



**New Zealand**  
**Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade**  
**Manatū Aorere**  
**Official Diplomatic Reporting**  
**Relating to**  
**“United Nations Peacekeeping Rwanda”**

Volume 4 of 5  
1 July – 19 July 1994



**New Zealand**  
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**“United Nations Peacekeeping Rwanda”**

To mark the 20th Anniversary of the Rwanda Genocide on 7 April 2014, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is making public its diplomatic reporting for the period March, April, May, June, and July 1994. This material includes the reporting from the New Zealand Ambassador to the UN in New York, who was President of the Security Council in April 1994. It also includes reporting from other New Zealand posts. These files contain the cables sent between Wellington and New York – a record of the unfolding disaster in Rwanda and New Zealand’s work to challenge the Security Council to respond to the genocide and protect innocent civilians, and the obstruction which it encountered from many of the major powers over this period.

This folder contains the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s  
official files from 1 July to 19 July 1994

Volume 4 of 5





NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 1 July 1994

TO: WELLINGTON  
WGTM UNSC  
GENEVA  
DEFENCE

No.  
No.  
No.  
No.

2898  
412

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY  
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY  
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE  
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD: SFAT (LGL, UNC, MEA, HRU, BUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Page 1 of: 8

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA: COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following are:

- (a) Resolution 935 (1994) adopted unanimously today, 1 July;
- (b) New Zealand EOV.

3 Also following is the latest RPF press statement reiterating RPF opposition to "Operation Turquoise" and accusing the French of failing to cooperate with the RPF and of intending to bomb RPF positions.

|   |   |           |       |
|---|---|-----------|-------|
| 2 | → | Winberg   | ✓     |
|   |   | Foreyth   |       |
|   |   | Ward      |       |
|   |   | Rider     | ✓ O/R |
|   |   | Hughes    |       |
|   |   | Kemmer    |       |
|   |   | McMaster  |       |
| 3 | → | Foster    | ✓     |
| 1 | → | McCormick | ✓     |
| 4 | → | Rush      | ✓     |
|   |   | Tyne      |       |
|   |   | Dalton    |       |
|   |   | Watson    |       |
| 5 | → | file      |       |



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/775

1 July 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND SPANISH

S/RES 935 (1994)  
15-0-0

Argentina, Czech Republic, France, New Zealand, Spain, the Russian Federation,  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and  
the United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda,

Reaffirming, in particular, resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994), which expanded the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and stressing in this connection the need for early deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to enable it to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21) in which the Security Council, inter alia, condemned all breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalled that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible,

Recalling also the requests it addressed to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 and in resolution 918 (1994), concerning the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640), in which he noted that massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda and also noted that only a proper investigation can establish the facts in order to enable the determination of responsibility,

Welcoming the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,

Expressing once again its grave concern at the continuing reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, including acts of genocide, have been committed in Rwanda,

3

Recalling that all persons who commit or authorize the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations and should be brought to justice,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information submitted pursuant to the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the information made available by the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide;

2. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to grave violations of international humanitarian law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, committed in Rwanda during the conflict, and requests States, relevant United Nations bodies, and relevant organizations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and as appropriate thereafter, and to provide appropriate assistance to the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 1;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts, and further requests the Secretary-General, within four months from the establishment of the Commission of Experts, to report to the Council, on the conclusions of the Commission and to take account of these conclusions in any recommendations for further appropriate steps;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General and as appropriate the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Secretary-General to make the information submitted to the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda available to the Commission of Experts and to facilitate adequate coordination and cooperation is maintained between the work of the Commission of Experts and the Special Rapporteur in the performance of their respective tasks;

5. Urges all concerned fully to cooperate with the Commission of Experts in the accomplishment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the Commission for assistance and access in pursuing investigations;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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**EXPLANATION OF VOTE**

**ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
COMMISSION OF EXPERTS  
TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES  
IN RWANDA**

**DELIVERED BY  
MR GERARD VAN BOHEMEN  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I.  
NEW ZEALAND PERMANENT MISSION**

**FRIDAY, 1 JULY 1994**

**AS DELIVERED**

6

The international community has been horrified at the orgy of killing and brutality that has engulfed Rwanda since the plane crash that took the lives of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April. Quite properly, the immediate concern has been to try to stop the fighting and the killings and to bring relief to the persons still alive in the country.

Though the international response has been too slow, action is now underway to alleviate the situation of Rwandans who have fled the country and of those who are still in the country and who can be reached. Clearly, we must continue to give top priority to these immediate tasks.

But for Rwanda eventually to achieve a lasting peace and national reconciliation, we must also begin to consider the longer term. The adoption of this resolution today should be seen in that context.

There is one essential purpose to this resolution: to provide a means for establishing the facts of the genocide and the other outrages that were unleashed following the events of 6 April. Once those facts have been established, then appropriate steps can be taken to determine how persons responsible for such acts, particularly the persons responsible for their planning and organisation, can be brought to justice.

Genocide and other grave breaches of humanitarian law are international crimes which are subject to universal jurisdiction. Persons suspected of having committed such crimes during the Second World War were put on trial. Much more recently, this Council took steps to ensure that persons suspected of committing war crimes in the former Yugoslavia can be brought to justice. We can be no less concerned about the commission of such offences in Rwanda.

Right now, the need is to ensure that information of the killings is collected and organised so that there is at least a basis upon which subsequent prosecutions, whether undertaken internationally or through the Rwandan legal system, can proceed. As the Secretary-General notes in his report of 31 May, this must begin soon if the process is to be effective.

The aim of the resolution is not retribution but justice. Moreover, the divisions in Rwanda, be they ethnically or politically based, will only fester and become more poisonous if the events of the past months and the causes from which they sprang are not adequately addressed. The process of investigation may itself help the Rwandan people to come to terms with what has gone on in their midst.

It is not intended that the Commission of Experts should duplicate or cut across the work being carried out by the High Commissioner for Human Rights or the Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to the resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on 25 May. We see the tasks to be pursued by the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur on the one hand and the Commission of Experts on the other as being quite distinct.

The Commission's task will be to collect evidence of specific acts of genocide so that at some point determinations of individual responsibility for past acts can be made. By contrast, the focus of the Special Rapporteur is more forward-looking, to determine how and why such abuses came to be committed, to make recommendations for bringing such abuses to an end and to help prevent future recurrences.

In some cases, the Commission and the Special Rapporteur will need access to the same information. This is why the resolution requests the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner to make available to the Commission information submitted to the Special Rapporteur, and to ensure that there is appropriate cooperation and coordination between the Commission and the Special Rapporteur.

The mechanism we are providing for today is a small step. Some may complain that it is too modest for the task at hand. But it is a beginning and that is important. It demonstrates that the international community accepts its responsibility to uphold the laws proscribing genocide and that it has the will to help the Rwandan people come to terms with what has happened in their country.





# **FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS** **RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**



New York, July 1 1994

H. E. Jumeed K.A. Marker  
President of the Security Council  
United Nations

Your Excellency

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to reiterate its total opposition to French intervention in Rwanda.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to point out that since the launching of Operation Turquoise, there are frequent flights over our territory by planes which refuse to respond to our control tower at Kigali airport.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front further wishes to inform the international community that it has reliable information that such planes overflying our territory have intentions to bomb our military installations.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for an immediate end to such flights and warns that all planes that overfly our territory without prior clearance by our control tower will be at risk of being attacked as enemy aircraft.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to reiterate its strong objections to French intervention in Rwanda and repeats its warning that this intervention will lead to an escalation of the conflict since France's real intentions are to intervene in the conflict on the side of the Rwanda Government forces and force a political solution in favour of the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda.


The Rwandese Patriotic Front:

1. Calls upon the international community to use its influence to restrain France from this course of aggression against the victims of genocide.
2. Reiterates the determination of its members and the Rwandese people at large to resist this French aggression by any means possible.
3. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda and calls upon the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Nations Security Council and Member States to expedite the deployment of UNAMIR II established by resolutions 918 and 925 (1994).

In view of the fact that the Rwandese Patriotic Front is opposed to Operation Turquoise, it wishes to inform the Security Council that it will review its position regarding participation in UNAMIR by all countries that intervene in Rwanda alongside the French.

Kindly ensure circulation of this letter to all members of the Security Council as an official note of the Council.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front



Claude Dusaidi

Rwandese Patriotic Front Representative to the United Nations

c.c. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
All members of the Security Council



115/23/37  
SECURE

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 1 July 1994

TO: WELLINGTON  
WGTN UNSC

No.  
No.

2899

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY  
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

LD: SFAT (LGL, UNC, MEA, DSP3, EAB)

Page 1 of: 4

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following is discussion paper circulated by Djibouti concerning  
Rwanda's Presidency in September.

SECURE

From : Ambassador Roble Olhaye  
Djibouti

**A DISCUSSION PAPER**

**RWANDA'S SEPTEMBER 1994 PRESIDENCY  
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

All members are aware a preliminary exchange of views on this matter took place among the members about three weeks ago. Since that time, I have held, in an atmosphere of candor and mutual confidence, thorough and extensive meetings with Ambassador Bizimana regarding the increasing sensitivity as well as wider implications surrounding his presidency in September, at a time his country is soaked in a blood bath, coupled with the absence of a viable, functioning central authority. I believe I have sufficiently conveyed to him the deep concerns and reservations of Council members, which are shared as well by many non-Council Member States of the United Nations.

I cannot, however, underestimate the emotions, agony and difficulty faced by Ambassador Bizimana and his Government in reaching a political decision.

I am pleased to report that, in a final meeting toward the end of last week, Ambassador Bizimana sounded decisive and quite realistic. He informed me that he understands these apprehensions at this time, and realizes the potential difficulties and strains which may attend to Rwanda's presidency, given the prevailing tragic situation in his country.

**CONSEQUENTLY, HIS POSITION :**

- He will not insist on assuming the Presidency in September 1994
- But will insist on preserving the right for Rwanda to assume the Presidency sometime next year, prior to the expiration of her term in the Council in December 1995
- He also insists that Members should desist from any attempts or actions directed toward challenging the continued membership of Rwanda in the Council

**OPTIONS**

After the rather lengthy discussions on this matter, during which several possible alternatives were examined, it would appear there are essentially three options the Council may elect to consider:

- A. There could be a "swap" where Rwanda gives up its right to preside in September 1994 for an exchange with another member's turn (spot) in 1995. This is predicated upon the availability of a Member willing to advance its Presidency to September 1994 and vacating its place in 1995 for Rwanda.
- B. Rwanda would forego its turn in September, and everyone else advances one month - no country assuming Presidency twice. This option would have a slot in December 1995 for Rwanda.

4

- C. *Rwanda to forego not only its Presidency in September 1994 but in any future possibility during its term in the Council*

### **CONCLUSION**

*In exploring these options the members may wish to know that Rwanda would be amenable to Options A and B, and Option C obviously seems unacceptable to them.*

*Fortunately, there appears to be a mutual recognition of the potential credibility issues involved here as things presently stand. Given the options available, however, I believe we can arrive at a satisfactory acceptable resolution which takes into consideration both the sensitivity of this issue and the possibility that Rwanda may keep its hope alive.*

*June 28, 1994*

CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

115/23/37

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 19:35 (5771)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$660.79    |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04705/NYK          | 01-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Priority    |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council adopts resolution establishing commission of experts to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda
- French advise that Operation Turquoise is going well but RPF assert that French are intending to bomb them
- Rwandan PR indicates that he may pass up the Presidency in September provided other Council members agree not to pursue an attempt to remove Rwanda from the council and provided he is assured of a turn as President in 1995
- One of the possible solutions may result in the Security Council summit planned for January to be brought forward to December

Action

Comments on various scenarios for avoiding a Rwandan Presidency in September

Report

Commission of Experts

The Council this afternoon unanimously adopted the Spanish-promoted resolution providing for the establishment

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of a commission of experts to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda. By the time the resolution had been put to the vote, it had been cosponsored by Argentina, Czech Rep, France, New Zealand, Spain, Russian Fed, UK and USA. A further small refinement was made to Op 4 to preserve Chinese honour, but in reality they had to accept that they could not secure the removal of the various references to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur.

2 EOVS before the vote were given by Spain, US, Czech Rep, and France. EOVS after the vote were made by NZ, China, UK, Argentina and Pakistan. Our accompanying fax (Wellington and Geneva only) contains the resolution as adopted and the NZ EOVS.

3 A notable feature of the US statement was its apparent acceptance of the idea that a tribunal should be established to deal with the crimes in Rwanda. Until today, the US and UK delegations had been adamant that they would not accept that today's resolution would lead to the establishment of a tribunal along the lines of that set up to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Yesterday, however, Christopher, in testifying to Congress, accepted that such a tribunal would be appropriate; hence, it would seem, the change in the US position.

#### Operation Turquoise and RPF position

4 At yesterday evening's informals, Merimee gave a further update on the French-led intervention. There was little new information; he said that the force was proceeding along the lines reported earlier and that the Force Commander had met with UNAMIR Commander, Dallaire. He also mentioned the French concerns about what might happen if the RPF were to push further into Government-held territory (we had heard from several sources that the French had come within 20 kms of the RPF lines).

5 This morning the RPF representative told us that the French were overflying RPF territory and failing to respond to RPF air traffic controllers. He also asserted that the RPF had intercepted French communications indicating French intentions to bomb RPF positions. A press release issue issued by the RPF is also in our accompanying fax. It reiterates RPF opposition to the French intervention, complains about the overflying and says it has reliable information of French intentions to bomb RPF installations.

#### Rwandan Presidency of the Security Council

6 At a meeting yesterday afternoon open to PRs or DPRs only, Djibouti briefed Council members of its discussions on the possibility of Rwanda not taking up the Council Presidency in September. Olhaye circulated a paper summarising the position. It is in our accompanying secure fax (Wellington only). In essence, Bizimana will not insist

on assuming the Presidency in September provided Rwanda gets another turn at President next year and provided Council members desist from any challenge to "the continued membership" of Rwanda in the Council.

7 The paper indicates two options for achieving this end. Under A, Rwanda would "swap" being President in September with another member who will be President next year. Under B, Rwanda would forego its turn in September, everyone else would move forward one month and Rwanda would get the Presidency in December 1995. (Option C which would have Rwanda forego its Presidency entirely is effectively precluded by Bizimana's conditions.)

8 There was little discussion at yesterday's meeting and a number of members said they would need to refer the matter home for instructions. Argentina, however, flagged that there were other ways of achieving the same end instead of Options A and B and that Option B would cause them difficulties because of the Council's Summit scheduled for January 1995 over which President Menem has been promised to preside. Council members agreed not to circulate the Djibouti paper or to publicise their discussions.

#### Comment

9 In strict terms, we would have no difficulty with Bizimana's conditions. Whether or not he is President in 1995 is of no direct concern to us. An undertaking not to challenge "the continued membership" of Rwanda in the Council would not preclude a challenge to the credentials of the particular representative. Whether Olhaye and Bizimana appreciate the distinction is another matter. In any event, we doubt that a credentials challenge would find much favour with a number of other Council members. Accordingly the discussion will focus on less formal and dramatic ways of getting Rwanda out of the Presidency in September.

10 Nigeria is being touted as the country to swap with Rwanda under Option A. We understand, though not from the Nigerians themselves, that Gambari is keen on this option. This would tie in with the comment he made us today that he may not be around in 1995. Under this option he would get a second Presidency this year. However, the swap option is not immediately attractive to a number of Council members because it looks so artificial.

11 Option B is much more attractive but causes Argentina a major problem because of the scheduled Summit in January. They do not see why they should pay a price because of Rwanda's crimes and are determined to hold on to the Presidency for the month the Summit is convened. They favour a refinement to Option B which would have every member moving forward a month but would also entail a swap between themselves and Brazil. Under this scenario Brazil would get the Presidency in December and Argentina would maintain the

Presidency in January. Obviously this scenario is attractive to Brazil which otherwise would not have a second go at the Presidency. It also means that the Summit would not be chaired by a complete newcomer to the Council as would otherwise be the case if everyone moved forward (Botswana will follow Argentina as President). The problem of this option is that it would not give Rwanda a second term as President because under a simple rotation it would just miss out.

12 Another option being discussed is to take Option B and to shift the Summit forward by a month to December. This is being promoted by the French, and the Argentines tell us they have no difficulty with it either. Clearly, that would work to our advantage as it would mean that New Zealand would be able to participate in the Summit. However, we are told that the British are opposed to this scenario because of the heavy pressure of EU meetings towards the end of the year.

13 Obviously, a lot of water will have to flow under the bridge before the situation is resolved. It seems to us, however, that if you are interested in promoting a scenario that would have the Summit moved forward by a month, then it would be useful to make your views known to the British. We do not consider that we should be too bashful about this. As the French have said to us, it is pretty rough on the outgoing members of the Council for the Permanent Members a Summit the month after five Non-Permanent Members have left the Council.

End Message



445 115/23/37

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 3 July 1994

TO: WELLINGTON No. } u/n  
WGTN UNSC No. }  
DEFENCE No. x }

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, EUR, ISAC, DSP3, EAB)  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, DDI, OPS)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Page 1 of: 7

Guided to UNSC, MEA, UNC

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Following is a letter from the French PR to the SecGen which was circulated to Council members yesterday (Saturday). Also enclosed is the covering letter from the SecGen and the draft reply prepared by the Pakistani Presidency.

2 You will see that the French are saying that as a result of increased fighting outside Kigali, the South-West of Rwanda is experiencing an influx of large numbers of people fleeing the fighting, and could soon become the scene of an "uncontrollable" humanitarian situation which could see renewed ethnic killings and could aggravate the situation in Burundi. They go on to say that unless a ceasefire is put in place immediately, France will have either to withdraw or to set up a secure humanitarian zone to protect the civilian population.

3 The letter says that the zone "would need to be sufficiently large, taking account of the number of persons involved, and contiguous, in order to stabilise the population in the area and facilitate the channelling of humanitarian relief." (The area then described as comprising the zone is truly large; by our reckoning it comprises about half of the territory still held by the RPF. We have sketched out on the enclosed map our guess of the extent of the proposed area. We are unclear, however, as the eastern boundary of the proposed zone as we have not been able to locate "the N'Daba Col".)

