

17 June 2026

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s9(2)(a)

OIA 30871

Tēnā koe s9(2)(a)

Thank you for your email of 13 April 2026, in which you request the following under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA):

"14/01/2026 Submission United States actions toward Venezuela: New Zealand Positioning
16/01/2026 Submission – Joint Briefing: New Zealand Defence Force Liaison Officer at the Civil-Military Coordination Centre - Next Steps
20/01/2026 Submission Invitation to join US-led 'Board of Peace'
20/01/2026 Submission MFA - Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry
21/01/2026 Submission United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland
29/01/2026 Submission Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's approach
29/01/2026 Cabinet Paper A non-binding framework on critical minerals between the United States and New Zealand
30/01/2026 Informal Note Informal Note – Forum Dialogue Partner and Observer Tiering
30/01/2026 Informal Note Informal Note – Tokelau: Current Developments
4/02/2026 Informal Note Informal Note: World Expo Riyadh 2030 Invitation
12/02/2026 Submission 2026 March Baseline Update Submission
16/02/2026 Brief for Meeting Meeting Brief: Neeta Bhushan, Indian High Commissioner
25/02/2026 Brief for Meeting Meeting Brief: New Zealand international development NGO representatives

13/01/2026 Submission New Zealand's Approach to IPEF
26/01/2026 Brief for Meeting Tariff breakdown table 23 Jan 26
27/01/2026 Informal Note Brief for FADTC: India FTA Outcomes
27/01/2026 Informal Note MTI Proposed Travel 2026 / key international meetings hosted in NZ
3/02/2026 Brief for Meeting Meeting with Korean People Power Party (PPP) delegation
23/02/2026 Brief for Event India FTA – Background for Christchurch Event "

On 12 May 2026, the timeframes for responding to your request were extended by an additional 25 working days because responding to your request necessitated the review

of a large quantity of information, and due to the consultations necessary to make a decision on your request (section 15A(1)(a) and (b) of the OIA refers).

Response to your request

Please see the below table for a list of documents in scope of your request. Some information is withheld under the following sections of the OIA:

- 6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the New Zealand Government;
- 6(b)(i): to protect the passing of information from another government on a confidential basis;
- 6(e)(vi): to avoid damage to the New Zealand economy by the premature disclosure of decisions relating to entering into of overseas trade agreements;
- 7(a)(i): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of the self-governing State of the Cook Islands;
- 7(a)(ii): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of the self-governing State of Niue;
- 7(a)(iii): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of Tokelau;
- 7(a)(iv): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of the Ross Dependency;
- 7(b)(i): to avoid prejudicing relations between any of the Governments of New Zealand;
- 7(b)(ii): to avoid prejudicing relations between any of the Governments of the self-governing State of the Cook Islands;
- 7(b)(iii): to avoid prejudicing relations between any of the Governments of the self-governing State of Niue;
- 9(2)(a): to protect individuals' privacy;
- 9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments;
- 9(2)(g)(ii): to protect officers and employees from improper pressure or harassment;
- 9(2)(f)(iv): to protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials; and
- 9(2)(h): to maintain legal professional privilege.

Where the information has been withheld under section 9 of the OIA, no public interest in releasing the information has been identified that would override the reasons for withholding it.

Where documents are publicly available, those parts of your request are refused under section 18(d) of the OIA, and a link to the document is provided:

#	Title	Decision
1.	Submission United States actions toward Venezuela: New Zealand Positioning	s18(d) www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/united-states-actions-toward-venezuela-new-zealand-positioning

#	Title	Decision
2.	Submission – Joint Briefing: New Zealand Defence Force Liaison Officer at the Civil-Military Coordination Centre - Next Steps	s18(d) www.defence.govt.nz/publications/extension-of-the-nzdf-liaison-officer-to-the-civil-military-coordination-centre/ of Defence website
3.	Submission Invitation to join US-led 'Board of Peace'	s18(d) www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/OIA-2026/OIA-30664-Invitation-to-join-US-led-Board-of-Peace.pdf
4.	Submission MFA - Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry	Some information withheld under section 9(2)(a).
5.	Submission United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland	Some information withheld under sections 6(a), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(h), 7(a)(i), 7(a)(ii), 7(a)(iii), 7(a)(iv), 7(b)(i), 7(b)(ii), 7(b)(iii), 6(b)(i), 9(2)(g)(i).
6.	Submission Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's approach	Some information withheld under sections 6(a), 6(b)(i), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(g)(ii), 9(2)(g)(i).
7.	Cabinet Paper A non-binding framework on critical minerals between the United States and New Zealand	s18(d) March release (contains this paper): www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/critical-minerals-proactive-release May release (for your information): www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/critical-minerals-proactive-release-may-2026
8.	Informal Note Informal Note – Forum Dialogue Partner and Observer Tiering	s18(d) www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/OIA-2026/OIA-307768-Omnibus-06-May-2026.pdf
9.	Informal Note Informal Note – Tokelau: Current Developments	s18(d) www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/OIA-2026/OIA-307768-Omnibus-06-May-2026.pdf
10.	Informal Note Informal Note: World Expo Riyadh 2030 Invitation	Some information withheld under sections 6(a).
11.	Submission 2026 March Baseline Update Submission	Some information withheld under sections 6(a) and 9(2)(a).
12.	Meeting Brief: Neeta Bhushan, Indian High Commissioner	Some information withheld under sections 6(a) and 9(2)(a).
13.	Meeting Brief: New Zealand international development NGO representatives	Released in full.

#	Title	Decision
14.	Submission New Zealand's Approach to IPEF	Some information withheld under sections 6(a), 6(b)(i), 9(2)(f)(iv), 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(g)(i).
15.	Brief for Meeting Tariff breakdown table 23 Jan 26	Released in full.
16.	Informal Note Brief for FADTC: India FTA Outcomes	Released in full.
17.	Informal Note MTI Proposed Travel 2026 / key international meetings hosted in NZ	Some information withheld under sections 9(2)(g)(i), 6(a) and 6(e)(vi).
18.	Brief for Meeting - Meeting with Korean People Power Party (PPP) delegation	Released in full.
19.	Brief for Event India FTA – Background for Christchurch Event	Released in full.

Please note that document 15, titled *Brief for Meeting Tariff breakdown table 23 Jan 26*, was accurate at the time it was prepared but no longer reflects current information.

Please note that it is our policy to proactively release our responses to official information requests where possible. Therefore, our response to your request (with your personal information removed) may be published on the Ministry website: www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses/

If you have any questions about this decision, you can contact us by email at: DM-ESD@mfat.govt.nz. You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the Ombudsman of this decision by contacting www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Nāku noa, nā



Sarah Corbett
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade



20 January 2026

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by

27 January 2026

Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To update you on the outcome of an external review of the Ministry's approach to health and safety at work and a related Official Information Act request from Radio New Zealand.

Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Tredene Dobson	Chief of Staff	Office of the Chief Executive	s9(2)(a)
Shannon Austin	Principal Adviser	Deputy Chief Executive P&O	

Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Referred |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry

Key points

- In June 2025, I commissioned an independent review of the Ministry's approach to health and safety at work, led by external adviser David Smol. This followed the December 2024 Port Vila earthquake and significant damage to the New Zealand High Commission building.
- I received the final report on 27 October 2025. The report concluded that while the Ministry has made considerable progress in strengthening its health and safety system since the Health and Safety at Work Act was passed in 2015, there is clear scope for improvement.
- The report sets out 14 recommendations for the Ministry to improve its health and safety system and I have accepted all of them. A small team and a programme of work is being put in place to deliver improvements in accordance with the report's recommendations.
- The report and an outline of the steps the Ministry is taking in response will also be provided to Ministry staff.
- On 1 December 2025, the Ministry received an Official Information Act request for a copy of the report and related information from Radio New Zealand Reporter ^{s9(2)(a)}
- A copy of the report, redacted as necessary, will be provided to ^{s9(2)(a)} on 27 January 2026. This will likely result in media coverage and, potentially, further requests for information from the media given that the report includes reference to the impact of the Port Vila earthquake on the New Zealand High Commission and to the fire risks associated with the New Zealand High Commission in Suva.
- Proposed media lines, should you be asked about the report, are:

I am aware that MFAT's Chief Executive commissioned an external review of MFAT's approach to health and safety at work. The review resulted in several recommendations to improve MFAT's systems, all of which the Chief Executive has accepted.

For anything further you'll have to talk to MFAT.

Bede Corry
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

1	Note that an independent report into the Ministry's approach to health and safety at work has been concluded and the Ministry is now taking steps to implement its recommendations.	Yes / No
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Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry

2	Note the report is subject to an Official Information Act request and will be released on 27 January 2026.	Yes / No
3	Note the proposed media lines, should you be asked about the report.	Yes / No
4	Note that the Ministry's response to the report will be managed within existing baselines.	Yes / No

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Released under the Official Information Act

Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry

Report

1. In June 2025 I commissioned an independent review of the Ministry's approach to health and safety at work, led by former senior public servant, David Smol. I commissioned the review as recent developments, particularly questions raised about the Ministry's approach to seismic assessment of our properties following significant damage to the New Zealand High Commission in the December 2024 Port Vila earthquake, suggested there were potential gaps in our approach. The review was foreshadowed in the 21 January 2025 submission, 'Port Vila Earthquake: Impact on the New Zealand High Commission.'
2. The review was focused on the effectiveness of the Ministry's system, capabilities, and accountabilities for managing health and safety, particularly in light of the Ministry's obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 ('the Act'). David provided his final report to me on 27 October 2025.
3. Key findings of the report include:
 - MFAT has made considerable progress in strengthening its health and safety system since the Act was passed in 2015.
 - However, the system has evolved in an *ad hoc* way in recent years, and is not as clear, consistent, or connected as it could be.
 - There have been failures to act in a timely way in response to known risks, and governance of health and safety is not operating effectively.
 - The Ministry's work can pose unique risks to the health and safety of our staff, their families, partner organisations and suppliers. These include extensive travel to diverse international locations; managing a portfolio of over 300 properties spread across 50 countries; living and working at posts and facing a range of hazards on a day-to-day basis; delivery of the International Development Cooperation Programme via a variety of contractual mechanisms; and contributing to consular and humanitarian responses.
4. The report sets out 14 recommendations for the Ministry to improve its health and safety system and I have accepted all of them. A team and a programme of work is being put in place to deliver improvements to our system in accordance with the report's recommendations.
5. With immediate effect, I have also established the MFAT Board as the governance body accountable for improvements to, and ongoing governance of, the Ministry's health and safety system.
6. The report and an outline of the steps the Ministry is taking in response will also be provided to Ministry staff.

Release of the report under the Official Information Act

7. On 1 December 2025 the Ministry received an Official Information Act request for a copy of the report and related information from Radio New Zealand ^{s9(2)(a)}

Review of Health and Safety at the Ministry

8. A copy of the report, redacted as necessary, will be provided to ^{s9(2)(a)} on 27 January 2026. This will likely result in media coverage and, potentially, further requests for information from the media given the impact of the Port Vila earthquake on the New Zealand High Commission and the fire risks associated with the New Zealand High Commission in Suva.
9. Proposed media lines, should you be asked about the report, are:

I am aware that MFAT's Chief Executive commissioned an external review of MFAT's approach to health and safety at work. I understand the review resulted in several recommendations to improve MFAT's system, all of which the Chief Executive has accepted.

I refer you to MFAT for any further questions.

Resourcing

10. The Ministry's response to the report will be managed within existing baselines. The team responsible for delivery of this work programme will be drawn from existing resources.

Released under the Official Information Act



21 January 2026

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

26 January 2026

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To provide an update on US pressure on Denmark and Greenland, ^{s6(a)}

Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
James Waite	Divisional Manager	Americas Division	s9(2)(a)
Rod Harris	Divisional Manager	Europe Division	

Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	31 January 2026
Minister of Defence	For information by	31 January 2026
Minister for Trade and Investment	For information by	31 January 2026

Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Referred |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Key points

- United States President Trump has publicly doubled down on his desire to take control of Greenland. ^{s6(a)}
Denmark, alongside European neighbours, are considering response options.
- The US has security interests in Greenland recognised under existing arrangements with Denmark, including a 1951 treaty. The US considers Greenland strategically important: it allows the US to counter its claim of rival powers' growing presence in the Arctic, allows the US to safeguard strategic sea lanes, hosts strategic US missile defence systems, and reinforces NATO's Arctic flank.
- Denmark and Greenland robustly reject President Trump's ambitions, pointing to international law and Greenland's right to self-determination. The Greenland Prime Minister says Greenland chooses Denmark and does not want to be owned or governed by, or be part of, the US. ^{s6(a)}

- ^{s6(a), s9(2)(h)}

- ^{s6(a)} New Zealand gains from the observance of international law, ^{s6(a), s7(b)(i), s7(b)(ii), s7(b)(iii)} These include the benefits and international trading system.
- We propose that New Zealand's approach to the situation be guided by the following principles: (1) the political future of Greenland is for Greenland itself to determine, in consultation with Denmark; (2) barring any democratic expression of self-determination, Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark; ^{s6(a), s9(2)(h)}

- ^{s6(a)}

Grahame Morton
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | | |
|---|---|--|----------|
| 1 | s6(a) | | Yes / No |
| 2 | Agree that New Zealand's position is that the political future of Greenland is for Greenland itself to determine – the right of self-determination – in consultation with Denmark; | | Yes / No |
| 3 | s6(a) | | Yes / No |
| 4 | | | Yes / No |
| 5 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Minister for Trade and Investment. | | Yes / No |

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Released under the Official Information Act

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Report

The United States' increasing pressure on Denmark and Greenland

1. United States President Trump's declared intention to acquire the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland is a major challenge for the Euro-Atlantic relationship, NATO, ^{s6(a)}

What are the United States' interests in Greenland?

