

28 October 2025

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OIA 30391

Thank you for your email of 1 September 2025 in which you request the following under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA):

"Under the Official Information Act, please supply all written advice, briefings, reports, aides-memoire, and notes, prepared for and arising from, Foreign Minister Winston Peters' attendance at the Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Fiji on August 13."

On 29 September 2025, the timeframes for responding to your request were extended by an additional 20 working days because responding to your request necessitated the review of a large quantity of information, and due to the consultations necessary to make a decision on your request (section 15A(1)(a) and (b) of the OIA refers).

Attached are the following documents in scope of your request:

1. Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027, dated 22 April 2025
2. Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting – Officials Brief, dated 14 August 2025
3. Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting – Ministers Brief, dated 14 August 2025
4. Formal Message: Pacific Islands Forum: 2025 Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting And Forum Officials Committee , dated 22 August 2025
5. Formal Message: Dialogue Partner Decision Day At The Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting, dated 18 August 2025

Some information is withheld under the following sections of the OIA:

- 6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the New Zealand Government;
- 6(b)(i): to protect the passing of information from another government on a confidential basis;

- 6(b)(ii): to protect the passing of information from an international organisation on a confidential basis;
- 9(2)(a): to protect individuals' privacy;
- 9(2)(b)(i): protect information where the making available of the information would disclose a trade secret;
- 9(2)(b)(ii): to avoid prejudice to the commercial position of another party;
- 9(2)(ba)(i): to protect the supply of confidential information by a third party;
- 9(2)(f)(iv): to protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials;
- 9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments;
- 9(2)(h): to maintain legal professional privilege;
- 9(2)(i): to enable a Minister, public service agency or organisation to carry out, without prejudice or disadvantage, commercial activities; and,
- 9(2)(j): to avoid prejudice to negotiations.

Where the information has been withheld under section 9 of the OIA, no public interest in releasing the information has been identified that would override the reasons for withholding it.

Please note that it is our policy to proactively release our responses to official information requests where possible. Therefore, our response to your request (with your personal information removed) may be published on the Ministry website:
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses/

If you have any questions about this decision, you can contact us by email at: DM-ESD@mfat.govt.nz. You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman of this decision by contacting www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Nāku noa, nā

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'SC' followed by a long horizontal stroke.

Sarah Corbett
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade



10 April 2025
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

22 April 2025

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To seek agreement on key priorities and attendance for New Zealand at the 54th Pacific Islands Forum and related meetings, and next steps on New Zealand's proposed hosting of the 56th Pacific Islands Forum in 2027.

Recommended referrals

Prime Minister

For concurrence by

29 April 2025

Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Tharron McIvor	Unit Manager, Pacific Strategy and Regionalism	Pacific Regional Division	s9(2)(a)
Jordan Allison	Policy Officer, Pacific Strategy and Regionalism	Pacific Regional Division	

Minister's Office to complete

☐ Approved

☐ Noted

☐ Referred

☐ Needs amendment

☐ Declined

☐ Withdrawn

☐ Overtaken by events

☐ See Minister's notes

Comments

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027

Key points

- Solomon Islands, as the incoming Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), intends to host the 54th PIF Leaders Meeting from 8-12 September in Honiara. This is the apex event of the Pacific regional calendar, preceded by the Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting (FFMM) in Suva, tentatively scheduled for 15 August.
- These meetings provide further opportunity to enhance the bilateral relationships you and the Prime Minister have built, reinforce New Zealand's commitment to Pacific regionalism (and Forum centrality in particular), s6(a)
- We recommend that you attend the FFMM in Suva. s6(a)

- s6(a)

s6(a)

- Other topics for discussion include the 'Review of Regional Architecture' and ongoing implementation of the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*; other key regional issues such as climate change, sea-level rise and economic development; s6(a)

- s6(a)

PIF Chairing

- Officials to have considered further the possibility of New Zealand chairing the Forum in 2027/28 (we last chaired in 2011/12). s6(a)

- s9(2)(f)(iv)



Bernadette Cavanagh
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Agree New Zealand's focus areas for upcoming Pacific Islands Forum meetings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening Pacific regionalism and Forum centrality, including through seeking greater regional integration and connectivity; - Advancing discussions on Pacific regional security priorities, including the adoption of an 'Ocean of Peace' Declaration; and - Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and Pacific climate resilience. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Reaffirm your agreement to attend the Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting in Suva on 15 August and undertake a short programme of related calls and engagements. | Yes / No |
| 3 | s9(2)(f)(iv) | Yes / No |
| 4 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 5 | | Yes / No |
| 6 | s9(2)(f)(iv) | Yes / No |
| 7 | Agree to seeking the agreement in principle of PIF Leaders for New Zealand to host the PIF in 2027. | Yes / No |
| 8 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 9 | Refer this submission to the Prime Minister. | Yes / No |

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Rt Hon Christopher Luxon
Prime Minister

Date: / /

Date: / /

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027 Report

1. Solomon Islands, as the incoming Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), intends to hold the annual PIF Leaders Meeting in Honiara from 8-12 September. This will be preceded by the Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting in Suva on 15 August. These meetings provide an opportunity for Forum Members to assess the degree to which the Forum and broader regional architecture is delivering against the increasingly complex needs of the region, amid growing strategic competition and the impacts of climate change.

2. s6(a) . Initial indications point to a focus on greater regional integration, s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

Other areas that could benefit from direction from Ministers and Leaders – and deliver dividends with respect to regional integration in line with New Zealand's interests – include shared standards for education (noting education is now a standing agenda item for PIF Leaders); aviation connectivity; and digitisation.

3. The 'Review of Regional Architecture' (RRA) is also likely to receive significant attention s6(a), s6(b)(i)
Another RRA outcome Members are aiming to deliver in September is a reformed Dialogue Partner mechanism, which will see improvements in how international partners engage with the PIF, in line with our efforts to give substance to "PIF centrality". s6(a)

4. s6(a)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

New Zealand priorities

9. s6(a)

underscore the need for the organisation to both deliver substantive outcomes of benefit to Members *and* be perceived as a credible and trusted institutional hub for Pacific regional processes.

10. With this in mind, we propose the following core areas of focus for New Zealand in 2025:

- **Strengthening Pacific regionalism and Forum centrality:** Officials are continuing efforts to embed the concept of Forum centrality so that we are better equipped as a region to advance our shared interests and address challenges collectively. This includes finalising the reformed Dialogue Partner mechanism commissioned by Leaders in 2024, giving the Forum more agency over how it engages with the wider world. On the theme of regional integration, we also see opportunity to advocate for taking a regional approach to building connectivity –s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
- **Advancing discussion on regional security priorities:** s6(a)
New Zealand sees benefit in the Forum continuing to act as the focal point for regional security discussions and for the PIF Secretariat to be appropriately resourced to support the development and consideration of regional security policy. The development of the 'Ocean of Peace' Declaration, to be agreed at the PIF Leaders Meeting, presents an opportunity to reinforce peace and security norms that align with New Zealand's interests.
- **Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience:** The Foreign Ministers and Leaders Meetings are important occasions for the region to coalesce and voice its climate change-related priorities, including ahead of a potential 'Pacific' Conference of Parties (COP) in 2026.¹ This presents an opportunity for New Zealand, in collaboration with other Members, to champion particular Pacific climate initiatives, such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, and the Pacific Resilience Facility s6(a)

, it will be important the Forum is seen to be delivering on Pacific climate priorities.

Out of scope

¹ s6(a)

Pacific Islands Forum: Priorities in 2025 and Proposal to Host in 2027

12. Out of scope

New Zealand chairing (and hosting) of PIF 2027 and resourcing

13. s9(2)(f)(iv)

. With the chairing now rotating between sub-regions, 2027 is the next hosting year for Polynesia, s9(2)(g)(i)²

14. Chairing carries with it the responsibility of being part of the PIF Troika (the incoming, current, and outgoing chairs). This responsibility would take up and finish at the PIF Leaders' meetings in 2026 and 2029 respectively. This could see the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister representing the Forum at key international engagements throughout the year as well as New Zealand leading Forum Ministerial-level and officials' meetings and processes.

15. s9(2)(f)(iv)

16.

17. In light of these requirements, we propose:

- In Honiara, the Prime Minister seeks agreement in principle from PIF Leaders for New Zealand to host the PIF in 2027. s9(2)(f)(iv)
- s9(2)(f)(iv)

² New Zealand last hosted in 2011; Samoa in 2017; Cook Islands in 2023; Tonga in 2024. Niue last hosted in 2008, s9(2)(g)(i)



NEW ZEALAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE
Manatū Aorere

OFFICIALS' BRIEF

PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

14 August 2025



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OVERVIEW AND AGENDA

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Agenda

1. Opening (9:00am – 9:05am)

The Chair will call the meeting to order and opening formalities will be observed.

2. Adoption of Agenda and Meeting Timetable (9:05am – 9:10am)

3. Regional and Strategic Landscape (9:10am – 9:45am)

To consider and discuss the evolving geopolitical and regional dynamics shaping the strategic environment in the Pacific region.

4. Ministerial Talanoa (9:45am – 11:00am)

Ministers will consider and discuss the outcomes and recommendations of the High-Level Political Talanoa (HLPT) process, and discuss opportunities for strengthened political cohesion, timely implementation of the 2050 Strategy, and the reform of the regional architecture towards strengthened and deepened regionalism, including in response to the evolving regional and strategic landscape.

MORNING TEA (11:00am – 11:30am)

5. Political Leadership and Regionalism (11:30am – 12:15pm)

To discuss the key regionalism initiatives, especially regional political developments within the framing of the 2050 Strategy and the Review of the Regional Architecture. This will include an update on the 2050 Strategy, the new PIF Partnership Mechanism, nuclear legacy issues and ongoing political developments in the region, particularly as it relates to New Caledonia and Papua.

6. Peace and Security (12:15pm – 12:45pm)

To discuss key regional security priorities and consider the draft Ocean of Peace Declaration to be conveyed to Leaders for endorsement.

7. Resources and Economic Development (12:45pm – 1:15pm)

To discuss the outcomes of the sectoral ministerials on opportunities for strengthened cross-sectoral collaboration on key regional initiatives and priorities, including the Pacific Resilience Facility, Labour Mobility Principles and fisheries development.

LUNCH (1:15pm – 2:30pm)

8. Climate Change and Disasters (2:30pm – 3:00pm)

To discuss and consider the arrangements for the preparation of COP 31 and the role that the Pacific region will play in supporting Australia's hosting of the first Pacific COP.

9. Ocean and Environment (3:00pm – 3:30pm)

To discuss and consider an update on the key priorities for Oceans moving forward, including the outcomes of the High-Level Talanoa on Deep Sea Minerals.

10. People Centred Development (3:30pm – 3:45pm)

To discuss an update on the key issues from the sectoral ministerials that are going to Leaders for discussion and decision at the 54th Pacific Islands Forum.

11. Technology and Connectivity (3:45pm – 4:00pm)

To discuss and consider the ongoing regional efforts on Information, Connectivity and Technology and related matters, as framed under the Lagatoi Declaration.

12. Update on the 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings (4:00pm – 4:15pm)

To consider an update on the preparations for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings in 2025, and the proposed process for the development of the Forum Communiqué for the 54th Pacific Islands Forum.

AFTERNOON TEA (4:15pm – 4:30pm)

13. Other Matters (4:30pm – 5:00pm)

14. Consideration of Outcomes Document (5:00pm – 5:30pm)

15. Closing (6:00pm)

Overview and Objectives

1. Pacific Islands Forum Leaders agreed in 2019 that in an increasingly complex world securing our region's future could not be simply left to chance. Instead, the region needed a long-term, carefully considered regionalism strategy, and the collective commitment to achieve it.

2. Since then, the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent* has started to deliver concrete benefits to the region. It is bringing coherence and strategic direction to the work of the Forum. It is becoming the organising framework to guide Forum Members and partners alike. It is a tool to hold partners to account. And it is helping our Secretariat align its work and organisational structure to the priorities of Leaders.

3. The meeting of Forum Foreign Ministers this year is organised around the thematic areas of the 2050 Strategy. This will help to ground the opening discussion, where Ministers will discuss how best to assert our region's interests in a dynamic global context. We expect this approach to continue for the upcoming Forum Leaders Meeting, and years to come.

Regional integration – an enduring theme

4. In 2006, you signed the Agreement establishing the Forum as an international organisation. This Agreement states the overarching purpose of the Forum as strengthening regional cooperation and integration, including through the pooling of resources and alignment of policies.

5. s6(a)

Notwithstanding its broad membership, past achievements and array of external partnerships, s6(a)

6. This meeting is an opportunity to build on the momentum of the 2050 Strategy towards greater regional integration, aligning policies and, over time, building better frameworks to bind our region together across a range of issues. This is in keeping with the theme for the Leaders Meeting in Honiara – *Act now for an Integrated Blue Pacific Continent* – s6(a)

Key objectives

7. Our priority is preserving regional unity through a Forum-first approach s6(a)

Our core objectives include:

- **Strengthening Forum centrality** so that we are better equipped to advance our shared interests and address challenges collectively. This includes ensuring our regional architecture is fit-for-purpose and finalising the Dialogue Partner mechanism, giving the Forum more agency over how it engages with the wider world.

- **Advancing discussion on regional security priorities: s6(a)**

- **Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience** by agreeing our climate change-related priorities, including ahead of a potential Australia-hosted 'Pacific' Conference of Parties (COP) in 2026.

8. s6(a)

Hosting in 2027

9. New Zealand's offer to host and chair the Forum in 2027 will be the centrepiece of our engagements. s6(a)

10. The Forum Officials Committee (11-12 August) will lay the policy and strategic groundwork for the Forum Foreign Ministers and Leaders Meetings. s6(a)
, the Officials Committee discussion will prepare the ground for your discussion with Ministers on hosting.

Media

11. You will be accompanied by several New Zealand media outlets, with opportunity to engage with media throughout the day. s9(2)(g)(i)

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AGENDA ITEMS

The following briefs are for items on the formal meeting agenda.

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Regional and Strategic Landscape

Possible intervention

- Warm Pacific greetings to my fellow Foreign Ministers, to the Secretary General and to everyone joining us today.
- As has been noted extensively at these meetings in the past few years, our world and our region are changing. It has become less open and less liberal. The multilateral system that underpinned the rules and certainty that made us all safer and more prosperous is under pressure.
- Uncertainty is now pervasive across the globe. We face an international operating environment under serious strain, one that poses complex challenges. This is especially so here in the Pacific. While geography remains a constant, distance is no buffer. There is no opting out from the geopolitical realities we face.
- In these difficult times, regionalism is essential. The Forum plays a critical role to bolster regional development and security, and to amplify our collective voice to hold bigger countries to account. It strengthens our hand and underwrites our sovereignty.
- So, this is a timely reminder of what is at stake and why the Forum matters for all our Pacific peoples. It is critical all our partners respect our Forum's priorities and processes and work for, not against, regionalism.
- As a Pacific country, New Zealand has a direct stake in the region's peace, stability, prosperity and resilience. Our own national security and economic prosperity is linked to developments in our region. We have said before that we have, in a very genuine sense, a shared Pacific destiny.

Possible intervention cont.

