Proactive Release

Date: 5 November 2019

The following Cabinet paper and related Cabinet minute have been proactively released by the Minister of Climate Change:

*Climate Change Negotiations Mandate: Update:* (CAB-19-MIN-0430 refers)

Some parts of this information release would not be appropriate to release and, if requested, would be withheld under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act). Where this is the case, the relevant sections of the Act that would apply have been identified. Where information has been withheld, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Key to redaction codes:

- 6(a): to avoid prejudicing the international relations of the New Zealand Government;
- 9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments; and
- 9(2)(j): to avoid prejudice to negotiations.

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UPDATE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS MANDATE

Proposal

1. I propose to update the climate change negotiations mandate ahead of the next meeting of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2-13 December 2019).

Executive Summary

2. New Zealand’s engagement in the inter-governmental process that underpins the global response to climate change is guided by a negotiation mandate agreed by Cabinet.

3. It is timely to review the current negotiation mandate because: we have now set the objective of limiting global average temperature increase to 1.5° Celsius above pre-industrial levels at the heart of New Zealand’s climate change policy; negotiation of the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement is substantively complete; new issues are emerging; and there is an opportunity to better align the mandate with the Pacific Reset.

4. The two annexes to this paper respectively set out (1) general principles for engagement in the UNFCCC and a proposed mandate on five new issues: loss and damage, oceans, international carbon markets, the future of the Kyoto Protocol and metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of greenhouse gases; and (2) elements of the current negotiation mandate that remain valid and applicable. I propose the updated, comprehensive, negotiation mandate comprises the recommendations on each of these elements as contained in this paper.

5. Officials have sought views from iwi and stakeholders on what New Zealand should be promoting in the negotiating process. The main theme of the responses was recognition of the urgent need for ambitious climate action and broad support for the positions proposed. Officials propose conducting further engagement with interested iwi and stakeholders on international climate change matters on an ongoing basis.

Background

1. Taking decisive action on climate change is a priority for this Government. We are taking significant action at home, but climate change is a global issue requiring a global solution. Ultimately, the adverse impacts climate change will have on New Zealand will be determined by the effectiveness of global, not national, action. The Government has agreed the importance of leadership at home and internationally in order to influence this global response [CAB-18-MIN-0218 refers].
6. The UNFCCC (and Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement) together set out the multilateral response to climate change. Decisions made by the governing bodies of these treaties, under the auspices of the UNFCCC, impact both New Zealand's and the global response to climate change.

7. The ‘Paris Rulebook’, the guidelines necessary to operationalise the Paris Agreement were substantially agreed last year. Some aspects of the rules are yet to be finalised, however. Being a Party to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement also involves New Zealand in ongoing decision making on a range of implementation and governance issues.

8. The climate change negotiation mandate sets out guidance for New Zealand’s participation in this process, including residual negotiation of the Paris Rulebook. It determines what New Zealand will advocate for, or resist, on specific issues; and/or the acceptable ranges for negotiators to work within.

9. Ministers need to be comfortable with (and give authority for) the positions and approach New Zealand will take because:
   1.1. decisions taken affect New Zealand’s national interests;
   1.2. some topics are of particular importance to segments of the New Zealand public;
   1.3. New Zealand’s conduct will be subject to stakeholder and media scrutiny; and
   1.4. the company we keep, and support we can give (or not) to like-minded countries, can impact on our relationships with other countries.

10. As a Treaty partner, in authorising the positions New Zealand takes, the Government also needs to be informed about the rights and significant interests of Māori as indigenous people regarding climate change and how the proposed positions will impact Māori interests. In particular, we must seek outcomes that facilitate te ao Māori perspectives in their implementation. These should better enable Māori to practise their roles as kaitiaki. They should also recognise the importance of the natural environment and the resource based economy to indigenous peoples and the important role indigenous peoples and their traditional knowledge (in New Zealand’s case, mātauranga Māori) play in the response to climate change.

11. The mandate proposed in this paper is designed to elaborate on the provisions of the Paris Agreement. Māori were consulted during the negotiation of the Agreement itself, and in relation to the negotiation of implementation guidelines. Engagement is ongoing, including in relation to current UNFCCC issues, to ensure informed decisions are taken in respect of New Zealand’s approach to the negotiation on matters that affect Māori interests. Officials will continue to strive to ensure our engagement process has integrity and value for Māori and is regular, consistent and deliberate.

12. The current set of issues does not have direct impact on New Zealand’s domestic policy settings, nor, as feedback from Māori suggests, on Māori interests. Māori responses to the proposed approach to the negotiations on these matters have been supportive.
13. The UNFCCC agenda includes a platform for engagement by local communities and indigenous peoples. Māori were consulted on previous negotiation mandates relating to establishment of this platform, and at the time emphasised the importance of indigenous peoples having the opportunity to be heard on climate change matters. The modalities for the Platform ensure this.

14. The current negotiation mandate was approved by Cabinet in April 2018 [ENV-18-MIN-0007 refers].

**Update to current mandate**

15. This paper proposes an update to the current negotiation mandate based on new priorities, and iwi and stakeholder input. This update continues a number of existing provisions, but I consider it appropriate to refine the mandate now for four reasons:

15.1. The context has changed since the original mandate, following the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report on the impacts of warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and the inclusion of a 1.5°C based objective in the Zero Carbon Bill.

15.2. The current mandate has a strong emphasis on developing implementation guidelines to give effect to the high level provisions contained in the Paris Agreement. This work (with the exception of carbon markets) was substantially completed at Katowice in December 2018. Therefore a portion of the mandate is now redundant.

15.3. Along with strong domestic action on climate change, the Government has committed to seeking leadership internationally to influence an effective global response to climate change. This leadership should be reflected in positions taken by New Zealand.