2. President Trump has a long-held interest in Greenland, having made an offer to buy the island during his first presidential term. This term both President Trump and Vice-President Vance have repeatedly signalled US interest in the territory.
3. President Trump has justified his pursuit to annex Greenland on national security grounds. He has claimed an increased presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in Arctic waters ^{s6(a)} and argued that European security interests depend on US involvement in Greenland. ^{s6(a)}
4. Official rationale focuses on Greenland's perceived strategic importance that it:
 - Provides a forward position in the Arctic, enabling surveillance and defence against potential threats from Russia and China. Its geographic position between Russia (and its missiles) and the US led to a 1951 Agreement under which the US has broad military and security access to Greenland. ^{s6(a)}
 - Hosts Pituffik Space Base (formerly the Thule Air base in northwestern Greenland), a critical component of US missile warning, space surveillance, and ballistic missile defence systems.
 - Provides proximity to emerging Arctic shipping routes, which may grow as ice recedes.
5. ^{s6(a)}
- 6.

What steps might the US take to acquire Greenland?

7. Should it eventuate, any acquisition of Greenland is likely to be based on a combination of ^{s6(a)}. This might include:
 - Political pressure on Denmark and Greenland, ^{s6(a)}
 - ^{s6(a)} the threat or use of tariffs on Denmark ^{s6(a)}
 - ^{s6(a)}

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

s6(a)

• s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Denmark and Greenland have a “fundamental disagreement” with the US...

8. Denmark has firmly and publicly rejected US efforts. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen says her country “is ready to defend our values – wherever it is necessary”. “We believe in international law and in peoples’ right to self-determination.” The Danish Defence Intelligence Service identified the US, traditionally one of Denmark’s closest allies, as a potential security concern in its 2025 public risk assessment.
9. Greenland has also rejected US proposals. While Greenland is open to strengthening cooperation with the US, Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen has been unequivocal that Greenland is “not for sale” and that in a choice between the US and Denmark it “chooses Denmark”. Greenland does not want to be owned or governed by, or be part of, the US.
10. The approach by Denmark and Greenland has been to:
 - Urge respect for international law and sovereignty. They have consistently asked the US to respect Greenland’s constitutional position as a democratic society with self-government, part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and in turn, a member of NATO.
 - Step-up Danish military investment and presence in Greenland. In October 2025 Denmark committed to an additional US\$4.2 billion in defence spending on the Arctic and Greenland and an additional \$4.5 billion for 16 US F-35 fighter planes. Denmark has increased its naval, air and land military activity in and around Greenland, including through Operation Arctic Endurance announced in January.
 - Engage the US to meet its concerns and deescalate the crisis:
 - Denmark has argued that US security concerns can be met through the existing constitutional arrangements and treaties.
 - Denmark is engaging the US through the High Level Working Group on Arctic security, set up following the meeting between Denmark’s Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Greenland’s Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt, Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio on 14 January.
 - s6(b)(i)
 - Seek broader support for Denmark’s position on Greenland. s6(a)

...and Europe is considering its response

11. European neighbours have been quick to provide public political support for Denmark s6(a)

Historically close US allies, including the EU, the UK, France, Germany, the Nordics, and Canada, have all issued statements in support of Greenland (see annex for international reactions).

12. At Denmark’s request, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK have deployed troops to Greenland. s6(a)

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

s6(a)

committed so far are low, s6(a)

While the total number of troops

13. Europe is now examining its options following the President's threat of new US tariffs. s6(a)

The European Union

14. s6(a)

Article 42.7 of the treaty on the European Union is a mutual defence clause, requiring member states to provide aid and assistance – economic, political, or military – if a state invokes it. It can be activated unilaterally, without a consensus decision.

15. s6(a)

s9(2)(g)(i)

NATO

16. At the strategic level, Greenland is another challenge for the trans-Atlantic security alliance. s6(a)

17. s6(a)

NATO permanent representatives (including the US) on 8 January 2026 agreed to reinforce the Arctic flank of the Alliance. Proposals included shifting military equipment to the region, conducting military exercises, and greater intelligence coverage and defence spending. A NATO Sentry operation may be another possibility in coming months.

18. The NATO principle of collective defence, Article 5, relies on a consensus decision¹, and so does not protect members from the use of force by other NATO states. s6(a)

¹ At the heart of NATO is Article 5, which outlines that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each member of the Alliance will consider this as an attack against all members and will take necessary actions to assist the Ally that was attacked. This principle of collective defence has only been invoked once by the US, after the September 11 attacks, which led to NATO's deployment to Afghanistan.

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

s6(a)

Broader implications

19. ^{s6(a)}

20.

21.

s6(a)

22. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

23. ^{s6(a)}

24.

New Zealand interests

25. US actions with respect to Greenland engage a range of New Zealand equities, including:
- **The international rules-based system**, and tenets of collective security and sovereignty.
 - ^{s6(a), s7(a)(i), s7(a)(ii), s7(a)(iii), s7(a)(iv), s7(b)(i), s7(b)(ii), s7(b)(iii)}

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

s6(a), s7(a)(i), s7(a)(ii), s7(a)(iii), s7(a)(iv), s7(b)(i), s7(b)(ii), s7(b)(iii)

- s6(a)
- **Possible impact on New Zealand trade interests** through the threat or application of US tariffs and retaliation by other countries, which impact financial markets.
- **New Zealand's bilateral relationships.** We are mindful of the range of bilateral interests affected, including with the US and with close partners in Europe and NATO.
- s6(a)

s9(2)(h)

A principled approach

30. We propose that New Zealand's position be guided by the following principles, including:

- I. The political future of Greenland is for Greenland itself to determine – right of self-determination – in consultation with Denmark.
- II. Barring any democratic expression of self-determination, consistent with the Self Government Act (2009), Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark.
- III. s6(a), s9(2)(h)
- IV. s6(a)

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

New Zealand outreach

31. ^{s6(a)}

32.

Media lines

33. If New Zealand is asked to comment officials propose responses draw on:

- New Zealand agrees that Greenland belongs to its people and that it is for Greenland and Denmark to determine the territory's future.
- It's in New Zealand's interests for there to be a stable and healthy trans-Atlantic relationship.
- *If asked about President Trump's threat of tariffs:* New Zealand supports a free, open and rules-based trading system. We do not think a tariff war is in anyone's interests.
- *If asked whether it is appropriate for the EU to retaliate with tariffs:* That is a decision for them to make.

^{s6(a)}

Resourcing

34. The issue will be able to be managed within MFAT's resources both in Wellington and our Americas and Europe network.

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Annex 1: Background on recent developments

Timeline of key developments:

- 28 March 2025: Vice President Vance visits Greenland and accuses Denmark of failing to invest enough to protect the territory.
- 22 December 2025: Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry appointed US Special Envoy for Greenland, with the stated objective of making Greenland part of the US.
- 3 January 2026: Senior White House aide Stephen Miller's wife Katie Miller posted a picture on X of a map of Greenland overlaid with a US flag, with the caption "SOON". Stephen Miller then refused to rule out the use of military force in taking Greenland.
- 5 January 2026: Secretary of State Rubio told Congress the President wanted to "buy" Greenland, though did not provide detail.
- 5 January 2026: President Trump stated "we will deal with Greenland in about two months. Let's talk about Greenland in 20 days".
- 6 January 2026: White House Press Secretary said the administration was discussing "a range of options" to acquire Greenland, and did not rule out the use of military force.
- 14 January 2026: Danish and Greenlandic Foreign Ministers met with Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio at the White House to discuss the future of the territory. Before the meeting President Trump wrote on social media that anything less than having the island "in the hands of the US" would be "unacceptable". A High Level Working Group was formed to further discuss the issue.
- 17 January 2026: In a post on Truth Social, President Trump announced his intent to impose 10% tariffs from 1 February, followed by a 25% rate on 1 June, on eight European countries – all NATO allies – that have deployed troops to Greenland (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the UK, Netherlands and Finland). Trump said that "this tariff will be due and payable until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland."

US historic interest in Greenland

The US has tried to acquire Greenland three times before...

In 1867-68 Secretary of State William Seward's discussed purchasing Greenland and Iceland.

In 1910 a three-way land swap was discussed involving the US acquiring Greenland in exchange for giving Denmark parts of the US-held Philippines and the return of Schleswig-Holstein from Germany. The US later acquired the Danish West Indies (now the US Virgin Islands) in a 1917 treaty in which the US agreed that it would "not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland".

In 1946 President Truman offered Denmark \$100 million in gold. After Denmark rejected the offer, US policy shifted toward securing military access through agreements rather than sovereignty.

...and has a long history of security involvement on the island...

The US assumed Greenland's defence during WWII following Denmark's occupation and secured basing rights in a 1941 agreement. During the Cold War, Greenland became central to US defence strategy. A 1951 agreement formalised US-Danish cooperation under NATO, enabling bases such as Thule (now Pituffik base). A 2004 amendment recognised Thule as the sole defence area and aligned base operations with NATO's Status of Forces Agreement.

However, outside of this defence cooperation, the US has no legal, political, cultural or people-to-people links with the territory of Greenland.

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Annex 2: International reactions

Australia	<p>s6(b)(i) . Various ministers and the PM have made refers to the principles of sovereignty and international law and emphasising that the future of Greenland is a matter for Denmark and the people of Greenland.</p> <p>In an ABC interview on 21 January Minister Wong said, "Australia's position is very clear and the Prime Minister has articulated it, and I have made the same point. We believe that the future for Greenland is a matter for the people of Greenland, and the people of Denmark." She outlined that: "...as a matter of principle, we should adhere to what we believe and what is in our interest. And that is that one, the stability of NATO and the US-European relationship matters to the world. It matters to Australia. And two, that the future of Greenland is a matter, as I said, for Denmark and for Greenland." On tariffs she has said, "The right thing for Australia is to continue to argue for stability. To continue to argue for international law. And that means that we don't support tariffs. We don't support tariffs which are imposed on us and on other countries. We see a benefit in fair and open trade, and that's always been in Australia's interest."</p> <p>Finance Minister Katy Gallagher has said sanctions and tariffs from the US would be the wrong course, "our position on that has been clear, that we don't support tariffs. We support free trade".</p>
Canada	<p>Canada condemned the escalation and reaffirmed support for the sovereignty of Greenland and Denmark, with Prime Minister Mark Carney urging the US to respect NATO commitments and stressing Canada's own obligations under Articles 2 and 5. Speaking in Beijing and later at Davos, Carney said Greenland's future is for Greenland to decide, opposed tariffs, and called for cooperation on Arctic security. Canada is also reportedly considering sending troops to Greenland for NATO exercises.</p>
China	<p>Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian rebuked the US for China threat as a pretext to pursue its own interests and urged Washington to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter. China describes itself as a "near-Arctic state", with observer status on the Arctic Council, and research bases in Norway's Svalbard archipelago, Sweden and Iceland. Chinese state-linked companies have also invested heavily in Arctic energy projects and developed maritime routes that significantly reduce shipping times between Asia and Europe.</p>
The EU	<p>European Parliament leaders voiced firm support for Denmark and Greenland, condemning US ambitions over the territory as a violation of international law and stressing that Arctic security is a strategic EU priority. In a joint statement on 17 January, Presidents Costa and von der Leyen reaffirmed EU solidarity with Denmark and Greenland, warned that tariffs would undermine transatlantic relations, and emphasized unity, dialogue, and respect for sovereignty. Speaking in Davos, von der Leyen called Trump's tariff threat a "mistake" and said any EU response would be "unflinching, united and proportional."</p>
Joint statement Denmark; Finland; France; Germany, and the Netherlands	<p>Joint Statement on 18 January:</p> <p>"As members of NATO, we are committed to strengthening Arctic security as a shared transatlantic interest. The pre-coordinated Danish exercise Arctic Endurance conducted with Allies, responds to this necessity. It poses no threat to anyone. We stand in full solidarity with the Kingdom of Denmark and the people of Greenland. Building on the process begun last week, we stand ready to engage in a dialogue based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that we stand firmly behind. Tariff threats undermine transatlantic relations and risk a dangerous downward spiral. We will continue to stand united and coordinated in our response. We are committed to upholding our sovereignty".</p>

United States Pressure on Denmark and Greenland

Finland	President Stubb has said on X (translated): "Finland assumes that issues among allies are solved through discussion and common rules of the game, not by creating pressure. Strengthening Arctic security together with our allies is important to Finland. This is also the goal of the Danish-led and allied-coordinated activities in Greenland. European countries are united. We emphasise the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty. We support Denmark and Greenland. Dialogue with the United States continues. Tariffs would be detrimental to the transatlantic relationship and could lead to a vicious cycle."
France	French President Emmanuel Macron said France's support for Greenland is rooted in the same commitment to sovereignty that underpins its backing of Ukraine, stressing that intimidation and tariff threats are unacceptable. He said France participated in Denmark's Greenland exercise on this basis and urged EU leaders to activate the bloc's anti-coercion instrument if US tariff threats proceed. At Davos Macron said he preferred "respect to bullies" and the "rule of law to brutality", he continued that now was "not a time for new imperialism or new colonialism", criticising the "useless aggressivity" of Trump's pledge to levy tariffs on countries that opposed a US takeover of Greenland.
Germany	German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Germany is working with France to present a unified EU response to President Trump's latest tariff threats, despite differences in tone. He stressed that the EU agrees such threats weaken transatlantic relations, while Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil said Europe would not allow itself to be blackmailed and that "the limit has been reached".
NATO	NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte denied the alliance was in crisis, praising President Trump for pushing members to increase defense spending and highlighting the need to protect the Arctic. Trump dismissed claims that his stance on Greenland could harm NATO, instead asserting that he "saved NATO," likely referring to Rutte's praise at the 2025 summit.
Nordics	Sweden, Norway and Finland issued unified statements supporting Denmark, stressing that sovereignty decisions belong to Copenhagen and Nuuk. Iceland shares this view but has kept a lower profile, privately expressing concern about its own strategic vulnerability while continuing to work through NATO and bilaterally to maintain strong relations with the US.
Russia	Russia, the world's largest Arctic nation, has so far remained silent on President Trump's latest comments on Greenland, with no official Kremlin response. ^{s6(a)} in January 2025 the Kremlin said it was closely monitoring Trump's territorial claims to Greenland, reaffirmed the Arctic's strategic importance to Russia, and criticised Europe's "timid" response.
United Kingdom	UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has backed Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and expressed support for Denmark and Greenland. He joined leaders from several European countries in a joint statement on 6 January stressing that the Arctic is a key security priority for Europe and NATO, that security must be pursued collectively with allies including the US, and that Greenland's future is for its people and Denmark to decide. On 18 and 19 January, Starmer said Greenland should be addressed through calm discussions among allies, highlighting growing Arctic security challenges linked to climate change. He reaffirmed the UK's commitment to working with the US and NATO on collective defence, criticised the use of tariffs against allies, and said the UK is pursuing a diplomatic, partnership-based approach while raising concerns with the US.