4 The French letter argues that the establishment of such a zone is authorised on the basis of Resolutions 925 and 929.

Comment

5 The French have grounds for arguing that they have authority to establish secure humanitarian zones on the basis of Resolutions 925 and 929. Op 4(a) of Res 925, like Op 3(a) of Res 918, specifically envisages the establishment of such zones as being part of the expanded UNAMIR mandate. Op 3 of Res 929 in turn specifically authorises the French force to use "all necessary means" to achieve the objectives of Op 4 (a) & (b) of Res 925. That said, and as you will well recall, when the idea of setting up such zones was debated in the lead up to Res 918, it was never

① COMM : PLEASE PASS TO REFENCE

intended that such zones would be large areas of the kind now proposed by the French. That, and the likelihood of complaints from the RPF may be the reason for the French seeking further authority from the Council.

6 This morning's New York Times quotes the interim government's "Foreign Minister" as requesting the French to take up a position between the government and RPF forces. A French spokesperson is cited in response as noting that France does not recognise the legitimacy of the "government" and that the French force would not be acting as an inter-position force. (Indeed, that would be directly contrary to the understanding recorded in Pp 6 of Res 929.)

7 Given the size of the proposed zone, and notwithstanding the arguments of humanitarian need, however, it could be argued that what the French are proposing is that their forces take up a position between the government and the RPF under a different guise. The RPF will almost certainly see things that way. If a zone of that size were established, and given the continuing advances of the RPF, especially outside Kigali, it must be very likely that the government forces in the south of the country would soon retreat to the safety of the zone. (Those in the north seem to be under less pressure as the government still has its traditional stronghold of Gisenyi to fall back to.) If that were to happen, and the Council endorsed the French proposal for the zone, the government would be able to claim the protection of the French forces and UN sanction of the protected zone.

8 Because of the current Independence Day long weekend, the Presidency has decided to deal with the matter by circulating a proposed reply to the SecGen's letter forwarding the French letter on a "no objection" basis rather than convening informal consultations. They have also set the deadline for responding to the draft at 1pm on Tuesday, 5 July, and have provided for an opportunity for discussion by scheduling informal consultations for 11.30am on Tuesday. It would not be surprising, however, if there is pressure for earlier action.

9 We understand from the Pakistanis that the SecGen supports the French proposal, just as he supported the French intervention in Rwanda, although his covering letter to the President simply asks that the French letter be brought to the attention of Council members. We also understand that the French would like the Council to welcome the French proposal. We are told, however, that others in the Council are reluctant to go that far, and some have even questioned whether any reply should be sent to the SecGen's letter. Accordingly, the draft prepared by the Presidency simply takes up the language of the SecGen's letter and says that the SecGen's letter has been brought to the attention of Council members.

10 Because of the holiday weekend, we have been unable so far to raise people in other Missions to gauge their reactions to the matter, but we will keep trying. Given the possibility that the French will press for action tomorrow in spite of the President's timeframe, we should be grateful for overnight guidance on the position we should take. We will be clearing our Comms early tomorrow afternoon; van Bohemen can be reached earlier at home or on the mobile phone.

2

Translated from French

Permanent Mission of France to the  
United Nations  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

1 July 1994

Sir,

Acting on instructions received this morning I wish to inform you of the very grave concern of the French authorities at the deterioration in the situation in Rwanda and the risk of a further humanitarian drama in that country.

In recent days fighting has intensified outside the capital and is spreading to the south in the region of Butare, not far from the border with Burundi, as well as, it is reported, to the west in the direction of Kibuye. French contingents, in place in the region in implementation of Security Council resolution 929 (1994), have already conducted reconnaissance operations in Butare. They have observed the influx of tens of thousands fleeing the fighting, adding to several hundred thousand displaced persons in that part of the country. The continued fighting is creating a situation in south-west Rwanda that, in humanitarian terms, will quickly become completely uncontrollable. If steps are not taken to remedy the situation, that entire area of the country will be the scene of major disorders, with the movement of hundreds of thousands of persons fleeing in desperation and the risk of the physical elimination of minorities in the area, as has already occurred during April and May. There is reason to fear that those persons will seek refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, aggravating a situation the precariousness of which you are already well aware.

France considers it its responsibility to alert the international community, through you, to the situation, which demands, as called for by the United Nations and OAU, an immediate cease-fire. A stop to the fighting offers the only genuinely effective means of stabilizing the humanitarian situation and opening the way to a resumption of talks with the assistance of the countries of the region with a view to reaching a political settlement on the basis of the Arusha agreements, from which those responsible for the massacres and, in particular, acts of genocide must, of course, be excluded.

If a cease-fire cannot be brought about immediately, France will be faced with the following choices:

To withdraw from Rwandan territory, while striving through ad hoc actions, which would be extremely difficult and limited, to save human life; or

His Excellency Boutros Boutros-Chali  
Secretary-General of the United Nations

/...

mh

To organize, based on Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), a secure humanitarian zone where the population would be protected from the fighting and its dramatic consequences in Rwanda. The Franco-Senegalese forces would seek to ensure, within their mandate, that no activity threatening the security of the population in question were carried out within or from the zone. The zone would need to be centred on the region where the humanitarian problems are most acute, and would need to be sufficiently large, taking account of the number of persons involved, and contiguous, in order to stabilize the population in the area and facilitate the channelling of humanitarian relief.

On the basis of information in our possession, the zone would include the districts of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and the southern half of Kibuye, including the Kibuye-Gitarama sector, as far as the N'Daba col.

It is the view of France that, on the basis of resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), it is authorized to organize such a secure humanitarian zone. Nevertheless, it is the wish of France that, through you, the United Nations should indicate its support for the establishment of such a zone.

I wish once again to draw your attention to the urgent nature of the situation and to emphasize that France, if it is unable to establish a secure humanitarian zone with the support of the international community, will have no choice other than to withdraw very rapidly from Rwandan territory.

I should be obliged if you would have this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Jean-Bernard MERIMEE

94.27404

pt

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5/7

Translated from French

The Secretary-General

2 July 1994

Sir,

I transmit herewith a letter from the French Government informing me of its intention to establish a humanitarian protection zone in south-west Rwanda pursuant to Security Council resolution 929 (1994).

I should be obliged if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros-Boutros GHALI

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His Excellency  
Jamsheed K. A. Marker  
President of the Security Council

Draft

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 July 1994 transmitting a communication from the Government of France concerning its intention to establish a humanitarian protection zone in south-west Rwanda pursuant to Security Council resolution 929 (1994), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Jamsheed K. A. Marker  
President of the Security Council

His Excellency  
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
Secretary-General

7/7



Extent of Proposed  
Zone

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 Export  
 Import  
 Zone.



CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

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|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 18:20 (5775) | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$314.70 |
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|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | WELLINGTON | C25306/WN1 | 04-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | NEW YORK   |            | Immediate   |
| CC:   | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WASHINGTON | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    | WGTN UNSC  | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

U53223: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your u/n fax of 3 July (not to all).

Summary

2 We are cautious about France's proposed secure humanitarian zone and any suggestion that the Council should indicate its support. We are happy with the letter of reply Marker has drafted. If there is any move to amend this to imply Council support, you should revert for instructions.

Action

3 Do not take a lead in Council discussions/informals. Report the views of others. Seek instructions as required.

Comment

4 The following are our preliminary comments.

5 On the face of it the French proposal is consistent with the concept of an expanded UNAMIR establishing secure humanitarian areas. But there are a number of problems with it:

- its size (approx half the RGF-held territory);
- that from west of Gitarama to the south, the border of the zone appears to be close to, if not contiguous

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with, the current confrontation between RPF and RGF forces (with the former thrusting forward);

- in other words, by securing such a zone, the French would inevitably be caught doing what they said they wouldn't - ie that their forces would avoid conflict with the RPF and would not get caught in fighting between the Rwanda parties or be interpositioned. Already there are media reports of French troops returning fire from RPF forces near Butare;
- it risks complicating matters further for UNAMIR in its own planning for neutral secure areas. If the French were given the Council's endorsement for the south-western quarter of the country to be a secure area, the result could be that UNAMIR would not be able to operate there if it were to become de facto the RGF/RPF dividing line. What happens if and when the French are to withdraw?
- at this stage Council members are wholly reliant on French information about the situation and needs. We seem to have moved very quickly from a situation where French forces were rescuing Tutsi survivors from Hutu militia, to one where French forces are proposing also to protect Hutu refugees from the Tutsi-led RPF;
- how long might it be before there is a proposal to extend the French zone north from Gitarama to Ruthengeri for exactly the same purpose?
- in other words, it gives the appearance of being or could very rapidly become a political mission under a humanitarian guise (the RPF's statement of 1 July clearly sees it in those terms);
- we could well end up seeing come to pass what we feared about the French intervention. If the Council were to support the French action as proposed, under threat of French withdrawal, it could well undermine its own impartiality.

#### Conclusion

6 The French intervention threatens to cause further complications for UNAMIR. If there is a move to amend Marker's letter you should revert for instructions. At the very least the Council needs an assessment from the Sec-Gen/UNAMIR of the implications of the French proposal, both in terms of the establishment of secure humanitarian areas and the impact on political/ceasefire talks which UNAMIR has been engaged in.

7 It may be that France has concluded that it would be unlikely to secure Council support for the proposal and is therefore not seeking it. The request is directed to the

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C25306/WN1

Page 3

United Nations through the Sec-Gen. Boutros-Ghali's word may be enough and in any event the French have already stated their view that France is authorised to organise such a secure humanitarian zone on the basis of SCRs 925 and 928.

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End Message

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Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

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| 18:41 (5776) | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$175.86 |
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|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | WELLINGTON | C25308/WN1 | 04-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | NEW YORK   |            | Priority    |
| CC:   | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WASHINGTON | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    | WGTN UNSC  | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

PMC (HILL)  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

U53225: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04705 and secure fax 2899.

2 We note the various options being considered and while we do not have firm views on them at this stage agree that an alternative to a direct challenge to Rwanda's Presidency in September seems likely to find greater acceptance. The situation clearly still has some way to play itself out and could also be affected by developments on the ground. As you know we do not see New Zealand as taking a leading part in discussions on the issue.

3 Grateful you keep us informed of the progress of informal discussions.

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End Message

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 197/1/1

|                            |                     |                      |
|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 21:37 (5785)               | 700/PAR/00000/00000 | \$597.21             |
| FROM: PARIS                | C01970/PAR          | 05-Jul-1994          |
| TO: WELLINGTON<br>NEW YORK | WGTN UNSC           | Priority<br>Priority |
| CC: BEIJING                | BONN                | Routine              |
| BRUSSELS                   | CANBERRA            | Routine              |
| HARARE                     | LONDON              | Routine              |
| GENEVA                     | MADRID              | Routine              |
| MOSCOW                     | OTTAWA              | Routine              |
| SANTIAGO                   | TOKYO               | Routine              |
| WASHINGTON                 | DEFENCE             | Routine              |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

**Subject**

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C25361.

**Summary**

- France is doing it all it can to encourage countries to contribute troops, logistical support and finance to UNAMIR. It would particularly like contributions from Western countries (including New Zealand).

- France is confident that the Canadians, as well as the Ghanians, will come through with their promised contributions **this month**. It understands that others, including the Australians and the Japanese, are examining closely what form of assistance they might offer.

- France does not expect the UNSC to take any further action on the establishment of the humanitarian zone which was already provided for by earlier resolutions.

- The timing of the withdrawal of French forces (within the two month mandate) will depend largely on when the additional UNAMIR forces can be deployed. France would expect the UNAMIR troops to be deployed throughout Rwanda, including within the humanitarian zone.

- French troops will respond if refugees in the zone are threatened by either side. Large numbers of both Tutsi and

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Hutu refugees are seeking the protection of the humanitarian zone in the wake of the RPF offensive. There are RGF forces within the zone but most are in the government zone to the north.

- France has said that it will not allow any military activity within the humanitarian zone.

#### Action

For information.

#### Report

2. We touched base with Lignière (African issues, UN Section) briefly this afternoon. We noted that de Bellescize had made a demarche yesterday in support of the the French initiative to create a secure humanitarian zone in south-west Rwanda. She confirmed that de Bellescize had reported New Zealand's cautious approach to the initiative, noting that France did not now expect the UNSC to need to take any further action. "There had been a bit of a misunderstanding" but it was now clear that the humanitarian area conformed with previous resolutions.

3. Lignière went on to note that the demarche had been part of a wider effort to solicit support for the zone amongst UNSC members and to approach potential contributors to UNAMIR to encourage them to firm up quickly their offers of support. Canada had assured France that it would have its contribution in place this month. Ditto the Ghanians. Japan was considering the possibility of providing financial support. The Australians were about to send a reconnaissance team to Rwanda (and neighbouring countries) to assess the possibility of contributing a 300-strong team of medics and associated security/logistical support.

4. Lignière confirmed that France envisaged that UNAMIR would be deployed throughout Rwanda, including the humanitarian zone. How long the French force remained depended largely on how quickly the UNAMIR troops could be deployed. PM Balladur had clearly said that he wanted the French forces out by the end of July.

5. Lignière noted that de Bellscize had reported that no decision had been announced on whether New Zealand would contribute to UNAMIR. We said that was also our understanding. In response to her further probing, we said that we were not aware of your latest thinking on the issue but understood that you had been examining some possibilities but that no decision had been taken. Lignière urged New Zealand to consider all options, including logistical or financial support. Although there was no special fund in place for the moment, the UNSG was looking into this. She noted that insufficient humanitarian aid was getting through to Rwanda. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that

the humanitarian zone was not a fertile area.

6. We asked Lignière to elaborate on what measures the French forces might take to protect refugees in the humanitarian zone. She evaded a direct response. She was not sure for example whether they would allow RPF forces to pass through the zone if they did not threaten refugees. She simply reiterated that France would not permit any military activity in the zone that might adversely affect the safety of the refugees. The French troops would respond if refugees were threatened. She was unclear however to what extent the French troops might try to disarm RGF or hutu militia or evict them from the zone. She noted that the RPF had not responded negatively to the creation of the zone. French troop commanders were in regular contact with the RPF forces.

7. Finally, we sought clarification on what initiatives might be taken to relaunch the **political dialogue and the search for a political settlement**. She said that that she was not aware of any specific French initiatives at this stage. France continued to support the idea of a regional conference. This had been discussed at a meeting between President Mitterrand and the Ugandan President (Museveni) during the latter's visit to Paris late last week. France expected Museveni to move quickly to convene such a conference, which would include Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi (and perhaps Kenya), to discuss a political solution to the crisis based on the Arusha Accords. As for the prospects for a ceasefire, Lignière suggested that this might not be so difficult to achieve now that the RPF had taken Kigali.

#### **Press comment**

8. Concerns about Operation Turquoise continue to appear in the French press, some commentators maintaining that there has been a deliberate shift in policy away from the humanitarian objective through the establishment of what is in effect a secure zone for the RGF.

9. Other comment focusses on President Mitterrand's current visit to South Africa and Nelson Mandela's refusal to support the French intervention. Mandela is reported to have affirmed that **"A solution should be found to the conflict within the context of the OAU"**.

#### **End Message**



CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 186/1/1

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| 19:11 (5784) | 700/LON/00000/00000 | \$370.23 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|

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|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | LONDON     | C04086/LON | 05-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC  | Priority    |
| CC:   | NEW YORK   |            | Priority    |
|       | WASHINGTON | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | OTTAWA     | BEIJING    | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | GENEVA     | Routine     |
|       | HARARE     | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | MADRID     | PARIS      | Routine     |
|       | SANTIAGO   | TOKYO      | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    | MOSCOW     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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**Subject**

U05278: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

**Summary**

British think UNSCRs do cover French action to create a secure humanitarian zone. While they have misgivings, and think French are sailing close to the wind in terms of their actions cutting across UNAMIR, their vote for UNSCR 929 and the importance of their relationship with France means they will not make trouble. They await the Sec-Gen's report of 7 July on Operation Turquoise, and Hurd has been given some points to raise with Juppe when he sees him today. As to RPF response to establishment of zone, our interlocutor thought they would not shy away from fighting on, but there were some indications that for military reasons, RPF might be willing to negotiate.

**Action required**

For information.

**Report**

Your U53223 and U53304.

In company with the Canadians, we spoke today about French proposed secure humanitarian zone with the FCO (Holmes and Hiscock, respectively Assistant Head and Desk Officer in African Dept (Equatorial)).

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2 In response to our question, Hiscock said that it was clear in New York over the weekend that the French wanted the UN to approve the creation of its proposed secure humanitarian zone. But it seemed that the Sec-Gen had "given the murmur" that the zone was acceptable, and the French had therefore moved ahead.

3 British have not been lobbied by the French - presumably the French thought this unnecessary. Our Canadian colleague confirmed there had been a demarche yesterday in Ottawa. Canada had reserved its response, having some concern about how the zone would affect UNAMIR to which, as you know, they plan to commit 350 troops, and wanting to consult others.

4 Hiscock agreed instructions for UKMIS New York at a meeting this morning with UN Dept. FCO believes the French do have cover for their action under UNSCRs 925 and 929 - especially the latter. Unlike NZ, as you know the UK voted for 929. Thus while it has misgivings and questions about the French action, it does not feel it can voice them freely. Hiscock said fundamental British position was that French actions should not cut across UNAMIR or hold up its deployment. He added that he thought this line was getting closer to being crossed.

5 British line at UNSC informals today will be that the zone does fall within the existing mandate, but that the French should make every effort to avoid confrontation. (In response to our question, Hiscock said he thought the British interpretation of the mandate given by UNSCR 929 was shared generally by UNSC members). British will be seeking, however, clarification of what is going on through the report the Sec-Gen is supposed to be presenting on Operation Turquoise on 7 July. Hiscock noted that at the moment, the French are the only source of information on what is happening, making it difficult to challenge them. The S-G's report should give a basis for questions. The Foreign Secretary, who is meeting with P4 plus EU Troika ministers today to discuss Bosnia, has also "been slipped a few points" on Rwanda to put to his French counterpart. Hiscock said there were confusing signals coming from the French themselves. They had told British Embassy in Paris that their operations would only be to protect civilians and they would not fire unless fired upon. But, Hiscock noted, the French commander has taken a much more gung-ho line, opposing "any infiltration of armed elements into areas under our responsibility". Hiscock said that Mitterand's remarks seemed to back the line of the French commander. French argued that it was a sign of their neutrality that Hutus had gone from welcoming their arrival (thinking they would support the RGF) to targeting them. Hiscock speculated that French might want to get Mobutu back in play. He had stuffed up the negotiations early on in the piece. But he was a francophone and in need of support.

