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

2

Following are:

French text as it emerged in blue this evening; (a)

Latest RPF letter urging withdrawal of UNAMIR. (b)





Security Council

PROVISIONAL

5/1994/737 21 June 1994 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH

France: _draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the Situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 and 925 (1994) of & June 1994, which set out the mandate and force lavel of the United Nations Assistance Hission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Determined to contribute to the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Rwands to continue and redouble their efforts at the national, regional and international levels to promote these objectives,

Stressing the importance of the cooperation of all parties for the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General of 19 June 1994 (\$/1994/728),

Taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of UNAMIR, as expanded in resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994)

Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda (S/1994/734), and stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an inter-position force between the parties,

Welcoming the dooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and neighbouring States to bring peace to Rwanda,

Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and wideapread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda,

Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community,

1 ---



<u>Determining</u> that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

- 1. <u>Welcomes</u> the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and <u>agrees</u> that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwands until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength;
- 2. Welcomes also the offer by Member States (S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to schieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwands through the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the offer will be borne by the Member States concerned;
- 3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994);
- 4. <u>Decides</u> that the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will be limited to a period of two months following the adoption of the present resolution, unless the Secretary-General determines at an earlier date that the expanded UNAMIR is able to carry out its mandate;
- 5. Commends the offers already made by Hember States of troops for the expanded UNAMIR;
- 6. Calls upon all Member States to respond urgently to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support, in order to enable expanded UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate effectively as soon as possible and requests the Secretary-General to identify and coordinate the supply of the essential equipment required by troops committed to the expanded UNAMIR;
- 7. <u>Welcomes</u>, in this respect, the offers already made by Hember States of equipment for troop contributors to UNAMIR and <u>calls on</u> other Members to offer such support, including the possibility of comprehensive provision of equipment to specific troop contributors, to speed UNAMIR's expanded force deployment;
- 8. Requests Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with UNAMIR and also requests the Secretary-General to set up appropriate mechanisms to this end;
- 9. <u>Demands</u> that all parties to the conflict and others concerned immediately bring to an end all killings of civilian populations in areas under their control and allow Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to implement fully the mission set forth in paragraph 3 above;

- 10. Requests the States concerned and the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this operation and the progress made towards the fulfilment of the objectives referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above;
- 11. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made towards completing the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR within the framework of the report due no later than 9 August 1994 under paragraph 17 of resolution 925 (1994), as well as on progress towards the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement;

12. pecides to remain actively seized of the matter.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



New York, June 21 1994

His Excellency Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby
President of the Security Council
United Nations

Mr. President

I received instructions this afternoon to convey to the members of the Security Council the request of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, that if the Council plans to approve the proposed French intervention, it should, simultaneously, authorize the withdrawal of the existing contingent of UNAMIR. .

The Rwandese Patriotic front is concerned that its personnel may not always be in a position to make a clear distinction between UNAMIR and other foreign forces in the event of an escalation of hostilities. We have, regrettably, come to the conclusion that it is necessary that UNAMIR personnel be withdrawn to safety, at least on a temporary basis.

We wish to assure your Excellency that this request is made in good faith and does not, in anyway, reflect a desire on our part to avoid our responsibility for the safety of United Nations personnel in our territory.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

Mr. Gerald Gahima

c.c. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
All members of the Security Council
Secretary-General of the OAU.

CONFIDENTIAL

115 /27/37

Your le:

Our file:

197/1/1

18:06 (5658)		700/PAR/00000/00000	\$317.56	
FROM:	PARIS	C01942/PAR	22 - Jun-1994	
TO:	WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate	
cc:	LONDON ROME MOSCOW WASHINGTON SANTIAGO HARARE DEFENCE	BRUSSELS MADRID GENEVA BEIJING CANBERRA OTTAWA BONN	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine	
MFAT	(UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, SMG, EAB)			
P/S MFA				

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Further to our C01940, tonight's <u>Le Monde</u> (see our accompanying fax) in an article sourced from New York quotes Mérimeé as saying that "all the members of the Council are persuaded of our pure intentions." It goes straight on to note that:

"The resolution should be adopted - with perhaps the usual abstention by China and the negative vote of New Zealand. The New Zealand Ambassador, who could still hold up the vote "by procedural obstacles" has been so vehemently opposed to the French initiative that some are wondering if the dark Rainbow Warrior affair was not still on his mind. "

Beeby called De Verdière this afternoon to express his regret at this reference to an issue which was now well and truely of the past. Beeby told De Verdière that there was no question of there being any link between RW and New Zealand's position on Rwanda. De Verdière likewise assured Beeby that he also considered the Rainbow Warrior a thing of the past and that he had nothing like it in mind in talking to him this morning. He asserted that responsibility for the article lay with the reporter alone (a proposition that we think unlikely to be true.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your f'le: 115/23/37

Our file:

18:52 (5666)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$622.54
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ	C04656/NYK	22 - Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	ON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	;	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC, (DSP1, EAB)	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, CEO)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		1

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U/N fax (not to others).

Summary

- Security Council endorses French intervention in Rwanda by a vote of 10-0-5(NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China)
- The significant number of abstentions and the qualified support by the US and Russia will have demonstrated to the French that their actions in Rwanda are not widely supported
- The vote also sent a message that the non-Permanent Members will insist on having their views taken into better account in future Council decisions

<u>Action</u>

Information

Report

Res 929(1994) endorsing the French intervention in Rwanda was adopted early this afternoon by a vote of 10 - 0 - 5(NZ, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, China).