- That is why New Zealand's commitment to the region spans the political spectrum and is foundational to who we are as a country.
- Our Pacific-focused International Development Cooperation programme – reshaped to achieve more impact by doing fewer, bigger projects better – is helping to support our Pacific partners to build climate and economic resilience, strengthen governance and security, and lift health, education and connectivity outcomes.
- Security cooperation affects us all – domestic security decisions and actions can have regional implications. As Pacific countries we have responsibilities to one another to promote a peaceful and stable region, and not to take actions which compromise the security of others.
- Since war and instability is everyone's calamity, diplomacy is the business of us all. We have observed that at this present moment the ability to talk with, rather than at, each other has never been more needed. That is what we hope for today.

New Zealand's Position

- The Pacific Islands Forum is critical s6(a)
As the pre-eminent Pacific-led regional mechanism, the Forum is a core platform for Pacific countries to discuss and build consensus on shared challenges.
- With intensifying geopolitical trends exacerbating the many and varied challenges faced by the region, Pacific regionalism is important for enhancing the voice and agency of individual Pacific countries and supporting regional security and sovereignty.

Handling Advice

- We recommend an intervention under this item to register New Zealand's views of the regional and global strategic environment. As this will likely be your first intervention of the meeting, it would be appropriate for New Zealand to provide remarks s9(2)(g)(i)

Ministerial Talanoa

Possible intervention

- When we signed the Agreement establishing the Forum, we committed to a goal of strengthened regional cooperation and integration, including through the pooling of resources and alignment of policies.
- Although times have changed since then, the value of the Forum remains beyond question. With this year's Forum theme in mind, we look forward to joining the old and the new. To harness the region's original vision for the Forum to inform our collective ambitions as outlined in the *2050 Strategy*.
- Recognising how our cooperation underpins our region's security and prosperity is crucial. We must continue to have open and mature conversations:
 - o To preserve the rules-based system;
 - o To mature our commitment to regional security;
 - o To uphold the common standards that we all rely on, whether for air and sea shipping, telecommunication devices, or biosecurity measures; and
 - o To welcome the opportunities for people to work and travel across our region and gain new skills and experiences.
- On people movement, New Zealand recognises its role in enhancing connectivity in our region. We also see value in taking a regional approach to people movement.

- This should extend to a conversation on aligning our national policies on issues such as passport standards and border processes.
- Other issues on which we might benefit from greater alignment, or by taking legally binding action include air connectivity, fisheries, digital and regional security.
- This is not an academic conversation for New Zealand. We want our Leaders to take active decisions on these issues. We want to deliver on the promise of regionalism.

New Zealand's Position

- The talanoa session is Forum Foreign Ministers' equivalent of a retreat, with the opportunity to discuss at Ministerial level the most pressing issues. s6(a)

Handling Advice

- s9(2)(g)(i)

Background

1. Pacific Islands Forum countries have long asked New Zealand to liberalise visa settings and improve service delivery, especially in relation to urgent visitor visa requests to attend cultural or family events. New Zealand recognises its role in enhancing regional connectivity and is keen to engage with Pacific partners – including through the Pacific Islands Forum – on the direction this should take.

2. New Zealand is making it simpler for people across the Pacific to visit New Zealand. In early July 2025, the standard visitor visa validity period was extended to 24 months for Pacific Islands Forum country nationals who require a visa. These visas are multi-entry. s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. These immigration changes are a tangible step to increase the connection between New Zealand and fellow Forum countries. s6(a)

Dialogue and Development Partner Participation

Possible intervention

New Zealand is disappointed that the Forum's Dialogue and Development Partners will not attend the Leaders Meeting in Honiara. Not inviting our partners is a missed opportunity to engage with key supporters of our region at s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

- s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

- s6(a), s6(b)(ii) It is incumbent on all hosts to follow Forum procedures.
- It is also critical all our partners respect our Forum's priorities and procedures. Forum procedures – owned by all Members – serve to shield us from undue pressure from outside the region.
- These procedures are codified through the hosting agreement Memorandum of Understanding. We call on all hosts to sign this agreement and adhere to it in future, and that we seek Leaders' commitment to doing so. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

New Zealand's Position

- New Zealand is disappointed in the decision of Solomon Islands not to invite Dialogue Partners ^{s6(a)}
- s6(a)
- We want to put down a marker that future Forum hosts should formally sign the Leaders Meeting hosting agreement Memorandum of Understanding to prevent issues like this in the future. We propose to seek Leaders' agreement to language in the Communique to ensure we can better preserve the status quo in the future and codify procedural expectations that hosts cannot make unilateral decisions.

Handling Advice

- s6(a) . We recommend you make an intervention on this item, ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

Background

1. On 6 August Solomon Islands informed Forum Members of its intention not to invite Dialogue or Development Partners to this year's Leaders Meeting. s6(a)
2. s6(a)
3. Key likeminded Dialogue Partners have reacted with disappointment to Solomon Islands' decision, s6(a)

Political Leadership and Regionalism

Possible intervention

- New Zealand supports the efforts of the Forum to embed the **2050 Strategy** as the region's collective vision for the future.

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

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- s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

- On **New Caledonia**, New Zealand welcomes the signing by New Caledonia and the French State of a provisional agreement on New Caledonia's future institutional arrangements.
- There is much work to do, but the provisional agreement represents a significant step towards a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future. New Zealand's recent hosting of Kanak entrepreneurs on a study tour of the Māori economy was designed to support that outcome too.
- We thank the Government of New Caledonia and the French State for welcoming the Forum Troika Plus mission in October. New Zealand looks forward to discussing how the Forum can continue to support New Caledonia as a Forum Member.
- New Zealand is pleased to have recently hosted consultations between Papua New Guinea and **Bougainville** at Burnham, New Zealand.
- At these talks we saw both sides come together for substantive, good-faith discussions. We welcome the progress made by the parties, including the conclusion of the Melanesian Agreement and a commitment to further structured dialogue.
- New Zealand stands ready to provide further support to the next steps in the process as appropriate.

New Zealand's Position

2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent

- New Zealand strongly supports the 2050 Strategy as the region's collective vision for the future. We welcome the focus on regional integration and the strategic opportunities it presents to bind our region more closely together.

Review of Regional Architecture

- s6(a), s9(2)(j)

Forum Dialogue Partnership Mechanism Reform

- s6(a)
- s6(a)

New Caledonia

- The signing of the provisional Accord de Bougival is a positive step towards achieving long-term peace and stability in New Caledonia. The focus now is on ensuring broad political and public support for the agreement.
- s6(a)
- s6(a)

Papua

- New Zealand's consistent policy is that Papua is the sovereign territory of Indonesia. We raise human rights concerns with Indonesia bilaterally or multilaterally where relevant.
- The 2023 PIF Leaders Communiqué reaffirmed Leaders' recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua and called for open and constructive dialogue with Indonesia. We would expect any new Forum statement to reflect this language.

Bougainville

- Regarding the political future of Bougainville, New Zealand supports a political solution which preserves peace and stability, and which both parties can abide by.

Handling Advice

- We recommend you make an intervention ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
- s6(a)

Background

Review of Regional Architecture

1. s9(2)(ba)(i)

2. s6(a), s9(2)(j)

Forum Dialogue Partner reform

3. Reform of the Dialogue Partner Mechanism has taken longer than expected and implementation before this year's Forum Leaders Meeting will be difficult. While this is regrettable, it is important that the membership get this right given the importance of Partners' support for Forum priorities.

4. s6(a)

Papua

5. s6(a)

6. Papua has featured yearly on the Forum Leaders' agenda. New Zealand supported the 2019 Forum call for a visit to Papua by the Office of the UN High Commission for Human Rights to provide an independent assessment, but this was not progressed. The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights visited Papua in July 2025, but in an unofficial capacity.

Peace and Security

Possible intervention

- New Zealand has a direct stake in our region's peace and security. Regionalism, with the Forum at its centre, plays a critical role as we seek to advance our collective development and security priorities.
- Security can be a sensitive subject – it affects us all and can have regional implications. We all have responsibilities to one another to promote a peaceful and secure region.
- New Zealand is confident that our planned **Ocean of Peace** declaration will make a positive contribution to regional peace and security.
- It is an important addition to the Biketawa and Boe Declarations and reaffirms our collective commitment to build peace and security in our region.

New Zealand's Position

- New Zealand strongly supports the Forum as the apex of the regional security architecture and the role of Foreign Ministers in discussing regional security issues.^{s6(a)}

Handling Advice

- We recommend you make an intervention to show support for the planned *Ocean of Peace* declaration and to reinforce our shared responsibilities on peace and security.

Background

1. An Ocean of Peace declaration is planned for adoption in September.^{s6(a)}

2. s6(a)

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Resources and Economic Development

Possible intervention

- New Zealand is committed to the **Pacific Resilience Facility**. It is an important part of our support for the region's long-term goals, including greater autonomy and resilience. We support Forum Associate Members' right to access finance under the PRF, as they too are affected by the impacts of climate change.
- New Zealand is also supportive of initiatives to improve **air connectivity** in the Pacific, such as those endorsed by Ministers at this year's Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting.
- New Zealand also supports the region's ambitions to grow the economic value of their **fisheries**.
- We were delighted to support several Pacific Fisheries Ministers' recent visit to engage with New Zealand businesses and scientific organisations that have been successful in increasing the commercial value of primary products.
- We have been pleased to support the *Increasing Economic and Employment Benefits in Tuna Fisheries* project over the past five years as a tangible way to support our Pacific partners to realise the economic and employment benefits of their tuna fisheries.

New Zealand's Position

Pacific Resilience Facility

- New Zealand agreed to the text of the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) Establishment Agreement at the Special Forum Economic Ministers Meeting in Tonga in March 2025. New Zealand supports the establishment of the PRF and intends to sign the Establishment Agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting, pending Cabinet approvals.

- New Zealand has pledged NZ\$20 million towards the capitalisation of the PRF.

Air connectivity

- New Zealand considers regional and domestic aviation connectivity essential to economic development in the Pacific.
- New Zealand supports the Pacific Regional Engagement Framework, Pacific Regional Aviation Action Plan and Suva Declaration for Regional Collaboration and Connectivity endorsed by Ministers at this year's Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting.

Fisheries

- New Zealand supports the economic development of fisheries in the region. However, there are significant challenges associated with increasing tuna processing in the region (such as excess canning capacity globally and competition with South East Asia) and it remains highly political.
- s6(a)

. In the meantime, we can continue to offer our expertise in areas like market access. This does not preclude us from considering support for Pacific countries bilaterally.

Handling Advice

- It is not essential to make an intervention under this item. Should you wish to speak, brief remarks are provided above.

Background

Pacific Resilience Facility

1. The Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee on 12 August 2025 considered the PRF Agreement text, including authority for New Zealand to sign the Agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting in September. Cabinet will consider ratification at a later point.
2. The Forum Secretariat anticipates eight Pacific countries will ratify the Agreement before the end of the year, at which point the Agreement will enter into force. The ambition is that the PRF will commence operations in early 2026.
3. s7(a)(iii)

Air connectivity

4. Ministers endorsed the Pacific Regional Engagement Framework, Pacific Regional Aviation Action Plan and Suva Declaration for Regional Collaboration and Connectivity at the Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting in Suva in March 2025.

5. New Zealand shares the concerns expressed by some Ministers about the resourcing requirements to implement the expansive ambitions of these initiatives, including the demands this places on the Pacific Aviation Safety Office and its ability to deliver core services to its member states.

Fisheries

6. Pacific countries earn revenue from fisheries primarily by selling access to their exclusive economic zones. The majority of Pacific-caught tuna is processed elsewhere (mostly in Thailand and the Philippines), although there is limited processing in Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

7. The East New Britain Initiative (ENBI) was endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2023. It seeks to maximise the economic benefits of Pacific tuna by processing more in the region. It proposes a 'hubs and spokes' model, whereby some countries process and export while others supply tuna and potentially labour and investment.

8. s6(a)

. This may change over time. In the meantime, we are seeing Pacific countries pursue fisheries development on their own or in smaller groupings rather than as a region.

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Climate Change and Disasters

Possible intervention

- Our region faces severe challenges from **natural disasters and climate change impacts**, and New Zealand is committed to doing its part to help.
- At home, we are reducing emissions and are on track to Net Zero carbon emissions by 2050.
- Globally, we are committed to the international system delivering on the promise of the Paris Agreement. We were one of the first countries to submit our international target under the Paris Agreement this year, and we worked hard to set a target that is both ambitious and achievable.
- And in our region, New Zealand is committed to partnering with you to champion Pacific climate initiatives. We want to maintain a strong regional voice on climate. This includes our work on issues like the Climate Mobility Framework, through the Moana Pacific pavilion at COP, and through partner-led climate finance. We are also committed to supporting Pacific priorities like the global fund to respond to loss and damage.
- We strongly support Australia's bid to host **COP31** next year. We do not often have an opportunity to showcase directly to the world the region's climate challenges and the variety of Pacific solutions to those challenges.
- This would be a significant opportunity to increase representation and participation for our region, deliver on Pacific priorities and strengthen the region's long-standing global climate leadership. It is time for a Pacific COP.

New Zealand's Position

- Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience is a priority for New Zealand's engagement with the Forum.
- New Zealand strongly supports the Australian bid to host COP31 in partnership with the Pacific.
- Ministers have identified New Zealand's priorities for international engagement on climate change as navigating the economic transition, supporting the agreed international framework to be effective and improving Pacific resilience.

Handling Advice

- We recommend an intervention under this item, taking the opportunity to reaffirm the Government's continued commitment to our own domestic transition, to supporting Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience, and to supporting Australia's COP31 bid.
- s6(a)

Background

1. Forum Leaders have long understood that climate change is the single greatest existential threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific. Pacific global leadership to limit warming to 1.5°C is a priority in the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*, alongside resilience to climate impacts.

2. While many major emitters s6(a) have yet to submit their 2035 NDCs, these are expected by September. s6(a) and COP30 and potentially COP31 will be expected to respond. s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. The Foreign Ministers and Leaders Meetings are important occasions for the region to coalesce and voice its climate change-related priorities, including ahead of a potential Pacific COP next year. This presents an opportunity for New Zealand, in collaboration with other Members, to champion particular Pacific climate initiatives, such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility and the Pacific Resilience Facility (the latter of which is a particular focus for Australia). s6(a)

Ocean and Environment

Possible intervention

- New Zealand is committed to the **conservation of the Blue Pacific Continent** and recognises the *2050 Strategy's* ambition for a sustainably managed ocean.
- New Zealand is pleased to be a core funder of the **Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC)**. It plays an important role in supporting Members to steward responsibly the Pacific Ocean.
- We note the challenges OPOC faces in securing future funding and support its efforts to do so.
- We are also pleased to announce that we have extended our support for the **SPC Centre for Ocean Science** until December 2027. This extension will allow SPC to develop the Centre as the core of its new Ocean Flagship programme and enable the Pacific family to use science to make informed decisions.
- On **Deep Sea Minerals**, New Zealand was pleased to participate in the very valuable Talanoa in February. The depth and breadth of perspectives, experiences and concerns shared in the Talanoa demonstrate the importance of this issue to the Pacific, where a large amount of this proposed deep sea mining would occur.
- The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the constitution for the oceans and is central to Pacific interests.
- It is important that future seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction takes place subject to international rules applicable to all operators, consistent with UNCLOS.