29 January 2026

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For approval by

29 January 2026

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's approach

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To confirm New Zealand's decision not to join the Board of Peace. ^{s6(a)}

Recommended referrals

Prime Minister

For concurrence by 30 January 2026

Minister of Defence

For information by 30 January 2026

Contact details

NAME <small>s9(2)(g)(ii)</small>	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE <small>s9(2)(a)</small>
		Middle East and Africa Division United Nations, Human Rights and Commonwealth Division Americas Division	

Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Referred |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

Key points

- President Trump hosted a signing ceremony for the Board of Peace Charter in Davos on 22 January. In total 25 leaders have accepted the invitation to join the Board.
- Of those leaders that have accepted, many either have a direct stake in the conflict in Gaza ^{s6(a)}
- Nine European Union countries, plus the UK, have declined the invitation, and others have signalled that they are unlikely to join. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

Canada's invitation

was withdrawn after Prime Minister Carney's speech in Davos.

- Joining the Board of Peace is not in New Zealand's interests and officials recommend New Zealand decline the invitation. ^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)}

•

•

- Thank the US for its leadership in trying to bring peace to the Israel/Gaza crisis;
- Express our support for the work of the Board in the Gaza context as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2803;
- Note a number of key states, particularly from the region, have stepped up to contribute to the Board, and we would not add significant further value to that,
- ^{s6(a)}

- Note that we will therefore not be joining the Board in its current form but will remain interested in its evolution.

- Officials will provide advice on public communication of New Zealand's decision separately

^{s9(2)(d)(ii)}

for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Agree that New Zealand will not join the Board of Peace ^{s6(a)} | Yes / No |
| 2 | | Yes / No |
| 3 | Agree that New Zealand will advise the US of this decision via diplomatic channels | Yes / No |
| 4 | Refer this submission to the Prime Minister for his concurrence. | Yes / No |

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Released under the Official Information Act

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

Background

Update on the Board of Peace

1. President Trump hosted a signing ceremony for the Board of Peace Charter on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos on Thursday 22 January. He was joined on stage by leaders, foreign ministers and senior officials representing 19 countries.
2. Invitations to join the Board have been accepted by 25 world leaders, most of which either have a direct stake in the situation in Gaza (e.g. UAE, Israel, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) ^{s6(a)} Annex A provides an overview of responses to the Board of Peace to date.
3. A group of Arab and Islamic states (Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Indonesia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) coordinated their response to the invitation and accepted it on the basis that the Board is focused on Gaza in line with Security Council Resolution 2803. In a joint statement, they noted that the Board's mission is aimed at "consolidating a permanent ceasefire, supporting the reconstruction of Gaza, and advancing a just and lasting peace grounded in the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood in accordance with international law". ^{s6(a)}
4. France, Greece, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway and Finland have explicitly declined the invitation, with the main rationale that the Board of Peace duplicates or presents a challenge to the role of the United Nations. Ahead of the signing ceremony, the United Kingdom said it "won't be signing the Charter today" and noted its discomfort at Russia's invitation. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(1)} Germany, Italy and Spain have declined to join the initiative in its current form (with Germany and Italy citing constitutional concerns with its unusual governance structure) but indicated openness if the terms were changed.
5. ^{s6(a)}
6. The Board of Peace met for the first time in Davos and adopted its first resolution, which sets out administrative arrangements and governance structures for Gaza. ^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)}

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

7. At Davos, Jared Kushner, in his capacity as a member of the Executive Board that sits under the Board of Peace, delivered a presentation setting out a masterplan for a "New Gaza". It is an ambitious plan that features skyscrapers, a "coastal tourism" zone along Gaza's seafront, as well as well as an industrial complex with data centres and advanced manufacturing. The plan is similar to Kushner's earlier proposals to build tourism and real estate developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. ^{s6(a)}

Joining the Board of Peace is not in New Zealand's interests

8. Officials assess that joining the Board of Peace is not in New Zealand's interests.

9. ^{s6(a)}

10.

11.

12.

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Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

s6(a)

US equities and forthcoming engagements

13. Our recommended approach is to decline the invitation to join the Board. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

14. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

15. s6(a)

- Thank the US for its leadership in trying to bring peace to the Israel/Gaza crisis;
- Note a number of key states, particularly from the region, have stepped up to contribute to the board, and we would not add significant further value to that,
- Express our support for the work of the Board of Peace in the Gaza context and the importance of it working within the mandate set out in UNSCR 2803;
- s6(a)
- Note we will therefore not be joining the Board in its current form but will remain interested in its evolution.

16. Officials will provide advice on public messaging of New Zealand's decision separately.

Board of Peace: Confirming New Zealand's Approach

Annex A: List of invitees and response

<u>YES</u>	<u>CONSIDERING</u>	<u>NO</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Albania • Argentina • Armenia • Azerbaijan • Bahrain • Belarus • Bulgaria • Cambodia • Egypt • Hungary • Indonesia • Israel • Jordan • Kazakhstan • Kosovo • Morocco • Mongolia • Pakistan • Paraguay • Qatar • Saudi Arabia • Türkiye • United Arab Emirates • Uzbekistan • Vietnam 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia • Austria • Brazil • China • Cyprus • European Commission • India • Ireland • Japan • Netherlands • Oman • Poland • Portugal • Romania • Russia • Singapore • South Korea • Switzerland • Thailand • Ukraine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finland • France • Germany • Greece • Italy • Norway • Slovenia • Spain • Sweden • United Kingdom

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Released under the Official Information Act

Released under the Official Information Act



NEW ZEALAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE
Manatū Aorere



12 February 2026

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

19 February 2026

2026 March Baseline Update Submission

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE Enclosed for your approval and signature is the 2026 March Baseline Update submission for Vote Foreign Affairs. The submission is due with the Minister of Finance by 1:00pm on Thursday, 19 February.

Recommended referrals

Minister of Finance

For approval by

19 February 2026

Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Wayne Verhoeven	Chief Financial Officer	Finance	s9(2)(a)

Key points

“ Treasury Circular 2026-02 requires that we update the baseline for Vote Foreign Affairs.

Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Seen |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

2026 March Baseline Update Submission

- This submission outlines the changes to the baseline and seeks your approval for these changes along with the approval of the Minister of Finance through the attached submission.
- The submission to the Minister of Finance is required to be signed and submitted to her no later than 1pm on Thursday, 19 February (soft copy only).



Cecile Hillyer
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------|
| 1 | Sign the attached cover letter and the Vote Foreign Affairs submission letter to the Minister of Finance; | Yes / No |
| 2 | Refer a soft copy of the signed March Baseline Update submission letter to the office of the Minister of Finance by 1.00pm on Thursday, 19 February. | Yes / No |



Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: 12 12 2026

2026 March Baseline Update Submission

Report

- The March Baseline Update is the second of the two opportunities to update baselines since the Main Estimates were finalised. The changes that can be included in the baseline update are those that can be approved by joint Ministers (Cabinet Office Circular (18) 2).
 - ***In-Principle Expense Transfers*** - for transfers within an appropriation or departmental capital injection across financial years.
 - ***Fiscally Neutral Adjustments*** – transfers within or across Votes with no impact on the operating balance.
 - ***Forecasting Changes*** – generally for demand driven appropriations where the criteria for the changes have previously been approved by Cabinet, including the automatic adjustments to the Ministry's baselines for foreign exchange/Consumer Price Index movements and adjustments to capital expenditure profiles.
 - ***Technical Adjustments and Approvals*** – includes accounting adjustments generally with no cash impact, such as revaluation changes, automatic adjustments related to capital charge, or changes to a multi-year appropriation profile.
 - ***Extension and/or Rephasing of Tagged Contingencies***– includes approval to extend the expiry date and/or adjust the phasing of approved tagged contingencies prior to potential approval and drawn-down.
 - ***Cabinet and Other Approvals*** – updating for any Cabinet or Joint Minister approvals that impact the baseline that have been approved since the Budget.
- All the proposed changes to baselines comply with Cabinet's criteria for changes to baselines.
- Details of the proposed changes are contained in the attached letter to the Minister of Finance and the supporting tables.

19 February 2026

Hon Nicola Willis
Minister of Finance
Parliament Buildings
WELLINGTON

Dear Minister,

2026 March Baseline Update (MBU)

Submission for Vote Foreign Affairs

Introduction

This report covers those items affecting the baseline for Vote Foreign Affairs for the 2026 March Baseline Update.

I confirm that none of the changes contained in this update require Cabinet decisions at this time.

Table 2 referred to below is attached to this letter.

The proposed changes to baselines requiring the approval of Joint Ministers are as follows:

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In-Principle Expense Transfers

An explanation of each in-principle expense transfer is listed below, and the amounts are specified in Table 2.

a) *Operating Projects – Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Solutions.*

This transfer is for delays in expenditure on SaaS operating projects (which used to be funded from capital and now funded through a capital expenditure to operating expenditure swap) caused by circumstances outside the Ministry's control including the non-availability of contracted resources. An in-principle expense transfer is sought to carry forward the anticipated underspend to meet the costs of existing operating projects that will now be advanced in the 2026/27 financial year.

This proposed transfer relates to projects including the Enquire (IDC Management system), Enterprise Content Management, Cyber Security and Identity & Access Management which are all linked to the Ministry's transition to the new Cloud IT environment.

These costs are included in the 2025/26 budget and committed and cannot be met from the existing 2026/27 baseline as it is already fully committed.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$4.900 million from 2025/26 is required to carry forward the anticipated residual budget to undertake the delayed activity in the 2026/27 financial year.

b) *Pacific* s6(a)

Delivery of a number of activities associated with the Budget 2025 funding for Pacific s6(a) have been delayed for reasons outside the Ministry's control.

s6(a)

As a result of these delays, a portion of expenditure appropriated and committed for 2025/26 will instead be incurred in 2026/27. These costs cannot be met within the Ministry's existing 2026/27 baseline, which is fully committed.

Accordingly, approval is sought for an in-principle transfer of up to \$4 million from 2025/26 to 2026/27 to ensure that existing commitments associated with this initiative are delivered as intended.

c) Doubling Exports and Asia Uplift

Budget 2025 funding to support increased engagement and export growth in South and Southeast Asia (SSEA) has been applied to additional people resourcing in the region. Funding also supports contestable grants to enable growth-related initiatives across government agencies, as well as other activities that strengthen cooperation with regional trade dependent economies to promote modern trade rules, enhanced investment flows and support collaborative solutions to global trade challenges.

Delivery of a number of activities have been delayed for reasons outside the Ministry's control. In particular, the timing of the deployment of New Zealand-seconded staff has been affected by: host-government approval processes and internal assurance requirements; the inability of some agencies to scale contestable grant-funded initiatives within the original timeframe; and the rescheduling from June 2026 to July 2026 of the Future of Investment and Trade Partnership Ministerial meeting to support stronger Ministerial attendance, critical to the meeting's success.

As a result, a portion of expenditure appropriated and committed in 2025/26 will be incurred in 2026/27. These costs cannot be managed within the Ministry's existing 2026/27 baseline, which is fully committed.

Accordingly, approval is sought for an in-principle transfer of up to \$2.540 million of expense funding from 2025/26 to 2026/27 to ensure that existing commitments associated with this initiative can be met.

d) New Zealand House (London) Fit-Out

The fit-out of New Zealand House in London is one component of a larger property transaction that will provide long term, safe, and secure accommodation to enable the New Zealand Government to continue to transact its diplomatic, political and trade engagement agenda with the United Kingdom as well as providing core consular services to New Zealand citizens.

