Ministry Statements & Speeches:
Chair,
I have the honour to deliver this explanation of vote on behalf of the EU and its Member States.
The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, align themselves with this statement.
Our delegations will vote against draft resolution L.69, submitted to the First Committee by China and entitled “Promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses in the context of international security”. We also call upon other Member States to do so.
This resolution builds upon resolutions 76/234, 77/96 and 79/80, reinforcing a central message with which we fundamentally disagree. Divergent views and serious concerns have been expressed consistently since the adoption of resolution 76/234 in 2021, including during the informal consultations this year. Several EU Member States took part in the consultations convened by the sponsor, both in Geneva and in New York, and we thank China for organising them. We proposed specific amendments. The concerns expressed are unfortunately insufficiently reflected in the draft text, and on several points this text has moved further away from what we could support.
Our countries are committed to the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, and back that commitment with resources. We are among the largest contributors to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and to the OPCW's international cooperation activities. We also support partner countries with capacity building for their own export control systems, as required by Security Council resolution 1540.
We agree with preambular paragraph 6 that development and international security are mutually reinforcing. Our difficulty is that the resolution does not reflect some of the consequence of that statement. It continues to suggest a false dichotomy between peaceful uses and non-proliferation export controls. In fact, such controls serve as the conditions that allow sensitive items to be transferred with confidence. Multilateral export control arrangements set common guidelines and control lists, which give exporting States the assurance they need to supply trusted recipients.
The multilateral export control arrangements, namely the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, together with the Zangger Committee, support the implementation of the NPT, the CWC, the BTWC, and Security Council resolution 1540. Through decades of technical work, they have identified the items, the misuse or unauthorised use of which could contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Their guidelines and lists facilitate international trade by providing exporting States with the assurance needed to supply sensitive items to trusted recipients. They contribute to international peace and security by preventing the diversion of sensitive materials, equipment, and technology to end-users of concern.
No reliable evidence, including in the report of the Secretary-General contained in A/77/96, supports the claim that existing export controls are excessive or undue. The expertise built up in the arrangements cannot be recreated from scratch. An attempt to do so within the United Nations would put at risk a system that delivers for international security.
On specific provisions:
First, we cannot accept the suggestion in preambular paragraph 18 that non-proliferation arrangements are used to impose undue restrictions or unilateral coercive measures.
Second, preambular paragraph 20 would apply uniform criteria to decisions taken under the export control arrangements. Licensing decisions, however, are national competence, case by case and risk based.
Third, OP3 addresses the very instruments through which States implement their non-proliferation obligations, including under resolution 1540. Unlike OP1, it does not specify that it applies “without prejudice to their non-proliferation obligations”. Basic scientific research and information in the public domain are already excluded from control.
Fourth, OP4 removes “as appropriate” from language agreed in resolution 79/80. It also places further dialogue “within the universal framework of the United Nations” and omits the reference in PP22 to existing mechanisms and arrangements.
We remain ready to continue this dialogue with all delegations, including the sponsor.
Thank you.
* North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.