6 Holmes and Hiscock said it was "a good question" what



might happen to the zone when the French pulled out. They agreed that UNAMIR had not agreed to take it on - the French had taken a unilateral decision. And Hiscock said UNAMIR would not be able to work in the same way in that its mandate under Ch VI differed from that of the French operation. We noted that, given the RPF was opposed to France's presence in Rwanda, including this action, stepping exactly into France's place would be likely to jeopardise UNAMIR's neutrality.

7 Hiscock's comments about the RPF's likely response to the French action were mixed. He did not think the RPF would have any compunction about taking on the French - they had said they would if necessary and he thought this believable. But there were some indications that they might be prepared to negotiate. The number four in the RPF, Dr Rudasingewe, had been in London yesterday and had met with ODA Minister Baroness Chalker. Hiscock had a few words with him. Hiscock said it seemed that, having taken Butare, the RPF might need to consolidate and so be open to negotiations. Rudasingewe had said the RPF had had to recruit (mostly Hutus) just to hold what it had taken; he had commented that there no more Tutsis left in Rwanda to recruit! But Rudasingewe stressed that the RPF was concerned that the French operation would protect those responsible for mass murder. And the RPF would not negotiate with the main govt party, the MRND, who they regarded as responsible for the major acts of genocide.

8 In response to a question, Hiscock said Chalker's message to Rudasingewe was that the RPF should not confront the French, not allow the French actions to affect their relations with UNAMIR, or permit the fighting to escalate. She stressed that the UK was very willing to provide humanitarian assistance into areas made safe by UNAMIR. Hiscock commented that this message was well received. The RPF seemed to believe that the international community was deliberately providing assistance outside Rwanda, and so was glad to hear that if the area under their control was made safe, humanitarian relief could be made available there.

9 Hiscock also expressed concern about progress with UNAMIR. British, as you know from our earlier reporting, have offered 50 trucks, but no one from the UN has yet been to inspect them. Hiscock said the DPKO person expected was actually a NZer.

#### Comment

10 While the UK has misgivings over the French action, they will be played very quietly. The overlying factor that caused them to vote for the resolution in the first place of course remains; their relationship with France is of great importance and Rwanda means nothing in terms of the national interest. British might ask questions on the basis of the Sec-Gen's report if others do. If the RPF and French came to confrontation, as Holmes thought the situation favoured, British might have to reassess their position. Officials

here are very cynical about the French actions.

11 As a matter of interest, we have received (and acknowledged) a fax of 2 July from one Hugh Jones of Kent, urging that NZ not support the French initiative as it would protect those responsible for crimes against humanity. He alleged, inter alia, that France had been supplying arms to the Rwanda "government" as recently as early June. He said he was approaching NZ as we were one of the few countries prepared to stand up in the Security Council and to talk sense about the situation in Rwanda. This is the first letter we have received on the subject. The FCO told us they get hundreds of letters on Rwanda, but the French initiative has yet to trickle through to the letter writing campaigners.

End Message

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Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

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|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 18:56 (5782) | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$379.49 |
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|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | WELLINGTON | C25361/WN1 | 05-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | NEW YORK   |            | Immediate   |
| CC:   | PARIS      |            | Priority    |
|       | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | SANTIAGO   | TOKYO      | Routine     |
|       | WASHINGTON | DEFENCE    | Routine     |
|       | WGTN UNSC  |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

U53304: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA : FRENCH DEMARCHE

Summary

Further demarche by French Ambassador this morning. Aim to inform UNSC members of French initiative to create a secure humanitarian zone in Rwanda and to seek support. Point made that French are proceeding on basis of SCR 925/928 and clear support from Sec-Gen. Not expecting a new UNSC decision or resolution.

Action

2 For information. Grateful your reporting of views exchanged in New York.

Report

3 Reading from his instructions de Bellescize said advances by RPF forces resulting in massive movements of population were behind the French decision to organise a safe humanitarian area in the south-west of Rwanda. Battles in the last few days had extended beyond Kigali to Butare in the south and towards Kibuye in the west. (According to Reuters reports, the RPF have taken Kigali and Butare and the French are moving to defend Gikongoro.) Tens of thousands of inhabitants were fleeing the battle areas adding to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the south-west of the country where a completely uncontrollable

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humanitarian situation was about to be created. If nothing were done all this area would lapse into enormous disorder, with the risk of physical elimination of minorities as in April/May, and also of fleeing people trying to seek shelter in neighbouring countries, especially Burundi, making the fragile situation there even more serious.

4 A stop to the fighting offered the only effective means of stabilising the situation and opening the way for talks. In the meantime French and Senegalese forces had no option but to seek, on the basis of the mandate given, to provide the population with shelter in the designated area by resisting any activity which would affect their security. To do this and to ease the provision of humanitarian support, including food/medical aid, the area needed to be single.

5 The Sec-Gen considered the initiative to constitute a safe humanitarian area in conformity with SCR 929 and had supported its creation without ambiguity.

6 France was not asking for Council approval or a new resolution (since the Council had already approved the creation of such areas) but would like all its friends, both within the Council and beyond, to support the initiative, or at least to show a general attitude of support.

7 The Ambassador gave us a transcript of comments by a spokesperson of the Quai D'Orsay on 4 July describing the intention as being to establish a zone in which the French would ensure, within the terms of their mandate and Chapter VII of the Charter, that no activity took place which would jeopardise the security of people finding shelter in that area. "All hostile activity against the population coming from whatever side would result in an action on our part."

8 Ambassador recalled Juppe's comment on 3 July that the French intervention had already saved thousands of lives. The situation continued to deteriorate. The French had concluded that creating a zone was the best action they could take to continue to try to protect the population at risk. Meanwhile they were continuing to encourage commitments by other countries to the strengthened UNAMIR, given that the French intervention was limited in duration. France had taken an initiative in New York to create a contact group among contributing countries. Juppe had said that several thousand troops were ready in principle to rejoin UNAMIR. It was a question of overcoming shortages of equipment, transport and logistical support.

9 In response to the Ambassador's presentation we recalled the reservations New Zealand had expressed about the intervention and the complications for UNAMIR. We said that, while recognising the difficulties of the situation on the ground, we could not help but be cautious about the latest developments. We agreed with de Bellescize's remarks that a ceasefire and resumption of talks in the framework of the

Arusha agreements offered the only real prospect of stabilising the situation.

Conclusion

10     Though France has said it is not looking for any additional Council action, we expect there may be some discussion in Council informals tomorrow. In that event you should draw on the above and our C25306 as you see fit. Now that the French have moved to implement the zone there seems no need for Marker's draft letter. It may be appropriate to reiterate New Zealand's caution. France's latest step has the potential to constitute a new confrontation line between the RPF and RGF forces, and to bring France into direct conflict with the RPF if it defends the declared zone with force. If France stayed, how long would it intend to defend a de facto dividing line within Rwanda? Assuming it wished to leave as soon as possible, as envisaged, would it then seek to have UNAMIR take over policing and monitoring of the zone it left behind?

11     The French are getting themselves into an increasingly difficult situation. They run the risk of prolonging the conflict and their own involvement. Through our questions to de Bellescize we encouraged France to continue contacts with the RPF and regional countries and work for a ceasefire, and to continue to help in getting the expanded UNAMIR operation underway. Hopefully other Council members will reinforce that.

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End Message



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115/23/37

Your (le: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

19:39 (5786)

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|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | NEW YORK   | C04710/NYK | 05-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC  | Immediate   |
| CC:   | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WASHINGTON | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your U53223, U53304 and van Bohemen/Ward telecons.

Summary

- Informals scheduled for this morning were postponed until tomorrow morning (6 July)
- China, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan and New Zealand agree that it would be preferable if no reply were sent to SecGen's letter and exchange views on what might be said at tomorrow's informals
- SecGen, through his spokesperson, endorses the French action (but senior Secretariat personnel are extremely concerned at the implications for UNAMIR)
- There is high interest among other delegations and the media on the positions of other Council members, particularly those who abstained on Res 929

Action

Information only

Report

As it happened, the informals that had been scheduled for

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this morning to hear a briefing from Gordon-Somers, the Special Rep on Liberia, were cancelled, and, in the absence of a specific request, the Pakistanis were reluctant to convene a meeting just to discuss Rwanda. They proposed to settle the terms of the President's reply to the SecGen today and to have a more general discussion tomorrow's informals.

2 We told the Pakistanis that our strong preference was for there to be an opportunity for Council members to discuss the French establishment of the "humanitarian" zone before any Council response went out, since the response would inevitably be closely scrutinised by the media for what it revealed of Council members' views on the French actions. However, we also said we would not delay finalisation of the letter if we were alone in our views.

3 The Nigerians (Gambari) subsequently told us they were very concerned about the French actions and were not happy with the Marker draft as in their view it conveyed the sense of Council acquiescence in the French actions. Gambari was also very unhappy that Council members would not have the opportunity to discuss the matter before the letter went out. He subsequently put these views to Marker. Meanwhile, the Brazilians confirmed that they too had reservations about the draft for reasons identical to Gambari's, but were not prepared to take a lead in putting forward amendments. As things turned out, they did not have to as the Chinese were already busy on that score. The Chinese were keen to secure the deletion of the clause describing the content of the French letter ("concerning its intention to establish a humanitarian protection zone in the south-west of Rwanda pursuant to Security Council resolution 929(1994)"). This proposal reflects the standard Chinese position that they do not like to refer in consensus documents to resolutions on which they abstained.

4 In the course of the morning, the French also called us in response to "rumours" that some countries had difficulties with the proposed letter. They confirmed that they were no longer looking for Council endorsement of their actions because they were confident of their legal position under Res 925 and 929 and because the SecGen would shortly himself be endorsing their actions (see below). This would be sufficient to indicate "United Nations support. Accordingly, they could accept the amendment proposed by the Chinese.

5 We told the French that we could go along with the text as drafted by Marker; our concern related to the timing of the letter in the context of today's cancelled consultations. Their response was that they were quite prepared to discuss the issue at informals this afternoon, but that Marker wanted to clear away the remainder of his bilateral consultations. Subsequently, Gambari called back to advise that the President had agreed to put the letter on hold pending discussions he (Gambari) was to convene in the afternoon of the five countries that had abstained on Res 929.



6 During the course of the usual midday press briefing, the SecGen's spokesperson, Sills, noted that the SecGen had "endorsed" the French decision to set up the humanitarian zone in south-west Rwanda. There was no written text of the statement. Notwithstanding this announcement, senior peacekeeping officials remain deeply concerned at the implications of what has happened for UNAMIR. Last night's late night phone call from ASG Riza (please protect) is a graphic demonstration of this.

7 At the afternoon discussions of the "929 five", Gambari said he wanted views in particular on the French claim that their actions were justified under Res 925 and 929 and on the likely consequences of those actions for UNAMIR. As far as the letter was concerned, he could go along with the shorter version proposed by the Chinese. However, when the Pakistanis then noted that, following the SecGen's midday endorsement of the French actions, the French could even do without a letter, the Chinese (Li) intervened strongly to press for the no letter option. He was endorsed by Brazil (Sardenberg) who considered that this option kept alive the issue of the relationship between the French actions and UNAMIR, whereas adoption of the letter would amount to acquiescence in the French letter.

8 We noted that our instructions, given at the point that the French appeared still to be seeking Council endorsement of their actions, were to accept the letter as initially drafted. However, the representations made in Wellington last night, and as now confirmed by the Pakistanis, suggested that the French were no longer pressing for a letter. Accordingly, we could also go along with the no letter option or at least with holding off any response until after tomorrow morning's informals. Gambari, visibly shaken by the news of the SecGen's midday announcement, concurred. It was agreed that this position would be conveyed to Marker.

9 There was little discussion of the specific points mentioned by Gambari. However, we took the opportunity to note, as we had done earlier to the French, that we had not understood the references to the establishment of "secure humanitarian areas" in Op 4 (a) of Res 925, and endorsed in Res 929, as contemplating setting aside such large tracts of the country. We also noted that we were aware that, notwithstanding Boutros Ghali's views, senior Secretariat members were extremely concerned at the implications for UNAMIR of the French actions. Sardenberg endorsed our comments and said that they were especially concerned at the implications of the third to last para of the French letter which threatened precipitate French withdrawal if they do not get international support for the zone.

10 Gambari urged all members of the "929 five" to voice their reservations about the French actions at tomorrow's informals, and suggested that the group be ready to caucus

beforehand if necessary. Privately, he noted to us that the SecGen's actions were further evidence of the man's disdain for the Council, especially its non-permanent members, and commented that if the "smaller" countries were not prepared to stand up for principle when the Permanent Members engaged in this kind of intervention, then the value of the UN itself would be called into question.

11 Given the twists and turns of the day, we were not able to make contact with many of the other Council members who supported Res 929 to see where they were at. As far as we can tell, however, while there is a great deal of skepticism at French actions and motivations, there is little disposition among the other nine to challenge the French openly. Not surprisingly, these members have been looking to the "929 five" to take the lead, as have non Council members and the media.

12 We have received a number of enquiries today from the media and other Missions on what if any position we would be taking. In response we have recalled New Zealand's initial hesitations about the French intervention and noted that recent developments have tended to underscore our concerns. It was evident that there is close interest in our position and how that will play out in the Council. A number of commentators evinced considerable cynicism at the French actions and the likely Council response. Radio New Zealand's Judy Lessing volunteered the opinion that unless those who abstained on Res 929 make clear their reservations with the latest French actions, "you will all be tarred with the same brush".

13 As you would expect, the RPF is keeping up its strong opposition to French actions. Our accompanying fax contains its latest press release.

14 We understand that Merimee intends to brief the Council on the French action at tomorrow morning's informals. Gambari will almost certainly lead off the ensuing discussion. We have the points in your U53223 and U53304 to draw on for our own intervention.

End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/3+

Your file:

Our file:

|              |                     |          |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 18:36 (5788) | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$268.42 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|

FROM: WELLINGTON C25408/WN1 06-Jul-1994

TO: NEW YORK Immediate

|     |            |          |          |
|-----|------------|----------|----------|
| CC: | WASHINGTON |          | Priority |
|     | BEIJING    | BONN     | Routine  |
|     | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA | Routine  |
|     | GENEVA     | HARARE   | Routine  |
|     | LONDON     | MADRID   | Routine  |
|     | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA   | Routine  |
|     | PARIS      | SANTIAGO | Routine  |
|     | TOKYO      | DEFENCE  | Routine  |
|     | WGTN UNSC  |          | Routine  |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

# Subject

U53389: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA : US DEMARCHE

# Summary

US Embassy reinforces critical need to get expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible in order to relieve the French bridging operation. View expressed that there are sufficient troops on offer but insufficient logistics support. US working to encourage "pairing" of countries offering logistics support with those contributing troops (along lines of US equipping of Ghanaian battalion). NZ encouraged to think about a logistics contribution, together with idea of matching up with one particular contingent. We note our capacity to contribute remains under active consideration.

# Action

2 For information.

# Report

3 In its call on us this morning Embassy (Counsellor, McCormick) said US focus was on what could now be done for the French and to follow up their operation. The French believed the longer they stayed in Rwanda the greater the chances of their becoming involved in confrontation and getting bogged down. French were providing a vital bridge until the arrival of the expanded UNAMIR and were in a difficult and exposed

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position. US view was that it was critical to get the expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible in order to relieve the French. US had done what it could. The impression in Washington was that there were sufficient troops on offer but not sufficient logistics support. Given this imbalance the US was suggesting that there be a "pairing" of countries with logistics support capability with troop contributing countries. US had no intention of contributing troops but had agreed to provide the necessary equipment for the Ghanaian battalion. Delivery of 50 APCs had been completed. US was now looking at how additional equipment needs of the Ghanaians could be met (Embassy was unclear whether US support extended to airlifting them in or provisions etc). It was understood that South Africa might adopt the Zimbabweans in a similar way. Interoperability might well be a practical consideration driving such arrangements.

4 The above lay behind US approach to encourage NZ to think about a logistics contribution, along with the idea of possibly matching up with one contingent.

5 In response we noted that following receipt of an informal Secretariat request for a cargo transport aircraft (and a movement control unit), NZ had been giving serious thought to a possible contribution. The positives that lined up against our peacekeeping criteria had to be put against our actual capability which was limited, particularly in light of other major contributions on-hand (Bosnia). Ministers were currently reviewing the question and we expected to have a decision within the next week or so. On the humanitarian front, we noted the Government had recently given NZ\$500,000 to Rwanda through various UN agencies and NGOs.

6 We took the opportunity to counter any misapprehensions the Embassy might have had about the policy implications of our abstaining on SCR 929. Our abstention was in fact an affirmation of our concern and support for the early and effective deployment of the expanded UNAMIR.

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End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

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|              |                     |          |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 19:58 (5789) | 700/MEA/...../..... | \$292.23 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|

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|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | Wellington | C06545/WN2 | 06-Jul-1994 |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|

|     |          |  |           |
|-----|----------|--|-----------|
| TO: | New York |  | Immediate |
|-----|----------|--|-----------|

|     |            |           |         |
|-----|------------|-----------|---------|
| CC: | Beijing    | Bonn      | Routine |
|     | Brussels   | Canberra  | Routine |
|     | Defence    | Geneva    | Routine |
|     | Harare     | London    | Routine |
|     | Madrid     | Moscow    | Routine |
|     | Ottawa     | Paris     | Routine |
|     | Santiago   | Tokyo     | Routine |
|     | Washington | Wgtn UNSC | Routine |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Action

2 See paras 3-4 below.

Report

3 Thanks your CO4710. The following talking points which have been prepared for use in the event of any media follow-up at this end may be of interest:

- Our abstention on SCR 929 was a very difficult decision. Our reservations related to the means chosen and the likely effect on an expanded UNAMIR and its early deployment; we fully shared and share the French humanitarian objectives and motives.
- We have been reassured by the continued French emphasis on the impartial nature and humanitarian objectives of their mission, as authorised by SCR 929.
- But we are cautious about the latest initiative to organise a secure humanitarian zone which by its size and location runs the risk of

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jeopardising the neutrality of the intervention and of its becoming caught up in the fighting and being inter-positioned, contrary to SCR 929. It also has the potential to complicate the handover to and the mission of the expanded UNAMIR.

- While we agree that technically the creation of such a zone is within the mandate authorised by the Council, it is not what we understood was envisaged by secure humanitarian areas when SCR 925 op 4(a) was considered.
- We urge France to pursue its dialogue with both sides with a view to avoiding confrontation or action that would permit the fighting to escalate.
- We also encourage continuing close consultation with UNAMIR and its contributors.
- We look forward to the handover to the expanded UNAMIR at the earliest possible time.
- We agree that a stop to the fighting and a resumption of talks in the framework of the Arusha agreements offers the only real prospect of stabilising the situation and achieving a political settlement. We encourage all efforts to that end.
- We look forward to the Sec-Gen's progress report on the situation in Rwanda due 9 July.