2 At the informals prior to the vote, Merimee attempted to

- reply to the questions he left unanswered yesterday concerning the attitude of the RPF. He said that it would be presumptuous of France to expect the RPF to welcome the French intervention given their public position against any foreign intervention in Rwanda, including by the UN. But, they could expect the RPF to change its position after the resolution had been adopted. At his meetings this morning with Juppe and officials at the Quai, the Deputy Prime Minister designate under the Arusha Agreement had indicated that while he could not publicly support the intervention, he considered that French intentions were laudable and that the RPF would cooperate with the French once they made contact in Merimee said that French officials were also meeting the RPF today on the Rwanda/Uganda border. In addition, he pointed to yesterday's announcement by Canada that it would be providing 350 troops to UNAMIR as proof that the French intervention was not acting as a disincentive to participation in UNAMIR.
- 3 There were no public comments on this information. For the Brazilians, however, who had made RPF consent a keystone of their attitude to the resolution, Merimee's comments were insufficient to persuade them off their proposed abstention.
- 4 The only other discussion at the informals concerned the timing of the vote. The French were desperate for adoption by the early afternoon (and frequently checked their watches as time ticked away). Nigeria (Ayewah), however, tried to defer the vote until the afternoon, allegedly on the basis that his Minister was tied up in a meeting and had not confirmed his instructions. He also argued that the Council should wait to hear from OAU SecGen, Salim Salim who was arriving in New York in the early afternoon. But Ayewah ran into a major and unexpected obstacle in the person of Boutros Ghali.
- In a move almost unprecedented in our time on the Council, the French had persuaded the SecGen to attend the final discussion of the text at the informals. When Ayewah argued for delay, the SecGen intervened to say that Council action was urgent and that he had had an urgent plea from his Special Rep in Burundi that something must be done quickly in Rwanda to stop the disease of the killings spreading to Burundi. Acknowledging the risks inherent in the French intervention, the SecGen also said that the dangers of intervention were less than those of Council inaction.
- The SecGen's remarks gave sufficient basis for Spain, UK and Russia to argue in support of rapid action. France then proposed that the vote be held at 1pm. No one demurred. We took no part in the discussions at the informals. Merimee told us he was very grateful that New Zealand had not sought any further delay.
- 7 Russia, Brazil, Djibouti, China and Rwanda gave EOVs before the vote. France, US, NZ, Spain, UK, Czech Rep,

Argent_na, Nigeria and Oman spoke afterwards. Pakistan kept its counsel.

- 8 Those supporting the resolution emphasised the need for rapid action to halt the killings in Rwanda, the difficulties in getting UNAMIR deployed, and the limited scope and timeframe of the French force. Probably the best case for the intervention was made by the US, though Mrs Albright's words comment that the nature of the humanitarian crisis demanded a swift response from the international community came oddly from the representative of the country most responsible for the delay in Council action on Rwanda. The US statement, however, was alos the most pointed at the French motivation, insisting on the need for neutrality and implying that the world will be watching closely.
- 9 We have sent by separate fax (Wellington and Paris only) the text of the NZ EOV which emphasised that while we shared and applauded France's humanitarian objectives, we disagreed with the means by which they were being pursued. As did Brazil and Nigeria, we expressed serious concerns about having two operations with different command structures and authorities operating in parallel, and noted the lessons that should have been drawn on this score from what happened in Somalia.

Comment

- 10 Paris's C01940 confirms our own impressions that the French had misread the level of support they had and were surprised when they learned this morning how many Council members intended to abstain. In fact, it could have been worse for them. Once the Argentines had found out where things stood, they made an effort to persuade Buenos Aires to move to an abstention as well. As it turned out, the Argentines continued to support the French, but had they not, the French would have been in the most uncomfortable situation of having the bare minimum of 9 positive votes (and reliant on that of Rwanda) to get the resolution through.
- 11 Merimee was clearly pleased at the tone of the New Zealand statement. He is also very well aware that the weight of New Zealand's independent viewpoint has been felt much more keenly by others in the Council. In fact, this is one of the few cases where we have had a difference with France. And on many other key policy issues in particular, Bosnia and the use of air strikes, and the creation last year of UNAMIR the French have had better cooperation from New Zealand than almost anyone else.
- 12 Like Paris, we do not think that the New Zealand abstention should do lasting damage to our relations with France. The number of abstentions, plus the fact that we were careful not to call into question French motives, should ensure that. We agree that our vote will not predispose the French to support future New Zealand initiatives on the

- Council. But it is in the nature of things that they have many more initiatives in the Council than we do and will want our support for those, and they are already (with the British) our principal opponents in our endeavours to open up the Council's procedures.
- 13 The vote today will have sent a clear message to the French that their actions in Rwanda will be scrutinised closely and that, short of a dramatic change of circumstances, they will be held to their promises to keep their intervention truly impartial and of a short duration.
- 14 On a wider level, the vote will also have sent a timely signal to all the Permanent Members and the SecGen that the non-Permanent Council members are prepared to stand up for principle and that the consensus tradition of recent times cannot be used to coerce countries into supporting initiatives on which they have serious reservations. In that sense, we consider that the vote will be a help rather than a hindrance in ensuring that the views of all Council members are taken into account in future decisions.

CONFIDENTIAL / IMMEDIATE
TO NEW YORK

C. Loudsai, Watenwetoni.

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04649 and fax 2826.

Instruction

- 2 After long and intensive consideration, Ministers have decided that you should abstain on the resolution as long as at least three other Council members also abstain. You should make a short EOV (see below).
- 3 The Minister would like Keating to telephone him before the vote, irrespective of the time here. The Minister's home telephone number is 0064-4-4995955.
- 4 You should know that in the circumstances we have told the Quai d'Orsay (through Beeby) and the French Ambassador here this evening that no final decision has been taken but that the balance of Ministers' opinion is inclining towards an abstention.