15.4. Pacific island countries are on the front line of climate change. Some issues emerging in the UNFCCC speak directly to Pacific concerns and a revised mandate will ensure we continue to stand with the Pacific in a way that aligns with our own national interests on climate change, in the context of the Pacific Reset [CAB-18-MIN-0054 refers].

16. While the negotiations are technical and multifaceted, what New Zealand is working towards is simple. New Zealand wants an international system that:

16.1. is effective in addressing climate change;

16.2. has environmental and scientific integrity;

16.3. is multilateral and rules-based (i.e. we need all countries to contribute, and need to be able to hold all countries to account);

16.4. is practical and based on continuous improvement; and

16.5. recognises and protects the rights and interests of indigenous peoples.

I have been guided by these objectives in developing this update of the mandate.
17. To form effective guidance the mandate needs to be clear and cohesive – and I propose the set of recommendations at the end of this paper comprise the updated mandate.

18. To update the mandate we need to do three things:

18.1. agree to the proposed approach to new matters for which there has been no or insufficient mandate in the past (six topics detailed in Appendix A);

18.2. confirm the previous mandate for remaining issues that will continue to be negotiated, including minor amendments as required (shown in Appendix B); and

18.3. agree, through accepting the recommendations of this paper, the proposed updated mandate replaces all previous versions.

19. Nearer the time of the next UNFCCC ministerial conference (COP 25, 2-13 December, in Santiago, Chile), I will determine New Zealand’s overall objectives for that meeting specifically, including representation on the New Zealand delegation by Māori and civil society.

Substantive updates for specific topics

20. There are six issues not adequately addressed by the current mandate. These are either emerging topics or established issues on which negotiators require more substantive direction. Appendix A describes these six issues and recommends New Zealand’s approach to each.

21. The topics covered in Appendix A are:

21.1. general principles (i.e. general guidance about New Zealand’s approach);

21.2. loss and damage (i.e. how we respond to permanent loss and damage in developing countries caused by climate change);

21.3. oceans (including the impacts of climate change on oceans, and the importance of oceans to Pacific Island countries);

21.4. international carbon markets (i.e. how countries cooperate to reduce emissions while ensuring environmental integrity);

21.5. the future of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. what happens to the old regime once the Paris Agreement is fully operational); and

21.6. metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of greenhouse gases.

Make minor amendments or confirm the previous mandate for remaining topics

22. Appendix B addresses a number of topics for which less substantive updates to the existing mandate are required. Cabinet has previously agreed to a mandate for all these topics, and this can either be carried over ‘as is’; or with minor updates. These remain important for delivery of New Zealand’s climate change objectives, however. I expect these updates to be straightforward as Cabinet has already agreed to an existing mandate for these items.
Agree the proposed mandate package and replace previous versions

2. It is important that the mandate forms a coherent whole. Recommendations for the substantive updates (from Appendix A), and confirmation/tweaks for the remaining topics (from Appendix B) are combined to form the recommendations of this paper.

23. I seek agreement that the recommendations of this paper will comprise New Zealand’s climate change negotiations mandate. I also seek agreement that the recommendations in this paper replace previous mandates for the purposes of future negotiations.

Consultation

24. In drafting this paper the following agencies were consulted: the Ministry for the Environment, the Ministry of Primary Industries, the Ministry of Transport, Te Puni Kōkiri, and the Treasury. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was informed.

25. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade sought views from iwi and business, science and eNGO stakeholders on what New Zealand should be pursuing in the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations. Responses were received by 14 organisations.

26. The majority of responses noted the need for urgent action on climate change. Other common themes that emerged included:
   - Having other countries addressing agricultural emissions, including by improving the emissions efficiency of their agriculture
   - Supporting increasing consistency and transparency to allow concerted, verifiable international action
   - Ensuring the environmental integrity of international carbon markets
   - Taking a precautionary approach to oceans based climate solutions

27. Officials propose conducting further engagement with interested iwi and stakeholders on international climate change matters on an ongoing basis.

28. Tokelau participates in the UNFCCC negotiations as part of New Zealand. The Government of Tokelau has been consulted in development of this mandate and has expressed support for the positions proposed.

Financial Implications

29. Nil.

Legislative Implications

30. There are no legislative implications arising from this paper.

Impact Analysis

31. A detailed impact analysis will be conducted if any of the outcomes of the negotiations require legislation.
Human Rights

32. The proposals in this paper are consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993.

33. This paper seeks a mandate to advocate for Parties, when taking action to address climate change, to respect, promote and consider their obligations to, amongst other things, human rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, as well as on gender equality and the empowerment of women.

Gender Implications

34. This paper seeks a mandate to encourage and facilitate the participation of women in the UNFCCC, including in leadership and decision-making roles. This reflects the fact that climate change disproportionately affects women in a manner that exacerbates gender inequalities.

Disability Perspective

35. The proposals in this paper do not have disability implications.

Publicity

36. No publicity of this paper is planned.

Proactive Release

37. I propose to release this paper and appendices proactively, subject to redactions as appropriate under the Official Information Act 1982, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Recommendations

Overview and Context

1. **Note** the importance of a global response to climate change and New Zealand and Tokelau’s commitment to effective multilateral action to address climate change;

2. **Note** it is appropriate to update the existing climate change negotiations mandate as negotiation of the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement is substantively complete; new issues are emerging; and there is an opportunity to better align the mandate with the Pacific Reset;

3. **Agree** recommendations 5 to 46 in this paper form the mandate for negotiations and replace all previous versions of the climate change negotiation mandate for future climate change negotiations;

4. **Agree** the Crown will approach development of New Zealand climate change negotiation mandates with a view to seeking outcomes that respect and maintain the unique Maori-Crown relationship;
General principles

5. **Agree** New Zealand advocate for UNFCCC Parties and other entities to align their climate action with the objective of limiting temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels with limited or no overshoot;