3 Although discussions among countries which abstained on SCR 929 is natural enough, we would be cautious if it appeared that a group was meeting to coordinate positions prior to Council discussions. Those members who abstained on SCR 929 did so for very different reasons and we would be reluctant to contribute to the impression that there continued to be two "camps" (those who supported and those who had reservations of one sort or another about the French intervention), with the potential for this to detract from the constructive and forward-looking debate that is needed.

4 As you know our own abstention was a very close call. The French intervention is now a reality and we see the primary concern as being to work together to minimise further complications and to accelerate efforts to achieve a clear

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C06545/WN2

Page 3

handover to the expanded UNAMIR.

5 The Minister has seen this message

End Message

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 21:54 (5796)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$1130.84   |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04713/NYK          | 06-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Immediate   |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1)  
(DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C06545.

Summary

- At French request, Council agrees to short form of response to the SecGen
- Secretariat confirm that RPF have taken Kigali which is quiet for the first time in months
- French brief Council on establishment of humanitarian zone and contacts with the RPF, taking care to address many of the concerns raised in the media and elsewhere about the motivation for the zone
- Subsequent discussion reveals that few Council members are comfortable with the zone; only Spain and Czech Republic are generally supportive, and even they reiterate the criteria of neutrality, impartiality and non-interposition of forces set out in Res 929
- Russian Fed, US, Argentina, as well as NZ, question the size of the zone
- Nigerians, Russian and Argentines say zone should be demilitarised and any government forces and militia in it disarmed; US says government forces, militia and Hutu

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killers should not be allowed to shelter in the zone

- In response, French challenge anyone to show they have not lived up to their commitments; Nigeria is a particular target for describing the French actions as a fait accompli

#### Action

Information only

#### Report

#### Reply to SecGen's letter

Prior to this morning's informals we learned that the French had had a change of heart and wanted a reply to the SecGen's letter after all. The Chinese tried to hold out against a reply (and seem to have used our name in vain in talking to the French) but dropped their objection when they realised they were alone. To avoid any French misapprehension about our position, we reiterated to Merimee that we had never been opposed to a Council reply to the SecGen.

2 At the commencement of discussions at the informals, Marker advised that on the basis of his consultations, he would send the short form of a reply to the SecGen (ie with the deletion of the clause referring to Res 929). There was no objection, but China (Li) recalled China's abstention on Res 929 and said their agreement to the letter did not signify support to the issue to which it referred.

#### Secretariat briefing

3 Gharekhan confirmed that the RPF had taken Kigali which was quiet for the first time in months. No radio broadcasts hostile to UNAMIR had been made over the last 24 hours. The new Special Rep, Khan, was now in Kigali and was beginning consultations with RPF and RGF leaders. UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire had met with Kagame, the RPF Chief of Staff, and was travelling to Goma today for a second meeting with the Commander of Operation Turquoise. Ghana had confirmed its readiness to send the troops to bring its battalion back to full strength. Fifteen APCs had arrived in Kigali; 50 more had reached Entebbe. Gharekhan said he would be presenting an oral report to informals tomorrow on Operation Turquoise pursuant to Op 10 of Res 929.

#### French briefing

4 France's report under Res 929 was on the desks this morning (see accompanying fax, Wellington and Paris only). Merimee made reference to it but focussed on the reasons for setting up the humanitarian zone. He prefaced his remarks by noting that he wanted to correct some of the misconceptions in the media about French motives; he cited today's NY Times

(separate fax) as a "particularly malevolent" example.

5 Merimee asserted the zone had been established pursuant to Res 925 and 929 in response to the severe humanitarian situation that had developed following the RPF's recent advances. People were coming into the area by the thousands every hour; there were 400,000 displaced persons in the zone yesterday, there would be 500,000 today. He stressed that France's intentions were "purely humanitarian"; their actions were to protect the civilian population. There would be a complete ban on actions by any party which endangered the security situation. Military activity was prohibited inside the zone; the zone would not be able to be used a starting base for military activities outside. French troops would be completely impartial in enforcing these requirements against any party coming into the zone.

6 Merimee said that France was confident it was achieving the goals set for Operation Turquoise; by their admittedly rough estimate they had saved about 50,000 people from being killed. He emphasised that the force was not and would not be an interposition force. He said that the government forces were not in the zone; they were in the north-west centred around the government stronghold of Gisenyi. There was no military or political significance to the establishment of the zone.

7 Merimee noted that the French Ambassador to Rwanda had met yesterday with RPF Commander Kagame in Uganda with President Musaveni and had explained the reasons for and modalities of the zone. The RPF had said it had no objection in principle to the zone and would not seek confrontation with the French force. He (Merimee) had had an amicable discussion with the RPF rep, Dusaide. He said that French relations with the RPF were steadily improving while their relations with the government were steadily deteriorating.

8 Merimee said that France needed help to cope with the humanitarian situation in the zone. It was also urging the Special Rapporteur appointed by the CHR to visit the zone to see for himself and to begin to collect information on war crimes. France would assist in the gathering of such testimony and would forward it on to the Commission of Experts. He urged every effort to get the expanded UNAMIR in place as soon as possible so it could take over from the Operation Turquoise.

#### Council discussion

9 The subsequent discussion took place after the SecGen's lunch for Council representatives. Interestingly, no reference was made in the open discussion at the lunch to developments in Rwanda. The batting order in the resumed informals was Nigeria, Russian Fed, Argentina, NZ, Spain, US, Brazil, Czech Rep and UK. Oman, Djibouti and Rwanda did not participate. China decided it had said enough in the context

of the reply to the SecGen. Pakistan exercised its Presidential prerogative not to speak.

10 Gambari, who had been working on his statement all morning to tone it down, thanked Merimee for his frank briefing. He described the zone as a fait accompli and said there was little point in prolonged debate about whether it was justified under Res 929. For the record, however, Nigeria would have preferred the establishment of the zone to have been the subject of separate Council authorisation, especially as Res 929 "was a reluctant decision by a divided Council." The best hope for Rwanda lay in the implementation of Res 918 and 925 expanding UNAMIR. While it was hard to question the humanitarian motivations behind the zone, he hoped its establishment would not jeopardise UNAMIR's role. If the zone were truly to be a neutral safe area, it had to be demilitarised and any government forces or militia inside it disarmed. He concluded by asking the President to brief the media on the Council's discussions, noting that this was only appropriate given the SecGen's press statement yesterday.

11 Vorontsov's statement was surprisingly hard-hitting. Any actions by the French force had to be in strict compliance with Res 925 and 929, particularly the objectives in Op 2 of 929. Like Gambari, he said the zone had to be demilitarised to be effective; the only persons carrying weapons inside it should be the French-led forces and UNAMIR; it should not need to be ringed by offensive weapons. Also the zone should not be used as a cover for separating the parties; that would be contrary to Pp 6 of 929 and could itself provoke more fighting between the parties. He questioned the size of a zone: a zone covering 1/4-1/3 of the country was not a safe area, "it was something else." It should be made smaller, and the consent of both parties should be obtained.

12 Argentina (Cardenas) said his concerns were similar to those set out by Gambari and Vorontsov. He too called for the zone to be demilitarised. This meant disarming any forces or militia inside the zone and policing it to be effective; that would be up to France and Senegal. It would be good to get some UNAMIR observers into the zone, and every effort should be made to get the consent of both parties to the zone. Another priority was to get medicine and other humanitarian relief to the people in the zone. Argentina was ready to assist in an international effort to provide medical relief personnel.

13 We thanked Merimee for his briefing and for addressing so directly some of the concerns to which the establishment of the zone had given rise. We then spoke along the lines of your C06545, para 3. We added in a call, made earlier to the RPF representative, to the RPF to avoid confrontation and to help ease tensions in the country, noting that this was the course most likely to facilitate the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. Our speaking notes are in our separate fax.

14 Spain and, later, the Czech Rep were the most supportive of the French actions, noting that they were confident that France was acting in accordance with Res 925 and 929. (Interestingly, both the Spanish and Czech representatives had commented to us in identical terms that the Council had given the French "a blank cheque" and there was little point in trying to argue about what was happening.) Each, however, reiterated the 929 criteria of neutrality and impartiality and the need to avoid becoming an interposition force.

15 The US (Inderfurth) welcomed the French briefing, especially the advice of French contacts with the RPF and the assurances that the force would not become interposed between the parties and would remain strictly neutral. He recommended that France adopt a few confidence building measures: the zone should not be geographically larger than required to protect the civilians at risk; government forces and Hutu militia had to be excluded from the zone; any reports of Hutu atrocities should be pursued aggressively; a rapid expansion in the international humanitarian presence should be facilitated; inflammatory Hutu broadcasts had to be stopped.

16 Brazil (Sardenberg) said he would not debate whether French actions were "entirely" covered by Res 929. The zone was a fact, as was the Brazilian abstention on Res 929. He did not exclude the possibility of a need for a new resolution on the subject. He was pleased at the contacts between France and the RPF; the operation should continue to be carried out in accordance with the letter and spirit of Res 929.

17 The UK statement was notable for what it did not say. Hannay thanked Merimee for his full and frank briefing, welcomed the contacts between the French, the RPF and UNAMIR, and expressed confidence that these contacts, coupled with a flexible application of the zone would help to avoid unnecessary difficulties. Meanwhile, the focus had to be on getting UNAMIR deployed.

#### French reply

18 All of the statements delivered by Council members were careful in language and tone and avoided direct criticism of France. But, the clear message was that France does not have much support or sympathy for its latest actions. Perhaps it was for this reason that Merimee responded in what was, for him, a fairly aggressive fashion. First he challenged any Council member to show where France had failed to live up to its commitment to act with strict impartiality and neutrality. France had done what it said it would do and it had kept the Council informed. He then directed his attention to Gambari, refuting the allegation that France had presented the Council with a fait accompli. France had responded to a real emergency on the basis of existing resolutions. It was no one's fault it had all happened over



Independence Day weekend, but Council approval was not necessary in any event.

19 Merimee, who had taken extensive notes during the discussion, then turned to Vorontsov, taking issue with what he thought Vorontsov had said (there had been a confusion in interpretation) about offensive weapons being carried by the French soldiers. He would like to know what kind of weapons the Russian troops were carrying in Georgia. He then took issue with remarks made by New Zealand "and others" about the size of the zone. It was not true that the zone was unnecessarily large; by their calculation, it comprised only 15% of the territory of Rwanda which was not large given the numbers of people it contained. Finally, he said he could not agree to Gambari's suggestion that the President brief the media on the discussion.

20 Gambari expressed regret that Merimee had taken issue with his observations "made in good faith" but insisted on the President briefing the media. Djibouti came in in support of France; Marker and Hannay insisted that the President be left with the usual discretion to brief the media as he saw fit. Merimee accepted Marker's assurances that he would not engage in a detailed exposition of the specifics of the discussion.

#### Comment

21 Clearly, today's informals were disappointing for the French, though the delegation professed that France was "entirely relaxed." "If people don't want us there, we will go. Then you will have to clean up the mess." It seems to us, however, that whatever the French may have had in mind when they decided to set up the zone, the strong international reaction has caused them to go very carefully and to make every effort to avoid being seen to be partial to the government forces. The collapse of the government forces no doubt adds to the political imperative not to be seen as the defenders of the old regime.

22 Some of the suggestions made today, particularly the calls for a demilitarised zone and disarmament of the government and the militia are clearly unrealistic given the size of the French force. Somalia showed graphically that even a vastly larger force is unable coercively to disarm armed soldiers and militia. However, the comments today may persuade the French to rethink the size of the zone. A reduced zone would of itself reduce the possibilities of it being used by government and militia as a haven for launching attacks and would give the French better possibilities for policing what goes on inside the zone. It would also encourage a more cooperative attitude on the part of the RPF.

23 Notwithstanding today's concerns about the French action, there is among Council members (apart from Rwanda PR Bizimana) a slightly more hopeful attitude about developments

in Rwanda. The advances of the RPF and the contacts between the RPF and the French give some cause for hope that the worst aspects of the Rwandan crisis may be over. Marker commented in this vein to the Council at the end of today's exchanges, though he noted that Rwanda would continue to be remain under close consideration for the meantime.

24 If, as they have announced they will, the RPF form a new government in the next few days, the issue of who should represent Rwanda on the Council is likely to come up soon. Thus, it may be that the issue of the September Presidency will have to be resolved by the credentials route after all. We will report as appropriate.

Postscript

25 We were a little puzzled by your para 3. As you know, Council members meet in all kinds of permutations depending on the issues under discussion. It would be odd indeed for New Zealand to stand aside from any meeting of Council members to which we had been invited. Yesterday's meeting of the five countries which abstained on Res 929 was a natural gathering of countries which took a similar position on an issue for broadly similar reasons, and would have been understood as such by the French. Such meetings happen every day in New York and are one of the most useful ways of learning the thinking of others.

End Message



NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 6 July 1994

|     |             |     |      |                       |
|-----|-------------|-----|------|-----------------------|
| TO: | WELLINGTON  | No. | 2908 | PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE |
|     | WGTN UNSC ✓ | No. |      | PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE |
|     | PARIS       | No. |      | PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE   |
|     | DEFENCE     | No. |      | PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE   |

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, EUR, ISAC, DSP3, DSP1, EAB)  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, DDI, OPS)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Page 1 of: 15

*Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNC, LGL, EUR*

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following are:

- (a) our speaking notes as used at today's informal consultations;
- (b) French progress report on Operation Turquoise;
- (c) French map showing extent of humanitarian zone;
- (d) latest RPF letter to the Council President.

SPEAKING NOTES FOR COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON RWANDA

- we welcome the written report provided by France on its operation in Rwanda; we particularly welcome the oral briefing provided this morning by Ambassador Merimee which addressed many of the concerns raised by the proposal to establish a humanitarian zone in Rwanda
- we recall that New Zealand's abstention on resolution 929 related to the reservations we had about the means chosen for external intervention in Rwanda, and the likely effect that the parallel deployment of a separate force with a different command structure and authority would have on UNAMIR
  - we have fully shared France's humanitarian objectives and have been reassured by France's continued emphasis on the impartial nature and humanitarian objectives of their mission as authorised by resolution 929
  - that said, we have been cautious about the initiative to set aside a large humanitarian zone in the south-west of the country
  - it had not been our understanding when we adopted Operative para 4 (a) of resolution 925 providing for the establishment of secure humanitarian areas that the Council was contemplating setting aside such large tracts of land; the focus was more on providing protection for specific concentrations of persons at risk
  - we have been concerned that the establishment of such a large zone, with boundaries close to the line of confrontation between government and RPF forces, risks jeopardising the neutrality of the intervention force, and risks the force becoming an interpositional force which would be at variance with what was authorised in resolution 929



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1994/795  
5 July 1994  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

You will find attached, in implementation of paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994, the first report on the implementation of Operation "Turquoise". I should be grateful if you would have this letter as well as the annex to it circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MÉRIMÉE

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Annex

Operation "Turquoise"

1. Troop contingent

The troop contingent for operation "Turquoise" has been placed under the command of General Lafourcade, who has at his disposal an inter-service theatre command post (PCIAT), which has been established in Goma and is linked to the Paris Inter-Service Operational Centre.

The troop contingent is made up of the following components:

- (a) A north forces subgroup composed of three combat units in Kibuye;
- (b) A south forces subgroup made of two combat units in Cyangugu;
- (c) A specialized subgroup consisting of four units in Bukavu;
- (d) A detachment of fighter aircraft in Kisangani;
- (e) Three transit bases in Bangui, Libreville and Douala.

The troop contingent currently numbers 2,300 French soldiers and 32 Senegalese soldiers.

2. Composition of the Force (expected strength)

2.1 Inter-service means

- (a) An inter-service command post (PCIAT - 305 troops);
- (b) A rapid intervention military medical unit (EMMIR - 46 troops);
- (c) A specialized detachment with five helicopters (220 troops);
- (d) Three detachments of the Armed Forces Petrol Service (35 troops).

2.2 Means of the Air Force and Navy

A unit of four Mirage F1CR, four Mirage F1CT, one Atlantic, two C135 FR, two Casa 235, five tactical cargo aircraft (C130, C160), two SA330 (SAR) helicopters. Total strength is 340 troops.

2.3 Means of the Army

- (a) Four motorized infantry companies (580 troops);
- (b) A 12-vehicle light armoured car squadron (130 troops);

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- (c) A six-piece heavy mortar section (70 troops);
- (d) An Engineers section (25 troops);
- (e) A logistical support battalion that has been partially dispatched and is being deployed (expected strength - 450 troops);
- (f) A detachment of Army light aircraft (ALAT) with three Puma helicopters (60 troops);
- (g) A logistical support battalion that has been partially dispatched and is being deployed (expected strength - 450 troops);
- (h) A detachment of Army light aircraft (ALAT) with three Puma helicopters (60 troops);
- (i) Two tactical headquarters (62 troops);
- (j) A command and service company (150 troops).

#### 2.4 Means of the National Gendarmerie

A provost detachment (10 troops).

#### 2.5 Foreign troop strength

A Senegalese infantry section (32 troops).

Other units provided by various African countries could be integrated into the Force. A Belgian advanced surgical unit is expected.

### 3. Sites and method of deployment

Initially installed in Goma and Bukavu on 22 June 1994, the Force subsequently reconnoitred several main routes:

- (a) In the north, from Goma towards Kibuye and the Ndaba pass;
- (b) In the south, from Bukavu in the area of the Nyugwe forest and as far as Gikongoro and Butare.

The operation consisted of:

- (a) Preliminary actions (measures to alert and pre-position forces in central Africa) from 16 to 21 June 1994;
- (b) Initial actions:
  - (i) Establishment of an advanced operational base in Goma and an air platform in Kisangani from 21 to 24 June 1994;

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- (ii) Reconnaissance of refugee camps in Cyangugu and western Rwanda from 22 to 25 June 1994;
- (iii) Progressive deployment of the Force on the aforementioned advancement routes from 24 June to 4 July 1994.

#### 4. Evaluation of the situation

The humanitarian mission entrusted to France is proving to be delicate, particularly in the centre and the south of the area reconnoitred by the "Turquoise" Force.

Until 2 July 1994, our troops had been able to operate without incident within the government zone from the Zairian towns of Goma and Bukavu.

Subsequently, the advance by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) led to a further flow of refugees. This made us define a safe humanitarian zone for the refugees within the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle.

