

16 October 2026

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Personal details removed for proactive release

OIA 31283

Thank you for your email of 14 September 2026, in which you request the following under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA):

RNZ reported on it in "NZ Walks Away from Multibillion-Dollar Defence Bank"

Personal details removed, 5 October 2026, <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/politics/1743288/new-zealand-walks-away-from-multi-billion-dollar-defence-bank>), and the article says that this report includes the advice provided to ministers in late July 2026.

I understand the Ministry usually publishes notable OIA responses towards the end of each month. If possible, I would be grateful if a copy could be sent to me directly, or published on your OIA responses website (<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses>), slightly ahead of that monthly release schedule.

We have interpreted your request as relating to the enclosed submission titled, *Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank*, dated 23 July 2026. Some information is withheld under the following sections of the OIA:

- 6(a): to avoid prejudicing the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the New Zealand Government;
- 6(b)(i): to protect the passing of information from another government on a confidential basis;
- 9(2)(a): to protect individuals' privacy;
- 9(2)(ba)(i): to protect the supply of confidential information by a third party; and
- 9(2)(g)(i): to protect the free and frank expression of opinions by departments.

Where the information has been withheld under section 9 of the OIA, no public interest in releasing the information has been identified that would override the reasons for withholding it.

Please note that it is our policy to proactively release our responses to official information requests where possible. Therefore, our response to your request (with your

personal information removed) may be published on the Ministry website:
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/contact-us/official-information-act-responses/

If you have any questions about this decision, you can contact us by email at:
DM-ESD@mfat.govt.nz. You have the right to seek an investigation and review by the
Ombudsman of this decision by contacting www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone
0800 802 602.

Nāku noa, nā

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'SC' with a stylized flourish.

Sarah Corbett
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade



23 July 2026

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

29 July 2026

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To provide advice on Canada's invitation to join the Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank initiative and propose a New Zealand response.

Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For concurrence by	31 July 2026
Minister of Finance	For information by	31 July 2026
Minister for Trade and Investment	For concurrence by	31 July 2026
Minister of Defence	For concurrence by	31 July 2026

Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE s9(2)(a)
James Waite	Divisional Manager	Americas Division	
Tui Dewes	Unit Manager Canada	Americas Division	

Minister's Office to complete

☐ Approved	☐ Noted	☐ Referred
☐ Needs amendment	☐ Declined	☐ Withdrawn
☐ Overtaken by events	☐ See Minister's notes	

Comments

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

Key points

- Canada is spearheading the establishment of a Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank (DSRB) with predominately Euro-Atlantic countries and has been lobbying New Zealand to participate. The purpose of the multilateral lending institution is to mobilise predictable, long-term, and low-cost capital for member countries and their defence firms struggling to access financing to support defence, security, and resilience priorities.
- Prime Minister Carney wrote to Prime Minister Luxon in March 2026 inviting New Zealand to participate in the Charter negotiations for the DSRB. Our Prime Minister responded that we would carefully consider potential DSRB membership. ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)}
- In line with our Foreign Policy Reset ambition to strengthen our relationship with Canada ^{s6(a)}
we have considered the ask thoroughly before recommending an approach. This has included: consulting with the Ministry of Defence, NZTE, and Treasury; ^{s6(a)}
and considering the needs of our defence industry.
- ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
- ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
- Though the quantum of any DSRB contribution remains unclear, ^{s6(b)(i)}
, our estimate is that New Zealand membership of the DSRB could cost upwards of NZ\$100 million.
- ^{s6(a)}
- ^{s6(b)(i)}
- We recommend against New Zealand joining the DSRB at this time, but we will continue to monitor developments.