<u>EOV</u>

- 5 You should make a brief EOV to include the following elements and those of the draft press statement (see separate fax):
- acknowledge good motivation behind France's proposal;
- share concern to protect civilian population and see an end to the killing;
- New Zealand's own efforts in the Council over the past two months to promote rapid deployment of UN forces, with enforcement authority are a matter of record;
- our reservations relate to the impact on UNAMIR, dilution of efforts to accelerate UNAMIR deployment and future ability of the UN and humanitarian organisations to operate in Rwanda.

=

Your ile:

Our file: 42/1/2

115/23/37

11:33

700/MAD/00000/00000

\$96.26

FROM: MADRID

RID U00603

23 Jun 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON

WGTN UNSC

PRIORITY

CC:

NEW YORK OTTAWA WASHINGTON

EC POSTS CANBERRA

HARARE

ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE

MFAT

(MEA, UNC, EUR, ISAC, HRU, SMG, EAB)

P/S MFA

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Spanish Press has given New Zealand's UNSC abstention only minor coverage. One paper has suggested that NZ "suspects French motives".
- Spanish press opinion is that the French action in Rwanda lacks adequate political preparation, and for this reason cannot be considered "purely humanitarian".
- Spanish Government has announced logistic support for French intervention.

Action

2 For information only.

Report

- In a report datelined Washington, today's edition of the main Madrid daily "El Pais" reports the outcome of yesterday's UNSC vote on Rwanda, adding: "Of the non-permanent members, only Nigeria and New Zealand had indicated doubts about French intentions. Nigeria, because it considers that the operation smacks of old colonial adventures in the African continent. New Zealand, for its part, suspects the motives of France, a country accused by the Tutsi opposition RPF of having supported for many years the Hutu-majority Government, which in its turn is implicated in most of the killings in Rwanda".
- In its editorial column "El Pais" does not mention the 5 Abstention votes in the SC, but comments "The attitude of the Tutsi front indicates that the French plan lacks the political preparation necessary for it to be considered an exclusively humanitarian operation, deserving the UN's support. France is trying to convince the RPF of its good intentions, but has not succeeded yet. As regards the OAU, Europe's interest is in cooperating with it and encouraging its involvement, certainly not in taking decisions without taking the OAU's views into account. There are therefore reasons for Spain to take a cautious approach to this question, without allowing this to harm our friendship with a country which is our ally and with which we have very close links.

logistic support for the French intervention, but has not yet given details.

We have sent copies of the Minister's press statement (your U52433) to leevant officials in the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1

Your le:

115/23/37

Our file:

20:11 (5689)			700/NYK/00000/00000	\$597.21
FROM:	NEW YORK	ζ	C04671/NYK	24-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGT	ON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	;	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT	'AT (MEA, UNC, ISA		HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAR	3)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- French give preliminary briefing on progress by their intervention force
- Secretariat confirm that some of the African troop contributors to UNAMIR are having second thoughts
- Spanish see merit in pressing ahead with their resolution on the commission of experts, despite our request that they hold fire for a bit longer

Action

Confirmation we should proceed with cosponsorship of the Spanish resolution even though they want to move ahead rather faster than we consider desirable.

Report

French intervention force

At informal consultations today, France, at the request of Argentina, gave a preliminary briefing on progress by the French intervention force.

Merimee noted that, although in terms of Res 929, the first progress report was not due for another 13 days, said he was happy to provide a briefing "on a personal basis". He noted that so far about 500 of the planned 2,500 French troops had been deployed to the area. Most were across the border in Zaire and would continue to be stationed outside Rwanda. The intention was that they would make "incursions" into Rwanda as necessary. Only "a small detachment" was in Rwanda itself. This was in the town of Cyangugu in the extreme south-west of the country. They had deployed there to protect the @ 8,000 Tutsis located in various camps in the area.

- 3 The next likely area of attention would be the north-west, in the area south-west of Ruhengeri where, Merimee said, the bulk of the population still at risk were located. The troops would seek to protect persons at risk, attempt to establish a "climate of security", and would use force to save people's lives if necessary.
- 4 Following Merimee's briefing, the Secretariat (Riza) noted that Gen Dallaire had made contact with the French Commander and was making arrangements for coordination between the UN and French forces. Riza noted that the situation in the country seemed largely the same as it had been in recent weeks, though the fighting in Kigali had intensified. One worrying development was that the Government-controlled radio had also intensified its vitriol against UNAMIR in general and Dallaire in particular.

Deployment of expanded UNAMIR

The UK (Hannay) asked Riza if the Council could do anything to ensure that the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR continued to move ahead, noting that a number of countries were concerned that the adoption of Res 929 should not affect the process. In response, Riza noted that Ghana had agreed to the deployment this week of the remainder of its battalion, but there now appeared to be some delay. Similarly, Zimbabwe, which had confirmed its readiness to deploy its battalion, was now reviewing its position. Riza agreed that the Council might assist in maintaining the deployment of the force but he thought that the Secretariat should first clarify the situation with these countries before suggesting a particular course of action. He noted that a Secretariat team was in the process of visiting Tunisia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to ascertain the equipment that those troops had available.

Spanish resolution

At the end of the informals, Spain (Barnuevo) announced that he wanted to move ahead with his resolution seeking the appointment of a commission of experts to investigate reports of genocide and other serious human rights violations. He asked that the issue be put on the agenda of informals on Tuesday, 28 June.