New Zealand's Position

Oceans and the Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC)

- New Zealand supports the region's ambition for a prosperous and resilient Blue Pacific Continent. To this end, we support a sustainably managed and healthy ocean that underpins the well-being, culture and livelihoods of Pacific people.
- New Zealand supports OPOC through a shared funding arrangement with Australia.

Deep Sea Minerals

- In areas **beyond national jurisdiction**, New Zealand considers mining should not be carried out in the absence of a Mining Code that ensures effective protection of the marine environment, as required by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Within **areas of national jurisdiction** (i.e. the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and continental shelf), New Zealand respects the rights of states to manage their own stewardship responsibilities.
- New Zealand supports the development of options towards a 'Pacific approach' to deep sea mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Handling Advice

- It is not essential to make an intervention under this item. Should you wish to speak, brief remarks are provided above.

Background

Deep Sea Minerals

1. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

The Forum held its first Talanoa on the subject in February this year, with Members agreeing to develop options on a 'Pacific approach' to deep sea minerals for Leaders to consider; s9(2)(g)(i)

People-Centred Development

Possible intervention

- New Zealand welcomes a regional approach to **education** to address the collective needs of Pacific learners. We endorse the Port Moresby Declaration from the 2025 Conference of Pacific Education Ministers. We particularly thank PM Marape for championing education in our region.
- Like our Pacific partners, New Zealand has a clear focus on lifting student achievement and closing the equity gap in our education system. New Zealand is proud to support the educational aspirations of our Pacific partners through our bilateral and regional investments.
- On **health**, New Zealand acknowledges the enduring contribution of the Healthy Islands Vision over the past thirty years. We welcome the refresh of the Vision to ensure it aligns with the 2050 Strategy s6(a)
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- s6(a)
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- [If raised] We also acknowledge the growing urgency of addressing HIV as an emerging health challenge in the Pacific and remain committed to doing so with partners.
- Regarding **gender equality**, New Zealand recognises the leadership shown by Pacific women and the strong direction provided through the Forum Women Leaders Meeting

- We welcome the outcomes of this year's Forum Women Leaders Meeting, including acceleration to combat gender-based violence and to advance women's leadership and economic empowerment. New Zealand strongly supports the centrality of the Forum and the Women Leaders Meeting's role to progress outcomes under the Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration.

New Zealand's Position

Education

- New Zealand's presence at the 2025 Conference of Pacific Education Ministers (represented by Minister Reti) was a show of support for regional educational processes, with our Pacific partners expressing their appreciation for New Zealand's collaborative and partner-led approach in the education sector.
- The Port Moresby Declaration strongly aligns with New Zealand's IDC investment in the Pacific and the broader education policy objectives of the New Zealand Government.

Health

- New Zealand supports refreshing the Healthy Islands Vision to reflect current priorities s6(a)
- New Zealand recognises HIV as an emerging and urgent health challenge in the Pacific and is exploring options with regional health partners for a coordinated response.

Gender Equality

- New Zealand is committed to advancing gender equality both domestically and internationally. In the Pacific, this commitment is evident through a variety of initiatives aimed at elevating the status and opportunities of women and girls.
- New Zealand's approach includes investment in education and training; economic empowerment; violence prevention; and leadership and political participation.

Handling Advice

- It is not essential to make an intervention under this item. Should you wish to speak, brief remarks are provided above.

¹ s6(a)

Technology and Connectivity

Possible intervention

- The **Lagatoi Declaration** provides a clear roadmap for the region to chart its digital development and, ultimately, its economic resilience and integration.
- The next step is making it happen. That means sustained investment to strengthen domestic systems and build Pacific capacity to manage and protect digital services.
- New Zealand is committed to working with our Pacific family to advance this work. We also continue to provide a range of support to boost the Pacific's connectivity, including through investment in submarine cables, funding of the Pacific Digital Economy Programme to build digital skills and expand access to digital trade, and provision of cyber security support to Pacific partners.

New Zealand's Position

- Given the criticality of digital connectivity globally, we seek to invest early and credibly in Pacific digital infrastructure, including submarine cables and cyber security. Our approach to digital cooperation reflects our long-standing commitment to Pacific regionalism as the most effective way to protect shared interests and support long-term development in the Pacific.

Handling Advice

- It is not essential to make an intervention under this item. Should you wish to speak, brief remarks are provided above.

Background

1. The Lagatoi Declaration represents a landmark regional commitment to advance digital development across the region. Minister for Media and Communications, Hon. Paul Goldsmith, attended the 2025 Pacific ICT Ministerial Dialogue at the Forum on 8 August.
2. New Zealand has made important contributions to the Pacific's digital and cyber resilience, including NZ\$80 million in IDC investment to develop submarine cable infrastructure, NZ\$6 million to build digital capability through the regional Pacific Digital Economy Programme and NZ\$10 million to help Pacific countries manage digital risks.

Update on the 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings

Possible intervention

- We are grateful for the update on Solomon Islands' preparations for the Forum Leaders Meeting. New Zealand is ready to play our part to ensure a successful and productive meeting this year.
- We stand ready to support Solomon Islands to further progress our collective vision for a stable, prosperous and resilient region.
- We note that our Leaders generally have the opportunity to gather only once a year. The Leaders Retreat is consequently the seminal event of our regional calendar.
- We encourage sufficient time be allocated to this to allow for substantive, action-oriented and forward-looking discussions.
- [If required] Procedures for hosting the Meeting, including attendance by Dialogue and Development Partners, stem from long-standing decisions made by Leaders. They are a matter for the whole Forum membership. s6(a)

New Zealand's position

- New Zealand supports the Forum status quo on Taiwan's participation in Forum meetings as established in the 1992 Leaders Forum Communiqué, which confirmed Taiwan's status as a development Partner of the Forum.

Handling Advice

- An intervention is not required for this item. Should you wish to speak, brief remarks are provided above.

Other Matters: Proposal to Host the Forum in 2027

- New Zealand last hosted the Forum fourteen years ago, in 2011. Much has changed since then, both in the world and our region.
- What has not changed is New Zealand's commitment to Pacific regionalism and, specifically, the Forum. Indeed, New Zealand considers our membership of the Forum to be one of our most important commitments.
- It is in this spirit that we are pleased to disclose New Zealand's offer to host the Forum in 2027. Our Prime Minister will seek the agreement of Leaders next month.
- s6(a) 
- Members will agree that hosting and chairing the Forum is a great honour. It is also a major responsibility, not to be taken lightly.
- It is with this attitude that New Zealand approaches the prospect of hosting and chairing the Forum. We would sincerely appreciate your support in Honiara.

New Zealand position

- Hosting and chairing the Forum in 2027 would provide New Zealand with a unique opportunity to reinforce our Pacific regionalism credentials and our commitment to the Forum. s6(a)

Handling Advice

- s9(2)(g)(i)

BILATERAL BRIEFS

The following briefs are for potential interactions with your counterparts in the margins of the meeting.

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Australia: Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong

Time and date:

Pull-aside in the meeting margins



Penny Wong is Foreign Minister and Leader of the Government in the Senate. She previously served as Shadow Foreign Minister for six years. Wong was born in Sabah, Malaysia and moved to Adelaide with her family in 1976, when she was eight. Wong was first elected to the Senate in 2001. She has served as the Minister for Climate Change and Water, Minister for Finance and Deregulation, Leader of the Government in the Senate, and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. You last met in person in July at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Key objectives

- Reinforce New Zealand and Australia's shared interest in strong and healthy Pacific regionalism underpinned by Forum centrality.

Discussion points*Pacific Islands Forum matters*

- s6(a)
- s6(a)
- s6(a)

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Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat: Secretary General Baron Waqa

Time and date: Pull-aside in the meeting margins



Baron Waqa [WONG-gah] became Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum in June 2024. A former President of Nauru (2013-2019), he brings deep political experience to the role. As Secretary General, he leads the Forum Secretariat and serves as Permanent Chair of the CROP agencies. Waqa visited New Zealand in May 2025 and met with yourself as well as other Ministers (including the Prime Minister). You last met in May in Wellington during Waqa's first official visit to the capital.

Key objectives

- Reinforce New Zealand's steadfast support for the Forum.
- Test Waqa's expectations for this year's Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara.

Discussion points

- Seek an update on Waqa's tenure since your last engagement.

Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara

- Seek Waqa's views on Solomon Islands' preparations for the Forum Leaders Meeting, including what Members might expect with respect to the theme of regional integration.
- s6(a)
- s6(a)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFS

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New Zealand Hosting of Forum Leaders Meeting in 2027

Key Points

- New Zealand last hosted the Forum Leaders Meeting in 2011. In April this year, you agreed that the Prime Minister seek the in-principle agreement of his counterparts at the Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara for New Zealand to host the Forum in 2027. ^{s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)}
- Hosting would serve as a concrete demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to the Forum and Pacific regionalism more broadly, strengthening New Zealand's reputation as a trusted, reliable partner in the region.
- Hosting also carries with it the responsibility of chairing the Leaders' Meeting and all subsequent Forum meetings up until the handover of the chair to the next host country, which generally occurs at the start of the following Leaders Meeting. Chairing also necessitates being a member of the Forum Troika (the incoming, current, and outgoing chairs). This responsibility would take up and finish at the Forum Leaders Meetings in 2026 and 2029 respectively. This could see the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister representing the Forum at key international engagements throughout the year.
- s6(a)

Background

1. In accordance with the Suva Agreement, the responsibility of hosting and chairing the annual Forum Leaders' Meeting is rotated between the three sub-regions of the Pacific: Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. Assumption of this responsibility is voluntary. Interested Members inform the Forum Secretariat of their preferred hosting year, after which the offer to host is formally tabled for Members' agreement.
2. As host of the Forum, New Zealand would be expected to provide appropriate hospitality to Leaders and their delegations, including the following: (1) accommodation for Leaders and accompanying spouses, Ministers and senior officials; (2) conference facilities and separate events programmes for Leaders and accompanying spouses; (3) catering and transport; (4) security for attendees; and (5) optional activities outside of the formal programme.

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s6(a)

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Forum Dialogue Partnership Mechanism Reform

Key Points

- We are disappointed that reforms of the Dialogue Partner Mechanism have taken longer than expected and that we were unable to complete this work ahead of Honiara as tasked by Leaders in 2024.
- We recognise the amount of work that has gone into these reforms this year, including agreeing the criteria for tiering. Despite this setback, we think it is important not to lose further momentum – for example, by securing forward-looking language in the Leaders Policy Statement on Partnership and Engagement.
- s6(b)(ii)

Background

1. At the 53rd Forum Leaders' Meeting in Tonga, Leaders agreed to tier the Forum's 21 Dialogue Partners into two groups and directed officials to implement this ahead of the Leaders Meeting in Honiara in September. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

2. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

3. On 6 August, Solomon Islands informed Forum Members of its intention not to invite Dialogue or Development Partners to this year's Leaders Meeting. s6(a)

4. Key likeminded Dialogue Partners have reacted with disappointment to the decision, s6(a)

5. Instead of finalising the reforms in Honiara, Leaders will be asked to agree a 'Leaders Policy on Partnership and Engagement', s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent

Key Points

- The *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*³ is the Pacific's collective vision for the future. It acts as a guiding light for the work of the Forum Secretariat, Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) agencies and partners alike, ensuring that action and engagement is delivering value for the people of the region.
- New Zealand supports the efforts of the Forum to embed the centrality of the 2050 Strategy through meeting agendas and strategic plans.

Background

1. This year's theme for the Forum Leaders Meeting: *"lumi Tugeda (We Together): Act Now for an Integrated Blue Pacific"* provides ample opportunity to make progress towards the 2050 Strategy. The 'Political Leadership and Regionalism' pillar, in particular, envisions a strong and unified regional system that both complements national efforts and protects collective interests.
2. Forum Leaders at their 2019 meeting in Tuvalu commissioned the development of the 2050 Strategy. The primary purpose was to "secure the region's future", to ensure the region acts with agency and direction in an increasingly complex world. This included determining the region's priorities in an effort to protect the people, places and prospects in the Blue Pacific.
3. The 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan is the region's map for achieving the goals and outcomes of the Strategy. It articulates collective actions and sets out, with support from New Zealand, how we will monitor performance. It also provides the region with a Plan to point to and ask of external partners (Forum Dialogue Partners) how they are assisting the region to achieve its goals and aspirations.

³ The seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy are: Political Leadership and Regionalism; Peace and Security, People Centered Development; Resource and Economic Development; Climate Change and Disasters; Ocean and Environment; and Technology and Connectivity.

Nuclear Issues

Key Points

- New Zealand is a strong supporter of international instruments that reinforce our objective of a nuclear weapon-free world, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW; to which a majority of Pacific states belong), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We also encourage their universalisation.
- New Zealand is also a strong supporter of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty ('Treaty of Rarotonga'), which is a concrete contribution by our region to a nuclear weapon-free world.
- New Zealand recognises that the release of ALPS-treated water from the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant remains of significant interest to the Pacific. We have full confidence in the advice and assessments of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the release of the treated water is consistent with international safety standards, and we value the Agency's ongoing monitoring of the release.
- We commend the transparent and sustained engagement by the Agency and Japan on this matter, s6(a)

Background

The Pacific's nuclear legacy

1. The nuclear tests carried out in the Pacific (by the US, UK and France) continue to impact the health of the people who were exposed, disrupt their way of life, and contaminate the environment. This was a catalyst for the rise of Pacific regionalism and remains an important political issue for the Pacific region.

2. s6(a)

3. Pacific countries expect New Zealand to demonstrate leadership in this area. This is because of our history of opposing nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific and strong support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which contains positive obligations on victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Treaty of Rarotonga

4. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty ('Treaty of Rarotonga') entered into force in 1986. It prohibits the manufacture, use and testing of nuclear weapons, and prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste by parties. It does not prohibit nuclear propulsion. The Treaty

also does not contain a mandate on nuclear legacy issues within the zone. However, legacy issues are regularly raised at Treaty of Rarotonga meetings

5. Current Treaty Parties are: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Samoa. In March 2025, the Marshall Islands signed the Treaty, so will become the 14th State Party if it ratifies. The Federated States of Micronesia and Palau are not Parties to the Treaty but are eligible to become so.

6. The Treaty has three Protocols concerning stationing, testing and use of nuclear weapons that are open to specified nuclear weapon states to join. The US is the only nuclear weapon state specified not to have ratified these protocols. New Zealand supports efforts to universalise the Treaty in our region and to encourage US ratification of its Protocols.

7. In the 2019 Forum Communique, Leaders called for the “operationalisation” of the Treaty “as necessary” and reaffirmed this in 2023. We support considering practical ways to operationalise the treaty, in line with the direction from Leaders. s9(2)(g)(i)

The Treaty’s Consultative Committee met in May 2025, where it agreed that a Declaration of Understanding would be progressed to update outdated references in the Treaty. On the proposal to reopen the text to address “new and emerging issues”, it was agreed that this needed to be discussed further.

Fukushima treated water release

8. In April 2021, Japan announced its plan to discharge treated water from the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Pacific Ocean in a sequence of phases over an approximately 30–40-year period. Under the plan, the water is filtered through an Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) prior to discharge to remove radioactive contaminants. The first discharge took place in August 2023. To provide ongoing transparency, the IAEA committed to continuously monitor the discharge for the duration of its operation, including through a permanent on-site presence at Fukushima and by providing live, publicly available monitoring data on its website.