The delay in expenditure is due to the postponed commencement of the Te Pou Ihi restoration component of the project. This work has not yet begun, as the Ministry is still finalising the methodology and scope for the restoration and confirming the expected delivery costs.

These costs are included and committed in the 2025/26 budget and cannot be met from the existing 2026/27 baseline as it is already fully committed.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$0.600 million from 2025/26 is required to meet this commitment in the 2026/27 financial year.

e) **Capital Investment related Operating Costs**

This transfer is for delays in expenditure caused by circumstances outside the Ministry's control for the investigation and design phases of investments. An in-principle expense transfer is sought to carry forward the anticipated residual budget to meet the operating costs of the investigation and design phases of deferred investments that will now be advanced in the 2026/27 financial year.

These costs cannot be met from the existing 2026/27 baseline as it is fully committed.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$0.548 million from 2025/26 is required to carry forward the anticipated residual budget to undertake the delayed activity in the 2026/27 financial year.

f) **Extradition Case of NZ Permanent Resident to Shanghai**

This transfer is for delays in expenditure for a Shanghai relief assignment linked to a Human Rights Commission Court case for a Korean-born New Zealand permanent resident. The date for the court hearing is outside the control of the Ministry and is now scheduled for May 2026, however any financial implications from the outcome will now be incurred in the 2026/27 financial year.

These costs cannot be met from the existing 2026/27 baseline as it is fully committed.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$0.504 million from 2025/26 is required to complete this activity in the 2026/27 financial year.

g) **Ukraine: International Court of Justice (ICJ)**

As agreed by Cabinet, funding of \$0.628 million was provided to enable New Zealand to intervene in the case against Russia at the ICJ to provide tangible support for Ukraine and to counter Russia's efforts to undermine the international rules based system.

New Zealand's application to intervene was accepted by the ICJ. New Zealand participated in the preliminary phase of the case in The Hague. The judgment for the preliminary stage of the case has been issued and New Zealand will provide written submissions and make oral submissions in the substantive hearing in the ICJ. A date has not yet been set for that hearing, however the timing of this case is likely to be known in February 2026. The slow progress of the case, which involves 35 countries, has delayed preparations for the substantive hearing.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$0.250 million from 2025/26 is required to meet commitments in the 2026/27 financial year.

h) Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

The next biennial meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government was originally scheduled for June 2026 in Antigua and Barbuda but has now been postponed to November 2026. Funding is required to support travel and other costs associated with New Zealand's attendance at this meeting, as well as participation in pre-meeting negotiations to be held in London in September 2026.

These costs cannot be met from the existing 2026/27 baseline as it is fully committed.

Accordingly, an in-principle expense transfer of up to \$0.100 million from 2025/26 is required to meet this commitment in the 2026/27 financial year.

Fiscally Neutral Adjustment

An explanation of the proposed adjustment is listed below, and the amounts are specified in Table 2.

a) Pacific Property Strategy

This fiscally neutral adjustment is required within the categories of the Ministry's Multi-Category Appropriation to correct the operating funding received for the Pacific Property Strategy recorded incorrectly as part of the 2025 October Baseline Update (Joint Ministers' paper dated 25 July 2025 refers).

	\$m - increase/(decrease)				
	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	2029/30 & Outyears
Vote Foreign Affairs					
Minister of Foreign Affairs					
Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure -Act in the world to build a safer, more prosperous and more sustainable future for New Zealanders MCA					
Departmental Output Expenses: <i>Deliver consular, business and diplomatic support services</i>	3.381	6.416	7.646	3.317	5.650
Departmental Output Expenses: <i>Representation and advocacy on New Zealand's foreign policy</i>	(3.381)	(6.416)	(7.646)	(3.317)	(5.650)

Forecasting Adjustments

An explanation of each proposed forecasting adjustment is listed below, and the amounts are specified in Table 2.

a) *Departmental - Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements*

An increase in Departmental Output Expenses: Act in the World to build a safer, more prosperous and sustainable future for New Zealanders MCA of \$0.071 million in 2025/26 and each of the out-years due to foreign exchange rate and overseas inflation movements (CAB (92) M52/16k of 21 December 1992 refers).

b) *Departmental Capital Expenditure*

The Ministry's infrastructure capital programme has been adjusted to reflect the latest five-year capital plan requirements as follows:

- o 2025/26 – a decrease of \$4.183 million
- o 2026/27 – an increase of \$0.625 million
- o 2027/28 – an increase of \$3.881 million
- o 2028/29 – a decrease of \$0.045 million
- o 2029/30 – a decrease of \$0.307 million

Departmental capital expenditure will be funded from the capital reserve balance, current depreciation, the proceeds of sales, and capital injections.

Technical Adjustments and Approvals

An explanation of each proposed technical adjustment and approval is listed below, and the amounts are specified in Table 2.

a) *Reprioritisation of Resources Across Multi-Category Appropriation Output Expenses*

The financial thresholds to be applied to the approval of transfers between the Ministry's Multi-Category Appropriation categories are as follows:

- Chief Executive – 10% or less
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs – more than 10% and up to 20%
- Joint Ministers – more than 20%

The Ministry's fiscally neutral adjustments to departmental output expense categories within its multi-category appropriation reflect the reprioritisation of resources since the completion of the 2025 October Baseline Update. The output expenses of the multi-category appropriation have changed as follows:

Output Expense (Category)	\$m			
	OBU	MBU	Incr/Decr	%
Analysis and Advice to inform New Zealand's foreign policy	104.509	103.157	-1.352	(1.3%)
Representation and Advocacy on New Zealand's foreign policy	295.471	296.509	1.038	0.4%
Deliver consular, business and diplomatic support services	83.565	84.709	1.144	1.4%
Management of NZ's International Development Cooperation	102.008	101.178	-0.830	(0.8%)

This fiscally neutral movement of funding across the multi-category appropriation output expenses is less than 10% so requires the approval of the Chief Executive only but is included here for your information. This reprioritisation of resources is to be applied in the 2025/26 financial year and each of the outyears.

b) Pacific Property Strategy

The drawdown of the Pacific Property Strategy tagged capital contingency to part fund the replacement of three Pacific High Commissions (Suva, Rarotonga, and Port Moresby) and the Official Residence in Suva was included in the 2025 October Baseline Update (Joint Ministers' paper dated 25 July 2025 refers.) The approved Cabinet paper incorrectly stated the drawdown was from Capital Expenditure, and your approval is sought to confirm this is a Capital Injection as intended.

Extension and Rephasing of Tagged Contingencies

I agree and seek your agreement to amend the following operating/capital tagged contingencies:

a) Fitting out of New Zealand House (London) Tagged Contingency.

Approval is sought for an extension of the expiry date for the Fitting out of New Zealand House (London) operating and capital tagged contingency from 30 June 2026 to 31 December 2026, and to rephase as follows:

	\$m					
Vote Foreign Affairs: Minister of Foreign Affairs	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	2029/30	2030/31 & outyears
Fitting out of New Zealand House - Tagged Operating Contingency	-	6.906	17.124	17.641	-	-
Fitting out of New Zealand House - Tagged Capital Contingency	-	48.791	34.968	-	-	-

b) Scott Base Redevelopment Project Tagged Contingency.

Approval is sought to rephase the Scott Base tagged operating and capital contingency as follows:

	\$m					
Vote Foreign Affairs: Minister of Foreign Affairs	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	2029/30	2030/31	2031/32 & Outyears
Scott Base Redevelopment Project - Tagged Operating Contingency	13.000	21.000	24.000	36.500	23.000	22.000
Scott Base Redevelopment Project - Tagged Capital Contingency	85.000	82.000	75.000	32.420	-	-

Cabinet and Other Approved Decisions

A number of items listed in Table 2 attached to this submission do not require Joint Minister approval or have already been approved by Joint Ministers. All Cabinet decisions and other decisions approved by Joint Ministers relating to Vote Foreign Affairs made since the previous baseline update have been included in this update and are listed in detail in Table 2 attached to this letter.

An explanation of each decision is set out below.

a) *New Zealand Support for Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List.*

Included in this submission is a fiscally neutral adjustment of \$15 million for the contribution to the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List comprising \$5 million from Vote Foreign Affairs, and \$10 million from Vote Defence Force.

Decision Submission paper dated 24 November 2025 refers.

b) *New Zealand House – New Lease Arrangements.*

This submission includes the future costs in Vote Foreign Affairs of \$5.159 million in 2026/27, and \$5.128 million in 2027/28 and each subsequent out-year, in recognition of new lease arrangements following the write-off of the existing leasehold property previously held in Vote Finance.

This adjustment is consistent with the decision recorded by the Cabinet Economic Policy Committee in ECO-24-MIN-0038, dated 27 March 2024.

Released under the Official Information Act

Recommendations

I agree and recommend that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | agree these baseline changes for the appropriations in Vote Foreign Affairs that require Joint Ministers' approval, as set out in Table 2; | Yes / No |
| 2 | agree that the proposed changes to appropriations for 2025/26, covered by recommendation 1 above, be included in the 2025/26 Supplementary Estimates and that, in the interim, the increases be met from Imprest Supply; | Yes / No |
| 3 | agree to the in-principle expense transfers from 2025/26 to 2026/27 outlined in this letter; | Yes / No |
| 4 | authorise the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to jointly agree to the final amounts to be transferred for the in-principle expense transfers outlined in this letter, following completion of the 2025/26 audited financial statements, with no impact on the operating balance and/or net core Crown debt across the forecast period; | Yes / No |
| 5 | agree that the drawdown of the Pacific Property Strategy tagged capital contingency approved in Joint Ministers' paper dated 25 July 2025, is a Capital Injection; | Yes / No |
| 6 | agree to the rephasing and extension from 30 June 2026 to 31 December 2026 of the Fitting out of New Zealand House (London) Tagged Contingency; | Yes / No |
| 7 | agree to the rephasing of the Scott Base Redevelopment Project Tagged Contingency; | Yes / No |
| 8 | note that Table 2 includes for completeness other changes to baselines for Vote Foreign Affairs that have been approved by Cabinet or Joint Ministers since the previous baseline update, or do not require such approval. | Yes / No |

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Table 1: Summary Table of Baseline Numbers, 2025/26 MBU, Vote 14 - 0: MFAT - Foreign Affairs.

Appropriations	2025/26			2026/27			2027/28			2028/29			2029/30		
	Agreed Changes		Revised Baseline	Agreed Changes		Revised Baseline	Agreed Changes		Revised Baseline	Agreed Changes		Revised Baseline	Agreed Changes		Revised Baseline
	\$000	%	\$000	\$000	%	\$000	\$000	%	\$000	\$000	%	\$000	\$000	%	\$000
Appropriations															
Departmental Output Expenses	-	-	105	-	-	107	-	-	110	-	-	112	-	-	114
Departmental Other Expenses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Departmental Capital Expenditure	(4,183)	(3)	116,703	625	-	142,979	3,881	4	108,200	(45)	-	65,082	(307)	-	67,205
Non-Departmental Output Expenses	-	-	29,581	-	-	26,081	-	-	26,081	-	-	26,081	-	-	26,081
Benefits or Related Expenses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Contributions to the Department (Pre PFAA)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Departmental Borrowing Expenses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Departmental Other Expenses	12,000	1	1,084,871	-	-	1,185,185	-	-	1,022,641	-	-	1,022,641	-	-	1,022,641
Non-Departmental Capital Expenditure	-	-	22,680	-	-	100	-	-	100	-	-	100	-	-	100
Repayment of Debt (Pre PFAA)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure	(1,929)	-	583,624	5,230	1	594,808	5,199	1	594,426	5,199	1	585,888	5,199	1	586,069
Total Appropriations	5,888	-	1,837,564	5,855	-	1,949,260	9,080	1	1,751,558	5,154	-	1,699,904	4,892	-	1,702,210
Crown Revenue and Receipts															
Tax Revenue	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Tax Revenue	-	-	400	-	-	400	-	-	400	-	-	400	-	-	400
Capital Receipts	-	-	100	-	-	100	-	-	100	-	-	100	-	-	100
Total Crown Revenue and Receipts	-	-	500	-	-	500	-	-	500	-	-	500	-	-	500
Output Revenue															
Revenue Crown	(1,929)	-	571,561	5,230	1	583,197	5,199	1	582,818	5,199	1	574,282	5,199	1	574,465
Revenue Dept	-	-	6,842	-	-	6,392	-	-	6,392	-	-	6,392	-	-	6,392
Revenue Other	-	-	5,326	-	-	5,326	-	-	5,326	-	-	5,326	-	-	5,326
Total Output Revenue	(1,929)	-	583,729	5,230	1	594,915	5,199	1	594,536	5,199	1	586,000	5,199	1	586,183
Capital Injections	-	-	28,406	-	-	13,729	-	-	6,935	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2: Baseline Changes Report, 2025/26 MBU, Vote 14 - 0: MFAT - Foreign Affairs.