6. **Agree** New Zealand should participate actively and constructively in the international negotiations to support the credibility and robustness of the Paris Agreement and its implementation;

7. **Agree** New Zealand will resist any development in implementation of the Paris Agreement that undermines either the Agreement’s applicability to all countries or its principles of environmental integrity, progressive ambition, and continuous improvement in transparency;

8. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for outcomes that support the interests of Pacific island countries, to the extent possible, in ways consistent with New Zealand’s national interest;

9. **Agree** New Zealand will seek effective and efficient outcomes, including avoiding duplication of existing multilateral processes;

10. **Agree** New Zealand will seek outcomes that are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and associated decisions by Parties to the Agreement;

Loss and damage

11. **Agree** New Zealand will continue to support the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage in fulfilling its mandate to address loss and damage in developing countries and, consistent with the decision that adopted the Paris Agreement, s6(a)

12. **Agree** New Zealand will continue work to respond to the threat of loss and damage, particularly in the Pacific, including through the provision of climate-related support, delivered bilaterally and through regional or multilateral mechanisms;

Oceans

13. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure that action on oceans and climate change is meaningful while upholding the existing international legal frameworks governing oceans and Antarctic issues;

14. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure robust science underpins mitigation claims and accounting practices relating to oceans initiatives where needed to safeguard the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement;

15. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure the UNFCCC takes a precautionary approach to proposals for ocean-based solutions to climate change;
International carbon markets

16. **Agree** New Zealand will seek guidelines for the use of carbon markets that promote environmental integrity through robust accounting, the avoidance of double accounting, and strong transparency (reporting and review);

17. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for accounting rules that do not recognise the use of pre-2020 units toward mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement;

18. **s9(2)(j)**

19. **Agree** New Zealand will seek share of proceeds provisions that apply to the Article 6.4 mechanism exclusively;

The future of the Kyoto Protocol

20. **Agree** New Zealand will resist potential attempts to introduce a third commitment period of the Protocol;

21. **Agree** New Zealand will, where and when appropriate, seek to close or rationalise Kyoto Protocol institutions and processes that do not serve a function under the Paris Agreement;

Nationally determined contributions

22. **Agree** New Zealand should:

   22.1. advocate for a common 5-year timeframe for NDCs, in order to facilitate greater synchronisation of national responses to the 5-yearly global stocktake mandated under the Agreement and to maintain clear upwards pressure on ambition;

   22.2. **s9(2)(j)**

   **s9(2)(j)**

Transparency

23. **Agree** New Zealand seek to maintain a robust and efficient transparency framework;

24. **Agree** New Zealand will pursue scientific and technical discussion of greenhouse gas metrics by the UNFCCC after completion of the Working Group I component of the IPCC 6th Assessment Report;

Facilitation of implementation and compliance

25. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure the mechanisms to promote compliance are effective in facilitating greater compliance with the Agreement and its implementing rules;
Global stocktake

26. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure that the global stocktake operates effectively, directs attention to the Agreement’s long-term goals, and focuses on collective progress and environmental integrity in implementing the Agreement;

Agriculture

27. **Agree**, in the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, and in other relevant fora, New Zealand will encourage other countries to take mitigation action on agriculture;

Climate finance

28. **Agree** New Zealand will seek agreement on tables for reporting climate finance that preserves New Zealand’s ability to report in line with our domestic tracking and accounting practices;

29. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for as much transparency and predictability of climate finance as possible within the limitations of national systems;

30. **Agree** New Zealand can join with other donor countries in any restatement of the shared commitment to delivering on the collective goal to mobilise USD 100 billion per year in climate finance until 2025 from a variety of public and private sources in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparent implementation by developing countries;

31. **Agree** New Zealand will participate in the negotiation of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance for the post-2025 period, scheduled to commence in November 2020;

32. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for any new collective quantified goal to be contributed to by all Parties in a position to do so;

Response measures

33. **Agree** New Zealand will seek to maintain a focus on economic diversification and a just transition for all countries, s6(a)

38. **Agree**, where trade measures are discussed, New Zealand will seek to ensure these discussions consider how trade measures can actively support implementation of the Paris Agreement Technology mechanism;

35. **Agree** New Zealand will support development of non-duplicative institutional architecture to maximise the effectiveness of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, focused on promoting and enhancing the development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries;

Human rights and gender

36. **Agree** New Zealand will support calls for Parties, when taking action to address climate change, to respect, promote and consider their obligations to, amongst other things, human rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples, local
communities, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, as well as on gender equality and the empowerment of women;

37. **Agree** New Zealand will support actions to advance women’s full, equal and meaningful participation and promote gender-responsive climate policy in implementing the Paris Agreement;

Local communities and indigenous people

38. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform operating to support respect for the rights and interests of indigenous peoples in international and national climate change actions, programmes and policies;

39. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform enabling indigenous peoples and local communities to exchange experience, best practice and knowledge, and build their capacity to engage in the UNFCCC;

40. **Agree** New Zealand will advocate for indigenous peoples having access to the Platform regardless of their country’s involvement;

Delegations within bounds of Cabinet guidance

41. **Authorise** the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and Minister for Climate Change to take together any final decisions, consistent with Cabinet’s decisions, on climate-related financial support for developing countries;

42. **Authorise** the Minister for Climate Change and, where appropriate, relevant portfolio Minister/s to take any final decisions on other issues in the negotiations;

Delegations outside bounds of Cabinet guidance

43. **Note**, should the negotiations move outside the bounds of existing Cabinet decisions, any final decisions with regards to New Zealand’s international climate change position would, where possible, be considered by Cabinet;

44. **Note** where there are fast-moving developments in the negotiations and time constraints, it may not be possible to convene Cabinet to take final decisions;

45. **Authorise**, in such situations, the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and the Minister for Climate Change to take together any final decision on climate-related financial support for developing countries;

46. **Authorise**, in such situations, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister for Climate Change, and relevant portfolio Minister/s, to take together any final decisions on other issues in the negotiations;

**Next steps**

47. **Note** the Minister for Climate Change may return to Cabinet for additional guidance on the negotiation mandate before COP 25, if warranted in light of developments in the interim, and will report back to Cabinet on the outcomes of COP 25; and
48. **Note** this Cabinet paper and appendices will be proactively released, subject to redactions as appropriate under the Official Information Act 1982, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Authorised for lodgement

Hon James Shaw

Minister for Climate Change
Update to climate change negotiation mandate

APPENDIX A – SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE MANDATE

1. This appendix addresses six topics on which I either propose a substantive update to the existing mandate, or which are of particular interest in the context of the Pacific Reset.