- We had strongly suggested to Spain that it would be good to let an interval of a week or two pass after the adoption of Res 929 before bringing forward their resolution. The Brazilians took a similar line. The Spanish maintain, however, that the Special Rapporteur will report be presenting a report on Rwanda in Geneva next Monday (27 June) and that it is important that the Council act relatively quickly. They also argue that their draft, which is much liked by the RPF, may help diminish RPF antagonism towards UNAMIR. Despite these arguments, the main reason Spain want to push the resolution next week is that Barnuevo will be on leave the following week.
- 8 On balance, if the choice is between acting next week or waiting, in effect, three weeks, we would be inclined to tell the Spanish that provided the situation on the ground does not worsen appreciably in the meantime as a consequence of the French intervention, we could go along with putting the draft to the vote on Thursday, 30 June. That would be a reasonable interval after the vote on Res 929.
- 9 Our accompanying fax contains the latest version of the Spanish draft. The major change from the last version we sent you was the removal of what was Op 1 to the preamble. We think that is an improvement. We are reasonably comfortable with the draft as it now stands. It will undergo some softening through the negotiation process if the Chinese and others are to be brought on board.
- 10 With regard to the specific queries in your U52262, we would note the following:
- Pp7(now 8) The Spanish advise that this was based on language put forward by the US. They do not know its origins but suspect it was custom made for this resolution. They are enquiring. They and we expect the Chinese will raise difficulties about it in any event.
- Ops 2&3 We put your views regarding "grave violations". The use of "grave" was not inadvertent. It is intended to limit the Commission's enquiry to "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, which are the only crimes under that Convention that entail universal jurisdiction, and breaches of the Genocide Convention which cannot be characterised as being anything but grave. The draft is deliberately cast to ensure that all breaches of the Genocide Convention are seen as "grave violations". We consider the Spanish reply to be fairly convincing.

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

24 June 1994

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB) Page 1 of: 4

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

Following is latest draft of Spanish resolution on the Commission of experts on Rwanda.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda,

Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21) In which the Security Council inter alia condemned all breaches of international humanitarian law in Awanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalled that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible,

Recalling also the requests it addressed to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 and in Resolution 918 (1994), concerning the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1994 (5/1994/640), in which he noted that massacres and in killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda and also noted that only a proper investigation can establish the facts and enable the determination of responsibility.

<u>Helcoming</u> the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,

Expressing once again its gravest concern at the continuing reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, including acts of genocide, have been committed in Rwanda.

Affirming that all persons who commit (authorize or instigate) serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations,

Noting the importance of the effective application of international humanitarian law in the fulfilment of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security,

- of urgency, an impartial Commission of experts to examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, or of other persons or bodies, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of possible acts of genocide and other grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of :- Rwanda, and recommendations in this regard;
- 2. <u>Calls upon</u> States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to grave violations of international humanitarian law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, being committed in the territory of Rwanda, and <u>requests</u> States, relevant United Nations bodies, and relevant organizations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and as appropriate thereafter,

and to provide other appropriate assistance to the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 1;

- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts, and to report also within [ninety] days from the establishment of the Commission of Experts, on its conclusions, so that the Security Council might take account of them in any recommendations for possible further appropriate steps to ensure that persons responsible for such acts are brought to justice;
- 4. Also requests the Secretary-General and as appropriate the High Commissions for Human Rights to ensure that adequate coordination and cooperation is maintained between the work of the Commission of Experts and that of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda;
- 5. <u>Urges</u> all concerned fully to cooperate with the Commission of Experts in the accomplishment of its mandate, including complying with requests for assistance and access by Commission members and expert staff in pursuing investigations;
 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your le:

Our file:

174/1/1

14:37 (5690) 700/ROM/00000/00000 \$156.96 FROM: ROME C00934/ROM 25-Jun-1994 TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Routine CC: PARIS NEW YORK Routine DEFENCE Routine HARARE MFAT (UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB) P/S MFA DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI) DEFENCE MOD

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our U00792 of 21 June refers.

Summary

2 Italian Government has announced that it is willing to send contingent of some 450 troops to Rwanda but has attached four specific preconditions. Support for French proposal may accordingly be less than wholehearted. Doubts probably stem from Italy's experience in Somalia. Secretary General of MFA (Salleo) told US Ambassador yesterday that he regards proposal as "ill advised and risky".

Action

3 For information only.

Report

- 4 Media reports note that Italy is ready to take an active part in Rwanda if four conditions can be met, as follows:
- a) operation authorized by UN;
- b) parties in conflict agree to presence of foreign troops;
- c) agreement worked out on the conduct and duration of the operation;
- d) command of the operation assumed by WEO or NATO.
- 5 While the Government appears willing in principle to take part in any action which will halt the events in Rwanda it seems likely that MFA and Defence officials (the Secretary General's comment reported above is direct and to the point)

have resh in their minds the problems which arose during the recent deployment of Italian forces in Somalia and are counselling caution.

- Of the four requirements only the first can currently be regarded as being in place but French can be expected to apply pressure on Italians in Corfu to modify their position on the other points.
- 7 As far as b) is concerned media reports state that so far only the Hutu (apparantly supported in the past by France) have agreed to the presence of foreign troops. A Tutsi spokesperson in Brussels is reported to have warned that should Italy send troops it will be "at its own risk and danger".
- 8 Senior Ministry of Defence staff, who we are told, "fully share views of the their MFA colleagues" say that they will require equipment they do not currently possess, and will insist that clear goals be established for the mission as well as agreement on the command structures, rules of engagement and likely duration. Undoubtedly referring back to Somalia the Chief of General Staff has said that the tasks assigned to Italy in any eventual operation will " need to be realistic and achievable".