	Classification	2025/26 \$000	2026/27 \$000	2027/28 \$000	2028/29 \$000	2029/30 \$000	Authority for Change	Final Year Funding
Departmental Capital Expenditure								
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Capital Expenditure (PLA)								
Dept Other Appropriation								
Adjustment of the Ministry's Infrastructure Capital Programme to Reflect the Latest Five-Year Capital Plan	Fcst Adj	(4,183)	625	3,881	(45)	(307)	CO-(18)-2	On going
Total changes - Departmental Capital Expenditure		(4,183)	625	3,881	(45)	(307)		
Non-Departmental Other Expenses								
Support for Ukraine								
Non-Dept Annual Appropriation								
New Zealand Support for Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List	Cabinet	15,000	-	-	-	-	Submission paper dd 24 November 2025	On going
Total changes - Non-Departmental Other Expenses		15,000	-	-	-	-		
Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure								
Act in the world to build a safer, more prosperous and more sustainable future for New Zealanders (MCA)								
Departmental Output Expenses								
<u>Analysis and advice to inform New Zealand's foreign policy</u>								
Dept Annual Appropriation								
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	CO-(18)-2	On going
Revenue Crown								
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	(1,352)	CO-(18)-2	On going
<u>Deliver consular, business and diplomatic support services</u>								
Dept Annual Appropriation								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	5	5	5	5	5	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
Pacific Property Strategy	FNA	3,381	6,416	7,646	3,317	5,650	CO-(18)-2	On going
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	CO-(18)-2	On going
Revenue Crown								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	5	5	5	5	5	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
Pacific Property Strategy	FNA	3,381	6,416	7,646	3,317	5,650	CO-(18)-2	On going

	Classification	2025/26 \$000	2026/27 \$000	2027/28 \$000	2028/29 \$000	2029/30 \$000	Authority for Change	Final Year Funding
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144	CO-(18)-2	On going
<u>Management of New Zealand's International Development Cooperation</u>								
Dept Annual Appropriation								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	(73)	(73)	(73)	(73)	(73)	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	(830)	(830)	(830)	(830)	(830)	CO-(18)-2	On going
Revenue Crown								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	(73)	(73)	(73)	(73)	(73)	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	(830)	(830)	(830)	(830)	(830)	CO-(18)-2	On going
<u>Representation and advocacy on New Zealand's foreign policy</u>								
Dept Annual Appropriation								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	139	139	139	139	139	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
New Zealand House - New Lease Arrangements	Cabinet	-	5,159	5,128	5,128	5,128	ECO-24-MIN-0038	On going
New Zealand Support for Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List	Cabinet	(2,000)	-	-	-	-	Submission paper dd 24 November 2025	On going
Pacific Property Strategy	FNA	(3,381)	(6,416)	(7,646)	(3,317)	(5,650)	CO-(18)-2	On going
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	1,038	1,038	1,038	1,038	1,038	CO-(18)-2	On going
Revenue Crown								
Foreign Exchange/CPI Movements	Fcst Adj	139	139	139	139	139	CAB (92) M52/16k	On going
New Zealand House - New Lease Arrangements	Cabinet	-	5,159	5,128	5,128	5,128	ECO-24-MIN-0038	On going
New Zealand Support for Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List	Cabinet	(2,000)	-	-	-	-	Submission paper dd 24 November 2025	On going
Pacific Property Strategy	FNA	(3,381)	(6,416)	(7,646)	(3,317)	(5,650)	CO-(18)-2	On going
Reprioritisation of Resources Across MCA Output Expenses	Tech Adj	1,038	1,038	1,038	1,038	1,038	CO-(18)-2	On going
Total changes - Multi-Category Expenses and Capital Expenditure		(1,929)	5,230	5,199	5,199	5,199		
Total changes - Output revenue (Crown +Dept+Other)		(1,929)	5,230	5,199	5,199	5,199		

Multi-year Appropriations

Multi-year Appropriations	Totals	Classification	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	2029/30	Authority for Change	Final Year
	\$000		\$000	\$000	\$000	\$000	\$000		Funding

Non-Departmental Other Expenses

International Development Cooperation (MYA)
(From 01 July 2024 - 30 June 2027)

Appropriation

Vote changes for this baseline

New Zealand Support for Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List	(3,000)	Cabinet	(3,000)	-	-	-	-	Submission paper dd 24 November 2025	On going
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Overall change to appropriation

(3,000)

Classification Key

Short Name	Description	Reference
Cabinet	Cabinet policy decision	Approvals are sought in cabinet papers (refer to cabinet manual), with authority given via a cabinet minute. The authority for change should reference both supporting documents.
ECT	Expense and Capital Transfer	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular Financial changes that can be approved by Joint Ministers). Transferring funding within an appropriation across financial years.
ECT ip	Expense and Capital Transfer in-principle	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular). The portion of an ECT that can't be accurately quantified so the transfer amount has been approved in-principle. 1st time can count in fiscal forecasts is OBU.
Fcst Adj	Forecast Adjustments	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular). Adjustments to the forecast expenditure of PLAs or where there is a pre-determined cost calculation, or Crown Revenue.
FLoS	Front-Loading of Spending	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular Financial changes that can be approved by Joint Ministers). Bringing forward expenditure to create lasting cost savings.
FNA	Fiscally Neutral Adjustment	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular Financial changes that can be approved by Joint Ministers). Transferring funding between appropriations within a financial year.
RoU	Retention of Underspend	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular Financial changes that can be approved by Joint Ministers). Transferring underspend to the next financial year.
RoU 50%	Retention of Underspend @ 50%	Defined in CO Circular. Portion of an ROU can't accurately quantify so the transfer amount of 50% of an underspend has been approved in-principle. 1st time can count in fiscal forecasts is OBU.
Tech Adj	Technical adjustment	Defined in (Cabinet Office Circular). Technical accounting adjustments with no cash impact to the Crown, MYA spending profile changes, non-controversial appropriation title or scope changes.
SuppsJune	Offset MYA June vs Supps Difference	This is a subset of the Technical Adjustments classification for neutral changes to the MYA spending profile to offset the difference between the Supps Forecast and June Actual.
BudgetOY4	Offset MYA Budget OY4 Rollover	This is a subset of the Technical Adjustments classification for neutral changes to the MYA spending profile to offset the rollover of Budget OY4 into OBU OY4.
Return Sav	Return of savings to the Crown	Returning savings to the Crown is always encouraged. Departments can achieve this by constantly looking for efficiency gains through improvements in processes and technology.
Crwn Liab	Recognition of Existing Crown liability	Crown liabilities need to be recognised as soon as possible. These affect Non-Departmental Appropriations.
Other	Other changes outside the above criteria	There should be very few changes outside the above criteria, so if there are any they require extra scrutiny.

Meeting Brief: Neeta Bhushan, Indian High Commissioner

Time and date (NZT): Tuesday 17 February, 3:30pm NZT



Her Excellency Neeta Bhushan has served as India's High Commissioner to New Zealand since October 2022 and will conclude her posting in March. ^{s9(2)(a)}

High Commissioner Bhushan joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1994. As a career diplomat, she has served in Japan, Bangladesh, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. We understand you last met her during the visit of India's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Piyush Goyal, in Rotorua in November 2025.

Population: 1.47 billion	GDP (PPP, per capita): NZ\$21,476	Inflation (%): 2.75
NZ exports (NZ\$/yr): \$1.93 billion	GDP (nominal): NZ\$7.4 trillion	Key NZ exports: Travel; Fruits & nuts; Aluminium; Iron and steel; misc provisions; Wood
NZ development spend (\$/yr): Nil ^{s6(a)}		Next elections: Next general election is due by April 2029

Key objectives

- Farewell the High Commissioner and acknowledge her significant contribution to the New Zealand-India relationship.

Discussion points

- Thank the High Commissioner for her significant contribution to the bilateral relationship.
- Highlight the significant uptick in political engagement during the High Commissioner's term, including your two visits to India, Prime Minister Luxon's visit to India, several visits by Minister McClay – and inwards visits by India's President, Minister Jaishankar and Minister Goyal.
- Note that we have achieved good outcomes across the breadth of the relationship during the High Commissioner's term – in trade and economics, defence and security, and in education, sport and other areas.
- Emphasise New Zealand's intent to continue the momentum in the relationship.

^{s6(a)}

16 February 2026

Meeting Brief: New Zealand international development NGO representatives

Time and date (NZT): Wednesday 11 March, 4:00pm

Meeting attendees: **Todd Cleaver**, Executive Director, Council for International Development (CID)

Heather Campbell, Chief Executive Officer, Save the Children New Zealand (SCNZ)

Gillian Whitley, Chief Executive, Leprosy Mission New Zealand

Kate Russell, Executive Director, Hagar New Zealand

Stephen McCurdy, Executive Director, International Needs New Zealand (INNZ)

Checklist of issues

- Invite representatives to briefly introduce their organisations priorities and key activities funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Ministry).
- With the exception of CID (umbrella body), the representatives you are meeting deliver development outcomes in Southeast Asia and the Pacific funded by the Ministry. You may wish to ask for their key observations about delivering development in Southeast Asia, in comparison to their work in the Pacific. They may share insights as to where they think New Zealand's strategic opportunities and strengths lie in Southeast Asia.
- Meeting attendees will be interested in your travels to Southeast Asia including your engagement at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 2025). Highlight New Zealand's commitment to peace and security in the region, and the shared responsibility to invest in dialogue, diplomacy and development.
- Ask attendees how they engage New Zealand media to raise awareness of development issues and whether this helps their fundraising.
- *[If raised – access to humanitarian aid]* NGOs report increasing constraints on humanitarian access globally, with Israel's restrictions on NGOs in Gaza of particular concern. New Zealand has raised with Israel the importance that they uphold their international humanitarian law obligations, including ensuring safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access, including for NGOs.
- *[If raised – NGO funding pressures and the role of the multilateral system]* Global ODA cuts have reduced both direct NGO funding and the resources channelled through multilateral organisations, which – despite these declines – remain essential for securing access and delivering development and humanitarian assistance themselves alongside NGOs.

Annex 2: Biographies of attendees



Todd Cleaver is the Executive Director of CID since September, 2025. Todd previously worked with the Ministry, including as Acting Head of Mission in Suva, Fiji (2007–2009), and as Deputy Head of Mission in Thailand. You met Todd briefly at the CID Annual Conference in 2025.

The Ministry provides \$406,400 per year to CID to support their members to strengthen organisational capability for increased development impact and to coordinate the NZNGO humanitarian network.



Heather Campbell is the Chief Executive Officer for Save the Children New Zealand (SCNZ), and serves as the Deputy Chair for the CID Board.

SCNZ is funded by the Ministry to strengthen protection of children in Laos, Fiji, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands from violence, disasters and climate risks, while also improving their educational and nutritional outcomes (\$12.57m, 2026–2031).



Gillian Whitley is the Chief Executive of Leprosy Mission New Zealand (LMNZ).

LMNZ is funded by the Ministry to support greater resilience for vulnerable communities in leprosy endemic areas in Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and Timor Leste (\$3.42m, 2022–2027). Their work includes supporting community leaders and health volunteers to raise awareness of and prevent leprosy, as well as delivering responsive interventions.



Kate Russell is the Executive Director of Hagar New Zealand and serves as the Board Chair for CID. Kate Russell is an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit for services to governance and health.

Hagar is funded by the Ministry to address the needs of survivors of, and those at risk from gender-based violence and human trafficking, abuse and exploitation in Viet Nam (\$0.84M) and Cambodia (\$0.68M).



Stephen McCurdy is the Executive Director of International Needs New Zealand (INNZ).

INNZ is funded by the Ministry to support food and water security through water, sanitation and hygiene, and livelihood initiatives in Sri Lanka (\$0.84M), and to support women's economic empowerment in Fiji (\$0.81M).

Annex 3: Background for Officials

Key objectives

- Connect with a small group of non-government organisation (NGO) partners to the International Development Cooperation (IDC) programme, on their priorities and insights with respect to Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and to brief sector representatives on the same reflecting on your recent travels.

New Zealand Government – NGO partnership

- New Zealand NGOs (NZNGO) deliver positive development and humanitarian outcomes in support of New Zealand's IDC priorities and contribute funds they raise from the New Zealand public to partnerships with Ministry for extra impact.
- MFAT funds 31 NZNGOs to deliver development benefits across the Pacific and Asia. Approximately \$132 million is available to NGOs for development programmes over this triennium through to 2027 (around 4.3% of IDC) under the Partnering for Impact Programme (P4I). NGOs are contributing at least \$27 million of their resources. Approximately 17% of P4I investment is in Asia and 83% is in the Pacific.
- Some NGOs, including SCNZ, also deliver humanitarian outcomes in non-conflict settings under the New Zealand Disaster Response Partnership (NZDRP). The NZDRP has a focus on responding to disasters in the Pacific, with Southeast Asia as the second geographic priority. The Ministry partnered with NGOs in response to the severe weather that impacted Viet Nam and Bangladesh in 2024, and again in Viet Nam in 2025. SCNZ is currently delivering multiyear humanitarian programming for the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh covering 2025–2026.

Additional funding for NGO-led climate and economic resilience work

- In January 2026, the sector was informed of an additional \$24 million of development funding for NZNGOs with demonstrated success to expand Pacific climate activities. The funding is primarily drawn from the \$100m Budget 2025 annual baseline increase.
- Of the meeting attendees, SCNZ (Solomon Islands) and Leprosy Mission (Papua New Guinea) will receive additional funding. Both organisations have supported communities with climate-resilient agriculture, training nearly 1,500 people in climate-resilient agriculture in the first year, improving water supply, and providing solar powered farming equipment.