2. These six topics are:

   1. general principles (i.e. general guidance about New Zealand’s approach);
   2. loss and damage (i.e. how we respond to permanent loss and damage from climate change in developing countries);
   3. oceans (i.e. amplifying Pacific voices so others understand the impacts of climate change on oceans, and the importance of oceans to the Pacific Island countries);
   4. international carbon markets (i.e. how countries cooperate to reduce emissions with environmental integrity);
   5. the future of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. what happens to the old regime once the Paris Agreement is in full-swing); and
   6. metrics for conversion of greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide equivalent.
### Appendix A: Item 1

#### General principles

**Nature of update:** Adding to the existing mandate.

#### Context:

1. The mandate provides guidance for negotiators – however it is impossible to predict all circumstances and emerging issues. Therefore, it is useful to provide general principles – i.e. what should guide negotiators in the absence of other instructions?

2. The instructions in the mandate, including these general principles, are paired with standard delegations (shown in Appendix B). These delegations limit the reach of the mandate by specifying which ministers have authority to make decisions within or outside the mandate.

#### Comment:

3. One new and central principle to New Zealand's international engagement on climate change is our commitment to the goal of limiting global average temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. I wish to establish this as the overarching objective of New Zealand's negotiation effort.

4. There are three core principles in the existing mandate that need updating. Two of these are principles about a credible and robust Paris Agreement, and ensuring implementing guidelines do not undermine the Agreement. These need updating to reflect the shift from negotiating the operationalisation of the Agreement to its implementation.

5. In the context of the Pacific Reset, it is important the mandate supports both our climate change and Pacific objectives. To this end, it is appropriate to strengthen the existing principle about standing with the Pacific. There are many issues across the UNFCCC agenda that are priority concerns for Pacific delegations. Accordingly, ‘standing with the Pacific’ in the UNFCCC requires consideration across the agenda, which is why I propose to retain and strengthen this guiding principle in this mandate.

6. The specific issues that are key for many Pacific island countries include the 1.5°C temperature increase limit, ambition of measures for the achievement of that goal, and support to adapt to climate change. In general terms, New Zealand is aligned with the PICs on these issues. s9(2)(j)

7. The UNFCCC is moving from the negotiation of guidelines for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement to implementation. The world is moving from the Kyoto Protocol era to the Paris Agreement era. Through this transition, new issues will emerge and old agenda items and processes will lose their relevance. Therefore, I propose we add two additional common-sense guiding principles to the mandate – to seek outcomes that are a) not duplicative of existing multilateral processes, and b) consistent with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement. These will authorise the delegation to support the primacy and endurance of the new regime, to rationalise efforts, and to dispose of things once their time is done.

#### Proposed approach:

8. I propose the following as guiding principles for the mandate:

- **agree** New Zealand will advocate for UNFCCC Parties and other entities to align their climate action with the objective of limiting temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels with limited or no overshoot

- **agree** New Zealand should participate actively and constructively in the international negotiations to support the credibility and robustness of the Paris Agreement and its implementation

- **agree** New Zealand will resist any development in implementation of the Paris Agreement that undermines either the Agreement’s applicability to all countries or its principles of environmental integrity, progressive ambition, and continuous improvement in transparency

- **agree** New Zealand will advocate for outcomes that support the interests of Pacific island countries, to the extent possible, in ways consistent with New Zealand’s national interest

- **agree** New Zealand will seek effective and efficient outcomes, including avoiding duplication of existing multilateral processes

- **agree** New Zealand will seek outcomes that are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and associated decisions by Parties to the Agreement

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1. For example, in climate finance, capacity building, adaptation, loss and damage, and in building a system that holds Parties to account and results in the reduction of emissions in line with best available science.


**Appendix A: Item 2**

**Loss and damage**

*how we respond to permanent and irreversible loss and damage from the impacts of climate change*

**Nature of update:**

A more elaborate position on loss and damage.

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**Context:**

1. The issue of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change ("loss and damage" for short) first surfaced in the UNFCCC in 1991 when the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) called for a mechanism that would compensate developing countries affected by sea level rise. There is no agreed definition of "loss and damage", and interpretations range from an "existential" perspective that focuses on measures such as compensation, to "loss and damage" as a sub-set of climate change adaptation (the traditional developed country view). These differing perspectives lead to loss and damage being a polarised political debate between developed and developing countries.

2. Progressing calls for compensation for loss and damage would be legally and politically fraught: establishing a causal link with climate change, determining responsibility, and apportioning shares for compensation would be impossible.

3. Responding to permanent loss and damage from the impacts of climate change is a priority for many developing countries, including our Pacific neighbours.

4. There is much useful work that can be done to avert, minimise and address loss and damage – and New Zealand is active in the Pacific in some of this (for example, on emergency preparedness, early warning systems, slow-onset disasters, such as sea-level rise and displacement, and disaster risk insurance).

5. In 2013, the UNFCCC established the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage Associated with the Impacts of Climate Change (WIM). The Paris Agreement affirms the WIM as the permanent vehicle for this purpose (Article 8.3) and further makes clear that the Paris Agreement cannot be used to underpin claims for liability or compensation.