The humanitarian problem in this zone is today assuming considerable dimensions, which require the involvement of the entire international community. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Tutsi and Hutu persons require emergency assistance. The protection provided by France should make it possible to provide such assistance as speedily as possible.

#### 5. Humanitarian actions undertaken

##### 5.1 Protection and organization of refugee camps

The "Turquoise" Force is carrying out action to provide protection around two camps:

5.1.1 Nyarushishi, an already existing camp containing 8,000 persons (Tutsi). Protection is being provided by the Rwandese Armed Forces (RAF) and soldiers from the "Turquoise" Force (one section).

5.1.2 Biserero, a camp set up and protected by French forces (1,000 Tutsi as of 1 July).

##### 5.2 Humanitarian activities

###### 5.2.1 General situation

Since the arrival of the "Turquoise" Force in Rwanda, the number of refugees spread out among more than 50 camps in the government zone is estimated at 850,000.

In the south of the country, many refugees are moving towards Gikongoro (westward movement) and towards Burundi (southward movement).

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During his visit to the area, Mr. Arturo Hein, Director of the United Nations Emergency Office for Rwanda (stationed in Nairobi), gave a very favourable assessment of the mission and operating methods of Operation "Turquoise".

#### 5.2.2 Actions carried out

Establishment of a rapid-intervention military medical unit (EMMIR) in Cyangugu (as of 5 July).

Delivery of 37 tons of humanitarian aid from the French Government and its distribution in the Kibuye and Gikongoro regions. Four hundred tons are expected in the next few days.

Evacuation of 1,325 persons.

The Western European Union has been requested to provide the following means:

- (a) A reserve of 35 tons of medicine (renewable every three weeks);
- (b) 400 tons of non-perishable foodstuffs;
- (c) Clothing and blankets for 200,000 persons.

Flagrant human rights violations have been directly observed by French soldiers and have been reported by the civilian population. Thus, the "Turquoise" forces discovered mass graves in the Cyangugu and Kibuye regions. Furthermore, bodies likely to be of persons of Tutsi origin were found near Biserero.

All relevant information collected will subsequently be transmitted to the experts on the Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994 and to the Special Rapporteur.

#### 6. Assessment of the implementation of the operation and possible difficulties to be encountered

Operation "Turquoise" is being implemented in accordance with Security Council resolution 929 (1994).

The French forces have demonstrated impartiality in the field by rescuing many Hutu and Tutsi Rwandese from certain death. This impartiality is beginning to be recognized by the RPF, which permitted the evacuation of 1,000 persons from Butare, even though a minor incident took place.

Certain difficulties remain. For the time being, non-governmental organizations and international institutions are doing very little to take over work carried out by the "Turquoise" forces, particularly in the south. In this field, as in the area of participating in the logistical support for our intervention, few promises have been carried out. While our contingent serves

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to deter the militias and armed forces involved in the conflict, it is still insufficient in view of the number of displaced persons to be assisted.

Furthermore, the difficulties involved in controlling the extremely tense military situation are not insignificant. Thus, possible hostility on the part of the RAF and the Hutu militias against our contingent may increase the dangers which our forces are already facing from RPF. Participation by third countries in the operation would constitute appreciable assistance to our efforts.

Lastly, the military effort borne almost entirely by France could not be extended without the serious prospect of relief by UNAMIR II. Most of the contribution offers are still uncertain or accompanied by conditions or time-limits that are incompatible with the taking over of our mission in the next two months. France therefore calls upon all Member States to ensure that the deployment of the reinforced UNAMIR is speedily carried out.

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Appendix I


Evacuations carried out  
(as of 4 July 1994)

| Date    | Place of removal  | To              | Persons concerned    |
|---------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 28 June | Kibuye            | Goma            | 35 nuns<br>8 orphans |
| 29 June | Kibuye            | Goma            | 1 nun                |
| 30 June | Gishyita          | Goma            | 94 Tutsi             |
| 2 July  | Butare            | Goma            | 16 nuns              |
| 2 July  | Kibuye and Butare | Goma and Bukavu | 130 civilians        |
| 3 July  | Butare            | Burundi         | 262 persons          |
| 3 July  | Butare            |                 | 700 TDH orphans      |
| 3 July  | Butare            |                 | 30 nuns              |
| 4 July  | Gikongoro         | Goma            | 14 persons<br>3 nuns |
|         | North<br>Kigeme   | Gikongoro       | 1 nun<br>31 Tutsi    |
| Total   |                   |                 | 1 325                |

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
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Appendix II



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# FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



New York, 6 July 1994

H. E. Jamsheed K.A. Marker  
President of the Security Council

Your Excellency

With reference to the situation in Rwanda, we trust that you have received our letter written to you dated 4 July 1994 and take this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the developments in Rwanda over the last few days.

Your Excellency, you will, by now, have heard that the Rwandese Patriotic Front has taken over the capital, Kigali. We are, consequently, the new authority in the country.

We wish to inform the Members of the Security Council that we shall, in the course of the next few days, formally set up a new Administration. This new Government would be broad-based, encompassing the broad spectrum of Rwandese political opinion. It would be formed in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement to which the Rwandese Patriotic Front reaffirms its commitment, but will exclude the perpetrators of genocide.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front shares the concern of the Security Council about the humanitarian situation in south-western Rwanda. We have taken successful measures to restore law and order in most of the country. The south-western part remains unstable, largely as a result of the activities of the former Government's troops, the militia and the threatening hate propaganda broadcast by radio stations under the control of extremists in the former Government. We anticipate, your Excellency, that the installation of the incoming government will stabilise the situation in the remaining parts of the country.

14/16

In our letter addressed to you and the Secretary-General, dated 4 July, we wrote at length on the apparent decision by France to extend its mandate under resolution 929/1994 by constituting itself into an interposition force for the protection of the former Government army and the militia. We have, however, stressed that we intend to do everything possible to avoid confrontation with French troops. Our leadership has indicated its willingness to discuss its role in Rwanda. Indeed, several meetings have already taken place between representatives of the French Government and our leadership. We welcome the assurances we have received that French troops will only limit their role to the humanitarian mission approved by the Security Council.

We remain convinced, Your Excellency, that the security zones in question are absolutely unnecessary. The advance of Rwandese Patriotic Front does not in anyway threaten the security of innocent civilians, as millions living in other parts of the country would testify. Nevertheless, the Rwandese Patriotic Front does not, in principle, object to the setting up of such security zones if the international community recommends their establishment on a temporary basis.

We would stress that no agreement whatsoever has been reached with France on the concept of the humanitarian security zones. Our view of such zones remains that:

1. They should be established in specific geographical locations where concentrations of displaced people presently exist.
2. They should be small in size and be only of such number as the size of the displaced population warrants.
3. They should strictly be for the use of civilians.
4. Any troops or members of the militia entering the zones should be promptly disarmed: the zones must be safe areas and French troops, and later UNAMIR, must accept the responsibility for policing them.
5. Perpetrators of acts of genocide and other human rights violations living in the security zones should be apprehended as information of their complicity in atrocities becomes available from the Commission of Experts established by Resolution 935.1994, investigations by the Special Rapporteur or any other source.

6. They should be accessible for monitoring.
7. French protection of these protection zones should be for only a limited duration, pending the deployment of UNAMIR II.

The RPF eagerly awaits the arrival of UNAMIR II, will do everything to facilitate its quick deployment and has, to this end, taken steps to reopen Kigali airport on 7 July 1994.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front remains vehemently opposed to any unilateral military operation by any country in support of the former Government, its armed forces and allied militia. Our contact with representatives of the French Government have centred around the discussion of the above views on the concept of the security zones and we have received assurances that the French Government does not, in principle, have any objections to most of our conditions. We trust that the French Government will, in the interest of peace, strictly ensure that the zones in question are kept for purely humanitarian purposes in order to avoid an unnecessary escalation of hostilities.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front requests the Security Council to make a definitive statement on the concept of the security zones proposed by France in its letter addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 1 July 1994, to enable us to know the precise conditions pertaining to the said zones with which we have to comply.

We pray, your Excellency, that this letter be distributed as an official document of the Security Council.



Gerald Gahima

For: The Political Bureau  
of the  
Rwandes Patriotic Front



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Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM: NEW YORK

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06-Jul-1994

TO: WELLINGTON

WGTV UNSC

Immediate

CC: BEIJING  
BRUSSELS  
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P/S MFA

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DEFENCE MOD

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA


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| Watson    |  |

Your C06545.

Summary

- At French request, Council agrees to short form of response to the SecGen
- Secretariat confirm that RPF have taken Kigali which is quiet for the first time in months
- French brief Council on establishment of humanitarian zone and contacts with the RPF, taking care to address many of the concerns raised in the media and elsewhere about the motivation for the zone
- Subsequent discussion reveals that few Council members are comfortable with the zone; only Spain and Czech Republic are generally supportive, and even they reiterate the criteria of neutrality, impartiality and non-interposition of forces set out in Res 929
- Russian Fed, US, Argentina, as well as NZ, question the size of the zone
- Nigerians, Russian and Argentines say zone should be demilitarised and any government forces and militia in it disarmed; US says government forces, militia and Hutu

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1. Illers should not be allowed to shelter in the zone

- In response, French challenge anyone to show they have not lived up to their commitments; Nigeria is a particular target for describing the French actions as a fait accompli

Action

Information only

Report

Reply to SecGen's letter

Prior to this morning's informals we learned that the French had had a change of heart and wanted a reply to the SecGen's letter after all. The Chinese tried to hold out against a reply (and seem to have used our name in vain in talking to the French) but dropped their objection when they realised they were alone. To avoid any French misapprehension about our position, we reiterated to Merimee that we had never been opposed to a Council reply to the SecGen.

2 At the commencement of discussions at the informals, Marker advised that on the basis of his consultations, he would send the short form of a reply to the SecGen (ie with the deletion of the clause referring to Res 929). There was no objection, but China (Li) recalled China's abstention on Res 929 and said their agreement to the letter did not signify support to the issue to which it referred.

Secretariat briefing

3 Gharekhan confirmed that the RPF had taken Kigali which was quiet for the first time in months. No radio broadcasts hostile to UNAMIR had been made over the last 24 hours. The new Special Rep, Khan, was now in Kigali and was beginning consultations with RPF and RGF leaders. UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire had met with Kagame, the RPF Chief of Staff, and was travelling to Goma today for a second meeting with the Commander of Operation Turquoise. Ghana had confirmed its readiness to send the troops to bring its battalion back to full strength. Fifteen APCs had arrived in Kigali; 50 more had reached Entebbe. Gharekhan said he would be presenting an oral report to informals tomorrow on Operation Turquoise pursuant to Op 10 of Res 929.

French briefing

4 France's report under Res 929 was on the desks this morning (see accompanying fax, Wellington and Paris only). Merimee made reference to it but focussed on the reasons for setting up the humanitarian zone. He prefaced his remarks by noting that he wanted to correct some of the misconceptions in the media about French motives; he cited today's NY Times

(see late fax) as a "particularly malevolent" example.

5 Merimee asserted the zone had been established pursuant to Res 925 and 929 in response to the severe humanitarian situation that had developed following the RPF's recent advances. People were coming into the area by the thousands every hour; there were 400,000 displaced persons in the zone yesterday, there would be 500,000 today. He stressed that France's intentions were "purely humanitarian"; their actions were to protect the civilian population. There would be a complete ban on actions by any party which endangered the security situation. Military activity was prohibited inside the zone; the zone would not be able to be used a starting base for military activities outside. French troops would be completely impartial in enforcing these requirements against any party coming into the zone.

6 Merimee said that France was confident it was achieving the goals set for Operation Turquoise; by their admittedly rough estimate they had saved about 50,000 people from being killed. He emphasised that the force was not and would not be an interposition force. He said that the government forces were not in the zone; they were in the north-west centred around the government stronghold of Gisenyi. There was no military or political significance to the establishment of the zone.

7 Merimee noted that the French Ambassador to Rwanda had met yesterday with RPF Commander Kagame in Uganda with President Musaveni and had explained the reasons for and modalities of the zone. The RPF had said it had no objection in principle to the zone and would not seek confrontation with the French force. He (Merimee) had had an amicable discussion with the RPF rep, Dusaide. He said that French relations with the RPF were steadily improving while their relations with the government were steadily deteriorating.

8 Merimee said that France needed help to cope with the humanitarian situation in the zone. It was also urging the Special Rapporteur appointed by the CHR to visit the zone to see for himself and to begin to collect information on war crimes. France would assist in the gathering of such testimony and would forward it on to the Commission of Experts. He urged every effort to get the expanded UNAMIR in place as soon as possible so it could take over from the Operation Turquoise.

#### Council discussion

9 The subsequent discussion took place after the SecGen's lunch for Council representatives. Interestingly, no reference was made in the open discussion at the lunch to developments in Rwanda. The batting order in the resumed informals was Nigeria, Russian Fed, Argentina, NZ, Spain, US, Brazil, Czech Rep and UK. Oman, Djibouti and Rwanda did not participate. China decided it had said enough in the context

of the reply to the SecGen. Pakistan exercised its Presidential prerogative not to speak.

10 Gambari, who had been working on his statement all morning to tone it down, thanked Merimee for his frank briefing. He described the zone as a fait accompli and said there was little point in prolonged debate about whether it was justified under Res 929. For the record, however, Nigeria would have preferred the establishment of the zone to have been the subject of separate Council authorisation, especially as Res 929 "was a reluctant decision by a divided Council." The best hope for Rwanda lay in the implementation of Res 918 and 925 expanding UNAMIR. While it was hard to question the humanitarian motivations behind the zone, he hoped its establishment would not jeopardise UNAMIR's role. If the zone were truly to be a neutral safe area, it had to be demilitarised and any government forces or militia inside it disarmed. He concluded by asking the President to brief the media on the Council's discussions, noting that this was only appropriate given the SecGen's press statement yesterday.

11 Vorontsov's statement was surprisingly hard-hitting. Any actions by the French force had to be in strict compliance with Res 925 and 929, particularly the objectives in Op 2 of 929. Like Gambari, he said the zone had to be demilitarised to be effective; the only persons carrying weapons inside it should be the French-led forces and UNAMIR; it should not need to be ringed by offensive weapons. Also the zone should not be used as a cover for separating the parties; that would be contrary to Pp 6 of 929 and could itself provoke more fighting between the parties. He questioned the size of a zone: a zone covering 1/4-1/3 of the country was not a safe area, "it was something else." It should be made smaller, and the consent of both parties should be obtained.

12 Argentina (Cardenas) said his concerns were similar to those set out by Gambari and Vorontsov. He too called for the zone to be demilitarised. This meant disarming any forces or militia inside the zone and policing it to be effective; that would be up to France and Senegal. It would be good to get some UNAMIR observers into the zone, and every effort should be made to get the consent of both parties to the zone. Another priority was to get medicine and other humanitarian relief to the people in the zone. Argentina was ready to assist in an international effort to provide medical relief personnel.

13 We thanked Merimee for his briefing and for addressing so directly some of the concerns to which the establishment of the zone had given rise. We then spoke along the lines of your C06545, para 3. We added in a call, made earlier to the RPF representative, to the RPF to avoid confrontation and to help ease tensions in the country, noting that this was the course most likely to facilitate the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. Our speaking notes are in our separate fax.



14 (pain and, later, the Czech Rep were the most supportive of the French actions, noting that they were confident that France was acting in accordance with Res 925 and 929. (Interestingly, both the Spanish and Czech representatives had commented to us in identical terms that the Council had given the French "a blank cheque" and there was little point in trying to argue about what was happening.) Each, however, reiterated the 929 criteria of neutrality and impartiality and the need to avoid becoming an interposition force.

15 The US (Inderfurth) welcomed the French briefing, especially the advice of French contacts with the RPF and the assurances that the force would not become interposed between the parties and would remain strictly neutral. He recommended that France adopt a few confidence building measures: the zone should not be geographically larger than required to protect the civilians at risk; government forces and Hutu militia had to be excluded from the zone; any reports of Hutu atrocities should be pursued aggressively; a rapid expansion in the international humanitarian presence should be facilitated; inflammatory Hutu broadcasts had to be stopped.

16 Brazil (Sardenberg) said he would not debate whether French actions were "entirely" covered by Res 929. The zone was a fact, as was the Brazilian abstention on Res 929. He did not exclude the possibility of a need for a new resolution on the subject. He was pleased at the contacts between France and the RPF; the operation should continue to be carried out in accordance with the letter and spirit of Res 929.

17 The UK statement was notable for what it did not say. Hannay thanked Merimee for his full and frank briefing, welcomed the contacts between the French, the RPF and UNAMIR, and expressed confidence that these contacts, coupled with a flexible application of the zone would help to avoid unnecessary difficulties. Meanwhile, the focus had to be on getting UNAMIR deployed.

#### French reply

18 All of the statements delivered by Council members were careful in language and tone and avoided direct criticism of France. But, the clear message was that France does not have much support or sympathy for its latest actions. Perhaps it was for this reason that Merimee responded in what was, for him, a fairly aggressive fashion. First he challenged any Council member to show where France had failed to live up to its commitment to act with strict impartiality and neutrality. France had done what it said it would do and it had kept the Council informed. He then directed his attention to Gambari, refuting the allegation that France had presented the Council with a fait accompli. France had responded to a real emergency on the basis of existing resolutions. It was no one's fault it had all happened over

Independence Day weekend, but Council approval was not necessary in any event.

19 Merimee, who had taken extensive notes during the discussion, then turned to Vorontsov, taking issue with what he thought Vorontsov had said (there had been a confusion in interpretation) about offensive weapons being carried by the French soldiers. He would like to know what kind of weapons the Russian troops were carrying in Georgia. He then took issue with remarks made by New Zealand "and others" about the size of the zone. It was not true that the zone was unnecessarily large; by their calculation, it comprised only 15% of the territory of Rwanda which was not large given the numbers of people it contained. Finally, he said he could not agree to Gambari's suggestion that the President brief the media on the discussion.

20 Gambari expressed regret that Merimee had taken issue with his observations "made in good faith" but insisted on the President briefing the media. Djibouti came in in support of France; Marker and Hannay insisted that the President be left with the usual discretion to brief the media as he saw fit. Merimee accepted Marker's assurances that he would not engage in a detailed exposition of the specifics of the discussion.

Comment

21 Clearly, today's informals were disappointing for the French, though the delegation professed that France was "entirely relaxed." "If people don't want us there, we will go. Then you will have to clean up the mess." It seems to us, however, that whatever the French may have had in mind when they decided to set up the zone, the strong international reaction has caused them to go very carefully and to make every effort to avoid being seen to be partial to the government forces. The collapse of the government forces no doubt adds to the political imperative not to be seen as the defenders of the old regime.