9. New Zealand has full confidence in the advice and assessments of the IAEA that the release of the treated water is consistent with international safety standards and will “have a negligible impact on human and environmental health”. s6(a)

CROP Taskforce on Nuclear Legacy Issues

10. The Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP) Taskforce on Nuclear Legacy Issues in the Pacific was established to deliver on Leaders’ 2019 decision to address the ongoing impacts of nuclear testing in the Pacific, with a primary focus on the Marshall Islands and Kiribati. New Zealand is on the Taskforce. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

it has organised a review of the existing scientific literature available on the impact of nuclear testing in the Pacific. This review is currently being carried out and a report expected by the end of the year

New Caledonia

Key Points

- New Zealand welcomes the news of the provisional agreement on New Caledonia's institutional future signed between political representatives of New Caledonia and France. There is much work to do to ensure political consensus and educate the general public about the agreement ahead of a vote on the agreement in early 2026, in addition to implementation of the necessary procedural and legal steps.
- Next steps on the Forum Troika Plus Mission report should be taken at the Forum Leaders Meeting. New Zealand should reiterate the importance of the report and its recommendations adhering to the Terms of Reference which were jointly agreed.
- New Zealand has demonstrated its commitment to supporting New Caledonia's economic recovery through a recent study tour for New Caledonian entrepreneurs, representatives of business and government to New Zealand to learn more about the Māori economy and deepen trade and economic connections.

Background

Provisional agreement on New Caledonia's institutional future

1. Following ten days of difficult negotiations convened by French President Emmanuel Macron, pro-independence and loyalist (pro-France) political representatives from New Caledonia, together with the French State, signed a provisional agreement on 12 July 2025. The agreement outlines a new constitutional status (a New Caledonian state within the French Republic) and includes a proposal for dual nationality for New Caledonia. It also affords New Caledonia increased autonomy to conduct its own international affairs.

2. The agreement is the result of compromise and major concessions from both sides of the political spectrum – the anti-independents gave ground to allow for a New Caledonian state within the French Republic and dual nationality, while the pro-independents settled for less than full independence for New Caledonia. Following the subsequent return of political representatives to New Caledonia, hardline pro-independence signatories have rejected the agreement s6(a)

3. The remaining five of the six political groups that signed the Accord are presenting the agreement to their respective constituencies, before the people of New Caledonia vote in a referendum in February 2026 on whether to accept it. France and New Caledonia will need to define what the agreement means in practice and complete the procedural and legal steps required to implement the agreement. The Minister for Overseas Territories, Manuel Valls, will convene a drafting committee from mid-August to this end.

New Zealand – New Caledonia cooperation

4. At the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a New Caledonian delegation comprised of entrepreneurs, business chambers and representatives of the Governments of New Caledonia and France visited New Zealand for a Study Tour from 29 June to 5 July 2025. The objective was to learn from the growth of the Māori economy and to facilitate the

deepening of connections between New Zealand and New Caledonia. The visit reinforced the warm relationship between New Zealand, New Caledonia and France and our commitment to supporting New Caledonia on its pathway forward.

Forum Troika Plus Mission Report

5. The Forum Troika Plus Mission⁴ visited New Caledonia in October 2024 following agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting in August. On 1 May 2025, the Forum Troika Plus Mission draft report was released to Forum Leaders and feedback sought prior to further discussions with France and New Caledonia.

6. s6(a)

7. On 12 May, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Tongan Prime Minister Eke in his capacity as Forum Chair to relay the importance of adherence to the Terms of Reference for the Troika Mission jointly agreed by France, New Caledonia and the Troika. The letter also encouraged dialogue between President Ponga and the Troika. New Zealand and Australia were the only countries at the time to respond to the Troika Plus Mission report. During High-Level Consultations with the Forum Secretariat in May, New Zealand again raised the importance of taking into consideration New Caledonia's views.

8. s6(a)

New Caledonia will provide an update at the Forum Leaders Meeting, but it is unclear whether the report will be presented to Leaders.

9. It is yet to be seen how the report will be referenced in Forum outcomes as many of the recommendations have been overtaken by the advent of the provisional agreement between New Caledonia and France.

⁴ Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands (as incoming Forum Chair).

Papua

Key Points

- s6(a)
- New Zealand aims to strengthen cooperation with Indonesia in the Pacific in a way that advances Pacific priorities, is consistent with established regional practices, and supports Pacific regional institutions – including the Forum.
- New Zealand recognises Indonesia's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Papua. In the 2023 Forum Leaders' Communique - the most recent with language on Papua - Leaders reaffirmed recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua. We would expect any Forum statement to reflect language in previous Leaders' statements.

Background

1. s6(a)
2. In 2023, the Papua New Guinea and Fijian Prime Ministers announced they would act as Special Envoys on Papua and increase engagement with Indonesia on human rights issues in Papua, s6(a)
3. s6(a)
4. s6(a)
5. s6(a)

Pacific Policing Initiative

Key Points

- Parts of the Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI) are progressing, including training at the Brisbane Hub, and the past deployment of the Pacific Police Support Group (PPSG) to respond to CHOGM in Samoa and the Vanuatu earthquake.
- The design of the other aspects of the PPI continues. How the PPI fits with existing Pacific regional bodies such as the Pacific Chiefs of Police is still being worked through.
- New Zealand Police expects to be represented on the newly formed PPI Leadership Board, and is represented on key design working groups and has hosted workshops.
- The New Zealand Police Officer Safety Pacific (OSP) programme is delivering frontline safety and use of force training at the Development and Coordination Hub. This is well positioned to develop into the overarching tactical options framework for PPI.
- New Zealand Police continues to assess how it can contribute to the Pacific Police Support Group.
- In Budget 2025, New Zealand Police received over \$10 million over 4 years, which included 2 positions for PPI support.

Background

1. The PPI is a Pacific-led, Australia-backed programme endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2024. It aims to strengthen regional policing capability in response to converging threats, including transnational crime, cyber insecurity, and climate-related instability. Australia has committed AU\$400 million over five years to support infrastructure, training, and rapid deployment.
2. The PPI is made up of three pillars:
 - o **Regional Centres of Excellence** — Specialised training centres in the region in investigations, forensics, and public order, fostering consistent standards and leadership across Pacific policing. This pillar is still at design phase.
 - o **Pacific Police Support Group (PPSG)** — A pan-Pacific rapid deployment force, providing operational support during major events and crises.
 - o **Development and Coordination Hub** — Based in Brisbane, the hub facilitates training, secondments and strategic coordination.
3. New Zealand Police continues to assess opportunities for further PPI contributions.

AUKUS

Key Points

- New Zealand welcomes AUKUS as an initiative to uphold regional security and stability and reinforce the international rules-based system. We see the deteriorating security environment in our wider region and we understand the strategic drivers for AUKUS.
- Pillar II of AUKUS involves cooperation on projects that look to develop advanced, non-nuclear military technologies. New Zealand continues to explore potential opportunities for participation in Pillar II projects; decisions about New Zealand participation in these projects will be a decision for Cabinet in due course.
- New Zealand has a long-standing and bipartisan nuclear free policy – this will not change.
- Importantly, AUKUS members have reiterated their commitment to non-proliferation and their compliance with international law. Australia is a party to the Rarotonga Treaty.
- We welcome the AUKUS members' ongoing engagement with the IAEA, as the relevant international authority, to ensure robust safeguards and verification measures.

Background

s6(b)(ii)

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Pacific Resilience Facility

Key Points

- New Zealand agreed to the text of the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) Establishment Agreement at the Special Forum Economic Ministers Meeting in Tonga in March 2025.
- New Zealand supports the establishment of the PRF and intends to sign the Establishment Agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara in September, pending Cabinet approvals.
- New Zealand has pledged NZ\$20 million towards the capitalisation of the PRF.

Background

1. In October 2024 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister announced New Zealand's contribution of NZ\$20 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF).
2. The PRF will be the first Pacific-owned and -led regional fund dedicated to community resilience building. It will support community-level projects required to build resilience and reduce the vulnerability and exposure of Pacific communities to disaster risks, from climate change and other hazards.
3. In addition to providing financing for community-level resilience projects, the PRF will:
 - o strengthen strategic partnerships with key development partners and global climate change and disaster-risk funding sources;
 - o support capacity building and development in resilient development planning and budgeting, through strengthened public financial management systems; and
 - o provide a compelling mechanism for climate change and disaster risk investors to contribute capital in support of climate and disaster resilience.
4. Forum Members have agreed that the PRF will be established as a treaty organisation, domiciled in Tonga.
5. Capitalisation pledges towards the PRF (including New Zealand's contribution) currently total approximately US\$153 million. The Forum Secretariat is administering the establishment of the PRF and has set a goal of reaching US\$500 million in pledges by 31 December 2026.
6. Australia has made the largest contribution so far, contributing to establishment costs and US\$62 million to capitalisation. Saudi Arabia (US\$50 million) and the United States (US\$20 million) have also confirmed significant contributions, with smaller contributions announced by several other countries.⁵

⁵ The United States contribution is currently subject to uncertainty due to the pause on development assistance.

Correspondent Banking Relationships

Key Points

s6(b)(ii)

Background

1. Many Western banks are choosing to sever correspondent banking relationships (CBRs) with Pacific countries. CBRs involve one financial institution (the correspondent) providing banking services to another financial institution (the respondent) across international borders which enables cross-border transactions.
2. CBR withdrawal is being driven by low profitability and risks posed by weak anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes in the Pacific. This poses significant development risks by cutting critical links for trade, remittances, and development assistance. s6(a)
3. The Pacific Strengthening Correspondent Banking Relationships Project is a joint Forum Secretariat-World Bank initiative that aims to address the drivers of CBR withdrawal. The project was approved by the World Bank Board in August 2024 and entered implementation in April 2025.
4. s6(b)(ii)
5. Phase I of the project will provide standby CBR services to participating countries. It will also deliver technical assistance to improve payment systems and AML/CFT regulation. Phase I will undertake a feasibility study to establish a regional payment aggregation mechanism that would be delivered under a potential Phase II.
6. New Zealand has contributed US\$2 million to the Pacific CBR Project which was announced at the Pacific Banking Forum in July 2024. s6(b)(ii)
7. The Pacific CBR Project is large and highly complex, incorporating many innovative and non-standard elements. s6(a)

Pacific Economic Outlook and New Zealand's Support to Pacific Economic Development

Background

Pacific economic outlook

1. Tourism and remittances have been key drivers of growth in the Pacific over the last two years, but this momentum is expected to slow as tourism recoveries mature. For most Pacific countries, gross domestic product has broadly returned to pre-pandemic levels or above.
2. Moderate growth is expected to continue across the Pacific (3.9 percent in 2025 and 3.6 percent in 2026), but this growth is occurring amidst declining international cooperation and development budgets, limited fiscal space and ongoing economic uncertainty. Inflation expectations have risen, with inflation tipped to reach 3.7 percent in 2026, from 1.9 percent in 2024.
3. Public debt levels continue to fall from recent peaks but remain a concern for Pacific economies exposed to significant economic and climate shocks.

New Zealand's support to Pacific economic development

4. New Zealand is committed to supporting the Pacific region to be more prosperous and resilient through our International Development Cooperation programme. We provide significant support for macro- and micro-economic development, including the development of an enabling environment for economic growth. Examples include:

- o Engaging in fiscal, macroeconomic and public financial management policy dialogue and technical assistance, as well as disbursing reform-linked budget support.
- o Supporting partner governments to finance their own development goals through supporting domestic resource mobilisation, including through improving the efficiency of taxation systems.
- o Targeted support at the foundations of economic growth: a healthy, educated and skilled population; reliable and affordable energy, transport, water and digital infrastructure; good governance; a functioning banking system; and laws and regulations that support rather than impede business.
- o Supporting the growth and resilience of key industries like agriculture and tourism, assisting them to diversify, improve quality, add value, develop new products and services, enhance their competitiveness and increase their resilience to climate change.
- o Ensuring small- and medium-sized enterprises have access to affordable finance and business advisory services, including through Business Link Pacific.

Pacific Regional Labour Mobility Principles

Key Points

- New Zealand supports the development of the Pacific Regional Labour Mobility Principles (Principles) as a key component of the region's collective approach to fostering long-term economic resilience through labour mobility, while also recognising the value of deeper integration through strengthened people-to-people connections.
- The Principles must reflect regional priorities and aspirations for Pacific labour mobility, while still empowering each nation to make sovereign decisions that reflect their own unique priorities and settings and aligning with other regional initiatives.
- New Zealand remains fully committed to continuing to work with all partners ahead of the upcoming Forum Leaders Meeting to finalise a set of high-level Principles that supports a more deliberate regional approach to labour mobility.

Background

1. In 2023, Forum Leaders noted the proposal to develop the Pacific Regional Labour Mobility Principles (Principles), in collaboration with the PACER Plus Implementation Unit (PPIU) and other regional stakeholders, to ensure synergies and avoid unnecessary duplication. The Forum Secretariat is leading the development of the Principles, but is being substantially supported by the International Labour Organisation and the International Organisation for Migration.

2. Labour mobility supports a stronger, more resilient Pacific, but a changed regional landscape has led to some negative impacts. These Principles, along with the refresh of the PACER Plus Arrangement on Labour Mobility (ALM), both form an important part of the region's collective response to the acute challenges associated with labour mobility. They provide an opportunity to articulate the values and aspirations of how we want to work together as a region to support labour mobility and regional integration more generally.

3. s6(a), s9(2)(j)

FTMM directed Forum Trade Officials to finalise the Principles for out of session endorsement by Trade Ministers, with a view to tabling them to Forum Leaders at the upcoming meeting in Solomon Islands. New Zealand officials are continuing to engage to that end.

4. s6(a), s9(2)(j)

Fisheries

Key Points

- Fisheries is a vital sector in the Pacific. New Zealand provided nearly NZ\$100 million of support for Pacific fisheries (and the Pacific Ocean more broadly) from 2021 to 2024. This contributes to a stable, prosperous and resilient Pacific.
- New Zealand seeks to promote regional unity and the centrality of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), to emphasize the broader regional benefits of fisheries, and, with international partners, to support regionally-led fisheries priorities.

Background

1. Just over half of the world's tuna supply comes from the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The tuna, valued at US\$6.1 billion in 2023, is sourced mostly from the exclusive economic zones of Pacific Island countries and territories. The tuna fishery is biologically sustainable, and the world's largest, most economically valuable.

2. Fisheries are vital to the economies, livelihoods, food security and social and cultural well-being of many Pacific Island countries, and are a crucial source of government revenue. The waters of the 17 members of the FFA account for a third of the world's commercially caught tuna. Fisheries contribute US\$1 billion a year to Pacific economies, generate nearly 25,000 jobs and provide an income source for up to half the region's households.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing

3. IUU fishing depletes fish stocks – threatening fishery sustainability, coastal livelihoods and food security – and deprives legitimate fishers operating in small island developing states of much needed revenue. Recent studies have shown that IUU fishing in the Pacific is estimated to cost about US\$333 million annually in lost revenue. There remains a significant issue with unlicensed 'dark vessels' in the Western Central Pacific. However, licensed vessels appear responsible for complex and fraudulent offending, such as the intentional misreporting of catch quantities and species. This has driven the need for regulators to ensure proper reporting and compliance by these vessels.