6. **s6(a)** Pacific island countries continue to raise loss and damage as a high priority, expressing dissatisfaction with the WIM as the totality of the UNFCCC’s response.

7. The Paris Agreement contains a provision on loss and damage that is tightly restricted to recognising the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage and establishing a role for the WIM in serving the Paris Agreement. Parties explicitly agreed this provision did not provide a basis for compensation for loss and damage in the accompanying decision (1/CP.21).

8. The WIM is scheduled to be reviewed at COP25 in December 2019. The proximity of the review has given rise to calls for more finance to be made available to developing countries to respond to loss and damage, and for the UNFCCC, via the WIM, to take on a greater, more centralised role, in coordinating the various work streams under way outside the UNFCCC to support developing countries in this response.

9. We seek to retain the integrity of the negotiated Paris Agreement, and therefore resist efforts to use loss and damage as a potential vehicle for claims for compensation or to expand the scope of the WIM.

10. This is the only major issue where our position does not align with the Pacific island countries. s6(a)

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**Comment:**

6. **s6(a)**

7. The Paris Agreement contains a provision on loss and damage that is tightly restricted to recognising the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage and establishing a role for the WIM in serving the Paris Agreement. Parties explicitly agreed this provision did not provide a basis for compensation for loss and damage in the accompanying decision (1/CP.21).

8. The WIM is scheduled to be reviewed at COP25 in December 2019. The proximity of the review has given rise to calls for more finance to be made available to developing countries to respond to loss and damage, and for the UNFCCC, via the WIM, to take on a greater, more centralised role, in coordinating the various work streams under way outside the UNFCCC to support developing countries in this response.

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**Proposed approach:**

13. I propose New Zealand continues to support the work of the WIM within the terms of the Paris Agreement, including its focus on averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage; but resist both expansion of the WIM’s work programme on loss and damage in ways inconsistent with the Paris Agreement, and any efforts to pursue development of compensation mechanisms should these arise.

14. I also propose New Zealand should continue to respond to the threat of loss and damage in the Pacific, including through the provision of climate-related support.

15. This will be reflected in the mandate as:

- agree New Zealand will continue support the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage in fulfilling its mandate to address loss and damage in developing countries, and, consistent the decision that adopted the Paris Agreement, s6(a)

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2 Paragraph 51, decision 1/CP.21 of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.

POLU 386-3310
### Appendix A: Item 3

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<thead>
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<th>Nature of update:</th>
<th>Oceans</th>
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<td>amplifying Pacific voices so others understand the impacts of climate change on oceans, and the importance of oceans to PICs</td>
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<td>A clearer position on oceans.</td>
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**Context:**

1. Pacific island countries have expressed ambitions to safeguard the ocean from the effects of climate change and to adapt to increasing threats from the ocean as a result of climate change.
2. These countries have also expressed frustration that the importance of climate change impacts on oceans and the importance of oceans to Pacific island countries are often overlooked by larger and more terrestrial countries.
3. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will release its Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in September 2019. Chile (the host and President of COP 25) has proposed this year’s COP is a ‘blue’ COP – focusing on the oceans and Antarctica. At previous COPs, suggestions have been made around dedicated UNFCCC agenda items with unclear scope and objectives.

**Comment:**

4. New Zealand supports initiatives that draw attention to the nexus between climate change and oceans, to drive more ambitious climate action. We work with and support Pacific island countries to do so – for example through Fiji’s Oceans Pathway Partnership.

5. Introducing a greater focus on oceans and Antarctica into the UNFCCC will need to be carefully managed to avoid detraction from and inconsistencies with the primary international legal framework governing oceans, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and, in respect of Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty System.

6. While supportive of initiatives drawing attention to climate change and oceans, we should be cautious about any proposals that could undermine the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement. This applies particularly to initiatives seeking credit for natural, rather than human-induced sequestration activity; as well as initiatives in areas where there is a high degree of scientific uncertainty.

   - s6(a)

7. In future, this caution may be directed at initiatives linking oceans with carbon markets – where getting things wrong could result in the crediting of action that lacks environmental integrity.

8. The importance of Antarctica to understanding the global impacts of climate change is clear. New Zealand has an interest in ensuring that the Antarctic Treaty System, which provides the governance to ensure Antarctica is maintained as an area for peace and science, is not undermined.

**Proposed approach:**

9. I consider the general principles of standing with the Pacific and not undermining the environmental integrity of the Agreement provide high-level guidance on oceans that is appropriate at this time (as this issue is still emerging).

10. Given UNCLOS is the primary international legal framework governing all activities in the ocean and the Antarctic Treaty System provides governance over activities in Antarctica, I propose to add specific guidance reinforcing the need to avoid detraction from these legal frameworks with regard to oceans and Antarctica.

11. I also propose New Zealand is cautious when it comes to initiatives that may have a high degree of scientific uncertainty, or which could undermine the environmental integrity of the Agreement.

12. This will be reflected in the mandate as:

   - **New recommendations**
     - **agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure that action on oceans and climate change is meaningful while upholding the existing international legal frameworks governing oceans and Antarctic issues
     - **agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure robust science underpins mitigation claims and accounting practices relating to oceans initiatives where needed to safeguard the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement
     - **agree** New Zealand will seek to ensure the UNFCCC takes a precautionary approach to proposals for ocean-based solutions to climate change
## International carbon markets

**how countries cooperate through international carbon markets to reduce emissions with environmental integrity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of update:</th>
<th>More granularity for the existing mandate.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Context:

1. Negotiations on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (which covers market and non-market cooperation between Parties) were unresolved at COP24 in December 2018. NB: These negotiations are not about whether or to what degree New Zealand itself may use international carbon markets in the future.