Comment

9 New Italian Government would want to be forthcoming to French request and, impelled by public opinion, would want to be seen to contribute to any action likely to bring an end to the horrific events in Rwanda. On the other hand their experience in Somalia is leading to a cautious approach to the practicalities. Corfu summit may alter the balance. If no agreement is reached Italy will probably limit its involvement to "humanitarian relief operations" along Rwanda's borders.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your f'le:

14:32 (5697)

Our file:

700/UNC/00000/00000 \$19.75

FROM:

WELLINGTON

C24997/WN1

27-Jun-1994

TO:

NEW YORK

PARIS

Routine

WGTN UNSC

Routine

CC:

CANBERRA DEFENCE

OTTAWA

Routine Routine

MFAT

(UNC, MEA, EUR, ISAC, LGL, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HONZDF

(DSIA)

Subject

U52679: OPS)

DEFENCE MOD

P/S MFA

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Minister considers, in consequence of last week's Council decision, and hesitations that decision has put into minds of contributors to UNAMIR (New York's C04671 refers), that France has a responsibility:

- to encourage countries providing troops and equipment to follow through

so that the expanded UNAMIR can go ahead;

- to offer appropriate transport/logistical support so that UNAMIR can be satisfactorily up and running by the end of the two month period authorised for the French intervention force.
- Grateful if in first instance, New York take this up with Merimee and report response.
- Minister welcomes advice that in field arrangements are being made for coordination between French and UN forces.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your le: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

115/23/27

200	7-14			
18:05 ((5705)		700/MEA/00000/00000	\$166.60
FROM:	WELLINGT	PON	C25024/WN1	27-Jun-1994
TO:	NEW YORK	ζ		Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	3	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON WGTN UNSC	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT		(MEA, UNC, ISAC	HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, E	AB)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE	HQNZDF	(DSIA, OPS, DI	DI)	EU-

Subject

U52725: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C04671.

- We can live with draft resolution as presently worded and recognise that it will be amended again in course of Council informals.
- 3 We have taken on board Spanish comments regarding "grave violations" (your para 10).
- 4 Minister agrees you may still co-sponsor resolution, with a view to adoption later this week.

-CONFIDENTIAL

Your le: 115/23/37

Our file:

3/88/1

<u>17:10 (</u>	5713)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$635.29
FROM:	NEW YOR	К	C04674/NYK	27-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLING	ron	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
cc:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO DEFENCE	5	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISA			HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAF	3)
P/S MFA DEFENCE DEFENCE		(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES))	

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- French are making efforts, in consultation with the Secretariat, to encourage greater participation in UNAMIR through provision of troops and/or logistics.
- RPF has undertaken to continue cooperating with UNAMIR. ~
- Council delivers firm message to Rwandan PR about controlling anti-UN propaganda from Radio Milles Collines.
- We take issue with Rwanda's announcement that it wants the Council to have on its agenda for informals this week the situation on the Uganda/Rwanda border.

Action

Information.

Report

French Actions to Bolster UNAMIR

Your U52679 (not to all).

We took the opportunity to follow up this morning with Merimee a comment he made at informals last Thursday (23 June) chat France, in the light of the remarks made at the adoption of Res 929, "would be making some suggestions" to encourage greater participation in UNAMIR. Merimee said to us that their idea was to put together a group of countries who might be persuaded to provide troops or equipment to UNAMIR to see what specific steps might be taken to ensure that the expanded force was deployed as quickly as possible. He noted that they were working closely with the Secretariat. We have subsequently learned that there is to be an expanded meeting of potential troop contributors and Council members tomorrow, 28 June.

- 3 Merimee said that there were two very compelling reasons for France to take this initiative. First, he said that unless France was able to ensure that the expanded force was in place within the next two months, then France would have great difficulty in pulling its force out of Rwanda in accordance with the time frame set out in Res 929. Secondly, France was very concerned at what might happen if the RPF were to make major advances into government held territory to the point that French and RPF troops came into direct contact. This was another reason for making sure that the French presence was a short one.
- 4 Merimee did not have any more specific information to offer. We did not press him directly for information on what logistical support France might be offering to UNAMIR. As it was, an unspoken aspect of our conversation was what NZ might be doing in this area. You should be aware that if we are to press the French more directly on this point, we will need to be ready to respond to direct questions about what contribution NZ might be making to the international effort.

Radio Milles Collines

- 5 At the end of this mornings informals, Gharekhan gave a brief update on Rwanda. He said that the fighting in Kigali was now intense with the RPF clearly trying to squeeze the government forces out of their positions. To date, however, there had been no marked change in their disposition of the two forces.
- 6 On the positive side, Gharekan noted that the RPF said it would continue to cooperate with UNAMIR.
- 7 Gharekhan noted that the diatribes against UNAMIR and General Dallaire from Radio Milles Collines were continuing. The nature of the broadcasts was such as to call into question the deployment of the Canadian contingent in view of the anti-Canadian overtones that were starting to feature. These appeared to be generated because of Canada's leading role in the passage of the resolution in the CHR.
- 8 The UK, Spain, Nigeria, Russia and we picked up the remarks about Radio Milles Collines. Hannay recalled that the Council had, last week, made a direct request to the

Rwanda PR to ensure that his Government took effective action to put an end to these broadcasts. It was suggested that the President should reiterate, in his comments to the press, the Council's grave concern at the continuation of these broadcasts.