5 March 2026

Brief for FADTC: India FTA Outcomes

Introductory Statement: NZ and Trade

- The rules-based trading system has served New Zealand well – a global project of rules, predictability, deepening economic ties, and sustainable development through the progressive liberalisation of trade between all nations. But the ground is shifting and we must adapt. **Our trade strategy** has three central elements: rules, resilience, and innovation.
- We are negotiating **rules** to give New Zealand companies as much certainty as possible: supporting and strengthening the World Trade Organization rules that govern roughly three quarters of world trade; we accelerated the entry into force of the European Union Free Trade Agreement in 2024, growing exports by \$2 billion; we have concluded new FTAs with the United Arab Emirates and Gulf Cooperation Council; and we have now concluded an FTA with India, unlocking unprecedented new opportunities with the world's fastest-growing economy.
- We are focused on building **resilience** through implementing, enforcing, and expanding our existing network of FTAs, including: intensifying work on non-tariff barriers; standing up a new FTA Boost unit in the Ministry's Trade and Economic Group to leverage more value out of these agreements; concluding an Agreement on Trade in Essential Supplies with Singapore; and leading more trade missions than ever before – 17 trade missions involving hundreds of delegates, delivering over 200 commercial outcomes valued at over \$2 billion in projected trade value.
- Finally, we are working to drive trade policy **innovation**: working closely with partners to expand the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) and to develop a Green Economy Partnership Agreement (GEPA) to seize opportunities for growth in new sectors; last year, in Singapore, we launched the Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FIT-P), an initiative that has grown from four founding members (including New Zealand), to now 16 countries. The FIT-P has already delivered an agreement on supply chains and, for New Zealand's host year, we will be focusing on paperless trade, spearheading a plurilateral initiative to combat non-tariff barriers, and advancing work to address trade-distorting subsidies.

Outcomes of the NZ-India FTA negotiation

India is a strategic priority for New Zealand because of its growing global influence, economic scale, and regional importance. This FTA will create valuable opportunities to expand two-way trade with one of the largest and fastest-growing economies in the world, currently just New Zealand's 12th-largest trading partner.

Overview:

- The FTA provides New Zealand goods and services exporters with:
- preferential access to India's middle class, which within five years will be larger than the entire population of the EU or ASEAN;
- a more level playing field with key competitors who already have FTAs or other advantages in India, including Australia, UK, and Chile among others; and
 - greater opportunity for diversification, including to mitigate risks and uncertainty.
- The FTA provides valuable new access to India's goods and services market:
 - 95% of New Zealand's current exports will be tariff free (82%) or have sharply reduced tariffs (13%) – creating new opportunities for export growth;
 - From day one New Zealand traders will save an estimated **\$43 million per annum** from the elimination or reduction of tariffs immediately on entry into force, reaching an estimated **\$62 million per annum** once fully implemented. These savings are calculated at last years' trade levels, and will grow as exports increase thanks to the liberalisation of tariffs.
- **Customs Clearance:** New Zealand is the first country to secure a legally binding timeframe from India for both the customs release of all goods – **48 hours** – and a commitment to endeavour to release all perishable goods and express consignments within **24 hours**.
- The FTA also secures New Zealand's **services trade** interests, with WTO GATS-plus commitments across a significant portion of India's services market, including areas of interest for New Zealand such as tertiary and private education, professional services, and environmental services. The FTA also future-proofs New Zealand's services access by securing a **most favoured nation (MFN) commitment** which ensures that we will automatically benefit from future improvements to services access extended to other Indian FTA partners.

Key sectoral outcomes:

- **Forestry:** Immediate tariff elimination on almost all exports on day 1 of the FTA, with additional tariff benefits phased in.
- **Wool, Sheepmeat and coal:** Immediate tariff elimination on entry into force.
- **Fish and seafood:** Duty-free access on most seafood exports, including mussels and salmon, over seven years.
- **Industrial products:** Tariff elimination on most exports immediately or over time.
- **Apples:** 50 per cent tariff cut on day 1, for a quota exceeding current trade – rising to almost twice recent average trade volumes (45,000 tonnes) over six years. New Zealand will be the first country to secure FTA access for apples into India.

- **Kiwifruit:** duty-free access on day one, for a quota exceeding current trade – rising to almost four times recent average trade volumes (15,000 tonnes) over six years. Trade outside quota enjoy a 50% tariff cut (to 16.5%). This is the best access to India of any significant kiwifruit exporter.
- **Mānuka Honey:** India will cut the tariff by three quarters (from 66% to 16.5%) over 5 years, for manuka honey certified by MPI. *Note: New Zealand is the first country to secure preferential access for honey into the Indian market.*
- **Wine:** the current 150% tariff will be cut to 25% or 50% (based on import price) over 10 years from entry into force, plus an MFN commitment whereby any advantages India extends to future partners will be automatically extended to us – meaning we will always have the best access for wine into India.

In return New Zealand has provided:

- **100% tariff elimination** from day one, consistent with the UK, EU, and UAE FTAs.
- Temporary Employment Entry **visas**, in-study and post-study work rights, and a working holiday scheme (*see section on labour mobility for more information*).
- **Agricultural cooperation:** we have committed to establish an “Agriculture Productivity Partnership” to drive cooperation activities across multiple sectors. This is a strategic opportunity for New Zealand to build key relationships within India as its market evolves over the coming years and will position our exporters as partners of choice for future liberalisation of this rapidly growing market.
- A side letter has been agreed that we will commence a review to consider the protection of individual **Geographical Indicators**.

Dairy outcomes:

Consistent with its existing FTAs (including Australia and the UK) and domestic political sensitivities, India excluded any outcome on core dairy products (milk powder, cheese and butter, etc). New Zealand has, however, secured outcomes for certain dairy ingredient lines as follows:

- **Bulk infant formula and dairy-based food preparations:** 33% tariff eliminated over seven years.
- **Peptones (dairy ingredients):** 22% tariff eliminated over seven years.
- **Albumins (whey protein concentrates):** 22% tariff halved on day 1, for a New Zealand-specific quota rising from 1,000 tonnes on day one and increasing over five years to exceed recent average trade volumes (3,000 tonnes).

In addition, New Zealand negotiated two additional commitments from India:

- **Import for Re-Export Programme:** a ‘fast track’ mechanism will be implemented by entry into force of the FTA, to facilitate the tariff-free supply of New Zealand inputs – including dairy – for use by Indian processors producing products for export.
- **Dairy review mechanism:** India has committed that if it provides dairy concessions to a comparable FTA partner in future, it will consult with New Zealand on dairy market access.

Investment:

- The Investment Cooperation and Promotion chapter provides for broad cooperation, setting out potential cooperation activities between New Zealand and India in an effort to deepen the trade and investment relationship.
- It also includes a commitment for New Zealand to promote investment into India, with the aim to increase private sector investment by US\$20 billion over 15 years. (The investment commitment differs from the approach taken in the India-EFTA FTA, where the EFTA states have an obligation to invest US\$100 billion, and generate 1 million jobs, over 15 years.)
- To facilitate New Zealand investments, India will establish a bespoke ‘New Zealand Investment Desk’ to assist New Zealand investors with issues that may arise across the investment lifecycle.
- **[If required]** While the chapter is not subject to formal dispute settlement, it does provide a process of reviews and consultations following which India may impose temporary and proportionate ‘remedial measures’ if it determines that New Zealand has not met its obligation to promote investment into India.

Labour Mobility

Commitments on new visa categories

- Under the FTA, New Zealand will provide Temporary Employment Entry (TEE) visas for Indian nationals, across two categories: skilled and iconic occupations. The total number of TEE visas across both streams will average approximately **1,667 visas per annum** – i.e. capped at 5,000 three-year visas at any one time.
- TEE visas will be granted for certain **skilled occupations** averaging approximately **1,467 visas per annum** (i.e. up to 4,400 three-year visas at any one time). These skilled occupations are all derived from New Zealand’s existing **Green List** of occupations where New Zealand has a skills shortage. *[[These include: Software Engineers; Software and Applications Programmers; ICT Project Managers; Civil, Mechanical, Structural and Environmental Engineers; Construction Project Managers; Building Construction Managers; Primary and Secondary Teachers; Registered Nurses; and Physiotherapists.]]*

- For **iconic occupations**, up to an average of **200 visas per annum** will be granted (i.e. up to 600 three-year visas at any one time). This will comprise capped numbers for each of the following occupations, across three years: Ayush practitioners (Indian traditional medicine) (200 visas), chefs (250), yoga instructors (100), and music teachers (50).
- **All TEE visas – both skilled and iconic occupations – will require:** a genuine job offer from an accredited New Zealand employer; a relevant recognised tertiary-level qualification (other than iconic (chef) visas, for which a recognised diploma-level course is required); evidence of proficient English language skills; and all standard eligibility requirements of the immigration system must be met, including health and character requirements.
- There is a **three-year stand-down period** following the completion of a TEE visa which the person must spend outside New Zealand before they can re-apply for a further TEE visa.
- TEE visas **do not provide a pathway to residence.**

Working Holiday Scheme

- A new Working Holiday Scheme (WHS) will be introduced that provides young Indian nationals the ability to holiday in New Zealand, while working to support their stay. Visa conditions will align with similar WHS arrangements with other countries, including China, the UK, Korea, and Germany among others. The key elements include:
- **Up to 1,000 places** each year for Indian citizens 18-30 years old (consistent with the Australian Working Holiday Maker visa program).
- **Visas will be up to 12 months in length.**
- Applicants must have health insurance, evidence of sufficient funds to support their stay and evidence of functional English language proficiency.

Commitments on settings for existing visa categories

- Post-study work for Indian students: Indian students will be able to work after completing New Zealand-based study for:
 - Up to 2 years for graduates at the Bachelor's level (as per students from other countries, consistent with current policy).
 - Up to 3 years for graduates at the Master's level and graduates of Bachelor's degrees with First-Class Honours in STEM fields, including ICT fields.
 - Up to 4 years for graduates at the PhD level.

In-study work for Indian students

- Currently, eligible students of all nationalities can work up to 25 hours per week. Indian students will be guaranteed the right to work up to **20 hours per week** while they are studying in New Zealand regardless of any future policy changes.
- The FTA does not include a commitment to increase student numbers, nor does it prevent future governments from capping numbers.

Facilitated entry of specialist workers and businesspeople

- The agreement also facilitates the entry of specialist workers and businesspeople in line with New Zealand's existing FTA commitments with other countries (e.g. the UK and EU) and commitments under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These include for Contractual Services Suppliers, Independent Professionals, Installers and Servicers, Business Visitors, and Intra-Corporate Transferees. India has made similar commitments, although the lengths of stay and conditions will in some cases differ.

Conclusion

- This Agreement creates opportunities New Zealand exporters have never had before in India. Deepening trade and investment links offers significant potential to diversify New Zealand's export markets and boost growth.
- Partnering more closely with India helps New Zealand support a stable, rules-based trading order and advance shared interests in security and prosperity.
- Many businesses will benefit from the reduction or elimination of what are often prohibitive tariffs of between 30% to 60% and up to 150% for wine. The FTA opens up significant new opportunities, as well as providing a more level playing field with competitors from India's FTA partners who already enjoy preferential access.
- This FTA also gives our exporters more options and guaranteed access at a time when global trade conditions are unpredictable.
- The impact and value of the NZ-India FTA will grow over time – delivering greater market access through streamlined border processes and phased tariff cuts – with benefits increasing as trade relationships mature and India's economy and middle class continue to grow.

Background Brief: Consultations

Public consultations

- Public Submissions on the India FTA ran from 24 March 2024 to 15 April 2025, with 96 submissions received from businesses, industry, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society groups and the public.
- The Ministry has also continued to monitor the inbox used (as listed on the website) to receive additional insights and feedback from the public.

Industry consultations

- Negotiators also undertook further consultations where appropriate, including with relevant industry bodies.

Māori stakeholders

- Officials engaged closely with Māori trade representative groups [Ngā Toki Whakarururanga, Te Taumata, Federation of Māori Authorities, National Iwi Chairs Forum, and the Mānuka Charitable Trust] throughout the negotiations to ensure that Māori interests were considered.
- These interests included the Treaty of Waitangi exception, goods access, cooperation to support business to business engagement, traditional knowledge and traditional medicines.
- New Zealand hosted a Māori business roundtable with the Indian negotiation team during the Queenstown round in September, which included delegates from Ngai Tahu, Māori tourism, Mānuka honey, and traditional medicines. This provided an opportunity for Māori to convey directly to India their interests in the trade agreement.

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Appendix one: List of external stakeholders consulted on the FTA by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other agencies.

