Ministry Statements & Speeches:
Mr. Chair, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates,
I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition — Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and my own country, Mexico.
At the outset, the New Agenda Coalition congratulates you, Ambassador Lok Bahadur Thapa of Nepal, on your assumption as Chair of the First Committee. You can count on the NAC’s support.
Chair,
The New Agenda Coalition — the NAC — was established as a cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States united by a common objective: to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, including through the full implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Our position remains grounded in a simple principle: nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing, and the credibility of the Treaty depends on the implementation of both.
That principle has particular importance today.
It is particularly concerning that we are witnessing a deterioration of the international security environment, in which nuclear weapons are acquiring greater prominence , instead of having their role progressively diminished, pursuant to commitments undertaken under the NPT.
Nuclear arsenals are being modernized and expanded.
Nuclear weapons remain key to security doctrines and extended deterrence arrangements.
Nuclear rhetoric and threats have become more frequent, while important elements of the disarmament and arms control architecture have been weakened, lost or disregarded.
These negative trends undermine and reverse the limited achievements toward the pending and urgent priority of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.
For the NAC, a more difficult security environment cannot become the rationale for greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
The increased prominence of nuclear weapons deepens existing risks, reinforces nuclear competition, and further erodes confidence in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
It is precisely in times of greater tension and uncertainty that arms control and nuclear disarmament commitments and obligations have proven most useful and are most needed.
Chair,
The fundamental problem facing the NPT today is not a lack of agreed commitments.
In 1995, the indefinite extension of the Treaty with the imperative of “permanence with accountability” was accompanied by decisions to advance its implementation and strengthen accountability.
In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States adopted an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
In 2010, States Parties agreed on an Action Plan containing concrete commitments on nuclear disarmament.
Yet, more than three decades after the 1995 decisions, the gap between what has been agreed and what has been implemented continues to grow.
The failure, for the third consecutive Review Conference, to agree on a substantive outcome or meaningful steps forward is a serious setback for the Treaty.
But it does not create a vacuum, nor does it release States Parties from obligations and commitments already undertaken under the Treaty.
The decisions and resolution of 1995, the commitments agreed in 2000, and the 2010 Action Plan, remain valid until fully implemented.
Their reaffirmation is necessary.
Their implementation, indispensable and urgent.
Chair,
The challenge now is to translate those commitments into action.
The erosion of the disarmament and arms control architecture makes this all the more necessary.
With New START expired and no successor agreement in place, the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals are no longer subject to legally binding numerical limits on their strategic nuclear forces or mutual inspection or monitoring systems.
In this context, renewed dialogue, restraint and practical, meaningful measures to reduce nuclear risks are essential.
The NAC supports such efforts.
But reducing immediate dangers is not enough.
Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear risks are complementary to, but cannot substitute for nuclear disarmament.
What is needed is concrete, verifiable and irreversible progress towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Implementation also requires accountability.
The indefinite extension of the NPT was predicated upon the notion that progress in the implementation of the Treaty would be subject to periodic review.
States Parties must be able to determine whether nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments are actually being fulfilled by the nuclear-weapon States.
Vertical and horizontal comparability across nuclear-weapon States’ reporting to determine their progress, or lack thereof, remains essential.
Despite the failure to advance related measures on Transparency & Accountability at this year’s NPT Review Conference, this issue continues to be a matter of the highest priority for the NAC, as it should also be for the nuclear-weapon States.
Chair,
The upcoming First Review Conference of the TPNW will also provide an opportunity to reinforce the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.
The NAC reaffirms that the TPNW is fully consistent with the NPT and that both Treaties offer a sound and mutually-reinforcing legal framework for nuclear disarmament.
Chair,
The urgency of nuclear disarmament is inseparable from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
Scientific knowledge continues to demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons would have consequences far beyond national borders and beyond the capacity of any State to respond adequately.
The report of the United Nations Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War next year will deepen our understanding of these consequences, but we already know enough to act.
This reality must remain at the centre of our work.
Chair,
It is in this context, that the New Agenda Coalition presents its draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments.”
Its message is clear.
The international security environment may have changed, but the obligations contained in the NPT have not.
Agreed commitments cannot be set aside because their implementation has become more difficult.
Nor can repeated failures to reach consensus weaken what States Parties have already agreed.
The task before us is to urgently close the gap between commitment and implementation — and to ensure that the commitments made in 1995, 2000 and 2010 are not merely remembered as promises of another time, but actually fulfilled today.
At a moment when nuclear weapons are once again being presented as instruments of security, we must offer a different vision.
A safer world will not be built by giving nuclear weapons greater prominence, but by reducing their role and salience, reducing nuclear dangers, and ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons.
That is not only the underlying purpose of the New Agenda Coalition. It is a responsibility shared by us all, for our world, for our peoples.
I thank you, Chair