4. New Zealand provides funding and broader support to combat IUU fishing:

- o We provide core funding for FFA and SPC, key regional fisheries agencies that support efforts to address IUU fishing.
- o We fund the 'Te Pātui' programme, under which the Ministry for Primary Industries trains fisheries officers in the monitoring and enforcement of fisheries regulations, including in-port and high seas inspections.
- o We provide fisheries surveillance aircraft through bilateral agreements with Pacific Island countries and through the 'Pacific Quad' (with Australia, France and the US, and coordinated through the FFA). With fisheries surveillance being expensive to deploy, we are trialling emerging technologies such as satellite imaging and big data analysis to better direct surveillance aircraft.

Climate Change: Global Context and Regional Implications

Key Points

- Global efforts to meet the 1.5 temperature goal of the Paris Agreement are not on track and COP30 (and potentially COP31) will be expected to respond.
- Similarly, calls for increased climate finance are also unlikely to be met, with global ODA declining.
- s6(a)

Background

1. Forum Leaders have long underscored that climate change is the single greatest existential threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific. Pacific global leadership to limit warming to 1.5°C is a priority in the 2050 Strategy, alongside resilience to climate impacts.

2. New Zealand was one of the first countries to submit an updated NDC before the February 2025 deadline. While many major emitters s6(a) have yet to submit their 2035 NDCs, these are expected by September s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

3. s6(a)

4. s6(a)

5. s6(a)

ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change

6. The International Court of Justice has delivered its advisory opinion on international climate obligations. Pacific Island countries have welcomed the opinion as supporting their climate aspirations. The opinion is comprehensive and touches on a wide range of obligations relevant to how states respond to climate change. Officials are carefully studying the opinion before recommending possible responses

Climate Finance

Key Points

- Pacific needs for funding to build resilience to the impacts of climate change and transition to low carbon economies are significant and there are high expectations for new climate finance flows and investments into the Pacific.
- New Zealand is delivering on its commitment to provide \$1.3bn in climate finance for 2022-2025, with more than 60% going to the Pacific and more than 60% going to build resilience to the impacts of climate change.
- A new climate finance commitment has not yet been decided by Government. s6(a)
- Greater coordination of finance flows is worth pursuing to improve efficiency and effectiveness of climate finance.

Background

1. Climate finance flows to the Pacific have been substantial in the past decade. However, needs outmatch available finance and Pacific countries still face challenges accessing and mobilising climate finance because of a lack of domestic capacity and at times challenging procedures to access finance from multilateral funds.
2. The UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP29) in 2024 set a new, collective climate finance goal of US\$300b per annum from official sources (including private finance mobilised by public interventions) and US\$1.3T per annum from all sources to be achieved by 2035.
3. s6(a)
4. s6(a)
 . MFAT is focused on delivering New Zealand's \$1.3bn climate finance commitment for 2022-2025. s6(a)
5. Gross flows of funds are only part of the answer. While we are keen to see other like-minded partners increase their efforts in the Pacific, Pacific countries have challenges coordinating funding flows. Aid effectiveness and efficiency principles should be applied to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination and help achieve impact and results
6. New Zealand's Climate Flexible Finance is welcomed by partner governments as it improves flexibility and predictability and reduces transaction costs.

International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Greenhouse Gas Reductions Negotiations

Key Points

- Global measures to reduce emissions from international shipping passed the first stage of agreement at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in April.
 - A majority of countries voted for the introduction of financial penalties/rewards for ships based on their emissions. A direct levy on shipping emissions was not agreed.
 - The measures now need a two thirds majority to be formally adopted at the IMO session in October, and would take effect in 2027.
 - s6(a)
 - s6(a)
 - s6(a)
- . Officials will provide advice to relevant Ministers to seek direction on New Zealand's position s9(2)(f)(iv).

Background

1. Emissions from international shipping are not covered by individual countries' NDCs under the Paris Agreement but by the IMO. IMO member states have been negotiating measures to meet the IMO's net-zero emissions 2050 target and progress targets (including to reduce total emissions by a minimum of 20% by 2030). s9(2)(f)(iv)
2. New Zealand abstained from the April vote consistent with direction from Ministers s6(a)

International Law on Sea Level Rise

Key Points

- New Zealand's regional and multilateral work on addressing sea-level rise has demonstrated our commitment to standing with Pacific partners on an issue which is of critical importance to them. Multilateral cooperation provides opportunities to highlight the Pacific region's challenges and needs, safeguard sovereign rights and deliver practical outcomes.
- Forum Leaders have had global impact in focusing the international community on sea-level rise. The landmark Forum Leaders' 2021 Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones and the 2023 Declaration on Continuing Statehood and Protection of Persons have demonstrated the influence a unified Forum voice can have. New Zealand worked closely with Pacific partners on drafting and promoting these Declarations.
- The UN General Assembly held a High-level Meeting on the threats posed by sea-level rise in New York during UN High-level Week in September 2024. It provided a platform for Pacific perspectives and globalised international cooperation on this issue. New Zealand co-chaired a panel on the legal dimension of sea-level rise, and also co-facilitated preparations for the Meeting.
- A key outcome of the UN High-level meeting was that there should be an "action-oriented and intergovernmentally negotiated declaration agreed by consensus" on addressing sea-level rise. This will be negotiated as part of a further High-level Meeting to be held in 2026.
- This presents a significant opportunity for the Pacific to drive forward international cooperation on sea-level rise, but will require effective Forum coordination on this multifaceted issue to advance Pacific interests.
- The Pacific's leadership on this issue has resulted in the International Court of Justice endorsing the Forum position on maritime zones and making statements that will support ongoing regional advocacy on the continuation of statehood. This is a significant outcome for the region.

Background

1. The Forum Secretariat has proposed at officials' level that there be a regional conference on protection of persons affected by sea-level rise, a topic partially addressed in the Forum Leaders 2023 Declaration on Continuity of Statehood and Protection of Persons.^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)}

Deep Sea Mining: Pacific Views

Key Points

- s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i) . Some see it as key to their economic prosperity, while others are concerned about potential environmental impacts.
s9(2)(g)(i)
- New Zealand's international position on deep sea mining is:
 - o Within areas of national jurisdiction New Zealand respects the rights of States to manage their own stewardship responsibilities, consistent with UNCLOS.
 - o In areas beyond national jurisdiction, mining should commence only when the International Seabed Authority has agreed its Mining Code in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including its requirement to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment.
- New Zealand is also stressing the need for the ISA to effectively deliver on its mandate, including by adopting UNCLOS-consistent regulations, as swiftly as possible.

Background

1. s6(a)

2. s9(2)(g)(i)

3. Following a February 2025 Regional Talanoa on Deep Sea Minerals, s6(a) The primary outcome from the Talanoa was for Forum Leaders to consider options for a "Pacific approach" to deep sea minerals at the Leaders Meeting.

4. On 24 April President Trump signed the Executive Order 'Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources', which seeks to secure US access to 'seabed critical minerals' and reduce US dependence on foreign supply of such minerals for economic and security purposes. It does this by seeking access to deep sea minerals in two jurisdictional areas: a) continental shelves within national jurisdiction of the US and other coastal states, and b) the deep seabed beyond any countries' national jurisdiction which is managed by the ISA.

Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM) 2025 Outcomes

Background

5. Forum Economic and Finance Ministers met from 22-23 July 2025 in Suva, Fiji for the annual Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM). New Zealand was represented by Hon. Dr. Shane Reti.

6. During the meeting, Forum Members agreed to the following key outcomes:

- o Directed the Forum Secretariat to work with the Forum Fisheries Agency to develop a draft terms of reference for a joint Economic and Fisheries Ministers Working Group.
- o Endorsed a draft terms of reference for Phase II of a Socio-economic Impact Assessment of Human Mobility. The Assessment will consider the impacts of temporary and permanent migration on Pacific countries.
- o Supported the Pacific Regional Private Sector Strategy and directed the Forum Secretariat to develop an implementation plan for endorsement at the 2026 FEMM. The Strategy aims to create a more robust and supportive business enabling environment for micro, small and medium enterprises.
- o Supported the convening of a Climate Finance Investment Forum in 2026. The Investment Forum aims to attract climate investment into the Pacific from non-traditional stakeholders such as pension funds and large companies.
- o Endorsed the establishment and terms of reference for the Public Financial Management Regional Coordination Mechanism. The Mechanism will coordinate and report to the Forum Members on public financial management technical assistance activities across the Pacific.
- o Endorsed an initiative from the Cook Islands to reduce tax and regulatory barriers to increase cross-border investment in the Pacific by the region's provident and superannuation funds.
- o Agreed to support Fiji's bid to host a regional outpost of the Green Climate Fund.

Pacific Trade (including FTMM 2025 Outcomes)

Key Points

- Labour mobility and kava remain core trade priorities. Ministers did not reach consensus at the Forum Trade Ministers Meeting and work continues.
- PACER Plus is the region's only reciprocal, comprehensive trade agreement. Global trade volatility underscores the importance of trade agreements like PACER Plus. New Zealand continues to encourage all Forum Members to join.

Background

Forum Trade Ministers Meeting, Suva, 18 July 2025

1. New Zealand was represented by Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Hon. Nicola Grigg. A Joint Ministerial Statement was the key outcome. s6(a)

2. No consensus was reached on Pacific Labour Mobility Principles or the proposed Kava Declaration. Ministers agreed further work is needed ahead of the Leaders Meeting.

3. s6(a)

New Zealand remains committed to supporting the Pacific's kava sector, including via PHAMA Plus and continued access to our market. Pacific Trade Invest estimates the global kava market at US\$1.5-2 billion, driven by rising demand in Australia and the United States.

4. Officials continue work on Quality Infrastructure (regional trade standards body) and Trade and Health (pooled procurement, tariff removal on medical goods and a Pacific Health and Trade Accord).

Impact of United States tariffs on Pacific Island Countries

5. On 31 July 2025, the United States announced new import tariffs. Fiji (32 percent), Nauru (30 percent) and Vanuatu (22 percent) were reduced to 15 percent; Papua New Guinea's tariff rate increased from 10 to 15 percent. Others remain at 10 percent.

6. s6(a)

Aid for Trade

7. New Zealand supports resilient Pacific economies through sustainable export growth and diversification. Key MFAT-funded programmes include:

- o PHAMA Plus: Strengthens agricultural and food export capacity in nine countries, in partnership with DFAT. (NZ\$13 million).

- o Pacific Trade and Invest (PT&I): Promotes trade and investment across the region. New Zealand supports PT&I New Zealand. (NZ\$11 million).
 - o Enhanced Pacific Market Access Programme: Builds biosecurity capacity for fresh produce. Delivered by the Ministry for Primary Industries. (NZ\$7.3 million).
8. MFAT also supports broader private sector development through:
- o Business Link Pacific (BLP): Enhances SME access to market, finance, export and supply chain support. (NZ\$25.9 million).
 - o Pacific Resilience Initiative (PRI): Delivered by the International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) with New Zealand support, PRI provides technical advice on large-scale private sector initiatives. Upcoming proposals include dry-docking feasibility in the Pacific, a public-private solar energy partnership in Fiji and continued advisory support for the Bina Harbour project in Solomon Islands.

Regional Trade Architecture

9. PACER Plus remains a cornerstone of the region's trade. Since its entry into force, New Zealand has invested NZ\$880.5 million. s9(2)(j)

10. Australia and New Zealand will continue to support Pacific Parties to implement and utilise PACER Plus with a five-year extension of funding beginning in December 2025.

11. New Zealand is committed to the Regional Collective Actions outlined in the 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan and will collaborate with Forum Members to achieve the goal of "improved socioeconomic wellbeing and prosperity of all Pacific peoples through inclusive, resilient and sustainable economic development".

Multilateral Trade Architecture

12. Defending, strengthening, and modernising the WTO remains essential to New Zealand. Our priorities through a Pacific lens include:

- o Agriculture: Securing an outcome on agriculture at MC14 that moves forward the objective of achieving strengthened disciplines on trade and production distorting, and environmentally harmful, subsidies.
- o Fisheries: Entry into force of Fish I, with ratifications needed from five Pacific WTO members (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu). To help, New Zealand has contributed NZ\$310,000 to the WTO Fish Fund. Preserving progress on the second phase of Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations (Fish II).

13. s6(b)(i)

Forum Women Leaders Meeting 2025 Outcomes

Key Points

- The Forum Women Leaders Meeting (PIFWLM) was established in 2021 as a standing annual meeting to strengthen political will and accountability for gender equality commitments across the region. The PIFWLM serves as the governance mechanism for the revitalised *Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration (PLGED) 2023*.
- The 4th PIFWLM was held in Suva, 22-25 July 2025 with high-level Pacific leadership and ministerial attendance, including the Prime Ministers of Tuvalu and Samoa. New Zealand's High Commissioner to Fiji led the New Zealand delegation.
- The agreed PIFWLM outcomes reaffirm gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) as a regional priority and reinforce the importance of Forum centrality in advancing GESI, including as a foundation of regional security, climate resilience and development.
- Key outcomes include a call for stronger leadership, governance and investment and integration of GESI into the annual Forum Leaders' agenda, the amplification of women's leadership in peace and security, and increased support for gender-based violence prevention.
- New Zealand can support these efforts by continuing to champion inclusive governance, and resourcing gender-responsive initiatives.

Background

1. The 2025 PIFWLM Outcomes recommended points for Leaders' visibility and action, including:

- o A call for Forum Leaders to recommit to leading national and regional gender equality advocacy efforts, including championing the engagement of men and boys in transforming social norms to advance women's human rights.
- o A recommendation that GESI issues are a standing agenda item at the Forum Leaders Meeting.
- o A reaffirmation of the importance of mainstreaming gender equality in the governance structures and programming of the Pacific Resilience Facility and climate financing.
- o A call for increased investment in gender-based violence prevention strategies.
- o Endorsement of work to hold a human rights treaty body session in the Pacific every five years, starting with the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability in 2030, and for a process to increase Pacific representation on UN treaty bodies.

Suva Agreement

Key Points

- New Zealand welcomed the decision by Micronesian Members to re-join the Pacific Islands Forum under the “Suva Agreement”. We provided NZ\$1.5m to assist with the Agreement’s implementation.

Background

1. s6(a)

2. s6(a)

3. In response to this, the June 2022 Suva Agreement formally established a system where the Secretary General role would rotate amongst Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, with the next – following Puna’s single term – to be from Micronesia. s6(a)

4. s6(a)

5. Leaders agreed a number of other reforms under the Suva Agreement:

- o A second Deputy Secretary General position, with both Deputies rotating alongside the Secretary General to ensure each sub-region has one of the positions. Desna Solofa of Samoa was recently appointed to this role, joining Esala Nayasi of Fiji. ^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)}
- o The Pacific Ocean Commissioner role (originally a responsibility of the Secretary General) was separated out and a Micronesian (Filimon Manoni of RMI) appointed to the role with his office in Palau;
- o A new Pacific Islands Forum sub-regional office located in Micronesia, with Kiribati selected by the Micronesians as the location.