- In response, Bisimana tried to argue that the Radio was a private station independent of the government, though he acknowledged that it should comply with the basic rules governing broadcasting in Rwanda. He claimed that he had relayed the Council's concerns to his authorities who had assured him that they would "step up their contacts" with Radio Milles Colline and try and ensure that it, like other radio stations in Rwanda, took a policy of promoting national reconciliation.
- 10 The French gave a firm rebuke to Bisimana. Legal (the French legal adviser) said that these comments about freedom of the press cut no ice. The fact was that the radio was under the government's political control, that it was engaging in the most blatant forms of propaganda that were completely beyond the pale and that they had to stop. The Spanish noted that the directors and shareholders of the radio station were either members of or closely connected with the Government. Vorontsov then proposed that the Government be given 24 hours to bring the radio station under control or to face further measures from the Council. This was accepted as being the sense of the meeting.

Rwanda's Request that Rwanda/Uganda Issue be out on the Agenda of Informals

- Il Prior to the exchange on Radio Milles Collines, Bisimana referred to various letters he has sent in over the past month (in which the Government has repeated its standard line that the RPF is acting at the behest of Uganda which is actively sponsoring and supporting the RPF) and asked the President to ensure that the Rwanda/Uganda issue was on the agenda for informal consultations later in the week.
- No other delegation commented on the request though it was clear that no-one was happy with it. Accordingly, following our remarks about Radio Milles Colline we expressed concern that one of the parties to a dispute seemed to be attempting to use his position as a Council member to the disadvantage of another of the parties. We noted that we did not deny the right of any council member to put an item on the agenda of informals but questioned the wisdom in the current circumstances of the situation in Rwanda. We also noted that there appeared to be little justification in view of the fact that the Council had only a week ago considered the situation on the Rwanda/Uganda border in the context of its renewal of the UNOMUR mandate.
- 13 Given the many public and private criticisms that have been made of the Council because of Bisimana's continued

representation on it, we considered it was important that his request should not pass unchallenged. Of course, should he persist in this kind of activity it will only give added strength to the arguments for there to be a challenge to his credentials. As we understand it, the discussions with Bisimana aimed at persuading him not to take up the Presidency in September have run into a snag, and he is now raising various objections to the course of action proposed. Part of the reason appears to be related to the French intervention. It would seem that at least of last week, the Rwandan Government has taken added heart from the French actions and is arguing that it is too soon now to be making decisions now when the situation in September is unknown.

115/23/37

Your e:

Our file: 42/1/2

16:36 (5710)	700/MAD/00000/00000	\$195.03
FROM:	MADRID	C00282/MAD	27-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Routine
cc:	NEW YORK	EC POSTS	Routine
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, EUR, DSP3, DSP2)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

A Spanish official comments on the Rwanda situation and asks for New Zealand views on Rwanda's UNSC and GA credentials.

Action

Comment please on the credentials issue for passing to the Spanish.

Report

- In the course of a routine meeting on 27 June with Moratinos (DG for Africa/Middle East in the Foreign Ministry) Moratinos made some comments on last week's UNSC/Rwanda vote which may still be of interest. He said he had read the copy of the Minister's press statement of 23 June which we had sent. He wanted us to know that he and his colleagues agreed entirely with New Zealand's reasons for abstaining on the French-sponsored resolution on Rwanda. Spain had helped the French out in the UNSC for bilateral reasons, and because considerable French pressure had been brought to bear. Juppe had telephoned Spanish FM Solana three times, and the French Defence minister had also been telephoning his Spanish counterpart.
- On the question of logistical support for the French intervention, Spain was now deliberately dragging its feet. Having announced that there would be some Spanish logistical support, which would probably turn out to be a transport aircraft and maybe a medical unit, Spain was slowing down the process of deciding what exactly to do. It did not want to "seem too keen". So far the French intervention in Rwanda had not gone too badly, but nor did it seem to have done much good in a humanitarian sense so far.
- Moratinos told us that a little while ago the Spanish PR in New York had been involved in a discussion with some other PR's of UNSC countries, on a personal basis, on the question

whether there was anything to be gained in terms of improving the situation on the ground in Rwanda by taking any action on the Rwanda delegation's credentials, either in the UNSC or later in the GA. When news of this had reached Madrid, the Spanish PR had been instructed that his Government did not wish him to initiate any discussion on this question. If other delegations raised the subject of Rwanda's credentials officially, Spain would of course address the issue. In this connection, Moratinos asked that we check with you whether New Zealand had any views on the usefulness of making an issue of Rwanda's credentials and also on whether the matter was likely to be brought up officially in the UNSC. He said that he wanted to be prepared in case the issue emerged suddenly. "The French have already taken us by surprise once on Rwanda. We would like to avoid other surprises."

Comment

6 Moratinos is, as you know, a useful and well-informed source of information on Africa and the Middle East. We will be reporting separately the interesting analysis he gave us of Spain's relations with Morocco. It would be particularly useful in terms of consolidating our dialogue with him if you could enable us to respond within a day or so to his question on Rwanda credentials.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your / '3: 42/1/2

Our file: 115/23/57

(5719)700/UNC/00000/00000 \$135.75 FROM: WELLINGTON C25052/WN1 28-Jun-1994 TO: MADRID Routine CC: NEW YORK WGTN UNSC Routine EC POSTS Routine WASHINGTON MOSCOW BEIJING Routine MFAT (UNC, MEA, LGL, EUR, DSP3, DSP2)

V-los-Treston

Subject
U52815: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C00282 (not to all).

- We are considering the question of Rwanda's position on the Council. We should be grateful for any further views New York may have following their report (their C04674, para 13) on the Rwandan PR's increasing intransigence.
- 3 The views of the permanent members, particularly France, will be persuasive in determining the Council's action. To date ideas have focussed on how to sideline Rwanda rather than remove it. One consideration is that a formal move to expel the Rwandan delegation would be likely to diminish further the RGF's willingness to cooperate with the UN (and the French?). Any step in the direction of a challenge would also need the support of the African group to have a chance of success.
- 4 It is not an issue on which we see New Zealand taking a lead.