2. New Zealand has a strong interest in ensuring the use of markets has integrity and adds to, and does not detract from, ambitious mitigation of climate change.

### Comment:

3. The previous mandate for carbon markets was high-level and appropriate for negotiating market rules in the context of delivering a package deal on the Paris Agreement Work Programme.

4. There is a strong push from some Parties to implement provisions that would undermine the environmental integrity of the market system (and potentially the Paris Agreement as a whole) – for example, through large-scale double counting.

5. While the current mandate is clear on New Zealand’s approach to environmental integrity, it does not provide sufficient guidance on issues beyond this. One such issue is known as ‘inside-outside’ – this relates to whether markets can be used if mitigation sold occurs outside a Party’s NDC (for example, a country with an NDC limited to the energy sector selling land sector mitigation).

6. Inside-outside is not a straight environmental integrity issue – being able to monetise mitigation from outside the NDC (particularly if this is not accounted for) may incentivise Parties from taking economy-wide targets in the future. Many Parties that seek market systems that have environmental integrity, and which are likely to be early movers on markets, favour rules that would either reduce the scope of mitigation that can be sourced from outside of NDCs (for example, using a time-limit) and/or require it to be fully accounted for. New Zealand is sympathetic to this view.

7. A mandate is also required to respond to other issues that have re-emerged in the current negotiations that were rejected in Paris (i.e. there is no legal ‘hook’ for these in the Agreement). These include:

   - Extension of the ‘share-of-proceeds’ agreed for the market mechanism established by the Paris Agreement to all international market mechanisms. The ‘share-of-proceeds’ will essentially tax the proceeds from the mechanism, to generate funding for adaptation action. Most developing countries want this concept extended to all international market mechanisms not just the Paris Agreement one (including to market links between domestic emissions trading schemes). New Zealand recognises Article 6 is not the vehicle to resolve political questions about the sufficiency of climate finance, and there are practical challenges to delivering a ‘share of proceeds’ outside the context of a central mechanism.

   - Operationalising that the Paris Agreement market-mechanism “shall aim” to deliver an “overall mitigation in global emissions”. Some Parties want to see this effected through a similar compulsory “taxation”, as for share of proceeds, and for it to apply not only to the Paris Agreement mechanism, but to all international market mechanisms.

   - Other Parties maintain the operation of the market mechanism will in itself achieve overall mitigation, without further measures taken. In light of this, New Zealand has looked for middle ground options – pragmatic approaches that enable (rather than compel) overall mitigation to be achieved under the central mechanism best reflect the Paris Agreement’s intent (i.e. ‘shall aim to deliver’ rather than ‘shall/must deliver’).

### Proposed approach:

8. I propose to add greater granularity to the existing markets mandate.

9. New Zealand must continue to work toward robust international carbon markets with environmental integrity. Given the strength of the push from some countries that would undermine this, and that this topic is no longer being negotiated as part of the overall Paris Agreement work programme, I propose to strengthen the existing mandate on environmental integrity – particularly as it relates to double counting, and pre-2020 Kyoto Protocol units (this is a pre-existing position on unit carry-over).

10. s9(2)(j)

11. Moreover, all markets outcomes should be consistent with the Paris Agreement. This general approach is reflected in the guiding principles of the mandate – in markets it particularly pertains to issues of share of proceeds and overall mitigation in global emissions.

12. The markets specific recommendations will be reflected in the mandate as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing mandate with updates in italics</th>
<th>New recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will seek guidelines for the use of carbon markets that promote environmental integrity through robust accounting, the avoidance of double accounting, and strong transparency (reporting and review)</td>
<td><strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will advocate for accounting rules that do not recognise the use of pre-2020 units toward mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s9(2)(j)</td>
<td><strong>s9(2)(j)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**agree** New Zealand will seek share of proceeds provisions that apply to the Article 6.4 mechanism exclusively
Appendix A: Item 5
The future of the Kyoto Protocol
what happens to the old regime once the Paris Agreement is in full-swing
Nature of update:
An explicit position on the future of the Kyoto Protocol.

Context:
1. The Kyoto Protocol is the UNFCCC agreement under which developed countries took targets to reduce emissions. The Paris Agreement is a new treaty, under which all countries (both developed and developing) will take action to reduce emissions.
2. New Zealand is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.
   - New Zealand signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol – and took a target under the Protocol for the first commitment period (2008-12).
   - New Zealand did not take a target under the Protocol for 2013-2020 (the second commitment period), associating our target with the UNFCCC instead. We ratified the Doha Amendment (which contain targets for the second commitment period) – meaning we participate in the Protocol in all ways other than by having a target.
   - The second commitment period has not yet entered into force because not enough countries have ratified the Doha Amendment, and may not do so.
3. The Nationally Determined Contribution New Zealand has taken under the Paris Agreement is for the period 2021-2030.

Comment:
4. With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (and the institutions and processes to implement it), the question becomes what happens to those institutions and processes set-up to implement the Kyoto Protocol. In the absence of active decisions to the contrary many of these could continue whether they are useful or not.
5. Some of the Kyoto Protocol processes are beneficial to New Zealand. For example, it is likely we will draw from existing methodologies such as the 2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol, in accounting for our NDC. Accounting rules generated for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol, like carbon equivalence, reference levels, carbon budgets, harvested wood products, are important to New Zealand.
6. The Kyoto Protocol has features that should not be perpetuated, however: that only a subset of countries now responsible for a minority of global emissions have emissions reduction targets; and that the world was bifurcated – rigidly split into developed and developing countries. In contrast, the Paris Agreement is applicable to all – bringing countries into a common system, while respecting the need for flexibility. Continuation of the Kyoto Protocol serves to reinforce dichotomous thinking in the UNFCCC.
7. Part of the understanding that led to the Paris Agreement was that developed countries would continue to take the lead on efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and meet finance commitments. For some developing countries, pre-2020 action including the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, has talismanic value as the developed world ‘making good’ on the commitments that led to the Paris Agreement. The Amendment needs to be ratified by a further 16 Parties to enter force – this will require a number of developing countries to ratify it.