6. New Zealand and Australia contributed NZ\$1.5 million s6(a) to support the implementation of these reforms. s6(a)

Forum Troika and Governance

Key Points

- New Zealand recognises the importance of international advocacy and consensus-building led by the Forum Chair and wants to ensure that all Members are supported to take on this role.
- s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Background

1. The Forum Secretariat is led by the Secretary General, supported by two Deputies. The Secretariat's role is primarily policy advice, coordination and to implement Forum Leaders' decisions. The Secretariat is funded by contributions from Member governments and donors. New Zealand contributes \$4.36 million each year to the Forum's budget, s6(a)

The Forum Officials Committee (made up of nominated representatives from all Forum Governments) is the governing body for the Secretariat and has oversight of its activities and budget.

2. The Forum Troika is a rotating leadership mechanism among Forum Chairs. The Troika involves the Leaders of the former, current and incoming Forum Chairs. This year, the Troika consists of Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown, Tonga Prime Minister Dr 'Aisake Valu Eke and Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele. Following the handover of the Chair role just prior to the Forum Leaders Meeting, Palau will replace Cook Islands on the Troika as the next incoming Chair.

3. The primary responsibility of the Troika is to support the Forum Chair in its engagement, advocacy and decision-making. s6(a)

4. In 2022, Forum Leaders endorsed a Troika Charter which formalised the Troika mechanism, supporting the Chair to call meetings of the Troika and receive administrative support from the Forum Secretariat. This formalisation was partly a result of the Suva Agreement, which directed Members to ensure Forum mechanisms were adequately representative of the Forum membership. In effect, each Troika should have one Melanesian, one Polynesian and one Micronesian representative. s6(a)

BIOGRAPHIES

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Cook Islands: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Immigration, and Marine Resources Tingika Elikana



Minister of Foreign Affairs, Immigration, and Marine Resources; Tingika [TING-ka] Elikana [el-ee-CAR-NA] was appointed in February 2024.

He is a member of the Cook Islands Party, representing Pukapuka-Nassau, and has been in Parliament since 2018. Before joining politics, he served as Secretary of Justice, Solicitor-General, crown prosecutor and as a police officer.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs last met Minister Elikana at the Joint Ministerial Forum in Russell in May 2024.

Fiji: High Commissioner to New Zealand Ratu Inoke Kubuabola



H.E. Ratu Inoke Kubuabola [Rah-too In know-cay Koom-boom-bowl-ah] presented credentials in August 2022. In addition to his role as High Commissioner, he is Fiji's Special Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum. Kubuabola is an experienced Fiji politician and diplomat. He has held senior roles across multiple Fiji Cabinets, including as Minister of Defence (2016-2018); and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2016) in the Bainimarama administration.

Kubuabola led the PIF observer mission to New Caledonia during the third referendum on independence in 2021. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

You last met at the last Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting in August last year.

French Polynesia: Dr Mareva Kitalong-Lechat



Dr Mareva Kitalong-Lechat (*"Kee-Ta-Long-Lur-Cha"*) is the head of the Delegation for International and European Affairs (DAIE). The DAIE is responsible for the organisation, coordination and monitoring of relations with the European Union, the Pacific and the international community, and reports to the office of the President. She was employed in former President Oscar Temaru's office and in 2017 she led Moetai Brotherson's successful campaign for the legislative elections. She has represented French Polynesia at the UN and in regional meetings.

Nauru: Vice President Lionel Aingimea



Hon Lionel Aingimea [“ung-ga-may-a”] is Nauru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Aingimea also holds the Ministerial portfolios of Assisting the President (Vice President equivalent), Justice, Border Control, Police, Nauru Port Authority and Nauru Shipping Line. Aingimea was President of Nauru from 2019-2022. s6(a)

Niue: Crossley Tatui, Minister of Finance and Infrastructure



Hon Crossley Tatui [Tah-two-ee] is the Minister of Finance and Infrastructure. Minister Tatui was re-appointed to the role in May 2023, following the General Election. Minister Tatui is in his fifth term as common roll member and has held ministerial roles since 2014. He has previously worked in Niue’s Treasury and held senior roles including Director of Parliamentary Services, Head of External Affairs, and Secretary of Government. Minister Tatui is from the village of Hakupu and is a deacon of the Hakupu Ekalesia.

Palau Minister of State Gustav Aitaro



Hon. Gustav Aitaro [Address as: Minister “eye-tah-row”] is Palau’s Minister of State since September 2021. Aitaro was re-appointed in early 2025 following President Whipps’ landslide election victory for his second term. Aitaro has a long career in diplomacy, having worked at the Ministry of State for two decades, including as Director (Secretary equivalent). He later served as the Special Assistant to the Office of the President on Foreign Matters.

He hosted you to a Rock Islands boat tour and fishing trip during your visit to Palau in August 2024.

Papua New Guinea: Minister of Foreign Affairs Justin Tkatchenko



Hon. Justin Tkatchenko [pron. ka-CHEN-ko] was born in Australia to Ukrainian immigrants and became a Papua New Guinea citizen in 2006. He was a TV presenter as well as director of a landscaping company in Papua New Guinea before entering politics in 2012. He was Minister responsible for APEC in 2018 and has held the Foreign Affairs portfolio since June 2022, s6(a)

You last met Minister Tkatchenko at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July.

Tonga: HRH Crown Prince Tupouto'a 'Ulukalala



His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a 'Ulukalala was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for His Majesty's Armed Forces in January 2025. He is heir to the throne. He studied at Australian National University, graduating with a Master's in Military and Defence Studies and Diplomacy. HRH has attended NZDF Leadership courses and worked in the Palace Office on secondment from the Armed Forces. He is married to HRH the Crown Princess Sinaitakala Tuku'aho and they have four children. HRH has strong connections to New Zealand and visits regularly. You last met HRH during the Pacific Mission to Tonga on 11 April.

Address as "Your Royal Highness". May be called "Sir" in conversation. A small bow on meeting is not required but would be respectful and recommended.

Tuvalu: Minister of Foreign Affairs Paulson Panapa



Hon. Paulson Panapa is a first-time Member of Parliament in the Feleti Government, elected to represent Vaitupu in the 2024 general election. Before entering politics, Panapa was Tuvalu's High Commissioner to New Zealand from 2017 to 2022 and High Commissioner to Fiji from 2014 to 2017. Panapa has held other roles as a senior civil servant, including as Secretary for Education, Youth and Sports and as Secretary for Works, Water and Energy. Prior to this, Panapa also served in clerkship roles in the Tuvalu parliament (1991-2004).

You were hosted by Minister Panapa during your visit to Tuvalu in May 2024.

Vanuatu: Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and External Trade Marc Ati




Hon Marc Ati [Address as: Minister “ah-tee”] entered Parliament in 2016, representing Luganville in Santo. This is Ati’s third time as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2020-2022; September 2023). Ati is leader of the Iauko Group, a key political party in Prime Minister Napat’s five-party coalition, holding six seats.

s6(a)

Before politics, Ati was a successful businessman and was engaged in the logistics and agriculture sectors. You last met Ati during your visit to Vanuatu on the Pacific Mission in April.

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NEW ZEALAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE
Manatū Aorere

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
RT HON WINSTON PETERS

PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

14 August 2025



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AGENDA AND OVERVIEW

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Agenda

1. Opening (9:00am – 9:05am)

The Chair will call the meeting to order and opening formalities will be observed.

2. Adoption of Agenda and Meeting Timetable (9:05am – 9:10am)

3. Regional and Strategic Landscape (9:10am – 9:45am)

To consider and discuss the evolving geopolitical and regional dynamics shaping the strategic environment in the Pacific region.

4. Ministerial Talanoa (9:45am – 11:00am)

Ministers will consider and discuss the outcomes and recommendations of the High-Level Political Talanoa (HLPT) process, and discuss opportunities for strengthened political cohesion, timely implementation of the 2050 Strategy, and the reform of the regional architecture towards strengthened and deepened regionalism, including in response to the evolving regional and strategic landscape.

MORNING TEA (11:00am – 11:30am)

5. Political Leadership and Regionalism (11:30am – 12:15pm)

To discuss the key regionalism initiatives, especially regional political developments within the framing of the 2050 Strategy and the Review of the Regional Architecture. This will include an update on the 2050 Strategy, the new PIF Partnership Mechanism, nuclear legacy issues and ongoing political developments in the region, particularly as it relates to New Caledonia and Papua.

6. Peace and Security (12:15pm – 12:45pm)

To discuss key regional security priorities and consider the draft Ocean of Peace Declaration to be conveyed to Leaders for endorsement.

7. Resources and Economic Development (12:45pm – 1:15pm)

To discuss the outcomes of the sectoral ministerials on opportunities for strengthened cross-sectoral collaboration on key regional initiatives and priorities, including the Pacific Resilience Facility, Labour Mobility Principles and fisheries development.

LUNCH (1:15pm – 2:30pm)

8. Climate Change and Disasters (2:30pm – 3:00pm)

To discuss and consider the arrangements for the preparation of COP 31 and the role that the Pacific region will play in supporting Australia's hosting of the first Pacific COP.

9. Ocean and Environment (3:00pm – 3:30pm)

To discuss and consider an update on the key priorities for Oceans moving forward, including the outcomes of the High-Level Talanoa on Deep Sea Minerals.

10. People Centred Development (3:30pm – 3:45pm)

To discuss an update on the key issues from the sectoral ministerials that are going to Leaders for discussion and decision at the 54th Pacific Islands Forum.

11. Technology and Connectivity (3:45pm – 4:00pm)

To discuss and consider the ongoing regional efforts on Information, Connectivity and Technology and related matters, as framed under the Lagatoi Declaration.

12. Update on the 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings (4:00pm – 4:15pm)

To consider an update on the preparations for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings in 2025, and the proposed process for the development of the Forum Communiqué for the 54th Pacific Islands Forum.

AFTERNOON TEA (4:15pm – 4:30pm)

13. Other Matters (4:30pm – 5:00pm)

14. Consideration of Outcomes Document (5:00pm – 5:30pm)

15. Closing (6:00pm)

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Overview and Objectives

1. Pacific Islands Forum Leaders agreed in 2019 that in an increasingly complex world securing our region's future could not be simply left to chance. Instead, the region needed a long-term, carefully considered regionalism strategy, and the collective commitment to achieve it.
2. Since then, the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent* has started to deliver concrete benefits to the region. It is bringing coherence and strategic direction to the work of the Forum. It is becoming the organising framework to guide Forum Members and partners alike. It is a tool to hold partners to account. And it is helping our Secretariat align its work and organisational structure to the priorities of Leaders.
3. The meeting of Forum Foreign Ministers this year is organised around the thematic areas of the 2050 Strategy. This will help to ground the opening discussion, where Ministers will discuss how best to assert our region's interests in a dynamic global context. We expect this approach to continue for the upcoming Forum Leaders Meeting, and years to come.

Regional integration – an enduring theme

4. In 2006, you signed the Agreement establishing the Forum as an international organisation. This Agreement states the overarching purpose of the Forum as strengthening regional cooperation and integration, including through the pooling of resources and alignment of policies.
5. ^{s6(a)}

membership, past achievements and array of external partnerships, ^{s6(a)} notwithstanding its broad

6. This meeting is an opportunity to build on the momentum of the 2050 Strategy towards greater regional integration, aligning policies and, over time, building better frameworks to bind our region together across a range of issues. This is in keeping with the theme for the Leaders Meeting in Honiara – *Act now for an Integrated Blue Pacific Continent* ^{s6(a)}

Key objectives

7. Our priority is preserving regional unity through a Forum-first approach ^{s6(a)}

Our core objectives include:

- **Strengthening Forum centrality** so that we are better equipped to advance our shared interests and address challenges collectively. This includes ensuring our regional architecture is fit-for-purpose and finalising the Dialogue Partner mechanism, giving the Forum more agency over how it engages with the wider world.

- **Advancing discussion on regional security priorities:** ^{s6(a)}

the Forum must act as the focal point for regional security discussions. ^{s6(a)}

- **Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience** by agreeing our climate change-related priorities, including ahead of a potential Australia-hosted 'Pacific' Conference of Parties (COP) in 2026.

8. ^{s6(a)}

Hosting in 2027

9. New Zealand's offer to host and chair the Forum in 2027 will be the centrepiece of our engagements. ^{s6(a)}

10. The Forum Officials Committee (11-12 August) will lay the policy and strategic groundwork for the Forum Foreign Ministers and Leaders Meetings. ^{s6(a)}

the Officials Committee discussion will prepare the ground for your discussion with Ministers on hosting.

Media

11. You will be accompanied by several New Zealand media outlets, with opportunity to engage with media throughout the day. ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

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AGENDA ITEMS

The following briefs are for items on the formal meeting agenda.

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Agenda item 3: Regional and Strategic Landscape (9:10am)

Handling Advice

We recommend an intervention under this item to register New Zealand's views of the regional and global strategic environment. As this will likely be your first intervention of the meeting, it would be appropriate for New Zealand to provide remarks^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

Possible intervention

- Warm Pacific greetings to my fellow Foreign Ministers, to the Secretary General and to everyone joining us today.
- Our world and our region are changing. It has become less open and less liberal. The multilateral system that underpinned the rules and certainty that made us all safer and more prosperous is under pressure.
- We face an international operating environment under serious strain. This is especially so here in the Pacific. There is no opting out from the geopolitical realities we face.
- In these difficult times, regionalism is essential. The Forum plays a critical role to bolster regional development and security. It amplifies our collective voice to hold bigger countries to account. It strengthens our hand and underwrites our sovereignty.
- So, this is a timely reminder of what is at stake and why the Forum matters for all our Pacific peoples. It is critical all our partners respect our Forum's priorities and processes and work for, not against, regionalism.
- As a Pacific country, New Zealand has a direct stake in the region's peace, stability, prosperity and resilience. Our own national security and economic prosperity is linked to developments in our region.

- We have said before that we have, in a very genuine sense, a shared Pacific destiny.
- That is why New Zealand's commitment to the region spans the political spectrum and is foundational to who we are as a country.
- We have reshaped our International Development Cooperation programme to achieve more impact by doing fewer, bigger projects better. This is helping to support our Pacific partners to build climate and economic resilience, strengthen governance and security, and lift health, education and connectivity outcomes.
- Security cooperation affects us all. Our national security decisions and actions can have regional implications. As Pacific countries we have responsibilities to one another to promote a peaceful and stable region, and not to take actions which compromise the security of others.
- Since war and instability is everyone's calamity, diplomacy is the business of us all. We have observed that at this present moment the ability to talk with, rather than at, each other has never been more needed.
- That is what we hope for today.

New Zealand's Position

- The Pacific Islands Forum is critical ^{s6(a)} . With intensifying geopolitical trends, Pacific regionalism is important for enhancing the voice and agency of Pacific countries and supporting regional security and sovereignty.