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your (le: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/8

22:35 (5752)		700/NYK/00000/00000	\$393.89
FROM: NEW YORK	ζ	C04695/NYK	29-Jun-1994
TO: WELLING	CON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING		BONN	Routine
BRUSSELS	\$	CANBERRA	Routine
GENEVA		HARARE	Routine
LONDON		MADRID	Routine
MOSCOW		OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS		SANTIAGO	Routine
TOKYO		WASHINGTON	Routine
DEFENCE			Routine
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)		
P/S MFA			
DEFENCE HONZDF DEFENCE MOD	(DSIA, OPS, DDI) (GENTLES)		

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Over the course of the past couple of days we have joined the Spanish in discussing various suggestions for amendments put forward, particularly by the P3, to the draft resolution establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate human rights violations in Rwanda. Various adjustments were made, none particularly significant. One of the main concerns was to try to avoid undue overlap between the Commission of Experts and the Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to the CHR resolution.

- Spain circulated the revised text in the informal consultations this evening. (Text in our accompanying fax Wellington and Geneva only.) France had a minor quibble with the final part of PP5 but was able to claim satisfaction wit the small adjustment proposed by Pakistan. It was helpful that in the course of his intervention Pakistan indicated support for the proposal, and welcome that the UK and US announced their readiness to cosponsor the draft. After some cajoling we were also able to persuade Nigeria (Gambari) to speak positively about the draft.
- 3 As expected, the Chinese raised the most substantive problems and, after making another speech about the Council needing to keep out of areas in which it was not competent, Li sought the deletion of references to the Special Rapporteur in PP6, OP1 and OP3. He did not press the point too hard, especially after the Nigerian intervention, but later sought the Nigerians' assistance in making at least

some adjustments to those aspects of the text. At Nigeria's request, we made an effort to come up with language that gives the Chinese something, but the Spanish resisted. As Barnuevo correctly pointed out, if China abstains on its own, there is no harm to the adoption of the resolution given its well known position on human rights issues.

- Rwanda also sought an amendment namely a new preambular para referring to the investigation called for in Res 918 into the causes of the air crash leading to the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. Spain resisted what would be an unnecessary distraction to the work of the Commission. Again, if Rwanda were to abstain, that would not cause the cosponsors any heartache.
- 5 The Spanish have asked that the text be put in blue this evening and are hopeful that it may be adopted tomorrow, 30 June. Whether this happens will largely depend on the pressure of more urgent business (Georgia, Haiti, Angola). In any event, there now seems a good chance the resolution will be adopted by the end of the week.

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephoy : (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date:

29 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC -

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

GENEVA

No.u/N

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DEFENCE

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD:

SFAT (LGL, UNC, MEA, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

Page 1 of: 4

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

UNSC, LGL, UNC, DSP3

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Our accmpanying message refers.

Following is latest draft of resolution establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate grave human rights violations in Rwanda.

OFAFT FESCIVERS:

(Argentina, Creck Republic, New Zealand, Spain)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda,

Reaffirming in particular, resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994) which expanded UNAMIR, and stressing in this connection the need for early deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to enable it to carry out its mandate.

Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 (S/PRST 1994/21) in which the Security Council inter alia condemned all breathes of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalled that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible,

Recalling also the requests it addressed to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 and in resolution 918 (1994), concerning the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640), in which he noted that massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda and also noted that only a proper investigation can establish the facts fand enable the determination of responsibility.

Welcoming the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,

Expressing once again its grave concern at the continuing reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, including acts of genocide, have been committed in Rwanda,

Recalling that all persons who commit or authorize the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations and should be brought to justice,

- 1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information submitted pursuant to the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide;
- 2. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to grave violations of international humanitarian law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Funishment of the Crime of Genocide, committed in Resada derive the conflict, and requests States, relevant United Nations codies, and relevant organizations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and appropriate thereafter,

4/4

and to provide appropriate assistance so the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 1;

- 3. Peopleses the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Emperts, and further requests the Secretary-General to report also to the Council within four months from the establishment of the Commission of Experts on the conclusions of the Commission and to take account of these conclusions in any recommendations for further appropriate steps;
- 4. Also requests the Secretary-General and as appropriate the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make the information submitted to the Special Rapporteur available to the Commission of Experts and to ensure that adequate coordination and cooperation is maintained between the work of the Commission of Experts and that of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda;
- 5. Urges all concerned fully to Cooperate with the Commission of Experts in the accomplishment of its mandate:
 - 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Your file:

Our file: 197/1/1

115/23/37

16:08		700/PAR/00	000/00000	\$96.26
FROM:	PARIS	U02437	30 Jun 1994	
TO:	WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	ROUTINE ROUTINE	
CC:	CANBERRA WASHINGTON BEIJING GENEVA LONDON SANTIAGO	OTTAWA DEFENCE BONN HARARE MADRID TOKYO	ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE	
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, ISA	C, HRU, LGL, EUR,	DP3, DSP1, EAB)	
P/S ME DEFENC DEFENC	CE HQNZDF (DISA	, OPS, DDI)		

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C25024.

Summary

Following Defence Minister Leotard's visit to Zaire/Rwanda yesterday, Cooperation Minister Roussin has called for UNAMIR troops to replace the French as soon as possible.

There is increasing preoccupation with the potential risks the French forces are facing in Rwanda - from the RGA and Hutu militia as well as from the RPF.

Former head of the anti-terrorist unit in the Elysûe, Paul Barril, has claimed that he is in possession of the "black box" from the aircraft shot down on 6 April carrying the former Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. He claims the FPR was responsible.