John Subritzky
for Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|----------|
| 1 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that the DSRB primarily aims to provide long-term and low-cost access to capital for member countries and their defence firms, ^{s6(a)} | Yes / No |
| 3 | s9(2)(ba)(i) | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that New Zealand membership of the DSRB could require a contribution upwards of NZ\$100 million, as well as other resourcing implications; | Yes / No |
| 5 | s6(b)(i), s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 6 | Agree that, ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
New Zealand should not join the DSRB at this time; | Yes / No |
| 7 | Agree that New Zealand should communicate this decision to Canada through our High Commissioner in Ottawa; | Yes / No |
| 8 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister for Trade and Investment, and Minister of Defence. | Yes / No |

Rt Hon Winston Peters
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Date: / /

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

Report

Background and rationale for the DSRB

1. The Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank (DSRB) was first proposed in 2025 by the DSRB Development Group, a coalition of leaders from finance, defence, academic, and multilateral institutions, to address access to finance issues affecting defence readiness and resilience. The core purpose of the DSRB is to mobilise predictable, long-term, and low-cost capital to support member countries' shared defence, security, and resilience priorities. The DSRB is expected to provide loans to member countries to fund sovereign defence capabilities, as well as loan guarantees and direct funding to their small and medium-sized defence firms.

Canada's leadership of the DSRB and Charter negotiations

2. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney agreed to Canada assuming leadership of the DSRB's establishment in early 2026 and aims to have it operational during 2027.
s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

3. Prime Minister Carney issued invitations to partner countries, including New Zealand, to participate in the Canada-hosted DSRB Charter negotiations in late March in Montréal. The Charter negotiations for the DSRB took place over two rounds in March and April 2026 and have now concluded. It was announced at the NATO Summit in Ankara, Türkiye on 7 July 2026 that Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye, and Ukraine have committed to joining the DSRB.
s6(b)(i)

New Zealand's invitation and response

4. In response to Prime Minister Carney's letter of invitation in March, Prime Minister Luxon advised that New Zealand would give the proposal careful consideration.
s6(a)

5. In line with our Foreign Policy Reset ambition to strengthen our relationship with Canada,
s6(a)

we have considered the ask thoroughly before recommending an approach. This has included: analysing the DSRB negotiating materials and outcome documents; seeking further advice from

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

Canada; consulting with the Ministry of Defence, NZTE, and Treasury;^{s6(b)(i)}
and considering the needs of our defence industry.

DSRB use case: New Zealand's defence sector

6. The DSRB at face value aligns with New Zealand's renewed focus on defence, as set out in the 2025 Defence Capability Plan and supporting Defence Industry Strategy. The Defence Capability Plan signals a significant uplift in defence investment, with the Government aiming to increase defence expenditure from approximately 1% of GDP to more than 2% of GDP over the next decade.
7. The Defence Industry Strategy identifies three key objectives: harnessing New Zealand industry capability to deliver defence outcomes; increasing participation in international defence supply chains; and supporting innovation and advanced manufacturing.
8. While improved access to finance may contribute to achieving these objectives, the Strategy does not currently identify the establishment of a dedicated defence investment bank or multilateral defence financing mechanism as a priority intervention.
9. ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
10. ^{s9(2)(ba)(i)}

^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
11. ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
12. On balance, available evidence suggests that industry would derive greater benefit from measures that improve market opportunities and strengthen participation in domestic and international defence supply chains than from the establishment of a dedicated defence financing mechanism, including given the likely cost of DSRB membership.
13. ^{s6(b)(i)}

^{s9(2)(g)(i)}

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s9(2)(g)(i)

DSRB economic case: cost of membership

s6(b)(i)

our estimate is that New Zealand membership of the DSRB could cost upwards of NZ\$100 million. s6(b)(i)

14. There would also be ongoing resourcing implications associated with the DSRB's governance, s6(b)(i)

15. The DSRB is designed to achieve and maintain an AAA credit rating. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

The expected contribution of NZ\$100 million s9(2)(g)(i)

16. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(b)(i)

17. s6(b)(i)

Assessment

18. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Canada: Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

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Released under the Official Information Act 1982