Agenda item 4: Ministerial Talanoa (9:45am)

Handling Advice

s9(2)(g)(i)

Possible intervention

- When we signed the Agreement establishing the Forum, we committed to a goal of strengthened regional cooperation and integration, including through the pooling of resources and alignment of policies.
- Although times have changed since then, the value of the Forum remains beyond question. This year we want to join the old and the new. To harness the region's original vision for the Forum to inform our collective ambitions as outlined in the *2050 Strategy*.
- We add our thanks to the High-Level Persons Group for all their work on this report. It was a considerable and intensive under-taking and we appreciate all their efforts.

s6(a)

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New Zealand's Position

- The talanoa session is Forum Foreign Ministers' equivalent of a retreat, with the opportunity to discuss at Ministerial level the most pressing issues. ^{s6(a)}

Background

s6(a)

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Agenda item 5: Political Leadership and Regionalism (11:30am)

Handling Advice

We recommend you make an intervention ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

Possible intervention

- New Zealand supports the efforts of the Forum to embed the **2050 Strategy** as the region's collective vision for the future.
- Recognising how our cooperation underpins our region's security and prosperity is crucial. We must continue to have open and mature conversations on these issues.

s6(a)

s6(a)

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

- On **New Caledonia**, New Zealand welcomes the signing by New Caledonia and the French State of a provisional agreement on New Caledonia's future institutional arrangements.
- There is much work to do, but the provisional agreement represents a significant step towards a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future. New Zealand's recent hosting of Kanak entrepreneurs on a study tour of the Māori economy was designed to support that outcome too.
- We thank the Government of New Caledonia and the French State for welcoming the Forum Troika Plus mission in October. New Zealand looks forward to discussing how the Forum can continue to support New Caledonia as a Forum Member.

New Zealand's Position

2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent

- New Zealand strongly supports the 2050 Strategy as the region's collective vision for the future. We welcome the focus on regional integration and the strategic opportunities it presents to bind our region more closely together.

Forum Dialogue Partnership Mechanism Reform

- s6(a)

- s6(a)

New Caledonia

- The signing of the provisional Accord de Bougival is a positive step towards achieving long-term peace and stability in New Caledonia. The focus now is on ensuring broad political and public support for the agreement.

- s6(a)

Papua

- New Zealand's consistent policy is that Papua is the sovereign territory of Indonesia. We raise human rights concerns with Indonesia bilaterally or multilaterally where relevant.
- The 2023 PIF Leaders Communiqué reaffirmed Leaders' recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua and called for open and constructive dialogue with Indonesia. We would expect any new Forum statement to reflect this language.

Background

Forum Dialogue Partner reform

1. Reform of the Dialogue Partner Mechanism has taken longer than expected and implementation before this year's Forum Leaders Meeting will be difficult. While this is regrettable, it is important that the membership get this right given the importance of Partners' support for Forum priorities.
2. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

Papua

3. s6(a)
4. Papua has featured yearly on the Forum Leaders' agenda. New Zealand supported the 2019 Forum call for a visit to Papua by the Office of the UN High Commission for Human Rights to provide an independent assessment, but this was not progressed. The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights visited Papua in July 2025, but in an unofficial capacity.

Agenda item 6: Peace and Security (12:15pm)

Handling Advice

We recommend you make an intervention to show support for the planned Ocean of Peace declaration and to reinforce our shared responsibilities on peace and security.

Possible intervention

- New Zealand has a direct stake in our region's peace and security. Regionalism, with the Forum at its centre, plays a critical role as we seek to advance our collective development and security priorities.
- Security can be a sensitive subject – it affects us all and can have regional implications. We all have responsibilities to one another to promote a peaceful and secure region.
- New Zealand is confident that our planned **Ocean of Peace** declaration will make a positive contribution to regional peace and security.
- It is an important addition to the Biketawa and Boe Declarations and reaffirms our collective commitment to build peace and security in our region.

New Zealand's Position

- New Zealand strongly supports the Forum as the apex of the regional security architecture and the role of Foreign Ministers in discussing regional security issues. ^{s6(a)}

Background

1. An Ocean of Peace declaration is planned for adoption in September. ^{s6(a)}

Agenda item 7: Resources and Economic Development (12:45pm)

Handling Advice

It is not essential to make an intervention under this item.

Possible intervention

- New Zealand is committed to the **Pacific Resilience Facility**. It is an important part of our support for the region's long-term goals, including greater autonomy and resilience. We support Forum Associate Members' right to access finance under the PRF, as they too are affected by the impacts of climate change.
- New Zealand is also supportive of initiatives to improve **air connectivity** in the Pacific, such as those endorsed by Ministers at this year's Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting.
- New Zealand also supports the region's ambitions to grow the economic value of their **fisheries**.
- We were delighted to support several Pacific Fisheries Ministers' recent visit to engage with New Zealand businesses and scientific organisations that have been successful in increasing the commercial value of primary products.
- We have been pleased to support the *Increasing Economic and Employment Benefits in Tuna Fisheries* project over the past five years as a tangible way to support our Pacific partners to realise the economic and employment benefits of their tuna fisheries.

New Zealand's Position

Pacific Resilience Facility

- New Zealand agreed to the text of the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) Establishment Agreement at the Special Forum Economic Ministers Meeting in Tonga in March 2025. New Zealand supports the establishment of the PRF and intends to sign the Establishment Agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting, pending Cabinet approvals. New Zealand has pledged NZ\$20 million towards the capitalisation of the PRF.

Air connectivity

- New Zealand considers regional and domestic aviation connectivity essential to economic development in the Pacific. New Zealand supports the Pacific Regional Engagement Framework, Pacific Regional Aviation Action Plan and Suva Declaration for Regional Collaboration and Connectivity endorsed by Ministers at this year's Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting.

Fisheries

- New Zealand supports the economic development of fisheries in the region. However, there are significant challenges associated with increasing tuna processing in the region (such as excess canning capacity globally and competition with South East Asia) and it remains highly political.

- s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

In the meantime, we can continue to offer our expertise in areas like market access. This does not preclude us from considering support for Pacific countries bilaterally.

Background

Pacific Resilience Facility

1. The Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee on 12 August 2025 considered the PRF Agreement text, including authority for New Zealand to sign the Agreement at the Forum Leaders Meeting in September. Cabinet will consider ratification at a later point.
2. The Forum Secretariat anticipates eight Pacific countries will ratify the Agreement before the end of the year, at which point the Agreement will enter into force. The ambition is that the PRF will commence operations in early 2026.
3. s7(a)(iii)

Air connectivity

4. Ministers endorsed the Pacific Regional Engagement Framework, Pacific Regional Aviation Action Plan and Suva Declaration for Regional Collaboration and Connectivity at the Third Regional Aviation Ministers Meeting in Suva in March 2025.

5. New Zealand shares the concerns expressed by some Ministers about the resourcing requirements to implement the expansive ambitions of these initiatives, including the demands this places on the Pacific Aviation Safety Office and its ability to deliver core services to its member states.

Fisheries

6. Pacific countries earn revenue from fisheries primarily by selling access to their exclusive economic zones. The majority of Pacific-caught tuna is processed elsewhere (mostly in Thailand and the Philippines), although there is limited processing in Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

7. The East New Britain Initiative (ENBI) was endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2023. It seeks to maximise the economic benefits of Pacific tuna by processing more in the region. It proposes a 'hubs and spokes' model, whereby some countries process and export while others supply tuna and potentially labour and investment.

8. ^{s6(a)}

This may change over time. In the meantime, we are seeing Pacific countries pursue fisheries development on their own or in smaller groupings rather than as a region.

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Agenda item 8: Climate Change and Disasters (2:30pm)

Handling Advice

We recommend an intervention under this item, taking the opportunity to reaffirm the Government's continued commitment to our own domestic transition, to supporting Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience, and to supporting Australia's COP31 bid.

Possible intervention

- Our region faces severe challenges from **natural disasters and climate change impacts**, and New Zealand is committed to doing its part to help.
- At home, we are reducing emissions and are on track to Net Zero carbon emissions by 2050.
- Globally, we are committed to the international system delivering on the promise of the Paris Agreement. We were one of the first countries to submit our international target under the Paris Agreement this year, and we worked hard to set a target that is both ambitious and achievable.
- And in our region, New Zealand is committed to partnering with you to champion Pacific climate initiatives. We want to maintain a strong regional voice on climate.
- This includes our work on issues like the Climate Mobility Framework, through the Moana Pacific pavilion at COP, and through partner-led climate finance.
- We are also committed to supporting Pacific priorities like the global fund to respond to loss and damage.

- We strongly support Australia's bid to host **COP31** next year. We do not often have an opportunity to showcase directly to the world the region's climate challenges and the variety of Pacific solutions to those challenges.
- This would be a significant opportunity to increase representation and participation for our region, deliver on Pacific priorities and strengthen the region's long-standing global climate leadership. It is time for a Pacific COP.

New Zealand's Position

- Reinforcing Pacific leadership on climate ambition and climate resilience is a priority for New Zealand's engagement with the Forum.
- New Zealand strongly supports the Australian bid to host COP31 in partnership with the Pacific.
- Ministers have identified New Zealand's priorities for international engagement on climate change as navigating the economic transition, supporting the agreed international framework to be effective and improving Pacific resilience.

Background

1. Forum Leaders have long understood that climate change is the single greatest existential threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific. Pacific global leadership to limit warming to 1.5°C is a priority in the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*, alongside resilience to climate impacts.

2. While many major emitters (^{s6(a)}) have yet to submit their 2035 NDCs, these are expected by September. ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

– and COP30 and potentially COP31 will be expected to respond. ^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

3. The potential Pacific COP next year presents an opportunity for New Zealand, in collaboration with other Members, to champion particular Pacific climate initiatives, such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility and the Pacific Resilience Facility (a particular focus for Australia). ^{s6(a)}

4. ^{s6(b)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)}

Agenda item 9: Ocean and Environment (3:00pm)

Handling Advice

It is not essential to make an intervention under this item

Possible intervention

- New Zealand is committed to the **conservation of the Blue Pacific Continent** and recognises the *2050 Strategy's* ambition for a sustainably managed ocean.
- New Zealand is pleased to be a core funder of the **Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC)**. It plays an important role in supporting Members to steward responsibly the Pacific Ocean.
- We note the challenges OPOC faces in securing future funding and support its efforts to do so.
- We are also pleased to announce that we have extended our support for the **SPC Centre for Ocean Science** until December 2027. This extension will allow SPC to develop the Centre as the core of its new Ocean Flagship programme and enable the Pacific family to use science to make informed decisions.
- On **Deep Sea Minerals**, New Zealand was pleased to participate in the very valuable Talanoa in February. The depth and breadth of perspectives, experiences and concerns shared in the Talanoa demonstrate the importance of this issue to the Pacific.
- The Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") is the constitution for the oceans and is central to Pacific interests. It is important that future seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction takes place subject to international rules applicable to all operators, consistent with UNCLOS.

New Zealand's Position

Oceans and the Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC)

- New Zealand supports the region's ambition for a prosperous and resilient Blue Pacific Continent. To this end, we support a sustainably managed and healthy ocean that underpins the well-being, culture and livelihoods of Pacific people.
- New Zealand supports OPOC through a shared funding arrangement with Australia.

Deep Sea Minerals

- In areas **beyond national jurisdiction**, New Zealand considers mining should not be carried out in the absence of a Mining Code that ensures effective protection of the marine environment, as required by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Within **areas of national jurisdiction** (i.e. the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and continental shelf), New Zealand respects the rights of states to manage their own stewardship responsibilities.
- New Zealand supports the development of options towards a 'Pacific approach' to deep sea mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Background

Deep Sea Minerals

1. ^{s6(a)}

. The Forum held its first Talanoa on the subject in February this year, with Members agreeing to develop options on a 'Pacific approach' to deep sea minerals for Leaders to consider; ^{s6(a)}

Agenda item 10: People-Centred Development (3:30pm)

Handling Advice

It is not essential to make an intervention under this item.

Possible intervention

- New Zealand welcomes a regional approach to **education** to address the collective needs of Pacific learners. We endorse the Port Moresby Declaration from the 2025 Conference of Pacific Education Ministers. We particularly thank PM Marape for championing education in our region.
- Like our Pacific partners, New Zealand has a clear focus on lifting student achievement and closing the equity gap in our education system. New Zealand is proud to support the educational aspirations of our Pacific partners through our bilateral and regional investments.
- On **health**, New Zealand acknowledges the enduring contribution of the Healthy Islands Vision over the past thirty years. We welcome the refresh of the Vision to ensure it aligns with the *2050 Strategy* ^{s6(b)(ii)}
- ^{s6(b)(iii)}
- *[If raised]* We also acknowledge the growing urgency of addressing HIV as an emerging health challenge in the Pacific and remain committed to doing so with partners.

- Regarding **gender equality**, New Zealand recognises the leadership shown by Pacific women and the strong direction provided through the Forum Women Leaders Meeting.
- We welcome the outcomes of this year's Forum Women Leaders Meeting, including acceleration to combat gender-based violence and to advance women's leadership and economic empowerment.

New Zealand's Position

Education

- New Zealand's presence at the 2025 Conference of Pacific Education Ministers (represented by Minister Reti) was a show of support for regional educational processes, with our Pacific partners expressing their appreciation for New Zealand's collaborative and partner-led approach in the education sector. The Port Moresby Declaration strongly aligns with New Zealand's IDC investment in the Pacific and the broader education policy objectives of the New Zealand Government.

Health

- New Zealand supports refreshing the Healthy Islands Vision to reflect current priorities ^{s6(b)(ii)}. New Zealand recognises HIV as an emerging and urgent health challenge in the Pacific and is exploring options with regional health partners for a coordinated response.

Gender Equality

- New Zealand is committed to advancing gender equality both domestically and internationally. In the Pacific, this commitment is evident through a variety of initiatives aimed at elevating the status and opportunities of women and girls. New Zealand's approach includes investment in education and training; economic empowerment; violence prevention; and leadership and political participation.

Agenda item 11: Technology and Connectivity (3:45pm)

Handling Advice

It is not essential to make an intervention under this item.

Possible intervention

- The **Lagatoi Declaration** provides a clear roadmap for the region to chart its digital development and, ultimately, its economic resilience and integration.
- The next step is making it happen. That means sustained investment to strengthen domestic systems and build Pacific capacity to manage and protect digital services.
- New Zealand is committed to working with our Pacific family to advance this work. We also continue to provide a range of support to boost the Pacific's connectivity, including through investment in submarine cables, funding of the Pacific Digital Economy Programme to build digital skills and expand access to digital trade, and provision of cyber security support to Pacific partners.

New Zealand's Position

- Given the criticality of digital connectivity globally, we seek to invest early and credibly in Pacific digital infrastructure, including submarine cables and cyber security. Our approach to digital cooperation reflects our commitment to Pacific regionalism as the most effective way to protect shared interests and support development in the Pacific.

Background

1. The Lagatoi Declaration represents a landmark regional commitment to advance digital development across the region. Minister for Media and Communications, Hon. Paul Goldsmith, attended the 2025 Pacific ICT Ministerial Dialogue at the Forum on 8 August.
2. New Zealand has made important contributions to the Pacific's digital and cyber resilience, including NZ\$80 million in IDC investment to develop submarine cable infrastructure, NZ\$6 million to build digital capability through the regional Pacific Digital Economy Programme and NZ\$10 million to help Pacific countries manage digital risks.