List of external stakeholders that have been consulted on the India New Zealand FTA by the Ministry and other agencies.	
1.	Ngā Toki Whakarururanga
2.	Iwi Chairs Forum
3.	Te Taumata
4.	Federation of Māori Authorities
5.	Mānuka Charitable Trust
6.	Quality Tertiary Institutions
7.	New Zealand Council of Trade Unions
8.	WeCreate
9.	New Zealand Apples and Pears
10.	Summerfruit NZ
11.	Mānuka Collective
12.	New Zealand Beekeeping
13.	Apiculture NZ
14.	UMF Honey Association
15.	New Zealand Beekeeping Incorporated
16.	Dairy Companies Association of New Zealand
17.	Fonterra
18.	Infant Nutrition Council
19.	Beef + Lamb NZ
20.	Meat Industry Association
21.	Wool Impact Ltd
22.	Wood Processors and Manufacturers' Association of New Zealand
23.	New Zealand Forest Owners Association

List of external stakeholders that have been consulted on the India New Zealand FTA by the Ministry and other agencies.	
24.	New Zealand Timber Industry Federation
25.	New Zealand Avocado
26.	New Zealand Winegrowers
27.	Deer NZ
28.	Federated Farmers
29.	Onions NZ
30.	Zespri
31.	NZ Horticulture Export Authority
32.	Seafood NZ
33.	New Zealand Forest Owners Association
34.	Wood Processors and Manufacturers Association
35.	NZ Timber Industry Federation
36.	Lonrix
37.	Fisher & Paykel Healthcare
38.	Nutiq360
39.	International Education Peak Body Forum
40.	Game Developers Association
41.	Honey Consulting
42.	CGB Consulting
43.	Only from New Zealand (OFNZ)
44.	Assure Quality
45.	Quality NZ
46.	BT Mining Limited
47.	Cosmetics NZ

Trade and Sustainable Development

Key Points

- The NZ-India FTA includes a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development.
- The Chapter helps ensure fair competition for NZ and Indian businesses through a commitment that neither country will reduce their environment or labour protections to encourage bilateral trade, while enabling both countries to retain flexibility to regulate for domestic interests.
- It reflects both parties' shared interest in open, fair and inclusive trade, and enables New Zealand and India to work collaboratively to strengthen their trade and sustainability credentials, while upholding their international environment and labour commitments.
- It promotes trade that contributes to sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection, and progress towards long-term (climate-related) transition strategies.

Background

- The chapter affirms New Zealand and India's existing commitments under a range of international climate, environment, and labour agreements, including the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC); the Paris Agreement; and International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.
- All obligations in this Chapter are consistent with New Zealand's current law and practice, and no legislative or policy changes are required.
- The chapter establishes a Trade and Sustainable Development Committee which will review and monitor the implementation and operation of the Chapter and its mutually beneficial cooperation activities, and address any government-to-government consultations. The Chapter is not subject to dispute resolution.

Trade and the Environment

- The chapter provides that both parties seek to protect the environment, the sustainability of ecosystems and long-term growth, and agree to strengthen policies for sustainable development.
- Environment and climate change-related cooperation provisions allow for information exchange and action in both Parties' interests in areas including:
 - biodiversity conservation and preventing the spread of invasive alien species;
 - conservation and sustainable management of forests and trade in sustainable forest products, and combatting illegal logging;

- addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and promoting sustainable fishing practices; and
- exploring opportunities for climate and energy solutions, climate-smart and climate-resilient agriculture; and the bilateral trading of emissions reductions and removals (under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement).

Trade and Labour

- The Chapter affirms each Party's commitment to implement International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions already ratified and to realise the fundamental ILO principles and rights at work for workers in both countries.
- Parties will enhance cooperation through the sharing of information and experience in areas of mutual interest such as:
 - responsible business conduct;
 - human capital development and the enhancement of employability including through lifelong learning and education, training and skills development;
 - promoting productive quality employment and green entrepreneurship; and
 - the ILO Decent Work Agenda.

Trade and Gender Equality

- The Chapter includes provisions on Trade and Gender Equality, recognising the importance of gender equality and of the empowerment and participation of all women in advancing sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development, and of adapting, maintaining and implementing women's economic empowerment and equality laws, regulations, policies and best practice.
- Parties shall endeavour to:
 - foster women's entrepreneurship and leadership and promote women's access to the benefits and opportunities of this Agreement; and
 - cooperate to share information and strengthen programmes aimed at enhancing women's participation in economic activity and trade, while identifying and addressing barriers faced by women.
- Parties further agree to implement the Agreement in a manner advancing the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in the economy, while protecting and promoting their human rights and economic well-being.

Comparability of Outcomes

- The chapter surpasses outcomes within the Australia-India ECTA (which does not contain provisions on trade and labour, gender, the environment, or climate change) and the UAE-India CEPA (which includes limited environmental cooperation elements but is silent on climate change, labour and gender equality). Chapter outcomes are broadly comparable with the TSD Chapter of the EFTA-India TEPA, with NZ securing more favourable outcomes across trade and gender, climate change and fisheries.

Chapter Overviews

Trade in Goods

The Trade in Goods chapter provides the basis for the liberalisation of customs duties. The chapter text provides a mechanism for the Parties to consider accelerating, or broadening the scope of liberalisation set out in the annexed tariff schedules. It contains key provisions common across many FTAs, including incorporating key WTO provisions relating to national treatment, administrative fees and formalities, customs valuations, import and export restrictions, import licencing, and non-tariff measures.

It also provides for duty-free temporary admission of goods, of commercial samples, and goods that re-enter after repair or alteration, and reiterates the parties' commitments not to apply agricultural export subsidies. The chapter also commits to sharing data on FTA preference utilisation and establishes contact points through which a Party can request detailed information and consultations relating to any measure it considers may materially affect trade in goods between the Parties, with a view to resolving any concerns about the measure.

The chapter also establishes a Committee on Trade in Goods for monitoring the implementation of the chapter and promoting bilateral trade, promptly addressing non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, and ensuring future tariff transpositions do not alter the Parties' tariff commitments.

Rules of Origin

Modern rules of origin provisions have been secured for New Zealand exporters in the NZ–India FTA. The NZ–India FTA rules of origin are aligned with New Zealand's existing FTAs, making it easier for New Zealand exporters to understand and comply with the Agreement. The chapter is forward-looking, promoting the use of electronic systems and paperless trade to further enhance efficiency and enables approved exporters to self declare their goods from entry into force, with potential to expand self declaration out to all exporters or producers following a review after 5 years.

Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation

The CPTF chapter will strengthen customs cooperation between the Parties and ensure that customs procedures are applied in a manner that is predictable, consistent, and transparent. It ensures information on customs laws and

requirements is published online and easily accessible, and establishes access to advance rulings for origin, classification, and valuation purposes. Collectively, these measures simplify compliance and give traders greater certainty and predictability, enabling them to make well-informed decisions in their trade activities.

The Chapter also provides for enhanced trade facilitation measures that will reduce costs for New Zealand exporters through streamlined electronic processing and faster border clearance. Provided all regulatory requirements have been met, goods will be released by customs within 48 hours of arrival, with a further commitment to endeavour to release perishable goods and express consignments within 24 hours.

Trade Remedies

The Trade Remedies chapter maintains WTO rules which will apply to the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties and to the application of global safeguards on trade between the Parties. These rules also protect the interests of New Zealand exporters faced with trade remedy actions by the Indian government. The chapter also provides both parties with the opportunity to apply a Bilateral Safeguard Mechanism (BSM) in the event of serious injury or threat of serious injury from an increase in imports due to tariff eliminations and tariff reductions under the FTA.

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)

India and New Zealand have agreed a comprehensive forward leading Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) chapter. The agreement promotes the use of enhanced cooperation, risk assessments, equivalence and regionalisation to help further facilitate trade in primary products. It strongly promotes the recognition of international standards, and provides for the non-discriminatory issuance of import permits without undue delay, along with a transparent border rejection appeals procedures. It sets up regular meetings to discuss any implementation matter and to initiate and conclude further SPS-based implementing arrangements including those providing for simplified certification, expedited border clearances, and reduced sanitary import permit requirements. It also provides for an overarching committee to consider and conclude implementing arrangements on any other non-tariff measure that is jointly regulated by the relevant competent authorities. While the agreement currently exempts the chapter from dispute settlement processes (DSP), it provides for enhanced timebound technical consultations where both sides are obligated to find solutions, and the application of DSP is required to be formally reviewed in 4 years. Like all technical chapters, the most important aspect is the commitment both parties are making to work more cooperatively together to find solutions to help further promote safe trade.

Technical barriers to trade (TBT)

The objective of the Technical Barriers to Trade chapter is to facilitate trade in goods by reducing unnecessary barriers to trade in order to lower costs for exporters. The chapter includes various mechanisms to support such outcomes such as improved transparency on technical regulations, commitments on marking and labelling, and greater cooperation on matters of mutual interest relating to standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures.

Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals Annexes.

- These Annexes are designed to reduce unnecessary regulatory barriers in the approval of medical devices and facilitate collaboration on relevant international initiatives.

Wine, Whisky, and Distilled Spirits Annex

- The Annex covers the full range of New Zealand's wine, including wines under 0.5% alc/vol. It will provide exporters confidence that they can use 'wine' as a product name for the full scope of their products and increases clarity on what exporters can put on labels for wine destined for India. The annex also includes transitional provisions including for stock in transit should regulations change, as well as provisions on certification. Crucially, the Annex establishes a Working Group to provide a forum for both parties to discuss, progress, and aim to arrive at solutions on issues of interest. For New Zealand this includes topics such winemaking practices and supplementary labelling.

Organics

- An interim organics mutual recognition arrangement (IMRA) has been agreed as a transitional measure until such time that a full assessment of each other's organic technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures can be made and a wider bilateral mutual recognition arrangement (MRA) agreed. The IMRA provides for two-way trade in unprocessed and processed organic horticultural products (including wine) from day one based on certification it meets a mutually recognised third country's standard. This will be the first time New Zealand has access to the Indian market for organic products, and should provide for additional opportunities particularly for our apple, kiwifruit, processed food and wine export sectors.

Investment Promotion

The Investment Cooperation and Promotion Chapter provides for broad cooperation between New Zealand and India in an effort to deepen the trade and investment relationship. The chapter sets out cooperation activities that may take place such as trade delegations, workshops, and events to promote two way investment and build the investment relationship between our two countries.

The chapter also includes a commitment for New Zealand to promote investment into India with the aim to increase private sector investment by US\$20 billion over 15 years. To facilitate New Zealand investments, India will establish a bespoke 'New Zealand Investment Desk' to assist New Zealand investors with any issues that arise across the investment life-cycle. This commitment is part of a balanced and commercially meaningful outcome across the wider agreement. It applies only to private sector investment.

The chapter is not subject to dispute settlement, including Investor-State Dispute-Settlement, though there is a 'remedial' process available to India

Trade in Services

New Zealand's services trade interests have also been secured, including through India making commitments on almost 100 additional sectors above its WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments, and crucially a most favoured nation (MFN) commitment which ensures that we will automatically benefit from any future improvements to services access extended to other Indian FTA partners.

Sectors of interest to New Zealand, which India has committed, include engineering services, environmental service, tertiary and adult education, audio-visual services.

The Trade in Services chapter was accompanied by annexes on financial services, telecommunications, professional services, health mobility and traditional medicines, and the movement of natural persons. In combination these annexes provided robust and comprehensive rules to ensure New Zealand service suppliers will be able to access the India market on conditions no less favourable than our trade competitors, and in many sectors, than domestic Indian services providers. In particular, the health mobility and traditional medicine annex sets up a process for Rongoa Maori practitioners to engage with the Indian market, while the financial services annex contains ambitious disciplines for the financial services sector, including rules to help advance FinTech and e-payment systems, including ambitious rules on the processing and location of financial data.

Similar to the Trade in Services chapter, the Movement of natural persons (MNP) annex and commitments sets in place the rules and eligibility criteria that will allow

skilled services providers to travel to and from each country – ensuring we are able to access the best of India’s skilled workers, while also opening the Indian market to our young, entrepreneurial service suppliers looking to expand into the Indian market. This includes reciprocal contractual service supplier (CSS), and intra-corporate transferee commitments that will allow New Zealanders access to the Indian market.

In addition, New Zealand has made temporary employment entry commitments with India for occupations that are highly skilled or iconic to India. New Zealand has agreed to provide the equivalent of 1,667 three-year temporary employment entry (TEE) visas per annum (capped at a maximum of 5,000 at any point in time). This number is less than 6% of the average number of total skilled visas issued each year by New Zealand and around 17% of those issued to Indian citizens each year.

Of the 1,677 TEE visas, 1,466 visas are aside for 13 skilled occupations, drawn from the Immigration NZ’s ‘Green List’ of occupations that have a skills shortage. The other 200 visas per annum would be issued in ‘iconic’ Indian occupations (Yoga, music, chefs and ayurvedic practitioners). New Zealand has also given India a working holiday scheme with up to 1,000 places per annum, has provided Indian students with the right to work for up to 20 hours per week while studying (current practice is 25 hours per week) and to work for a set period, ranging from two years for those graduating with a bachelor’s degree, to four years for PhDs after they have complete their programmes of study.

Across the services chapter, and within the commitments New Zealand has made to India, we have ensured that New Zealand retains the necessary policy exceptions to regulate into the future. This includes the safeguards employed in the movement of natural persons commitments, which are designed to protect the labour market from a surplus of overseas workers impacting any one occupation or sector.

Competition Policy

The Competition Chapter promotes fair competition and consumer welfare in order to facilitate trade and investment flows between New Zealand and India and support the efficient functioning of each Party’s market. The Chapter requires both Parties to maintain and enforce competition laws that address anti-competitive practices and ensure that these laws apply to all commercial activities, including public enterprises. It also enables cooperation between the Parties’ competition authorities on enforcement and policy matters, and provides procedural safeguards to ensure transparency and fairness.

Intellectual Property

This chapter confirms important intellectual property (IP) rules from TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and other international IP agreements. These provide greater transparency and certainty for our innovation

focused exporters, while also recognising the interests of intellectual property users and the public. The chapter also provides opportunities for greater cooperation with India on IP issues including issues related to genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.