22 Some of the suggestions made today, particularly the calls for a demilitarised zone and disarmament of the government and the militia are clearly unrealistic given the size of the French force. Somalia showed graphically that even a vastly larger force is unable coercively to disarm armed soldiers and militia. However, the comments today may persuade the French to rethink the size of the zone. A reduced zone would of itself reduce the possibilities of it being used by government and militia as a haven for launching attacks and would give the French better possibilities for policing what goes on inside the zone. It would also encourage a more cooperative attitude on the part of the RPF.

23 Notwithstanding today's concerns about the French action, there is among Council members (apart from Rwanda PR Bizimana) a slightly more hopeful attitude about developments

in Rwanda. The advances of the RPF and the contacts between the RPF and the French give some cause for hope that the worst aspects of the Rwandan crisis may be over. Marker commented in this vein to the Council at the end of today's exchanges, though he noted that Rwanda would continue to be remain under close consideration for the meantime.

24 If, as they have announced they will, the RPF form a new government in the next few days, the issue of who should represent Rwanda on the Council is likely to come up soon. Thus, it may be that the issue of the September Presidency will have to be resolved by the credentials route after all. We will report as appropriate.

#### Postscript

25 We were a little puzzled by your para 3. As you know, Council members meet in all kinds of permutations depending on the issues under discussion. It would be odd indeed for New Zealand to stand aside from any meeting of Council members to which we had been invited. Yesterday's meeting of the five countries which abstained on Res 929 was a natural gathering of countries which took a similar position on an issue for broadly similar reasons, and would have been understood as such by the French. Such meetings happen every day in New York and are one of the most useful ways of learning the thinking of others.

*wasn't  
suggested they  
should.*

End Message



CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1, 42/6/1

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| 19:41 (5803)     | 700/WSH/00000/00000                          | \$259.16    |
| FROM: WASHINGTON | C03131/WSH                                   | 07-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON   | WGTN UNSC                                    | Routine     |
| CC: NEW YORK     | GENEVA                                       | Routine     |
| OTTAWA           | CANBERRA                                     | Routine     |
| BEIJING          | MOSCOW                                       | Routine     |
| TOKYO            | PARIS  | Routine     |
| LONDON           | BONN   | Routine     |
| HARARE           | MADRID                                       | Routine     |
| SANTIAGO         | BRUSSELS                                     | Routine     |
| TO: Defence      |  | Routine     |
| MFAT             | (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, EAB, AMER, DSP3, DSP1) |             |
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| DEFENCE HQNZDF   | (DSIA, OPS, DDI)                             |             |
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Subject

U04580: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA AND ITS PRESIDENCY

Summary

State is inclining toward seeking Rwanda's expulsion from the Council. The US is broadly supportive of the French humanitarian zone - but they share our concerns as to its size, the importance of neutrality, non-interpositioning etc.

Action

2 For information.

Report

3 During a call on Snyder (Director, IO/P, State) on 6 July we referred to New York's reporting on possible resolutions of the Rwandan September Presidency problem. Snyder said he was having a hard time getting anything out of his New York Mission on this topic (he said they clearly wanted to be able to run things unencumbered by Head Office's views) and was accordingly grateful for the update we were able to

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provide. But he signalled that State is coming to the view that it is not enough simply to solve the September visibility problem but that something "more drastic" is called for. Events on the ground are increasingly impelling the Administration to believe that Rwanda must be "got rid of" from the Council. He defended this position by noting that quite aside from the horrors of what it had recently perpetrated, there was now no real functioning government. For good measure he noted that there was also the argument that a country which is the subject of SC action should not actually be on the Council.

4 He made it clear that no decisions had yet been taken. State's lawyers are still gnawing the problem. It is probable that if the change in position is approved, the US would decide first to focus on Rwanda's GA seat (he did not know whether through a credentials challenge or GA resolution on expulsion) and then move on to the Council. He stressed that the US would be seeking a consensus on the part of African countries in support of any such action.

5 In further remarks he said the US was headed toward derecognition of the Rwanda Government - but again no decisions had quite been taken.

6 As to the French humanitarian zone, the US is broadly supportive (Snyder tried to suggest that this was the concept that the US had itself originally tried to promote) but they are intent on reminding everyone of the importance of neutrality, the fact that it must not be used to the advantage of any one group and that those inside the zone must be disarmed. They have no doubts whatsoever that the zone's creation is very clearly within the mandate given by the SC resolutions. They share our concerns regarding the proposed size of the zone and other points in your C06545 as regards interpositioning and possible complications to the handover to the expanded UNAMIR. He added that for the US the questions of

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C03131/WSH

Page 3

most concern are the nature and size of the zone and what the French are doing in terms of policing it.

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End Message

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UNCLASSIFIED SECURE



115 23/37

**FACSIMILE MESSAGE**

**NYPM File: 3/88/1**

**NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK**  
**Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827**

**DATE: 8 July 1994**

**TO: WELLINGTON  
WGTN UNSC**

**No.**

2921

**PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY**

**RPTD: HQNZDF (OPS)  
DSIA  
Defence MOD**

**No.**

412

**PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY**

**LD: MFAT (UNC, MEA, DSP1, EAB, HRU)**

**Page 1 of 3**

**SUBJECT: UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MEETING**











1. The subject meeting took place yesterday morning just as the same UN Mission was being considered in the SC. The Meeting was Chaired by USG Annan with ASG Riza and Maj Gen Baril in attendance.
2. Annan opened the meeting and immediately asked the French delegate to give an update on the situation with respect to the French Operation TURQUOISE. This update was delivered by the French MILAD. Very little detail can be added to our C04715/NYK other than the following points:
  - a. There are some 400,000 refugees in the 'French zone'. The situation of these refugees was very bad. France had already airlifted some 400 tonnes of food in order to assist refugees but it was not enough and more was needed.
  - b. The RGF located inside the 'zone' had been 'told' to refrain from all military activities. Only food and water was being allowed to be brought into the zone for their resupply.
  - c. There had been no 'massacres' inside the zone since the presence of French troops. It was strongly emphasized that France was neutral and was taking no sides.

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- a. The situation in Rwanda, as a whole, was now stable. It was hoped that a general ceasefire would be achieved soon.
- e. It was emphasized on four occasions, that the mandate given to France by the SC was for two months. At the end of August 1994, there would be no French troops in Rwanda. Even with the end date of the end of August, France wanted to be replaced by a expanded UNAMIR ASAP. France would commence its withdrawal at the end of July. A strong appeal was made to 'all member states' to facilitate this.
- f. A map was distributed (attached) which showed the main dispositions of the parties in Rwanda. The RPF held some two thirds of the country and the RGF was now limited to the NW of the country, other than those inside the 'French zone'.
3. General Baril then reviewed the commitments of various nations to an expanded UNAMIR. Little new was disclosed other than the deployment timings for some nations which have already been reported in our C04715/NYK. Baril did make the point, however, that offers by nations (conditional) still were not compatible with requests placed by the UN in order to meet those offers. There was a clear need for both parties to compromise.
4. After Baril had spoken, some nations chose to elaborate upon their commitments, either spoken about at the last UNAMIR troop contributors meetings, or spoken about at this meeting by Baril.
5. Of note to a possible New Zealand contribution of a C130, were the comments by the Italian delegate and by Annan. The commitment by the Italian government would be realized very shortly. The Italian C130 was on seven days notice to move and was 'only' waiting for the UN to call it forward. This C130 would be based in Nairobi. Annan stated that Kigali airport was expected to be 'opened' today (7 Jul 94) and he asked that nations who had placed caveats on flying into Kigali previously (Netherlands [F27] and Italy? [C130]) might remove these caveats. The situation in Kigali was now quite different and UNAMIR was depending on nations who were supplying aircraft to fly in troops and equipment rather than force UNAMIR to bring in the same by the very much longer, and uncertain, land route.
6. In closing, it was notable that the number of attendees at the Meeting was approximately 50% fewer than the meeting last week.



## RIVANDA


- |   |   |
|---|---|
|  | Côte d'Ivoire<br>(plus de 156.000 hab.) |
|  | Plus de 10.000 hab.                     |
|  | Ville importante                        |
|  | Autre localité et lieu                  |
|  | Route de viabilité permanente           |
|  | Autre route                             |
|  | Piste                                   |
|  | Aéroport                                |
|  | Limite de préfecture                    |
|  | Chef-lieu de préfecture                 |
|  | Parc National                           |
|  | N'aurais                                |
|  | 0 10 20km                               |

Bulare C.-el-lieu de préfecture

 Perc National

**STREY**

0 10 20km



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115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 20:45 (5818)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$495.55    |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04726/NYK          | 08-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Immediate   |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Balladur, with Juppe in attendance, is to address a formal meeting of the Council on Monday, 11 July
- RPF are consulting other Rwandan parties and Tanzanian facilitator of the Arusha process on establishment of broad-based government
- RPF may announce a unilateral ceasefire; negotiations for agreed ceasefire continue

Action

Information

Report

Balladur Visit

At this morning's informal consultations, the President announced that French Prime Minister, Balladur, is coming to New York next Monday and will address a formal meeting of the Council commencing at 10.30am. Foreign Minister Juppe will be coming too. Marker also advised that the Argentine Foreign Minister (in New York to address the C24 session on the Falklands) may also attend the Council.

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2 Merimee explained that Balladur and Juppe will truly be making a flying visit: arriving by the morning Concorde and departing on the early afternoon flight. They will see the SecGen and senior DPKO officials as well as attend the Council.

3 Merimee said the reason for the visit was that Rwanda had been a difficult issue which had given rise to a certain amount of disagreement. They would be emphasising that France wanted its mission in Rwanda to be successful and to end quickly. Balladur was not a man to do things for self promotion. He wanted to emphasise the humanitarian nature of the French actions and to reinforce the need for UNAMIR to be redeployed asap so that France could leave by the end of this month as Balladur wished.

4 The timing of the visit will be so tight that, with the possible exception of the Argentine Foreign Minister, there would be no opportunity for other Council members to speak - unless they wish to do so after Balladur and Juppe have left. We doubt that others will speak.

#### Secretariat Briefing

5 Gharekhan advised that Kigali Airport had opened yesterday and that 206 Ghanian soldiers had flown in. Special Rep Khan and Force Commander Dallaire had had further meetings with the RPF and government representatives. The RPF had advised that they would operate within the framework of the Arusha Agreement and were consulting other political factions and the Tanzanian facilitator before forming a broad based government of national unity. They had confirmed, however, persons implicated in active genocide would be excluded from participation.

6 The RPF had also indicated they might declare a unilateral ceasefire. (The RPF Rep Dusaide told us that the intention for such a move was to encourage defections from the moderates in the government forces so as to further isolate the ringleaders and to broaden the pool of persons who might be incorporated in the broad based government.) Meanwhile, the negotiations for an agreed ceasefire would continue.

7 The RPF had asked for assistance in reestablishing basic services in Kigali such as electricity and water. At the moment the RPF were engaged in strengthening the defences along the perimeter of their territory in preparation for the declaration of the unilateral ceasefire.

8 Gharekhan also gave a brief rundown on yesterday's troop contributors meeting (see our separate fax). The US noted that while the information provided was reasonably encouraging we had to remember that the deployment of the Ghanians only brought UNAMIR up to phase one of the expansion authorised in Resolution 918. Much more had still to be

done. Gharekhan endorsed these remarks and noted that the Secretariat was far from satisfied at the pace of deployment of the expanded force.

Comment

9 Whether there is more to the Balladur/Juppe visit than explained by Merimee will probably only be revealed on Monday. The one slightly worrying feature of Merimee's remarks today was his stress on Balladur's wish to have a French force withdrawn by the end of July. As you know, Res 929 authorised the force to stay until the end of August. Although the French had made noises about pulling out at the end of this month, their remarks at yesterday's troop contributors meeting suggested that they were again working to the 31 August deadline. Merimee's remarks today suggest they may be returning to the earlier exit date.

10 While it is the universal wish for UNAMIR to take over from the French forces asap, the pace of deployment of the expanded UN force suggests that UNAMIR may not be in a position to take over by the end of this month and could well be overwhelmed by the scale of the humanitarian situation that seems to be developing in the south west of Rwanda. It is not inconceivable (indeed Merimee made some hints, albeit jocular, in this direction the other day) that the French may setting up a situation in which the Council will have to ask the French to stay on after the end of this month in order to avert a major vacuum in the security situation. That would certainly be one way of turning this week's widespread hesitations about the establishment of the French zone back on the other Council members.

End Message

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115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 16:52 (5826)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$368.39    |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04730/NYK          | 11-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Priority    |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04726.

2 French Prime Minister, Balladur, with Foreign Minister, Juppe, in attendance, addressed the Security Council this morning. Also present was Argentine Foreign Minister, Di Tella. Balladur and Di Tella were the only speakers in what turned out to be a PR exercise only, with no substantive content.

2 The text of Balladur's address is contained in our accompanying fax (Wellington and Paris only). There were two interesting aspects to the address. First, it emphasises at length France's traditional support for international order through the League of Nations and the United Nations. Secondly, on Rwanda there is nothing new in terms of what France sees as the way ahead. The essential message on the latter score is that France wants to get out of Rwanda by the end of July and therefore wants the expanded UN force deployed as quickly as possible so it can take over.

3 It seems very clear that the trip was designed as a PR exercise, made in response to the widespread skepticism, including in last week's informal consultations, about France's intentions in Rwanda following the establishment of the "humanitarian zone" in the south-west of the country.

4 The Argentine address was, in the circumstances, a

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C04730/NYK

Page 2

predictable statement of Argentine position on Rwanda, couched in a reaffirmation of the essential elements of neutrality and impartiality set out in Res 929.

5 The United States was also originally inscribed on the speakers' list, but later withdrew. We have been given two different explanations for Mrs Albright's decision to scratch herself from the list. One was that she was unhappy that the meeting was suspended after the Argentine address to enable Balladur to give a press conference and head for the airport, so she would not have been speaking to him. The second was that Rwanda had inscribed to speak and she did not want to be followed by Bizimana. In any event, neither she nor Bizimana took the floor.

End Message

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115/23/37

Your file: 161/1/1, 42/6/1

Our file:

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|              |                     |          |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 18:52 (5831) | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$286.93 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|

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|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | WELLINGTON | C25628/WN1 | 12-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | NEW YORK   |            | Priority    |
| CC:   | WASHINGTON |            | Priority    |
|       | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WGTN UNSC  | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, EAB, AMER, DSP3, DSP1)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

U53755: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Summary

US is considering de-recognising Rwandan interim government and is inclined to challenge, or support a challenge to, Rwanda's credentials in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, according to US Embassy.

Action Required

2 For information. Grateful your continued reporting on consultations among Council members.

Report

3 Washington's C03131. On instructions US Embassy (Counsellor, McCormick) came in this morning, as part of a US approach to Council members (only) in capitals and New York. He said the US was considering de-recognising the Rwandan interim government. This did not mean the US assumed the RPF could organise itself to take a seat in the UN, let alone assume the Council Presidency in September. While best outcome would be for Rwanda to withdraw from the Council, the US judged, after speaking with the Nigerians, that withdrawal was not likely. Accordingly US inclination was to challenge or support a challenge to Rwanda's credentials in both the UNSC and UNGA. It was beginning a process of consultation with this in view. US had abandoned idea of trying to suspend

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Rwanda under Article V (which would require nine affirmative votes and no vetoes). McCormick emphasised that it would be important not to do anything that could jeopardise the safety of French forces on the ground. US had consulted the French who shared US view of the problem but were concerned about not setting a precedent that would later be regretted. The French were also hoping that the situation on the ground would change for the better.

4 In response we agreed it seemed politically inconceivable that the Rwandan interim government should hold the Council Presidency in September. We had looked at various options under discussion but events in Rwanda had continued to evolve rapidly. Further developments, including a declaration by the RPF of a broad-based government of national unity working within the framework of the Arusha Accords, could change the situation. Continuing consultations would be needed. Our own preliminary thinking was that we should not give up on regional diplomatic efforts aimed at securing a voluntary withdrawal by the interim government. An African consensus, and in particular Tanzania's views as chief broker of the Arusha Agreements, would be crucial in arriving at an agreed course of action. (McCormick concurred and said the US had been consulting with both Nigeria and Djibouti.) We would welcome staying in touch with US thinking as the situation was readdressed.

5 Comment: We are glad that the US is beginning a process of consultation, but with the prospect of the RPF forming a new government and events on the ground unfolding and still having some way to go, we would not expect precipitate action on the Rwanda credentials question. We noted to McCormick that we anticipated the bulk of the consultations would take place in New York.

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End Message

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~~NZEO~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1 42/6/1

18:51 (5838)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$254.15

|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | NEW YORK   | C04739/NYK | 12-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC  | Priority    |
| CC:   | WASHINGTON | BEIJING    | Routine     |
|       | BONN       | BRUSSELS   | Routine     |
|       | CANBERRA   | GENEVA     | Routine     |
|       | HARARE     | LONDON     | Routine     |
|       | MADRID     | MOSCOW     | Routine     |
|       | OTTAWA     | PARIS      | Routine     |
|       | SANTIAGO   | TOKYO      | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, EAB, AMER, DSP3, DSP1)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

We met today with Australian Defence Force Reconnaissance Team which was visiting New York en route back from Rwanda.

2 They are enthusiastic about proposed ADF contribution of approximately 300 personnel (90 member surgical team, 120 member rifle company and 80-90 logistics). They believe a useful job can be done and will recommend accordingly to Australian ministers.

3 The question of movement control unit (which Secretariat have also approached New Zealand for) was raised with Australians again by Secretariat. The Australians were asked if they would agree to transfer 10 or so of their movement control staff with UNOSOM down to Kigali. Clearly there was some ADF interest in doing this as their people in Mogadishu are apparently underemployed at present.