French humanitarian organisations MŪdicins Sans FrontiÙre and MŪdicins du Monde have both called for military intervention to stop the massacres.

Action

For information.

Report

- French Defence Minister LÛotard visited French troops in Zaire and Rwanda yesterday. Somewhat surprisingly he has so far made little public comment on the visit, confining himself to noting that "the difficulties are ahead of us". "We are over the easy bit. There is risk of the Rwandan Army turning against us."
- 3 Today Minister for Cooperation, Roussin, called for the urgent

place of the French military operation. (Roussin, L \hat{U} otard and Balladur are all thought to have held reservations about the French intervention with the real push having come from Jupp \hat{U} 's office and the Elys \hat{U} e).

- The French media continue to report extensively on Rwanda. A number of French journalists are now based in Zaire and are accompanying French troops on sorties into Rwanda. Early reports indicated that the French had received a warm reception from the Hutu and Rwandan military to the point that the French were finding it difficult to dissuade the Hutu that they had not intervened on their behalf. Over the past couple of days, however, there have been a number of reports of increasing tension between the French troops and the Rwandan army as the latter come to appreciate that the French are not there to help them militarily.
- Speculation continues to exist over claims made by the former head of the anti-terrorist unit in the Elys $\hat{\textbf{U}}$ e, Paul Barril published in Le Monde (28 June), that he is in possession of the "black box" from the aircraft shot down on 6 April. Dassault, the plane's manufacturers have cast

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1

U02437

over this as has the supposed manufacturer of the black box (Litton). Bartil accuses the RPF of being responsible for the attack and is said be helping lawyers for former President Habyarimana's wife prepare a case to go before the International Court in The Hague. FM JuppÛ has responded to Barril's claims by calling him to hand over whatever he's in possession of to the UNSG who has been given the task of conducting an official investigation into the attack.

The same Le Monde article also queried the reasons for the death of three French nationals in Kigali immediately following the attack on the former President's plane. Two were French police and the other a spouse of one of the French officers. A number of question-marks remain over their deaths, none of which have been officially addressed.

Comment

We will try and seek further comment from our contacts on the emerging concerns about the safety of the French troops and report further.

UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

115/23/37

Your life:

Our file: 186/1/1

16:51 (5761)		700/OTT//	\$263.04	
FROM:	Ottawa	C01960/OTT	30 - Jun-1994	
TO:	Wellington	Wgtn UNSC	Routine	
cc:	Beijing Brussels Geneva London Moscow Paris Tokyo	Bonn Canberra Harare Madrid New York Rome Washington	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine	
MFAT	(MEA, UNC, I	ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, AMER, SMG, EA	В)	
DEFENCE DEFENCE		S, DDI)		

<u>Subject</u>

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

SUMMARY

DFAIT called a meeting of all resident Ambassadors and High Commissioners to appeal to all countries to make firm commitments to UNAMIR TWO asap.

ACTION

For information.

REPORT

- On Wednesday pm (29 June) DFAIT at Deputy Minister level (ADM Lavertu, Political and International Security Affairs, and ADM Perron, Africa and Middle East) briefed the diplomatic corps (Zaire was excluded because of Canadian concern about Mobutu's role in events) on current developments in Rwanda, and urged all representatives to convey a message to their governments about the importance of redoubling efforts to make firm commitments to UNAMIR TWO.
- 4 Lavertu noted that Canada understood the humanitarian motives behind the French initiative, but said that a long term solution had to be found through a full scale UN operation. Indeed the Chapter 7 humanitarian operation reinforced the urgency to get UMNAMIR TWO in place on the ground. It was now essential that the UN obtain a sufficient force with proper equipment for the task. It was noted that the troop contributors meeting in New York the previous day (28 June) had been disappointing in that many offers remained to be confirmed or were conditional, and there had been some excessive requests for equipment. A further meeting was

planned for 5 July.

- 5 Perron said that the tragedy on a gigantic scale in Rwanda had a significant impact on the whole region. The credibility of the UN was at stake. There was the desperate humanitarian need within Rwanda itself. The authorities in Burundi deserved congratulations and support in their efforts to hold together a very fragile situation. Tanzania had been very supportive of the Arusha process and had taken in over three quarters of a million refugees. It had to be acknowledged that it would take many years to rebuild the structure and soul of the country, but immediate help was needed from the international community.
- 6 Perron said that Rwanda's designated prime minister Mr Twagiramungu supported the UN operations, and had a role to play in reunifying the people of the country. He also noted that Canada remained very concerned that the Rwandan government radio continued to attack UNAMIR, as the international community required a supportive climate for success.
- 7 Admiral Murray, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reported that Canada's contribution of up to 350 communications experts was intended to ensure that UNAMIR had effective communications and command and control structures. The unit was in training, and there was a 15 person reconnaissance unit in Rwanda. The unit would be ready to deploy by mid July.
- 8 Admiral Murray said that the prospects of General Dallaire renegotiating the opening of Kilgali airport looked reasonably promising. The intention was that UNAMIR would deploy initially in Kilgali, and then move into the south and west which was the area of greatest humanitarian need. There were up to two million displaced persons in Rwanda. The multinational force was undertaking helicopter surveys to identify key areas of need, and the commanders of the two forces would be meeting shortly. The humanitarian situation behind RPF lines was seen to be less critical, and NGO's were also operating in those zones.

COMMENT

9 Canada is clearly concerned about what they see as pretty negative prospects for UNAMIR TWO coming together in the next month or two, and decided on this event to do their bit to add to the pressure. We understand the French Embassy expressed a concern about possible negative reactions, but in the event no negative sentiments were expressed. A number of representatives made predictable remarks in support of UNAMIR and DFAIT's initiative.