Under a Side Letter, we have agreed to undertake a review of GI protections with a view to matching protections we have agreed with the EU, including to allow for protections of individual GI names. The review will start on signature of the agreement and be completed within 6 months of the agreement entering into force. The public will have a chance to have input, including in relation to the protection of any nominated names.

Trade and Sustainable Development

The objective of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter is for New Zealand and India to work collaboratively to strengthen both countries' Trade and Sustainability credentials, while upholding their international commitments. The parties agree to promote international trade in such a way as to contribute towards broad-based, sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, high levels of environmental protection, progress towards long-term strategies for transition, and to work to integrate and reflect this in their trade relationship.

The Chapter includes a range of reciprocal trade and environment and trade and labour commitments, including that neither party will use their labour or environmental standards to restrict trade, or to lower these for trade advantage. It establishes a Trade and Sustainable Development Committee which will review and monitor the implementation and operation of the Chapter and its mutually beneficial cooperation activities.

SMEs

The SMEs chapter follows a similar approach to the equivalent chapters in our other FTAs. It provides for cooperation between the Parties to enhance the ability of SMEs to benefit from the opportunities arising under the Agreement.

The chapter also provides for key information about the Agreement to be available online. This includes information that would be useful for SMEs interested in taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the Agreement.

The chapter establishes contact points that are responsible for exchanging information, including sharing best practice in supporting SMEs, facilitating communication between the Parties and coordinating cooperation initiatives.

The chapter is not subject to dispute settlement.

Economic Cooperation and Technical Assistance

The Economic Cooperation and Technical Assistance Chapter provides opportunities to grow durable, long term, and mutually beneficial relationships between India and New Zealand including through dedicated cooperation in areas of Indian interest. As part of this comprehensive chapter on cooperation, an “Agriculture Productivity Partnership” has been established to drive cooperation activities across multiple sectors. A Committee on Economic Cooperation and Technical Assistance has also been created to progress cooperation in non-agricultural areas.

Working Groups will be established led by the relevant government agencies of each party, which can include experts from outside of Government. These Working Groups will ensure cooperation projects are robust, led by experts and specifically targeted where they are required. Areas of interest identified for potential Working Groups include forestry, horticulture, apiculture and honey, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture, wine, traditional knowledge and medicine, tourism, audio visual production and sports.

Cultural, Trade, Traditional Knowledge and Economic Cooperation Chapter

This chapter provides a framework to pursue mutual cooperation to enable and advance the Parties’ economic and cultural aspirations, including Māori for New Zealand. It acknowledges the role that trade can play to address economic disparities and to enhance trade for, with, and between them. It also identifies the importance of traditional language, culture and heritage preservation and promotion to achieving economic benefit and cultural continuity.

Activities covered by the cooperation framework include information exchanges on best practices and technical matters, traditional medicine collaboration including for AYUSH and rongoā Māori practitioners, business to business exchanges including Māori and tribal enterprises and to enhance the ability for businesses to benefit from this Agreement, science, research and innovation, tourism, cultural exchanges, and trade missions.

Traditional knowledge cooperation, preservation and protection is a strong feature of this Chapter to achieving shared economic growth, cultural preservation and sustainability, including drawing on defensive protection mechanisms that assist in preventing the misappropriation of traditional knowledge such as India’s Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) and New Zealand’s Māori Cultural and Intellectual

Property Committees. Cooperation activities can include exchanges, training, and research on traditional medicines and health standards and qualifications, biodiversity, traditional cultural expressions, arts, crafts, dance, music and tourism.

The Parties recognise that for New Zealand, cooperation under this Chapter should be implemented in a manner consistent with te Tiriti o Waitangi / the Treaty of Waitangi.

Legal and Institutional Chapters

The FTA includes chapters that provide for its legal and institutional framework. These chapters facilitate the structure of committees, transparency, and State-to-State settlement of disputes. They also facilitate the overall operation of the FTA including entry into force and amendment and provide for general review at regular intervals. The FTA also secures exceptions to ensure both governments can continue to regulate in the public interest.

The Treaty of Waitangi exception, included in all New Zealand's contemporary FTAs, allows the New Zealand Government to fulfil its obligations under te Tiriti o Waitangi / the Treaty of Waitangi.

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
Supplementary Information

Benefits for Māori economy

- In a first for India, a **Culture, Trade, Traditional Knowledge and Economic Cooperation Chapter** provides a new platform to advance Māori economic aspirations with India.
- For NZ, **cooperation** undertaken and implemented in manner **consistent with Treaty of Waitangi**.
- Framework for **Māori-owned enterprises to benefit from trade and investment opportunities** including businesses derived from traditional knowledge, biodiversity and traditional cultural expressions.
- **Collaboration in training and research** between Indian traditional medicine (AYUSH) and Rongoā Māori practitioners.
- Binding commitment to check **new patent applications** do not inappropriately appropriate traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.

As with all of New Zealand's free trade agreements since 2001, our agreement with India contains a **Treaty of Waitangi clause** that protects the New Zealand Government's ability to adopt any policy it considers necessary to fulfil its obligations to Māori.

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Apples quota

Average NZ trade (2022-2024)	Current Tariff	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6 onwards
23,603 tonnes (MT)	50%	32,500 MT at 25%	35,000 MT at 25%	37,500 MT at 25%	40,000 at 25%	42,500 at 25%	45,000 MT at 25%

Quota details:

- Season: Entry into India from 1 April – 31 August
- CIF price: ≥US\$1.25/kg
- Quota administration: NZ to issue export certificates

Kiwifruit quota

Average NZ trade (2022-2024)	Current Tariff	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6 onward
3,984 tonnes (MT)	33%	6,250 MT at 0%	8,000 MT at 0%	9,750 MT at 0%	11,500 at 0%	13,250 at 0%	15,000 MT at 0%
	33%	Unlimited at 16.5%					

Quota details:

- Entry into India: 1 April – 31 August
- CIF price: ≥US\$1.80/kg
- Quota administration: NZ to issue export certificates

Out of quota preferential tariff:

- Year-round
- CIF price: ≥US\$2.50/kg (below that, the standard 33% tariff applies)

Albumins quota

Average NZ trade (2022-2024)	Current Tariff	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
2,814 tonnes (MT)	22%	1,000 MT at 11%	1,500 MT at 11%	2,000 MT at 11%	2,500 MT at 11%	3,000 MT at 11%

Mānuka honey

Average NZ trade (2022-2024)	Current Tariff	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5 onwards
7 tonnes (MT)	66%	US\$20-30/kg: <u>200MT</u> at 56.1%	US\$20-30/kg: <u>200MT</u> at 46.2%	US\$20-30/kg: <u>200MT</u> at 36.3%	US\$20-30/kg: <u>200MT</u> at 26.4%	US\$20-30/kg: <u>200MT</u> at 16.5%
	66%	US\$30+/kg: <u>Unlimited</u> at 56.1%	US\$30+/kg: <u>Unlimited</u> at 46.2%	US\$30+/kg: <u>Unlimited</u> at 36.3%	US\$30+/kg: <u>Unlimited</u> at 26.4%	US\$30+/kg: <u>Unlimited</u> at 16.5%

Quota details:

- Eligible: Mānuka honey certified by MPI
- CIF price: ≥US\$20 per kg but below US\$30 per kg
- Quota administration: NZ to issue export certificates

Out of quota preferential tariff:

- Eligible: Mānuka honey certified by MPI
- CIF price: ≥US\$30 per kg

MTI Proposed Travel 2026 / key international meetings hosted in NZ

Destination(s)	Timing	Comment
Switzerland <i>CONFIRMED</i>	21-24 January	WTO-mini-ministerial meeting, FIT Partnership meeting
s6(a)		
s6(a)		
sb(a)		
Cameroon for WTO MC14 <i>CONFIRMED</i>	26 March – 1 April (these are the meeting dates)	WTO 14 th Ministerial Conference 26-29 March, with potential to run into 30 March. Arrive back in NZ 1 April
India	Late March/early April TBC	Possible signing of India FTA
s9(2)(g)(i)		
s6(e)(vi)		
s6(a)		

s6(e)(vi)		
Suzhou, China <i>CONFIRMED</i>	22-23 May	APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade meeting.
s6(a)		
s6(a), s6(e)(vi)		
s6(a)		
s6(a)		
s6(a)		

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s6(a)

s6(a)

Auckland	17 July	New Zealand-hosted Future of Investment and Trade (FIT) Partnership Ministerial Meeting
Philippines	19-20 September	58 th Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and Related Meetings (AEM) 5 th RCEP Ministers Meeting s6(a)

s6(a)

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s6(a)

Travel yet to be scheduled

s9(2)(g)(i)

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Meeting with Korean People Power Party (PPP) delegation

Suggested Talking Points

- Note the importance of our bilateral relationship in the increasingly **complex geostrategic and trading environment**. Korea is a trusted partner, with shared democratic values and support for the international rules-based order.
- Welcome the elevation of the Korea - New Zealand relationship to a **Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP)** last year. This is a foundational achievement and sets out many pathways for expanding cooperation.
- Note the importance of our **bilateral trade and economic relationship**. Korea is New Zealand's sixth largest trading partner. Our trade has more than doubled since the Korea New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (KNZFTA) entered into force ten years ago.

Background

1. The People Power Party (PPP) is Korea's main opposition party. It sits on the centre-right to right of Korea's political spectrum, with a conservative, pro-market and security-focused orientation. The PPP lost power in the June 2025 Presidential election following the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol for imposing martial law. President Lee Jae Myung (leader of the liberal centre-left Democratic Party) now leads Korea's Government.
2. New Zealand enjoys an increasingly trusted partnership with Korea. Our bond was forged when New Zealand deployed more than 6,000 personnel during the Korean War. Today, Korea is our sixth largest trading partner, fourth largest source of international students, a close defence and security partner, and we are engaging more on issues like critical minerals and Antarctic science.
3. The CSP, signed by Prime Minister Luxon and President Lee in October 2025, elevated New Zealand's relationship with Korea and established new initiatives that enable smoother regulatory access, closer people-to-people ties, and greater educational and cultural exchanges.
4. The KNZFTA has more than doubled two-way trade over its 10 years but has disproportionately benefitted Korea which is now one of our largest trade imbalances. In the year ending September 2025 (latest data) New Zealand exported NZD 3.12 billion to Korea and imported NZD 5.51 billion – a total trade value of NZD 8.63 billion. Our major exports are tourism, dairy, aluminium, fruit (kiwifruit) and timber. Refined fuels dominate imports.

*North Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
February 2026*

India FTA – Background for Christchurch Event

Key Points

- The FTA provides New Zealand goods and services exporters with:
 - preferential access to India's middle class, which within five years will be larger than the entire population of the EU or ASEAN;
 - a more level playing field with key competitors who already have FTAs or other advantages in India, including Australia, UK, and Chile among others; and
 - greater opportunity for diversification, including to mitigate risks and uncertainty.
- Tariff elimination or reduction on 95 percent of our exports.
- Duty-free access on almost 57 percent of New Zealand's exports from day one, increasing to 82 percent when fully implemented, with the remaining 13 percent being subject to sharp tariff cuts.
- Immediate tariff elimination on sheep meat, wool, coal and over 95 per cent of forestry and wood exports.

Background

India has a population of 1.4 billion with a large and growing middle class expected to number 700 million by 2030. It has the fastest growing economy in the G20 and is projected to become the third-largest economy globally, with GDP expected to reach approximately NZ\$12 trillion by 2030.

The FTA eliminates or reduces tariffs **on 95% of NZ current exports to India – among the highest of any Indian FTA**. This includes

- **Sheep meat:** New Zealand used to provide 85% of India's sheep meat imports. Now it's just 9%. NZ-India FTA delivers 33% tariff removed at Entry into Force (EIF). 2.75% tariff on wool also removed at EIF.
- **Fish & Seafood:** Australian fish and seafood exports increased 269% in first two years of its FTA with India; New Zealand's dropped 67%. Our FTA delivers tariff elimination on 90% of fish and seafood over seven years.
- **Horticulture:** NZ-India FTA delivers tariff preference on 98% of current trade at EIF (apples, kiwifruit). Tariff elimination on cherries, blueberries, persimmons and avocados over 10 years

- **Forestry:** Australian forestry exports increased by 119% in the first two years of its FTA; our exports fell by 19% over that period. Our FTA **most tariffs removed immediately (96% current trade) Nearly all tariffs removed (99.8%)** once fully phased in.
- **Industrial goods and manufacturing:** **Most tariffs** on New Zealand's industrial manufacturing goods exports are **eliminated** under the FTA, for example:
 - Furniture tariffs (averaging 22%) almost all eliminated
 - Industrial machinery tariffs (averaging 9%) most eliminated
 - Precision instrument tariffs (averaging 10%) most reduced or eliminated
 - Metal fabrication (averaging 10%) most eliminated
 - Wood product tariffs (averaging 10%) almost all eliminated

CANTERBURY (Provided by Business Canterbury and MFAT)

- In Canterbury it's estimated that **around 16% of workers (more than one in 10) are in sectors set to benefit most from New Zealand's improved access to the Indian Market as a result of the FTA** – higher than the 14% nationally.
- These sectors include agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; food processing and manufacturing; and general manufacturing, which account for around 17% of the region's economy.
- Canterbury is New Zealand's largest agricultural region by GDP – producing 20% of NZ's total agricultural output and employing 20,000 people.
- The manufacturing sector employs 40,000 people in the region – with 38% of that manufacturing activity tied to food processing.