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 161/1/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 16:06 (5848)   | 700/BON/00000/00000 | \$574.08    |
| FROM: BONN     | C01562/BON          | 13-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Routine     |
| CC: BEIJING    | BRUSSELS            | Routine     |
| CANBERRA       | GENEVA              | Routine     |
| HARARE         | LONDON              | Routine     |
| MADRID         | MOSCOW              | Routine     |
| OTTAWA         | PARIS               | Routine     |
| SANTIAGO       | TOKYO               | Routine     |
| WASHINGTON     | DEFENCE             | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Summary

Germans have misgivings over French humanitarian zone but are not prepared to voice them openly. The short-term problem is relations between the French and RPF, arising from the establishment of the humanitarian zone. In the medium term it is what to do with the zone after the French had left. While the Germans admit to having no recipe for the future, they place some hope on negotiations for a Government of national reconciliation, led by RPF. Doubts were expressed about the practicality of prosecuting all those involved in atrocities. Germany was still considering a UN request to provide vehicles for UNAMIR. We disabused our interlocutor of the notion that our abstention on SCR 929 was somehow linked to our past experience with the French.

Action

For your information.

Report

We spoke with Wienand, Deputy Director in the East Africa Section of the German Foreign Office yesterday on the situation in Rwanda, the Ballardur statement in New York, and a possible German contribution to UNAMIR.

2 Wienand characterised the biggest short-term problem in Rwanda as the relations between the French and RPF. The

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establishment of the humanitarian zone had complicated the situation greatly. A large number of militia, "government" soldiers and others who had committed atrocities had fled into the zone. There were likely to be calls for the French to hand over the worst perpetrators to the RPF or the UN. Because of the sheer size of the zone and the number of people in it, Wienand thought the French had little chance of isolating the wrong-doers or disarming them. This had the potential to lead to considerable difficulties with the RPF.

3 For this reason it was necessary, in the German view, that the French leave Rwanda as soon as possible. This, however, was conditioned on UNAMIR being strengthened. Wienand said that any UN action needed time to be established and UNAMIR was no exception. The African soldiers that were available needed logistical assistance and outfitting. It took time to find the money from domestic budgets, including Germany's.

4 We asked Wienand about the significance of Balladur's statement and French withdrawal by the end of July. Wienand attached no particular significance to it. He claimed the French had always said their action in Rwanda would be limited to two months. Of late they had been talking of the end of July. It was no surprise to the Germans.

5 Wienand thought that the biggest medium-term problem was what to do with the humanitarian zone after the French left. The establishment or protection of such a zone was not in UNAMIR's mandate. (Wienand also said that it could be argued that the establishment of the zone fell outside the terms of SCR 929.) The zone could not remain as this would lead to a defacto partition of the country. It was also under criticism as an area which protected killers. He could envisage small protected zones being established in the area for the protection of refugees. Return of refugees to their homes was a significant long-term problem.

6 Wienand went on for some length - speaking honestly he said - about the practicalities of punishing all those involved in committing atrocities in Rwanda. There were so many with blood on their hands, and others who had incited the massacres. Some had already fled to Paris. He wondered how the Tribunal would handle this work from a practical point of view: collecting evidence; finding those responsible and punishing them; the length of time it would take; and the cost. For future peace in Rwanda an accommodation had to be made between the Tutsi and Hutu. We argued that humanitarian principles needed to be upheld and at least the worst perpetrators brought to justice.

7 The establishment of a new government of national reconciliation would assist greatly in providing a stable environment. There had been relatively few revenge killings on the part of the RPF - their soldiers were under better control. Wienand envisaged a solution whereby the RPF formed

a new government, similar to but not the same as the one laid down in the Arusha Agreement. The situation had altered drastically with the death of the Rwandan President, and the relative balance between the Tutsi and Hutu had changed. As in Burundi it was likely that the Tutsi would dominate the military and also hold down the Presidency.

8 We asked about a possible German contribution to UNAMIR. The German Government was still considering the request from the UN to provide transport vehicles, most probably as a gift. He could provide us no answer on the likely outcome of the inter-departmental debate. There was no question of German soldiers participating. While our meeting took place before the decision of the Constitutional Court was known, he thought that the Parliamentary hurdle, which he expected the Court to impose on out-of-area operations, meant that by the time Parliament had considered the action, the situation in Rwanda would have changed considerably. He rejected as impractical the US idea being considered by the Europeans of "adopting" an African battalion for the purpose of equipping them. For a start there could be political problems in "adopting" troops from one or other African country and picking and choosing between various African troop contributors. Further, the Somalia operation had shown the importance of maintaining a firm UN command and control. For this reason logistical assistance and outfitting should be centralised in the UN. Lines of responsibility should not be confused.

#### Comment

9 Wienand was critical of the French action, saying they were trying to play a role as "Gendarme of Africa". He questioned the establishment of such a large humanitarian zone and the consequences of this action. On the other hand, no-one else had been prepared to move in quickly and he did not doubt the French humanitarian motives. For bilateral political reasons the German Government was not, however, going to be openly critical of the French. Our abstention on SCR 929 was mentioned by Wienand and we disabused him of his notion that our abstention was somehow linked to our past dealings with the French, explaining our position along the lines of your useful C06545/WN2.

#### End Message

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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|              |                     |          |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|
| 20:56 (5865) | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$508.30 |
|--------------|---------------------|----------|

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|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | NEW YORK   | C04768/NYK | 14-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC  | Immediate   |
| CC:   | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WASHINGTON | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Summary

- the situation in Rwanda takes a serious turn for the worse
- well over a million people flee to Zaire and the French humanitarian zone in the south
- the "interim government" seeks refuge in the French zone
- Council adopts a presidential statement calling for an immediate ceasefire

Action

For information.

Report

The French delegation announced at this morning's consultations that the situation in Rwanda had rapidly deteriorated as a result of the RPF capture of Ruhengeri and advance on Gisenyi and that the Council should take immediate action in response to these developments.

2 Although the chaotic situation defied precision, reports from French, US, UK and UN sources were that between 500-700,000 people were fleeing in the direction of Zaire

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CONFIDENTIAL

following the capture of Ruhengeri by the RPF. Another half million were heading towards the humanitarian zone in the southwest. It appears that these movements were provoked by the bombardment of Ruhengeri, which was sheltering many already displaced Hutu, and the Rwandan Radio's calls to flee the "Tutsi-led massacres".

3 As well as the immediate humanitarian catastrophe facing this "wall of humanity" without food or possessions, the French were very concerned at the impact the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Hutus would have on the extremely fragile situation in Zaire. The border region closest to Ruhengeri already had many Tutsi refugees and this would be likely to inflame an already volatile situation. Furthermore, Goma, where the refugees were headed, was the staging point in Zaire for Operation Turquoise.

4 By lunchtime the situation had worsened. The French announced that the interim government was rapidly on its way to the humanitarian zone under French protection in the southwest of Rwanda. The Secretariat (Gharekhan) said that according to his information they had already arrived. France said they did not want RGF forces or leaders in the zone and wanted the Council's help in warning them off.

5 We suggested that the French might make it clear to the members of the "interim government" that they could only enter the zone as individuals, in other words their government was at an end. The French claimed that such a declaration would have no practical effect but it became clear that what they really wanted was cover from the Security Council in case things started to go badly wrong. Their major concern is that RPF will pursue RGF into the zone leaving France with some very difficult choices.

6 Following by fax (for Wgtn only) is the Presidential Statement adopted this evening by the Security Council which:

- demands an immediate and unconditional ceasefire
- urges the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement
- reaffirms the humanitarian nature of the secure zone and demands that all concerned fully respect this
- urges urgent humanitarian assistance
- calls for the necessary contributions so that the expanded UNAMIR can be immediately deployed

The text of the Sec-Gen's statement also follows for Wgtn.

Comment

7 Today's developments will have immediate and serious

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04768/NYK

Page 3

consequences for the status of the "interim Government" of Rwanda. The US delegation told us that this afternoon President Clinton will "derecognise" the Rwandan government. (This will affect Rwandan representatives in Washington but not directly in New York- the US regards that as a matter for UN members to decide.)

8 Of direct relevance is information given to us by the RPF representative today, that the RPF PM-designate, Faustin Twagiramungu, had arrived in Kigali and proposed to establish a government within a day or two. The PM-designate had announced his intention to impose a unilateral ceasefire if agreement couldn't be reached with the other side.

End Message

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
TELEPHONE: (212) 826-1960 FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 14 JULY 1994

TO: WELLINGTON NO. 2956 PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
WGTN UNSC ✓  
DEFENCE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)  
P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)  
Spied to UNSC, MEA, UNC

PAGE 1 OF: 3

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Our accompanying cable refers.

We attach Presidential statement on Rwanda adopted this evening by the Security Council and statement by the spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

1. Mr. McCormick  
→ 2. file.



## STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council is alarmed by the continuation of fighting in Rwanda, which is causing a massive exodus of the population. This situation may lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster and endanger the stability of the region, since the flow of these refugees is seriously affecting the neighbouring countries.

In the light of this grave situation, the Security Council:

- Demands an immediate and unconditional cease-fire and invites the parties to report to the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) on their actions in this respect;
- Urges the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement and calls upon the countries of the region, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to contribute actively to it;  
    *and the OAU*
- Reaffirms the humanitarian nature of the secure area in the south-west of Rwanda and demands that all concerned fully respect this. It will keep the matter under close review;
- Urges also Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to mobilize all available resources in order urgently to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in distress;
- Calls upon Member States to provide the necessary contributions in order to ensure the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR in the immediate future.

The Security Council is determined to follow very closely the development of the situation in Rwanda and remains actively seized of the matter.

STATEMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO  
THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General is making an urgent appeal to the parties to the conflict in Rwanda for an immediate cease-fire. He is gravely concerned about the dramatic turn of events in that country, following reports that hundreds of thousands of refugees are now streaming towards the borders of neighbouring countries. Unless this exodus of population ceases, the stability of the whole region will be endangered, unleashing a humanitarian catastrophe without precedent in Africa.

14 July 1994

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
TELEPHONE: (212) 826-1960 FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 15 JULY 1994

TO: WELLINGTON  
WGTN UNSC ✓  
\* DEFENCE

NO. 2963

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)  
P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)  
Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNC

PAGE 1 OF: 2

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA


The following is a letter from the RPF Representative to the UN to PR informing us that an agreement between the Rwandese political parties on the formation of a new government has been reached.

\* Coms,

Please pass to defence



**FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS**  
**RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**



New York, 15 July 1994

H.E. Mr. Colin Keating  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Mission of New Zealand  
to the United Nations  
One United Nations Plaza, 25th floor  
New York, N.Y. 10017

Your Excellency,

We have the pleasure to inform you that an agreement between Rwandese political parties on the formation of a new broad-based Government of national unity has been reached.

The new Government will be sworn in at a ceremony in Kigali on Monday, 18th of July 1994, at 12.00 o'clock, Rwanda time.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandese people have the honour and pleasure to invite you to attend the ceremony.

Kindly accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of our highest regard.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

Claude Dusaidi  
Rwandese Patriotic Front  
Representative to the United Nations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 17:38 (5872)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$431.97    |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04775/NYK          | 15-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Immediate   |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Summary

France seeks (but doesn't get) guidance from the Council on how to deal with members of the "interim government" who might be found in the French protected zone.

Action

For information

Report

At informal consultations this morning, the Secretariat (Gharekhan) updated the Council on the situation in Rwanda.

2 Gharekhan had been told by the SRSG (Khan) in Kigali that there were strong rumours (not confirmed) that the "interim government" had fled Gisenyi. Some had gone to Goma and some had allegedly been seen in Cyangugu which was in the French humanitarian zone.

3 Meanwhile, the situation in Kigali was quiet, even relaxed. People were returning to the capital, some with the assistance of UNAMIR. A Special Envoy of UNHCR had arrived in the city.

4 SRSG Khan had met with General Kagame, the Chief of Staff of the RPF that morning. Kagame told Khan that RPF intended

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to declare a unilateral ceasefire very soon, within 24 hours. (Gharekhan commented that he inferred from this that the RPF had achieved, or were close to achieving, their military objectives which meant they probably had control of the Rusengheri corridor and Gisenyi.) Kagame had requested that UNAMIR monitor the ceasefire. The modalities of the ceasefire could be worked out in consultation with UNAMIR.

5 Kagame was very keen to gainsay the reports spread by Radio Rwanda, RGF officers and prefects in RGF controlled areas that the RPF intended to massacre the Hutu and commit unspeakable torture. Kagame said that all people were welcome to return to their homes and they would not be harmed. Gharekhan confirmed that Radio Rwanda and RGF officials were major contributors to the panic which had led to the massive exodus in recent days. In response to a question from the UK, Gharekhan said that the SRSG was talking to the PM designate Twagiramungu as well as Kagame.

6 In two interventions, the French made quite clear their extreme discomfort with the rapidly developing situation. With respect to the rumours that members of the "interim government" were in the French zone, the French Charge d'Affaires (Ladsous) said that he was "not in a position" to confirm them (however he didn't deny them either). His authorities had issued a statement that it was "not desirable" for political officials to enter the zone. Activities of a political or military character would harm the humanitarian character of the zone. Later in the morning, Ladsous intervened again with news just to hand (the mobile phone was running hot) that the RPF had expressed its intention to enter the humanitarian zone. Ladsous concluded by saying that his government was seeking the "guidance" of the Council. The humanitarian zone had been set up pursuant to a Council resolution. It was being managed by the French on behalf of the international community. The French did not want to act on their own. They wanted reactions from the national authorities of SC members on this complex and dangerous situation.

7 No-one responded to the French plea for guidance. The President suggested that we should remain in close touch on the issue and that more information would be faxed to us in the course of the day.

8 After the meeting, the French relaxed a little after seeing a letter to Ambassadors from the RPF inviting them to the swearing-in of the new Rwandese Government on 18 July in Kigali. (Copy follows to Wellington.) We raised the question of RPF entering the zone with the RPF representative who said that they were hoping that the French would "cooperate". They also told us that they had had reports from France that the French Government had announced its intention to arrest members of the "interim government" found in the humanitarian zone.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C04775/NYK

Page 3

End Message

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111/23/37

Your file: 161/1/1 42/6/1

Our file:

|                  |                     |             |
|------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 15:31 (5883)     | 700/MEA/00000/00000 | \$157.35    |
| FROM: WELLINGTON | C25834/WN1          | 18-Jul-1994 |
| TO: NEW YORK     | WASHINGTON          | Priority    |
| CC: BEIJING      | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS         | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA           | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON           | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW           | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS            | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO            | DEFENCE             | Routine     |
| WGTN UNSC        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, EAB, AMER, DSP3, DSP1)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U54091: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

New York's C04740.

2 US Embassy rang today to advise that the US has decided to require the cessation of Rwanda's diplomatic operations in Washington and has asked that Rwandan personnel be withdrawn. Embassy was careful to explain that the US was not breaking diplomatic relations with Rwanda, but was reducing relations to the lowest level consistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations between states. At this time the US did not recognise any government in Rwanda.

3 Embassy offered no further comment on US intentions with respect to Rwanda in the Security Council.

=

End Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111/125/37  
NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
Telephone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 18 July 1994

PAGE 1 OF: 6

TO : WELLINGTON

NO: 2979

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

TO : WGTN UNSC ✓

NO:

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNC

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our IPT refers.

2/6

## RWANDA - HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Department of Humanitarian Affairs  
(Information from communications received by DHA  
as of 0800 Monday 18 July)

1. As at 1245 local time, Sunday 17 July, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) Liaison in Goma reported that more than one million Rwandese had crossed the border into Zaire. Goma was being shelled, reportedly by RPF forces. This resulted in the closure of the airport.

2. The UN Humanitarian Relief Coordinator, Arturo Hein, stresses that a ceasefire is an urgent necessity and that a political solution to the conflict in Rwanda must be found as a matter of urgency. The enormous number of refugees is likely to destabilize the area with consequences for the security of the local population, refugees and humanitarian staff and has unpredictable consequences for Zaire. The Humanitarian Relief Coordinator emphasizes that although emergency humanitarian efforts are the first priority, a rehabilitation effort should be conceived immediately in order that it can be put into effect without delay.

3. It should be borne in mind that the zone protected by the Franco-Senegalese forces may also produce an influx of refugees into Zaire, especially after the departure of these forces. Some 2.5 million to 3 million people are estimated to be in the protected zone. The estimated 600,000 internally displaced people in the Gikongoro region are reported to be exhausting local food supplies, destroying woods. This group is in dire need of proper camp organization, hygiene and healthcare. No sanitation is being provided. WFP is organizing food deliveries and several NGOs are undertaking food distribution and health activities in the area. It has also been reported that 150,000 people are moving from the French protected zone in the southwest towards Bukavu in Zaire.

4. UN operational agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP), together with ICRC and some 29 NGOs are supplying assistance, coordinated by UNREO, established under the aegis of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and headed by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. UNREO is headquartered in Nairobi, with an advance humanitarian team in Kigali and branch offices in Goma, Kabale and Bujumbura. UN agencies have all strengthened their staff in the region and have expedited emergency stocks, both from facilities in the region and from warehouses at Amsterdam and Copenhagen.

dha/rwa/1807/1000

5. Despite the coordinated efforts of the humanitarian organizations in Goma, the means available are wholly inadequate. The only stockpiles in Goma (Oxfam's 16,000 blankets and ICRC's 1,100 tons of food, 800 rolls of plastic sheeting and 4 mt of medical supplies for cross-border operations), are insufficient.

6. Estimated humanitarian needs in Goma:

- a. Food - 800 to 1,000 tonnes per day
- b. Water - 30,000,000 liters per day
- c. large quantities of shelter, sanitation and health supplies
- d. Immediate mobilization of massive logistical support

7. Food and other assistance is not being distributed in Goma itself, only in camps.

8. The airport came under shell fire on Sunday and has been closed to all but [French] military aircraft. Zaire's air traffic controllers have had difficulty in reaching the airport due to chaotic conditions in the area. No aircraft fuel is available in Goma. Offloading facilities are poor and slow. No storage is available at the airstrip. Aircraft are expected to take off immediately after offloading. UNREO is asking that the normal landing fee of \$2,500 be waived for humanitarian flights.

9. WFP is working to organize airlifts of supplies from elsewhere in the region to Goma. An airlift of up to 160 tons of maize and maize meal per day from Mombasa to Zaire has been organized. Supplies are available in Dar-es-Salaam, some of which will be allocated to Goma. Another 20-30 metric tonnes of food is being expedited from Burundi to Goma. WFP Kampala is arranging local purchase of 4,000 metric tons of food, which will take two days to transport.


10. UNHCR's resources already seriously strained by an outflow of more than 600,000 refugees from Rwanda since late April. Another 500,000 Burundi refugees and returnees in the region are dependent on UNHCR humanitarian assistance. For its part, before the mass exodus from Rwanda to Zaire Goma, WFP was providing 40,000 tons of food per month to Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda to cover a planning caseload figure of 2.5 million people.