8. While countries are now focused on the Paris Agreement, continuation of the Kyoto Protocol reinforces dichotomous thinking about countries’ responsibilities. s9(2)(g)(i)

Proposed approach:
9. I propose New Zealand continues to support pre-2020 action, and the entry into force of the Doha Amendment, s9(2)(j)

10. The Paris Agreement is the appropriate arrangement for multilateral climate action from 2020/21 onwards. Consistent with the common sense principle of avoiding duplication, I propose we:
   - seek to close (where and when appropriate) Kyoto Protocol institutions and processes that do not serve a function under the Paris Agreement; or where these functions are needed, to transition these into the Paris Agreement framework in ways that do not perpetuate bifurcation or undermine the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement.

11. This approach is supported by general principles on the Agreement’s applicability to all and environmental integrity. I propose specific guidance on two points, as below, to flesh this out:
   - s9(2)(j)

New recommendations
   - agree New Zealand will, where and when appropriate, seek to close or rationalise Kyoto Protocol institutions and processes that do not serve a function under the Paris Agreement
Appendix A: Item 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics for conversion of greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how emissions from gases like methane are counted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nature of update:** New mandate on the process by which the UNFCCC comes at this issue.

**Context:**
1. For purposes of greenhouse gas reporting and accounting for targets, Parties use metrics assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for converting non-CO\textsubscript{2} gases to CO\textsubscript{2} equivalent. Through the Paris Agreement, Parties endorsed this approach for reporting and accounting under the Agreement.
2. The Paris ‘rulebook’ provides this metric is the 100-year time horizon Global Warming Potential (GWP 100) values from the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, or from subsequent assessment reports as agreed by Parties to the Paris Agreement. In addition, Parties may also use other metrics assessed by the IPCC to report supplemental information on aggregate emissions and removals of greenhouse gases, expressed in CO\textsubscript{2} equivalent.

**Comment:**
3. The IPCC has assessed a number of metrics. Compared to GWP 100, some of these reduce the calculated impacts of some non-CO\textsubscript{2} emissions such as methane, for example the 100-year Global Temperature Potential (GTP 100).
4. Some countries, particularly those for which livestock emissions are significant, have an interest in encouraging the UNFCCC to seek adoption of alternative common metrics.

The Paris landing zone on metrics is skewed toward retention of GWP as the common metric, and future discussions will depart from this point.

5. Science on a range of greenhouse gas metrics is increasingly available, and we anticipate the Working Group I component of the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report will include a substantive discussion of this matter.
6. Advocating for a shift in common metric by the UNFCCC now, with the rulebook only recently agreed, and the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report yet to be received, is likely to undermine prospects for future agreement to change.

**Proposed approach:**
7. I propose to add specificity to the mandate on the question of metrics to guide negotiators in engagement with other countries eager to make the case for change before the next IPCC report is released.

- agree that New Zealand will pursue scientific and technical discussion of greenhouse gas metrics by the UNFCCC after completion of the Working Group I component of the IPCC 6th assessment report

New recommendation
**Update to climate change negotiation mandate**

**APPENDIX B – MINOR AMENDMENTS AND CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS MANDATE**

1. This appendix covers items in the existing mandate which can either be carried across as is, or which require minor amendments that are still consistent with the underlying rationale behind the existing mandate.
2. The approach in this table is to show the existing mandate – along with recommended additions or tweaks in the right hand column.
3. There are some sections of the existing mandate which have been entirely overtaken by events (such as those pertaining specifically to COP24 last year). These sections have been deleted in their entirety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Existing mandate</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The framework of the Paris Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally determined contributions what emissions reduction targets under the Agreement should look like</td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand should advocate for:</td>
<td>Replace with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• a common 5-year timeframe for NDCs, in order to facilitate greater synchronisation of national responses to the global stocktake and maintain clear upwards pressure on ambition;</td>
<td>agree New Zealand should:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• s9(2)(j)</td>
<td>o advocate for a common 5-year timeframe for NDCs, in order to facilitate greater synchronisation of national responses to the 5-yearly global stocktake mandated under the Agreement and maintain clear upwards pressure on ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common Timeframes for NDCs</td>
<td>o s9(2)(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o s9(2)(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rationale:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Paris COP was unable to reach agreement on whether NDCs should all have the same duration, and how start dates of NDCs should be synchronised. Parties have mostly communicated either 5 or 10 year contributions (New Zealand’s NDC is over a period of 10 years, from 2021 to 2030). Some Parties require a 10-year cycle to manage internal processes and provide long-term certainty to business, and others seek a 5-year cycle to maintain the momentum for ambitious action.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No significant national interest for a particular timeframe has been identified. Supporting the shorter timeframe would help to amplify the Pacific’s voice in the negotiations. 5-year NDC duration would also facilitate greater synchronisation of countries’ responses to the 5-yearly global stocktakes, and help focus pressure for upward ambition.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The proposed position recognises New Zealand will be a deal taker on this issue ultimately and authorises us to go along with a consensus on an approach to timeframes other than one of the two we advocate for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency how we see whether countries make good on their commitments</td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand should pursue a robust and efficient transparency framework that applies equally to all Parties, with the exception of developed country reporting on the provision of support to developing countries, and that has in-built flexibility for those developing countries that need it in light of capacity constraints;</td>
<td>Replace with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree New Zealand seek to maintain a robust and efficient transparency framework</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rationale:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reflects conclusion of negotiations and commencement of implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation of compliance how can we help countries do better in meeting their obligations</td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand will seek to ensure the compliance mechanism is effective, and includes a comprehensive set of triggers for facilitative intervention, balanced by flexibility of the Committee to respond to matters in ways appropriate to the national circumstances of the Party it is dealing with, including on the measures it can apply in cases of non-compliance;</td>
<td>Replace with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agree New Zealand will seek to ensure the mechanisms to promote compliance are effective in facilitating greater compliance with the Agreement and its implementing rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Global stocktake

