Ministry Statements & Speeches:
Resolutions L.53 Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,
L.54 No first placement of weapons in outer space.
Decision L.52 Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities
Chair
I am speaking on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We are explaining our vote on Resolutions L.53 and L.54 as well as our position on the Decision L.52.
Chair
We voted against the Resolutions L.53 and L.54 because they do not offer a viable path towards a stable and secure space environment. We further note that these resolutions misinterpret the mandate of the UN OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects, established by resolution 79/512, adopted with 168 votes.
These resolutions seek to draw us into negotiations for a treaty to prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against space objects – the PPWT. We have long-standing and substantive concerns about the PPWT.
Our principal concern is that a credible verification mechanism for a prohibition on the placement of weapons in space is not presently feasible. Space objects are small, distant and moving rapidly; their payloads are easily concealed; and many systems and technologies have dual uses. These characteristics make it exceptionally difficult to determine reliably whether an object has been placed in orbit as a weapon. A prohibition that cannot be credibly verified would not increase security. Instead, it will increase ambiguity and uncertainty, raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.
In any case, we have reason to doubt the sincerity of the lead sponsor of these resolutions, namely the Russian Federation. We have previously made clear our concerns about Russia’s on-orbit anti-satellite weapons, its willingness to harm the orbital environment through testing of direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, interference and interruption of satellite operations and its reported intention to place nuclear weapons in orbit. Just last week, the deliberate and provocative close approach by Russian satellite COSMOS 2612 to the commercial satellite ICEYE-X36 was irresponsible and dangerous, and we find it difficult to interpret as anything other than an on-orbit weapons testing operation.
We also find Russia’s behaviour in this case difficult to reconcile with its purported commitment to TCBMs in outer space activities, which are aimed at reducing misunderstandings, mistrust and miscalculation. Nonetheless, we remain supportive of TCBMs and we will not oppose the Decision L.52 keeping them on the UN agenda, reflecting our continued support for risk reduction measures in space.
Chair
We remain open to legally binding measures on PAROS where they are clearly defined and can be supported by robust and credible verification arrangements. In the near term, we believe non-legally binding measures offer better prospects of addressing threats in space. In a domain characterised by rapid technological and operational change, non-legally binding measures focused on activities and behaviours can provide adaptable and effective means of reducing risk. They can also help build shared understandings, practice and confidence that may, over time, support the development of future legal measures. Ultimately, legally binding and non-legally binding measures should not be treated as mutually exclusive. Both can contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to a safer, more stable and secure space environment.
We also underline the continuing importance of existing international law. We call on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Outer Space Treaty and on all parties to comply fully with its provisions, including Article IV and its prohibition on placing in orbit around the Earth objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
Chair We remain ready to work with all states to advance practical measures to reduce risk and enhance the long-term stability of the space domain.
Thank you.