\* \* \* \* \*

dha/rwa/1807/1000



# **FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS** **RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**



New York, 18 July 1994

H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
United Nations Secretary General  
New York, New York 10017

H.E. Jamsheed K.A. Marker  
President of the United Nations  
Security Council  
New York, New York 10017

Your excellencies,

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to inform you, members of the United Nations Security Council and the international community as a whole, that the forces of the Rwanda genocidal rump government have been completely defeated and war in Rwanda has come to an end. There is now an effective ceasefire throughout the country.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front further wishes to inform you that it has nominated Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu as the new President of Rwanda. Mr. Bizimungu and his cabinet will be sworn into office on Tuesday, 19 July 1994.

Finally, your Excellencies, the Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to inform you that there continues to be hostile activities emanating from the South West of the country and requests that you authorise the immediate deployment of UNAMIR troops into the region in order to avert confrontation between our forces and French troops.

Claude Dusaidi

Rwandese Patriotic Front  
Representative to the United Nations



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1994/832  
15 July 1994  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.  
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following. The presence of the "President" of the "Interim Government" of Rwanda and four of his "Ministers" has been observed in Cyangugu in the safe humanitarian area in south-west Rwanda. The French authorities have given official notice that they will not tolerate any political or military activity in this safe area, which is strictly humanitarian in nature, and that they will take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules applicable to the area.

The French authorities are ready to lend their support to any Security Council decision relating to the persons in question. The French authorities are at the disposal of the United Nations to consider any decision in respect of which the Organization might wish France to lend its support.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOU

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/834

18 July 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.  
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The French Government has asked me to inform you urgently of the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda and in the region near Goma, where the humanitarian aid operation for the Rwandese refugee population is based.

As you are aware, artillery bombardments coming from the east and, therefore, from Rwanda, and very likely carried out by forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), were directed today at the village of Goma. These bombardments have already left some 60 civilians dead and many wounded, particularly in the airport zone. The humanitarian lifeline from the Goma airport established by the United Nations with the assistance of French forces had to be immediately suspended. The refugee population, whose situation was already tragic, is even more directly threatened today.

The French Government condemns these bombardments, which are directed at the refugee population and are impeding the humanitarian operations established by the international community in response to a tragedy of immense proportions. It calls once again for the immediate implementation of the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council.

I must also inform you that armed RPF elements attempted this afternoon to enter the humanitarian safe area established in south-west Rwanda. An encounter ensued with the French forces responsible for ensuring that the humanitarian character of this area is respected.

The French Government will of course ensure that this character is respected and French forces will, as announced from the outset, continue to oppose the entry of all armed persons, no matter what their origin, into the humanitarian safe area, where all military activity is by nature prohibited.

I would be grateful if you would draw these developments to the attention of the Security Council by transmitting this letter to it as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

20:05 (5892)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$508.30

|       |            |            |             |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------|
| FROM: | NEW YORK   | C04791/NYK | 18-Jul-1994 |
| TO:   | WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC  | Immediate   |
| CC:   | BEIJING    | BONN       | Routine     |
|       | BRUSSELS   | CANBERRA   | Routine     |
|       | GENEVA     | HARARE     | Routine     |
|       | LONDON     | MADRID     | Routine     |
|       | MOSCOW     | OTTAWA     | Routine     |
|       | PARIS      | SANTIAGO   | Routine     |
|       | TOKYO      | WASHINGTON | Routine     |
|       | DEFENCE    |            | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- humanitarian situation in Rwanda and Zaire is catastrophic
- France informs the Council that the members of the "interim government" sighted in the humanitarian zone have now fled to Zaire
- the RPF intend that the new government will be sworn in tomorrow

Action

For information

Report

At informals this afternoon, the Secretariat (Gharekhan) briefed the Council on the situation in Rwanda.

2 The humanitarian situation is catastrophic. Gharekhan distributed a note (by fax to Wgtn only) which noted that as of Sunday 17 July, one million refugees had crossed the border into Zaire while there were approx 2.5-3 million people in the French protected zone. Many of them were in a desperate state. Although the UN humanitarian agencies had increased their numbers, means available at present were

CONFIDENTIAL

wholly inadequate to meet the needs in Goma. The shelling of Goma airport on Sunday had meant its closure to all but French military aircraft.

3 Gharekhan said that the capture of Gisenyi by the RPF meant that the war, for all practical purposes, was over. The SRSG had met with the PM-designate. They discussed the establishment of a broad-based government of national unity, which according to Twagirimungu would be sworn in tomorrow, 19 July at 2 pm local time. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, would be appointed President and General Kagame would be appointed Vice-President (the latter was a new position not foreshadowed in the Arusha Accords).

4 Twagirimungu had assured the SRSG that the RPF had not been responsible for the shelling of Goma airport on Sunday, nor was the RPF seeking a confrontation with the French in the southwest of the country. Twagirimungu had reiterated that any Rwandese who had not committed atrocities was welcome to return home.

5 On the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, Gharekhan said that the 50 APCs leased from the US were now on their way to Kigali and would be used by the Ghanaians already there.

6 The President then read out a letter he had received from the RPF representative in New York which claimed that a ceasefire was now in place and that the new government would be sworn in the next day. (Gharekhan had noted, however, that the SRSG had not been formally advised of the ceasefire). A copy of the letter follows by fax for Wgtn.

7 The Council also had before it two letters from the French delegation. The French Charge (Ladsous) informed the Council that the first letter, informing the Council that five members of the "interim government" were in the French humanitarian zone, had been overtaken by events. The persons in question had now fled to Zaire.

8 The second letter advised that the airport at Goma had been bombarded the previous day, "very likely" by the RPF, causing 60 deaths. At the same time there had been an "encounter" between French forces and RPF when the latter tried to enter the humanitarian zone while they were armed. Both letters follow by fax to Wgtn.

9 The French Charge stressed that their concern was humanitarian. There were 1.5 million displaced people in the humanitarian zone. If something were not done for them quickly, they would flee to Zaire and compound the problem. In light of the situation, the priorities were: to confirm the ceasefire; to create a new government; to strengthen UNAMIR asap; and to assist all those suffering including the internally displaced.

10 The US (Allbright) announced that President Clinton had

derecognised the government of Rwanda. She also noted that the President had expressed the hope that the UN would move quickly to establish a war crimes tribunal. The US supported efforts to respond to the humanitarian crisis and had sent the head of its aid department to Zaire to assess the situation.

11 We urged the rapid deployment of UNAMIR, especially in view of the much improved security situation which should mean that UNAMIR troops- or at least many of them- do not need quite the same level of protective equipment. We also proposed that UNAMIR should rapidly deploy in the humanitarian zone. A UN presence would help secure support for the humanitarian efforts taking place there. It would also have the merit, if blue berets were present, of demonstrating that the country was not divided into two artificially separate zones. We suggested that the French might want to accelerate this process in the new environment by placing Operation Turquoise forces under UNAMIR control. (Ladsous told us privately later that this would be unlikely because the French were now very keen to get out of Rwanda as quickly as possible. Joining UNAMIR might give rise to expectations that they would be prepared to stay on.)

12 In conclusion, the President said that he would convey to the media the Council's concern at the humanitarian situation, its anticipation of the establishment of a new government and a definitive announcement of a ceasefire. He would also lay emphasis on the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

End Message

UNCLASSIFIED  
UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

|                |                     |             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 17:28 (5896)   | 700/NYK/00000/00000 | \$304.98    |
| FROM: NEW YORK | C04793/NYK          | 19-Jul-1994 |
| TO: WELLINGTON | WGTN UNSC           | Priority    |
| CC: BEIJING    | BONN                | Routine     |
| BRUSSELS       | CANBERRA            | Routine     |
| GENEVA         | HARARE              | Routine     |
| LONDON         | MADRID              | Routine     |
| MOSCOW         | OTTAWA              | Routine     |
| PARIS          | SANTIAGO            | Routine     |
| TOKYO          | WASHINGTON          | Routine     |
| DEFENCE        |                     | Routine     |

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

The President (Marker) reported at this morning's informals that Ambassador Bizimana of Rwanda had informed him that he and his delegation would no longer participate in the meetings of the Security Council. Marker had obtained an opinion from the UN Legal Office which stated that the Council could continue to function notwithstanding that one of its members was absent. Three precedents were cited. The opinion reiterated that the Charter provisions continued to apply with respect to Security Council decisions (ie an affirmative by nine members is still required). Copy of legal opinion by fax for Wellington.

2 Marker concluded by noting that Rwanda of course retained its seat on the Council.

3 We have been encouraging delegations to think about the options for the future, in particular the notion that the new Government should be persuaded to resign the Rwanda seat so that UNGA could elect a new member. There is some interest in this idea and a general sense that it would be better if Rwanda were not to resume its seat. The US (Albright) told us that they remain opposed to Rwanda assuming the Presidency in September and that this needs to be factored into consideration.

4 At this afternoon's informals, Gharekhan reported that the new "broad-based government of national unity" had been

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Page 2

sworn in today. Following by fax to Wellington is the list of the members of the new government given to us by the RPF representative (party affiliation marked where known).

End Message

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UNCLASSIFIED

115/23/37  
NYPM FILE: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
TELEPHONE: (212) 826-1960 FAX: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 19 JULY 1994

TO: WELLINGTON  
WGTN UNSC ✓  
DEFENCE

NO. 2989

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)  
P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

PAGE 1 OF: 4

Filed to UNSC, MEA, UNC

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Our accompanying cable refers.

Attached is a legal opinion, provided by the UN Legal Office, on whether the Council may meet in the absence of one of its members.

2 Also attached is the list of the new Government of Rwanda.

Note to the Secretary-General

You have asked for my opinion on the question of whether the Security Council may legally meet in the absence of a representative of one of its members. The question whether the Council may legally function with less than the statutorily required number of members has arisen on at least three occasions; the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council in 1950 during the Korean crisis; the continued functioning of the Council with 11 rather than 15 members for a period of 4 months in 1966 which was the period between the entry into force of the amendment to the composition of the Council and the election of new members; and the continued functioning of the Security Council in 1980 for a period of weeks which was occasioned by the inability of the General Assembly to conclude its voting on one of the non-Permanent Members until after the end of the calendar year in which the term of office of the old members expired.

In practice the Council may, clearly, therefore, continue to function notwithstanding the fact that one of the members is absent. It goes without saying that decisions of the Security Council would, nevertheless, have to be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

19 July 1994Ralph Zacklin  
RZ



THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

President: PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU (RPF) <sup>3/4</sup>  
Vice President

Min. of Defense: Paul KAGAME (RPF)

Prime Minister: FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU. (MDR)

Vice Prime Minister

Min. of Public Service: Col: ALEXIS KANYARONGWE (RPF)

Minister of ~~Foreign~~  
Foreign Affairs: JEAN MARIE VIANNESY (MDR)  
NDAGITIMANA.

Minister of Interior: Seth ~~Sendashonga~~  
SENDASHONGA. RPF.

Minister of Justice: Alphonse NKUBITO (PL)

Minister of Primary Education: Pierre CLAVER RWIGEMA.

Minister of Superior Education & UNIVERSITY: Dr. Joseph NSENGIMANA.

Minister Finance: Marc RUGENERA (PSD)

Minister of Industry: Prosper HIGIRO (PL)

Minister of Health: Col. Dr. Joseph KALEMER, (RPF)

Minister of Transport & Telecommunication: Mr. Imaculée KAYUMBA. (RPF)

4/4  
Minister of Social Affairs: P. Mugabo.

Minister of Environment &

Tourism: JEAN NEPOMUCENE

NAYINZIRA  
(PDC)

Minister of Public

Works: Charles NTAKIRUTINKA.

Minister of Women

Affairs: Ms. ALOYSISIA INYUMBA.  
(RPF)

Minister of Youth &

Sports: Patrick MAZIMHAKA.  
(RPF)

Minister of REHABILITATION:

Dr. Jacques BIHOZAGARA.  
(RPF)

NYPM File: 2/6/33 115/21/37

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK  
Tel phone: (212) 826-1960 Fax: (212) 758-0827

DATE: 19 July 1994

PAGE 1 OF: 5

TO : WELLINGTON  
TO : WGTN UNSC ✓

NO: 2991  
NO:

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, DSP1, EAB)  
Copied to UNSC, MEA, UNC

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our fax 2989 refers.

You may also find the attached note by the UK Legal Adviser (Michael Wood) on Rwandese credentials of interest.

2/5

Chargé

cc: Ms Holland  
Mr Bowden, UND ) by  
Ms Wilmshurst, Legal Counsellor) fax 18 July 1994

RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL: REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

1. The White House has announced that it will begin consultations with other Council members "to remove Representatives of the interim Government from Rwanda's seat in the Council", and the RPF's has announced of the formation of a broad-based Government. The following is a note on questions that may arise concerning representation of Rwanda on the Security Council and the credentials of the Representatives of Rwanda on the Council.

2. The main relevant rules and practices in the matter of representation/credentials of Security Council members are as follows:

(a) The credentials of a Representative on the Security Council are to be communicated to the Secretary-General, and shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rule 13).

(b) The credentials of Representatives on the Security Council are to be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval (Rule 15). In fact, if the Secretary-General reports that credentials are in order, they are tacitly approved by the Council (presumably at the first meeting at which the Representative concerned is present) - see S/8365. Occasionally, the Secretary-General's report is non-committal, ie he merely lists the communications received, and possibly adds that, on the information available to him, he is unable to say whether they are in order.

(c) Any Representative on the Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other Representatives until the Council has decided the matter (Rule 17).

(d) A challenge to credentials would probably be regarded as a procedural matter, to which the veto does not apply. The US and France are on record to this effect in 1950, but there has been very little practice. A challenge could take the form of a resolution rejecting credentials or an oral proposal to reject them. Equally, a member of the Council may simply put on record his objection, without pressing the matter to a decision.

(e) General Assembly resolution 396 (V) (attached) recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the Government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, such question should be considered by the General Assembly, and that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly should be taken into account in other UN organs. This reflects the fact that the General Assembly is the body on which all Member States are represented, and the desirability of avoiding different organs reaching different conclusions on the question of representation.

3. In December 1993 a report on the credentials of the Representative (Bizimana) and Deputy Representative (Abimana) of Rwanda on the Security Council were circulated by the Secretary-General to Council members (S/26923), and no objection was raised. In accordance with the practice of the Council, these credentials were tacitly approved when no objection was raised to them at the first meeting of the Council at which Bizimana represented Rwanda (for the Council's practice see S/8365). As of now, no changes have been made in these credentials, and no credentials have been submitted in respect of any other person claiming to be the Representative of Rwanda.

4. Any member of the Council may challenge the credentials of the Representatives of Rwanda. A challenge could take the form of a draft resolution (see the 458th and 459th meetings of the Council) or be an oral proposal (see the 480th - 482nd meetings of the Council). This challenge could be put to a vote, and if there were nine votes in favour, the credentials would be rejected. (The matter would probably be regarded as procedural, and the veto would not apply.) The seat of Rwanda would then be empty.

5. It would, however, be unusual for there to be a challenge to credentials unless competing credentials had been submitted. The more likely eventuality is that a new "Government" will submit the credentials of its Representatives to the Security Council. The Secretary-General would probably then be asked to report to the Council. He might well do so without comment, and it would then be for the Council to decide whether to postpone the matter (thus leaving Bizimana in place for some time), to eject Bizimana without accepting the new credentials, or to accept the new credentials.

M C Wood

M C Wood

## General Assembly—Fifth Session

24

- 394 (V). Palestine: Progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine; Repatriation or resettlement of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Having examined with appreciation the general progress report<sup>12</sup> dated 2 September 1950, and the supplementary report<sup>13</sup> dated 23 October 1950, of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine,

Noting with concern:

(a) That agreement has not been reached between the parties on the final settlement of the questions outstanding between them,

(b) That the repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation have not been effected,

Recognising that, in the interests of the peace and stability of the Near East, the refugee question should be dealt with as a matter of urgency,

1. Urges the governments and authorities concerned to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

2. Directs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to establish an office which, under the direction of the Commission, shall:

(a) Make such arrangements as it may consider necessary for the assessment and payment of compensation in pursuance of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

(b) Work out such arrangements as may be practicable for the implementation of the other objectives of paragraph 11 of the said resolution;

(c) Continue consultations with the parties concerned regarding measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the refugees;

3. Calls upon the governments concerned to undertake measures to ensure that refugees, whether repatriated or resettled, will be treated without any discrimination either in law or in fact.

325th plenary meeting,  
14 December 1950.

- 395 (V). Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 44 (I) and 265 (III) relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa,

Having considered the communication<sup>14</sup> by the Permanent Representative of India to the Secretary-General dated 10 July 1950.

<sup>12</sup> See documents A/1367 and A/1367/Corr.1.

<sup>13</sup> See document A/1367/Add.1.

<sup>14</sup> See document A/1289.

Having in mind its resolution 103 (I) of 19 November 1946 against racial persecution and discrimination, and its resolution 217 (III) dated 10 December 1948 relating to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Considering that a policy of "racial segregation" (Apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination,

1. Recommends that the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa proceed, in accordance with resolution 265 (III), with the holding of a round table conference on the basis of their agreed agenda and bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

2. Recommends that, in the event of failure of the governments concerned to hold a round table conference before 1 April 1951 or to reach agreement in the round table conference within a reasonable time, there shall be established for the purpose of assisting the parties in carrying through appropriate negotiations a commission of three members, one member to be nominated by the Government of the Union of South Africa, another to be nominated by the Governments of India and Pakistan and the third to be nominated by the other two members or, in default of agreement between these two in a reasonable time, by the Secretary-General;

3. Calls upon the governments concerned to refrain from taking any steps which would prejudice the success of their negotiations, in particular, the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of "The Group Areas Act", pending the conclusion of such negotiations;

4. Decides to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

315th plenary meeting,  
2 December 1950.

- 396 (V). Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State

*The General Assembly,*

Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be reached by its various organs,

Considering that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the Organization that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations,

Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the views of all Member States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole,

1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations,

nons. question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case.

2. *Recommends* that, when any such question arises, it should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the General Assembly is not in session.

3. *Recommends* that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies;

4. *Declares* that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question shall not of itself affect the direct relations of individual Member States with the State concerned;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the other organs of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies for such action as may be appropriate.

325th plenary meeting,  
14 December 1950.

### 397 (V). Report of the Security Council

*The General Assembly*

*Takes note* of the report<sup>18</sup> of the Security Council covering the period from 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950.

325th plenary meeting,  
14 December 1950.

<sup>18</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 2*.