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Agenda item 12: Update on the 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders and Related Meetings (4:00pm)

Handling Advice

s9(2)(g)(i)

Possible intervention

- We are grateful for the update on Solomon Islands' preparations for the Forum Leaders Meeting. New Zealand is ready to play our part to ensure a successful and productive meeting this year.
- We note that the Leaders Retreat is the seminal event of our regional calendar. We encourage sufficient time be allocated to this to allow for substantive, action-oriented and forward-looking discussions.

s6(a)

- [REDACTED]
- New Zealand is disappointed that the Forum's Dialogue and Development Partners might not attend the Leaders Meeting in Honiara.
- Not inviting our partners is a missed opportunity to engage with key supporters of our region

s6(a)

- We share the frustration that Dialogue Partner reforms have not been completed. But this is not a reason to exclude Partners ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s6(a)} It is incumbent on all hosts to follow Forum procedures.
- It is also critical all our partners respect our Forum's priorities and procedures. Forum procedures – owned by all Members – serve to shield us from undue pressure from outside the region.
- These procedures are codified through the hosting agreement Memorandum of Understanding. We call on all hosts to sign this agreement and adhere to it in future, and that we seek Leaders' commitment to doing so. ^{s6(a)}

New Zealand's position

- New Zealand is disappointed in the decision of Solomon Islands not to invite Dialogue Partners ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s6(a)}
- We want to put down a marker that future Forum hosts should formally sign the Leaders meeting hosting agreement Memorandum of Understanding to prevent issues like this in the future. ^{s6(a)}

Background

1. On 6 August Solomon Islands informed Forum Members of its intention not to invite Dialogue or Development Partners to this year's Leaders meeting. ^{s6(a)}

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2. Reaction from the region has been mixed, with most Forum Members reserving their position until the Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting. ^{s6(a)}

3. Key likeminded Dialogue Partners have reacted with disappointment to Solomon Islands' decision, ^{s6(a)}

4. ^{s6(a)}

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Agenda Item 13: Other Matters: Proposal to Host the Forum in 2027 (4:30pm)

Handling Advice

s6(a)

- New Zealand last hosted the Forum fourteen years ago, in 2011. Much has changed since then, both in the world and our region.
- What has not changed is New Zealand's commitment to Pacific regionalism and, specifically, the Forum. Indeed, New Zealand considers our membership of the Forum to be one of our most important commitments.
- It is in this spirit that we are pleased to disclose New Zealand's offer to host the Forum in 2027. Our Prime Minister will seek the agreement of Leaders next month.
- s6(a)


- Members will agree that hosting and chairing the Forum is a great honour. It is also a major responsibility, not to be taken lightly.
- It is with this attitude that New Zealand approaches the prospect of hosting and chairing the Forum. We would sincerely appreciate your support in Honiara.

New Zealand position

- Hosting and chairing the Forum in 2027 would provide New Zealand with a unique opportunity to reinforce our Pacific regionalism credentials and our commitment to the Forum.^{s6(a)}

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BILATERAL BRIEFS

The following briefs are for potential interactions with your counterparts in the margins of the meeting.

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Australia: Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong

Time and date:

Pull-aside in the meeting margins



Penny Wong is Foreign Minister and Leader of the Government in the Senate. She previously served as Shadow Foreign Minister for six years. Wong was born in Sabah, Malaysia and moved to Adelaide with her family in 1976, when she was eight. Wong was first elected to the Senate in 2001. She has served as the Minister for Climate Change and Water, Minister for Finance and Deregulation, Leader of the Government in the Senate, and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. You last met in person in July at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Key objectives

- Reinforce New Zealand and Australia's shared interest in strong and healthy Pacific regionalism underpinned by Forum centrality.

Discussion points

Pacific Islands Forum matters

- s6(a)
-

Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum

- Test Minister Wong's views on attendance at the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum in Canberra 2-3 September, noting both have received invitations.

Papua New Guinea 50th Anniversary of Independence

- Note your intention to travel to Port Moresby for the 50th independence celebrations in September. Welcome the strong Australian presence ^{s6(a)}

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Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat: Secretary General Baron Waqa

Time and date: Pull-aside in the meeting margins



Baron Waqa [WONG-gah] became Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum in June 2024. A former President of Nauru (2013-2019), he brings deep political experience to the role. As Secretary General, he leads the Forum Secretariat and serves as Permanent Chair of the CROP agencies. Waqa visited New Zealand in May 2025 and met with yourself as well as other Ministers (including the Prime Minister). You last met in May in Wellington during Waqa's first official visit to the capital.

Key objectives

- Reinforce New Zealand's steadfast support for the Forum.
- Test Waqa's expectations for this year's Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara.

Discussion points

- Seek an update on Waqa's tenure since your last engagement.

Forum Leaders Meeting in Honiara

- Seek Waqa's views on Solomon Islands' preparations for the Forum Leaders Meeting, including what Members might expect with respect to the theme of regional integration.

s6(a)

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**FORMAL MESSAGE: PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM: 2025 FORUM FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
AND FORUM OFFICIALS COMMITTEE**Dated 22/08/2025

RĀPOPOTO – SUMMARY

Minister of Foreign Affairs Rt Hon Winston Peters represented New Zealand at the Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting (FFMM) in Suva on 14 August. The FFMM was preceded by the Forum Officials Committee (FOC - 11-13 August). The meetings took place against the backdrop of Solomon Islands' ^{s6(a)}

decision to exclude Forum Dialogue and Development Partners from the Leaders Meeting, as reported separately in [PACREG's FM of 18 August](#). ^{s6(a)}

this message focuses on other aspects of the meetings.

Items endorsed for Leaders to consider when they meet in Solomon Islands (8-12 September) included:

- The High-Level Persons Group (HLPG) report on Forum reform, which summarises the 'Political Talanoa' the HLPG undertook with Members in recent months and proposes next steps for Phase 3 of the Review of Regional Architecture;
- The draft *Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration*;
- *2025 Progress Report on the Regional Collective Actions for the 2050 Strategy* updating Members on progress made to date by the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) in relation to the 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan 2023-2030;
- A Leaders' Statement on the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the Treaty of Rarotonga;
- The Pacific Regional Labour Mobility Principles ^{s6(b)(ii)}
- The Pacific Information Communications and Technology Ministers' Dialogue 2025 Communique.

COP31 was a particular focus, ^{s6(a)}

Foreign Ministers also agreed a statement reaffirming support for a Pacific COP. The International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Climate Change also received ^{s6(a)}airtime,

^{s6(a)}

New Zealand formally announced to fellow Members our intention to seek Forum Leaders' agreement to New Zealand's offer to host the Forum in 2027. This was subsequently publicised in the Minister of Foreign Affairs' [press release](#).

PŪRONGO – REPORT

1. The Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting (FFMM) was held in Suva, Fiji on 14 August, preceded by a meeting of the Forum Officials Committee (FOC) on 11-13 August. Minister of Foreign Affairs represented New Zealand at the FFMM. DM PACREG (Ramsden) led at FOC as our Forum Senior Official. All eighteen Forum Members attended in person, at varying levels of

seniority.

2. The FOC considers the reports and recommendations from the various Sub-Committees that constitute the Forum architecture, which are then submitted for consideration at the FFMM. These two meetings, alongside other thematic ministerial meetings (including Economic Ministers, Trade Ministers, Education Ministers, Aviation Ministers, ICT Ministers and Women Leaders Meetings this year), lay the groundwork for the Forum Leaders Meeting.
3. Members' engagement at FFMM on Solomon Islands' decision to exclude Forum Dialogue and Development Partners is reported in [PACREG's FM of 18 August](#); this companion report focuses on remaining meeting elements, ^{s6(a)}
4. ^{s6(a)} the Forum Secretariat framed the FFMM and FOC agendas around the seven 2050 thematic areas for the first time. We replicate that approach below.

Political Leadership and Regionalism

5. ^{s6(a)}, the **Report on the High-Level Political Talanoa on Deepened Regionalism and the Regional Architecture to Support the 2050 Strategy** (attached) [[PACREG's FM of 4 July](#) refers] was a key focus for both meetings with Ministers agreeing to its conveyance to Leaders. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)}

We expressed scepticism regarding the idea of two Forum Leaders Meetings a year (one exclusively devoted to engagement with external partners) ^{s6(a)}

^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)}

^{s6(a)}

6. On the ongoing workstream to reform the **Forum Dialogue Partnership Mechanism**, Members agreed to finalise a draft Policy Statement on Partnerships for Leaders' consideration in Honiara. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)}
7. Ministers endorsed in principle the **2025 Progress Report on the Regional Collective Actions for the 2050 Strategy** (attached), which provides an update on the collective efforts of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) to realise Leaders' commitments. Additionally, Members also agreed to develop a **2050 Strategy International Engagement and Advocacy Plan** to improve coordination of the Forum's advocacy efforts of its key regional priorities on the international stage.
8. Members also received updates on **New Caledonia** and **Papua**. ^{s6(a)}

s6(a)

Ministers

reaffirmed the Forum's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty and tasked the Secretariat to work with Indonesia on a proposed visit by Forum Envoys Prime Minister Rabuka and Prime Minister Marape next year.

9. On **Nuclear Legacy Issues**, Members considered a Secretariat paper^{s6(a)} spanning the Treaty of Rarotonga, CROP Taskforce on Nuclear Legacy Issues and Fukushima ALPS-treated water release.^{s6(a)}

10. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

11. s6(a)

Members welcomed an update from SPC on its workstream to develop a long-term regional interpretation capability with respect to nuclear-related discharge issues, including its progress on a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Atomic Energy Agency^{s6(a)}

Peace and Security

12. The **Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration**, a key deliverable for this year's Leaders Meeting [PACREG FMs of [20 March](#) and [7 April](#) refer], was endorsed by Ministers after officials concluded text negotiations the day prior.^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)}

13. Other security outcomes included the integration of the **Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility Implementation Plan** into the **Boe Declaration Action Plan review**. Members also noted a proposal from the Cook Islands (initially made at the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting - [DEVECO's FM of 4 August](#) refers) for the Forum to develop regional principles on **dual-use frameworks** to support Members' development priorities and partnership relations, which will be further considered under the Boe Declaration Action Plan review.

Resources and Economic Development

14. On the **Pacific Resilience Facility** (PRF), Ministers welcomed Members' readiness to sign the Establishment Treaty in Honiara.^{s6(a)}

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

s6(a), s6(b)(ii)

15. Ministers recommended that Leaders support Fiji's bid on behalf of the Pacific to host the **Green Climate Fund (GCF) Regional Office** in Suva and tasked the Secretariat to support Fiji in this regard. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(ii)}

Climate Change and Disasters

16. Discussions largely focused on ^{s6(a)} **COP31**, which comprised an update to Members, a campaign plan and a proposed Foreign Ministers' Statement (attached). ^{s6(a)}

In addition to endorsement of the campaign plan and Statement, Ministers also supported the standing up of a Special Taskforce, co-chaired by Australia and Tonga, to lead COP31 preparations under the guidance of Pacific Climate Change Ministers. Additionally, Ministers agreed to the Forum Troika lending support to political advocacy for the campaign.

17. The other major item under this thematic area was a country paper ^{s6(a)} on the **International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change**. ^{s6(a)}

Members urged all countries to utilise the AO as appropriate in respect of their obligations in relation to climate change and agreed to progress next steps to advocate the AO on the global stage, including through the development of a follow-up UN General Assembly resolution. ^{s6(a)}

Ocean and Environment

18. ^{s6(a)}

In terms of next steps, Members directed the Secretariat to report back to FOC on potential options for an appropriate mechanism to ensure oversight of DSM-related work ^{s6(a)}

19. Members also considered updates from the **Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner (OPOC)** on its ongoing review of its institutional arrangements and development of a OPOC Strategic Plan, ^{s6(a)}

People Centred Development

20. On **gender equality**, Ministers supported the outcomes of the **4th PIF Women Leaders Meeting** and encouraged their reflection in the Leaders' Communique.

21. Turning to **education**, Ministers recognised the **Conference of Pacific Education Ministers (CPEM)** as the oversight mechanism for the review of the architecture and supported Education Ministers' call to Leaders concerning the need for increased investment to improve education outcomes in the region.

22. Ministers also committed to multi-sectoral coordination and mobilisation of investment and partners to achieve the **health** goals set out in the *2050 Strategy*.

Technology and Connectivity

23. Ministers agreed to convey the **Pacific Information Communications and Technology Ministers' Dialogue 2025** Communique to Leaders for endorsement, including the call for a regional approach to enhancing digital transformation across the Pacific (most notably on undersea cables, data storage transformation and cloud solutions).

Other Matters

24. ^{s6(a)}

25.

26.

27.

28.

29. Finally, New Zealand presaged that Prime Minister Luxon would seek his counterparts' endorsement in Honiara of **New Zealand's offer to host the Forum in 2027**. The offer was publicised in Minister Peters' subsequent press release.

Bilateral Element

30. Minister Peters also had a bilateral with his Australian counterpart on the margins of the meeting – see attached file-note.

TĀKUPU – COMMENT

31. ^{s6(a)}

32.

33.

MUTU – ENDS

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**FORMAL MESSAGE: DIALOGUE PARTNER DECISION DAY AT THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING**Dated 18/08/2025

RĀPOPOTO – SUMMARY

s6(a)

Members “noted” the Solomon Islands Government decision,^{s6(a)}

Forum Foreign Ministers agreed to review host country obligations in the next phase of the Review of Regional Architecture work.

PŪRONGO – REPORT

The Minister of Foreign Affairs represented New Zealand at the annual Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting (FFMM) in Suva on 14 August. Formal reporting on the meeting and preceding Forum Officials Committee (11-13 August) will follow in due course.^{s6(a)}

2. ^{s6(a)}

MFA reiterated New Zealand’s deep concern and disappointment at the decision. Solomon Islands were allowing external forces to dictate who could and could not be invited, and risked dissuading partners from supporting our region at a time when we needed them most.^{s6(a)}

3.

4.

s6(a)

Ministers agreeing “to review the host country obligations for a Forum Leaders Meeting as part of the review of the Pacific Islands Forum Governance Guide, under Phase 3 of the Review of Regional Architecture”.

5. Forum Members also agreed to several references to the importance of partners in the FFMM outcomes document and keeping them updated with respect to the ongoing reform of the Forum Dialogue Partnership mechanism. Ministers “noted the importance of dialogue with external partners”, “reaffirmed the importance of partners and their contributions to the implementation of the 2050 Strategy, emphasised the careful engagement and management of partner relationships and encouraged ongoing communication and updates on the evolving partnership mechanism review process”.

s6(a)

6. The Forum decision to defer Dialogue and Development Partner participation was publicly confirmed in a press conference held by the Forum Chair after the FFMM. ^{s6(a)}

7.

- Forum Foreign Ministers met in Suva last week [August 14] and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, ^{s6(a)} expressed deep disappointment at Solomon Islands’ decision to exclude Dialogue and Development Partners from the Forum Leaders meeting in Honiara in September.
- He made clear that the Forum should not allow external forces to dictate who can and cannot be invited to a Forum meeting, particularly at a time when our region needs the support of the widest range of Partners.
- However, ^{s6(a)} it was agreed that the Leaders Meeting would proceed without Dialogue and Development Partners. ^{s6(a)}
- New Zealand maintains that any Forum Member who offers to host the Leaders’ Meeting has a responsibility to live up to decades-old understandings and obligations in terms of including dialogue and development partners.

- To that end, we would support a restatement and clarification by Leaders in Honiara of the obligations of hosting – so that we do not find ourselves in this situation again.

s6(a)

TĀKUPU – COMMENT

9. s6(a)

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6(a) - Withheld in full including title

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