**Rationale:**
Reflects conclusion of negotiations and commencement of implementation

| **Global stocktake** | **Rationale:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>do countries collective efforts add-up to meeting the global climate change goals</td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand will seek manageable operating modalities for the global stocktakes that effectively direct attention to the Agreement’s long-term goals and retain a focus on collective progress and environmental integrity in implementing the Agreement;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Replace with:
| | agree New Zealand will seek to ensure that the global stocktake operates effectively, directs attention to the Agreement’s long-term goals, and focuses on collective progress and environmental integrity in implementing the Agreement; |
| | Rationale:
| | Reflects conclusion of negotiations and commencement of implementation |

### Enabling the transition

#### Mitigation

| **Agriculture** | **Rationale:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how do we promote countries taking action on agricultural emissions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agreed that, in the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, and in other relevant fora, New Zealand will encourage other countries to take mitigation action on agriculture, including by improving the emissions efficiency of the sector as a transition towards the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Replace with:
| | agree New Zealand will encourage other countries to take mitigation action on agriculture |
| | Rationale:
| | Gives clearer signal of expectation agriculture sector will contribute to global emission reductions. |

| **Climate finance** | **Rationale:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>support for countries to meet their climate change objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand will seek an outcome on reporting climate finance that preserves New Zealand’s ability to report climate finance in line with our domestic tracking and accounting practices;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Replace with:
| | agree New Zealand will seek agreement on tables for reporting climate finance that preserves New Zealand’s ability to report in line with our domestic tracking and accounting practices |
| | Rationale:
| | Reflect progression of negotiations to focus on reporting tables and formats |
| | agree New Zealand will advocate for as much transparency and predictability of climate finance as possible within the limitations of national systems |
| | agree New Zealand can join with other donor countries to restate the shared commitment to delivering on the collective goal to mobilise USD 100 billion per year in climate finance until 2025 from a variety of public and private sources in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparent implementation by developing countries |
| | Rationale:
| | Recognises a restatement may not necessarily occur |
| | agree New Zealand will participate in the negotiation of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance for the post-2025 period, scheduled to commence in November 2020 |
| | agree New Zealand will advocate for any new collective quantified goal to be contributed to by all Parties in a position to do so |
| | Rationale:
| | COP24 decided deliberations on a new collective finance goal would commence in 2020. This will build on the previous collective goal agreed in 2010. It is important any new goal to include as many donors as possible, which will also enable the goal to be more ambitious. |

### Technology mechanism

| **Technology mechanism** | **Rationale:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how does the developing world get technology needed to effective respond to climate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand will support operation of non-duplicative institutional architecture to maximise the effectiveness of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, focused on promoting and enhancing the development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No change</td>
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<tr>
<td>change</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response measures how do countries transition their economies</td>
<td>agreed that New Zealand will seek to maintain a focus of discussion on economic diversification and a just transition for all countries, and avoid outcomes that hold developed countries collectively responsible for fossil fuel producers’ transition to a low emissions future;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Human and social issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human rights and gender</strong></th>
<th><strong>Replace with:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how do we ensure consistency with, and the promotion of, human rights and gender equality</td>
<td><strong>agreed</strong> that New Zealand will support calls for Parties, when taking action to address climate change, to respect, promote and consider their obligations to, amongst other things, human rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, as well as on gender equality and the empowerment of women; <strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will support calls for Parties, when taking action to address climate change, to respect, promote and consider their obligations to, amongst other things, human rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, as well as on gender equality and the empowerment of women;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflects conclusion of negotiations and commencement of implementation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform</strong></th>
<th><strong>Replace with:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>how do we assist local communities and indigenous peoples in responding to climate change</td>
<td><strong>agreed</strong> that New Zealand will support further operationalisation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform and advocate indigenous peoples platform enabling indigenous peoples and local communities being enabled to exchange experience, best practice and knowledge, builds their capacity to engage in the UNFCCC process, and encourages respect for their rights and interests in international and national actions, programmes and policies; <strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will advocate for the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform operating to support respect for the rights and interests of indigenous peoples in international and national climate change actions, programmes and policies; <strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will advocate for the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform enabling indigenous peoples and local communities to exchange experience, best practice and knowledge, and build their capacity to engage in the UNFCCC; <strong>agree</strong> New Zealand will advocate for indigenous peoples having access to the Platform regardless of their country’s involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responds to indigenous peoples being among the first to face the direct impacts of climate change due to their close relationship with, and dependence upon, the environment and its resources. Also reflects conclusion of negotiations to establish the Platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegations</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within bounds of the approved mandate</td>
<td><strong>authorised</strong> the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister for Climate Change and Minister of Finance to take together any final decisions, consistent with Cabinet’s decisions, on climate-related financial support for developing countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>authorised</strong> the Minister for Climate Change and, where appropriate, relevant portfolio Minister/s to take any final decisions on other issues in the negotiations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside bounds of the approved mandate</td>
<td><strong>noted</strong> that, should the negotiations move outside the bounds of existing Cabinet decisions, any final decisions with regards to New Zealand’s international climate change position would, where possible, be considered by Cabinet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>noted</strong> that where there are fast-moving developments in the negotiations and time constraints, it may not be possible to convene Cabinet to take final decisions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>authorised</strong>, in such situations, the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and the Minister for Climate Change to take together any final decision on climate-related financial support for developing countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>authorised</strong>, in such situations, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister for Climate Change, and relevant portfolio Minister/s, to take together any final decisions on other issues in the negotiations;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>